Volume II - Annexes

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED
ACTIVITIES
ON THE TERRITORY
OFCONGO
DEMOCRA TIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
V.
UGANDA
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
VOLUME II
ANNEXES
21 APRIL 2001
VOLUME II
ANNEXES
INDEX OF ANNEXES
IN CHRONOLOGICAL OROER
1 7 Sept. 1990
Annex 1:
19 Aug. 1995
Annex 2:
31 Aug. 1995
Annex 3:
23 Mar. 1996
Annex 4:
24 Apr. 1996
Annex 5:
VOLUME II
Report on U ganda/Zaire Matters of Security
Concem to U ganda presented by Amama
Mbabazi, then Director General of the
President's Office, to the Adrninistrator
General, National Documentation Agency,
Zaire, 17 September 1990 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
Minutes from Meeting of "Elders" of the West
Nile Bank Front Military High Command, 19
August 1995 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Report of the Ugandan Delegation to the 2"d
Regional Border Meeting Between the
Districts of Kisoro, Kasese, Rukungiri,
Bundibugyo, Bushenyi and North-Kivu
Province (Zaïre) 28 - 31 August 95 Held at
Mbarara ( obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Letter From West Nile Bank Front Military
High Command to Major Motindo, Imbokolo,
Zaïre, 23 March 1996 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
Report Regarding Enemy Attack on Kisoro
Detachment, 24 April 1996 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
10 June 1996
Annex 6:
15 June 1996
Annex 7:
July 1996
Annex 8:
16 Sept. 1996
Annex 9:
20 Sept. 1996
Annex 10:
15 Oct. 1996
Annex 11:
2 July 1997
Annex 12:
13 Sept. 1997
Annex 13:
Situational Report from Resident District
Commissioner/Kisoro on Activities of Hajji
Muhammed Kabeba's Group in Zaïre, 10 June
1996 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Operational Report Covering Period from 22
April 1996 Up to Date, 15 June 1996
( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Human Rights Watch/Africa, Zaire: Forced to
Flee, Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire,
Vol. 8, No. 2(A), July 1996
United Nations Economie and Social Council,
Report on the situation of human rights in
Zaire, prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr.
Robert Garret6n, in accordance with
Commission resolution 1996/77,
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l, 16 September 1996
Combat Analysis Report on WNBF in West
Nile, 20 September 1996 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
Minutes of District Security Situation Review
Meeting Held at Bunagana on 15 October,
1996 ( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Report Regarding Threat Assessment in South
Western Districts Kisoro, Kabale and
Rukungiri, 2 July 1997 (obtained from
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence)
Monthly Report for the Month of August 1997
Regarding General Security Situation in the
Area of Mbarara, 13 September 1997
( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
2
Oct. 1997
Annex 14:
Jan. 1998
Annex 15:
1998
Annex 16:
6 Feb. 1998
Annex 17:
13 Feb. 1998
Annex 18:
27 Apr. 1998
Annex 19:
27 June 1998
Annex 20:
9 Aug. 1998
Annex 21:
13 Aug. 1998
Annex 22:
Human Rights Watch/ Africa, The Democratic
Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is
Hiding, Vol. 9, No. 5(A), October 1997
Human Rights Watch, Wor/d Report 1998:
The Children 's Rights Project, J anuary 1998
Training Agreement between the Govemment
of the Republic of Uganda and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of
Congo for the Training in Public Order for the
Police of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Report Regarding Security/Military Situation
in Eastern Congo (27 January - 4 February
1998), 6 February 1998 ( obtained from
Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
Situational Report, 13 February 1998
(obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Protocol dated 27 April 1998 Between the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Republic
of Uganda on Security Along the Common
Border
Report of Interrogation of Captured ADF
Rebel Fred Tukore, 27 June 1998 (obtained
from Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
Statement by H.E. Y oweri Kaguta Museveni,
President of the Republic of Uganda, on
Background to the Situation in the Great
Lakes Region, 9 August 1998
Human Rights Watch Press Release, "HR W
Alarmed About Radio Broadcasts and the
Incitement of Ethnie Violence in the DRC,"
13 August 1998
3
21 Aug. 1998
Annex 23:
23 Aug. 1998
Annex 24:
3 Sept. 1998
Annex 25:
8 Sept. 1998
Annex 26:
11 Sept. 1998
Annex 27:
18 Oct. 1998
Annex 28:
20 Oct. 1998
Annex 29:
27 Oct. 1998
Annex 30:
Nov. 1998
Annex 31:
Letter dated 21 August 1998 from the
Embassy of the Republic of Uganda to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of Congo
Communique of the Summit Meeting of the
SADC on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 23 August 1998
Amnesty International, Democratic Republic
of Congo: A Long-standing Crisis Spinning
out of Contrai, AFR 62/033/1998, 3
September 1998
Joint Communique of the Second Victoria
Falls Surnmit, 8 September 1998
Position of the High Command ofUganda on
the Presence of the UPDF in the DRC, 11
September 1998 (obtained from Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence)
Communique of the East African Co-operation
Heads of State Summit on the Security
Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 18 October 1998
Press Statement by United States Department
of State regarding the Congo Conflict, 20
October 1998
Media Statement Issued by the Regional
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Defence on the Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo Held in Lusaka, Zambia
from 26-27 October 1998
Uganda's Position on Issues of Peace and
Security in the Great Lakes Region, November
1998
4
16Dec.1998
Annex 32:
18 Dec. 1998
Annex 33:
1999
Annex 34:
16 Jan. 1999
Annex 35:
18 Jan. 1999
Annex 36:
Feb. 1999
Annex 37:
Mar. 1999
Annex 38:
1 Mar. 1999
Annex 39:
Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, S/1998/1180, 16
December 1998
Letter dated 18 December 1998 from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Uganda to the DRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Jean-Claude Willame, L'Odyssée Kabila:
Trajectoire pour un Congo nouveau?
(Karthala Press, 1999), pp. 222-23
Communique of the Regional Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence on
the Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo held in Lusaka, Zambia from 14th to
16th January 1999
Press Release on Summit of Regional Leaders
on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, held in Windhoek, Namibia,
18 J anuary 1999
Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of
Congo: Casualties of War -- Civilians, Rule
of Law, and Democratic Freedoms, Vol. 11,
No. 01 (A), February 1999
Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on
Slavery and Slavery Redemption in the Sudan,
March 1999
Memorandum dated 1 March 1999 from
Colonel Henry Tumukunde to H.E. Y oweri
Museveni Regarding Kidnap of Foreign
Tourists in Bwindi ( obtained from
Chieftaincy ofMilitary Intelligence)
5
1 Mar. 1999
Annex 40:
10 Mar. 1999
Annex 41:
23 Mar. 1999
Annex 42:
17 Apr. 1999
Annex 43:
1 June 1999
Annex 44:
10 July 1999
Annex 45:
Rough Translations of Notes Left on Bodies of
Executed Hostages and Letter Sent with
Released Hostage, Bwindi Impenetrable
National Park, Uganda, 1 March 1999
( obtained from Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence)
Report on Proceedings of the 1561
h Session of
the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Council, Montreal, Canada, 10 March
1999
Statement by Hon. Amama Mbabazi to the
United Nations General Assembly, 95th
plenary meeting, A/53/PV.95, 23 March 1999
Press Statement on the Second Meeting of the
Committee on the Implementation of the
Ceasefire Agreement in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, held in Lusaka, Zambia,
from 16-17 April 1999
Joint Communique Issued by the Republic of
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 1 June 1999
Agreement for a Ceasefire in the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("Lusaka Agreement"),
S/1999/815, 10 July 1999
6
TCUCIUI, l'AOMIHISTU" ICAlll'AU.
Tcuno•cr SOll/1. OUA, OUJ. o,u a 4117'. • .. . .
'" Uf COll(S,ONOCWCC ON B l / 9 0
, .... I UIJICI '"'''' ouor, •o . ......................................... . TMC l(tUIUC Of UCAlfO•
17 SEPTEMBER 1990
The Administrator General
National Documentation Agency
Kinshasa
ZAIRE
Dear Sir
UCMANNEX
PRESIOEtffS OFFICE.
PARLIAMENTARY DUILOIHGS, .
P.O. ·BOX 7168 •
KAMPALA, UGANDA.
RF. : UGANDA/ZAIRE_MATTEflS_OF_SECURITY_fQ~f~~~-TO_UGANDA
I have the honour to present to you the attached detoiled repo~t
or ma~ters or security concern to Ugonda Government, in the
relationship between our two countries, as I promised in our
last meeting on 9 September 1990 .
!n order to consolidate the good neighbourliness betwecn our
two countries could you address the issues raised in this
report .
Wi th compliments, ·I remain,
Truly
AUAMA MBABAZI
DIRECTOR_GENERAL
~Q~~Q~L;AIRE_SECURITY_CONCERNS
1. -A-RM--ED- -A--TT-A-C-K-S- --IN-T-O- --U-G-A-N-D-A
Armed Zaireans have been attacking somc border areas in
Uganda; particularly nwenshama fishing villngc in
RukÙngiri district, committing robberies and terrorising
the masses there. Consequently, Ugandans have · lost the
following properties;
On 22.4.90 Mr. MUGISHA lost 45 fish-nets
24.5.90 36 fish nets were 1ost from Mr. DENON
NSHEMEREIRWE's boat No. K. 138.
23.6.90 30 fish nets were lost from Mr. DYAMUGISHA
KIJURA's lloat;
7.7 . 90
10.8.90
Mr. DAGASIIA who was on the boat, ·was kidnapped
to unknown destination and has not returned
since then.
Mr. JOHNSON DAGUMIRE lost boat No.K. 128 with
40 fish nets; Mr. MUGISHA ZEFERINO lost boat
NO . K. 112 with 50 rishncts .
Mrs. SSEMDEDA lost one boat cngine and 47
fish nets.
2. HARRASSMENT OF UGANDANS IN ZAIRE
i Zairean security officiels have been arrcsting,
detaining and torturing Ugandans, as evidenced by
the following incidents:
On 6.3.90 Mr. DAYANGA PETER, a businessman was
arrested in Zaire and released several
days later, after his money had bcen
stolcn by Zaircun sccurity officluls.
12.3.90 Sorne Ugandans who had crosscd to ISHASliA
market were harrassed by Zaire soldiers,
and one FRED KAPERE, a Ugandan ~aG arrested
and relensed after 20,000/= was extorted
from him.
6 . 6 . 90 Zaire authorities arrested 4 Uganda
officials who had crossed to ARIWALA
market. The Ugandans were released on
2.9 . 90 nfter being severely tortured.
They were:
MWAKA BERNARD, AUUKAL HARRAN, KAUO MAWANDA
and RWANYAKA-CWAMDA.
14.6.90 3 Ugandan businessmen were arrested in
ARU, Zaire and by early September 1990
they had not been released. · These were:
YASSIN DAUDI, SULEIMAN MOHAMMED and
ARAFATA TADAN.
22.7 . 90 At SONGO-LENDU londing shore, Zoire
soldiers kidnopped 4 Ugondons i~ O~INY
GODFREY, ODAGA GODFREY and Om/AIIG OZELE •
. . . . /2
2
ii Sorne Ugandans were killcd in Zaire, cg.
In early May 1990, Zairean authorities killed !~e
following Ugandans who had crossed to Zairc:
RUKYERA, RWASISHANA, MUGIRIMANA, TURYAMUREDA MUDAMBI,
NYANSIO, TUMURANZYE, KADOGO, KATEMDA AND μYftNDUSYA .
On 18.6.90 4 Ugandans were killed in Virunga National
Park of Zaire.
3. CAR_THEFTS
Armed thugs have been
crossing 1nto Zaire.
the border allow the
protection of Zaire.
stealing vehicles from U~a~da and'
Zaire security officiols along
robbers safe passage and give them
i Car_robberi_incidents
28.8.89 A Toyota Land Cruser No. UXU 981 belonging
to (Medicine San-Son Frontiers (MSF) was
stolen from Nebbi district and crossed to Zaïre.
19.9 . 89 A Motor vehicles No . UPA 703 Tata Lorry was
stolen from Ugonda by 7 ormed thugs who
crossed to Zaïre wïth it.
11.10.89 2 armed thugs robbed a motor vehicle No.
UWS 999 a Mercedes Denz, and crossed with it
to Zaire.
27.2.90 11 armed men led by ADINANI, a notorious
Ugandan car robber hiding in Zaïre, robbed
a Tata Lorry No. UPW 161, belonging to
Arua Cooperativc Transport Society and crpssed
with it to Zaïre.
ii Lack of cooperation from Zaire authorities in dealing
-w-i-th-- -c-a-r- -ro--b-b-e-r-s- ------------------------------------
On 25.5.90 Zaire authoritics rounded up the following
Ugandan car robbers based in Zaire:
ADINANI NASURU, ABDU MADHIVA, SHALA SHOLABA, FE~TO
AFETA , WILFRED AGOTA, ONHAMA FELIX, ABIMA KEMISI,
SHELEMAN.OBHITRE, SOSO KELE, and EDWARD SIMDA. When
the District Administrator, ARUA approached Zaïre
authorities in ARU, to secure extradition of these
thugs, Zairean military authorities demanded Ushs
2 million, as a bribe for them to release the criminals.
iii The following cors were stolen between 1907 and 1989
from UGANDA and crossed to Zaïre where they were
re-registered:
•• •• / 3
.. ,...
4 .
3
OLD_REG. _N·o. NEW_REG._NO ___ _
UXI 021 Mitshubis hi H.Z 9561
UWN 423 Mercedes Denz KN 7668 J
uxs 404 Toyota KN 7721 M
UXT 641 Toyota KN 0343 .M
Other Uganda vehicles in Zaire, bearing Zai~e Re~istration
Numbers are:
Reg ._No._ -M-a-k-e· - !Xe!:_
KN 5694 C Pajero
KN 9597 B ..
KN 0844 L Il
KN 8118 M Tata Lorry
KN 1380 K Fiat "
KN 7721 M Toyota Corolla
KN 9938 B Il "
KN 7969 M Isuzu Troopcr
KN 7520 J
KN 9556 M
KN 0386 N
NZ 9561 B Pajero
NZ 0307 C.": Toyota Corolle
NZ 0288 C Il Il
NZ 0258 " Pick up
NZ 0276 C Isuzû Trooper
NZ 5172 C "
NZ 9009 B
NZ 8164 M
NZ 0607 B
NZ 7752 D
NZ 0202 e Mercedes
Benz Car
NZ 0386 C Mini eus
NZ 3289 C Suzuki
-U-G-AN-D-A-N- --D-IS-S-I-D-E-N-T--S -...-I. N- --Z-A-IR-E- . ~ ....
i Dissident_Groues ., .
à. NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR LIBE~ATIO~- Ot U~ANDA (NMLU) .. -------------------------------------------------
Amon Bazira
Amos KAMBERE
Stephen BALUKU
Fenhnnzi BWAMBALE
... /4
BENI
Il ..
Il
'
Lt. Col. KASHIRINGI
Lt. MULIWABYO JULIAN
Lt •. MUSANGE TOM
Dr. KIHANDI
Maj. Gen •. Isaac LUMAGO
Brig. Dusman SADUNI
Brig. Isaac MALIYAMUNGU
Brig. ·TABAN LIPAYI
Col. Elly HASSAN
Maj. GALA
Maj. ~UMA AYIGA
Capt. Ali MUSA
Capt. ARIBAKU
Lt. ADUDU
Lt. YASIN
SHADAN AYOO
c. NINTH OCTODER MOVEMENT (NOM)
Lt. col. ATIIOCON
Capt. ONEN
Capt. OKECHA
Capt. OPETU
ABEL SIMBA
ABDU MECHO
DENI
KIKURA
Il
LUME TRADING CENTRE
MDOKORO
ALIWARA
ALIWARA
MAIIAGI
Il
Il
Il
Il
DJEGU
~2~~!~!~ Most of these dissidents had been arrested by
Zaire authorities but were later released.
d. -SA--N-C-T-U-A-R-I-E-S- -O-F --A-N-T-I--U-G-A-N-D-A-- -D-I-SS-I-D-E-N--T-S- -IN-- -Z-A-IR--E
MUMBILI
BAFASENDO
YAMBAYO
OMBOKE
LUME
KIBATA
Bunia
Beni Zone
in Rwenzori Mountains
in Ituri Forest
e. -C-O-L-L-A-B-O-R-A-T-IO-N- --B-E-T-~-EE-N-- -T-H-E --D-I-S-S-ID-E-N--T-S- -A-N-D --Z-A-IR-E-A-N-- -A-U-T-H-O-R-IT-Y- -
On 1.6.90, Uganda dissidents held a meeting a MUTAWA
military barracks ctüïir~~-:by·:a Zairëërt, Maj·;.:.TAMBWE.
Among the Uganda rebeli who attended were: ·
FRED MUKASA, HAJI TIBAHA, llaji JUMA, Drig. DUSMAN, SADUNI
and Cap t. ABDULHAI. Th~ë'!::iiiè"'ét:ing~''w·és-.-~è:'àl1·ëdïx.i,tO discuss ·:::;fil!
a strategy for fighting · tin1,f'lrG·ovëfr-ninent; •
• • • / 5
5
f. -M-E-E-T-IN-G--S --O-F --U-G-AN-D-A-N- --D-IS-S-I-D-E-N-T--S- -IN-- -Z-A-IR--EOn
1.6 . 90 Ugandan rebels belonging to FUNA, held a
meeting at EMBOKOLO chaired by Lt. Col. AODULLATIFF
and attended by among others Brig. DUSMAN SADUNI,
Maj. Gen. ISAAC LUMAGO.
On 21.6.90 rebels held a aeeting at Embokqlo choired
by Capt . OKWERA and attended by among othcrs Lt. ~LI
CHAKU.
g. ATTACKS_BY UGANDAN_DISSIDENTS_BASED_IN_ZAIRE_
i On 23.4.90 about 60 rebels attacked NRA at NdanduKisinge
sub-county. The rebels who sustained
serious casualties, were taken to Nyakûndi in
Zaire for treatment.
ii In early July, 1990, some Ugandan rebels under the
command of ADINANI, NSIMDA and MADIRA fired at an
NRA Post located at Gombe - Koboko county, Arua
District. · This group was arrested in Zoire. Uganda
government demanded their extradition but Zaire .
authoritics refused to extradite them.
iii On 18.7.90 4 armed thugs fired et NRA .'troops at
ADRAMACAKU along the Uganda/Zairc border after
which the group withdrew inside Zaire.
iv On 11.8.90, 20 armed rebels of Daziro's group
attacked Kilembe Mines and shot 2 guards and ottempted
to blow up electricity substations at Dugoye.
5. ~!Q~~!!Q~_OF_UGANDA'S_AIR_SPACE_AND TERRITORIAL_DORDERS
i On 2.4.90, a helicopter from Zaire ille~ally entered
Uganda and hovered over Rwenshama fishing village
before returning to Zaire.
ii On l l.4.90 armed Zairean soldiers entered Uganda via
Dusunga, Dunyanguge, Kikora and Kisiri in Dundibugyo.
• 1 ~ UCMANNEX ;
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UCMANNEX3
•2ND. REGIONAL :BORDER MEEil'INO .l}El't·TEEN THE DISTRICTS OF .. ~asoao,KAS~E. ROOJNOIRI1;:
BUND:Ùll,1JtO,BUSHEllY I AND 1roJiTH-KIVU PROVINCE(ZAIRE) 26°' _: 31 AUG 95'"HELD AT MBARARA
REPORT PRESENTED BY UGA1'DAN DELEGATION
; 0·i1ow~. .. g ,the Uganda.}za.ire border meatings of Rukungiri , (Jan 92) Kasese1 (Sep 92)
and tha.t of Goma(Apr 95) respectively, several issues remained untackled. In due
regardl the Uganda delegation for the 2nd border meeting presents the following
issues that it feels can be solved by such meeting.
(1) SECURITY POLITICAL
r
A. J.CTS OF PROVOCATION BY ZAIREAN OOVERfil.IENT
13. lIARRA.SMENT OF UGANDAN CITIZENS
c. ROBBEIIY
D. VIOLATION' OF U~TDAN AIRSP ~Ç~.
E 'l'ICLATION OF lJll,UGRATION ·LAWS
(2) ECONOMIC
A.. !30RDER TRAira
13. ESTABLISBlOE?IT OF COMMIDIICATION LINK BET\~f 'MORTH.X:tVU AND UClANlM :BY ROAD
(TRANSPORT)
Ct CUSTOMS
D. TOURISM
E. FISBERIES
(3) SOCIAL
A. FAILURE OF THE ZAIREAll CONSULATE (KASESE) TO MEET ITS FINAllCILA 8BLIGATI0N
B • UGAND}Jl PROPEilTI~ IN ZAIRE
C • REFUm1E3 ( UGAJTDANS)
D. CUALTURAL EXHAUGES
(4) A.O.B
SECURITY /POLITICAL
ACTS OF PROVOCATION BY ZAIREAll OOVER?1?,OEllT
U~anda Àa.s noted wi th çeat concel"n that acta of .11ggression euch as 12obilisa.tion
!r·-a.in1ng .u,O: a.l.'1... ..: 6 01: ugC.:. ....... :.:·. . i.11:1.1.8 are being carrieci ourfrom· Zaîre-.-.. . . . .... .. . . . . .. .... .. ........... . .
Caes in point
(iJ.. :.~ -feh 1995, Ha.mis Kai~;u.1 \ de:.ôfe!-:àffd~ewn:.o·aïëi-.iâl~:.:-:lorl:ier· ~~.!!~! .. ~f_lfi"~ : ~·~:i;t .. ': .·
~;r..g ~)~o.lD.a .· c~p. qroia.sed f ol'l:l . Z l i~.~.:.:.~!l:~ .~T~~l'î·gTÔùp'.:îri ""Busêrùléa-Hoima~ i : · · · ,.
Ugârida,"' On .cap+.ure, they i111pl:1 01,1.ted ..tliEh~s...Goyç~~~·· - · · · · .. ··:.
:O..I l~~.!L~~g~ei>{ •i ·~;---·, -gd,'ir1niic_1c.·_1,_;jii . ïf,h °l$5M}ièW@~
Za±T · · ~ - · allies .. e"&h Jiiobi11ë1..n recriïitin "·and r .. · · ·
and eoldiors o the defunct U da amy UA and UNLA : ~om- ref:ugeë · 5)ÎUl1J!S • in N .~.JIJ.lll'
Zaire _1nto est Ni e Brl.nk Front WllBF U~~d .. rebel· or~sation of T,t Col J'~a Oris•
1\ - . ,...
These-,ma..- ·recru1. ts ·anâ. -otliers "i".ooiHsed. lrom ll .We~tem Ugaii'da ·cross into Suda.n
thro~ DIOOKOI.0 (MIDKOI.O) 2l~d BlzÏ.'"1 · . ~ : • • • # •
(iii) · Fui:therto (ii) ·abo ,1e, · tf?.in~d.\1est .une ~ rebels leave the Suda.n?,and E_:1ter
Zaire thrn~ ·Eaazi. and go tè t'ough Mbokolo, Oo>4be and Aruu and enter irito..,Ugar.:la
with anti-tank 111ines thro~h c;ur West~rn borde; 'with· Za.ire. These mines have b~/ en ..
~la."lted on ~oad.a ins~de A.rua ~.istriot in·'·Ujfdl1d&~ · Sof'ar there bave been eeven :
incidences in such mine explosions destroyir.g vehicles, killed and injured a number
of innocent civilians.
(iv) Rebel ~ nf ~-Tn <>+ uu ~ n~ .. ·. "
. :~
·tJIJilding with an RPG in Koboko town. The rebela retreated into Zaire while f'iring
• several rounds. ·
(v) On 19 May 95 l"ür Uga:!dan rebels ente:~-~Jd Ui:anda from 'Bunia and\.tt'bked Pa.id.ha
Uganda ColllJllercial ·Bar.k• The attackors had intended to rob paidha UCB b'rallch. 03 of the
attaokers were however k.illed and 0) rifles captured from them. The fourt~ esoaped
and entered Zaire""à'1>istol. Two Uganda policerner. were injured in the attack.
" (vi) on 09 Aug 95' Za,i.raan troops crossed into Uganda and seriouàl;r woF.ded Sefuroza
Mbalnbu a refugeé wo~an from Dulyata village., Bunya.ngw.e pari.ah borde.dng Zail'.8•-~
(Vii) On 04 Oct 94 a mortar shell vas fired into Uganda by FAZ at 1Cab1dyiri near
Mpondwe border post.
(viii) On o8 Mar 95 FAZ conducted a milita.ry exercise at Kyeshero/Butogota near
Uganda bo~der, an act that ca.used a lot of panic to the local Ugandans at the border.
(ix) mn April 95 one ASUMAN KIHATlfE a suspected Zairean Intelligence agent/sm:P waa
arrested at !3utogota.
(x) On 18 Feb 95 à Zairoan '1ad,y called Shtùcala Kateike suspected of espionage was
arrested at t,tpondwe whil.e in possession of a hand grena.d,>e
(xi) On 10 Jun 95 a Zairean Captaiu armed wi th a pi stol crossed into Uganda at
13usunga customs.
(xii) On 1,3 Jun 95 a Zairea.n Captain of Kasindi a.ru.y unit croased :tnto Ugaada and
threatened the 21/c 21 Bn of possibly launching an attack aga1.n$t Ugandâ. ~s f'ollowe
the death of a Zairean businesSIIBll , one Baluloe who had been killed oeij 10 Jun 1995,
300 meters inside Zn.ire.
(xiii) On 11 Jul 95 throe à.rmed Zaireans orossed into Uganda and murderect onè Balabiri
and Christopher Mbony-. in Oisld ta village, Nyarusiza sub county· K!ëèirÔ district~ ,,. .. . -...J
(xiV ~ On 19 Aug 95 a Uga.ndan by the narnes of.:", ulius Tembo was shot inside Zaire for
unlo1o'Wl1 reasons and ia curreutly imd~r!:oing treatment.
{;cv) Zaire continues to harbour Ugandan rebel commandera who launch attacks on
Ûganda from Zél.irean territory. ·
~'or example ~-
( 1) Hosea Muh.indo
(2) Maj Gen Lumago
(.3) Lt Col Kisule
(4) Comd Denis Lukale
(5) Amos Kambere
(6) Haji Kabeba
(7) Lt Col .,..bdalntiff'
(a) Ng.!iClc~o
(9) Lt Col Athochon and. oth.!re
~·:- ·--m.. '•U U.$!,!'ZFIT--OJ.t' tiGt,XDAl.- ~ITIZN?lS: . ·- -
Jl~~~G.;..9.~.0~l'l!!lO.~~~.~~,P-f>~:~-~ -·~:l'~ .. ~.~-I.~o:;.&4in.,q)f.,;,:i4~rd·~111.~i:it:,·~.oab)n,_of,•.monoy -and ..
,.co'n!~.;c_?-~~~eir tr~y~!._~ocllll!ent9 ~ .=.• x as~:lili - and j3J1rnaD&{abo roadblo'*:a.. · · ·
-~ ~ · · 'ROB3:::RY ·
On 21 Jul 95 four heads of cattle belongi.ng to John Sendege of Oaaovu, l1jtarU.Siza in
Kisoro-Ugru1da ..rere ro~".1:!~ a!lè. talc ,n to Z_air~ by Zaircnns. In the process of this .
robbery tï·:o bullet.s we:,:o shot in Casovu, lly!"'1'Usiza sub co~ in Kisoro by the robbers ,
D VIOLATION' OF UOAlIDA AD 3PACE
(i) In tha à.f't.,rnoon of 21 Feb 95 ir. K sese, three Zairean military aircrafts over
flew areas of .:{itoma, BwerJ a."ld nakinyunb·. in Ugd.llda and flew back to Zaire.
~i) In Jul 95 a Zairea.11 aircraft over(ew Iéisoro in Uganda and back to Zaire. ~. VIO!.A.TI01i OF IM~UGRATIOU LAWS
Cases of ille;i:ê>l e .. trv i nt.o l'.n»..to "'" '1~J. -- .. . ..
2.
A•
l3.
ECC>?:Of.tIC
l3order trade
Uga.nda notes With concc11, that whenever there have been incindences of~se1urit.
nature, Zairaan autho~ilies have ove: reacted at times closing the border.This
has often bd t~Ôlo~ of Ka.sindi, Mpondwe and .Dunagar.a markets cauaing
Ul'.neces~a.ry sufrering to the border citizens.
CO?oi!,!t.DITCATIOU LilOC
Border tensionu have mrui.y times interfered wi th inter-cow.try communioatio· •
FJ;-ee movements should bo encouraged as it helps in clearing unnecessar,y
suspicionu. ·
C. CUSTOMS
D. TOURISM
The encroachcent Wn li!gahinga. l:ationcl Park !>y Zaireans undermines the touriet.
ind.ustry which is a major !;Ource of income fo',!' Uganda..
E. FISHERIES
B.
~. ..
Violation of territorib-1 waters by Zairean fishermen have bJen noted especiall;
on lakes, Eduard and Albert.
SOCIAL
The Zairean Consulate in Xasose has for the last two years not made its
~ c.v..r • finanoial o:>ligations e.g house rent • This aot i1:1 likely to ~the ensting
good relations: l1i th the local population.
Uganda property in ~ire.
- 3ome robbed/stolen vehicles and motorcycles from Uganda are in Zaire. Motor
vehicle ret:."is'trii-tion number UXU 442 (Land Cruiser) belong:ing to J..rua Dioeese
is cur1·entl:r being dri ven by an immigration off'icer at Bunya and motorcycle
UM 1460 belo11ging to tho Uganda medical departmcnt is also seen in Bunya.
C. UG:J.:DAN REr•'UOEES IN ZAIRE
· volunta.ry repairiation of Ugandan ref'ugees should be encouraged.
D. CULTURAL EX~
ExcàOJ1gc in !., .. ort:...,111u:.;ic w1tl. otlwr iï~]dlshould be encouragad.
4• A.C.B
25.5.95 nr Okia Hare1in0,tone - 57 yrs driver of u.c.T.U assaulted and robbed of
80,000/. at Humang~bo
25.5.95 Mr Julius Bakumba aged 42 yrs driver of u.c.T.U UWS 818, assaulted and
robbed of 50 litres of dieael ~d spare tyre.
26. 5. 95 Mr Siraje Zari b.rende 52 yrs a ss·aul te-d and ro bbed of , 35 and 25 litres
of diesol.
Il
"
Mr Santo .Bakahebwa aged 40 yrs assaulted and robbed ~f , 35 and 25 litre
diesel.
b1z- KS.:<:ooza Joseph 8.89d 72 yrs robbed of 15,000/. and 25 litres ot diesel ..
UCMANNEX
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'l'Os 2 DIV .CO KD
l'MI 2 I1IV I.0
SUBI Rl • ~AJZ. OR XISOBO DWITACll
CI3, CX>J'lFIDEtiTIAL
lX>RI 24•04..9o
Tut
UCMANNEX
HQ 2 INF' DIVISION
PO GOX 1559
.\ IHARARA
Tel : 20180, 21409 214 J 6
Fnx: 20150
1. en 22.oï;.9.6' ~cl:-:'0600!·'~ ah' anèaY r~ h.ttaok~ 'â· 1dètt~ o'f· 2·5 :aâtta!ion
1n Kiao;n:,. The sa.id' 'W , : a· 1i· lt>oat'e4 ::in' XS.Boici -~ b'n'· dbamkà1 xo~· ~ an~ i. -· ~ ~ të poeetnt~~*·tia1{~i~er~~·U,.pri ·" '·~'-i,j:'~tiie ·c,J;,_, ~':
püsoei· ~ Op~t'.9,··ilie ~ (~~Ji;\lb. th~ ~ . '. · ~èn:~.'.:;::·~· ~ ~ ~tü ~~ ~ ai'te~• k.Ulinë ·m ·io'l.#î~· .. . . \r'.~'. ~ng ~ iie~sé:, L-~ -~1 ~: ~ -~
were tclteh oût '01: the etoiè"ài:ia put out id.\ie-.:·!~ \ie're' !nÎnèdiateti' hànded out '.to . ,
~hoir· C9ll~·~es V~ ;tiad; ~~ un~e~ whilê; 'th~-·~:va~ ~~aei: ZIIOW.d -~~.~_. .
ers·t,btel' lienr the 'ctaf8llee1 !'1fi'th one -~ aoldJ.er :(eap~vel and oommand.eered en lf(X)
I,and Cruise~· f'rom 'a. ~hite' couple. rua''wü :the "vahiëlé' 'ihtandad ià'r oarl:7:ins ·a.;ai. the
a:rm.s durin ~ thdrawal. T'.ais plan' "follëd.' tw'. thE> 'coàrnàh~er --~ -: . t exc:1 ted"''tmd ' . .
drove' the ·~ciJ.'o to· the. IDlddJ.e:~fi tovn '.m1ct'tri.e·d .~ oall~'paopÎ&~attd~·all( W th-·~
lt ~u.s durin th1s~ ~oki tliat~\~ râW~T'â:rr.t.véd:~sn~ ~ ·'the 'tin~ :, . .
otill' 1.n tho8
~ ld.llibg '(J7 or tliea'- lilblûalhâlj4'. rebei' ~~miderai The veblÔl.e . .
whioh' had. ba91'.i ·~re'd' wa.e int~'d! ~ the 'èlaf'.Giioii ~ ëhof a.t/ ground.ed sa '
the raboi'o' usillg 1 t " wero' also Jdlled' ü;î ,tlle prooff,'a';.i ! • . 1.1•• .
1
t : t • • • • • : • : ~ ., •. • i :
2. 'I'he en · ' · · · acoordlhg \o' 1h'.to'rmàt1ori':i\W~~ ·l111~ 'rebel:s' ·:t.ntor.t'-· 1
osat~d s'el)e.n~~, ho~ :lllO.H, th'.an'.· ·2ëf ~C,.! :~ :1i.f~t.r.t~:e:/,~~!~se' tiren~~ b:4,
anti-tànk ~a,·. 07 st1clc ·'grenades ahd e.'bouit" ~ i-otmda· ~ imino. • Th97 ·a1eo bd. ' ·
oewral panaas.' 1or food they oarned roaated oasoovâ ai.la '«fnuts.' !r2>.e;r wore -a.reoo'ed . :
in civ:Uiah ofc:rthoa.· . : .
·· ·· t
1
4- Alf ALYS:tS
oJole, '!'ha rabels were~o· suooeed 1i1 d1so.rganiaing the ·dettsch :due -io" the tolloidhg
..-.. ... :...:..._. , ... , ~-'did tü.;)~;;",,.;-,' Heov tèr knov iiha'i: our ilien vm \u.·881'me·d. foe- 'im' ' ·-·-•- \""I -~ _.. .JS ·..:...L _I; . . . . . . . onsnii:Jg u-a.i.ning exorcise' and tbat the ~ liai-e' "iri· tli:a ~ .. ~ .
(b) Th4 ,i~\y' routine" ,nia "cttuii'ed'. ~cl 'aÏl lbbpb'ol){ât~'oited'..1
~;. .
(o) 'l'hq khw th:Àt ~orcoment·a; f':ram icabal.ë~ voul.i! "'tak:e' not "iatui •thazi··-·
OJ hours "i!htoli l ,a enotigh time tô break lnto store·e.• "steal amo and ·cross
back to %aj.1'9. . ,
(b) The ooimty Chi.et• s Offioe· 1à rigb.t in the d.tJrénoe· béoause the barlÎ,
acks is in tlio Chiala Bl."GM\ ~ote 'thà.t' the Cbiet"·iètohtim.ies' to· lioiic hitri,. reGieve vi'sitors,; ta:q,~~ \t·o.' The &A11··~ ·\ ·a1 n'en' 'to' the office
bloak or th.o Chle.t.· 'I'he abow faot~·-~ ·: ü \b"' tlie 'a~e ·ohb.rt~"' of
land. in nsoro and Xabnl.(i ar..& a 'so rel~\'ion· ~ ~ 'Wan'o'e: elsavhèN .·
is va~ ù.im'aul t ·. , .
OBS'ERV'A'l'IOmJ ._
'l'hs eneoe_r·must havé ahar~~•bcnit· 1s ~ ~ "lli'e ~ l>eoatiee
llhat thoy bad planned. 't<>' load. on· th9 vehiclê Yais ·re~ anêl )àaàe:··w~ vbi.~ ha4 '
baen ·gt.ven' to: the ·~ed :rebel"b vëre· •omidohe'd.; ah1d. rècmre<f.1itatlie tollo1'1lia ~
out ~ the ll11~fe\ ·en·em;r gro,i;>;· 'tha:1:· at~acloeèt rii vire· ;,\!, l'e;! o1i~ 8~~ i.liol~ ~e~ · ... '
avera11~ Oêxrzmandarhl~ea $oeA, oe ~ tca:,tüNa· Çi:i ..,e ~ ~& !total' 1, .. ~wmr ~'
liaji !(ababà 'irJ.11 contiÏllle··to· plan" cle'atabi.11·a:auoh~. '"t • a lata:r :as.th'.,... slio~d 'bë: l'lOted
that Zaire· tJovt ':fo'roslj' airs ittvolYéd· 't~iim' ·no~ ~~~.! 'l'he:re~ 1-f~!zië~ t, ~ •
f?o~e.tlon~·idth VN!P ot Oria.~): num~Tc;t. ~ · ~ ·~ ·al.ms li~ '-~ .
1n aatnhmu ana ~ ' hrea' àre ~~~W\li~,.~ 1i. " )éd' tilA. ~ ·~·
X:akeli~i 'b0ing" "àn etmil'o~ltÙhlltü 'n 'th 'oloa1{èônne\iùo1i' ~~. tomë·i~dëe rûlorâ "en~.
CQOperation· 'ot the interahàmiio' w~ 1oe· lia'.à asiJUl'K o~ .1~i: to~ illl' Msi·a' 1n·· ~
'Ogand& and lbmr.dae' À: gU:llt prof'ife· 'Ôf lr:abebà 'e}._a biB ~ë1~·~~·é9'9 °Va8 sent 'to1
, '
you nth photoa· dato·d.· 17" Da·o 93· lléf' rmA./211!1/rrtr/AB titlo1d' "~tuatl.oh' Alb?lK Uganda-' ·
Zsire Bord.or".· ~ woro oopi'ed ·to' mr.. In oa.ae' tliia· ~'ro.f'1le' 'is' rù,t 't'nr.oe'nbl e i n: yov
reoo:ro.s, I otill ma.intaih' a :file! ot "llHW."•
- 2 !..
'.'1. ••
~ SUOOEST.Ieml 1
1. I. suggeet tbat the ex> 25 Bn, OC 1A' Coy 25 :Bn and. the OP'ro 25 lm abould 'be.
oap.ed to «:plain w~ all thoee ndatakas Vere ·oom.rnitt~ whloli re·oul:ted into ·aath ~t
our 07 solcllaro, 02 ooldiors Wives· and 01 child. They_ abould bear the re·aponsibiliV,
Of the loao of &mB and. othor conaoquemce'3 be~ thsro· la no· reason H~ (1 l>orde.r '
unit in a hostile eriviroalont 'alwtwl 'bé. d.i'sa.xmed 8op~n117 ·at' nieiit· 'on tho rrete:xt '
ot tra1nins• ·
2. I reque·st ·for a oon~~ ritto~ to _a.saist. m:e· :d.t~ ·re~à ·to f'u1.ly:
boost 'oe:/ n·otwoek both into.rnal' and. u:ternal. In oonslëteât tinanoeng bas ~tq
aurt~od izi;f_ capabill ty" to ~ - sevoral ·agent~' ·ot :the_ ~o :~m~~· ~. ~ )1re ~~
agents ·sent acro&B tha border néod ·substahtial finanêing oo flff.~ taâ:1.ng as .has
b&ên. =reneoted 1n· ri:i colleotio~ plarus-:~-rr m;f O!i"ioe ë;o\ùd ~V,~ ?_orex 'tunc1 •. , .
reinstateèt on regular be.sis,. it vould 80 along vat ib.' hëlpiM ~ planning.· Thia
.rogiozi hàa Dl8.cy' 'Willillg people' ahcl the 'Za,S.rois aaros~' 08 thq ·êc,'l.di'ON or oi Villan à
are sO corrupt that· ~ t:h mone.r aiq ïd.hd ot Wormo.tlbri '.oan be Jiérnab.'.\• Our 1o·w:· ~ . .
B.BGnts··c1er.tnete]i need ~"tatton' 1fhen taak.9d b'tt·~Wif· aa'oipen.t.. .. )tr boi-der . .•
pG1'90 , . ,. . ~.. a, f . . , , ... ', . \.L .• . . hilal iri' l3undi'titgyb r_âhâliiîtogot·. /;;taganc· . Chsnilda.'àha ~t1 ""z :Border) :
. co:i.sisterrt fundihg and X'81iabla ·bazl'sport . theii netwol:kaé' All these problema ·.
have been· preeentec1. ~~ ;t:ilne~ :tii tlie :rouow1ng ·èÔrreepohciérioës ë:1. ther to iou ' · -
oopied. to IIU ~ vi~'i '. :i ··
: .•..
(1) Cci~~~Î;àia11·~~et;"-Si0Rm" datri 2B/31')6' Rllt HQ/2l>IV/110 ·
(2) ·~:d.1a~nc1à~~ !è!a\e~~ ~~. ·tf~ 95· Retr 'IfQ/2llIV/m/10 •
,q ·i· :· . '.-;: .,l,.. . ~ ~ .. -L • • • ·· · - ~ •. , , .·• 1 : (3) tt . . 1!
1,
; .:~.\-~ :\ ·:: ·.05 Sc,p 7;; on :i.ru:11:traUop: ~ .a .in llB:01'0: br . ..
en ' • lti ::tliid' ~. ·r ~ ni'i..nbipall,T . ,. : 'ati~f 1 err.::, 'da r . . t ot· 2·1: 13n· . ···i.: ,."1:1 .... ,;. . . • ~ • r~ augge g P o:,men J
88 A 'l(bol9,~ tQ n~·;~!"\ 1 •
(4) ·eorre·apoh~~oe~ M~!-~/;4 Râf ~21Jri'/oe/TA 11 ..
In conCllueiOn, . !t ~. ~. ., -~~· ~.e d: 't~f! ~ .0\%1".Nn\' \ii:tuation· 1n thia .. '
region io' n'ot oo' mùàb: a· ~'iy bîl.itari· ,~bl'.~~ ïf èan 1)è· Jfuhdlôà "'tij inteïll' . ~ , .
aod thooe smalr lÇ'OupB rieutrall'eod 'WliU~ oür ï!o~o·erf shouiêl ndt relax 'ih' éiM' :;. a
b:i~r iriourmoh· • ... ' ' .
TELEPHONE:
UCMANNJ
OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE
KISORO DISTRICT,
IN ANY CORRESPONOENCE ON SEC/ 2
THIS SUBJECT PLEASE QUOTE NO . ........................ .
P.O. BOX 123, '
KISORO.
THC u uauc: o, UÇAHOA
11CONFIDENTIAL"
10th June, 1996.
H.E. The President of
the Repub;l.ic of Uganda,
P. O.Box · 7168,
Kampala.
Your Excellency,
RE: SITUATIONAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF HAJJI MUHAMMED
KABEBA'S GROUP IN ZAIRE
1. . T~" Î'ëbèl:gn,~p .. ~f ·H;jj'i ' M~~ëd. Kâbeba- itï Zaire is
currnntly conqêntrâtlngl·o"n· rë·cn11 tllig péopie-'from ·,
• . ,,. •. , ·,.:_ • • •, -'•, : - • • • .... t ,:-.... 1,.:,· . .~ :..;,· •, .•. ... _; .,.. .. ~ ... , - . t:" .• ,
Ugarida espeèially'runong Muslims and Zaire especially
·among Rwandese rnïdiiêS'~oB mp's' ··of GATARE and KIBUMBA-•
. 'l'hey are prepar1n~ -for.·more. ·attacks On' Uganda ·
P.S~_eciallÏ :1n_ thè. !)ist~icts of _KIS_QRO' ~~ RÙ~G~ .• -.
2. They so far have three camps in Zaire namely;
(1) KINYANDONYI Training Camp with around two hundred and
fifty (250) trainess under the leadership of Hajji
RASHID, a Nubian and former Amin• s soldier. This Carap
is located 9 miles from Rutshuni to Ishasha ro1d. It
1s near BUSANZA side of Uganda.
. (·l >· !ülloei;;mt'~i.frOriâ:.~'.fôtiY~trrè'a:=-1im'. ·tramee s:;vμ ·~
....- -'~e~~li- §~~ i~·:m ·cK· - 0.:_@c--I-jfjô*-·"· ~'1~~~~;~ï-!1c~~1 u~,~o~· F\=ci:b~=~ ,m.__ ..... -~-- ~ i - • • • • - .. H.-. • • • •• • , ., ... ,--.,"f, :an;qaoe C ·e'f RJHQWGIR I D fats# ctr·~:-... , ~;:·. · - .. .. ....
~ · . .. -
111) NYAMI~MA - MUGOGO - KATWEIGURU area w~th ~round three
hundred and twenty (32~) traibe~~- ~t 1~ located hear
" .. ... --·-· .
Kab~ba:' s own home ~so tow~rds BUTOGOT~·I Th~ Camp is
near MUNYANGA lil.ll ·that overlooks Uganc1.a:.
1
./2
11 CONFIDENT IA L"
- ~ ..
3. The can~;1s are ail located ir(.areas wi th hills tr~it
overlook Uganda. These bills have been receded to
be used for positioning support weapons once they
start fighting U ganda.
4. bere:. is co-ordinatio~ among .. rebel groups .
';gâ1.nst Uganda in Zaire starti g ~rom the JUMA ORIS
group i.n . ARUA Ùp to KABEBA t s group near KISORO and . : .
RUKUNG_IRI. :Each gro~ bas been given its own area of
responsibili ty. Hajji Kâbéb'à."iS'"'l.ii'·'cbarge of ·. . ... .... . ., . . . ..... . ... .. . . ~ ... . . . . ... '"'\"'" ".·· . ,,. .
. ~-is~~~?_ 1 !i;ng KISQ.B.Q_~UJCt?NGplI using_ ZAIRE as ~~--
~ : -· . -·· ..
5. ~ H8:jji KA.BEBA~ s group is assisted by his sons who work
il'.l the ref'ugee camps• stores to get food and other
logistics. The three sons are:
(1) ALI MUJEMA
(11) MUSA BUKYAKYA
111) MAJIDU FIZII
However, be al,.so· has éioser ·_links witb .. th~ INT~~
Officers who ~ake jo'i~~- p_!_i!!!lJEg .. ~g~n_~~ .. μg~_a_ with h,im.- .
He .. 'is al.ways :at GATARE-Càmp1. the ·. headqùàrters· of;
. . . --~-........ , .... .... .... ~~n·"·~r· ··"·:""'i' • .•.•. · .. 1f'"-,; ~:-::.~. · ···: .;;·· •
INTE~_...:J..n . ZAtRE. ~ T_be __ FRENCH and SUDANESE are a:J;sè,_ ·
.involved iri. assistirig' tliésë~?rébé1 ''groups~ '~·
6. Recommendations:
. .
(i) Diplomatie pressure on Zaire for constant regional
meetings should be exerted.
(11) Refresher course for Local Defence Forces in Kisoro
should be organised after which they would be
deployed. ·At least money should be released for
training about 150 personnel.
SSIONER KISORO.
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UCMANNE:X
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA , ,
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
DES .LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
ZAIRE
FORCED TO FLEE
Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaïre
Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
iNTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
RECOMMENDATIONS ... .... .. .. ... . .. . .. . ... .. . ... . . ... ... ·. . . . . . • . . . . 4
To the International Community ................ '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
To the Govemment of Zaïre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 4
To the Govemment of Rwanda ........... : .......... . ............... 4
ORIGINS OF THE BANY ARW ANDA COMMUNITY IN ZAIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S
SOURCES OF CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . 6
THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE . . . . . • . . • • • . . • • • • • • . • • • • . • . • • • • • . • • . . . • • 8
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ZAIRE . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 10
THE CURRENT CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 12
SENDING THE TUTSI "BACK TO RWANDA" ..•..• . • • •.. ........ .. ...... 15
A CAMPAIGN TO CREATE ETHNIC ENCLAVES ............ .. . . .... .. ... 19
COMPLICITY OF THE ZA1RIAN GOVERNMENT . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 21
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 27
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
485 FlFTH A VENUE
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
17 PASSAGE DE LA MAIN D'OR
PARlS 750ll
TEL:(331)43552518
FAX:(331)43551880
NEW YORK, NY 10017-6104
TEL: (212) 972-8400
FAX: (212) 972-0905
E-MAIL: [email protected]
INTRODUCTION
The reg ion of North Kivu in eastem Zaïre has been the site of recurrent interethnic violence since 1992, often
carried out with the complicity of Zairian regional and national leaders and the Zairian security forces. The explosion
of violence in 1993 pitted the mostly Zairian Tutsis and Hutus against other Zairian ethnié·groups in the region, but
the situation was exacerbated by the arrivai in Goma of some 720,000 largely Hutu refugees from Rwanda after the
genocide in July 1994.1 The influx of refugees served to reignite the ethnie violence and to break down the HutuTutsi
alliance, leading to attacks against the Tutsi population by both sides. The violence in North Kivu has left
hundreds dead, some 250,000 displaced and approximately 16,000 Tutsis forced to flee as refugees to Rwanda. The
goal of the attacks is to drive out rival ethnie groups and to create ethnicatly pure enclaves. ·
This"report focuses on the violence against Tutsis, which has been particularly severe since late 1995, and
escalated in 1996. Given the recent history of unresolved conflict in the region and the arms flows into the area that
accompanied the refugees, an esèalation of deadly violence in North Kivu was sadly predictable.
The conflict in North Kivu is complex and involves a series of shifting conflicts among the ethnie groups
and the refugee community. The conflict originally involved the Hutu and Tutsi ethnie groups, known as the
••aanyarwanda,'' who constitute nearly half of the population of North Kivu but have been largely excluded from
regional political office and administrative posts, against the Hund~ Nyanga, and Nandê ethnie groups (autochtones),
who consider themselves native to the region and have sought to protect their potitical power. Despite the long
history of the Banyarwanda in Zaïre, the other groups have accused them ofbeing foreign interlopers, exploiting local
populations and unworthy of citizenship and political power. Sorne Zairians feared that the Banyarwanda had
designs to take over North Kivu, which further increased the animosity toward them.
Beginning in March 1993, Hunde, Nyanga, and Nande militia groups called Mai-Mai or_ Bangirima,2 which
apparently had the support of local Zairian political officiais, began to attack the Banyârwânda popuiàtion in several
zones of North Kivu. ln response, the Hutu, who were the main targets of the attacks, formed their own militia.
Attacks and counterattacks by rival ethnie militia continued for nearly six months, leaving approximately 6,000 dead
and displacing an estimated 250,000. Through the action oflocal nongovemmental organizations (NGOs), churches,
and the intervention of the central Zairian govemment, which deployed elite troops in Masisi, a tenuous peace was
restored to the region in July 1993, and most people were able to retum to their home cÔmmunities. However, none
of the underlying political issues weie resolved, thus setting the stage for the resumption of violence.
TI1e genocide in neighl:ioring Rwanda in 1994 and the subsequent flight of mostly Hutu Rwandan refugees
into North Kivu fanned interethnic tensions in the region. The Rwandan refugees arrived in Zaire well-anned, and
they worked to politicize and organize the local Zairian Hutu population,joining together with Zairian Hutu to fonn
joint Interahamwe3 militia groups. The massive inflow of refugees augmented significantly the numeric advantage
1According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in June 1996 there was a total of 1.1 million
Rwandan refugees in Zaire: 716,000 in Goma; 316,400 in Bukavu; and 71,800 in Uvira.
2The tenns "Bangirima" and "Mai-Mai" both refer to militia èomposed of groups that considered themselves autochthonous
to North Kivu. White the tenns are used to some extentintêrcliangeably bY. the population in the region, "Mai-Mai" generally
refcrs to Hunde and Nyanga militia in Masisi and Walikale, white "Bangirima" are Hunde, Nyanga, and Nande militia in Rutshuru
and Lubero.
• . .. •dl!f. • ' •• I •,-... JThe lnterahamwe, which means "those who attack togetlièr," was founded in Rwanda as the youth wing of the National
Rwandan Movement for Democracy and Developmënt (MRND), the party.of fonner President Juvenal Habyari~~~a'. Following
the introduction ofmultiparty politics in mid-1991, the Interahamwe gradually was fransfonned into a civilian militia.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 2 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
of the Banyarwanda, increasing tensions between the Banyarwanda and other groups. In addition, genocide and
ethnie conflict in Rwanda led to a divide within the Banyarwanda community in Zaire between Hutu and Tutsi, a·nd
thousands of Tutsis in Zaire crossed over to Rwanda and Uganda in the months following the end of the genocide:
In late 1995; the level of violence in North Kivu intensified sharply, following several confrontations in
Masisi between Zairian soldiers and various militia groups. Attacks by rival Interahamwe and Mai-Mai/Bangirima
militia quickly spread throughout Masisi and Rutshuru Zones. In contrast to the 1993 conflict, Hutu have had an
upper hand in recent clashes, due to their abundant armaments and extensive militia organization, but Mai-Mai have
also succeeded in pushing Hutu out of certain areas, particularly in Walikate, Lubero, and Rutshuru. Tutsi, who have
not been involved in the militia, have been attacked by both Interahamwe and Mai-Mai, and ihousands have been
forced to flee into Rwanda. Violence by various militias in North Kivu has gradually intensified and spread into the
surrounding zones ofLubero and Walikate.
Zairian authorities have shown little interest in ending the violence. On the contrary, testimony from
witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa and the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de
l'Homme (FIDH) researchers indicates complicity in the violence against Tutsi on the part of Zairian government
officiais and military personnel at the local, regional, and national levels. Witnesses report that local Zairian officiais
and soldiers participated in recent militia attacks against Tutsi, and there is ev.idence of official involvement in
attacks by Hutu and Hunde militia since the beginning of the conflict in 1993. National and regional politicians have
been unwilling to take steps that might hait the attacks, including publicly denouncing the abuses and supporting a
disciplined military presence in the region to protect civilians. The few soldiers and police stationed in the area have
themselves frequently profited from the situation, looting from the various sides and essentially selling their services
to the highest bidder, which has contributed to the climate of impunity. The regional governor fueled the conflict
in 1993 when he suggested that security forces would assist efforts by Nyanga and Hunde to "exterminate" the
Banyarwanda.
The international community has responded to the growing conflict in North Kivu with silence and
indifference. The poor handling of the refugee crisis exacerbated the simmering conflict in North Kivu, with
predictable consequences. Efforts by local and international NGOs to alert the international community about the
potential for renewed violence were ignored. In April 1996, even as killings were taking place on a daily basis and
thousands were being displaced, France announced a resumption ofbilateral aid to the Zairian government:' which
had been eut off in late 1991.
The conflict is also increasing tensions between the governments of Rwanda and Zaire, with each side
accusing the other of manipulating the refugee situation in their respective country and with both sides denying
citizenship to the Tutsi refugees. The Zairian government denies that the Tutsi refugees are Zairian, and
representatives of the government have gQne so far as to deny that Kinyarwanda is even spoken in Zaïre. The
Rwanda government contends that the refugees are Zairian citizens fleeing violence, and established a refugee camp
in Gisenyi, about a kilometer away from the border. Despite appeals by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) that the camp be moved away from the border, the govemment has refused. Clearly, the presence
of refugee camps so close to both side~ of the border poses serious security risks for the refugees and for their hast
countries. If the conflict continues to escalate, bath Zaire and the Great Lakes region in general cou Id face further
disastrous consequences.
4françois Raitberger, "Mobutu hails 'courageous; French Aid to Zaïre," Reuters, April 26, 1996.
Human Rights Watch(Africa and FIDH 3 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the International Community:
• · Hold the Zairian government accountable for the actions against the Tutsi population in North Kivu and other
attacks against civilians. The government must be urged to launch an immediate investigation into the
complicity of its military and civilian personnel in the attacks, and to prosecute those responsible.
• Encourage the peaceful and voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire. The international
c-0mmunity should provide the means necessary to isolate the camps to prevent further infiltration of ex-FAR
and Rwandari Interahamwe into North Kivu. and to ensure that Zairian soldiers involved in abuses against
refugees be prosecuted.
• Pressure the Rwàndan govemment to improve its human rights record and to create a climate conducive to
the return ofRwandan refugees. Provide adequate support for the Rwandanjudicial system and urge the
R wandan government to begin free and fair trials for those accused of involvement-in the I 994 genocide,
so that refugees currently in Zaïre can be guaranteed just treatment upon their return to Rwanda.
• Monitor the conduct of Zairian forces involved in Operation Kimia toward the civilian population to ensure
that civilians from ail ethnie groups are protected and that ail militia are disarmed.
• Deploy international monitors at airports and border crossings in eastern Zaïre to enforce the UN arms
embargo against the formër Rwandan military and militia.
• Support the establishment of a UN commission of inquiry into the abuses against civilians in North Kivu.
• Ensure that no bilateral or multilateral assistance, other than humanitarian aid, is provided to· the Zairian
government unless it ends ail support to the militias operating in Zaire, investigates and prosecutes soldiers
responsible for abuses against civilians, and complies with Security Council Resolution 978 calling on
member states to arrest persans suspected of participating in the genocide in Rwanda for prosecution in
national courts or by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
To the Governmeot of Zaïre:
• Immediately cease ail support for Mai-Mai, Bangirima, Interahamwe, and any other militia with a record
of gross human rights abuses. This should include an end to the provision of armaments and logistical
assistance, participation by government officers and military personnel in militia attacks, and public
pronouncements of support for the militia by military and political officiais.
• Leaders at all levels of government -national, regional, and local- should publicly denounce the ethnie
violence in North Kivu. lnvestigate and identify those political, administrative, and military officiais who
have participated in militia attacks or profited from the insecurity to pillage or rape, and immediately remove
them from their posts and begin prosecution.
• The right to nationality must be respected. The government of Zaïre must cease denationalizating those
members of the Banyarwanda community who qualify for Zairian citizenship; no one should be rendered
stateless.
• The Zairian government must support efforts to encourage the peaceful and voluntary repatriation of
Rwandan refugees in Zaïre. Ail assistance to the former Rwandan government, ex-Forces Armées
Rwandaises, and Hutu militia mÙst be stopped; in particular, the provision of arms and related training and
materials in violation o(the United Nations embargo against these forces.
• The Zairian government must cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and bring
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to justice, including turning over indicted suspects to the International
Tribunal. ·
• Ensure security to allow the safe return of Zairian Tutsi refugees from Rwanda .
• Allow access throughout North Kivu for local and internationaljournalists and other independent observers .
To the Govcrnment of-Rwanda:
• Create conditions within Rwanda that would favor the peaceful and voluntary return of refugees from Zaire,
including respecting rights to freedom of expression, movement, and assembly regardless of ethnicity and
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 4 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
•
beginning trials for those currently imprisoned in Rwanda under accusations of participation in the 1994
genocide.
Provide safe and secure haven for refugees from the conflict in Zaïre. Locate the refugee camp a sufficient
distance from the Zaïre border that refugees will not be exposed to the threàt of attack from zàire. The
current site, 800 meters from the Zairian border, places the refugees at risk.
Establish screening procedures in the refugee camp to determine if the Tutsis from .Zaïre qualify as refugees .
ORIGINS OF THE BANYARW ANDA COMMUNITY IN ZAIRE
The region of North Kivu lies on the northe~ shores of Lake Kivu, along Zaire's eastern border with Rwanda
and Uganda. The Region is divided into six administrative zones: Masisi, Rutshuru, Kalehe, Walikale, Lubero, and
Gorria,5 it contains a diverse ethnie mix of Hunde, Nan de, Nyanga, and Tembo, as well as the Kinyarwanda-speaking
Hutu and Tutsi, together known as Banyarwanda. The Banyarwanda made up roughly 50 percent of the population
in North Kivu (though they constitute the majority in certain regions), with the Hutu comprising about 40 percent
and the Tutsi about 10 percent.
The origins of the Banyarwanda population in North Kivu are diverse. The arbitrary establishment of
colonial boundaries placed a large population of people formerly subject to the Rwandan king outside Rwandan
territory.6 The capricious manner in which the European colonial powers carved up the African continent placed
several regions formerly connected to the pre-colonial Rwandan kingdom within the boundaries of the Belgian
Congo. Under the principles set down in the 1885 Conference of Berlin and formalized in a convention signed in
1910 between Germany, Belgium, and England, the Rwandan territories ofGoma, Jomba, Bwisha, and the Island
of ldjwi, among others, were attached to the Belgian Congo, while the region of Bufumbira was integrated into the
British colony of Uganda. Accordingly, some of the Banyarwanda descend from families that have lived for
centuries on land which today lies within Zaïre.
When Belgium assumed control of Rwanda from German y during the First World War, Rwanda was already
·a densely populated territory. Belgian colonial administrators established a policy encouraging Rwandans to
emigrate into Zaïre to supply labor for plantations that were being establishe~ in the lightly populated district of
Masisi. Administrators in Kivu and Rwanda signed a formai agreement in 1937 organizing the migration and
creating Rwandan areas within Masisi. Other Rwandans were brought in as laborers in Kalehe, Rutshuru, and Shaba.
In addition to the formai program of tabor migration, which continued until 1955, many H;utu and Tutsi -both from
Rwanda and from Jomba and other territories within Zaïre- independ~ntly migrated into the districts ofMasisi,
Walikale, Rutshuru, and Lubero seeking land for cultivation or for grazing goats and cattle.7
•
In addition to economic migrants, North Kivu has welcomed thousands of poli.tical refugees fleeing conflicts
in Rwanda. After the uprising against Tutsi colonial administrators in Rwanda in 1959, thousands of Tutsi fled into
Zaïre. Thousands more Tutsi arrived in Zaire during repeated outbreaks of ethnie violence in Rwanda in the eariy
5Each zone within the region is sub-divided into several collectivities, anq these collectivities are themselves sub-divided into
localities and groupements.
6Aloys Tegera, "La réconciliation commu~;utaire: Le cas des massacres au Nord-Kivu," in A~dre Guich~oua, editor:ï.~s ·
crises politiques au B11run_di et au Rwanda (/993-1994) (Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, 1995), pp. 395-402;
UNHCR, "La sitμations dans le Masisi et les propositions de la Sous-Délégation," March 18, 1996.
'Tegera, "La réconciliation communautaire," p. 396; UNHCR, "La situation dans le Masisi." March 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 5 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
1960s, in 1973, and again in the early 1990s.• Finally, in 1994 nearly one million mostly Hutu refugees fled into
North Kivu at the end of the genocide and in advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front taking power in Rwanda. White
the majority of these recent refugees has been housed in refugee camps, others have settled outs ide the camps in the
zones of Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru, and Kalehe and have integrated into existing Hutu communities.9 The villages
in North_ Kivu were frequently multiethnic, and these Hutu communities are often found within villages consisting
of other ethnie groups.
Border changes, economic migration, and political conflict have combined to make Banyarwanda the largest
group in North Kivu and a sizable majority of the population in certain areas of the region. Of the estimated 600,000
people living in Masisi zone before interethnic violence broke out in 1993, 75-80 percent were Banyarwanda, while
the remaining 20-25 percent were primarily Hunde, along with some Nyanga and Tembo. Banyarwanda were also
the majority iri parts of Bwito and Bwisha collectivities in Rutshuru zone, and they were the largest group in Goma.10
SOURCES OF CONFLICT
Land distribution and economic competition have been at the root of conflicts between the Banyarwanda and
other groups looking for political power. In general, th~ Tutsi have cleared large tracts of land in the region to use
as pasturage for grazing their cattle and goats, white the Hutu predominantly cleared land for fanning. As the
Banyarwanda population has increased, particularly following the arrivai of many Tutsi refugees front Rwanda
beginning in 1959, they have gradually migrated further and further from the Rwanda border. In Walikale, Masisi,
and other districts, the Banyarwanda have cleared large areas of forest to use for farming and grazing, Ieading to
conflicts with the local Hunde population who have traditionally used the forests for hunting game. The
Banyarwanda have been quite successful in the regional and national economies, supplying livestock and produce
to markets as far away as the Zairian capital Kinshasa. The relative prosperity of the Banyarwanda has contributed
to resentment by other groups in the region.11 Despite their numeric significance and long history in North Kivu, the
Banyarwanda have enjoyed little politieal power, at least in terms of formai politieal and administrative positions.
Residents of North Kivu have disagreed about the treatment of the Banyarwanda in Zaire. The Banyarwanda
believe that they have been discriminated against in terms of employment and education. However, other Zairian
groups contend that the Banyarwanda have had advantages over other Zairians, including disproportionate access
to higher edueation in Zaïre. The perception on both sides of the conflict that the other has been privileged bas clearly
fueled resentments and increased tensions between the communities. · ·
Another key issue in the conflict involves nationality, which was recognized and later taken away from the
Banyarwanda. Other ethnie groups in Kivu have justified their political dominance by arguing that the Banyarwanda
are foreigners who have no claim to Zairian citizenship. In practice, members of other ethnie groups make no
distinction between those Banyarwanda whose families lived on Zairian territory prior to colonial boundary changes
and those whose families migrated into the area more recently. It is important to note that the nationality issue has
been used only against'the Banyarwanda. and not against other ethnie groups that were divided along Zaire's borders
at independence.
,;.Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," ANB·BIA Supplement, p. viii; Tegera, "~ réconciliation communautaire," p. 397.
9"Masisi ou la guerre ou.bliée," p. viii; UNHCR, "Repatriation·ofRw~ndan Refugees from Eastern Zaire," ~arch 1996.
1°Tegera. "La réconciliation communautaire," pp. 398-399; UNHCR, "Repatriation ofRwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaïre."
11 Marc Hoogesteyn, "Anned Rwanda Hutus uproot spear•carrying tribesmen," Reuters, February 21, 1996; Tegera, "La
réconciliation communautaire,'' p. 399; and Human Rights Watch/FJDH interviews with Zairian refugees in Rwanda, April 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 6 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
The issue of nationality has been a recurrent source of contention in Eastern Zaïre, especially relating to voter
eligibility in electoral periods. After Zaïre gained independence in 1960, a nationality law granted Zairian citizenship
for anyone who had been living in Zaïre for ten years. Although most Banyarwanda quatified for citizenship under
these terms, provincial authorities in North Kivu excluded them from civil service posts in the early 1960s. A 1972
law adopted as part of President Mobutu's "authenticity" program reiterated the principles of the earlier nationality
Jaw, granting Zairian citizenship to anyone whose family was living in Zaïre on January 1, 1960, and had since
maintained continuous residence.12 In Article 15, nationality was specificalty granted to people from "RuandaUrundi"
who were on Zairian (Congolese) territory before January 1, 1950 and continued to reside in Zaïre. No
distinction was made between Banyarwanda who had lived in Zaïre for generations and those who had arrived as
political refugees or economic migrants in later years.
The nationality issue came to the fore again in 1981 when the Zairian parliament approved a revision to
citizenship laws that accorded citizenship onJy to those who could demonstrate that their ancestors lived in Z~ire
prior to August 1, 1885. Although many Banyarwanda qualified for citizenship under these new ru les, ancestry was
difficult to demonstrate, and in practice both the non-Banyarwanda public and the govemment tended to treat
Banyarwanda as a single group. The law did not specifically state that citizenship would be revoked from those who
had already acquired it; nevertheless, the effect of the law was to deny citizenship rights to a substantial portion of
Zairian Kinyarwanda-speakers and practicalty denied rights to most others.13 The nationality issue was summarized
in a report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Zaïre as folJows:
The tensions [in North Kivu] are caused by two retated probtems. The first arises from the right of
the Banyarwanda to Zairian nationality. This was recognized in the 1964 Constitution and in the
law of 1965, which allowed them to vote in 1965 and 1967; it was left unchanged in the 1967
Constitution, and confirmed once again by Decree Law No. 71-020 of 1971; then it was restricted
under Law No. 002 of 1972 to those living in Kivu since before 1960, abolished by law in 1981 t!nd
taken over by the CNS [Sovereign National Conference] in 1992. The second problems is derived
from the first, namely that recognizing the Banyarwanda as Zairians would give them the right to
vote in any elections which might be held.14
In practice, however, the 1981 Jaw was never active)y enforced, and identity cards were never revoked. After
officially enjôying the rights of citizenship for two decades, the Banyarwanda did not passively accept the revocation
oftheir nationality. In the mid-1980s, Hutu from throughout North Kivu fonned an ethnie organization, known as
a "mutual," to unite Hutu and defend their interests. Initially an agricultural association, MAGRIVI, the Agricultural
Mutual ofVirunga, gradually became politicized. In 1991, when Banyarwanda were excJuded from participation
in the national conference held in Kinshasa to debate the political future of the country, organizers of MAGRIVI urged
Hutu in North Kivu to protest by rejecting the authority oflocal Hunde chiefs and refusing to pay taxes, a particularly
serious threat given the economic importance of the Banyarwanda.'s
12Jean-Baptiste Kayigamba, "Zaire-Human Rights: Thousands Flee Ethnie Cleansing," lnterPress Service, April 7, 1996; U.S.
Committee for Refugees (USCR), "lnducing the Deluge," p. 9.
13See "Ordonnance-Loi No 71-020 due 26 mars 1971 relative à l'acquisition de la nationalité congolaise par les personnes
originaires du Rwanda-Urundi établies au Congo au 30 juin 1960," and ''{.oi No 81-002 du 29 juin 1982.n Also see: UNHCR.
"Repatriation ofRwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire;" USCR, "Inducing the Deluge,11 pp. 8-9.
14United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "Report on the situation of human rights in Zaïre, prepared by the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto <;,arret6n, in accordance- wtih Commission resolution 1995/69," E/CN.4/1996/66, 29 January 1996, p.10-
11.
15Kayigamba, "Zaire-Human Rights."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 7 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE
With democratic elections becoming an increasingly imminent possibility in the early 1990s, the growing
political organization of the Hutu posed a serious threat to the political power ofHunde, Nande, and other ethnie
groups. Given the numerical majority of Banyarwanda, members of other groups would have difficulty retaining
the chieftaincies and other political positions, and their associated prerogatives, ifBanyarwanda were allowed to vote.
TI1e threat of losing power in elections was particularly serious for Nyanga and Hunde, who compriseà _:,nly 4 and
3 percent, respectively, of the population of the region of North Kivu as a whole.16 Local authorities th\,;S !aunchic:~
a program in 1991 to identify and register Zairian nationals, a process that sought to exclude most Banyarwanda, and
make them ineligible to vote in future elections.17
Political conflicts combined with continuing clashes over land use to create a highly volatile situation in
North Kivu. Tensions in the region came to a peak in March I 993 when the then govemor of North Kivu, Jean-Pierre
Kalumbo Mboho, publicly questioned the nationality of Banyarwanda and suggested that the security forces would
assist efforts by Nyanga and Hunde to "exterminate" Banyarwanda. The govemor was suspended in late July I 993.18
Attacks by Mai-Mai militia in Masisi and Walikale zones and Bangirima in Rutshuru and Lubero zones
apparently began several days after the governor's comments. Hutu protests over the arrest of a MAGRIVI leader
.seem to have been the spark that ignited the violence. On March 20, Mai-Mai attacked Banyarwanda at Ntoto market
in Walikale, after Banyarwanda raised a political party flag that other groups erroneously claimed was the flag of
a foreign government. By the next day, violence had spread throughout Walikale and Masisi zones.19
The U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that 1,000 people are estimated to have been killed injust the first
two days of fighting. By April, attacks against Banyarwanda had spread into Lubero and Rutshuru zones. With
anned support from local gendarmes, Mai-Mai and Bangirima militia attacked Hutu and Tutsi with guns, machetes
and spears and bumed hundreds of homes. After several months of such attacks, some Banyarwanda, primarily Hutu
who could build on the existing MAGRJVI organization, formed their own militia groups to counter-attack, killing
Hunde and Nyanga and buming their homes.20
Violence by ail sides in North Kivu continued from March until July 1993. Official Zairian govemment
statistics estimated that 6,000 people were killed during the six months of the conflict, but estimates of the number
of dead by OXFAM, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Caritas, and other in~ependent observers range from 7,000 and to as
high as 40,000, the large majority being Hutu. The UNHCR est.imated that 350,000 people were displaced by the
violence.21 The fighting started a process of ethnie pogroms and clearances in which members of the dominant ethnie
16Tegera, "La réconciliation communautaire," p. 399.
17USCR, "lnducing the Deluge," pp. 9-10:· .
11Amnesty International, "Zaïre: Violence Against Democracy," September 16, 1993, p. 22 and "Masisi ou la guerre oubliée,"
p. viii. ·
''Raymond Luaula, "Leur nationalité zaîroise ne se marchande pas!," Umo/a (Kinshasa), February 28, 1996, p. 2; "Masisi ou
Ja guerre oublié;" p. vii; Tegera,''La réconciliation communautaire," pp. 395-396; USCR, "Inducing the Deluge," p. 10.
20"MasisÎ ou la guerre oubliée," pp. vii-viii; Tegera, "La réconciliation c~~in~nautaire," pp. 395-396; USCR, "Inducing the
Deluge."
21"Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. vii; Hugh Nevill, "Explosive ~ix crackting in Eastern Zaire," Agence France Presse.
October 18, 1994; UNHCR, "Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire"; Kayigamba, "Zaire-Human Rights.11
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 8 July 1996, Vol. 8, l'.'Jo. 2 {A)
group in each area drove out members of minority ethnie groups. The ryfai-Mai and Bangirima militia drove Hutu
out ofLubero zone and the districts ofKisimba and Ikobo in Walikale zone, while Hutu fighters drove Hunde and
Nyanga out of much ofMasisi zone and the collectivities ofBwito and Bwisha in Rutshuru zone. The violence in
1993 began a process of establishing ethnie enclaves where ethnie groups had formerly lived together in multiethnic
communities. Communities that had formerly included Hutu, Tutsi, and Hunde, now became almost exclusively
Hutu or exclusively Hunde.22
The position of Tutsi in this conflict varied from one area to the next. ln some areas, they were lumped
together with the Hutu as a single Banyarwanda population and thus were targeted. ln o~er areas, because they were
not organized politically, they were not considered threatening and were left untouched. According to Emmanuel,
a Munyarwanda from Walikale, "In Masisi ... sometimes the Hunde killed Tutsi, sometimes Hutu killed Tutsi. In
Ikobo, the Hunde left the Tutsi atone. In Kisimba, Hunde chased out both Hutu and Tutsi. And in Bwito, Hutu
chased out the Hunde, and the Tutsi stayed."23 According to other sources, in some areas ofMasisi and Rutshuru,
Hutu and Tutsi joined together to fight against the Hunde and other groups.2
'
Although the Mai-Mai and Bangirima were civilian militla composed primarily of youths, both local
witnesses and international observers agree that they were acting with the approval and encouragement of local
·Hunde and Nande govemment officiais. According to ~girabakunzi, a Tutsi from Lubero zone:
The traditional chiefs, the baami, said that the Hutu were chased out [of Lubero and Walikale]
because of MAGRIVI. There was much hatred against the Hutu mutual association MAGRlVI. This
organization had entered into potitics and was trying to have its own chiefs. Because ofthis, there
was a big conflict between the chiefs, who were Nande and Hunde, and the Hutu. The Hutu were
chased by groups of bandits who were not afraid of shedding blood. But the chiefs were behind
them. They were supported by the chiefs. After they were done, there was not a single Hutu left in
our area. But we Tutsi did not have any problems. The chiefs told us that they had no problems
with the Tutsi, because we did not have a mutual association."
The role of the Zairian military and security forces in the 1993 conflict is unclear. Sorne witnesses claim
that members of the Forces Armées Zaïroises (F AZ) joined with the Bangirima in attacking Banyarwanda. Sorne
Hunde claim that FAZ soldiers were offering special protection to the Banyarwanda, who, unlike the Hunde, could
afford to pay for the service. Reports from several organizations of the Catholic Church contend that gendarmes
offered extensive support to the Mai-Mai for its attacks. Numerous accounts make clear that in many cases rather
than intervening to calm the situation, soldiers took advantage of the insecurity to loot from bath sides in the
conflict.16 What is clear, however, is that the govemment threatened to strip the Kinyarwanda-speaking population
of its Zairian nationality and so to marginalize it from political life, a goal shared with those attacking them. At the
same time, the governor had openly expressed support for their "extermination/'
22La commission justice et paix/Diocese de Goma, "Masisi: ·zone devastée, victime de sa richesse, du tribalisme ou du
pouvoir, Mondé Nouveau (Goma), November-December 1995; USCR. "lnducing the Deluge"; and testimonies taken by Human
Rights Watch/FIDH from Zairean refugees.
23Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Gisenyi, Rwanda, April 17, 1996.
24Kayigamba, "Zaire-Human Rights."
i~Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Nkamira Transit Camp, Rwanda, April 5, 1996.
26USCR, "Inducing the _De luge," p. 1 O; "Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. viii.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 9 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
The violence continued in North Kivu with varying degrees of intensity until July 1993, when a group of
churches and local non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) brought members of the warring groups together in ar
effort to ease tensions in the region. The meetings concluded that the conflict had been manipulated by Zairian
politicians, but failed to resolve the underlying issues. Also in July, President Mobutu visited Goma and
sul>sequently deployed troops from the Special Presidential Division (DSP), the country'~ most elite military division.
The DsP did not overtly take sides, but rather helped to prevent fighting and to bring some order to the area.27
However, the key issues of nationality, land distribution, and political representation had not been resolved, and
government officiais at both the provincial and national levels showed no interest in seeking a lasting resolution.
Severa( meetings sponsored by OXFAM, church groups, and other local NGOS brought together members ofvarious
ethnie groups in early 1994. The meetings produced proposais for bringing a lasting peace to the region --chief
among them a resolution to the nationality issue-- but the proposais received no response frcim government officiais.
With tensions still high and tens of thousands of people still displaced from their homes, conrutions were ripe for
renewed conflict. 21
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ZAIRE
The spark that reignited ethnie violence in North Kivu was the genocide set into motion in Rwanda after the
airplane crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in April 1994, and the renewed fighting between the
RPF and Rwandan govemment forces. When word began to filter into Zaïre about the massacres taking place in
Rwanda, sharp divisions developed between the Tutsi and Hutu communities in Zaïre. Reportsïndicate that a few
Hutu attacks against Tutsi in Zaïre took place as early as May of 1'994, but violence against Tutsi becarne much more
widespread after the arrivai in North Kivu of an estimated 720,000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda in July. The majority
ofthese refugees, many of whom were involved in massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda, settled in refugee camps around
Goma, but others integrated into local Hutu communities in Goma, Rutshuru, Kalehe, and Masisi.29
Witnesses report that Interahamwe militia continued their violence against Tutsi after their arrivai in Zaïre
and the first attacks by Interahamwe against Tutsi in Zaire took place the last week of July 1994. Semasaka, a Tutsi
who was living in the town of Sake in southem Masisi, recounts the attack on bis family in August 1994:
The Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda came to Masisi in July 1994. They tried to stay in groups
together. They wanted to continue what they had started in Rwanda. The Hutu who came from
Rwanda held secret meetings at night with the Hutu from Zaïre, and the Zairian Hutu began to (onn ..
Interahamwe together with the Rwandan Hutu. They began to steal cows, to take Tutsi women by
force. They began to kill and pillage and rape, just as they had done in Rwanda ... The area is vast
there, and there were many cows, so it was a good place for us. But you can't stay in a place where
they are killing you.
My family was attacked by Rwandan military [ex-FAR, Forces Armées Rwandaises]. I was atour
home at Centre Sake with my mother and father and six children. A large group attacked. They
were wearing R wandao military unifonns. When they attacked, I jumped out of a back window, and
. so I was able to escape. ~ut ail the rest were killed, my mother and father and the children. This
27United Nations Department ofHumanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regionai Jnfonnation Network, "Situation Report on Masisi
and Rutshuru, North Kivu, Zaïre," May 10, 1996.
21UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi;" Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devastée," p. 12.
29Nevill, "Explosive Mix Crackling"; Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devastée"; "Masisi ou la guerre oubliée";
UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 10 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)'
was August 4, and I came here [to Rwanda] August 1.Sth. My family had been there in Masisi since
1959.30
The anti-Tutsi violence in Masisi and Rutshuru zones continued for several months, reaching a peak in
September, then diminishing in October. The Zairian army sent approximately one hundred troops to Masisi in
October to reinforce the military presence in the region, but according to reports from the area, the military often
joined in the looting and killing. The violence drave many Rwandan Tutsi refugees, like Semasaka, whose families
had been in Zaire for decades, to flee to Rwanda, where a govemment installed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) had taken power."
Even after this wave of violence diminished, tensions in North Kivu remained high. The arrivai in the region
of the Hutu refugees intensified anti-Banyarwanda sentiment among other groups in North Kivu. The new refugees
themselves were a highly potiticized group who, according to many sources, worked to politicize local Hutu.
Numerous witnesses interviewed by Hum an Rights Watch/ Africa and FIDH reported that Hutu refugees from Rwanda
integrated into Zairian Hutu communities. Sorne reports indicate that they gave militia training to local Hutu, similar
to the training given to Interahamwe in Rwanda before the genocide.32 The Hutu community in Zaïre thus became
increasingly well organized and increasingly well armed, due to the massive quantities ofweapons brought by the
refugees and the Rwandan army fleeîng the RPF, or flown into Goma afterwards as the routed army regrouped.u
The additional F AZ troop reinforcements that the govemment in Kinshasa sent to Masisi and other parts of
North Kivu in 1994 in response to the influx ofRwandan refugees and renewed tensions seems to have contributed
to the insecurity. Rather than sending the more disciplined DSP, the govemment sent a regiment known as the
Parachute Commandos or "Paras," who were underpaid and undisciplined, and began to prey on the population.
The Paras demanded bribes, pillaged, and, according to various reports, chose sides and participated in the
local conflict. Nzamwitakuze, a Tutsi refuge from Bahunde collectivity in Masisi, explained. "The govemment
placed soldiers around, but the. soldîers themselves just came to attack and pillage goods.11
,.
In May and June of 1995, the ethnie militia, known collectively as the "combatants,11 (abacombattant)
launched renewed attacks.35 The Mai-Mai and Bangirima groups ofHunde, Nande, and Nyanga fought with Hutu
30Human Rights Watch/FIDH Interview, Gisenyi, April 6, 1996.
11La commission justice et paix, "Masisi: Zone devastée," pp. 12-13; Nevill, "Explosive mix crackling in Eastern Zaïre''; and
Human Rights Watch/FJDH interviews, Gisenyi and Nkamira, April 1996.
321n late 1993 and early 1994, pararnilitary training was given to Interahamwe members, including instructions on how to Joad
and tire a gun. Most observers consider this training to have been in preparatïon for the ge_nocide that began in April 1994.
nHuman Rights Watch Anns Project, "Rwanda/Zaïre: Reanning with lmpunity: International Support for the Perpetrators
of the Rwandan Genocîde," vol. 7, no. 4, May 1995; UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masïsi;" and HRW/FIDH interviews in
Gisenyi and Nkamira in April 1996.
'
4"Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. viii; UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masïsi." Quote from Human Rights Watch/FJDH
interview in Gisenyi, April 17, 1996.
• 35 Given the complexity of the ethnie mix and the conflict in North Kivu, the tenns used by people from the area to discuss
the ethnie militia are not.completely consistent. As mentioned above, "Mai-Mai" and "Bangïrima" are used to some extent
ïnterchangeably, but they also have a regional basis. The tenn "combatants," (abacombattant) is used by some people in the area
to refer to ail ethnie militia but the tenn is used by others to refer to the Hutu mititia. The term "lnterahamwe" is used by some
to refer to ail Hutu militia and by others exclusively to refer to Hutu militia from Rwanda. Given the mixing of Zairian and
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 11 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
Interahamwe militia in Masisi and Rutshuru. Both sides attacked villages, pillaging and buming homes, displacing
thousands of people and furthering the process of establishing ethnie enclaves. At this time, Tutsi families, both
Zairian nationals and refugèes from Rwanda's ethnie conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s, were ·targeted by both groups.
According to Livania, a young woman from Bishusha in Rutshuru zone:
Before the arrivai of the Interahamwe, there were no problems for Tutsi in our area. After the
Interahamwe came, problems started with the Bahunde. The Bahunde said, "What are you doing
still here when others are returning to their country?"
The signais of trouble began in May [1995]. The combatants came little by little, pillaging. The
Hunde pillaged at one bouse and then another. They came in groups of more or less ten people,
pillaging here and there. Things became really hot in June, when there was a great number of homes
pillaged. These groups, though, came only to pillage. No one was killed or hurt. The killing in our
area bas just started now .... The Hunde began to pillage the abjects from the bouse and cattle. Tuen
the Interahamwe followed after with threatening comments. These attacks in our community took
place during one week [in June 1995). The Hunde came several times and attacked. They took
things, then left. Tuen the Interahamwe would corne around and tell us to leave. They did not
attack, but they came by to threaten us.36
As with the attacks in July and August 1994, these renewed assaults encouraged many ofthose Rwandan
Tutsi families who had been living for decades as refugees in Zaire to retum to Rwanda. While some Tutsi would
certainly have chosen voluntarily to retum to Rwanda following the victory of the RPF, the violence carried out by
the Interahamwe and Mai-Mai forced many Tutsi to leave Zaïre against their will. Through pillaging, these Tutsi
families lost their livestock and their household goods, and in fleeing they lost their land. According to UNHCR,
38,000 Tutsi retumed to Rwanda from Zaïre in 1995. According to various reports, rather than calming the situation,
the Zairian military participated in the pillaging. Nevertheless, by July 1995 the fighting and attacks had again
tapered off.37 •
THE CURRENT CONFLICT
White the potential for an escalation of fighting in North Kivu was quite high, when fighting broke out in
July 1994 and May 1995, the Zairian govemment made no concerted effort to intervene to establish order and protect
civilians. In fact, the Zairian govemment was complicit in the distribution of arms to the former Rwandan military
and militia. Throughout the refugec crisis, the Zairian govemment bas supported the former Rwandan authorities and
facilitated the training and arming of its troops and militia in the refugee camps. The govemment bas allowed its
territory to be used as a conduit for weapons supplies to the ex-FAR, and cargo companies based in Zaire have acted
under contracts with Zairian officiais to transport these weapons.31 The vast increase in arms flows to the region has
been a key factor in exacerbating the conflict in North Kivu, and helped set the stage for a renewal of interethnic
fighting and killing in Kivu. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Zairian security forces stationed
Rwandan Hutu in the militia, the term "Interahamwe" is used in this report tp refer to all Hutu militia.
16Interviewed in Nkamira commercial center, April 16, 1996.
37UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi and R.~tshuru"; UNHCR, "Situation dans le Masisi."
"Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Reanning with Jmpunity: International Support for the for the Perpetrators of the
Rwandan Genocide"; UNHCR, "Situation dans le Masisi."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 12 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
in North Kivu are poorly equipped, paid and disciplined, which creates a situation where they may sell their services
to the highest bidder and foot from ail sides.
Because of the fighting, communities in Masisi and Rutshuru that formerly enjoyed ethnie diversity have
become increasingly monoethnic as the dominate ethnie group in each community forces others to flee. Villages in
the area are increasingly identified ~s "Hutu" or 11Hunde11 or ''Nande." As such, they become the targets of the militia
from rival groups. Since December 1995, thousands of.Hunde and Nyanga have fled from Masisi to Kisimba and
lkobo areas in Walikale, while others have fled to Goma and parts ofRutshuru. Mai-Mai have also driven Hutu out
of certain areas, particular~y in Rutshuru and at the extremities of Masisi. In February J 996, the International
Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 150,000 people from Masisi had been displaced since November 1995.39
By mid-May, Doetors Without Borders USA estimated that the number of displaced had risen to 250,000.4°
The latest round of interethnic violence began in southem and eastem parts of the Masisi zone in November
1995. Several factors contributed to rising tensions in the region that set the stage for renewed violence. Threats
by President Mobutu and other members of the Zairian govemment to close the Rwandan refugees camps by the end
of December seem to have increased the anxiety ofRwandan Hutu refugees, many of whom believed that they would
be arrested or killed ifthey were forced to retum to Rwanda. Hutu.leaders in the camps began to talk ofMasisi as
a "Hutu-land," where Rwandan Hutu could settle as an alternative to retuming to Rwanda, which had become a
'1Tutsi-land.11 These claims infuriated the area's Hunde, Nyang~ and Tembo, who view Masisi as their ancestral
territory and have feared the creation of a "greater Rwanda" or :'Hutu-land" in the region, and their leaders catled
for the camps to be closed and the refugees repatriated. Public comments by General Eluki, the chief of staff of the
Zairian army, auring an official VÎ$it in Goma in November, appeared to give official sanction for the
"autochthonous" groups to take up arms once again. In a public setting and in the presence of journalists, General
Eluki stated that the Hunde, Nyanga, and Tembo were justified in fighting for the land of their ancestors and seeking
to expel "foreigners," which was interpreted by other groups in the region to mean all Banyarwanda, not simply the
Hutu refugees.41
The immediate spark that reignited the interethnic fighting in Masisi seems to have been conflict over local
resources, particularly firewood, in the vicinity of several Rwandan refugee camps. Clashes in early December
between Mai-Mai and Zairian army soldiers at Bikenge, Masisi town, and elsewhere intensified the level.of combat,
and violence quickly spread throughout southem Masisi. Mai-Mai appear to have launched most of the initial attacks
against Hutu, but Hutu Interahamwe groups quickly responded with attacks oftheir own on predominantly Hunde
and Nyanga villages. Because of their vast numerical superiority and better arrnaments, the Hutu militia were quickly
able to dominate. By the end ofDecember, Interahamwe attacks had driven thousands ofHunde, Tembo, Nyanga,
and Tutsi out of parts of Masisi, particularly areas near the refugee camps.42
In the first months of 1996, fighting gradually spread into other parts ofMasisi and Rutshuru. Witnesses
report that the Hutu militia groups that have been involved in the attacks have contained a mixture ofRwandan and
Zairian Hutu. Nzamwitakuze, a young refugee from a cotlectivity catled Bahunde in southeastern Masisi, explains
that attacks began in his community in late 1995:
39Hoogesteyn, "Anned Rwanda .. / Reuters, Feburary 21, 1996.
•
0samantha Bolton, "3,000 Tutsi under threat in Masisi-Zaire: Only im.mediate evacuation can save lives," Medecins Sans
Frontieres, press release, May 22, 1996.
•
1"Masisi ou la guerre ~ubliée," p. viii; UNHCR, "Repatriation of Rwandàn Refugees."
•
2Marc Hoogsteyn, "Forty killed in Zaire dispute on Rwandan refugees," Reuters, December 12, 1995; Commission justice
et paix, "Masisi: Zone devastée," pp. 12-13.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 13 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
When the Interaharnwe came to attack, they took everything. They took even our clothes. The
clothes we are wearing were given to us by our neighbors .... The abacombattant came to our area
and first killed three people who were guarding the cows. Then people began to flee. When the
abacombattant came, they were armed with guns. They could kill a few people with bullets, and
then others could be killed with machetes. Our neighbors were attacked, and our own cows were
pillaged, so we fled in fear. We fled to the church at Matanda.43
Despite being outnumbered and out-gunned by the Interahamwe, Mai-Mai a.nd Bangirima groups have
continued not only to defend their communities but to launch attacks against Hutu and Tutsi in Masisi and Rutshu~
forcing bath groups to flee certain areas. Comments by the govemor and other political and military officiais made
the militia believe that they have the support of higlier authorities in their struggle.
Beyond the practical fear of losing political power, the. Mai-Mai and Bangirima militia have been inspired
to continue their struggle by a strong sense of moral purpose. For many Hunde and Nyanga, the war is a noble
struggle to defend their ancestral lands and historical prerogatives against people thëy view as foreign interlopers.
The conflict in Masisi and Rutshuru bas expanded beyond guerrilla-style raids on villages, in which people
are killed, women raped, and goods stolen. ln recent months, open combat between Mai-Mai and lnterahamwe bas
broken out as the groups struggle for control of territory, with Tutsi, who have sought refuge in towns that have
become predominantly Hunde, targeted for killit}g by Interaharnwe. Examples of attacks are numerous and include
the following: · '
• Nearly 800 Tutsi who were gathered at the parish ofMokoto in Masisi were attacked on May 12, 1996, by
Hutu militia. Sorne 700 were able to flee to temporary safety in the largely Hunde town ofKichanga, but
as many as one hundred of the Tutsi who had sought refuge at the Mokoto church are believed to have been
killed."" .
• According to Gabriel, a Tutsi man who had sought refuge at the town of Tonga in Rutshuru, several
lnterahamwe, most coming from the refugee camps, were arrested on April 11 as they passed through Tango.
They were carrying bullets and guns which they said were to supply Interahamwe in a planned attack on the
town ofKichanga,just across the border in Masisi. According to Gabriel, the attack on Kichanga took place
the same day, but the Interahamwe were repelled by the flunde militia. Gabriel claimed to know one Hutu
and two Tutsi who were killed in the battle."'
• ln early March, Hutu militia came to attack Mweso parish, where several thousand displaced Hunde and
Tutsi had sought refuge. According to Hakizimana, a young Tutsi man from Bibwe, Interahamwe shot at
aid workers who were unloading supplies for the displaced. Hakizimana reports:
After that, the president ofMAGRIVI came, Eraste from Busumba in Masisi. He
came to Mweso with the Interahamwe and said, 4'You must give food first to the
Interahamwe if you are going to give it to the Hunde and Tutsi. If not, we will
~~~~~ .
"'Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Gisenyi, April 17, 1996.
~Samantha Bolton, "3,000 Tutsis under threat in Masisi-Zaire," Doctors With out Borders, May 22, 1996; and report on BBC
May 13, 1996.
"
5Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Nkamira Transit Camp, April 16, 1996.
"
6Human Rights Watch/FIDH inte.rview at Nkamira Transit Camp, April 17, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 14 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
• According to various sources, in February Hutu militia attacked Sake, a town just off Lake Kivu considered
a Hunde stronghold. The attacks forced many people to tlee, including the local Hunde chief, who sought
refuge in Gama. Severa! subsequent attacks, including an attack on April 26, have led to additional deaths
and injuries.47
• Witnesses from Bibwe in northem Masisi report that early in the morning on January 25, 1996, Mai-Mai
attacked the commercial center at Bibwe, killing ten Hutu and forcing both Hutu and Tutsi to flee the
community briefly and bide. Later in the day a large group oflnterahamwe descended on the community,
killing a number of people, including several local Hutu whom they viewed as traitors. The Interahamwe
drove some 500 Hunde and Tutsi from Bibwe to seek refuge at Mweso parish.41
• The Justice and Peace Commiss!on of the Catholic ~iocese of Gama reported that Qn December 9, 1995,
Hunde militia attacked the village of Bikenge in Masisi zone. More than thirty people were killed, including
four Zairian soldiets. In reponse, F AZ forces pillaged and burned Hunde homes in a number of sites in
Masisi.'9
SENDING THE TUTSI "BACK TO RWANDA"
White fighting has displaced thousands of Hunde, Nyanga, and Hutu, driving them from their homes into
refuge in other parts of North Kivu, thousands of Tutsi have been forced to leave the country and seek refuge in
Rwanda. The Tutsi, who have generally not participated in the militia groups, have increasingly been targeted by
both sides in the conflict While attacks in 1994 and in mid-1995 targeted Tutsi refugees from Rwanda who had
arrived in Zaïre in the 1960s and 1970s, anti-Tutsi attacks in the current round of violence have expanded to include
Zairian Tutsi: those who trace their origins to formerly Rwandan territories now integrated into Zaïre or whose
families migrated to the region in the 1930s and 1940s. Both Mai-Mai/Bangirima and Interahamwe have insisted
that Tutsi "go back to Rwanda," whether or not they are Rwandan refugees. Sorne Interahamwe have insisted that
Tutsi leave Zaïre for Rwanda, since Rwanda has become a "Tutsi-land," while claiming North Kivu should be left
for the Hutu.'0
The targeting ofZairian Tutsi began in Masisi and Rutshuru in January and February 1996 and bas gradually
expanded into Lubero and Walikale. In the last four months of 1995, according to UNHCR statistics, 11,825 l'efugees
categorized as ''old case Joad," those who had fled from Rwanda prior to 1994, retumed to Rwanda from Zaïre. In
the first three months of 1996, 10,164 Zairian Tutsi crossed into Rwanda from North Kivu. Between Match and May
1996, more than 8,000 Zairian Tutsi crossed into Rwanda." In June, approximately 3,200 crossed. UNHCR estimated
that 17,233 Zairian asylum seekers had crossed to Rwanda by the end of June 1996. A small number ofHunde have
also fled to Rwanda. ·
47Luala, "Leur nationalité zaïroise ne se marchande pas!," p. 2; UNHCR, "Situation dans Je Masisi;" and from interview with
Semasaka in Gisenyi on April 6, 1996.
"Human Rights Watch!FIDH interviews with Hakizimana, Habimana, and Nyirantunzuwami, in Nkamira Transit Center, April
17, 1996.
49Commission justice et paix, "Masisi: Zone devastée," p. 13.
50UNOHA, "Situation Report on Masisi and Rutshuru;" Antonie, "Suspected Hutu killers."
51UNHCR Services des Statistiques, UNHCR Field Office Gisenyi/Ruhengeri, monthly statistics on repatriation 1996; UNHCR
Service des Statistiques, Kigali, annual statistics 1995, monthly statistics 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 15 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 {A)
. Habimana, a Tutsi from Bibwe in Masisi, explains how Tutsi began to be targeted in his community ir
January 1996:
In our area there were no problems for Tutsi until January [1996]. There was fighting between
Hunde and Hutu that had been going on since 1993. In 1993, the Mai-Mai took ail of our cattle,
along with MAGRIVI. They took just our cattle and goats. There was no pillaging of homes, no
attacks on people. After this, though, it became cairn, because the military came and stopped the
fighting. They disarrned the Hutu. ... When the Interahamwe came from Rwanda to Zaïre, they told
local Hutu to remember their anns. Before, things had been cairn, but the Interahamwe started to
organize the Hutu. You could buy one lA rifle for four cows. The Hutu began to ann themselves.
The Hutu began to tell us to retum to Rwanda, because Tutsi had taken Rwanda. "We don't want ·
Tutsi here, because it was you who made us flee from our country. Go back to Rwanda." Hutu from
other places began to corne, and they were welcomed by·neighbors. Then they would attack homes
at night.'2
Gasamuyinga Rutshogoza, a middle-aged Tutsi man from Bukombo, an area in Bwito collectivity just across
the Masisi border in Rutshuru zone, recounts that a mix of Zairian and Rwandan Hutu came to attack Tutsi in the
community on March 4:
The (Hutu] abacombattant started by buming the bouse of a widow .... They bumed many Tutsi
homes, but they Jeft the homes of the Hutu untouched. lt was local people from Bukombo, helped
by people from Masisi. There were many Rwandan Hutu at Bukombo. Many. They came to take
the young Hutu who were from the community and they gave them militia training. ... There was
a group of neighbors who attacked with a Captain Siboman~ He was the "chier' of.the village, the
leader of a group of youths.. This was not an official title, b~t after he got a lot of money from
raising pigs, they began to call him captain. lt was he who sto]e my money and my goods. lt was
be who was at the head of the group that attacked my hou se. They came at 11 :00 at night. They
attacked the home with machetes. They eut my father, Rwangaguhaba, with their machetes and
killed him. They killed another neighbor in adqition to my father. My mother was injured, but she
was not killed. "" ·
Survivors from Bukombo list at least eleven Tutsi from the community know to have been killed during the
March 4 attack: Rwangaguhaba, Bajoje .Rwamuhizi, François Ndamiyumuhatsi, Kwisebura, Kamanzi, Ngarambe,
Kabanda, Marthe and her son, Nyaramba, and Rutsitsi.S4 After the attack, Bukombo's Tutsi fled to nearby Birambizo
Catholic parish, where Hutu abacombattant came to attack a few weeks later.
Several witnesses reported that Tutsi living around Tongo in Bwito Collectivity in Rutshuru Zone were
attacked by Interahamwe in mid-March. One survivor recounts that after his home had already been raided, he was
attacked as he fled to Tongo with a group of other Tutsi, accompanied by two locality chiefs who offered to escort
them: "On the way to the town, we were attacked by a group that began to pillage. They took everything we had with
.s2Human Rights Watch/FJDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 17, 1996.
s1Human Rights Watch(FJDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 16, 1996.
54Based on Human Rights Watch/FJDH interviews at Nkamira Transit Center, April 16, 1996, and Gisenyi Hospital, April 17,
1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 16 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
us. They even took our clothes." Tutsi refugees were grouped in several locations in Tongo and protected by
gendarmes, but lnteraharnwe came to attack them in these locations as well.55
Since late March, anti-Tutsi violence bas spread to areas dominated by Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga in
Walikale and Lubero zones. Attacks against Tutsi in Walikale zone began in an area known as Ikobo which, along
with neighboring Kisimba, has become a major site of refuge for Hunde and Nyanga fleeing violence in Masisi. As
the refugees arrived in the area, they found that much of the land was controlled by Tutsi, who used the land for
grazing cattle and goats. As with J:Iutu refugees arriving in Masisi and Rutshuru from Rwanda, the displaced Hunde
and Nyanga who arrived in Ikobo worked to radicalize the local Hunde and Nyanga population, known as the
Bakobo. The displaced population was integrated into local Mai-M~i rnilitia groups.56
The first Mai-Mai attacks targeted specifically against Tutsi began in Ikobo around March 14. According
to a young Tutsi man from Katikwu village in Walikale Zone:
There was a group of people, eighty to one hundred, armed with knives, spears, guns. They came
at about 5:00 p.rn. They came to my neighbor Sebatware and pillaged his cows. This was the first
attack. The group of bandits came and then left, but this was followed by other attacks .... When
we saw that they were going to pillage ail of our cattle, we went to an area to the side, to Mirigi in
Lubero.
They came back a week later to Mirigi and attacked again. I saw tbem myselfthis tirne. We had
gone to take refuge with our friends in Mirigi. The bandits came again at around 10:00 in the
moming. At this time, they took many cows. They took all of rny cows, all seventy, and they took
one hundred from the friend with whom I was staying. So we fled from tbere to go to
Kanyabayonga. We had no cattle Jeft, so we just Jeft with our families. ... When we were there,
they harassed us. Leave for Rwanda. It's your country.' The Nande said this. Also there were some
soldiers who said this.57
After a number of Mai-Mai raids against Tutsi in lkobo, rnost local Tutsi fled with their rernaining cattle to
Lubero, a nearby zone where there were also rnany Tutsi berders. The Mai-Mai from Ikobo, however, pursued the
Tutsi into Lubero. According to a number of testimonies gathered by Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH
researchers, the Mai-Mai from Walikale joined with local Lubero Hunde and Nande Bangirima rnilitia groups to
attack both displaced Watikale Tutsi and Tutsi frorn Lûbero.
Nyirasengo Kabami, a Tutsi wornan from Mwekwe village in Lubero Zone recounts that sbe and her farnily
fled to nearby Mbabinyo village when they heard that the Bangirirna had corne to attack their village, but the
Bangirima soon came to attack there as well:
We waited at Mbabinyo, and the bandits arrived there. The bandits were called Bangirirna. We
were staying with Nande, with friends. Sorne other Nande arrived and told us to bide, because the
bandits, the Bangirima~ were coming. We sent our cattle on up the road, to bide thern. The bandits
came to where we were hiding .... The friends who were hiding us closed the door and shut us
inside. The bandits asked if there were any Tutsi there. The friends said no. The bandits had lances,
55Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews conducted at Nkamira Transit Center, April 16, 1996.
s6Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews conducted at Nkamira Transit Center, April 1996.
57Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 17 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
guns. They numbered more than forty. Our Nande friends did everything they could to save our
lives. The Nande said that our cattle had gone up the road, so the bandits followed the road to get
the cows and steal them. The bandits took the car that was at the house to chase after the cows.
After this they returned the car and left, and we went to Kanyabayonga by car, in this same car ....
I saw the bandits myself. I was looking out the windows when they came to the house. They were
ail strangers. But then, I cou Id not recognize them because of what they wore, bark froqi trees,
animal skins . ... They even wore skirts and dresses. They covered. their faces in black so that they
could not be identified.
When they came back to the bouse where we were hiding, they said that the Tutsi should go back
home [to Rwanda]. They ~aid if there are any Tutsi here, they should leave immediately. Otherwise,
we will corne back and kill them." ·
As the anti-Tutsi attacks quickly spread across .Wa1ikale and Lubero, hundreds of Tutsi, the vast majority
ofthem Zairians, according to witnesses, began to converge on the center ofKanyabayonga. The Zairian military
had organized buses to transport Tutsi for a fee of US $12 from Kanyabayonga to Goma, where they could then
cross into safety in Rwanda. Witnesses, reported that the displaced Tutsi were scrambling to raise the money to buy
places for their families on the buses to Goma. According to a school director from Kanyabayonga:
Refugees who were coming with the rest oftheir cattle sold them for low prices before they could
leave. Cows could usually be sold for $200, even more if they were big and healthy. The refugees
had to sell their cows for $20.59
Buses began to leave Kanyabayongà during the final days of March. On April 2, the Mai-Mai and Bangirima
came to attack the town of Kanyabayonga itself. According to the school director and other witnesses, the attackers
were assisted by local Nande, who indicated the homes of Tutsi and participated in the attacks. The military did
nothing to protect the town. Tutsi fled from the city into the bush, then retumed in the evening after the attackers
had left. In the next several days, thousands of Tutsi in the community chose to leave for Goma in the military
buses.60
Following attacks in Walikale and Lubero, Zairian Tutsi refugees began pouring into Rwanda on March 27,
1996. According to UNHCR figures, between March 27 and April 16, in a period of only three weeks, 4,820 Zairian
Tutsi fled North Kivu into Rwanda. By late May, more than 8,000 Zairian Tutsi were gathered in two campsjust
a cross the Zaïre border in Gisenyi prefecture of Rwanda. At the same time, thousands of other Tutsi were gathered
in centers throughout North Kivu, such as Kikuku, Rutshuru town, Tongo, and Kichanga, where they continued to
be harassed by militia, particularly Interahamwe. Many Tutsi have been afraid to make the joumey to Rwanda,
because the road to the border runs past the Rwandan refugee camps and other areas where Hutu militia are strong.61
Karambizi Ntabaringamira, a young Tutsi man from Ngololo in Bwito Collectivity, was injured by Interahamwe in
Rutshuru, then again by Hutu refugees when the Zairian military forced the vehicle he was in to stop outside a large
refugee camp:
"Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 1996
59Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 5, 1996.
60Based on Human Rig~ts Watch/FIDH interviews conducted at Nkamira. T~nsit Center, April 5, 1996.
61UNHCR, Department ofStatistics; Mseteka Buchizya, "Thousands on move from violence in Eastern Zaire," Reuters, May
7, 1996; Chris Tomlinson, "Zaire/Refugees," Voice of America, May 29, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 18 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
Yesterday [April 15] we left Rutshuru. We passed Kibumba [refugee camp] at about 7:00 p.m. I
was again bit with a stone, on thé same leg. That is why it is so swollen. I was in a vehicle with a
few other people, not in a bus. We were stopped at Kibumba at the barrier by Zairian soldiers. They
demanded that we pay them to let us pass. While the driver was negotiating with the soldiers,
Interahamwe came and began threatening us. They said, "Where are you going? We will follow
you and kill you. Even if you go to R~anda, _we will follow you there and kill you." Then they
started throwing stones.62
Many of the Tutsi interviewed for this report insisted that, although they speak Kinyarwanda, they are
Zairians, not Rwandans. Their families have lived in Zaïre for generations, and they have no connection to Rwanda."
Gasamuyinga Rutshogoza is typical of many other refugees recently arrived in Rwanda when he said:
My family is Zairian. My father and grandfather were both bom at Jomba [in Zaïre]. They moved
to Bukombo when my father was young. They left me large tracts ofland in Bukombo.63
A CAMPAIGN TO CREATE ETl:INIC ENCLAVES
The primary goal of the attacks that have been taking place in North Kivu has been to create ethnically pure
enclaves by forcing members of competing ethnie groups out of targeted areas. The Hutu·refugees in particular,
fearing forced repatriation t(? Rwanda, have sought to increase the land available to them by targeting members of
other ethnie groups. The Hutu refugees have sought to guarantee that, should the refugee camps be closed, they have
a fall-back destination other than Rwanda, where many could face arrest for participation in the genocide of 1994.
As the Jnterahamwe have driven Hunde and Nyanga out of areas in Masisi and Rutshuru, displaced members of these
groups have in tum sought to aquire new land for themselves. For both Mai-Mai/Bangerima and Interahamwe, Tutsi
have been logical targets, because despite their relatively limited numbers, they have controlled extensive tracts of
land used for grazing.64 ·
A number ofmeans have been used to force targeted populations to flee in order to create ethnie enclaves.
Pillaging has been widely employed by militia as a weapon to drive targeted ethnie groups out oftheir homes. Both
Mai-Mai/Bangerima and Interahamwe militia groups have pillaged extensively, stealing livestock and household
goods. A number of refugees claim that when they were attacked, they were stripped even of the clothes they were
wearing. In many areas, militia have bumed bouses as well. By.<festroying the homes of the targeted groups and
by taking their means of eaming a living, the mititia clearly intended to force them into leaving the area.
ln certain militia attacks where pillaging has occurred, violence has been fairly limited, particularly in
Watikate and Lubero. But this was not simple banditry; pillaging has been clearly designed to encourage the victims
to leave the area, since the attacks have almost atways been accompanied by demands for the victims to flee and by
threats of future violence ifthey remain. For example, on March 27 and 28, Mai.Mai and Bangerima pitlaged the
rural community in Lubero zone where Gilbert, a Tutsi teacher bom in·Rutshuru zone, was living. In the first attack,
the militia stole one hundred cows, and on the next day, they stole another fifty. According to Ngirabakunzi:
62Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center,_April 16, 1996.
61Human Rights Watch/FtDH interview at .Nkamira Transit Center, April 16, 1996.
64Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devasté," p. 12; UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi and Rutshuru."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 19 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
When they take your cattle, when they take your livelihood, it gives you a great moral shock. We
wept. Those of us who were pillaged, we wept as they took our cattle. They told us, "Don't cry for
your cattle; cry for the blood we are going to spill the next time we corner' They told us, "Go back
to Rwanda, because you already have your country." There at Lubero, I have land that I have
worked and many cattle. In Rwanda I have nothing.65
According to numerous testimonies, Mai-Mai, Banigirima, and Interahamwe have all warned Tutsi to "go
back to Rwanda." Mai-Mai and Bangirima have used the same argument against Hutu. According to a refugee from
Bibwe:
. TI1e Mai-Mai came at 5:00 in the moming, and we fled to the forest. They pillaged homes, broke
our radios and machines, ripped up our money. They said, "Ali Rwandans should take their bags
and go to Rwanda." For them, neither Tutsi nor Hutu should stay.66
Pillaging has been most widely targeted against Tutsi, who are perceived to be the wealthiest group in the
region, but has also affected other groups.
Violence has been the primary tool used to achieve the expulsion of Tutsi (and others) in Masisi and
Rutshuru. No accurate statistics regarding the number of people killed since the conflict reignited late last year are
currently available, but the figure is clearly in the hundreds and steadily mounting. As one young woman. who fled
to Rwanda from Bishusha in Rutshuru zone in June 1995 explained:
In our region, it was a mix of Hutu, Tutsi, and Hunde. The Hunde started by attacking the
lnterahamwe to make them retum to Rwanda. But then they began to attack everyone. Now the
Tutsi have left, and the Hutu remain, and ther~ is fighting between Hutu and Hunde.67
The attacks discussed in this report represent selected examples, and in no way comprise a comprehensive
list. Sorne places, such as Sake, Kichanga, and Masisi town have been attacked repeatedly by Interahamwe in the
effort to drive out Hunde, Nyanga, and Tutsi. Other communities in Rutshuru and Lubero have been repeatedly
attacked by Bangirima and Mai-Mai to drive out Hutu and Tutsi. Attacks by militia initially took the form of raids
on communities, in which a small number of people were killed and goods were pillaged, apparently with the
intention of frightening the survivors into fleeing. But since February, attacks have become increasingly blo?dy, as
with the massacre at Mokoto parish .. An additional troubling development has been the reports of sustained battles
waged between militia groups, as the militia vie for control of various terri tories. The towns of Sake, Kichanga,
Bambu, and others have seen repeated fighting, with militia members killed on both sides and numerous civilians
wounded or killed.61
In some areas, rape of women and girls appears to have been widespread, particularly in Masisi and
Rutshuru. Although many of. the peopl~ interviewed for this report were reluctant to discuss the issue, several
confirmed that militia had used rape during attacks on their communities. Sexual violence against women has been
an effective weapon to drive populations to flee their homes, both because of the severe so~ial consequences for the
65Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 5, 1996.
66Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 17, 1996.
67Human Rights WatctyflDH interview at Nkamira commercial center, April 16, 1996.
61Mseteka, "Thousands on move"; Tomlinson, "Zaire/Refugees;" and witness accounts in Human Rights Watch/FIDH
interviews.
Human R\ghts Watch/Africa and FIDH 20 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
victims and because of the negative reflection on the fathers and husbands, who are expected by society to protect
the women oftheir community. Rape was used as a weapon to terrorize and dehumanize Tutsi women during the
genocide in Rwanda. Since the renewal of conflict in North Kivu charges ofrape of Tutsi women by Interahamwe
militia members have been frequ~nt, suggesting a continuation of the practices used in Rwanda. Nevertheless, ail
the niilitia groups have been accused ofrape, and women from ail ethnie communities have been targeted.
The process of ethnie violence has ·been suppo~ed by the pursuit of targeted populations as they seek refuge,
with Mai-Mai and Bangerima, or lnterahamwe, or both, following them and attacking. Interahamwe have attacked
displaced Hunde and Tutsi who have gathered at churches and schools in Mweso, Kichanga, Matanda, Mokoto,
Birambizo, Tongo, and Rutshuru, seeking to drive them out ofMasisi and Rutshuru entirely. Mai-Mai from Ikobo
in Walikale have pursued Tutsi into Lubero, attempting to drive them out of the country. Many of the refugees
currently coming out of North Kivu report fleeing from one community to the next, with the Mai-Mai or Interahamwe
or both following them and attacking again and forcing them to move on. The point ofthis pursuit seems ta be to·
drive populations as far from their homes as possible s9 that retum becomes increasingly difficult.69
The effect of ail ofthese strategies bas been to create ethnie territories. As the Commission of Justice and
Peace of the Goma Catholic Diocese noted in February, the fighting has devastated the region: ·
The attacks are thus systematically directed ·and by village. Entire villages are bumt, cows
scandalously pillaged, people are injured, other killed. Thousands of people, including customary
chiefs, have been chased from the villages. The cattle herds of Masisi are have been destroyed. The
entire economy of the zone is ruined. Villages are now separated by ethnicity.70
Continuing violence in North Kivu supports the conclusion that the establishment of monoethnic territories
in an historically multiethnic area is inherently unstable. Even after most communities have been cleared of all but
a single ethnie group, fighting continues as each group seeks to expand its territory. People who have been driven
from their homes seek to reclaim the land which they consider theirs by right and therefore attack communities they
have left in an attempt to eject in tum those who drove them out. Hutu militia in Masisi have continued to attack
centers such as Sake and Kichanga that are currently dominated by Hunde, white Hunde have fought to defend their
communities. With many communities now bereft of ethnie diversity,. the intensity of combat has increased rather
than diminished, and the number of dead continues to mount.
COMPLICITY OF THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT
Despite the severity of the conflict in North Kivu, Zairian govemment officiais at the local, regional, and
national levels have shown little commitment to ending the conflict or protecting civilians. Govemment initiatives
to disarm combatants and stop fighting have received only limited official endorsement, and little commitment of
resources. The national authorities have failed to act consistent)y to hait the conflict. Indeed some govemment and
military leaders have exploited the conflict for their own political purposes, white incendiary public statements by
various national and regiona~ leaders have played a major part in fanning its flames.71
69Mseteka, "Thousands on move"; Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devasté," p.14; and Human Rights Watch/FIDH
interviews.
'°Commission Justice ~t Paix, "Masisi: Zone devasté," pp . . 12-13.
71Chris McGreal, "Zaïre: lnstability Revives Mobutu's Fortunes,'' Jancs Dcfcncc Weekly, May 1, 1996; "Masisi ou la guerre
oubliée," p. viii.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 21 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
The primary govemment initiative taken to address the latest phase of the conflict in North Kivu has been
"Operation Kimia" (Operation Peace), a military operation announced as intended to dis~ combatants and restore
cairn. Following a visit to Goma by a delegation of govemment ministers, Operation Kimia was launched on April
11, 1996, as the first step in an effort to bring about peace talks between the warring groups. Over the course of
several weeks, approximately 800 FAZ troops, including member~ of the Para-Commandos, DsP, and the Service
d'Action et de Renseignement Militaire (SARM), were deployed in Masisi. These troops have guarded roads and
markets; and according to observers in the zone, they have restored order at least temporarily in some areas, so that
people have been able to retum to their fields and markets.72
1l1e ultimate success ofOperation Kimia, however, is likely to be limited. The govemor of the region first
promised in February that military reinforcements would be sent to the zone, but the violence was allowed to·
intensify for another two months before troops were sent. The soldiers participating in the operation have extremely
limited material resources, making it likely that they will tum to looting and graft to support themselves. The stated
primary objective of disarming the militia has met with little success, and mostly traditional arms have been
collected, along with very few guns. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees: "The elite DSP troops engaged
in Operation Kimia have been somewhat effective. Other, non-DSP troops, however, have generally been ineffective
at best and, at worst, have facilitated or participated in violence and looting.,,73
Despite a Juil in fighting in the areajust after the deployment, by the end of April, fighting had recommenced
and intensified throughout May. Major attacks have taken place at Kichanga, Nyamitaba, and Mokoto in Masisi.
In addition, fighting has escalated in Rutshuru, where troops have not been deployed, and violent incidents have been
taken place near Goma. No initiatives have been taken to organize peace talles between the parties in the conflicL 74
1l1e history of the involvement of the Zairian military in the conflicts in the region also raises serious doubts
about the potential success of a pure.ly military response. The Zairian military bas been responsible for serious
human rights violations, and has established a pattern of corruption and a Jack of discipline which enables soldiers
to take sides in the conflict for their own profit. While most of the attacks in the current round of violence apparently
have been carried out by civilian militia, the Zairian armed forces have occasionally supported attacks by one or the
other militia group. After several members of the Parachute Commandoes were killed by Hunde attacks in early
December 1995, for example, the "Paras" attacked Hunde villages. They have subsequently joined with Interahamwe
in several attacks, though in some areas there has also been combat between the Para-Commandos and Interahamwe.
The police and DsP have been accused of supporting the Mai-Mai and Bangirima in various attacks.75 There have
been no investigation or prosecution of these abuses, which' contributes to the climate of impunity.
More often than actually participating in the fighting, soldiers and police have simply profited from the
chaotic situation. When Mai-Mai, Bangirima, or Interahamwe have arrived, the soldiers and police have fled the
communities they were assigned to protect. Soldiers and police have been accused of pillaging from ail sides in the
conflict. Pillaging is not the only example ofways in which military and police have profited from the conflict. The
72UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi and Rutshuru"; "Zaïre: Zaïre Accuses Rwanda Refugees of Killing Six," Reuters, April
30, 1996.
71U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Masisi, Down the Road from Goma: Ethnie Cleansing and Displacement in Eastern Zaîre,"
June 1996, p. 8.
74Hoogesteyn, "Anned Rwanda Hutus"; Bolton, "3,000 Tutsis under 'Threat in Masisi;" UNDHA, "Situation Report on Masisi
and Rutshuru"; "Zaire: Zajre Accuses Rwanda Refugees;" BBC World News, June 2, 1996.
75"Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. viii; Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devasté," pp. 13-14; Hoogesteyn, "Forty
killed in Zaïre dispute."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 22 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
Zairian anny has required refugees to pay to be evacuated by bus, and soldiers have demanded refugees pay fees to
pass by barriers on their way to refuge. Several Tutsi refugees in Rwanda report that they paid US $12 or US $15
for transport from Kanyabayonga or Katwe to Goma but were instead dropped off halfway there, at Rutshuru, where
they were then attacked by Interahamwe. The interest of the soldiers was obviously not in protecting the threatened
groups but in making a quick profit by transporting as many people as possible out of the communi~ies where they
were being attacked.76 !
Even where soldiers or police have demonstrated good intentions to stop the violence, they have been
hampered by inadequate equipment and personnel. Severa) examples in the region make clear that where there is
a will, sufficient discipline, and adequate support, the attacks can be stopped and victims protected. In the town of
Rutshuru, for example, the contingent of gendannes was sufficiently large to provide protection to r~fugees at a local
school when they were attacked by Interahamwe in mid-April. Several witnesses praised the commander of the
police at Kanyabayongo for trying to prevent violence.77
In general, however, even when military or police have attempted to intervene to stop fighting, they have
been too few in number and too poorly supplied to succeed. In several instances, as in the town of Masisi in
December where soldiers wer~ attacked by Mai-Mai, soldiers or police have themselves been targeted by militia
from one side or the other. ln other instances, good intentions have been hampered by inadequate material resources
and personnel. According to one witness, after his community in Lubero was attacked, the gendarmes were called
and came quickly. A group of gendannes stayed for the night, but left in the moming:
When they were leaving, we asked the capta in of the gendannes who had corne from Kanyabayoi:tga
to leave at least a few soldiers. The captain said that he understood the problem, but he did not have
enough men. He said it was unfortunate, but he could not leave men. They left about 10:00 a.m.,
and the bandits came back by 11 :00 a.m .. 78
ln general, a military response seems unlikely to bring lasting peace to the region as long as the political will
for peace is Jacking. The Commission of Justice and Peace of the Catholic Diocese of Goma noted that:
More than a few people think that these military operations are only a mascarade. Ali that one can
say is that the soldiers traffic in anns, conduct commerce in pillaged cows and agricultural products
(beans). Perhaps peace will return to Masisi when there are no more cattle, no beans. And that
moment will arrive soon.79
The greatest obstacle to establishing peace in the region is the complicity and involvement in the conflict
by government officiais, as evidenced by the targeting for expulsion of the Tutsis. Refugees from the vio,ence in
Zaïre who were interviewed for this report universally expressed the belief that Zairian govemment officiais have
been behind the attacks. One refugee stated:
The stories of govemment complicity are numerous. The attacks and violence have clearly been
targeted. In November, it was only Tutsi who had their homes pillaged. Sorne Tutsi were taken to
16Commission Justice et Paix, "Masisi: Zone devasté," pp. 13-14; "Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. viii; and Human Rights
Watch/FIDH interviews.
77Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Nkamira Transit Center and Gisenyi, April 5, 16, and 17.
"Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 1996.
79Commission Justice et Paix, Masisi: Zone devasté," p. 14.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 23 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
the road block and thrown out of the country by force. ln Goma, only Tutsi were targeted. It is just
as in Walikale and Lubero now. Sorne members ofmy family lived between Nande families who
still have their cattle. Only our cattle were pillaged. •0
The refugees report numerous instances of local officiais who participated in militia attacks. According to
several refugees from Walikale, the locality chief in Ikobo was involved in the raids against Tutsi there. One Tutsi
man from the region testified: ·
My family had 300 head of cattle that were stolen at Walikale. This happened just in the past few
weeks [in late March]. The chief of the Jocality, Matshozi Likanga, was involved. He even led the
group of Bangirima that stole our cattle - mine, my father's, and my brother's. 11
Another Tutsi from Walikale who took refuge in Lubero reported that in late March the section head of
Mirigi, Njenja Kyamwami, sent his assistants10 demanda cow from each of the Tutsi in the area:
The commandant sent his police. They came by and asked for a cow. They took one of my cows
and one cow from the man in whose bouse I had taken refuge. They said they would protect us in
exchange. They said they would protect all of us herders. ... This was the day before the attack.
The next day the bandits came [ and took all of our càttle] and the commandant did nothing.12
Severa! refugees who had sought shelter in Kanyabayonga claim that Muhindo Pandasi Rukira II (head of
groupement), in Bwito, required Tutsi to provide cattle in exchange for protection. They t):ien saw him corne to
Kanyabayonga the day before the April 2 attack there to sell the cattle, but no protection was provided.13 While none
of the refugees interviewed for this report claimed to have seen govemment officiais actually injuring or killing
during any of the attacks, many people were convinced that local officiais strongly supported the actions of the
militia, particularly the Mai-Mai and Bangirima. .
More troubling than the involvement of local officiais and low-level military personnel in the conflict bas
been the complicity of higher level officiais. The initial attacks in Masisi in March 1993 followed comments by
then-governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho questioning the nationality of the Banyarwanda. Likewise, the Jatest
round of violence followed comments in November 1995 by General Eluki, the anny chief of staff, in which he stated
his belief that the Hunde, Nyanga, and Tembo were justified in their effort to protect the land of their ancestors and
to expel "foreigners," a clear reference to the Banyarwanda."' ·
· Numerous other official actions seem to give sanction to the attackers. The refugees coming into Rwanda
in April reported that their Zairia~ identity cards, which identify them as Zairian citizens and would be necessary for
them to re-enter the country, were taken by guards at the border and destroyed. The refugees were also forced to tum
10Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Gisenyi, April 17, 1996.
11Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Gisenyi, April 17, 1996.
12Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 1996.
13Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 1996.
1'"Masisi ou la guerre oubliée," p. viii; Amnesty International, p. 22.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 24 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
over ail oftheir Zairian money. These actions represent troubling official signais that the Zairian Banyarwanda, and
Tutsi in particular, are being arbitrarily stripped of their Zairian nationality.15
The reaction of the current govemor QfNorth Kivu, Christophe Moto Mupenda to the conflict bas also been
disturbing. In public comments, Moto Mupenda bas repeatedly minimized the severity of the violence and has lashed
out at critics who have tried to pressure him to take stronger action. In addition, hè hâs often spoken in tenns that
have heightened tensions, for example publicly doubting the claims of nationality for Zairian Banyarwanda.86
According to witnesses who were in Kanyabayonga, Govemor Moto Mupenda èame to town with the
vice-prime minister of Zaïre on March 31. Various prominent local individuats raised the problems of ethnie
violence in the meetings, but the officiais subsequently took no action. Two individuals from Kanyabayonga explain
the followup to the visit:
The following day, the chief of the·city held a popular meeting. During the meeting what astonished
us is that he addressed the Tutsi and said, "Go home. Go guard your cattle. There is no more war
here." This was when our cows had already been stolen! He told us to go guard our cattle! This
speech by the chief of the.city was the day after the govemor had corne, and the next day we were ·
attacked in bis city.17
In a pastoral letter issued on April 20, "Renoncez au Mensonge,'1 the Cathotic bishop of Goma, Faustin
Ngabu, condemned the false arguments used to support the ethnie attacks, such as the idea that the Tutsi are not
"true" 23:irians. He also strongly condemned the role of govemment officiais in the violence:
The authorities who should corne to help the victims of violence seem on the contrary to want to
feed the tire that destroys them .... We are troubled to note that these practices that sow division,
misery, and death within the different ethnie groups in our Region are the result of an organization
at a high level, and we regret that the regional and local authorities who have as a mission to infonn
the central govemment about the rea!ity of facts prefer to execute directives based on t.ies.18
The govemor of North Kivu responded to the letter at a public meeting on April 24, attributing to the Tutsi
responsibility for the conflict. According to a broadcast by a local station, Radio Star, he said:
The Govemor of the Region made it known that this declaration is nothing less than a slandcr and
a gross lie by the Catholic Prelate directed at the authorities of the Country and it is necessary at ail
costs to react to clarify public opinion. According to the regional authority, the causes of the
conflicts in North Kivu are known by everyone. Far from being lies, the conflicts are created
deliberately by people who want to be given a status that they don't have. lt is these who deformed
the truth, who can be called liars, and not the regional authorities. The Govemor of the Region
85Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Nkamira Transit Center, April S, 16, and 17.
16"Reaction de l'autorité regionale du Nord-Kiw, Mr. Christophe Moto Mupenda vis à vis de la déclaration de l'Evéque de
Goma, Mgr. Faustin Ngabu sur la situation générale qui prévant dans )a Région actuellement," Radio Star, Journal parlé de 18h00,
April 24, 1996; Christophe Moto Mupenda, "Communiqué Officiel," December 6, I 99S; Hoogesteyn, "Anned Rwanda Hutus";
"Zaire Accuses Rwanda Refugees."
87Human Rights Watch/FJOH interview at Nkamira Transit Center, April 5, 1996.
18Faustin Ngabu, "Renoncez au Mensonge" Declaration de Mgr. Faustin Ngabu, Evéque de Goma aux Chretiens et aux
Hommes de Bonne Volunté," April 21, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 2S July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
reminded those in attendance that since the beginning of the confrontation, both Hunde and Hutu
have been displaced from their villages and no one has raised his voice. When the Tutsi are being
knocked about, voices are raised everywhere. Is it the ethnie group cherished by the Cathotic
prelate, the regional authority demanded. This same observation was made by Mwami Kalinda, who
asked that Mgr. Ngabube be tried for his discourteous pronouncements regarding the Zairian state.
Finalty, the Govemor of the Region, Moto Mu pend a confinned that the Tutsi who have retumed to
their mother country were Rwandan refugees from 1959, installed at Bibwe [in Masisi] and who had
infiltrated into the Collectivities of Batangi and Bamate in the zone of Lubero searching for arable
land. They decided to retum voluntarily to Rwanda; in short, this is not an issue of expulsion nor
refoulement, the Govemor of the Region, Mr .. Christophe Moto Mupenda, concluded.19
Interviews with Tutsi who have recently fled Zaïre indicate that the majority of them are not, in fact, refugees
wh~ fled Rwanda in 1959, and they insist that their flight from Zaïre was not voluntary but forced.
Most recently, according to news reports, the govemor rejected criticism of Operation Kimia. When the
national radio station, The Voice of Zaïre, reported on April 30 that local official~ in Masisi claimed that killings
were continuing in the region despite Operation Kimia, mentioning in particular six people who had been ambushed
in one area in the five prece~ing days, the govemor rejected the claims. According to a Reuters report, Moto
Mupenda said, "I have not caught wind of these killings. The radio is adding fuel to the fire. I have the impression
that there are people who do not want tension in Masisi to be defused."90
The govemor is ultimately responsible to authorities in Kinshasa, and the case presented by Emmanuel, an
industrialist from Goma, provides a troubling indication that leaders at the national level have also been involved
in the interethnic violence in North Kivu:
l left Goma, because I was pillaged by the Zairian military. ln November [of 1995] there were two
soldiers and four civilians who came to pillage my house. They took my luggage, everything, even
my diploma, though I got that back a little later. They said, "Go to Rwanda, because you're Tutsi."
The next day, I went to file corn plaints at the office of the military chief and at the govemor's office.
But the authorities did nothing. There were other prominent Tutsi who were targeted at the same
time.
In January, the 18th of January, there was a friend of mine who was a soldier. He came to tell me
that the military was coming to find me. SARM, the Service d'Action et de Renseignement Militaire,
Mobutu's elite service was coming to take me. The friend advised me to flee. When they corne to
get someone, it is to torture them to death. In November, at the same time that the group came to
pillage my house, SARM took two other people, Tutsi. They were at home at the time, and they took
them under the pretext that they had anns. Their names were Samuel and Fiat.. They were tortured,
nearly to death, then they were sent to Kinshasa. The troops produced a grenade and said that they
had been stocking arms, which was obviously a set up. The two were taken -to Kinshasa and
tortured, then liberated ....
When I heard that the same group was coming to search for me, I came immediately to the road
black at the border. I got a pass and went into Rwanda. Five minutes after leaving my office, they
19"Reaction de l'autorité regional du Nord-Kivu," Radio Star.
'IO"Zaire Accuses Rwanda Refugees," BBC Wor/d News.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 26 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
came to search for me there. Then they went to my home. The next day they came to the road
block and asked ifl had crossed over, and they were told that I had.91
According to Emmanuel and a number of other witnesses, numerous cases of attacks and assassinations
raised with authorities at the local, regional, and national levels have received no response. For example, the killing
in May 1995 of Nyangezi, a ·Tutsi judge at Jomba-Gisigari in Bwisha collectivity, has never been officially
investigated, despite requests by local residents. Local officiais who have participated in attacks in various parts of
the region have received no official reprimands or punishment, but continued to enjoy impunity for their acts.
The Human Rights Watch Arms Project report, "Rearming with Impunity," published in May 1995,
demonstrated extensive involvement by the Zairian govemment in providing arins tri the 'Hutu militia and the
ex-Force Années Rwandaises {FAR). The lnterahamwe and ex-FAR have been allowed considerable liberty to move
and operate within both North and South Kivu and have even been provided territory to conduct training. These
activities have taken place with the involvement of various military offièers and regional officiais and have certainly
had the endorsement of national officers and officials.92
·, , .
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The international community has tried to ignore the conflict in North Kivu, choosing instead to focus on the
refugee crisis in isolation. The massive international assistance provided to the Rwandan refugees in Zaire did not
benefit the local Zairian population who suffered fr9m the impact of the refugees, including environmental
devastation, the increased arms flows and the growing insecurity in the region. In addition, the sources of the 1993
ethnie conflict in North Kivu and the role played by Zairian security forces in the conflict remained unaddressed, all
of which made a new explosion of ethnie violence predictable.
Moreover, as noted, the Zairian authorities have played a key role in re-arming the ex-FAR, providing shelter
and protection to them and other Hutu militias in eastem Zaïre, and pennitting these forces to carry out military
training and raids into Rwanda. This close association between the Zairian security forces and elements of the Hutu
refugees in Zaïre was well-known to the international community, and clearly pointed to the spill-over that was likely
to occur on the ethnie tensions in the region.
Although France, Betgium, and the U.S. - known as the troika- have periodically collaborated to support
the transition process in Zaïre and have conducted joint initiatives, they have remained silent on the conflict in North
Kivu. Only the U.S. govemment has publicly condemned the recent violence, though U.S. officiais have been careful
not to strongly criticize the Zairian govemment's rote. The troïka, as well as the United Nations, have focused their
attention largely on the fate of the refugees in Eastern Zaïre, the forthcoming presidentiat etections in Zaire, and the
rote that Mobutu plays in the Great Lakes region. ·
France went so far as to renew its assistance to Zaïre at the height of the expulsions, in April 1996. Ali but
humanitarian assistance had been eut off in October 1991. A spokeswoman for the Ministry_ of Cooperation said
French aid would be for the health and education sectors, but did not disclose the amount. The spokeswoman added
that the French decision did not reflect a determination in Paris that human rights had improved in Zaire.93
91Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Gisenyi, April 17, 1996.
'llHuman Rights Watch, "Reanning with Jmpunity."
'llfrancois Raitberger, Reuters, April 26, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 27 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
The U.S. State Department issued a statement on May 21 expressing concem about the violence in Eastern
Zaire, calling on the Zairian authorities to protect ail residents and to provide sanctuary to the displaced.94 U.S.
officiais have visited the Tutsi refugees on the Rwandan border, including John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Coordinator for Rwanda and
Burundi.
However, the U.S. government's attempts to engage Mobutu on regional issues has led to a reluctance to
criticize bis record too strongly. In a July 1 response to a letter by Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Russell Feingold,
the chair and ranking member of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, the State Department went out ofits way to refrain
from criticizing the Zairian govemment, and even to praise its actions:
White we would not dismiss your suggestion that the Zairian govemment and military are exploiting
these tensions for their own purposes and inay be forcibly eviéting the Banyarwanda, we note that
the Govemment of Zaïre (Goz) bas engaged in several measures to attempt to reduce tensions.
Government officiais have met with traditional chiefs and religious leaders in Kinshasa to pursue
possible solutions. As we noted in our statement, some ofthese local officiais have set courageous
examples in opposing the violence. The Goz dispatched a military mission to attempt to disarm
armed groups. Unfortunately, even when Zairian security forces attempt to iÔtervene in positive
ways, they are not always operationally capable of successfully completing their mission.95
The conflict in North Kivu is increasing tensions between the govemments of Rwanda and Zaïre. At the
United Nations, Rwanda's permanent representative, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, sent a letter to the President
of the Security Council dated May 24, 1996, in which he condemned the United Nations for not holding Zaïre
responsjble for the attacks against Tutsis. 96 The Chargé d' Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Zaïre responded on
June 3 with another letter to the Secur~ty Council, which "vehemently rejects" the Rwandan ambassador's action and
denies that Kinyarwanda-speaking Zairians live in Zaïre: "The Govemment of Zaïre would like to inform the Security
Council that, of the languages spoken in Zaïre, Kinyarwanda is not one of them. It is a language of Rwandans
transplanted by colonization in 1929 and 1957-59, who have never been integrated into th~ local population."97
The Rwandan govemment contends that the refugees are Zairian citizens fleeing violence. It therefore
established the Petit Barrière refugee camp in Gisenyi, located about a kilometer away from the Zairian border.
Despite appeals by the UNHCR that the camp be moved a reasonable distance away from the border due to security
risks, the govemment has refused. According to UNHCR, a reasonable distance is usually interpreted as not less than
fifty kilometers.91
A U.N. team, led by the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs, visited eastem Zaïre in late May and early June
to investigate the violence and th~ humanitarian needs in the Masis~ region. The team did not visit Masisi for security
94Statement by Nicholas Burns, spokesman, "U.S. Concemed by Ethnie Violence in Eastern Zaïre," U.S. Department of State,
May 21, 1996. . .
..
95Letter from Barbara Larkin, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Nancy Kassebaum, July 1, 1996.
96Evelyn Leopold, "Rwandan envoy seeking UN action in east Zaïre," Reuters, May 24, 1996.
97Letter dated 3 June 1996 from the Charge d' Affaires A.I. of the Pennanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations Addressed
to the President of the Sec~rity Council, S/1996/413.
91Letter addressed to Janet Fleischman, Human Rights Watch/Africa, from Jiddo van Drunen, Head of Operations, Special
Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, UNHCR, July 11, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 28 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
reasons, but stayed in Goma and talked to aid workers. 99 The team recommended the appointment of a speciat envoy
to estab~ish dialogue with the Zairian authorities to address issues such as the nationality qu~stion for the
Banyarwanda and improving security in North Kivu. To stabilize the situation, they suggested removing the military
camps near Goma, known to be the site of ex-FAR activities, and relocating the Petite Barrière refugee camp in
Rwanda. •00 At this writing, no action bas been taken on these recom. m. endation·s·.,..
'
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was written by Timothy Longman, consultant to Hu~an Ri~hts Watch/Africa and FIDH, and
edited by Janet Fleischman, Washington Director ofHuman Rights Watch/Africa.
Human Rights Watch/Africa
Human Rights Watch is a nongovemmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance
of intemationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and among the signatories
of the Helsinki accords. It is supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations ~orldwide. It
accepts no govemment fonds, directly or indirectly. The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Cynthia
Brown, program director; Holly J. Burkhalter, advocacy director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance and administration
director; Robert Kimzey, publications director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director;
Juan Méndez, general coun~el; Susan Osnos, communications director; Jemera Rone, counsel; and Joanna Weschler,
United Nations representative. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of the board and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair.
Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takirambudde is the executive director; Janet Fleischman is the
Washington director; Suliman Ali Baldo is the senior researcher; Alex Vines is the research associate; Bronwen
Manby and Binaifer Nowrojee are counsels; Kimberly Mazyck and Lenee Simon are associatés; Alison DesForges
and Timothy Longman are consultants. William Cannichael is the chair of the advisory committee and Alice Brown
is the vice chair.
Gopher Address://gopher.humanrights.org:5000
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to ·[email protected] with
"subscribe hrw-news" in the body of the message (leave the subject lin~ blank).
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FJDH}
The International Federation ofHuman Rights is an international nongovemmental organization for the defense of
the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights of 1948. Created in 1922, it includes 89
national affiliates throughout the world. To date, FIDH has undertaken more than a thousand missions for
.investigation, observation of trials, mediation or training in some one hundred countries.··FIDH enjoys consultative
status with the United Nations, UNESCO, the European Council and observer status with the African Commission
ofHuman and Peoples' Rights. Antoine Bernard is the executive director. Patrick Baudouin is president; Pascuale
Bandiera, Hélène Cidade-Moura, René Degni-Segui, Enoch Djondang, Michael Ellman, Oswaldo Enriquez, Cannen
Ferrer Pei'ia, Cecilia Jimenez, Haytham Manna, Gerald McKenzie, Sabine Missistrano, Francisco Soberon, Robert
Verdier, Vo Van Ai and Saadeddine Zmerli are vice-presidents; Odile Sidem Poulain, Claude Katz and William
Bourdon are secretary generals; and Philippe Vallet is treas1:1rer of the international board. Catherine Choquet is
deputy secretary general and Eric Gillet is coordinator for Burundi and Rwanda.
991'U.N. team flies to Burundi after eastem Zaire," Reuters, June 6, 1996.
100"B~ckground Paper on Eastern Zaïre," DHA-JnterAction Meeting, June 28, 1996.
rnan Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 29 July 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (A)
UCMANr
UNITED
NATIONS
Economie and Social
Council
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-fourth session
Item 10 of the provisional agenda
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
16 September 1996
ENGLISH
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMJ\N RIGHTS AND FONDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLONIAL
AND OTHER DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire. prepared by
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Robert Garret6, in accordance with
Commission resolution 1996/77
Addendum
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I • INTRODUCTION •••• ..•••. ••• ••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• l - 13 3
A. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur and ethnie
conflicts in Northern Kivu ....... . ............... . l - 6 3
B. Purpose of the visit ............................. . 7 3
C. Lack of cooperatiÔn from the Government of Zaire .. 8 - 9 4
D. The visit ......................................•.. 10 - 13 4
II. ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN KIVU . ... ......... . 14 - 61 5
A. Historical background., ..............••.•...•..... 14 - 21 5
B. Conflicts before the arrival of the
Rwandan refugees ................................. . 22 - 33 6
c. Current state of the conflict ..........•.......... 34 - 61 8
CONTENTS (continued)
III. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE .... ... . . .. .. . .. .. .
IV.
A. Violation of t~ obligation to respect the rights
recognized in the International Covenanc on
Ci vil and Pol itical Rights . . .....•. ..... ..... : ... .
B. Violation of the obligation to guarantee the rights
recognized in the Internatlonal Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights .• ..•. • . . • •. . . ... •..• . ... . . . . .
C. Violation of the obligation not to discriminate •..
MAIN RIGHTS VIOLATED
A. Right to life .. . . . .. ... ............... .. .... ..... .
B. Right to physical and mental integrity . • . . . . . . .• • .
C. Right to nationality ... . .... . ........ . ... . ...... . .
D. Right to live in one •s own country .• . . • . . .. . ..• . ..
E. Right to choose one's own place of residence .. .. . .
F. Right to security .... ..... . .. . ....... . • . .. • . ••. .•.
V. REFERENCE TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN KIVU ....... . .. .
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....... . . . ... . .. . ..... .
A.
B.
Conclusions
Recommendations ...... . . ...... . .. .. . . .. . .. . ....•. . .
Pa ragraphs Page
62 - 93 14
64 - 81 15
82 - 89 17
90 - 93 18
94 - 109 18
95 18
96 - 97 19
98 - 102 19
103 - 105 20
106 - 107 20
108 - 109 20
110 - 116 21
117 - 138 22
117 - 125 22
126 - 138 23
E/CN . 4/1997/6/'Add.1
page 4
I . INTRODUCTION
A. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur and
ethnie conflicts in Northern Kivu 1
1. One of the features· ,of most concern to the Commission on Human Rights in
the human rights situation in Zaire has been the ethnie conflicts in the
Northern Kivu region .
2. In resolution 1994/87, adopted at its fift ieth session, the Commission
professed itsel f "concerned about the persistent seriousness of the situation
of human rights in Zaire" and "seriously concerned" at reports of "forced
displacements of more than 750,000 persans belonging to ethnie minorities,
especially in the provinces of Shaba and Northern Kivu, as well as the heavy
loss of human life and other numerous violations of human rights accompanying
such displacements". It went on to reiterate its "loathing of all forma of
racial or ethnie discrimination"; and to condemn the practice of forced
population displacements, particularly in Northern Kivu and Shaba, "for which
the authorities [bore] primary responsibility", and "all discriminatory
measures affecting persona belonging to minority groupa". The Commission
invited its Chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to report on developments
in the human r i ghts situation in Zaire at i ts fifty-third session.
3. The Special Rapporteur submitted the report requested (E/CN.4/1995/67),
in which paragraphs 85 to 95 were dedicated to "ethnie conflicts in
Northern Kivu".
4. At its fifty-first session the CoQlmission passed resolution 1995/69 by
which, besides renewing the Special Rapporteur's mandate for one year, it
again professed itself "also seriously concerned at the worsening of ethnie
confrontations in Kivu, following the arrival of new Rwandese refugees", and
reiterated its co~demnation and loathing of all forma of racial or ethnie
discrimination .
5. The Special Rapporteur's second report (E/CN.4/1996/66 and Corr.1) again
took up the "continuation of ethnie conflicts in Northern Kivu" (paras. 23 to
32, 122, 123 and 130).
6. At its fifty-second session the Commission, -by resolution 1996/77, again
renewed the Special Rapporteur•s mandate and once again voiced serious concern
at the worsening ethnie conflict in Kivu and its loathing of all forma of
racial or ethnie discrimination.
B. Purpose of the visit
E/CN . 4/1997/6/Add .1
page 5
7. A number of reports of worsening conflict prompted the High Commissioner
for Human Rights to ask the Special Rapporteur to conduct an investigation on
the spot. The reports indicated that acts of violence in Rutshuru, Masisi,
Walikale and elsewhere were driving large numbers of Zairian refugees into
Rwanda. The principal object of the mission was to visit the area of conflict
and the refugee camps in Rwanda in order to arrive at recomrnendations on how
to deal with the violence in the region.
C. Lack of cooperation from the Government of Zaire
8. On 24 June 1996 the Special Rapporteur asked the Government of Zaire,
through the Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations Office at Geneva,
for cooperation in arranging for him to visit the country. He said he would
travel between a and 12 July and was interested in meeting the Zairian
authorities to tell them what he had found on the spot or - if the Government
preferred - to discuss matters with them before going to the conflict region.
9. The Government of Zaire did not give a timely reply to the Special
Rapporteur•s request. Only on Sunday, 14 July 1996, when the visit had taken
place, did the Ministry of Foreign Affaira contact the Special Rapporteur to
tell him that it would be unable to receive him on the dates proposed owing to
preparations for forthcoming elections and the fact that two large
United Nations missions would be there at the same time, thus making it
difficult to comply with his suggestion . The Special Rapporteur was thus
prevented from learning the Government's position on the incidents he was
investigating, and this he regrets sincerely. He hopes that the reply
received does not refl ect the Government's lack of interest in cooperating
with part of the machinery of the Commission on Human Rights, which he
mentioned in his report (E/CN.4/1996/66, paras . 8 and 119).
D. The visit
10. The Special Rapporteur ' s visit, which was limited to Rwanda, took place
between 6 and 14 July 1996 . The Rapporteur had at his disposal a detailed
preliminary study by the Rwandan office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the problems produced by the influx of refugees, whose
well-founded fears of persecution in their home country aèrived from acts of
violence inspired by policies of discrimination and ethnie cleansing. He also
had before him a large number of reports on violence in Northern Kivu from
intergovernmental organizations and from national and international
non-governmental organizations.
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 6
11. The Special Rapporteur had meetings in Kigali with the office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and representatives of the European Union and the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
12. In Gingensi, across the frontier from Goma, the capital of Northern Kivu,
he met staff from the regional offices of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He visited the
Zairian refugee camp of Petite Barrière or Umubano, and the transit camp in
Nkamira . He also visited the ETAG prison where he met exiled Zairian
prisoners .
13. Officials from many Zairian and international non-governmental
organizations with offices in Zaire travelled to Gisenyi to meet the Special
Rapporteur, and they provided him with important information.
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 7
II. ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN KIW
A. Historical background
14. The Northern Kivu region, about a~ big as Rwanda and Burundi combined,
is according to some sou~ces inhabited by around 3 million people, about half
of whom are Banyarwanda 2 people who speak Kinyarwanda and belong to the Hutu,
TUtsi or Twa ethnie groups. In some districts, such as Masisi and Bwito, the
Banyarwanda are in the majority, making upas muchas 80 percent of the
population before the influx of Rwandese refugees in 1994.
15. As the Special Rapporteur•s first report said (E/CN.4/1995/67, para. 86),
tribal problems in this part of Zaire stem from the borders of the country
established by the Act of Berlin of 1885 and the Brussels Convention of
il August 1910, which left many people from the neighbouring State of Rwanda
annexed to the Belgian Congo.
16. In any case, it seems that the ethnie groupa to which these people belong
have long been found in what is now Zaire .
17. Sorne sources say that the area of the current conflict (Rutshuru, Goma,
Karisimbi, etc.) were added to the Kingdom of Rwanda between 1510 and 1543 .
Others add that the King of Rwanda (Mwami) lived in what is now Rutshuru.
Certainly the Mwami wielded authority over all the ethnie groups today
considered Rwandese-speaking: the Hutus (the majority), the TUtsis and the
Twa, which have long inhabited the rich lands of Rutshuru and Masisi.
18. Despite this, and although their citizenship bas not so far been called
into question, these peoples continue to be regarded as "non-locals", for the
Zairian authorities consider only the Bakonjo, Banbuba, Bahunde, Bapere,
Bakomo, Babira, Banyanga, Banande, Balendu and Batembo to be local in
Northern Kivu.
19 . A second group of Banyarwanda in Zaire, known as the n immigrants" , are
those who fled Rwanda to escape the famine that followed the First World War
and those resettled by Belgian colonists during this century, particularly
in 1911, 1930, 1939, 1948 and 1954, to satisfy the need for labourera: native
Rwandans ~ere settled in Northern Kivu (particularly Masisi) and
Southern Kivu, and even in Katanga (modèrn Shaba). In Masisi they became the
majority and numbered between 450,000 and 600,000. The Banyarwanda
Immigration Mission, which was founded in 1948 by the Belgian authorities and
operated until 1955, gave the displaced Rwandans land to work, and this was
not welcomed by the II indi~enous" locals. These ·are. the· gro·up most: dire.ctly
F./CN.4/1997/6/Add. l
page 8
affected by the nationality problem.
20. A third group of Banyarwanda are refugees of Rwandan nationality who fled
to Zaire to escape revolution, violence and ethnie conflict in 1959
(the overthrow of King Kigeri V), 1960, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1972 and the attack
by the Rwandan Patriotic ·Front in 1990. Practically all the members of this
group have returned to Rwanda and rejoined their original families or are in
the course of doing so . Nationality for them is not the problem that it is
for the other two groupe. 3
21. A fourth group are the Rwandese refugees, mainly Hutus, who fled Rwanda
and the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994; they are mostly to be
found in refugee camps in Northern and Southern Kivu; the Special Rapporteur
bas discussed their situation in bis reports (E/CN.4/1995/67, paras. 96
to 103; E/CN . 4/1996/66, paras. 43 ta 54).
B. Conflicts before the arrival of the Rwandan refugees
22 . Before events in Rwanda in 1994, these ethnie groups had, generally,
lived peacefully together with much intermarriage. Schools were communal and
solidarity was the rule. True, there are records of numerous instances of
inter-ethnie violence between the "indigenous", "original" or "real•
inhabitants, on the one band, and the Banyarwanda on the other, and between
Tutsis and Hutus. Examples of this were the Kinyarwanda revolution in Bwito
in 1964; fights pitting Bahunde and Banande against Batutsi, leaving dozens of
dead; the Banyarwandas• boycott of the local assemblies in 1982 and 1987; and
ethnie violence in Northern and Southern Kivu following the outbreak of war in
Rwanda in 1990, which led ta illegal arrests, cattle-stealing and bouses being
burnt down . But these were mostly isolated incidents and rather out of the
ordinary.
23. The greater problems stemmed from poli tics and nationality, as the
Special Rapporteur•s first two reports indicated (E/CN , 4/1995/67, para . 87,
and E/CN.4/1996/66, para. 24) .
24 . As regards the poÎitics, the Banyarwanda form the majority in both Masisi
and Rutshuru and, in the case of the Tutsi minority, are economically stronger
and grow~ng mores~ with the acquisition of land that formerly. belonged to
"indigenous" inhabitants; this in turn bas give~ them greater educational
opportunities . Nevertheless, political power continued to be reserved for the
original inhabitants, particularly the Hunde, bath locally (district
a s semblies, etc . ) and nationally.
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 9
25. The Special Rapporteur's first report relates a series of events pitting
Hundes and Nyangas against Hutus in Masisi, Bwito , Lubero and Walikale after
March 1993, leaving some 3,000 people dead and 150,000 homeless, and mentions
the attack on Ntoto market in particular (E/CN.4/1995/67, para . 90) . It
should be added that this latter incident occurred after the then Governor of
Northern Kivu had said that the true indigenous inhabitants should be helped
by the security forces to "exterminate" the Hutus .
1. The problem of nationality
26. The immense nationality problem was covered by the Special Rapporteur
in bis first two reports. Paragraphe 88 and 89 of the first report
(E/CN . 4/1995/67) read: "From a legal standpoint, legislation on nationality
is one of the main causes of the ethnie conflict. Decree Law No. 71- 020 of
26 March 1971 granted nationality on a collective basis to the Banyarwanda who
thereby acquired certain rights, such as the right to vote and to stand for
election. However, Law No. 81-002 of 29 June 1981 amended previous
legislation, granting Zairian nationality solely to those who could prove that
their ancestors had lived in Zaire since 1885 . The application of this Law,
because of its retroactive nature, would revoke the rights acquired by the
Banyarwanda. Under the new Law, moreover, each individual would have to
submit a formal application for naturalization . OWing to the reaction caused
by this Law, the National Sovereign Conference ruled that it would be applied
after having been amended in favour of the population and that, in nationality
matters, the Transitional Government should respect acquired rights in order
to prevent statelessness. It would appear that recent ethnie confrontations
were due in part to the fact that the Hunde and Nyanga disagreed with this
decision." It should be added that the 1971 Law had only confirmed previous
rulings such as the resolution of the 1960 Round Table, before independence,
and the 1964 Luluaburg constitution.
27. At the National Sovereign Conference in 1991 and 1992, Banyanga and
Batembo representatives tried ta settle the nationality problem in a
restrictive sense.
28. In any event, the 1981 law did not in practice affect the daily lives of
the Banyarwanda ~n the second group because their Zairian identity cards were
not taken away. ·
29. For the rest, denying Zairian nationality to Banyarwanda is not only a
violation of human rights and general principles of law (E/CN.4/1996/66,
paras. 84 and 95) but does a violence to Zaire•s own recent history. The
Special Rapporteur has drawn up a preliminary list of political, church and
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 10
university leaders who are Banyarwanda either because their forebears lived in
Zaire before 1885 or because they came to the area during the present century:
they include both Hutus and Tutsis . 4
2. Rivalry between Hutus and Tutsis in Zaire
30. Besides the problem of power and nationality which sets the Banyarwanda
against the "original" ethnie groupa, there is a dispute within the
Banyarwanda between Tutsis and Hutus, which bas been exacerbated by the
inter-ethnie conflict in Rwanda and Burundi. Concerned at their lack of
power, the Banyarwanda have decided to venture into politics. Although for
the most part they are Hutus, the person who has attained the highest office
is Barthelemi Bizengimana, a Tutsi who rose to be the director of
Marshal Mobutu's cabinet. Tutsis are more strongly represented than Hutus in
the former Parliament, the National Sovereign Conference and the current
Supreme Council of the Republic-Transitional Parliament.
31. Finding themselves outweighed politically and economically by their Tutsi
brethren, the Hutus formed a variety of groupa, most notably the Virunga
Farmers and Herders Association (Mutuelle des Agriculteurs et Eleveurs du
Virunga (MAGRIVI)) founded in 1989 by, among others, Sekimonyo wa Magango, the
current Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research, whicb was given
strong backing by President Habyarimana•s regime in Rwanda. The Special
Rapporteur has been told that, starting in 1992, the Association sold farm
produce to invest in weapons and took part in the 1994 genocide.
32. The impending establishment of a democratic regime in Zaire and the need
ta secure positions of power within it aggravated the conflict .
33. The tensions and violence were unleashed before the massive influx of
refugees, as can be seen from Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/87
of 9 March 1994, antedating the plane crash which cost the Presidents of
Rwanda and Burundi their lives. It is maintained that the support that
Zairian Tutsis and Tutsi refugees in Zaire gave to the Rwandan Patriotic Front
during the 1990 civil war in Rwanda helped to radicalize MAGRIVI. The Tutsi
community in Zaire welcomed Marshal Mobutu •s assistance to
President Habyarimana, in coping with attacks from the Hutus in Zaire .
C. Current state of the conflict
1 . The Hutu-TUtsi conflict in northern Kivu
34. The arrival of 1.2 million Rwandan refugees since July 1994 bas fuelled
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 11
the violence already taking place. The refugees include many who were
involved in the Rwandan genocide. Many arrived with weapons and large amounts
of property stolen from the Government, including buses donated by foreign
Powers; the buses circulate freely in Zaire, as the Special Rapporteur
observed during his two visits to the country (1994 and 1995) .
35 . The Special Rapporteur was told that MAGRIVI, whatever its original
welfare or cultural objectives, has changed or been consolidated into a
militia bent on winning power for the Hutus and has worked closely with the
Interahamwe (those who attack together) . In the long run its objective is to
establish a Hutuland, a racially pure area dominated by Hutus.
36. Before the refugees arrived MAGRIVI was in dispute with the Hunde and the
Tutsi tended to remain neutral, but since 1994 the Association has taken on
quite a different character.
37. All the evidence gathered by the United Nations Human Rights Field
Operation in Rwanda in preparation for the Special Rappor~eur•s arrival, and
information given to the Special Rapporteur by Zairian refugees in Rwanda
known as Abanyejomba, after the district they corne from, shows that since
mid-1994, relations among the Banyarwanda have deteriorated as the Rwandan
conflict has shifted to Zaire.
38. The Hutu militia known as the Interahamwe have been the main instigators
of violence .
39 . In his first report the Special Rapporteur remarked how dangerous the
Interahanwe were, painting out that they were difficult to identify and easily
confused with the civilian population, that they were responsible for most of
the massacres in Rwanda, that they were to be found in all refugee camps in
Zaire, "especially in Mugunga, where it is believed that 80 percent of the
young people belonged to them", that they possessed firearms, communications
equipment and vehicles, and that they opposed the voluntary repatriation of
the refugees, whom they tyrannized and threatened (E/CN.4/1995/67, para. 96).
40. Since this militia'formed, it bas made constant incursions throughout
virtually allo~ Northern Kivu; it has absolute liberty to mobilize anywhere,
ev~n in refugee camps, from where it has mounted sorties to infiltrate into
Gema and thence into conflict areas such aà Rutshuru, Masisi and the
neighbouring districts, attacking Tutsis and telling them they should go back
to Rwanda where they are in power or to Ethiopia where, it is claimed, they
came from. The Interahamwe have. weapons and military traini~g ':1llsuspected by
the Zairian Hutus, and have established a training camp in Katoyi, near Gema .
F./CIJ . 4/1997/;/~rld.1
page 12
They use not only large calibre firearms but also nail-studded clubs; the
Special Rapporteur was able to see and photograph the brutal wounds left on a
female refugee in the Petite Barrière camp . They have intelligence reports,
since they frequently search out victims from pre-established lists. Their
aim appears to be ethnie cleansing - ridding districts of Tutsis - and they
therefore kill TUtsis, burn their bouses, steal their cattle, drive them out
or force them to seek refuge in Rwanda and other countries. A variety of
sources interviewed by the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in
Rwanda and by the Special Rapporteur maintain that some Interahamwe elements
have practised cannibalism. The Special Rapporteur met one witness who had
personally been present during acts of cannibalism.
41. Accounts persistently link MAGRIVI with the Interahamwe . Weapons brought
to Zaire by deserters from the Rwandan Armed Forces are said to be distributed
by the Interahamwe to the MAGRIVI. According to sources, Hutu moderates have
often been forced to take part in militia violence. This indicates a failure
to comply with the Caire Declaration of 28 November 1995, which called for the
"bullies" to be removed from the camps (E/CN . 4/1996/66, para . 30);
confirmation would seem to corne from the information that only 41 have been
brought to Kinshasa. 5
42. Besides the traditional enmity between these ethnie groupa in Rwanda, a
new ingredient has now been added: Hutu extremists are said to fear that
TUtsis would back the Government in Kigali if they attacked their country.
43. It must be pointed out that the victims are not just TUtsi refugees who
have arrived in the past three decades, nor just Zairians of Tutsi origin
whose nationality is in doubt (who arrived between 1885 and 1959) . There are
also some whose forebears have lived in Zaire since time immemorial, a subject
we shall return to later.
44. It is also important to point out that the presence of refugees in Zaire
has had other adverse effects: on the economy, security and the environment,
wi th an increase in violence and militarism, as described by the Special
Rapporteur in his first two reports (E/CN.4/1995/67, paras. 97 to 103 and
E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 45 to 47) .
2. Conflict between the Tutsis and the "indigenous ethnie groupa"
'
45. There have also been numerous incidents between TUtsis and members of the
Hunde, Nande and Nyanga ethnie groupa. originally, as has been seen, the Hutu
MAGRIVI militia took on indigenous ethnie groups in political power . The
Ntoto market incident in March 1993 and its aftermath were Hutu-Hunde
disputes.
E/CN . 4/1997/6/Add.l
page 13
46. The arrival of the Rwandan refugees led to violence throughout the
region, which the indigenous ethnie groups attributed to the Banyarwanda in
general .
47. Young Bahunde set up a guerrilla group known as "May May" ("water" in
Swahili), harking back ideologically to the nationalist and marxist groupa of
the 1970s and with a heavy reliance on magic . Bahunde youths had enrolled in
guerrilla groupa set up by Pierre Mulele (who succeeded Patrice Emery Lumumba)
in the early 1970s and were joined by deserters from the Congolese Armed
Forces led by Sergeant Mobuto Sese Seko . Defeated, they regrouped in the
forest, preparing for revolution. As regards the magic element, they peddle
religious and tribal artifacts said to make them invincible. They have
rudimentary military training . The Special Rapporteur met a member of the May
May guerrilla, a Hunde, who had joined after the attack on Mokoto Monastery in
which his father, mother and seven brothers died of machetë blows at the bands
of the Interahamwe, and had eventually fled and taken refuge in Rwanda. He
said that on enrolling recruits were tattooed (as the Special Rapporteur could
see) "for protection", and that magic was present at every stage of the
fighting: they drank herbs which protected them from death, they could not
wash with soap, they went to war naked or dressed in grass; they yelled "May"
when they attacked so that enemy bullete etriking them would turn to water;
they were not allowed carnal relations with women; in combat they could not
retreat or even look sideways, and so forth. It should be noted that one of
the rules says "in war you should never attack a civilian, only protect him".
These points are confirmed by all the reports the Special Rapporteur had
before him .
48. The principal enemy were the Bahutu, who had been attacking the Hunde for
years. They were so fierce that even the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) tended to
be afraid of theM and flee rather than fight.
49. The May May often have other names linked to the regions they corne from,
such as the Ngilima May May (the best known) or the Bangirima May May.
50. There have also been serious confrontations between the May May and
Tutsis since the latter, t~o, are Banyarwanda . The older Bahunde app~rently
still resent the Banyarwanda, while the younger one·s, in the Ngilima militias,
have often defended harried TUtsis against Hutu violence. This was confirmed
to the Special Rapporteur by a member of the militia now hiding in Umubano, in
Rwanda.
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 14
51. Sorne refugees in the Petite Barrière camp said they had been harassed in
Walikale by the May May, whp, one added, "were in cahoots with the
Interahamwe". Most, however, had no complainte about the conduct of the May
May, and indeed there are some Nglimima May May among the refugees. At least
25 refugees in the camp are not TUtsis but Hunde who also fled from
Interahamwe-MAGRIVI harassment in Zaire.
52. The refugees stress that May May violence against TUtsis is not intended
to eradicate them physically but to seize their land, cattle and other
property in order to make money and acquire weapons so they can defend
themselves from attacks by extremist Hutu militias and the Zairian Armed
Forces. Other accounts say the intention is to drive the Tutsis out
temporarily but that they should swiftly return when peace has been attained.
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page 15
3 . Conflicts between indigenous peoples
and the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ)
53. That the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) have been present during or have
tolerated attacks by the Interahamwe on Tutsis and the Zairian population in
general has turned the May May against them.
54. There have also been reports of conflicts between ethnie groups accepted
as indigenous who have traditionally opposed the Mobutu regime and the Z~irian
Armed Forces. Such cases have been especially frequent where the ethnie
groups have been defending besieged Zairian Tutsis.
SS. The Zairian Government has made some effort to prevent incidents -
operations Kimia ("calm" in Swahili) and Mbata ("slap in the face"), but to
the Special Rapporteur •s knowledge the Zairian authorities have never corne out
firmly against the establishment of a Hutuland .
56. Operation Kimia, carried out by some 800 FAZ members and the Service
d'action et des renseignements militaires (SARM), began in March 1996 and
initially restored calm in the Masisi district which the Tutsis had virtually
abandoned, driven elsewhere by the Interahamwe and MAGRIVI. Although it might
have been intended to disarm all the militias, in fact it was aimed chiefly at
the May May.
57. But poor preparation and equipment and the fa i lure to pay the FAZ troops
involved in the operation eventually drave the troops to robbery, pillage and
arson, particularly in the districts of Kanyabayonga, Walikale, Sake ,
Vitshumbi, Beni and Lubero. The terrer inspired by the Ngilima May May drove
some soldiers to flee, and many others died . FAZ High Commana had to admit
that operation Kimia had been a failure.
58. It therefore mounted operation Mbata, conducted principally by SARM and
the Division spéciale présidentielle (DSP) (E/CN.4/1995/67, paras. 67 and 69),
directly against the Ngilima May May. Refugees questioned at the
Petite Barrière camp by the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in
Rwanda and by the Special Rapporteur emphasized that in the Interahamwe attack
at Kitshanga on~ April 1996 the DSP played a positive role, protecting the
victims .
59. Overall, however, this was another failure: on 11 May 1996, 30 people
were killed in Vitshumbi , while on 4 June around 20 people died in
Kanyabayonga, according to officials from numerous national and international
NGOs based in Goma (Zaire) who met the Special Rapporteur in Gisenyi. One
page 16
witness interviewed by the Special Rapporteur, a Hunde woman whose husband ·and
three of hersons had been killed and her house set on fire by Interahamwe
from Mugunga refugee camp in September 1995, did not share the favourable view
of the events in Kitshanga, stating that the "Zairian Armed Forces protected
us but then were corrupted by the Interahamwe and became our enemies, and this
was possible because they, had neither the means, nor a radio, nor the courage
to take them on".
4 . Violent incidents in 1996
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 17
60. The Special Rapporteur was informed, by Zairian refugees, humanitarian
organizations and various reports, of violent incidents that left many people
wounded, causing violations of people's safety, property and other rights and
population displacements ,in 1996. He regrets the list may contain errors, in
part owing to the lack of cooperation from the Zairian Government which did
not authorize him to visit the country and thus prevented him from hearing its
explanation; in part also because many accounts obviously refer to the same
incidents but differ in substance and detail. It has thus been necessary to
exercise special caution in selecting the reports and accounts to follow up.
61. Besides those cited above, these incidents include:
(a) 25 January 1996: May May militias attack the centre of Bibwe,
killing at least 10 Banyarwanda . During the night Interahamwe militias react,
killing many Hunde. Apparently the Interahamwe suspected some Hutus of being
traitors, because some of their own ethnie group were killed;
(b) February 1996: Hutu militias attack Sake, where the Hunde are in
the majority. Many of the indigenous population are forced to take refuge in
Goma;
(c) 4 March 1996: Hutu militias set fire to Tutsi houses in Bokombo,
killing at least 10 people;
(d) March .1996: The Interahamwe attack a group of displaced Tutsis and
Hunde who have taken refuge in the parish of Mweso. People coming to the
assistance of the displaced persons are fired on;
Ce) 14 Mar ch 1996: A May May attack on Katikwu (Walikale) followed by
another in Mirigi. No indication of the number of victims, but many people
forced to flee;
(f) 9 to 23 March 1996 : Hutu fighters in Bwito, claiming that six of
their comrades have disappeared, threaten Tutsis and Nande and then attack
Bishusha before _proceeding to Mashango where the local chief is captured,
dismembered anG parts of his body eaten. Eight people, all Tutsis, reported
killed . ' The parish priest in Birambizo lends support;
Cg) 27 and 28 March 1996: The Bangirima May May attack a village in
Lubero, stealing Tutsi cattle;
•
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page 22
67. The Chief of Staff of the Zairian Armed Forces, General Eluki, said in
November 1995 that the Nianga, Tembo and Nande were right to expel the
Banyarwanda.
68. The present Governor of Northern Kivu, Christophe Motomupenda, maintained
in May 1995 that "we should attack and attack the immigrants now", and then,
on 12 April 1996, told a group of 973 Zairian Tutsis who had been driven into
Gema, that "··· if you do not wish to go we cannot guarantee your lives",
adding that they had "the choice between expulsion or death". On
24 April 1996, he went on to say that thare were "· · · no Zairian Tutsis among
the returnees ... ", and that all should leave. He disparaged the catholic
bishop for interfering in Government affaira - meaning Mgr. Ngabu's letter.
69. Moreover, the Minister of social Affaira, Cesiré Lumbulumbu, and the
Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Sekimonyo wa Magango,
the latter a Hutu and one of the founders of MAGRIVI, went to Northern Kivu
with a group of members of Parliament in late March; instead of calling for
peace, they were unanimously understood to be advocating ethnie cleansing.
70 . Reference must likewise be made to a letter from the Ambassador of Zaire
to the United Nations claiming that Kinyarwanda is nota Zairian language but
that of Rwandans transplanted by colonization since 1929, who have never
integrated into the local population.
71. These attitudes contradict the Cairo Declaration of 29 November 1995 in
which the Heads of State, including Marshal Mobutu, and the delegations
present called on the international community to condemn vigorously the ethnie
and political genocide ideology used in competition for conquest and monopoly
of power.
72. The Special Rapporteur has also been told that the Minister of the
Interior and Vice Premier, Kamanda wa Kamanda, together with
Governor Motomuper,da, visited Kanyabayonga on 31 March; the following day the
violence and expulsions of Tutsis from the district increased. The Special
Rapporteur records this incident because many different sources mentioned it,
although be does not have the text of what the Minister is supposed to have
said . The Special Rapporteur•s personal knowledge of the Minister suggests
that this is more likely to be a coincidence than case of incitement.
73. Unfortunately, incitement to racial and national hatred is not only to be
found among government authorities; the same kind of incitement has been
endorsed by the Supreme Council of the Republic - Transitional Parliament
(HCR-PT) on 28 April 1995, as the Special Rapporteur mentioned in his second
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 23
report (E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 27 and 28) .
74. The political class generally and some sectors of civil society display a
dangerous anti -Banyarwanda attitude, as the Special Rapporteur recorded in
paragraphs 26, 29, 33, 35 and 123 of his second report (E/CN.4/1996/66) .
2. Direct involvement by the military and security forces
75. All the evidence and reports from intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations explicitly mention the involvement of the military and security
forces in the attacks, pillaging and burning, as the Special Rapporteur
mentioned in his first two reports.' What is new is their involvement in
expelling Zairians from the country.
76. The Zairian Armed Forces have clearly sided with the Interahamwe and Hutu
militias in the fighting, and the efforts of the central Government to impose
order through operations Kimia and Mbata ended in complete failure as
described in paragraphs 55 to 59 above. There are even some reports that
Interahamwe militias pay soldiers to take part, or at least to protect them
during attacks. This was the case in attacks on the villages of Kanii and
Loashi.
77. The presence of the Zairian Armed Forces has heightened the insecurity
owing to their abuse of the local population and connivance at Hutu violence
against Tutsis and Hunde.
78. The Zairian Armed Forces have also been accused of active involvement in
internal displacements and expulsions of Zairian Tutsis, in what is known as
"Operation Café". Their involvement ranges from direct threats if Tutsis
remain in the country to arrests and the transport of Tutsis in military buses
from various districts to Goma or straight to the frontier . The buses used in
these operations belong to Rwanda but were taken with them to Zaire by
refugees. Members of the arme? forces demand payment from their victims
(roughly the equivalent of US$ 12 or US$ 15) for transporting them to the
Rwandan border.
79. One partic~larly serious matter reported by refugees in the Umubano camps
is that Zairian soldiers, w.h .e ther from .t he armed f. orces o. r SNIP, tak. e a.w ay the
identity carda of those they expel when they leave them at the border: this
prevents them from returning to Zaire.
frequent between Marchand June 1996.
Such cases are said to have been
It is also alleged, but bas not been
possible to check, that the cards are then given to MAGRIVI or Interahamwe
members not of Zairian nationality, thus enabling them to slip illegally into
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 24
the local community and acquire land - and even to vote in the forthcoming
elections .
80. The only exception was, as mentioned above, the Interahamwe assault on
Kitshanga on 8 April, where the Division spéciale présidentielle protected the
victims (see above, paras, 58, 59 and 61).
3. Impunity of the culprits
81 . A third way in which the rights recognized under the Covenant are not
respected is that the Zairian military and security forces are certain to go
unpunished. In bis second report the Special Rappor teur maintained that
impunity is a real incentive to abuse of power, pillage and robbery; 8 this
argument remains fully valid and is implicit throughout this report.
B. Violation of the obligation to guarantee the rights
recognized in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
82. States must not be content simply not to violate human rights. The
Covenant makes it incumbent upon them to guarantee the enjoyment of buman
rights and to protect the individual . '
83. The Special Rapporteur's impression during the visit under discussion was
that, apart from inciting and participating in the ethnie violence and
ensuring impunity, the basic attitude of the Zairian political and military
authorities is to affect ignorance of events taking place in plain sight:
" . .. it all happened as if there were no authority in the country ... " said
one refugee in Rwanda.
84. Reports indicate that in response to public appeals for protection,
" the military prefer to remain in barracks". On other occasions indolence
is combined with complicity: "··· go home to Rwanda "soldiers said to
Interahamwe victims as they proceeded to loot them.
85. This attitude dates back a long way. It is reported that MAGRIVI bas
been acting wit~ Government connivance or inability to prevent its illegal
activities since 1990 (see para . 33 above).
86. Ending the impunity of the Zairian armed forces and security services,
removing the intimidators as agreed at Cairo, professionalising the Zairian
armed forces, disbanding the MAGRIVI, sacking public officials who incite
others to racial or national hatred, and disarming the refugee camps and the
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add .1
page 25
Interahamwe are all protective measures that could be taken and are
desperately needed for putting an end to the conflict. The State's failure to
take action is a breach of its duty of care since, in the Special Rapporteur•s
view, there can be no doubt that the lack of State involvement bas been one
cause of the violations that have occurred .
87 . As in his earlier reports , the Special Rapporteur draws attention to
efforts by Prime Minister Kengo to remedy t~ese failings, calling for more
members of the zairian Armed Forces, but the indiscipline in the forces and
the lack of equipment have made the conflict worse.
88 . President Mobutu, who managed to pacify the country in the 1970s and even
in 1993, does not now appear inclined to take the lead in restoring peace.
89. Government indifference is definitely a danger to the political process;
the Minister of the Interior, Kamanda wa Kamanda, argued one April 1996 that
if the violence did not stop the elections scheduled for 1997 might be
cancelled.
C. Violation of the obligation not to discriminate
90. All the incidents related in this report are based on legislation,
attitudes and actions rooted in discrimination.
91 . The Banyarwanda are discriminated against owing to the origine of their
forebears, who not are not considered to be originally from Zaire although
their nationality was recognized from 1960 to 1981. Thus they are denied the
human right to a nationality, deprived of their property, driven from their
homes and expelled into foreign countries .
92. But the discrimination is discriminatory in itself, for not all
Banyarwanda are treated the same way : for ethnie reasons those belonging to
the Tutsi ethnie group are discriminated against by those belonging to the
Hutu ethnie group and Zairian Government officials, for it seems that the
Zairian Government also has an interest in establishing a Hutuland.
93. Such legislation, attitudes and incidents are in themselves contrary to
the obligations undertaken by the State in adhering to the Covenant, since
they militate against the equality, dignity and inherent nature of all members
of the human race, not being based on natural, legitimate differences between
people (age, nationality, education, etc) .
IV. MAIN RIGHTS VIOLATED
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 26
94. The point of the obligations set forth in article 2, paragraphs. l and 2,
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to "give effect
to" - i.e. not establish simply as empty, illusory or theoretical - the human
rights it covers . That these obligations have been breached is manifest in
the fact that the followipg rights at least are not respected:
A. Right to life
95. The incidents described in this report have caused, according to a
variety of sources, between 6,000 and 40,000 deaths over the past two years.
It is not easy in Zaire to put a precise number on the assaults and other
violations of rights, since the sources differ considerably, but many refugees
interviewed in Rwanda, from many different cities and villages, often said
that they had seen "hundreds of corpses".
B. Right ta physical and mental integrity
96. The Special Rapporteur saw with his own eyes the marks of blows inflicted
on a Zairian women refugee in Umubano with a nail-studded club (see para. 40
above) and was told of many violations of people's physical and mental
integrity by members of the Zairian military, the Interahamwe and Hutu
militias. The Ngilima May May have conunitted similar attacks, and all have
gone unpunished.
97. The Special Rapporteur has also had the opportunity ta ascertain that the
practice of torturing individuals accused of common crimes, unrelated ta the
tribal or regional problems covered in this report, has remained current in
Zaire. He personally observed the sequelae of torture in the cases of
Ndikumvenayo Ntamuturano, Nzambazumunemyi Seburikoko, Nimyekure Habumana,
Ditumana Charles, Bizagwina Dagumimana, and N. Nzabulunda, who are also being
held at the ETAG detention centre in Rwanda . All are Zairian nationals from
the Hutu ethnie group who were detained in Zaire in May in connection with a
cattle theft. After being tortured they were expelled into Rwanda, a country
with which they have no links at all, where they are now being held prisoner.
C. Right ta nationality
98. As has been seen, Banyarwanda who came to Zaire between 1885 and 1960
were recognized as Zairian until 1981, at which time they were deprived of
their nationality and left stateless. It should be added that the 1981 law
was the result of a political choice by the Central Committee of the Mouvement
populaire de la revolution during the Party-State period.
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 27
99. But many descendants of people who were living in the Congo before 1885
have also been expelled, being regarded as foreigners.
100. These people are all still stateless not only because of the way things
are (neither they nor their forebears have ever lived in Rwanda or held ,
Rwandan nationality) but also because of the Kigali Government's explicit
announcement on 2 April 1996 that it did not recognize them as nationale . The
announcement confirmed what the Special Rapporteur had said in hie second
report, namely that recognizing the Banyarwanda as Zairian would be no
violation of the Transitional Constitution of 9 April 1994, article 7.2 of
which prohibits double nationality, since Banyarwanda from ethnie groups in
Rwanda had no nationality (E/CN . 4/1996/66, para. 130).
lOl. The position taken by the Catholic bishops in Kivu, that it is a lie to
say that the Banyarwanda are not Zairian, is thus to be applauded.
102 . The special Rapporteur also notes with concern that article ll of a
recent bill on a census needed for election purposes 10 stipulates that Zairian
nationality is to be proved, inter alia, by "the identity card for citizens",
which makes the problem of the carda taken away from those expelled worse. If
the carda are tampered with by simply changing the photographs and given to
Hutu refugees in Zaire, the refugees will have the opportunity to cast
fraudulent votes.
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page 28
D. Riqht to live in one's own country
103. Refugees began to arrive in Zaire on 27 December 1995 and
by 31 December 1995 numbered 1,200. According to the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by 9 July Zairian refugees
who had arrived in Rwanda,by their own means or been forcibly expelled
(Operation Café) numbered 12,625 in Umubano Camp and 849 in Nkamira camp .
Besides these, there are a number who for various reasons have abandoned the
camps.
104. These refugees include Tutsis and Hunde but no Hutus, whereas if, as
Banyarwanda, Hutus were of indeterminate nationality, they ought to be
affected as well . Thus the political and doubly discriminatory nature of this
breach of the right to live in one's own country, as recognized in article 12
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, can be clearly
seen.
105. The only Hutus expelled were those mentioned in paragraph 97 above: in
their case it is not only the right to live in their own country that has been
violated, but also their right to physical integrity.
E. Right to choose one's own place of residence
106. The violence has resulted in enormous numbers of internally displaced
people, for the most part but not exclusively Tutsi, since there are also
displaced people from other ethnie groups in the region . In bis second
report, completed on 31 December, the Special Rapporteur said that according
to various sources the displaced people numbered some 100,000 . By
29 July 1996, according to his sources, they had reached 250,000 or
maybe even 400,000.
107 . It is reported that virtually no Tutsis remain in Southern Rutshuru or in
Masisi generally.
F. Right to security
108. In his first report the Special Rapporteur sought to "draw particular
attention to the right to security as an autonomous human right which is
linked not only to individual liberty but to all the rights enjoyed by the
human persan as a simple corollary of his human statua, because he believes
that it is one of those rights that is least observed in Zaire" (para. 157).
109. The incidents described in this report only confirm that position, while
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page 29
besides the rights mentioned, the following have also been affected:
(a) The right to housing, since thousands of homes have been burned or
taken over by the winners in each successive incident;
(b) The right to property, in thefts of cattle, assets and goods of
every kind. Of the 400,000 or so head of cattle in the region before
mid-1995, no more than 20,000 remain . Besides, a persan who bas taken someone
else•s cow sees no reason not to sell it for the equivalent of roughly $20,
even if its real value is US$ 250;
(c) The entire range of economic, social and cultural rights: in
current conditions no one can go to school, jobs have been lest, food is
precarious and often dependent on donations, etc.;
(d) Rights of women, women having been most affected by the violence
and insecurity.
V. REFERENCE TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN KIVU
110. The Special Rapporteur dedicated a chapter of his second report to the
conflict with the Banyamulengue in Southern Kivu, offering a brief historical
overview and referring to the most serious acts of discrimination and human
rights violations (E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 33 to 37). The rebuttal by the
Council of Ministers on 14 March 1996 challenges only this part of the
report. 11
111. The Special Rapporteur knew that that chapter of his second report would
stir up controversy, for during his second visit to the country he was struck
by the degree of hostility throughout Zairian society towards Rwandans and
Zair i ans from ethnie groupa considered to be from Rwanda. As he said in his
report, "A strong anti-Rwandan feeling has arisen (in Zaire) which has
permeated all political sectors. As one disillusioned human rights advocate
said, 11In order to succeed in politics, you have to be anti-Rwandan"
(para. 26). The subject was pursued in the following paragraphe up to
paragraph 30, and again in paragraph 123. Lastly, in paragraph 129, the
Special Rapport~ur recommended that the Government must "stop seeing enemies
where there are none. It must abando~ its aggressive langu~ge towards people
of Rwandan and Burundian origin and must stop denigrating one ethnie group in
the eyes of others".
112. Unfortunately, this recommendation has not been heeded by the Government,
the political classes, or - worse yet. - those who claim to be champions of
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page 30
human rights .
113. Indeed, on top of all the incitements to violence mentioned in
paragraphs 65 to 74 above, one has to remember that the Governor of
Southern Kivu called for immediate implementation of the HCR-PT
resolution dated 28 April ,1995 on the expulsion of all Rwandans .
114. It thus surprises the Special Rapporteur that only one group of refugees
from Southern Kivu in Canada, and one Zairian citizen from the region now
living in Egypt, rebutted the report. 12 Unfortunately, the rebuttals just
confirm his point: both describe the Banyamulengue as a group of "extremists"
and exude the same ethnie and national hatred that inspired the HCR-PTU
resolution, amounting to incitements to ethnie cleansing incomprehensible in
people enjoying refugee statua.
115. The reports received by the Special Rapporteur speak of a hard, ening of
attitudes on both sides. For while the authorities are calling for the
Banyamulengue to be expelled, the Banyamulengue admit that they are arming .
Unfortunately the intention of the visit was not to analyse the situation in
Southern Kivu. The information gathered is therefore only superficial and
will not sustain more thorough analysis.
116 . Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur is alarmed by the reports he has
received, and warns of the possibility that what has recently been taking
place in Northern Kivu may recur in like vein in Southern Kivu.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENOATIONS
A. Conclusions
117. The conflict with which this report is concerned, like the one developing
in Southern Kivu, has been virtually ignored by the international community,
reluctant, perhaps, to have its conscience pricked again after the horrors of
Rwanda and Burundi.
118 . It is a dispute in which a great many people have been suffering
violations of ~.large number of their rights. Those responsible are:
(a) Th'e State of Zaire, wh1ch has been direct'ly involved in and .héiS
incited people to commit such violations, and bas not made sufficient effort
either to prevent or to restrain them;
(b) The political class, which has fomented xenophobic nationalist
sentiment;
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 31
(c) Sorne ethnie leaders, who do not conceal the fact that they are
arming, albeit to defend themselves; and, regrettably, also
(d) Sorne human rights organizations, which have chosen to foster racial
hatred and ethnie cleansing rather than defending the oppressed.
119. The Special Rapporteur is not overlooking the enormous difficulties that
the massive influx of refugees from the war in neighbouring Rwanda poses for
the people and Government of Zaire. On the whole, Zaire has reacted as it
should, facilitating the work of UNHCR and, with some exceptions, honouring
the principle of non-refoulement. In any event it must make it clear once and
for all, in word and deed, that there will be no repetition of the cases such
as those in 1995 when refugees were expelled to countries where they had
well-grounded fears of persecution on account of their racial or national
origins.
120. But the most important finding of this report is that the conflict is
neither solely regional nor solely national. Julius Nyerere, the former
President of the United Republic of Tanzania, has said as much, maintaining
that the interethnic conflict has now become international .
121. The conflict in Zaire and the Great Lakes region is in fact nothing more
than a prolongation of the events that have taken place in Rwanda and
Burundi - the causes and the effects. The existence of the Interahamwe
represents a threat to peace in Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Many
accounts from refugees in Rwanda, and more from the staff of specialized
agencies and non-governmental organizations, say that the Interahamwe are
attacking Rwanda looking for survivors of the genocide (the rescapés) so as to
prevent them from testifying in court by exterminating them physically .
122 . There was even a report from Uganda on 16 April 1996 that Rwandan
opposition militias had entered the country from Zaire and attacked a military
post in Kisoro, forcing Uganda to close its bordera. Subsequently the
Government of Zaire lodged a complaint against Uganda for an attack mounted
from Uganda .
123 . The Special Rapporteur has received numerous reports of Interahamwe
crossing the border from Zaire into Rwanda to murder survivors, leaving many
people dead . A member of Parliament for the Mouvance présidentiel,
Mr. Vangu Manbweni, went so far as to state, on 2 May 1996, that Parliament
would be ready to declare war on Rwanda if the motion were placed before it.
E/CN . 4/1997/6/Add.l
page 32
And on 6 May 1996 the Zairian Minister for Foreign Affairs complained about
accusations from the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi that their countries
felt threatened by incursions mounted from Zaire, according to a statement by
the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affaira.
124. The border between ·Zaire and Burundi was closed in April 1996 for fear of
incursions by Rwandan refugees, and although Prime Minister Kengo visited
Bujumbura in May it has not been reopened.
125. These were the reasons wby, at their first meeting, the Special
Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights on the countries in the Great
Lakes region pointed out that there were features in common - particularly
population movements, illegal arms sales and incitement to racial hatred
(E/CN.4/1996/69, annex, paras. 13 to 15), and why they called on the
Commission to take an all-encompassing approach to the region (para.18).
B. Recommendations
1. To the Zairian authorities and people
126 . The Special Rapporteur finds himself obliged to repeat some of the broad
and specific recommendations on the region he made in bis first two reports,
besides proposing other action in the light of what he saw during his mission:
(a) Concerning the armed forces and security services:
. (b)
(i) Effective, genuine and practical control must be established
over the State security apparatus, with the police being
placed under the Ministry of the Interior and the Zairian
Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defence, both being
answerable to the Prime Minister, net the President . The
powers of each service must be precisely regulated
(E/CN.4/1995/67, para . 257);
(ii) All corrupt officials must be removed from office;
(iii) An end must be putto impunity (E/CN . 4/1996/66, para. 121);
' .
(iv) Membership of the Zairian Armed Forces and security services
should be multi-ethnic (E/CN.4/1996/69, annex, para. 17(a)).
Tolerance. The authorities and the political class must accept
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 33
that Zaire is a country made up of many ethni e groups who have arrived in the
region over the centuries, and that they must all share the land, political
power, wealth and poverty (E/CN.4/1995/67, para. 259; E/CN.4/1996/66,
paras. 123 and 129; E/CN. 4/1996/69, annex, para . 17 (e)). This recommendation
applies the more urgently to non-governmental organizations, especially those
concerned with human rights . If they do not make individuals - whatever
ethnie group they corne from - and their rights the prime focus of their
operations, preferring partisan political activity or, worse yet, fomenting
discrimination, they not only do irreparable moral harm but also betray the
international non-governmental organizations movement;
(c) Nationality. The problem of nationality, which the conflict in
Kivu is currently exacerbating, must be resolved: not only are Hutus, Tutsis
and Twa who arrived in the Congo region after 1885 being deprived of their
nationality, but people who arrived earlier are, too, as the Special
Rapporteur was able to appreciate with the refugees in Rwanda (E/CN.4/1996/66,
para. 130). The HCR-PT agreement of 28 April 1995 must be repealed. There
are three further problems relating to nationality and citizenship which must
also be tackled in accordance with the following criteria:
(i) The Zairian refugees expelled to Rwanda must be given back
their identity cards or issued with new ones;
(ii) The identity carda taken away from expellees and given to
Rwandan Hutus, many of them members of the Interahamwe, must
be recovered;
(iii) Lastly, the bill on the pre-election census now before the
HCR-PT must incorporate provisions enabling all Zairians to
vote but no one else, even upon presentation of a card that
used to belong to an expellee.
(d) Removai. of all the "intimidators" from the area: the process
already embarked upon must be pursued;
(e) Repatriation of refugees. A programme for repatriating all the
Zairian refugees .in Rwanda must be set up, covering:
(i) Restoration of property toits rightful owners;
(ii) Reparations for damage and injuries;
(iii) Effective security measures to prevent and punish any hint
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 34
of ethnie or national rivalry;
(iv) Safeguards for the exercise of all civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights.
(f) Respect for Rwandan refugees. The problem of the Rwandan refugees
in Zaire must be dealt with; this will only be possible with the agreement of
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1
page 35
the Governments and peoples of all three countries involved and with strict
regard for the principle of non-refoulement and voluntary repatriation
(E/CN.4/1995/67, para . 275; E/CN.4/1996/66, para. 131);
(g) Disarmament. The Zairian Government must proceed without delay to
disarm the armed groupa -., first and foremost the Interahamwe, MAGRIVI, the
Ngilima, Banguirima and May May, but also any other organization that has
armed for the purpose of attack or of defending itself;
(h) Human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The recommendations
on this subject in the previous reports remain entirely valid (E/CN . 4/1995/67,
paras. 260, 264, 266, 267 to 269; E/CN . 4/1996/66, paras. 125 to 128;
E/CN.4/1996/69, annex, para. 17 (a) and (b));
(i) Extraditior. of individuals accused of genocide to be tried by the
International Criminal Court investi gating the crimes committed in Rwanda
(E/CN.4/1996/66, para. 132) ;
(j) Safety of internally displaced persona . Internally displaced
persona must be allowed the right to choose where to live, in particular the
right to set up their homes in places t hey have been driven away from by
physical or moral coercion. The Government must establish resettlement
programmes for this purpose, covering housing, education, health and, above
all, security for all, especially women and children;
(k) Cooperation by the Zairian Government with the Commission on Human
Riqhts and in particular the Special Rapporteur. The Special Rapporteur is
sorry not to have had a timely response from the Government to his request to
visit the country while on mission for the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights . This report could then have reflected the official view of
the events described, as well . The Special Rapporteur bas submitted to the
Government a series of human rights violations brought to bis attention, but
has had no respo~se. He has also suggested that he might visit the country
between 14 and 26 October, and hopes that this will be accepted;
(1) Observer mission. In his first report (E/CN.4/1995/67) the Special
Rapporteur suggested an office comprising two experts on human rights in Zaire
to monitor the human rights situation and keep him informed and to give
technical assistance to the Zairian authorities and people (para. 277). In
resolution 1995/69, the Commission invited the High Commissioner to study this
suggestion. The Special Rapporteur repeated his suggestion in his second
report (E/CN . 4/1996/66), detailing the communications the High Commissioner
has had with Zaire on the subject (paras. 9 to 11 and 134). At the
E/ct:1 .4/1997/6/Add.l
page 36
fifty-second session of the Commission, on 15 April 1996, the Zairian
delegation announced that the proposed agreement would be signed in the next
few days. After drafting on the present report had concluded, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights told the Special Rapporteur that
the protocol of agreement between the Government of Zaire and the United
Nations on the opening of.a human rights office in Zaire had been signed on
21 August 1996 . The Special Rapporteur hopes this agreement will
significantly advance respect for human rights in Zaire . He also trusts that
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 37
the office will be set upas quickly as possible and warmly recommends that,
given the events taking place in Northern and Southern Kivu, the office should
be able to set up branches with observera in Goma and Bukavu .
2. To the international community
127. For his recommendations ta the international community the Special
Rapporteur will simply repeat what he said in his first report: "One
observation heard by the Special Rapporteur in Washington, in Mbuji-Mayi, in
Geneva, in Kinshasa, in Brussels and in Goma, from journaliste, lawyers,
political specialists, diplomate and members of the military, and one which
may be inferred from the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, is that if the political situation in Zaire
explodes, its consequences will be far greater than those in Rwanda or
Burundi. The current level of tension and the tribal and regional rivalries
that have been stirred up, and have been further inflamed by the huge inflow
of Rwandan refugees, give reason to fear this may occur. The internati onal
community, and in particular those countries with historical responsibilities
in the region, cannot disregard a situation of this scale. The Special
Rapporteur's conscience would not be clear if he failed to express bis opinion
in this respect. Preventive diplomacy is urgently required, although the
Special Rapporteur believes that any such diplomatie measures cannot be aimed
at reinforcing the statua quo, as there is no certainty that an irreplaceable
guarantor of stability exista. Zaire•s transition cannot be postponed.
Friendly countries could bring their diplomatie and political influence to
bear in order to resolve the current conflicts in Zaire" (E/CN.4/1995/67,
para . 274). That was written more than two years ago, and events have
heightened the fears of that time.
128. Spread of the conflict. The international community must be alert to
what is happening in Kivu, and to efforts by international organizations to
stave off the cruellest consequences of a disaster already in the making .
129 . United Nations or Orqanization of African Unity military observera in the
region. This suggestion bas been put forward on various occasions but the
necessary agreement has·never been reached. The Special Rapporteur considers
that, given the level of ethnie confrontation in the Great Lakes region and
the increasingly international nature of the conflict, aggravated by the sense
that the Zairian Armed Forces are not capable of dealing with it in Zaire and
may even have made things worse, the only possible way of preventing the
violence from spreading is to dispatch military observera to the region.
130. Extraordinary session of the Commission on Human Rights. At their first
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 38
meeting, the Special Rapporteurs on the human rights situations in Burundi,
Rwanda and Zaire suggested that the Commission on Human Rights shoul d adopta
global resol ution on the region (E/CN.4/1996/69, annex, para. 18). The
Special Rapporteur, having discussed the situation in the region with the
Special Rapporteurs on Burundi and Rwanda, ventures to suggest an
extraordinary session bas~d on the Special Rapporteurs ' latest reports,
including this one, since the Economie and Social Council, in resolution
E/CN . 4/1997/6/Add. l
page 39
1990/48 and decision 1993/286, has authorized the Commission to meet
exceptionally between its regular sessions in the event of urgent or acute
human rights situations.
131. Coordination of the High Commissioner•s operations in the three
countries . The three Special Rapporteurs also recommended that the operations
of the High Commissioner should be extended to the three countries in the
region and that observers should be deployed. They recommended that human
rights should form an integral part of United Nations strategy in the region
(E/CN.4/1996/69, annex, para. 17 (f)). The Special Rapporteur wishes to
emphasize this recommendation.
132. Representation of the Commission on Human Rights in the bodies
deliberating on and taking decisions for the region. The Special Rapporteur
also emphasizes the need for the Commission•s Special Rapporteurs to attend
conferences, seminars, symposia and other activities relating to the region,
as they stated in the report of their first meeting (E/CN.4/1996/69, annex,
para. 17 (1)) .
3. To United Nations bodies
133. The Special Rapporteur is obliged to draw attention to a lack of
coordination among the United Nations bodies concerned with the topic of human
rights.
134. On this subject, the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in
1993 recommended: " ... increased coordination in support of human rights and
fundamental freedoms within the United Nations system" (A/CONF.157/23,
para . II.li. Sundry other paragraphe of the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action also emphasize coordination .
135. This was why the three Special Rapporteurs for the Great Lakes countries
(Réné Degni-Ségui for Rwanda, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro for Burundi and the
present writer for Zaire) stressed, at their first coordinating meeting in
Geneva, on 18 and 19 January 1996, the need for them to take part in and be
kept informed of other United Nations bodies dealing with matters relevant to
their mandates (~/CN . 4/1996/69, annex, para. 17 (g), (b) and (1)).
136 . Likewise, at the yea~ly meeting of special rapporteurs ·and chairpersons
of working groups in Geneva, on 28-30 May 1996, several participants spoke of
the grave lack of coordination among the various bodies and agencies of the
United Nations dealing with human rights issues and that the situation
setiously undermined efficiency. The meeting suggeeted that the High
E/CN. 4/1997/6/Add.l
page 40
Commissioner should forge stronger links with the rest of the system (see
E/CN.4/1996/50).
137 . The Special Rapporteur has noted the dispatch by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of a team from the Department of Humanitarian Affaira to
discuss the problem of e~hnic violence in the Northern Kivu district with the
Zairian Government so as to be able to cope with the humanitarian needs
attendant on the criais. The mission, which was prompted by the events in
Mokoto and took place between 30 May and 7 June, focused on ethnie violence, a
subject which the Special Rapporteur covered in his first two reports .
138. Another United Nations mission sent to Zaire this year to evaluate the
electoral process pointed out in a summary that almost all the people
interviewed mentioned, as a prereguisite for the elections to take place, the
implementation of the 1981 Nationality Act; the Special Rapporteur furnished
precise guidelines on this subject in his first two reports (E/CN.4/1995/67,
paras. 122-124, 243-247 and 264 ; E/CN .4/1996/66, paras. 57-63 , 117 and 120).
In the Special Rapporteur•s view the result, if the Act is indeed implemented
but so interpreted as to deny Zairians their nationality, will be a serious
violation of human rights, as this report has shown.
North or Northern, and South or Southern, Kivu are used interchangeably.
They sometimes refer ta themselves by other names, such as that of the district they live ir
g. the Banyabwisha.
The Tutsi refugees who fled to Zaire in the first months of the fighting in 1994 have also ç
ck to Rwanda.
National deputies Ciprian Rwakabuba (The national leader of the Mouvement populaire de la
volution (MPR)); Phogas Sebakunzi; Emmanuel Rwiyereka; Mrs. Kanamahalagi Mburanuhwe; Gatalik
ançois Mpagazihe. Ministers of State Léonard Senseyi and Nepomusene Rwiyereka. Catholic bi
r. Patient Kanyamachumbi. The Director of the National Bank, Damien Munyarucendo. Universi
ofessors Deogratias Mbonyinkebe, Joseph Mulinda, Célestin Kalimba. Deputy Gstaliki, Ministe
iyereka Nepomusene and the adviser to the Governor of Northern Kivu, Joseph Mwangachuchu, al
me to Zaire this century. The current Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research,
kimonyo wa Magango (a Hutu).
Thirty-one are said ta be being held by the Service d'action et des renseignements militaire
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.l
page 41
d 13 by the Service national d'intelligence et de protection.
Zairian Camp Security Operation (ZCSO). See the second report, E/CN .4/1996/66, para. 47.
E/CN.4/1995/67, paras. 61-76, 94, 99 1 102, 145-169, 184, 201, 249, 258; E/CN.4/1996/66,
ras. 45, 47, 69-81, 88, 89, 97, 121-123.
Impunity is discussed in paras. 77-84, 249 and 261 of the first report (E/CN.4/1995/67) and
ras. 77 ff. and 121 of the second (E/CN.4/1996/66).
The Special Rapporteur discusses this in paras. 156-159 and 257 of the first report
/CN.4/1995/67) and paras. 75 and 122 of the second (E/CN.4/1996/66).
Projet portant organisation de l'identification des nationaux, du recensement de la population e
l'enrolement du corps électoral.
The council of Ministers• statement also finds fault with the Special Rapporteur•s supposed
ggestion, which he has never made, of absorbing the Rwandan refugees in Zaire. What the Special
pporteur did recommend was that the principle of non-refoulement established by the
51 Convention relating to the Statue of Refugees should be respected.
The criticisms focused on two points: (a) the report spoke of the Banyamulengue who numbered
orne 400,000 individuals". The lack of censuses in Zaire makes it bard to give an exact figure.
e sources cited by the group in Canada gave different figures: one said there had been only
O individuals in 1954; another, that there were 6,000 in 1956; a third said they now number
,ooo, and yet another says 14,000. The sources interviewed by the Special Rapporteur showed him
gures around the 350,000 mark, but insisted that there were "over S00,000". In any case, if
ere were fewer than 20,000, the violence this argument has developed would defy explanation; (b)
e Banyamulengue arrived in the region not in the eighteenth century, as the report says, but in
e twentieth. The self-styled "original" inhabitants and the Banyamulengue drew on a variety of
roniclers.
at differs .
Paradoxically, these are often the same - it is the interpretation of what they say
The self-styled original inhabitants appear to believe that before colonization
ere were rigid boundaries, whereas all authors stress that until the Berlin Conference the
undaries were only approximate, and·there is no question of the Rwandan Kingdom of Urundi having
cluded districts that now belong to Zaire . The Special Rapporteur points out, in any event, thal
his statement to the fifty~second session of the Commission on Human Rights the Minister of
stice, Mr. Joseph N'Singa Udjuu, said it "must be recognized that Rwandan immigration into the
zi, Mwenga and uvira districts of Southern Kivu dated from the same period as the immigration
to Northern Ki vu" .
TO:
FM:
DATE:
SUBJ:
PRE.AMBLE:
DMI
B/COHBAT
20/9/96
COMBAT ANALYSIS REPORT ON WNBF IN WEST HILE.
UCMANN
West Nile Bank Front is a ~ebel organisation under the leadership of Juma Oris
a~d mainly baaed in Southern Sudan. Sudan. like LRA. recognises it ·a formidable
force one of the several it is giving assistance. Quite related to WNBF is
the UNRF II under Bamuze whose Bqrs are Kajo-Keji whose operation ·area is
Moyo district.
The WNBF though lossing its fighters through desertions. has the capacity
to disorganise and stretch the UPDF might. Recause of_ t~e mas~ive lo_gi~tical.
and i;tround su2P.ort off ered to the se rebels by bo~μ ~h.ç _;;ydan!t~~- _and Zairean
governm__!nt. its op~ra~-~ons are like~y to . .s..o bevopd W~ Nile re_g~on'. Rampant
acts of terrorism. assassinations and nuissance ~ .erations are .. li~e!Y ~
~xtended to t~e cap!tal K~mpal~.
~ts wo_!'th noting_that th~ tabl~_q_~ecru~; s who ~~ve been ferried throuR~ Zaire
to Sudan have joined the WNBF in ~ue~t_to fig~t a fundamentalist war against
the NRM redme.
1. WNBF COMMAHD STRUCTURE.
Major General Juma oris is the chairanan of the high command and commander
in chief of the rebel faction. His 2I/C is Abdallatif who is also the chief
administrator. Following the hierarchy. is the Diyision commander of the
only Division the group bas. be is Colonel Yassin Noah. Following are the
21 members of the high command among whom are the six Brigade Commandera and
commanders of the special Units.
The 11st below shows members of the high command:-
a. Juma Oris
b. Abadlladil
c. -.Ju.ma Nclege
d. Chekn Sammuel
e. Matata Moses
••• /2
- Chaix.an
ZI/C chief Adm1n
- Chief advisor
- Operationa/laison officer
- General Sec. to BC and LRA liason officer •
f....--MOlres Okello
g~ Gulamn
h. Yabaya
1.. Ssemalcu] a
j. Yassin Noah
k. Musa Ali
1. Moses Gala
m. Athocon
u. oghoki.
o. Dudu
p. Sudi Ali
q. Baker Tretre
r. Ojere
s. Azi.z Odua
t. Moro
u. Abbas
-2-
Chief of civi.1 intellligence and security
21/C chief of civi.l intelli.gence and S.
Head of m.:ilitary intelligence
political representative
- Division CO
1 Bde CO
2 Bde CO
3 Bde CO
4 Bde CO
- 5 Bde CO
- CO artillery
- Chief signal officer
- Director of m.:ili. hospital
Supplies
training
Rations
The-Bde-CO 6 Bde whose names are yet to be got.
2. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE:
The WNBF political hierarchy is headed by Zubairi Atamuvaku together with
yet other unestablished officials at the SAF Juba Garrison Rqrs. Their role
is mainly to recruit, mobilize, solicit logistics and to gather general intelligence.
lts other work is to spread anti NRM propaganda and to align with
any anti NRM movement/oarganisation~·-.
Under Atamuvaku, are two structures:-
(a) The political representatives base at Kaya.
(b) The regional heads-based inside Uganda.
3. WNBF STRENGTB.
a. Personnel.
The overall strength ranges from 2000 - 2500 officers and ·men~~· There are
six brigades and each has three Units of approximately 200-2500 men but keep
on dwindling due to desertions.
• •• /2
-3-
There are special Units namely:-
(i)
(il)
(iil)
(iv)
(v)
Suicide Bn - Under Major s'r id (reported to UPDF)
Strike force - · under Major Awara
Milan (tabliq Bn) - under Capt. Wasswa
Military police - under Capt. Garry
Tank Unit - under Capt. Kadogo
The overall strength of the special Units1 rangès from 500-650 officers and
men.
b. Weapooary.
(1) Indivi.dua1 Weapons: AK 47 rifles and band granades.
(il) Grev Served weapons: - Mortors 60mm, 81mm, 82mm each Bn bas about
3 and the Arty regiment bas about 8 in number.
(a) Doscar Anti-Aircraft - Iraq modified gun with an effective range of
6 miles.
(b) RPG 10 - 2 miles range
(c) BIO - Anti tanks
(d} Anti tank mines
(e) Antipersonnel mines .
(iii)
(iv}
Mec~~\'-cal:~ H~v.~a~~:-~1t1J.$!.~;.~th~!.:c;R~~-n.5L,9~ .·~l\~~'and.~ lf4:il:
·for t ~ Jin~·~ fmlïr~·b":~~A!~~~~:-r~~ré'ot ~c~.t;-~·~.~f'â,1~ ),s~~-:--t:o
·OErR .. og·tsi:rcs aÏiâ~OP.~.· • .:: ' 1
Combat Effectiveness: As a guerrilla force with sucb a strength,
it would. have been expected, to be combat effective. Ho- ever, lack
of good bommand and failure to o·arry out Independent co111b!t pla'nning
' •1 ' " had de ,ted this guerrilla force combat effectiveness. ~~èy cannot
hold g ·ound.
../4
-4-
4. CQKPOSITION.
The WNBF bas 6 Bde and special Units.
1
Unit
1 BDE.
1 Bn
2 Bn
3 BN
2 BDE
4 Bn
5 Bn
6 Bn
3 BDE.
7 Bn
8 Bn
9 BN
4 BDE.
10 Bn
11 Bn
12 Bn
5 BDE.
13 Bn
'ïitin
15-.Bll
(red)
6 BDE.
16 Bn
17. Bn
18 Bn
Coomander
Lt. Col. Ali Musa
Capt. Tito
Capt. Anania
Jackson Dimba (dead)
Col Moses Ga1a
Capt. Apollo
Capt. 'Woku
Capt. Okello Wange
Col Atochori
Capt. Ali BBC
Capt. Karim
Capt. Ayeho
Maj. Salim Ogwoki
Capt. Mohammed Olera
Capt. Guma
Capt. Sbaban Alai
Maj. Charles Dudu
Capt . Bil:ali
Capt': ·-io"i-\i'= Popl'ê
· 1 • ,.-........,,.
Capt • .,Alü.~-
Not yet known
Capt. Abubakari Kenia
éapt~".. benëf ts"sa' .
Capt. Ag~~a (dead)
Location
Poki
Agigwa bills
Dudulabe
Kaya Poki
•• /5
-5-
N:B The compo$iti\n 4f special Unit, is as mentioned is 3 a. above.
5. TACTICS.
a. Use guerrilla tacts
b. Conventional v!th the barking of the SAF
6. TRAINING.
At first Arabe were the ones training but because of the language barrier,
instructors were selected from the for111er UA's
Training takes place at Poki and Molobo and there after, recruits are distributed
to different Units.
6. LOGISTICS.
a. Food: is supplied by Sudan and it is mostly sorghum, beans, ocra, ados and
sugar Gulu.
b. Medical: Drugs are rare but it is supplied by the SAF and the political
wing which is in Zaire.
c. Uoiforms: Supplied by SAF.
8.
9. ENEMY PLANS.
-·· ... . -- - .. . ~
1
a. To train a forte that w1ib infiltrate ~t~e Urban areas of central region for
terroristic acts. (In fact a force of i00-250) is already un~er training in
K~ya), They are called commando stri ~ing forces •
.. /6
b.
-6-
They intend to co-ordinafe with UNRF II activities in Moyo areas while
for them tbey concentration military targets in Koboko, Kaya and Arua.
C · Destioying key bridges in the a region is one of tbeir major plans inorde.,r (-
to deny UPDF supplies.
cl· To continue with the recruitment !Dostly of former soldiers and to ~nter.a.ràte
the tabliqs that are fertied througlt_Zaire.; .... , ..... · .. ,
e. To co- ordinate and possibly send :in trooos through Zaire to launch a~-attack
in the south western areas ot"Üg_~~d~·:, This would be in lia!son ~-1-~~
Rwandese army and some Ta~liqs recruits inside Zai!_!.
10. OBSERVATIONS.
a. The enemy is likely to use many fronts in the region of W. Nile and even
beyond so as to stretch UPDF and tender it ineffective.
b . Enemy terrorist groups would soon infiltrate deep inside the country for
assassinations, muissance operations etc inorder to divert the attention
of the security organs.
c . The enemy bas infiltrated th.e ~DF Intelligence net work especially in
W. Nile where the rebels women 'iré used during market days _to get information
from UPDF defences.
d. Secrets and plans of UPDF leak to the rebels throug~ indiscipline officer
who go on gossiping to civilians of double standards .
f. Desertion in the ranks of the enemy
c ' mpletely denies these thugs ground
! . .
are likely to ~:cntinue if the m,1,~·
in the region~ Most of them have been
t ••
, disappointed by the empty' promises of large sums · J~ money and yet the way
. i
:ioesn' t make any headway as they expected it.
(LT. C. M)
'
MI!füTES OF DISTRICT . SLCURITY SITUATION REV_J;l:w _I'!_EB~~NG
lfüLD AT BUNAGANA·:oN 15TH OCTOBERt...1936"
. .
1 . Iii ATTENDANCE: .
a •
b .
c.
d.
e.
f.
Lt. _Emmy ~agira
Maj.s>r Go~ Ssambwa·
ar. A, , M. Kiganda
Mr. ·G. · Rusarigiza
AS1' Semflkula
Mr. EvarÜt BÎdafashe
g. Mr. Charles Oluru.,· ··
h. Mr. FranciG, Kanyoro
i. Mr. Robe~t B~gi~imana
--:;r.--·· Iit. .~n ~ Akomi
AGBNDAE
-
Ag. RDC/l)SO - Chairman
CO 25 Bn.
CAO "'!' l{isOJ;'o.
Ag• C.ha irmru.:.i L. c_. V
D~C .. Kisorq.
O,C CI~ - Kisoro.
I.o - Bunagana.4
-I-mmigrations~ Buna.g ~ .iJ,r,. · Bunagann Cust~
I·.o 25Bn~/Seeretary •.
•
a. Communication from the dhair
b.. As.sessment or the Border Sc.curity Situation
c. Loopholes at Border check point~ .wi.tli em.Pha.s.:i.s •c
nunagana and Busanza
d. r-tcasures to contain thè situntion
e. · A.O.B.
ITEM NO. I:
3. The ·c.h airman a.eclareê:ï': the 'meetiriif open· by· first,; ' • . . . . : .. , . . . ..
elaboratinr:; on the provocntive tandencieG .of ,~r$3Sts t
YIU:rdert, ancl abduction. of Ugandan . ëitiier.s :·by:w'itnG;oni.st.,i. ..
forces he n~ed as ZaiI'eans ·:md Int~r;h~we·s;o1Jerr1tirif;'_ ,
!rom their b~ses in Zai,r.~. OtheI.' humUiating. acts of
torture againot suspected Ugandnns on espionage to Zaire
_.~ . n5-Ci ted. . He. a:Jso expi:.esè"ë°èf:dismày, ·at .th~ -in.tim~~t:i,~n ,
a:1d propag~da of' ·an ,approp~·iatë ··retaii~tive -~ttaCS.lr.foy·
• . . . ··~; ·:·· ... ;!~_,.., . . •,:._ .. ~- .~.. .. . ~ . · t . . ... ...
Zai.rcan basod .. forces on Ugançiif;,P.ê>ra.ers wnièll:~ç~_eatArl feax..
in llunagana ·a. reas, causin. g nightless· slee. pD, business
ciet.crioration,. and untolerable suf·.fA"'_icp: of t:he ma~f:~B
~eeking assylum in safe . areas._ ·f?ji})Q.l.éJij~rj:tlllg: .t~~(P.tovo~.
cation IJ:nd int:tmidAtion wn:/ t'.he .. .'~01ib1nÙOUG ruut!l"ëi.figifOf:
domestic anim~ls by c~rnbined 7.a\ré/.i~~~~-W>~~~e A~~~t~··buT;
ruled out · i,'ossibility ·or· a"'·tbi~ ..' ~~:~~~~;·êiüo .to~::tli~ ...~ .;~- ...
goi?g . COl}.f,"U;i~-~ in. za:i~é·:· ahd ·~}~e-i;.'. i~;~pa~i t~; ·t~ ~~~Iitain'
a retalia.tive .. counte1.' aggr.èssiori;r :. .
UCMANN
2 . .
ITEM NO . II:
..!Action
• 1
.. . I'
4. . Assessment of· the Eorder Secv~i~y.situation.
-In analysing tlfo bo:der s_e.~;t~i ty ·~i~~~ticr~. .
especi'à11f· of Bundgana and BÙsanza, the, .followint;
were realiued and decroed com?at ind~nators or· n.n
unstable sccurity oituo.tion within th~ horder:i. ri.g
areas with·· Zaire ·as"·tÇ.hey f,rovide UllC.Ontrolled ··--·
influx/exit âvenues ·to external antagonistic
: . -... . . - •. - . . . .. . .
forces p8rpe~atïng 'hc·stility:- · . . . . . .
a. l>rQvocatiye, IntlmliiaH,ve· a. n•d•· . :h...~ .f. ü.a' t.-
ing tend.e...n• c.. ies of the .ho. stile service
rôrë;ès" ag°iinst Ûgancians·.·.ilonr; ..,the bord,erlli
.. .... "·•-· .·· . - . . . . .· . arici in Zaire unde~ining· ·the iord.ial
All membcrs.
Organs
to
_ ~eïgh~?u,rh~.•d . r'~l;ti~;ship accord.cd· t~· ·thcmll~ccurity
by Ugançiana1;·1 ·Sim.i,larly is the propagation ·ahd L.Cs
of alarminB·Prop~ganda of attack instill- . m~int&in
in~. îear in t~c ;~sses and cuusing PFQ- 'yigillaricy.
. . : .... , ' ,: . . . . •
longedr.suf fe1:inr-;s.
In!l'lt·rit.ing and penetrating own areas
taking advantag~ of our laxity gathering
intelligence about;
(1) ~ilitary posirions, octjvitics nnd
!)lo.y me:nt . . (2) .... rr:1ament :md capnbili ty to cont;lih
the situati0.11.
Â~l Intelligence
orgiui?, lmmigrntions/
Cuntom:i
Administr.ntors
· r.nd L.Cs.
. .. ' .... It was also ee~lised thnt mpvcmr.nts of 1nf1·lt.rn-,.
tors are fncili~at~ù by;
. •. .
a.
b ,
c.
• t.. . ·,
Fake docurr,ents from Znire ns they -cltjn. to Customs and
. '·
have lost ,:;heir original document..s., or I1JP.Digration
• -11 •
ldentity cJrds. Offlèers ••
U~anda's lack· of.a nation-tl Idcntity Car~
has also contributed to the frec inc~rsion
of tnfiltrators:
Sale ·of Graduated Tax Tickets (Uga~.d nn) to external forces by individ\:ah ; in -the
· i'Ldministrative '.5t.:ctor, e. t.c has rnade ·
worse the influx ns this is the most;
v:'llid and considcred docurumt in the
country. The .\d.m:i.uietrativc w:i.ng and L.Cn
nre C'~.~ l.ed upon to· terminute this tendency
to r.:-~·,~~ influx.
... \.,
D~s·trict
Aùithorities
to· .rorward
th.!3 $Bme to
igllfr .. echcJ.pns.
. . .
tll A~ministrator
t1nd L.Cs.
3
d. Lack of liaison ).ctween the Immigration
Office an,j Securïty organs has resulted . t ' : .. .. .
j..nto failure: ·to reduca external · inf'lù:J.
thus . rend~ring · the deni.11 of enemy 'th.e
a~eess .to~ ?bt~initlg·•inform:ttion fërtile·
grol,Uld./advan"t;n.ge.
Th~ District ~olipe Commander alortod the·
me~ting that ;;.oaripg of .animn"l:3 along the bord.cr
lino has b·ec~me insecu~e as cxt~I:'.nal hostile . .:
:_ ·.rÔ~ces se~~ to target them. H~ .further. ch~ged
· · th~t Ugand~s are very relaxod with the
neighbourhood in a bond of brotherhood while
idle Ugnndans tend ~o ~eek for jobs ·in Zaire
·créating a situation for the Nation· to libcrato
thè~ i:h case of vict.imi.sation by Zairean
Auth;ori tics •. The Ag~ L.·c. V. Chairmnn supplemoa . . .
ntcd\~h~ D~Cïs' views by adding that L.Cs should
be ·v~gilant to con tain such situations ns
. people along the border line are· intcrrc·latcd·
and immediate .ncighbours of Zairwas citin~ ru1
C')('runp~c of 'Rusnnzn whcrc the border i s rlc,tc1•r11jned
q;y- road sides. He coJ:IJi!onted Ugnnda for law
abidirtg thus Zaire bcing unluwlcssnesa i~.
capita.l ising on our ·gcnti1ity as .t hoy nre
-âccordbd sanctuary by thcir neighbours.
. . .
·H0wever, the Chairman put it cle~r that K~soro
is a strategic position for .the mov~ments of
nntngonistic forces within the trio-countt'tes.
Thus nny persan who abcts or facilitntos tho
rnov~ment of non citiiens ~hould be arrested, and
dcalt with harsiy. He also romindcd the moetirig
tnn.~thc two 1ulllion cxilcd Rwnndoso in Zn~rc is
n-favourable ground for rccruitment of. forces to
dèstAblizc the Rceion. The ~'ustorns . Officer,
Bunnngann added thnt Z~irenns cxtort .moncy from
UGnndans naminB thcm ppios yot they (Znirenns)
~re so.fe on our sidc.
Hf') continuoct by z:,yi11c; th:i.t ho.r. ·o.ssmcnt nnd
m.mstreatmcnt of Ugnndnns in Zairc is at the
incrcase And nono nrc nll~wcrt to procccd
beyond Rutsuro whilc thosc who manouvro are
torturcd or maimcd.
·Action
Dl'C, CO,
DISO,
Immigration
& Customs.
..
L.Cs .and
Administra tors.
Customs/
Immigrations
Officcrs.
./4
4
-IT-E-M- ·N·O-; ·I·L·I-:
5. ioopholes nt Border Check. l ·oi.i;tn. The
following· wcre obscrvcd ns .),.oopholes ·at the ·
bo~er check points::-
a.
):, .
. . . ; ... .
Lc~ek-~f nn· Intorr.lctioh ·betwëea 'Zo.trc·· ·n.nd
U5anô.a to have common ~striëtcd'môvemen~
j;>ermi ts· whÏQ~ : coul4_: çoμ.f.:i.no ).o0.11i .;mo~:.. .
~ents to a spèeifi~ ·chi~! o~ ~Admini~t"rdtor, . . . . .. :· . ·,,·
The etistoms Officer nssured members .that
... a ' • • ' •
,this sys~cm e~ei- porfoét'.'..y workod bctw~on
Ugancla and Rwanda. ·
Continous exit o.nd. influx of both Naticnals
Action
by passing th •. Immigration Offices purPort- Police a.nt
ingly to v:is:.t relatives has JMde ident~~i- Immigrations ..
cation of -pe~sons difficult éspecially,o~
mnrke t days. .
c. Somc ~~ctlr~.y personnel hnvo nlso Rdopted
th.e ZÊ:l.irean habit, of ·oxtorting moncy nnd
allow·i~g mo· ·er:icnts in nnd out.
d. Unccntrollc l dny :.md niE,ht movc1mmt:. ncc::.--oes
the Borders.
o.
f.
Unthorough scannin5 of documents nt the
check poin1·. Othcrs who pnssed vin the
Customs/:trnnigration ·offices have been
turned bac'< tho11gh they pos~c!l~ed
official documents on susp.iéion.
ffar~..: ts e.long · the border line 11'.:l.d ~!9-
man I S land allowing freo ::iixins of bo'th '
l~at.io:mls ~ith ynri~us ·1ntP.rests. · It ·was
·observed:
(1) Th,<\t ··tho M:irkct of Bu~IUlZi\ bo ohiftcd . .
to.its new site whilc•· thnt of Nteko
pends su;rvey nnd allocation ot·n now
site.
(2) Thht an earlicr decision hnd .been
reached to shift nll border mnrkcts
lnw~rds but implc~c~tntio~ nc~Qr:
tool{ pl nec.
Sceui•ity
brgnns,
Immigr:itions
office.
CAO and
:t.ça.
CAO • ; I ,
.CA0.
./5
5 Action
(3) :rhat Bussiness communitics negloct
shifting of border mn~kots inwnrds
because of the nccess th~y hnve to
smu~gling thoir itoms which shouldn't
be condoned.
(4) That scrving ,._bussinoss intcrests
should be subsidiary RS thcy provide
avenue~·for infiltrntors.
(;) Th~~- due _to t~~ f ree mixing ~ ·
infiltrators have f\CCOSS t~ gnther.
t . • •
intelligence rcquirod :md OVE.ln
abduct n~yb;~y .ns mny.bc thcir
. •. .
mission.- . " · . ..
(6) ~hflt thcrc is m::-.rketinp; of items in
·No-mnn I s lruid which ma.kes identifi- . . .
cation of porsons dîfficUl~ as they
·. do~ I t reach tho · i:eJ.,evq.nt _pfficcis
anà chc~k _poïnts .•
'· . .
(7) As a s0curity monstirc, Mn.rkots nt
l'ordcrs/:~o-ninn I s ·lnnd ·~ be moved
im.,r:1rds to sc·rvc both securi ty rmcl
bussincss intcrosts.
(8) That ovor crowding of Trucks at the
Customs offic:ns/prm:iiscs m:\y be of
security risk·but the Customs
Officcr Rttributcd the orunc to·
delays c:tÛ.sod -by his Hcndquartcrs
in Knmpala.
ITi::M UO. IV:
6. I1co.surcs to contnin the situation:
Hith nll items f:rorr ·.,.ln_ . I to III exhaustcd, the
following me:isurès {\rc s;oÜght to rcctify nnd
cont.:lin the dct~rior,..ti.ng sccuri ty ai tu:ition :\t
hnnd:-
R. The Ul'DF Cornrnnndcr emphnsiecd on th~
nccd to· incïitiil'iso o.nd scnsi tise . the
L.Cs nnd mns~cs at large t~ guard ·
ngainst the onèmy hostititias.
~~i1~3cs ·should hnvc· cnrly w~rning
alrlrm mochnnisms likc drums to
,!.r UlI!lip;rntions,
: L.Cs nnd
1 S0cu1;ity
Orgnns .•
All Mcmbcrs.
Customs
Office,
1 Kampala.
;
l
Î District ! Conuni ttcc,
County nnd·
Sub-county
Committccs
nnd L.Cs.
6
'·
(1)
!.' 1.ler.t bo ·: h s.c curi t:, ore;ans and
neighbours to nyoid being caught . . , . . . .
unawar0s by thc .çnomy. Mobilisation
c.nd. senn.i.tie;ition should bo
ccntralis~d to pnri~h. levels so th~t
.every L.C · eBBures· ~is role is fu3:1y
:I?layed\ supplcnientcd· 0by sub~ounty
commi'ttees~··
Ui'DF Commo.nder si1ould. devis'.? a. system
of• guarentccing· sçicurity for. tho
. population in' the "dist1Jrb9d. npens of
Muramba, GÎsozï Îlnd Nynrub11yè.
Militru:y dcttc.èhos no.y be'
vulnerable :ind c::.sy te>'": d,cd,ro thus
this shall be;
Donc tnr·mgh Aggressivo Fl,ghting
patrols · .;-,i covcrt n:i lnnrl ,i;d~in<?
parties· in collnbor~tion with the
i>ttlice." anéi. Spoèi:Ù constabulnrios.
Such opo~. nt.i ons shnll be bnsed on
Intelligèn~o prc-réquisitcs nnd
gatherings.
(2) Coyert ni~ht pntrolG and ~bushos
nîong nll suspectcd cntry and exit
points in linison with the Special
Constnbul~rios to curb infiltrators
nnd nny othcr persons nvoiding
ontry or exit .from the -mnin border
post.
c • . Strict observfltion ~1d ·scailning. pf
movcment_docum~~ts acér~~s bordèrS
s~roing movement nëce~sib: .. âty .to
thoso in r1.:.:ssessicn .,f l-ASS.1:0RTS .
only • . . ..
d. Border mn-:-~i::cts opornting nonr border
linus and 11.>-man ' s lnnd bo immedintely
·shift-~d ·iu~nrds. Bus:mzn · m;rkot
to ope_r:,.t_e f~om i t~ 1,rojc_ct,:?d now
si te whilo :'l'tcko market· bo· ·ro:;
è~carcatcd for the ti..m. e ,.. .~ oing ns nn
:ü tornntivc is soup;ht.
Action
En. Co.
DI-C and nll
Intelligence
sources.
.UPDF Field
Co1nrn~rndors
end
Intelligence
1s0rvicos.
Border Ul1>F
Commnnder,
l'olico :md
:i.rca
sccrct:irics
for Defence.
·Pus.toms,
Immigrations
~d Security
Orgo.ns.
CAO nnd
S•..e cur..i ty.
C>rgnns.
. ...
7
ITEM NO,.. 'V:
e. Immigrations ~nd CUstoms Officinls
should li.aise wi th their Zaircnn
countcr parts to stop bussiness in
the No-mnn's land whilc timc should
also be fixed for movnm1mts n.ccross
b6rdcrs.
7.. A .. O.B.,
The following fnll undcr this it~m:
Im:migrntions
Customs and
n1:1c.
a. All Zaircnns in Uganda without v~lid D~C, OC
b.
c.
d.
documents; i.e; movcrn~nt and Tradc
should be rounded up, their
propcrtics storcd i!l the Customs
stores nnd suspects prosccutcd.
The DFC to rein.force tho Cμstoms
Office with mn.npowcr to broadcn his
oper'ltions nl_ong the bordcrline.
Cows rustled should be hnndcd bnck
throuf>h th~ police for dclivcry to
thcir r.iGhtful 011norc.
No vchiclc should lc~vc Ug:mda for
Zaire n.nd vico-vcrnn bcforc the
situntio~ normalises.
Bunngnna
.I'olice post
; r.nd euetoms
Î Officcr.,
f
DI-C•·•
Dl:'O. OC .
Bunagn•a ~•lice
l-ost,
CUsto!Ds/
Immigrntion8 an( Secu~' ity ~. ans.
e. An nltcrnntivc pc.rking :position shoul 1 CUstoms/
be sited to ~void ovcr crowding of Immigrnti_p~s
vchiclcs ~t the CUstorns Offices. Officcra,
1"leetinE5 ndjourncd !'lt 1400 hours.
Compiled by:
(Ben Vuni Akomi)LT.
BN. I.O - À'ISOlO.
Distribution:
DGISO.
I.G - .l:OLICE.
BRIG1~DE CO.
ALL f1EMB1::RS.
Approvod by:
(Emmy Twn.c;ir:\ Tu.zindo )LT.
AG. RDC/DSO - CHAIRI1AN.
t ••
TO: DMI
FM: H/COMBAT
DATE: . ·2 JUL197
SUBJ: THREA1 ASSESSMENT IN S/WESTERN DISTRICTS.
'KI60RO, KABALE AND 'RUKUNGIRI-.- , .
1. .GENERAL:
UCMANNEX
îhe capture of:.power bY ·RPA. in 1994, pushed th.ousands of armeé
. Rwaridëse· -~O i d1èrs 1. é-f=Aiù' and ' Hutu ml 11 t.l a lnto thë'° western·:.. . .. . . . • .. • • . . • • •••. =- • . • • ,.. - ...
side·,-.of Congo ··cforme·r1y· Zaire>. that borders Uganda. Instead '
of··ctrsartni'ng. them·~·'·thè Mobutu regtmè simPlY concentrated ari.d
.'organlsed . th,em·: ln·to·:=:camps-~ ... The : Kabt ra fortes d1s1ntegratea .
. ~hese · camps'. t~e :;oc~upants mos~l~ an~~~- ml 11 tla ~n~ ex-~~R
w~nt .lnto d~sarray~ disappearlng 1nto; the Jungles of south
eas.tern Congo,· Bec~use of the vastness and wi ldness of. Congo,
Kabi la' s forces thin a.s theY were on the ground never. bothered:
• 1 to hunt them down, dlsarm and repatrlate them. This has pose~
a se.curl.tY threa~ :.to th~:· re·ar ·of Kablla' s forces and to bath
countries of Vgand~ .and Rwanda.
. .
,. from fts·angan~- areàs in _.Cpn_go, t~.e e~-FAR,·_ ex-:-FAZ and ,hutu_
mf11t1a have been Joined· by ·a few Ugandan :dis~ldents and have
• • -·· • • : • • ... .. •• • : ai:, ••• , •• -- · • • • • ... • •• . ~m, b~rked on ; a ·:~outil .ward ..m ov~rnent . to the .areas or· Vlrunga, .. . .· .. ,, ... .., . . ,; -
.. ~w1nct1 and Mgah.tngà ·.Natro·nar parks·:
. . . .
2 ~ REGROUPING_· OF ·EX-FAR, EX-FAZ AND HUTU MI~ITIA IN CONGO.
à. · B.e tween 2000;: 30. 0. 0 m.e n e. x...- FAR and. hutu •m. . lli\t i.a. falrlY armed ·
have ·am~~s~~ -1n ·Y1run~a and Mgahlnga Nattcina1.~arks. Out
of these between 700-100 men have 1nf1ltrated and had runnlng
battles in Rubengerl <Rwanda). The remainder ln Vlrunga have
been.under att~ck from iDFL forces of Congo.
..
· :.-: ..
-2-
. .
~b. q :rhese-d~~~1dents, .m~ny as they are though not d1rectly
:threate~ ing -Uganqà'-s territorial integrlty, could be a securltY
· thr.e at be. caus'e of pressure excerted on them by both RPA and .ADFL forces.
.. .. .
. . . · .c. J~e· places wheré ·.these thugs are concentrated are in Natlom
: ·.. · .. Parks· where· food -.-and bthe·r loglstlcs are lacklng, This m~kes
Uganda Yulnerable_ s1rice these thugs cou Id cross over forceful lY
to acquire ·these supplies.
.- .
3. KABEBA~S .GROUP:
After attacking Kisoro -ln 1996, Kabeba' s group retreated lnto • • • • • • • 1 • • • • C-ongo where 1.t ·Is thought to have been dlslntegrated by changes . . . ..
. that top~ Plaçe,.-lrislde ·conga', However the group went lnto
:h1o~Ing ahd ·hai startèd re-organlslng ltself.
a. ·composi tfon:
·The··.group_ is esti1J1ate_d _ta be :_between 200-300 men· re-organlslng
in -:vi tchÙmb.t /.· LÛÜJmbL ,Klsegulu and Kisoso. It is composed . . " !· . ... . . . . .
·of Jew ·ADF -·wh·o /μr( froiri Kas1n·91, late Kl-sase's recrults, few
= hut~-. àn9 ·~x-FAzr·.e)ernen~,s~ _:· T~e. group· ls falrly ·armed.
l .
b.·_ Actlvtttes; ,•
The · 9roup h·as of recerit-been carrying out nuisance attacks
qn ADFL of Congo, · ADFL efforts to comb their vast areas where
they ha~· suspected Kabeba's forces to be hldlng, have so far
y le lded· noth 1 ng.
.....
,··.
• ,
·,.
. ,: ,
-3-
c. Intention:
. Jo ~erge ~itn -b(g nu~bèrs of ADF operating in Kasese areas
~nd :~eg,n op~rattog !ri the rear areas of UPDF in Runkugiri
. and Kisoro; ··CurrentlY the group is lacking arms, ammunltion
·and '.oth.er suppll,es ' in fonn of drugs . .They intend ta get these
f rom Ugand~. ·
4·. ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO UGANDA.
a. :The ëthhlc -composition of the civillan population along
the .épmmon bc:i°rders -of Uganda and Congo favour the cause of
. ·. fightÜ1g g.r .o u-ps. , .- The:y. · are bro.thers, cousins and have many
thlngs in comiTion .. ·:They are mainly Hutu. The L.C syst~m lnslde
Uganda has_ b~en :u~ed as a conduit as some of them issue lnfiltratori
with movément ~rders~
b. ··The pressure excerted on these groups from Rwanda leaves
Ugahda .district 9f- Kfsoro an alternative vulnerable point
.by-these groups, ·
..
c. ~n ~he whole Kisor9 district, there 1s only one company
which ls based ât .the district Hqr, In other border points,
there police ·posts :wtth very few personnels. The enemy groups
tha. t are ·ilong the ._bo~der are· aware of such thin securitY '\ .
personnei o·n ·._the ·ground . . It. 1s their prime target, to overrun
1 thènL g:et" arms and ·.am,nunltion, food and drugs. This leaves
key ooints .bf -Chan1ka; Bunagana and Klsoro town as areas which
are likely tri be ~ttacked at any opportune moment •
d.· The_ Kabeba's rebel group presence ln areas ·borderlng Ugandan
districts of :Klsoro and Rukungirl poses a serlous threat of
attacklng and · inf1·1trat1ng areas of Butogota, the Olugano
forest, Kihihi and' Ishasha areas.
/
-4-
. .
e.. It should. .b- e hoted that the composition of Kabeba's Ugandan
~ diss~dents ls rif local youths born in R~kungirl and Ntugamo
. districts . . The.Y know the terrain and have intelligence about . ' own f.orces ,
' f, · The Bang111ma ·trlbe of Congo whlch 1s oooosed to Kablla's
reglme ·arid }ew>rerim.ànts -o·f Bisase's recrults have Jolned up
h·ands ·.with ·Uçfandp dlssldents. This has ·gtven these groups
caver in Congo . This wtll gtve them opportunitY to deal wtth
the thinly ~eoioyed ADFL troops along the Uganda border and · . . . .
then make 1ncurs1ons .1nslde Ugartda.
g, . ·or :rec~nt, ... .comm'a:n.d :structure of ADFL along the border .. ' . • . • • • • ,ê;r h~·s. b~.en ·changèd \ .· T~e· o·r1g1nal 9evot~d Banyamulege commanders .
havë ·beeh .. replacèd by 'former FAZ :conmanders who have been under
'· re•or.lènt:atlbn, .. :îheSè"· ar.e the s·ame COl11Jlanders Who were itiannlng • :, • • ' 1 • ..
. the~~ _border .ocilnts ·and· giving sanctuary to these dissidents
1ns1de Congo, Their vfgi-lance and trust to deal wlth the
groups which theY -Once collaborated with, is doubtful.
Thi~ lèaves room for the dissidents to freely re-organise,
get intelligence and cross over to attack areas lnslde Uganda
witholit' any pressure from thelr original bases.
h •. As. if. the above ·1.'s not enough, mllltary intelligence
capabî 11 tl és ·of. :ADF(~:fre v.ery much l imi ted . . They lack comp~~ent
. ·' L.0.' .S. a. 1. 0r19·:·t~. e'.°'bord.. .er ·.to·:rnoni to'r. , .a ss. e.s .s . . ... ,,a ..n ,. d.. PfOVld. e. . coll aborati VE
.: ::: t-riteI11geoce to .. Ugahdari's·ëcurlty"·ooeràtfvês . .. This makes it -::· 1 • • . , • • .... .. .... - • • •• • , •••
diffic.ult to ·.fiave .co·~·oraTnated anélfocused operatlons against
t he rebel _bas·es·.: · .
-s~
5. ENÈMY LOCATIONS:
a. Instde Rwanda
(1) Muhavura ranges
. (2 >: Mgahinga .National park
(3) ·Sablnyo -range~
(4) Kidaho commune
b. Ins1de :Crin~~
, . .
. · :{. 1 ). ·. vi rür. igà .:N. ational park
(2l. TongQ : .
·. (.3) . ïdsoso
. ( 4). -Kisegulo ..
3· and 4· ·ar.~ ~reas coverl.ng between Nyakakoma and Vlchumbl
on -the Ugandâ/Congo border.
(5) Bwindi ~atlonél park where an estimated group of
200 ex-FAR amd EX-F.AZ are concentrated.
NB: 'There are no enemy camps inslde Uganda.
6. ·OWN FORCES ASSESSMENT:
· . a.: · UPDF· has -~onlY:· ·a company 1n Klsoro that can hardly defend
: ),-the ~for- tn·.·case'·of.· a :masslve -àttack. They cannot flght an
offensive ·battle .ahd the nearest relnforcement ln terms of
ber~onnel and e~ufpment ls ln Mbarara.
.. .. • .1 .~
. . b. The whole of K!soro district has -never bothered to·traln · . . . . .
LDU personnel' ttjereby_ leavlng the wllderness of the countryside
withàut any secur:ItY ·organ to deter any enemy threat.
:
.....
-5-
....
c. _The po_l1ce 1posts scattered in Bunagana, Chanlka and other
trad. ing centrès. . are defenceless and thlnly spread.
d. · ·M11.11:ar.y'.ithetligence 1s hardlY felt on the ground thereby
· 1 ea~H ~g to ·an: · 1 nteÎ 11 gence vacuum. The re 1 s_ much requ 1 red
for:m111t~ty lnte)11gence to collect and monitor about enemy
act1~1t1es · and . tourses of action across Rwanda and Congo.
It has only. tieen the DI.SO'·s office w1th some limitations doing
in te 11 1 gente ·;) n. the reg.1 on.
·e. In Rukun~iri ~lsttlct there are 200 LDUs trained but only
1oo ·ar. e d. ep.l oyed a.n d .offlciallY pald bY government, the rest
àre ·1ct1e 1n the Villages. The 100 are deployed as follows:-
Cl) Rweshama - 40 LDUs
· (2) Butogota - 25 LDUs
(3) · Kirarq National park - 35 LDUs.
f. ADFL of Cong~: . (friendlY force>.
They have .a strength of a BN based at Luchuru but wldely and
thlnly sprea~ rlght from the border of Rwanda CVirungaJ to
lake Edward. They are of a strength of platoon~ along the
following border" posts:-
c 1 > · Bunagana ·.
<2> Butogota·:
.(3L Ishasha .
<4> NYakakoma
C5J NYamusfsi
_.( 6) :"NYamt'r lma
/
...... .
. ·:: ,,• -7-
Such. ,th. lnly. ' s~r. ead forçes can hardlY contaln and monitor enemy
actlvitles wlt~in the wlld and wlde forests ln thelr areas
of cohtrol.
g. RPA :cfrlendlY force> •
. . .
• • •• 1 • . . .! .
They are. 1n :a :Brigade ·formation wl th 1 ts Hqr at Ruhengert.
1he~ .have :a fJiI .Battalion plus, statloned near Chanika at . . . .. . .
the · Uganda Border. ·.They are a wel 1 equtpped and organtsed
.forc'e·.- that. h.as· con,t~ineq several rebel incursions w1th1n thelr
t~riitbr(es; They ~an eas11Y contain any situation along . . . .
the border.·· They ohlY need co-ordlnatton wl th our forces
to execute Joint missions.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS:
..
a. The company ln Kisoro be relnforced to a strength of a
Battalion in order·. to contain a serious securitY situation
that 1s ~evelooing .ln the reglon.
b. A. ·programme to train local LDU be embarked on through
~he local authorities ln Klsoro. Such a force would ln the
future be·-1-n posftl9n to contaln spill-over Incidences along
our. border fines;
ç. The ·ga~e rangérs be armed wlth automatlc rifles and thelr
numbers: to ·be .:boost:ed· so as to be utl 11 sed bY the securl tY
organs an early ~ar~lng group~,
d. .In Rukupg1 ri. a force of a company be put at Kihlhl and
another company ~t Is~asha. The 1nter1or strateglc ireas
of Ruku~giri can be secured by LDU units.
..
. :
-8-
e. 2hd Division .I.O should de~loy his operatives ln areas
of Butogota,· Kihihi ahd Ishasha so as to tap intel l igencè
deepet 1 ns 1 de . con.go;.
UCMANNEX
Ue;tlDda PGop1es D8Xunco F.01.'Can
t'li1 :rnt er. sec ne·pt
2 l)iv:ieion Hg.e
!l'HE
2 n:cv. oommn.
JWD.F- ?-IDJ\.R.\RA.
P.O.B01t 1559
11barara.
1~ aept 97.
Th:f.a ~port; çovers the period t.rom Ist Aug to 3·ist 1tug 97.,
and it highl;lgl1ts the .f.ollow-lng:-
(a) G-Ono1?>al. secnri ty Bi ttle.tioD.
(b) EDemy situation.
(o) Et\em;y- r..ocations aJld plans.
{ù.) own .1v:1hiove111enta.
( ro ) own I.<~se s.
(~) own Forces.
(6) Opart;\1;io11aJ. :erobloms.
(b) suggois·t;icllS tu:1d Observations.
(i) conclusion.
..
GePeral.l;r aecuri·ty situatio11 in the area o.t.' oooti'Ol.
ÇW/Ugfi:\.Jlda) baa grwimll.l.y been içroving. Though ·t;he1:e
is atil1 ADF ac1."iv1.tio~-4-.o~. Rai4i~9 ._,J,tL:q.~,Jlg. ,.e..bduct:J.;ng
axtd looti115 .food eti1.tra3,ragi.s.t~J:'ed·~~~~~~!-.fegi.0D~
Atld. ·tbia a.et o:t ld1llng9 nbciucti.oJi, bnrning housco i:;·
rai.ding an:l lootiDS food etor~a bas been carr~ed by the
·.A:DF rebels in tbe placoa where they oomplet&1y lmve no
supp,O:t't .:rroin wanai.nch:!. a.a a Ji;.e tJJJ.s ·of reveDge.
..... .. ~· ""'.. ' . ..... .
~~'.;,..;;~st -::o~~eE~!.<!"'"<1t~W~-~;..~~ë~1
.. ~e.~9..~rlaro.:.~K1M.~Rf!,.
Dttuu...:.u,1gyo · so~e ... pcu.·."a.,o .... : :Kaue.%''? e ,~s et,..~ ng .. usot\
n.a tr1.U1Sit ro'-,"t~s t<> th~: neighbourJ.~:districta ot' R.i.balo9
:a,.rnhony:i., Hoilna ro"lcl :(bapg.a sv.b distriobs p1us xat·o.nga G/-
~es-orve. · ---(
a) n~curihjr:y Situation in B,undibugyo, tho aoe1oeit:y ~it:-" ---
uatio.n. in :Btl.lldibugyo zone ho.a been stea.d.17 irn_proviDg l'lith
t:he- di.epl.aced p:~1la sl.owl.~ going back to thoir hof!H!e.
Hm-reveT.• e..1.ot l."e na to be done :in l3l1Ddibut,70 to. e.m:mre
-2
"COlU'l'IDJ!!~ITIAL"
2 DIV . OPS HQS
11(:l()fJlt''rnRN'T'TII T.tt
-2-
·the population oE ·l;beir sa..i'tlJty.
(b) El~El1Y SITTTATJ:0If Dl BUliDIBUGYO.
ThG enomy. operating in :Bund:ib,igyo is bighl.y mobil.e and
operates i11 smnl1 groupa of' 02-05 meJl as 8'1ch given i.he
illacoeesbility to ~ebel. positions due to cli.t.ticult terrain,
XJO sigx>i.f'iéant enem;r posi.tion havtt be.en .identif'ied.
However the f'o11owing hi.de outs have been identi.tied:-
Keballgo- in Butama Parish.
- KasEU'UÛ -
- Bukwe-ra -
- 1ratung,iru
- 11.i.J~~bi.
B1!tam.a. parish.,
Xaknloe. Pariah.
Itaknlal Parisb.
( c) -)~REMY STfil:..~GT.fI.
~e enemy opara.t;ing in Bundibngyo is abo,.d; 300 mon.·
II0w0ver this num'be:r OlUl eas:1.ly be reinf'oroad b!v ·the gron.P
in the near by rebel bases in Collgo.
The t~nemy sub devided. thamse1ves iDto small gx•oups acco~
iDg ta the mission at hand.
(iii.) lvlSESE DlS'l'R!CT.
The aecuri~ siti1atioD in this .di:;rtrict has buen improving
o~ recent atter a Duruber of. rebel activities ··wha~e
UCMANNEX :
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / AFR"':CA
FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE
DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
October 1997 Vot 9, No. 5 (A)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
WHAT KABILA IS IDDING
Civilian Killin&s and Impunity in Congo
I. SUM:MARY ...•...............................•...............................•....•.•.• 3
Il. RECOMMENDATIONS •.....................................................•........•.. S
III. BACKGROUND ....................................................................•... 7
The Origin of the Ref ugees ....•...•....•.............•................................• 7
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge ......................•......... : ....... , , , , • , • , , , ... , •• , 8
The Citizenship Question ....................................... .........•...•.•...•.. , 8
Violence Against Speakers of Kinyarwanda ............................................... 9
The Banyamulenge Revolt ........................................... · •.....••.•••.....• 9
Attacks on the Camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Laws Violatcd ....•.... , . , •. , •.•............ : .................................... 11
IV. OVERVJEW OF CIVILIAN KILLINGS FROM OCTOBER 1996 TO AUGUST 1997 .•...........•.. 12
Human Rights Abuses by the FAZ ...................................................... 12
Human Rights Abuses by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Mîlitia ............................... 13
Human Rights Abuses Committed by the ADFL .............•............................. 14
V_ WHAT KABILA HAS TO HIDE: A CASE STUDY .........•.....•.......•....••.....•• : ....• 16
Human Rights Abuses Committed by the F AZ ...••.•.••..•.•.•••.••• ; , • , ••••. , , , •.••...•. 17
Human Rights Abuses Commifted by t~e Ex-FAR and lnterabamwe Militia ••....•... ~: ...... -... 18
Human Rights Abuses Committed by the ADFL •... · .•. : ..................... , .............. 19
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / AFRICA
485 FIFTH A VENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10017-6104
TEL: (212) 972·8400
FAX: (212) 972-0905
E-MAIL: [email protected]
FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE
DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
17 PASSAGE DE LA MAIN D'OR
PARIS 75011
TEL: (331) 43 55 25 18
FAX: (331) 43 55 18 80
VI. CLEANING UP: SITE PREPARATION AND TIIE INTIMIDATION AND KILLING OF WITNESSES
•.••.•.. .. ........••. •••.•• •• •. ... . .. •• .. •.....•.......••••.•.•..•...••. •. ....... ........ 2.s
Vil. WHO IS IN CHARGE: TOWARDS ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILI1Y ..••.. .• •. ...•. ..... ... 28
Commander '·'Da'Vid'' ....... ...... ............ . . . .................. ..... ............. 29
General Gaston Muyango . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Commander "Godfrey" Kabanda ...... . ....... .... .. .. ........ ... .. . ....... . . ..... ..... 30
Lt. Colonel or Col. Cyîago (Kiago) . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Commander or Lt. Colonel "Wilson" . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Colonel ''Richard'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Major "Jackson" Nkurunziza ( or Nzîza) .••..• .••• •.•.. •.•••..••.......•. ...•... ......... 31
Commander ''Joseph'' ........ ....... ............ .... ......................... . ....... 31
Colonel "Dominic Yugo" .............. . ... ... . . ... ... ... .. ....... . . ..... ..... . . .. .... 32
VIII. UNCERTAINPAST, UNCERTAINFUTURE: CIVILIANKILLINGS INNORTH-KIVUTODAY ..• 32
IX. TIIE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The United States .. . .............. ... ...... ... .. ... . .. ....... . .......... .. ...... . . .. 35
Europe and Africa . ..... . ... .... .... : ........•...................... .. .. .... . .. . ..... 31
The United Nations ... ........... ............. . ....... .... .... . . . .. ... .... ..........• 38
X ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . ... . . . ....... . .......• . ........ .... ......•.•• . •. .. .•..... . ... . 40
I.SUMMARY
The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Alliance ofDemocratic Forces for the Liberation ofCongoZaire
(ADFL) carried oùtiiiassivë killings of civilimùefugëès and othcr violations of basic principles of international
humanitarian law dunng· àttacks_ôn'~!\Jg~e c~i>s.~ .. the former Zaïre (now the J?ëmô~ràtic Republic ·ofCÔngoftïiat
bég.ui' in late 1996, and in the énsuing seven m~mths as war spread across_the country. The war pitted ~he.M)FL,
used bere to mean all forces under the nominal command of Laurent-~~siré Kabila, 1 with important backing Îrom
Rwanda, U ganda, Burundi, Angola ~nd_ other neighboring states, )lgain~t ·a coalition of then President MobÜtù 'sëse
Seko's Zairian Anned Forces (FAZ), former Rwandaii Anned Forces (ex:FAR), Rwàndan InterahamwéÏnîlitia; and
mercenaries. In addition to overthrowing former Zairian President Mobutu, the RP A and ADFL sought to disperse
the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, home to hundreds ofthousands of civilian refugees as well as the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe. Since the beginning of the war in the fonner Zaire gross .violations of international humanitarian law
have been committed by all parties to the conflict. ' · · · :•': ·· ' ·· · · · ·
The nature and scale of abuses by different armed parties during the war varied significantly. The F AZ, illcquipped
and poorly motivated to combat the ADFL, were responsiblc along with thcir mercenary allies for countless
acts oflooting, destruction, and rape, in addition to indiscriminate bombings of Congolese populations re.sulting in
numerous civilian casualties. Prior tothe war, the FAZ, Interahamwe and local militia had carried out attacks on
civilian populations in the east, as part of a national intimidation campaign against ethnie Tutsi Congolese.2 The exFAR
and Interahamwe militia supported their combat with and flight from the ADFL and its allies by widespread
theft from Congolese communities and using civilian refugees as a shield. Ex-FAR and armed militia who had fled
Rwanda in the wake of the genocide were responsible for sporadic kitlings of Congolese and reportedly some civilian
refugees. Members of the ADFL military, in particular its Kinyarwanda and K.iswahili-speaking elements, regular
troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), and their allies were responsible for large-scale killings of civilian
refugees from Rwanda throughout their military advànce across the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo). One
Rwandan officer who had been in charge of troops at several massacre sights in Congo commented, "It's so easy
to kill someone; youjust go-[pointing his finger like a pistol]-and it's finished."
These killings represent the latest in a cycle of massive violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law in the Great Lakes Region in which impunity for the perpetrators has been the rule. Human Rights
Watch/lntemational Federation ofHuman Rights Leagues (FIDH) will soon publish a major account of the 1994
gcnocide in Rwanda, including precursor events and the entirely inadequate response of the international community.
Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviewed Congolese, refugees, international humanitarian workers, and longtime
foreign residents in several provinces of Congo and the subregion during a six-week mission. Human Rights
Watch/FIDH visited an eighty-kilometer stretch of road in one region of Congo, far from areas where combat took
place, along which civilian refugees were slaughtered by members of the ADFL and RP A. In this area, Human
Rights Watch/FIDH photographed mass grave sites of refugees and areas of road still littered with their decomposed
bodies, among which the remains of women and children were clearly identifiable. Many of the skulls seen and
photographed contained holes or were fractured, suggesting blows with a heavy object. The testimony of
1In addition to being president' of Congo, Kabila is ~irtlifèFiira;f~iii'~and'CÔ~dê~t;~Jll:t of the anned forces, but ' " .1..1•:.. ....... ~- ,.. 1,t . , • • . .. . • t . "' • • •:.:.1\.l"• · ·~·,".J'l'~"'t-. ·
clcarly be does not control ail the soldiers participating in or àll.iéd with the ADFL wlio foùght on bis behalf. Sub~~~l ?~ers
of non-Congolese, including Rwandans, Ugandans, Burundians, and .Angolans assisted Congolese who belped put Kabila'"in
power, with Rwandans playing the most visible rote. 1brougbout this ;êport, we refer to all these soldiers as thé ADFL forêès.
Military leaders responsiblc for massacres are discus~ed in greater detail in the "Wbo's in Charge: Towards Establishing
Responsibility" chapter of this report.
2See Human Rights Watch/Africa and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, "Forced to Flee:
Violence Against Ethnie Tutsi in Zaïre," vol. 8, no. 2(A), July 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 3 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
eyewitnesses describing how certain refugees were killed corroborated with physical evidence on the site, such as
smashed skulls or other physical trauma. The refugees in this particular area were killed largely with machetes and
knives by Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili-speaking members of the ADFL and members of the RP A. Prior to the arrivai
of the ADFL and RPA to this area, the ex-FAR and armed Rwandan exiles operating with them were responsible for
widespread theft, destruction and reportedly some killings of Congolese civilians.
The killings and violations of international humanitarian law in this area represent a cross-section of events
that occurrcd througbout Congo. Thousands of refugees, often young men, the sicle, and those too weak to flee were
killed by soldiers of the ADFL and RP A as they advanced across Congo. Thousands of other civilian refugees were
deliberately eut off from humanitarian. assistance, resulting in thousands of deaths due'to starvation,· dehydration, and
disease. Many of the remains of refugees that were killed by the ADFL or the RP A have been exhumed, bumed, or
otherwise disposed of out of sight of potential witnesses. Congolese have been intimidated to keep them from
providing information about the killings through arrests, beatings, and killings ofthose who have dared to speak out.
Killings of civilians from several ethnie groups continue in Congo, most notably in the east where the unresolved
issues ofland rights, citizenship, and customary power have aggravated violence between remnants of the ex-FAR,
Mobutu's former Arrny (ex-FAZ), and other ethnic-based Congolese militia, all aligned against the troops of the
Rwandan Patriotic Army still garrisoning the region. ·
Sorne members of the international community, including the United States, were aware of Rwanda's
intention to attack refugee camps in Eastern Zaïre well in advance and either supported the idea, were unable to
propos~ alternative solutio~s ~~. the .c~al!~~ges po~ed .~Y th~ 9~~Pf~ ~~~-~Ud.11~thing t~ ?:ev~!l.t i~. _ ~~~! mo~~s. ~f
denial, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame m early July 1997, ~launed responsib1hty for plannmg and.leadmg
the invasion of the former Zaïre and explained that bis objective of dispersing refugees and destroyirig the"ex-F AR
and Interahamwe had been made known to officiais of the United Nations and the United States among other
members of the international community. The United States provided key political support to the Rwandan
authorities throughout the military campaign in Congo and up to the present; knowledgeable witnesses have clairned
that U.S. military provided training and assistance to the RP A on Congolese terri tory. ·
In April 1997, upon the recommendation of the United Nations. special rapporteur on Zaïre, the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights requested that an investigation be conducted into mass killings and other
gross violations of human rights in Congo. Since then, the Congolese government bas demanded changes in the
mandate of the U.N. investigation and repeatedly stalled the investigation. International support for the investigation
bas fluctuated: negotiations between Kabila and U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan led to a change in the head of the U.N. mission and its mandate; as of this writing, however, the United
Nations, European Union and United States have taken a firmer stand on the investigation taking place, insisting that
international aid be conditioned on cooperation with the U.N. mission. Key members of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) have been firm in their support ofKabila as he defies the U.N. investigation.
The Congolese and Rwandan govemments, aiong with the international community, should take all measures
necessary to put an end to impunity in the region. This includes public recognition by all governments concerned
that massacres of civilians took place during the armed conflict in Congo, as well as insisting that war criminals are
investigated and held accountable for their acts. In parallel, efforts should be reinf orced to bring the perpetrators of
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to justice. The international community should encourage the growth of Congolese
organizations of civil society and provide aid in key areas such as health and education through nongovernmental
organizations, but condition its other non-humanitarian aid on full compliance and cooperation with the United
Nations Secretary-General's Investigative Mission and respect for international human rights no_xms. International
support for national institutions of justice should be an urgent priority once the Congolese government has fully
cooperated with the U.N. Investigativc Mission.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 4 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Il. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
• Suspend and investigate members of the ADFL suspected of involvement in civilian massacres and other
violations ofhumanitarian law, and hold individuats accountabte for such abuses; members of the ADFL who
obstructed humanitarian assistance to civilian populations should be subject to investigation, and prosecution
where appropriatc. ADFL officers and troops under investigation should be suspended from positions of
authority for the duration of the investigation. ·
• Publicly denounce deliberate kitlings of civilians in Congo by alt parties, inctuding foreign military from Rwanda
and other neighboring states, during the seven-month war that brought the ADFL to power, as well as ongoing
killings. Insist that those responsible are immediately withdrawn from the field and subject to investigation, and
prosecution where appropriate, either in Congo or their home country.
• Protect refugees, intemally displaced, and othcr civilian populations from abuses committed by members of the
former Rwandan Army (the ex-FAR. Forces Armées Rwandaises), Interahamwe and other armed militia, and
F AZ; in doing so, respect international humanitarian law and take all possible measures to limit civilian and
refugee casualties during military operations.
• Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha in bringing those responsible for the 1994
Rwanda genocide to justice.
• Allow the United Nations Secretary-General's Investigative Mission unhampered access to all regions of Congo
and ensure its security and independence in accordance with its mandate. Instruct members of the ADFL and
other military forces present in Congo to cease the destruction of evidence of civilian massacres and other abuses.
Encourage the Congolese population and ADFL military to cooperate with the U.N. mission and ensure the
protection of those who pro vide information; · ·
• Cease its intimidation campaign against potential witnesses of civilian massacres. Investigate human rights
abuses committed by ADFL or other military forces on Congolese territory against individuals suspected of
collaboration with the U.N. Investigative Mission.
• Guarantee the protection and assistance of refugees on Congolese territory in accordance with international
standards, including the right to non-refoulement. Create the conditions necessary for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide assistance and protection to refugees remaining in Congo.
• Support the work of Congolese organizations of civil society, especially those involved in the protection and
promotion ofhuman rights.
• Establish national institutions to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular an
independentjudiciary and a permanent human rights commission.
• Initiate training programs in basic principles ofhuman rights and international humanitarian law for members
of the police, army, andjudiciary.
To the Government of Rwanda
• Withdraw, suspend from active duty, and investigate Rwandan military suspected of being involved in civilian
massacres in Congo, and hold individuals accountable for such abuses; members of the RP A who obstructed
humanitarian assistance to civilian populations should be subject to investigation, and prosecution where
appropria te.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 5 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
• Assist the U.N. Investigative Mission in Congo in fulfilling its mission by publicly disclosing the names oJ
officers and Rwandan units deployed in Congo from September 1996 up to the present, as well as all othe1
information relevant to their mandate.
• Denounce deliberate killings of civilian refugees and Congolese civilians during the war that brought the ADFL
to power and up to the present.
• Protect and assist refugees upon repatriation to Rwanda. Cooperate fully with the UNHCR in its efforts to
protect and assist refugees, in particular by providing access to recent retumees.
. .
To all Members of the International Community, including the United Nations, the European Union and its
member states, the United States, and the Organlzation or African Unity
• Insist that accountability for human rights abuses in Congo and Rwanda not be sacrificed for economic or
diplomatie reasons. Members of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia, as well as individuals from the ADFL,
RP ~ and other militaries or mercenaries responsible for massive civilian killings in Rwanda or in Congo should
not be granted impunity
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Consider extending the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha to include jurisdiction over war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the war in Congo. ·
Make assistance for the Congolese judiciary an urgent priority once the govemment of Congo fully complies and
cooperates with the U.N. Investigative Mission. lnsist on the development of the judiciary as an independent
institution. Assist the Congolese govemment in the establishment of other national institutions that will help to
promote the rule oflaw, such as a permanent human rights commission, once full cooperation with the U.N. team
~es place.
Provide immediate aid to the Congolese population via nongovemmental channels· for humanitarian relief .
Condition the convening of any donor meetings and the granting ofnon-humanitarian aid, particularly balance
of payments support, on full compliance and cooperation with the U.N. Secretary-General's Investigative
Mission and respect for human rights. The European Union should lift the suspension of development aid to
Congo, as outlined in the Lomé Convention, only upon full compliance and cooperation with the U.N. SecretaryGeneral's
Investigative Mission.
Support Congolese organizations of civil society in their efforts to promote and protect human rights. Encourage
the Congolese government to foster the growth of and consult with such organizations.
Makc sufficient human and financial resources available to the UNHCR to enable a process of individual
determination of refugee status for Rwandans, Burundians, and other refugees in the subregion. Protection,
assistance, and the right to asylum should ~e provided to those who qualify by the, states of the Great Lakes
region as well as the intem~tional community.
Assure that cx-F AR, Interahamwe militia, and others implicated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as well as these
forces and Mobutu's FAZ who have committed war crimes and other humanitarian law violations under the
Mobutu govemment or since the ADFL took power, are pursued wherever they may be and brought to justice.
The United Nations should continue its human rights investigation in Congo regardless ofwhether the Kabila
govemment cooperates with the investigation. If access to Congolese territory is impossible, the U.N. should
continue the investigation based on sources available outside the country. The U.N. team should also investigate
the various levels of responsibility for the crisis, including the failure of the international community to rem ove
armed elernents from the camps in eastem Zaïre and in permitting them to prepare new combat against Rwanda.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 6 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Specific recommendations to the U.S. govemment
• Publicly acknowledge and denounce deliberate killings of civilians in Congo by the members ADFL, troops of
the Rwandan Patriotic Arm.y (RP A) and members of other foreign militari es allied with the ADFL, and release
all information available regarding these atrocities.
• U.S. Department of Defense and other govemment agencies should full y disclose the nature of all present and
past involvement in training, tactical support, field assistance, or anns shipments to Rwanda or Congo for use
by the ADFL or Rwandan, Ugandan or other forces operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
• Conduct investigations to detennine whether any of the military involved in civilian massacres or other gross
violations of international humanitarian law have received training from the U.S. anned forces or other U.S.
agencies, eitber in the region or in the U.S. Make public the identities of any such military and insist on their
prosecution where appropriate. ... ·
• Immcdiately suspend any tactical support, field assistance, or arms shipments to Rwanda. The U.S. should
conduct a thorough evaluation of the cfficacy ofU.S. military training to Rwanda in the areas of intérnational
humanitarian law, military justice, and other area's pertaining to the respect ofhuman rights. The U.S. should
make public its findings ofthis investigation.
m. BACKGROUND
The Origin of the Refugees
In April 1994, Hutu extremists used th~ military, administrative and political structures of Rwanda to carry
out a gcnocide against the minority Tutsi and to kill moderate Hutu who were seen as Tutsi collaborators. Soldiers
of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and members ofmilitia groups known as the Intcrahamwe took the lead in
slaugbtering more than 500,000 people.3
In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi movement, overthrew the genocidal
government, against which it had waged war since 1991. Sorne two million Rwandans then fled to surrounding
countrics, somc bccause thcy fearcd retn'bution from the RPF, some bccause they were ordered to follow go'9ernment
leaders into exile. The cstimated 1.1 million who ended up in Zaïre included both refugees as well as others who were
implicated in crimes against humanity in their home country and remained anned, planning to continue the
genocide-and their war against the RPF-from adjacent countries. This mixed population settled in camps, the great
majority in Zaire and the next largest number in Tanzania, where they were nourished at the expense of the
international community. Human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of
Human Rights (FIDH), humanitarian agencies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and the Rwandan government repeatedly demanded international intervention to separate the refugees,
rnany of them women and children, from the armed elements, former soldiers (ex-FAR) and militia members.
Although the U.N. prepared plans for such action, the Security Council rejected them as too expensive and perhaps
unworkable. ·
Administrative officiais and military and political leaders responsible for the genocide controlled the camps
and with the ex-FAR and militia intimidated many refugees into staying in the camps instead ofretuming home.
3lnterahamwe were a militia organized by former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana 's political party. During
the genocide in Rwanda, the nùlitia were transformed into bands of killers.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 7 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Within Rwanda, hurnan rights abuses, particularly killings by soldiers, massive arrests without regard to due process,
and the paralysis of the judicial system also discouraged refugees from retuming.
Beginning almost immediately after settling in the enormous border-area camps, the ex-FAR and militia
Teorganized, trained new recruits and bought new arms from abroad. • As their incursions into Rwanda increased in
number and impact, the govemment of Rwanda signaled that it would act on its own to end the threat from the camps
in Zaire if the international community failed to intervene. In the face of stepped-up infiltration in 1996, a rash of
killings of civilians in border areas, and apparently aware of preparations for an invasion, Rwandan leader General
Paul Kagame again alerted leaders of the U.S. and perhaps other countries that Rwanda would actif conditions did
notchange. ·
Banyanvanda and Banyamulenge
Before the massive influx ofRwandans in 1994, about half of the 3 million people of North-Kivu, in the
former Zaire's extreme northcast, were speakers ofKinyarwanda, the languagc of Rwanda. Known collectively as
Banyarwanda, they includcd about four times as many Hutu as Tutsi.5 Sorne had been present before the drawing
of colonial boundaries, white others had migrated from Rwanda for economic reasons or as political refugees during
the twentieth century, many with official encouragement from the Belgian authorities in the 1930s. In soine areas.
such as Masisi, the Banyarwanda comprised a large majority of the population.6
Of the Banyarwanda in South-Kivu, a group.of pastorals on the Itombwe plateau, principally near Mulenge,
became lmown, at least to themselves, as the Banyamulcnge (the people of Mulenge bill or forest) during the
rebellions against Mobutu in 1964. Most of the Banyamulenge are descendants ofRwandans who flcd political
repression and population pressure in Rwanda during the 18th and 19th centuries; 7 other Banyarwanda immigrated
to the area in more rec~nt timcs, some fleeing oppression in Rwanda in 1959. Many Ban~ulenge· camë üridér thrêat
from the rebet forces ted by Kabila and others in the 1964 uprisings and sought protection &ôni the Mobutur~gime
in Kinshasa, white othcrs sidc4 with the rebellion. The tenn Banyamulenge came to be usêd widèl}ÏiÏÏCorÏgÔtéirèfer
to etlmic Tutsi Congolese in general from mid-1996. . · ···· ·· -· · ·
The Citizenship Question
The right to Zairian citizenship, recognized for Banyamulcnge and Banyarwanda by earlier Iaws and
constitutions, was limited in 1981 to those people who could prove that their ancestors lived in Zaïre before 1885.
But the 1981 law was not actively enforced and identity. cards ofKinyarwanda-speakers were not revoked. Politicians
who fcarcd the number of votes represented by Kinyarwanda-speakers in proposed clections stirred up feelings
against them among people ofneighboring ethnie groups. At the time of the National Conference in 1991,1 Celestin
•sec Human Rights Watch/Arms Projcct. "Rcamûng with Impunity," A Human Rigbts Watch Short Report. (New Yorlc
May 1995} vol 7, no. 4.
5Mgr. Ngabu, "Situation qui prévaut dans le diocèse autour des massacres dans les zones de Watikate et Masisi," May
11, 1993. Cited in Aloys Tcgcra, "La réconciltiation communautaire: Le cas des massacres au Nord Kivu," in André Guichoua,
ed., Les Crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (Lille: Unive.r sité des Sciences et Techn. ologies de Litte, 1995), p. 399.
6For a more detailed discussion of the origins of the Banyaiwanda, sce Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee:
Violence against the Tutsi in Zaire,0 A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 2{A), July 1996.
'David Newbury, "Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnie and Territorial Frontiers in Central Africa,0 Africa Today, vol. 44, no.
2, 1997.
'The National Sovereign Conference was a meeting of all sectors of Zairian society that set the framework for the
transition to democracy in Zaire.
Hwnan Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 8 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
Anzuluni, a Bembe ftom South-Kiw, led a move to exclude the Banyamulenge, claiming they were not Zairians but
Rwandan immigrants.9 Banyarwanda ftom North-Kiw were similarly to be excluded. After this, leaders of other
etlmic groups increasingly challenged the rights of Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda generally to Zairian citizenship.
Violence Against Speakers of Klnyanvanda
· In 1993, Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga civilian militia lmown as Mai-Mai and Bangilima, encouraged by
government officials and sometimes supported by the Zairian military, attacked Hutu and Tutsi communities in
North-Kiw, killing thousands and displacing some 300,000.10 The arrivai in Eastern Zaire of the enormous number
ofRwandans in flight in 1994 exacerbated tensions between previously resident Kiny~rwanda-speakers and other
ethnie groups. The lnterahamwe militia and many of the former military and civilian authorities of Rwanda
encouraged hatred of Tutsi among adjacent populations. Local ethnie groups which had once viewed Hutu and Tutsi
as a common enemy sided increasingly with Hutu, bath refugces and local residents, in attacking Tutsi, who were
sometimes branded as loyal to the new govemment of Rwanda. ln South-Kivu, Bembe and Rega, encouraged by
comments by regional politicians, began to organize militia, following the model of the Interahamwe of Rwanda and
the Mai-Mai and Bangilima of North-Kivu.11
Feeling increasingly threatened by harassment and arrests and talk of expulsion, 12 numbers of Banyàmulenge
young men went to Rwanda where they joined or were trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RP A), which also
supplied them with weapons. ln South-Kiw, others organized the1r own militia and bought arms during 1995.
According to one witness, "The Banyamulenge [even] bought rifles from the Interahamwe [in the refugee camps] .
. • • With the crisis in Zaire, the Interahamwe sold their guns.013
In early 1996 Interahamwe, Mai-Mai, and Bangilima kiUed hundreds of Tutsi and drove morethan 18,000
from North-Kiw into ·exile in Rwanda and Uganèla}' ·>.~~ ~; .:. · · · .·::.·.. ·::·.: !. i·l .·:•.; .·;,
The Banyamulenge Revoit
ln August 1996~ Zairian authorities baniled Mll..IMA~ a development and human rights nongovemmental
(NGO) working among the Banyamulenge, and arrested several prominent Banyamulenge. In early"Sépfeïnber
Zairian authorities said Banyamulenge should leâvè the country, an order-fôrmalized <>Îl October 7 by the deputy
govemor of South-Kivu, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji, who ordered all Banyamulenge to leave Zaïre within a week.ts
9J. Bruno Kadima Abuika, "Large complot ourdi contre le Congo-Kinshasa dans sa partie Est," Umoja, February 26,
1996; Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with Jonas, a Munyamulenge, in Butare, January 10, 1996.
1°United States Committee on Refugees, "Inducing the Deluge," July 1993.
110riginaires des Zones de Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira, "Droit de réponse au Mémorandum du 05/10/95 des immigrés
rwandais sous le pseudonyme 'Banyamulenge,"' letter to Minister of the Interior, November 4, 1995.
12Heritiers de la Justice, "Vue synoptique des violations des droits de l'homme au sud-kivu en 1995, Bukavu, December
10, 1995; Human Rights Watch/FIDH inteiview with Jonas, a Munyamulenge, in Butare, January 10, 1996.
13Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Bugarama Transit Camp, Cyangugu, November 4, 1996.
14See Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee: Violence against the Tutsi in Zaïre"
15Sam Ngoza, "Zaire's People of Tutsi Origin Say 'Enough is Enough, • "AU Africa Press Service, November 12, 1996;
"Crisis Grips Central Africa,'' The Jakarta Post, December 23, 1996.
Human Rights Watch/Aftica and FIDH 9 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
In eJrlY Sep_te.~~~r, Bembe militia, supported.by FAZ soldiers, began attacking Banyamulenge villages,
killing and raping, and forcing survivors to flee. The Banyamulenge, joined by other groups, rose up against the
Zairian govemment They later fc;>11~cd '! coaliti~n, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of CongoZaire
(ADFL), and chose Làurent-Desiré Kabila as spokesman, a post he la ter transformed into président -of the
movement. Rwandan, Ugandan and later A;ngolan troops supported the ADFL and quickly overran the demoralized
and poorly disciplined Zairian Anned Forces (F AZ).115 After a rapid advance from east to west, during which he was
generally hailed as a liberator, Ka bila proclaimed himself head of the newly declared Democratic Republic of Congo
onMay 18, 1997.
Attacks on the Camps
As the ADFL forces and their allies began combat against the F AZ they simultaneously attacked the camps
sheltering the Rwandans, breaking the control of the former administrative and military authorities. In some camps,
the ex-FAR and militia retreated quickly, sometimes after briefly resisting the ADFL advance. The majority of people
in the camps, perhaps 600,000 of the 1.1 million estimated to have been in residence in October 1996, retumed to
Rwanda in November. Of those who retumed, many went voluntarily, white others were forced back by the ADFL,
fearful of the conditions in Rwanda. A number estimated in the thousands died in the first weeks of the attacks on
the camps, caught in crossftre between the ADFL and elements of the ex-FAR, militia and FAZ; killed by the former
camp authorities in an effort to prevent their retum to Rwanda or to force them to accompany the ex-FAR and militia
on their retreat westward; or killed by ADFL and RPA troops. Hundreds of thousands ofRwandans fled westward,
some in relatively organized caravans, others in scattered small groups. Tens of thousands of these were armed
elements, but the rest were unarmed civilians, many of them women and children.
Many of the civilians who fled to the west were attacked aga in, some of them repeatedly as they sought
safety. In a few cases, ex-FAR and militia used the refugees as human shields or even injured and killed them. But
in the vast majority of instances, it was clearly ADFL soldiers ·and their foreign allies who slaughtered the refugees.
In addition, untold thousands dicd of hunger or disease because ADFL and Zairian authorities denied humanitarian
agencies permission to enter their zones to deliver assistance Ôr because the security conditions prevented them frorri
doing their work. Sorne humanitarîan workers testified that ADFL soldiers accompanied them, supposedly to
facilitatc their work but really to find out where refugees were hidden in ordér to retum later to eliminate them.
The UNHCR states that it helped an additional 234,000 Rwandans retum to Rwanda between December 1996
and June 1997 and that it had located an additional 52,600 Rwandans. about half of them in Congo and the other half
dispersed in the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Angola by July 1997. According to the refugee
agency's figures, an estimated 213,000 Rwandaris remain unaccounted for, either dead in the period of violence or
hidden in the forests or among the people of Congo. 17
Controversy continues about the exact number of refugees who perished during the conflict due to massacres,
malnutrition, or disease. Kabila's govemment bas effectively denied the U.N. Secretary-General's Investigative
Team and other diplomatie missions or human rights organizations access to reported massacre sites and thus bas
made assessment of the casualties impossible.
16For details ofhuman rights abuses in the early days of the war, see Human Rights Watch/FIOH, "Forced to Flee:
Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire"; Hurnan Rights Watch/Africa & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de
l'Homme,"'Attacked By Ail Sides, • Civilians and the Warin Eastern Zaire," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no.
l{A), March 1997; Hurnan Rights Watch/Africa, .. Transition, \Var and Human Rights," A Human Rights Watch Short Report,
vol 9, no. 2(A), April 1997.
"UNHCR public information fact shcc_t, July 2, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 10 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
The Laws Vlolated
All parties to the war in Congo, whether rebel or govemmental, are bound by international humanitarian Iaw
to respect basic norms conccrning victims of anned conflict. In particular, regardless of whether a govemment or
an insurgent group, all sides are obliged to apply common ~icle 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
In case of an anned conflict not of an international character occurring in the terri tory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persans taking nô active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who had
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall be in all circumstances treated humanely, without any advei:se distinction founded on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persans:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; ·
(b) taking ofhostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatmcnt;
( d) the passing of sentences and the canying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording an the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoplcs.
Furthennore, an parties to the conflict in Congo should respect the principles ofU.N. General Assembly Resolution
2444, which recognizes the customary law principle obliging all factions of an armed conflict at ail times to treat ·
civilians distinctly from combatants. It states that,
the foUowing principles for observance by all govemment and other authorities responsible for
action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities
and mernbers of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as rnuch as
possible.
While the above principles apply to all parties to the war in Congo, additional bodies of international humanitarian
and human rights law place further obligations on certain parties to the conflict, notably the govemment of the former
Zaïre, the ADFL authorities who succeeded to the international obligations of the former govemment, the
govemrnent of Rwanda and other govemmental allies of the ADFL.11
"Notably, the fonner Zaïre had ratified, among other treaties, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 1
Additional to the Geneva Conventions. The ADFL govemment of Congo succeeded to these obligations on May 17; 1997 when
it ousted the Zairian authorities. The Rwandan govemment has also ratified, arnong other treaties, the four G~nevii ·cônventions
of 1949 and Protocols l and 2 Additional to the Gcncva Conventions:
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 11 October 1997. Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
IV. OVERVIEW OF CIVILIAN KILLINGS FROM OCTOBER 1996 TO AUGUST 1997
The seven-month war between the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (ADFL)
and the Zairian Anned Forces (F AZ) was accompanied by gross violations of human rights and international
bumanitarian taw. Killings ofboth Congolese civilians and refugees continued at the time of this writing. This
overview summarizes the general trends ofkillings in Congo from the outbreak of the war in October 1996 through
August 1997.
Most of the killings and other abuses from October 1996 between August 1997 were committed by
individuals belonging to three distinct groups: former President Mobutu 's F AZ and mercenaries; the former Rwandan
Armed Forces (ex-FAR) and militia from the camps; and the ADFL. consisting of both Kabila • s troops and military ·
'from several neighboring States, including Rwandan; Uganda: Angola. and Burundi. Other anned militia have also
reportedly attacked civilians. particularly in recent months in eastem Congo.
The nature and scale of the killings and other violations committed by each of these groups diff ered
significantly.
Human Rlghts Abuses by the FAZ
Throughout the war that led to the ousting of Mobutu. the Congolese population, refugees. and foreign
nationals in Congo were witness to numerous violations of international humanitarian law and other abuses
committed by the notoriously ill-trained and poorly supported F AZ. Mobutu• s forces perpetrated abuses to sus tain
their fighting with and retreat from the ADFL, to enrich themselvcs. and to settle old scores with opponents of the
Mobutu regime. These acts included widespread theft, rape, various acts of revenge. destruction of infrastructure.
destruction of priva te and public property, and.killings of civilians.
In September 1996 the F AZ, indigenous militia from South-Kivu, and anned elements from the refugee
camps carried out attacks against Banyamulenge and other ethnie Tutsi in South-Kivu. resulting in numerous civilian
deaths and incidents of rapc.19 This followed a period of several months of intensifying intimidation of Tutsi by
military and civilian authorities throughout the country. as authorities claimed that Rwanda and Burundi were arming
the Banyamulenge.
Throughout the war. the F AZ exercised ablatant disregard for international humanitarian law. Before fleeing
the city of Kindu in February of 1997, the F AZ looted the Kindu General Hospital, depriving patients of medical care
and stealing basic medical supplies and equipment including medicine and mattrcsses in use by patients.20 In midFebruazy
1997, the F AZ, in collaboration with Serb and other mercenaries. bombarded several cities in eastem Zaïre,
including Bukavu, Shabunda, and Walikale, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths and injuries.21 In early May of
1997, indiscriminate bombardment by the FAZ of the city ofKenge, 180 kilometers east of Kinshasa, resulted in the
deaths of approximately 200 civilians, according to the Congolese Red Cross.
With insufficient logistical support from· Kinshasa for their military campaign against the ADFL, the F AZ
resorted to widespread theft and appropriation. lndividual soldîers also looted for their own persona! gain and then .
abandoned their units with no intention of retuming to mititàryservice. In November 1996 United Nations officials
in North-Kivu reported several hundred vehicles lost to looters. predominantly members of the FAZ '?'ho had fled
19Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Zain:: Transition, War and Human Rights."
1°Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with nongovemmental organizations working in Kindu, Kinshasa,
March 1997.
21See Hurnan Rights Watch/Africa, "Zaïre: Transition, War and Human Rigbts."
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 12 October 1997, Vol. 9. No. 5 (A)
the cities of Uvira, Bukaw and Goma.22 The F AZ developed a pattern oflooting just prior to their retreat from cities
throughout the country, eaming them the title of pillards-foui/lards (fleeing looters).
Sorne abuses committed by the F AZ from September 1996 to May 1997 were acts of revenge against longstanding
opponents of the Mobutu regime. White elements of the F AZ frequently participated in indiscriminate rape,
beatings, and other cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment during their retreat, church leaders, members of the
political opposition, and leaders of civil society were otlen singled out for abuse. Churches that Jay in the path, or
within striking range, of the retreating FAZ were frequently looted by the FAZ; severat were intentionally bumed.23
Refugees consistentty accused the F AZ of acts of raping and killing refugees, as welt as forcing them to assist the
FAZ as laborers.24
Looting of public and private property, and the destruction of local infrastructure continue to affect the
Congolese population today. Many state institutions under the Mobutu regime were in astate of advanced decay,
leaving churches and nongovemmentat organizations often as sole providers in key sectors such as health and
education. This destruction of property and services belonging to churches and nongovemmental organizations
deprived the Congolese population to many basic rights including access to heatth care and education.
Human Rights Abuses by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Militia
Abuses committed by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia after their flight from the camps of the border
area were largely related to strengthening their forces for combat with the ADFL, thcir retreat, or simply their
survival. Throughout their flight across Congo, ex-FAR and Interahamwe intimidated civilian refugees to discourage
them from retuming to Rwanda, as they had done since the establishment of the refugee camps in 1994. Ex-FAR
and militia participated in sporadic killings of Congolese civitians and some refugees:
The ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and civilian refugees participated in widespread theft to sustain themselves. In
addition to theft by these former military or armcd militia, the prcscnce of tens of thousands of fleeing civilian
refugees had a profound impact on Çongolese civilian communities. Schools, public buildings, and homes were used
for shelter, health centers were emptied oftheir medical supplies, and crops wcre lootcd and destroyed as rcfugecs
passcd through Congolese cities and villages. The massive loss of property and destruction of infrastructure
contributed to the declinc of economic activity as welt as numerous deficiencies in public services-problems that
persist today.
According to corroborated testimony, ex-FAR and armed militia were responsible for at least one large-scale
killing of Congolese civilians during their trek across Congo.2' On or about November 6, 1996, ex-FAR and
Interahamwe attacked a convoy of trucks near Burungu, North-Kivu, resulting in the deaths ofhundreds of civilians,
according to survivors. Congolese from villages in Equateur, Haut-Congo, and North-Kiw told Human Rights
Watch/FIDH of sporadic killings of their neighbors by armed Rwandans when food or supplies were withheld or were
insufficient.
Other reports describe ex-FAR or armed militia intimidating and at times shooting at civilian refugee
populations in attempts to direct their movements throughout their flight from the ADFL. One U.N. offi~i~l
described testimony from civilian refugees with machete wounds near Mbandaka who claimed that the ex-FAR had ·
2lHuman Rights Watch/FIDH interview, U.N. official, Goma, Novcmber, 1997.
"Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with officiats from the Catholic church, Kinshasa, April, 1997.
24Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with Rwandan refugees in Loukolela refugee camp, Congo-Brazzaville, August
9, 1997.
l'Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Goma, Congo and Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 13 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A}
attacked them, complaining that the civilian refugees had become a burden.26 UNHCR officials in refugee camps
as far west as Congo-Brazzaville stated that intimidation of refugees wishing to retum to Rwanda continued in some
areas at least until July 1997.27
The presence of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia in several provinces of Congo remained a security threat
as of this writing in September 1997. In the east, ex-FAR and militia have carried out attacks on civilian
populations, primarily Tutsi, and continue to use North-Kiw as a rear base for incursions into Rwanda. In the central
and western provinces of Congo, some internally displaced villagers still refuse to retum to their homes, fearful of
theft and violence by ex-F~ or concemed that attempts by the ADFL to track down and eliminate both refugees
and the armed exiles will create security problems for themselves.
Human Rigbts Abuses Committed by the ADFL
The human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law committed by the ADFL and its
allies are remarkably different in their scale, nature and motivation from abuses perpetrated 1n Congo by the FAZ
and ex-FAR. From the ~eginning of the war up to the prescnt, ADFL troops or their allies, in particut~·those of
Rwandan or of ethnie.Tutsi origin, have carried out làrgé-scalè killings of civilians, predominantly refugees as well
as some Congolesc. In addition, the intcntional blocking of humanitarian assistance to civilian refugees by ADFL
troops is likely to have resulted in thousands of additional deaths.
These killings and the intentional blocking of aid were apparently both in revenge for the 1994 g~ <>~~dë. in
which Tutsi and moderate Hutu were systematically massacred by ex-FAR and Interahamwe as well.as an atteinpt
to weaken their military organization in Congo and their support base· Ôf civilian refugees. From mid-1994 up to their
dispersal, armed elements in the camps in eastem Congo benefited from aid destined for the civilian refugee
population and used the camps as a rear base for incursions into Rwanda.
The presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese terri tory was confirmed by Rwandan Vice-President Paul
Kagame during an early July interview with the Washington Post2' and again on Scptembèr ~( 1997 when Ka~ila
publicly thankcd Rwandâ for its help during the war on an official visit to Kigali.29 Civilian r~fugees wcre often
caÙght in areas of combat betwecn these Rwandan forces and others backing the ADFL as they fought their F AZ and
ex-FAR opponents. ln addition to deaths due to crossfire, however, refugees describe numerous examples of
indiscriminate attacks on refugee camps, including the use of mortars and heavy machine guns in the attacks on the
Kibumba refugee camp in North-Kivu.30
,
31 These attacks on camps in eastem Congo marked the beginning of a series
of attacks on rcfugees and temporary camps set up as refugecs fled westward into the interior of Congo.
Other killings were more selective: numerous refugces reported being overtaken throughout their trek by
military that they recognized as RPA.32 They describcd systematic triagc.ofrefugees carried out by these troops that
resulted in young men, former military or militia, former members of govemment, and intellectuals being selected
for execution. Women and children were often encouraged to retum to Rwanda but were occasionally allowed to
flee further into the forest. Refugees retuming from eastem Congo to Rwanda during the ftrst months of the war were
9, 1997.
26Human Rights Watch/FIDH telephone interview with former UNHCR official in Congo, September 23, 1997.
2'Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with UNHCR officials, Loukolela refugee camp, Congo-Brazzaville, August
21John Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revoit in Congo," Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
29Integrated Regional Information Network, Update 245, September 10, 1997.
30Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Mugunga refugee camp, October 29, 1996 and Loukolela refugee camp,
Congo-Brazzaville, August 9, 1997.
31See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Zaïre: Transition, War and Human Rights" (April 1997).
32Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Nairobi, Kenya, July 28, 1997, and Loukolela refugee camp, CongoBrazzaville,
August 8, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 14 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
largely women, children, and elderly, who confirmed that male refugees among them had been taken away by the
ADFL. As the refugees moved westward and into more remote areas, killings became more indiscriminate and
women and children were more often included in massacres.
Testimonies taken in several provinces of Congo as. w~ll as in neighboring states concur that the perpetrators
ofmost killirigswerë froÏn~an·ethnic Tutsi sub-grôiip of ADFL.troops, ofteri desènoed by Congolese as "Rwandan",
"Ug~dan", "Burundian", or "Banyamulenge." Numerous refugees described how, when overtaken by the ADFL
or their allies during their flight, they had recognized and had conversations with members of the RP A who were
from their home communes in Rwanda. Congolese viltagers described numerous incidents in which refugees and
rnembers of the RP A recognized and spoke with one another in areas where massacres took place. Many
commanding officers in areas where massacres took place, as well as troops under their command, were members
of the RPA. Sorne stated that they had grown up in Rwanda, having left for studies or other reasons.33
Languages spok~ by p·erpetrators similarly indicates their origin as primarily Rwandan, eastern Congolese,
or Ugandan.34 Congolese, foreigners in Congo, and rcfugees consistently described the perpetrators qf massacres
in several regions or those blocking humanitarian access to refugees as Kinyarwanda speakers. Many wïtnesses
noted the divisions among the ADFL, claiming thàt the troops of the ADFL wbo killed \vere ofteri from'Rwanda,
some speaking only Kinyarwanda.35
• · ·
Others witnesses stated that the perpetrafuts spoke Kiswahiii às well as Kil'ynrwan~: f.Ometimes·mixed.with
French or Englisb. This indicates that soine Ôf the froops ·mvôtvèd in~llings w~re ukely'fühave ëo~ffron:Ï.i~ih~m
Uganda, as well as eastem Congo and Burundi:" Many ëoiiüriait.d~g· officëis arid trôops''in areas where massacres
took place were tlu~nt Engiisli,'Kiriyarwârutà~aiidKis~"biij'spêàkëii; èharaètëristié:"o(members of the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA)_who invaded Rwanda frÔm .south~~ UgandaTii 1990. · "·'
Cert~in Jnilitary among the ADFL and especially the RP A appeared to be particularly motivated to kill
refugees. Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili-speaking ADFL or Rwandan troops repeatedly demonstrated througbout the
war a specific intent to hunt down and kill civilian refugees as well as armed exiles from Rwanda. Numerous
residents of Mbandaka report that, upon the arriva} of the ADFL on May 13, 1997, Kinyarwanda-speaking troops
immediately asked "where are the refugees?" and proceeded to seek them out and begin killing.36 Human Rights
Watch/FIDH received similar reports from towns between Kisangani and Mbandaka, where the first or der of business
for the ADFL upon arrivai in a village was to eliminate refugees.37
Congolese development workers descn'bed an incident during the arrival of the ADFL in Mbandaka during
which ADFL troops demanded that a resident shout in Lingala, the local language, to tell people in a crowd to quickly
get down on the ground. Refugees in the crowd, who did not understand Lingala, remained standing and were
subsequently singled out and fired upon by ADFL troops.38
1997.
J
3Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews w~th cburch officials and humanitarian agents, Kinshasa and Goma, August
34 Or possibly Burundian. K.irundi, the national language of Burundi, may be confused with Kinyarwanda
by those not fluent in these languages.
"Congolese in the Kivus also claimed that the Kiswahili spoken by perpetrators was the Kiswabili of Rwanda, easily
distinguished from the Kiswahili of eastem Congo.
36Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Kinshasa, August S, 1997.
37Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Equateur, August 17, 1997.
38Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Kinshasa, August S, 1997; Robert Block, "Congo Villagers Describe Horrifie
Killings of Refugees," Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 15 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
At a barrier south of Kisangani in April of 1997, soldiers blocked a high-level diplomatie delegation from
proceeding into an area where massacres had recently occurred. An aid worker described their attitude:39
The govemor spoke with the soldiers, trying to convince them to let us pass. The soldiers told the
govemor in Ki~wahili, 'we haven 't finished our work yet. Tell them to go. We are not afraid to kill
them. If they go past us, we will shoot to kilt. We know that if we kill one of them, they will go away
and leave us al one.'
The delegation could clearly hear the sound of heavy road machinery working nearby where refugees had been
massacred in previous days.
The Wall Street Journal reported that the ADFL soldiers in Mbandaka had said that more important than
fighting Mobutu's soldiers was the elimination ofrefugees.40 To the contrary, non-Tutsi ADFL troops told Congolese
in areas where massacres had taken place that the killing of refugees was not their business;41 one Katangese general
stated in a private conversation that he had nothing to do with refugee affairs.42
Othcr humanitarian organizations operating in eastem and central Congo expressed their frustration from
having been manipulated by the ADFL in what they ·described as "hait and kill" operat.ions. White attempting to
locate and set up assistance stations for refugees dispersed in the forest, agencies claimed that they were required
to be accompanied by an ADFL "facilitator." According to their reports, after refugees had been located and put in
groups to facilitate humanitarian assistance, access would be eut offto the refugees by ADFL military. Typically,
after several days of no assistance, humanitarian groups would fmd the refugees had disappeared or been dîspersed.
Humanitarian agencies claimed that the "facilitators" would inform ADFL military of concentrations of refugees to
expedite their killings.43 ·
1
• •• • •
At least one agency ceased providing services to refugees in certain areas in protest of this practîce by the
ADFL, estimating that fewer refugees would die from a Jack ofhumanitarian 3:ssistance than would die if their work
continued to serve as an orientation tool for ADFL military seeking out refugees.44
V. WHAT KABILA HAS TO HIDE: A CASE $TUDY
Human Rights Watch/FIDH visîted three villages along an eighty-kilometer length of road, one of the
principal routes followed by Rwandan and Burundian refugees who fled the camps in eastem Congo in October and
November of 1996. This same stretch of road was traveled by the F AZ, ex-FAR, and refugees, and finally by the
ADFL.
Human Rights Watch/FIDH spent several days along this road, interviewing villagers and community leaders
who had witnessed killings or other human rights violations or participated in burials. Civilian refugees who had
survived the trek through this area were interviewed in Congo-Brazzaville and gave accounts that corroborated with
those of the Congolese witnesses.
39Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with aid worker in North-Kivu, August 27, 1997.
40Robert Block "Congolese Villagers Descnèe Horrifie Killings ofRefugces," the Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1997.
41Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with Congolesc from Mbandaka, Kinshasa, August 5, 1997.
42Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with resident of Mbandaka, August 19, 1997.
43Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with several humanitarian organizations, Nairobi, July 1997.
44Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with aid organization, Kinshasa, August 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 16 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Several mass graves and execution sites were visited. Most of the laltings occurred during a three-day period
during which front-tine ADFL troops advanced through this area, overtaking and killing civilian refugees with
knives, machetes, and bayonets. The three-day period is described below.
Humanitarian law violations committed by the F AZ and the ex-FAR a long this same length of road are also
descnoed below.
The three villages visited'by Human Rights Watch/FIDH in August are like many others in the region. The
exact locations and names of these villages may not be disclosed, and the names of witnesses have been changed due
to their clearly stated fear of reprisai by Rwandan or Kinyarwanda-speaking elements of the ADFL (see Intimidation
ofWitnesses section below). The real names of the villages and the sources used by Human Rights Watch/FIDH
have been submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General's Investigative Team for further investigation.
In addition to those mentioned below, many others killings by the ADFL are likely to have occurred over
the same eighty-kilometer length of road over the same three-day period. As noted below, villagers were reluctant
to give information regarding the killings by the ADFL due to fear of reprisals. Over the several days that Human
Rights Watch/FIDH visited the area, villagers came forward with progressively more information, sometimes
revealing execution sites of mass graves that had been "forgotten" the previous day. Villagers spoke openly and
apparently without fear ofreprisal about the violations committed by the FAZ or ex-FAR.
Human Rlghts Abuses Committed by the FAZ
The F AZ arrived in the first village in small groups over a period of approximately three weeks. The first
group of about seventy-five arrived in approxima tel y eight vehicles, reportedly stol en en route, and consisted of many
officers, including at least one colonel. The F AZ continued to arrive and depart progressively up until just prior to
the arrivai of the ADFL. No combat occurred in the area.0
In the area near the villages, measures taken by state authorities and traditional chiefs appear to have resulted
in far fewer human rights abuses committed by the FAZ, as compared to other villages and cities in their path of
retreat (see above). Local authorities in the first village, wamed of the imminent arrivai of the FAZ, instructed the
local population to make cash and in-kind donations for the fleeing soldiers. Upon arriva), local chiefs and
administrators presented the F AZ with abundant food and supplies, preventing widespread looting, according to those
in the füst village. Numerous residents of the village praised the measures taken by the local authorities and claimed
that the F AZ created few problems.
The F AZ arrived first in about ten vehicles with ten people per vehicle. Hearing of their arrival, most
of the population had fled into the forest. They were welcomed by the population that remained in
the village. The military were treated well, given food, materials, gas, and money. The military
behaved.•6
It should be noted that the particular experience of villages in this area was an exception to the general pattern of
human rights abuses committed by the F AZ during their retreat across Congo. Consistent testimonies from other
regions depict acts ofrape, killing, destruction, and looting perpetrated by the FAZ, as described above.
45Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with villagers, U.N. officiais, and aid workers in the area, August 1997.
46Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 16, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 17 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Human Rights Abuses Committed by the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Milltla
Community leaders and villagers in the villages stated that local authorities attempted also to prepare for the
arrivai of the ex-FAR, Interahamwe militia, and refugees, as had been done with the FAZ. Villagers described the
arrivai of the ex-FAR and the refugees as initially cairn:
The first group was of about 3,0~0 •. They came in four single columns, two on the outside with guns,
some in uniform, two columns ofrefugees on the inside. The military elements among them were
strong and healthy; the civilian population was weak, emaciated, and sick. The chief had prepared
their welcome. He bad given instruction to give them free medicine in hopes of gctting reimbursed
afterwards. They stayed one night.47
With the arrivai of more refugees the next day, the situation soon deteriorated. Employees of a major
plantation in the area created a counting station near the first village w°Qere they recorded the passing of more than
9,000 refugees over the first three days. After that, they claimed they were too numerous to count. The flow
continued ovcr an eighteen-day period, ending with the arrivai of the ADFL. UNHCR estimates that between 22,000
and 30,000 refugces traveled on this particular road between the villages, while thousands of others fled along
different routes in the same area. ·
Abuses committcd in the area by the ex-FAR and other armed exiles, presumed to be members of the
Interahamwe militia, were Iargety related to foraging and piltaging to sustain themselves. These consisted primarily
of theft, destruction, and violations of physical integrity, as well as some kitlings.
Many residents of the area claimed that refugees Iooted extensively along the main road between the villages
as weII as in peripheral villages. Villagers stated that ex-FAR in uniform or armed exiles would beat or kill people
for food if they offered any resistance. Such allegations of killings or beatings were frequent but vague. Michel, a
local humanitarian worker, described the impact of the refugees and ex-FAR in the first village; ·
Refugees looted extensively for food and materials. The local population fled into the forest.
Refugees killed Congolese. I heard of one person killed twenty-two kilometers from here. I heard
that two others were killed also.41
Accounts oflooting and threats by ex-FAR or other armed exiles were more detailed. At a local plantation,
one employee described how ex-FAR in uniform looted his home and threatened to kill bis wife.49 Human Rights
Watch/FIDH visited storehouses at the plantation that bad been emptied by the ex-FAR and vehicles, now recovered,
that had been stolen and extensively damaged by the ex-FAR.
The civilian refugee population, in a deplorable health and nutritional state, also had enormous impact on
the population of the first village, numbering Jess than 4,000.5° Civilian refugees stripped fields of their crops, used
schools and bouses abandoned by villagers for shelter,·and overwhelmed local health centers. Residents of the first
village claimed that the Joss of material goods and damage to property was still having a profound impact on the local
ecoriomy. Jean, an employee of the plantation explained the effects of the refugees:
The chiefhad done an impressive job of preparing food and assistance for their arrivai, attempting
to avoid looting. When the food supply became insufficient, the refugees looted. They threatened
47Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 16, 1997.
41Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 16, 1997.
49Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 15, 1997.
'° According to local hcalth authorities.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 18 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
the local population for food, and they threatened a local doctor to give them all his medicine. If the
food was insufficient, they killed.s1
In August 1997, UNHCR reported estimates of several hundred civilian refugees in the surrounding area
mixed with small numbcrs of ex-FAR.s2 At this time, villagers were concemed about the presence of civilian
refugees, ex-FAR and militia in the area due to bath the immediate security threat presented by armed elements and
the fe.ar that the ADFL forces would retum to hunt them down. Months after the passing of the bulk of the refugees,
many local villagers still had not retumed to their homes out of fear of further abuses by either of these groups .
..
Human Rights Abuses Commltted by the ADFL
The violations committed by the ADFL in the area near the villages consisted primarily of widespread
killings of civilian refugees. Refugee men, women, and children who were too weak or sick to flee were killed by
the first units of the ADFL coming into contact with "them. The killings in the villages and on the road between the
villages were carried out over a three-day period as the ADFL troops advanced and overtook refugees. No combat
took place in the area as the last of the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FAZ had left several days before the arrivai of the
ADFL.
In the Gondi area,.killings were carried out almost exclusively with knives, machetes, or bayonets. Villagers
hypothesized that this deliberate strategy of not using bullets was to avoid scaring off other refugees ahead on the
road, to conserve ammunition, or to leave fewer traces of their killings.
The first three days of the ADFL presence in the villages are described below.
Day one: The ADFL troops arrived in the first village around 4:00 p.m .. Almost ail the refugees had left at this point,
except for a few too weak to continue. The first few hundred ADFL arrived on foot, eventually followed by
commanders in vehicles. Viltagers described most of the troops as "Rwandan" or "Kinyarwanda-speaking" and very
well-armed. Two of their commanders spoke Kinyarwanda, Engtish, and Ki swahili, white one was of Katangese
origin.53
A nurse in the first village watched the arrivai of the ADFL:
The first ADFL arrived on foot in a group of around one hundred. Their vehicles came la ter. Upon
arrivai, they killed thirteen refugees, ten in the yard by the Catholic church and school, three over
there by the crossroads. The refugees were killed with knives and machetes; they were the weak
ones who were sick or malnourished. The soldiers who kilted them spoke Kinyarwanda and French
and told us the refugees were bad and should not be helped.s.
"
1Human Rights Watcb/FIDH interview, first village, August 16, 1997.
"
2Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with UNHCR official, Congo, August 19, 1997.
53Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 17, 1997.
~Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 16, 1997
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 19- October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A}
Figure 3 This slcull was among many bones scattered around the bridge .
. \
Day three: The front-tine ADFL troops advanced twenty-two kilometers from the second village to the third village
on their third day in the area.61 Human Rigbts Watcb/FIDH saw and photographed the remains of at least thirty
refugees along this segment of the road. Eyewitnesses to killings or villagers who had assis"ted in disinfecting sites
accompanied Human Rights Watcb/FIDH and explained the circumstances of some of the killings or described the
nature of the wounds of the dead. The cause of death was at times not lmown; most often, however, the testimony
of eyewitnesses describing how certain refugees were killed was corroborated with physical evidence on the site,
such as smashed skulls or other physicat trauma.
Witnesses from the area estimate that hundreds ofrefugees had been killed betwcen the second and third
villages alone, but that some cleanup had already taken place. A medical doctor with extensive experience in the
area estimated that up to 1,700 people may have been killed between the second and third villages. Residents of the
area were particularly reluctant to accompany Human Rights Watcb/FIDH along this segment of road due to a fear
of reprisai by the ADFL. ·
AU bodies or bones photographed were in the road or within a few meters of the road, some in groups of up
to eight, often near or in the remains of campfires. Many of the skulls contained ho les or were fractured, suggesting
blows with a heavy object. AU bodies were in approximately the same state of very advanced decomposition or were
skeletons. Many of the remains were clearly identifiable as women or children.62
Human Rights Watcb/FIDH was guided by individuals who had accompanicd the ADFL troops or
participated in clean-up activities. Jean-Pierre, who disinfected bodies in the ·area, described one site seven
kilometers from the second village : · ·
We disinfected bodies in this area for about a week. Right here, there were eight in all, where the
refugees had been camped. Sorne of them are gone now; I think animals may have taken away some
of the bon es. The bodies all had lmif e wounds.
61Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview near the first village, August 18, 1997.
62By sizc, remnants of clothing, and in some cases eyewitness testimony.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 22 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Figure 4 This refugee and at least seven others at this site were killed by ADFL troops as
they fled across Congo.
Another witness, who had carried gasoline for the ADFL, accompanied Human Rights Watcb/FIDH to a site
approximately one kilometer from this area where a refugee boy preparing food by the roadside was killed.
He was preparing food when the ADFL arrived and killed him with a knife and a machete. They eut
his neck first, and then smashed his skull here on the left side.63
. .
Figure 5 This refugee boy was preparing
food at his makeshift campsight when
ADFL troops kilted him with a knife and
a machete.
Figure 6 The blow from the macbete left a fracture near the
left temple.
63Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, road between second and third villages, August 18, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 23 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
A photo taken by Human Rights Watch/FIDH of the site verifies a fracture to the left temple area of the skull. The
skeleton of the boy lies in the remains of a campfire.
Seven kilometers further toward the third village lies a second bridge where Human Rights Watch/FIDH
photographed the remains of six refugees. The skulls were partially smashed or contained holes and were in the
vicinity of many campfires. One viltager said be had accompanied a soldier whom be described as a Kinyarwandaspeaking
colonel of the ADFL to the bridge shortly after the killings. He claimed that he had seen at least twenty-one
bodies near the bridge but that many more had been thrown into the water.
We .left [the first village] with a DAF truck and a.motorcycle. We were in the second·group with
Colonel Cyiago. There were many cadavers near the second bridge. At night, the ADFL would do
calisthenics and would go out into the forest. They held many meetings during the day. I remember
a group of eight, a group of ~elve, and one atone, but there were many more that had been swept
away in the water. •
. '.: 'f,,, '
Figure 7 These remains of thcse refugees are from a group of at
least twenty-one men, women, and children killed near the second
bridge by the ADFL. Figure 8 Of this group shown in Figure 7, the
skulls of these five men, women, and cbildren
were smashed and full ofholes.
Five kilometers from the second bridge is the third village, where UNHCR estimates that between 22,000 and 30,000
refugees bad passed through a temporary c~mp. Numerous testimonies from Congolese, international humanitarian
workers, and refugees in Congo-Brazzaville spokè of mass killings by the ADFL of refugees at the third village. A
witness who had accompanicd the ADFL to thè third village stated that he saw several hundred cadavers in and
around the camp upon bis arrivai. ·
On the road approaching [the third village], there were many, many cadavers. There were many
more at the camp, several hundred. They were killed with knives and machetes, but right in the
camp they had been shot, too.6'
64Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, first village, August 19, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 24 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Civilian refugee survivors, interviewed in Congo-Brazzaville, stated that the ex-FAR had moved on long
before the anival of the ADFL and that no combat had occurred at the third village.155 Congolese in the area similarly
denied that combat had taken place anywhere near the third village.
Human Rights Watch visited thê former refugce camp site at the third village which spread over some 800
meters of road and into the forest. The camp was littered with clothing, shoes, equipment and many bullet shells.
No evidence of bodies or mass graves was present. According to villagers and relief workers, the site had been
cleaned by the ADFL and the bodies of refugces, numbering in the hundreds, were dumped in a nearby river.
According to witnesses, the majority of.these killings were carried out by Kinyarwanda speaking members
of the ADFL, ethnie Tutsi from Rwanda, Uganda, and eastern Congo. Villagers consistently described elemcnts of
the ADFL who participated in killings as being "Rwandans." When asked to explain how they knew they were
Rwandan, witnesses claimed that often the only languages spoken by refugees were Kinyarwanda or Kiswahili, and
their morphology was different from Congolese: many were tall, very dark, and had facial features characteristic of
someTutsi.
VI. CLEANING UP: SITE PREPARATION AND THE INTIMIDATION AND KILLING OF
WITNESSES
Authorities in Congo have made concerted efforts to conceal the evidence of civilian killings. The ADFL
and its allies, especially Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda-speaking elements, have engaged in a campaign to cover up
civilian killings throughout Congo, largely through the physical cleansing of massacre sites and by the intimidation
ofwitnesses. These efforts have been ongoing sincc the beginning of the war in October 1997 and up to the present
throughout eastern, central, and western Congo. It is likely that efforts in both of these areas---cleanups and
intimidation-have intensified since April 1997, paralleling an increase in allegations of massacres and the arrivai
in the region on four separate occasions of United Nations investigative teams.156 Pressure from the international
community on the Congolese government to cooperate with the U.N. missions may also have contrfüuted to
intensified cleanup and intimidation efforts by the ADFL and its allies.
Unlike the area near the three villages visited, located in a remote part of Congo, most massacre sites have
been cleaned up by the ADFL or local villagers under their instruction. Major massacre sites have been subject to
particularly concerted efforts, such as those in the Goma refugee camps or the area south of Kisangani, using dozens
ofvillagers and heavy equipment.157
A large number of cleanups have taken place in North-Kivu where thousands of civilian refugees and
Congolese have been killed since October 1996.158
6sHuman Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Loukolcla rcfugcc camp, Congo-Brazzaville, August 9, 1997.
66 March 1997 to Goma, Congo; May 1997 to Kigali, Rwanda; and June and August of 1997 to Kinshasa.
67Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with hurnanitarian organizations in Goma, Congo, August, 1997, and Nairobi,
Kenya, July, 1997.
~orth-Kivu bas been subject to statc-sponsored ethnie conflict for several years, and violent con.flict since March of
1993. This complex conflict bas ebbed and flowed in North-Kivu over the past several years, and likely resulted in thousands
of civilîan deaths.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 25 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Civilian killings increased with.the attacks on refugee camps in North and South-Kivu in October 1996. In
the city of Goma and the North-Kivu camp area atone, the UNHCR made arrangements for the burial of more than
6,800 people,69 a mix of men, women and children in and around the camps themselves. 70 Residents of Goma,
however, stated that roads leading to the camps were blocked by the ADFL im.mediately after the attacks. Before the
U.N. had access to the camps, a front-end loader from the local public works department was seen heading toward
the camps. An intemationaljoumal~~t visited one site near the camps during this period where·bodies were being
dumped in a ravine, with heavy equipment tracks leading away.71 Local villagers from the area stated that they had
been eyewitnesses to the ADFL's use of a front-end loader to dispose of bodies from the camps in the ravine.72
Another notable cleanup operation was conducted south of Kisangani in late April and May 1997, following
large-scale killings. Subsèquent to several attacks in mid to late April on temporary refugee camps south of
Kisangani by a mix of villagers and ADFL troops, humanitarian workcrs were denied access to the area by the ADFL
troops. Independent eyewitnesses gave consistent reports to Human Rights Watch/FIDH ofheavy machinery and
trucks being used by the ADFL or workers engaged by them in the area where the camps had been.7J White access
was eut off, many trucks loaded with firewood were seen heading toward the former campsites. Severa! sources
reported that bodies were being bumed and ashes disposed ofin rivers or deep in the forest.74 In mid-September, the
New York Times reportcd that the driver of a tractor used in these cleanup efforts and a Belgian national who owned
heavy machinery and land in the massacre area were arrested without charge.75 This report was later corroborated
by French and Belgian authorities who reported on September 26, 1997 that two residents of Kisangani, nationals
of France and Belgium, had been arrested without charges and were being held for questioning. Knowledgeable
sources sta1ed that the two were in possession of a videotape of evidence pertaining to massacres in the Kisangani
area.76
Villagers and aid workers reported that smaller cleanups have continued from the beginning of the war up
to the present in séverâl difîerent regions. In the Rutshwu area of North-Kivu, several villages where massacres had
·occurred were visited by development workers in March of 1997. The evidence at sites consisted of the charred
remains of bouses with bones and skeletons visible inside. When the site was revisited several months later, the
remains were gone: villagers told them that Kinyarwanda-speaking ADFL soldiers had corne back to the sites and
ordered them to clean up the sites and hide the remains in common graves.77
Another recent cleanup was witnessed by a resident ofGoma who was traveling into the Masisi area in July
of 1997. The witness reported that ADFL soldiers stopped the truck he was traveling with and all traffic on the road
for a period of thirty-six hours, claiming that the way ahead was unsafe. When the truck was allowed to proceed,
the witness claimed that smoke and bones were visible near a small river by the roadside where the ADFL had been
working.71
69 According to UNHCR officials in Goma, Congo.
"Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Nairobi, July 28, 1997.
72Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Goma, Congo with villagers from the Nyragongo zone, August, 1997.
73Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with aid workers in Kinshasa, Nairobi, and Goma, July-August 1997.
7~1bid.
75Howard French, "Hope for Congo 's Revolution Dissolves Over Old Tensions,,; New York Times, September 28, 1997.
76U.N. Department ofHumanitarian Aff airs, Integrated Regional Information Network. "Great Lakes: lRlN Update 257
for 26 September, 1997 ...
''Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with humanitarian organiution in Goma, Congo, August 28, 1997.
71Ibid.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 26 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
Congolese in villages visited by Human Rights Watch/FIDH were reluctant to speak of the killings and stated
that they feared reprisais from Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the ADFL.79 Congolese who have spoken out
against the killings, orthose who have been suspected of speaking out, have been subject to intimidation, beatings,
arrests or killings by ADFL. Residents of Goma told Human Rights Watch/FIDH with apprehension of an incident
during which two humanitarian workers in Bunyakiri, South-Kivu, had 0 disappeared" shortly after showing mass
grave sites to foreigners.'°
Such claims were frequent. In one village in Haut-Congo, residents spoke of a local civil servant, Mr.
Kahama, who had been arrested at his home by a Kinyarwanda-speaking ADFL officer. The officer critfoized Mr.
Kahama for having made a call via high frequency radio to Kisangani, requesting gloves and disinf ectant to bury a
large number of refugees who had been massacred by ADFL troops in bis village. Mr. Kahama was taken to
Kisangani to meet with a local ADFL commander for questioning. Guards outside the home of the commander
subsequently heard Mr. Kahama crying out for help and then gunshots being fired. Mr. Kahama•s body remains
missing.81
The president and executive secretary of the Regional Council of Non-Govemmental Development
Organizations (CRONGD) in the Maniema province were arrested by ADFL militaty under the orders of Commander
"Bikwete" and Commander "Leopold" on August 6, 1997 in Kindu. J3oth commanders were described by residents
ofKindu as "Banyamulenge." The two CRONGD officiais, Bertin Lukanda and Ramazani Diomba, were suspected
ofproviding information to the U.N. Investigative Team regarding the killings ofrefugees in Maniema.12 Bath men
were beaten severely and detained at Lwama military camp. Mr. Ramazani Diomba, the executive secretaty, was
hospitalized due to the beating; Mr. Lukanda, also a staff member of a local human rights organization, remained
in detention for thirty-one days. Two of Mr. Lukanda's colleagues from bis human rights organization have been
prohibited by the ADFL from leaving Kindu.13
A witness from Haut-Congo, Jean, stated in bis first interview with Human Rights Watch/FIDH that there
were no problems in bis village in Haut-Congo whcn the ADFL arrive4, describing thcm as the "Iiberators." When
asked specifically about alleged killings in the area, he stated that he was not interested in talking about "politics."
Ovcr the next few days, Jean provided progressively more information regarding killings committed by the ADFL
and brought additional eyewitnesses to Human Rights Watch/FIDH. Jean explained that he, like many in bis village,
were frightened after the abduction and killing of a local civil servant as the ADFL "did not joke around" when it
came to killings.
Similarly, according to a local organization in Goma, on at least one public radio station there, the Voice of
the People, armouncements have been made in Kiswahiti to discourage the population from cooperating with the U.N.
team investigating the massacres.14 The ADFL led ideological seminars in the east throughout early 1997 informing
79 Villagers referrcd to these soldiers simply as "Rwandans .. or "Burundians" or ''Ugandans" or ''Tutsi".
10 Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with aid workers in Goma and Kinshasa1 Congo, August, 199~.
11Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with relatives and colleagues of Mr. Kahama in Kinshasa and in Haut-Congo,
August 1997.
12Letter of appeal for assistance from Haki za Binadamu, September 15, 1997; Hwnan Rights Watch/FIDH interview
with Haki za Binadamu staflïn Kinshasa, August, 1997.
13Letter of appeal for assistance from Raki za Binadamu, September 15, 1997; interview with National Council of
Development NGOs in Kinshasa.
''Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with a non-govemmcntal organization in Goma, Congo.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 27 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
local populations that all refugecs who had wanted to rctum to Rwanda had done so; seminar leaders told participants
that any Rwandans who remained wcre ex-FAR or Interahamwe and therefore should be exterminated.as
VII. WHO IS IN CHARGE: TOW ARDS ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY
During a July 1997 interview with the Washington Post, Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame claimed that
the Rwandan government bad planned and led the military campaign that dispersed the refugee camps in Eastern
Congo and ousted former President Mobutu.16 According to the Washington Post, Kagame was unequivocal
conceming bis objectives: .
The impetus for the war, Kagame said, was the Hutu refugee camps. Hutu militiamen used the
camps as bases from wbich they launched raids into Rwanda, and Kagame said the Hutus had been
buying weapons and preparing a futl-scale invasion of Rwanda.
Kagame said the battle plan as formulated by him and bis advisors was simple. The first goal was
to 'dismantle the camps.' The second was to 'destroy the structure' of the Hutu army and militia units
based in and around the camps either by bringÎng the Hutu combatants back to Rwanda and 'deating
with them here or scattering them.' 17
Kagame's third objective was to topple Mobutu. Congolese President Kabila confirmed Rwanda's military assistance
in Congo during an official visit to Kigali on September 9, 1997, when he publicly thanked Rwanda for their help
during the war.11
These statements tend support to the numerous testimonies taken by Human Rights Watch/FIDH from
Congolese, refugees, and expatriates ~ Congo regarding the presence ofRwandan and other foreign troops in Congo
during the war. Similarty, Kagame's stated objective of destroying "the structure" of the ex-FAR provides a possible
e~planation f?r _the active pur~u~t o.f..refur, former military! and • • • ·. ~ acros~.. 4 g~tese territory to areas of
mmor strategic importance, sucfi a.s 1M. . bar,i,_ ~. ~~ · . ..·....r..... -~· ~ i ' • .,·
Despite the public recognition of militai)' involvement, both Kabita and Kagame have denied that any civilian
massacres took place by troops under their command.89 Both during the war and up to the present, however, the
identities of many commanding officers and strategists of the ADFL and its allies we~ç kepfiecret. Throughout the
seven-month militai)' campaign, senior officers in the field were often out of uniform and many used only their first
names in public. Similarly, ran1OE were apparently confused or intentionally simptified to avoid identification of the
militai)' hierarchy: many officers ofKatangese or Angolan origin were given ôr assumed the'rank of0 generat", while
numerous Ugandan and Rwandan officers were known only as "commander" or "colonel0 followed by their first
name only. It is possible that many of these füst names that were used in public are pseÛdonyms.
Regional power structures that reflect the pattern in Kinshasa have been pÜt· into place in many of the
provinces. In several regions, govemors from the political opposition or from local ethnie groups have been installed,
at times through simple hand-raising elections in stadiums. Despite this apparent democratic method, Congolese
community leaders and civil servants, international humanitarian workers, and U.N. officials claimed that civilian
15Situation Report from a humanitarian NGO operating in eastcm Congo, April 13, 1997.
161ohn Pomfrct, "Rwanda Planned and Led the Attack on Zaire," Washington Post, Iuly 9, 1997.
17Ibid.
"Integrated Regional Infonnation Network, Update 245, September 10, 1997.
19In bis interview with the Washington Post, Kagame does not deny the possibility of "individual atrocities".
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 28 October 1997, Vot. 9, No. 5 (A)
authorities have had little power in decision-making, especially regarding refugee issues, and that important questions
were handled by military authorities. ·
In several provinces, Katangcsc generals have been installed as regional military commanders, seconded by
Rwandan or Ugandan officers in charge of operations and questions related to refugees and security. Tension often
exists between the various military factions, especially between those ofRwandan or Ugandan origin and thosè from
Angola, Katanga, or non-Kinyarwanda speaking groups.90 One Katangese general, allegedly responsible for the
province of Equateur, stated flatly to a Congolese humanitarian official that he did not handle refugee issues.''
The identities ofleading officers and strategists may have been intentionally hidden by the ADFL in order
to protect those responsible for war crimes. Nevertheless, some became known to embassies in Kinshasa,
humanitarian organizations, and Congolese, as either strategists or field commanders, or both. Lt. Colonel James
Kabarebe, often known as Commander "James," or "James Kabare," was described by a U.S. Embassy official in
Kinshasa as the most powerful commander in Congo and a principal strategist during the seven-month war.'2 An
English-speaker, James claims to have grandparents from Rutshuru in North-Kivu, and bas spent time in Uganda.
James was active in the field during the war, telling an embassy official in Kinshasa how be changed the tactics of
the ADFL after tak:ing Kisangani. He was reportedly the field commander for the decisive battle at Kenge Just prior
to the fall of Kinshasa and was subsequently responsible for troops taking the capital.
James continued to play a key rote in the military structure in Kinshasa and is likely the most powerful officer
in Congo as ofthis writing. He participated in the first official talks between President Kabila and U.S. Ambassador
Bill Richardson in Lubumbashi in early June 1997. Rwandan Vice-President Kagame acknowledged that James was
a key commander operating in Congo during the war and had been assigned to organize the new Congolese army.93
Otber officers were seen regularly by many observers in areas where massacres took place. Below is a Iist
of some of these individuals who may have been involved in, or been aware of, the organization or execution of
civilian q-iassacres in Congo. The list is incomplete, and likety represents a small fraction of those involved. Human
Rights Watch/FIDH publishes the list not in an effort to accuse the below of war crimes but to insist that
investigations are initiated by appropria te govemments to clarify the rote of each of the se individuaTs and, equally
important, other parties implicated in the massacres.
Commander "David"
Referred to as commander or major, originally from Rwanda or the Rutshuru area of North-Kivu. A fluent
English and Kinyarwanda speaker, David bas said that be left Rwanda at a young age to study in Uganda. By some
reports, he also studied in Canada. According to numerous testimonies, he is approximately thirty years old, six foot
one inch tall, thin, and bas longish hair, very dark skin, and features characteristic of many ethnie Tutsi. David is a
member of the RPA.94
David ptayed an important rote in the faU of Goma on October 31, 1997. Expatriates in Goma at the time
were instructed by UNHCR to refer to "Major David" in the event that they encountered the RP A during their
evacuation.95
'°In addition to numerous ~eports describing this tension, three separate sbooting incidents in three diff erent provinces
occurred between Rwandan and Katangan elements during the Human Rights Watch/FIDH stay in Congo. At least four military
deaths resulted.
91Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Mbandaka, August 20, 1997.
92Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, U.S. Embassy, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997.
93John Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revoit in Congo," Was!,ington Post, 1uly 9, 1997.
9'Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Kinshasa and Goma, August 1997.
9~Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with aid workers in <;,orna, November 1996.
Human Rights Watch/ Africa and FIDH 29 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
David was in Beni in November 1996. in Isiro in early 1997. and finally in Kisangani in April 1997 during
the period when access was eut to refugee camps and large-scale massacres were taking place.96 David was in
Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, where eyewitnesses report over 1,300 people killed by ADFL troops and their allies.97
David told several sources in Mbandaka how be had made the joumey from Kisangani to Mbandaka on foot.
After the departure of Commandant Wilson and Commandant Godfrey (see below) from Mbandaka, David
claimed to be responsible for Equateur. David was described by many who had dealings with him as being very
intelligent, helpful. and a disciplinarian. On at least one occasion, he ordered a soldier under bis command to be
flogged in public for an alteged rape.91 In an informai conversation with colleagues, he mentioned how easy it was
to kill:
It's so easy to kill some one; youjust go-(pointing bis finger like a pistol]-and it's finished.99
General Gaston Muyango
A native of the Katanga region, General Muyango is reportedly a Tshiluba, Lingala, and Portuguese speaker.
Muyango was at numerous locations between Kisangani and Mbandaka shortly after killings took place. He arrived
in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 wbere over 1,300 refugees were killed by ADFL troops and their allies. In Mbandaka,
he lived in ex-Minister Eduard Mokolo's bouse on Avenue Itela.100
Despite bis rank of general, Muyango was described by numerous Congolese and expatriates as having little
power in Mbandaka. Humanitarian workers claimed that for important decisions they were referred to Commanders
David, Godfrey Kabanda, or Wilson. Muyango stated in s~veral private conversations that he didn't deal with
refugee issues. He was reportedly often in conflict with these commanders and left Mbandaka around the third week
in June.
Commander "Godfrey" Kabanda
Commander "Godfrey" was reportedly either the top commander or a commander of operations for the ADFL
in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997 during the Mbandaka massacre. He is descnèed as short and robust and baving facial
features characteristic of some Tutsi. Godfrey claimed to be the military commander for the Equateur region.
According to press reports, Godfrey denied that any massacre had taken place in Mbandaka but spoke openly of bow
many ofhis soldiers were Tutsi survivors of Hutu refugee attacks on Congolese Tutsi in eastem Congo in 1996.101
Godfrey left Mbandaka within a few weeks after the May 13, 1997 massacre.
Lt. Colonel or Col. Cyiago (Kiago)
Often seen just behind the front lines during the war, a Lt. Colonel or Colonel with a name close to Cyiago
( or "Kiago") was responsible for some of the ADFL troops on the road between Kisangani and Mbandaka, an area
where massacres took place. A Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili speaker, Cyiago is tall, dark, thin and reportedly used
an interpreter for bis communications. Cyiago bas been accused of being involved in the abduction of at least one
Congolese civil servant who had spoken out conceming the killings in Equateur. Cyiago is a member of the RP A.102
96Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with U.S. Embassy official, Kinshasa, August 22, 1997, and aid workers in
Goma, August 28, 1997.
97Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with development workers of Mbandaka, Kinshasa, August 5, 1997.
91Human Rights Watch/FIDH tclcphone interviews with aid workers fonnedy in Mbandaka, July 1997.
99Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview with collcaguc of David, Congo, August 27, 1997.
'
00Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with eyewitnesses between Kisangani and Mbandaka, August 1997.
101 Colin Nickcrson, "Refugee Massacre Unfolds in Congo," Boston Globe, June 6, 1997.
102Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, first village, Kinshasa, and Nairobi, July and August, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 30 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Commander or Lt. Colonel "Wilson"
Wilson was at or near sites in South-Kivu, Haut-Congo, and Equateur during periods when massacres took
place. Several reports indicate that he may be responsible for a special unit of RP A, composed primarily of
experienced R wandan soldiers, that bas been implicated in several large massacres in Congo.103
Wilson was in Kisangani during military interventions that took place at Biaro, Kasese I, and Kasese Il that
likely resulted in thousands ofrefugee deaths. According to aid workers in Kisangani, Wilson was responsible for
training and inciting the local Congolese population south of Kisangani to launch attacks against refugees. He was
a commander for RPA operations in Mbandaka on May 13, 1997, when a massacre took place. He was in Mbandaka
until approximately May 24, 1997 when he was reportedly replaced by Commander David.104
Wilson has striking facial scarification and, in addition to English, speaks the Kiswahili typical ofUgandà.
He claims to be from Uvira, in castem Congo and is described as professional and intelligent by many who dealt with
him on refugee issues. Wilson reportedly often went by the alias "Khadafi" in Rwanda as an RP A officer.105
Colonel "Richard''
According to members of the ADFL military ip. Mbandaka, Colonel Richard, a rnember of the RPA, was one
of the commanders responsible for operations at Mbândaka during the massacre May 13, 1997.106
Major "Jackson" Nkurunziza (or Nziza)
An officer reported to be Major Nkurunziza (also referred to as Colonel or Commander "Jackson'') was seen
by numerous sources in Maniema, South-Kivu and Haut-Congo near sites where refugees were concentrated and/or
massacres took place. Jackson, according to Congolese and aid workers also known as "the exterminator," spëàics
the Kiswahili ofUganda as well as fluent English and Kinyarwanda.107 ., · · ...
In early April, Jackson was a commander in the Shabunda area where he told aid workers that his mission
was to eliminate ex-FAR and lnterahamwe. During this l)eriod, humanitarian sources saw mass graves and
decomposing bodies of what they state were civilian refugees in the Shabunda and neighboring areas. Corroborating
sources state that Jackson was at barriers south of Kisangani during mid- to Jate April 1997 when massacres allegedly
were taking place at refugee camps in the area. He was in Kisangani until mid-May and later in South-Kivu and
Maniema as late as July 1997 during a period in which UNHCR was organizing voluntary repatriation.108 He was
seen again in Kisangani as recently as early September 1997.109
Commander "Joseph"
Commander "Joseph" or "Yusef', according to witnesses from the Masisi area, was in charge of ADFL
troops based in the village of Rukwi in North-Kivu in late 1996. Joseph, reportedly a captain from the Burundian
anny, bas been accused by eyewitnesses of commanding troops who participated in massacres in the villages of
Nyakariba and Nyarnitaba in late December 1996.110
103Human rughts Watcb/FIDH interviews withjoumalists and aid workers in the field, July and Scptember 1997.
104Jbid.
105Human rughts Watcb/FIDH telephone interviews with Ù.N. officials in Europe, July 1997.
106Human rughts Watch/FIDH telephone interview withjoumalist in Washington, September 30, 1997.
107Human rughts Watch/FIDH interviews, Congo, Nairobi, and New York, July-Scptember 1997.
lOIJbjd
109Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews withjoumalists, aid workers, and U.N. officiais, July-September 1997.
110Human rughts Watch/FIDH interviews, Nairobi, Marchand August 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 31 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
,' . .
Colonel "Dominic Yugo"
According to testimony from local Congolese NGOs, countless journalists, and international humanitarian
workers, a commanding officer among Mobutu's mercenaries in the Kisangani area by the name of Colonel "Dominic
Yugo" was responsible for numerous abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Yugo, a Serb,
personally executed and tortured Congolcse civilians suspected of collaborating with the ADFL. On March 8, 1997,
on a road near the Kisangani aùport, Yugo shot and killed two Protestant missionaries, with bibles in band, accusing
them ofbeing ADFL spics.m A beef importer from Goma was arrested by mercenaries on February 23, 1997 under
Yugo's command and later described how be and others in detention were tortured and subject to inhumane treatment
by Yugo himself.112
According to an aid official, Yugo claimed responsibility for air attacks on Walikale and Bukavu, incidents
which resulted in numerous eivilian deaths and casualties. m ·
VIII. UNCERTAIN PAST, UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CIVIl..IAN KILLINGS IN NORTH-KIVU TODAY
Most of the eivilian killings in Congo today are in the province of North-Kivu, providing an example of
perhaps the worst possible futures for the newly re-baptized Congo. North-Kivu has been subjeet to several waves
of immigration from Rwanda since the 1920s, setting the stage for the state-condoned ethnie violence of more reeent
years. In particular, since March of 1993, civilians in the region have been the victims of govemment policies that
inspired extremists and community leaders to take up anns to resolve their disputes. These differences revolved
around three intertwined themes: customary and civilian power, citizenship, and land rights. These problems, left
festering under the Mobutu·regime,.have yet to be resolved by the new ADFL government.
. The conflict in North-Kivu was complicated and exacerbated by the arrivai of ex-FAR and anned militia in
the region in July of 1994. Alliances betweeq ethnie groups ehanged at this point, as they have donc several times
· in North-Kivu from 1993 to the present, white abuses inflicted by armed groups upon the civilian population have
reniained a constant. From late 1994 until the arrivai of the ADFL in North-Kivu, civilian casualties numbered at
.least in the hundreds, and thousands were displaced from a range of ethnie groups including the Tutsi, Hutu, Hunde,
Nyànga, Tembo, and Nande.
Under the Mobutu regime, civilians from the Hunde and other ethnie groups indigenous to the Masisi zone
becarile targets of the FAZ during their operations "Mbata" and "Kimia" in 1996 aimed at eliminating anned militia
from these ethnie groups.114 Hutu communities in North-Kivu were frequently under attack throughout 1995 and
1996 and displaced by these militia who sought to force ail Banyarwanda,115 including Hutu refugees, ''back to
Rwanda." Ethnie Tutsi in North-Kivu were subject to increasing attacks by Hutu militia and ex-FAR from mid-1994
through October 1996. Thousands of Tutsi fled North-Kivu to refugee camps in Rwanda throughout 1996 due to
these attacks. Ethnie Tutsi throughout Congo came under increasing pressure to flee Congo in the months leading
up to October 1996, due to a state-sponsored intimidation campaign against them.116
1997.
"'James McKinley, "Serb Who Went to Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror lnstead," New York Times, March 19,
112Ibid.
113Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, UNHCR official, September 1997.
114 Primarily Hunde and Nyanga, these militia included members of the Nande, Tembo, and other groups.
m Banyarwanda are people whose ancestors are from Rwanda.
11 6Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee: Violence Against the Tutsis in Zaire"; Human Rights Watch/FIDH,
"Attacked By Ail Sides,"; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition, War and Human Rights".
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 32 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A}
Under the ADFL, civilian killings have continued on an alarming scale in North-Kivu, particularly in the
early months of the war and from April 1997 to the present. While some deaths may have been associated with
combat between the ADFL or its allies and their focs from the ex-FAR, ex-F AZ , and armed militia, many civilians
were deliberately attacked by these different armed groups and the ADFL, resulting in hundreds of deaths. 117, 111
Many of the killings in recent months have been related to the unresolved issues of land rights, customary
power, and political leadership. Wit~ th~ arriv~l of the ADFL in October and November 19~6 and the dispersal of
the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, rriany ethnie Tutsi Congolese attempted to return from exile in Rwanda to their land
in the Masisi àrea. Their retum; coupled with rurriors·or an anncxation of North-Kivu and South-Kivu by Rwanda,
the installation of ethnie Tutsi to positions in the new civilian administration, and brutal repression by ADFL and
RP A forces ~ .Masisi bas increased tension among Tutsi civilians and other ethnic'groups. Many returning Tutsi
have been attacked by what they describe as a mix of ex-PAZ, ex-FAR, and militiamen from indigenous groups
including the Mai-Mai.119
Thcse attacks have caused several massive displacements of ethnie Tutsi civilians in North-Kivu and an
unknown number of civilian deaths. In July 1997, several thousand Tutsi fled the Masisi area after attacks from exF
AZ, ex-FAR, .and militia on villages in the Masisi, Ngungu, and Minova areas. In August, many of these displaced
attempted to retum to their homes under the protection of RP A troops. Following further attacks, many of these
ethnie Tutsi Congolese were again forced out of the Masisi and Goma area in early September, several thousand
seeking refuge in Rwanda.120
Human Rights Watch/FIDH received numerous reports from the Masisi, Rutshuru, and Nyragongo zones of
North-Kivu where civilian killings were carried out by the ADFL or RPA since November of 1996. Villagers and
humanitarian workers gave eyewitness accounts of scores of civilians killed by ADFL or RP A troops in the Masisi
area during the month of August 1997 alone. In the town ofMasisi itself, humanitarian workers counted over sixty
bodies of civilians on August 25, 1997 following a raid on the town by ADFL and RP A troops. The general hospital
was razed during the raid and the bodies of patients were disposed of in latrines. Other civilian killings.in late August
took place in the villages of Kalangala and Ruzirantaka, where twenty-four and nineteen people respectively were
killed by Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the ADFL or RP A. Among the dead were many women, children and
elderly.
Human Rights Watch/FIDH received numerous testimonies in Goma ofhelicopters being flown repeatedly
between Rwanda toward the Masisi area, allegedly for military purposes.121 Many residents in Goma declared that
convoys of trucks of RP A soldiers could be seen routinely entering from Gisenyi, Rwanda and heading înto the
Masisi area. lt is likely that some of these soldiers have been used in the attacks on civilians in the Masisi area
described by villagers from the area to Human Rights Watch/FIDH. Residents of Goma also reported a general
insecurity in the town due in large part to frequent looting and killings by Rwandan soldiers, who would often slip
across the border to Rwanda following abuses.122
117Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Goma, Congo with villagers from the Masisi zone, August, 1997.
111Mission d'enquete sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu, Action paysanne pour la
reconstruction et le developpement communitaire integral, September, 1997.
119 Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews with returnees in Gisenyi, Rwanda, September, 1997.
llOJbid.
1
l
1Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Goma, Congo with several individuals including an international pilot,
August 27, 1997.
122Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Goma, Congo, August 26, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 33 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
The Jack of functioning legislative or judicial institutions in Congo to address these issues bas aggravated
the resurgence in violence since March of 1997. It is likely that these cycles of violence will continue or increase
in eastem Congo, and perhaps in other provinces, if political solutions to the core problems of citizenship, land rights,
and customary power are not found. The commander of Congo's 4th Mili~ Brigade, based in Goma, stated shortly
after his arrivai in Goma in late July that there would be "no prison for killers, bandits, and armed robbers" and
declared that military or bandits caught committing crimes would be subject to public executfon.123
IX. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Beginning in 1994, the international community helped create and perpetuate problems in eastem Congo by
dealing only with the humanitarian needs and neglecting the more complex political and military issues conceming
the refugee camps. Aware tbat authorities responsible for the gcnocide in Rwanda controlled the camps and that
soldiers and militia were using them as bases for raids into Rwanda, donor nations still continued to support them.
Despite appeals from the UNHCR, humanitarian groups and human rights organizations, they refused to invest the
resources needed to separate anned elements ·from actual refugees or to move the camps further from the R wandan
border. The only solution they offered, partially effective and only for the short-term, was financing F AZ sol di ers
seconded to the service of the UNHCR.
Not long after seizing power in Kigali in July 1994, Rwandan authorities insisted that the refugees be
repatriated and the camps dispersed, an insistence that grew during 1996 as incursions from Zaire increased in
number and scale. In the face of such clcar wamings, the international community still did not take action to defuse
the situation.
When the ADFL attacked the camps, the international community once more addressed simply the
humanitarian issues of facilitating repatriation and delivery of aid. It spent a month preparing for a multinational
·military force to provide security for refugees and humanitarian workers but then dropped the plan after the U.S.,
the U.K. and Canada decided not to send combat troops. ·
Having decided against armed intervention, the international community was reduced to repeatedly deploring
the ADFL attacks against the refugees and obstruction of humanitarian assistance, whether by the ADFL or the
govemment of Zaïre. In the face of reports of massacres, they engaged at most in public protestations and priva te
diplomacy, alI of which seemed equa11y ineffective. Even after the United Nations special rapporteur on Zaire,
Roberto Garret6n, presented evidence that massacres had occurred in his April 2, 1997 report to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. proposed a more thorough investigation but made no intervention that might
have averted subsequent slaughter, such as that to the south of Kisangani in mid to late April 1997 and in Mbandaka
on May 13, 1997.
The U.S., tom between concems for the stability and territorial integrity of Congo and a desire to have the
problem of the refugees resolved, long remained silent on the massacres and obfuscated important questions, such
as the number ofrefugees in Congo afterNovember 1996 and therole ofRwandan troops in the ADFL forces. Such
positions seemed to indicate backing for the ADFL, a conclusion strongly reinforced by revelations ofU.S. military
aid to Rwanda. An important number of African nations have also supported Kabila and downplayed or denied
accusations of crimes against humanity by bis troops.
After mounting an initial effort to seek accountability through a U.N. investigation, the secretary-general and
others backed down, permitting Kabila to veto G;met6n as chiefinvestigator. More recently, the U.S., the European
123Integrated Regional Information Network, Emergency Updatc No. 227 on the Great Lakes, August 8, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 34 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
Union, and the secretary-general appeared ready to meet Kabila 's stonewalling with the firmness which if sustained
could break the cycle of violence and impunity. Afiican supporters ofKabila. however, have notjoined this renewed
effort at demanding accountability.
The United States
U.S. policymakers saw the refugee camps as a threat to regional stability. Although the U.S. itselfwas not
prepared to use force to break up the camps, Department ofDefense officiais had decided as early as August 1995
not to oppose such action by Rwanda, provided it was a "clean" operation, meaning one with limited civilian
losses.'24 In August 1996, Kagame informed State Department officiais that Rwanda was ready to dismantle the
camps ifno one else acted, and, according to him, the U.S. took "the right decisions tolet it proceed!'1"
As it became clear that the ADFL attacks had caused a new humanitarian crisis, the U.S. eventually agreed
to join the multinational force, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, which was to provide assistance to refugees
and to facilitate their retum home. But within days of the decision, attacks by Kabila's forces drove hundreds of
thousands of refugees home, opening the way to a debate between various governmental, U.N. and NGO actors about
how many Rwandans were left in Congo. According to a senior administration official, from the start of the crisis
the U.S. used the Iatest technology of satellite and airplane reconnaissance to produce daily and, later, weekly
assessments of numbers and locations ofrefugees. This information was shared at least with UNHCR, raising the
possibility that it might have ended up in other bands as well.126 In a November 1996 briefmg in Kigali, U .S. embassy
officiais told representatives ofNGOs that aerial reconnaissance data showed no evidence of the missing hundreds
of thousands. Soon after, officiais admittcd that this assessment had been wrong, because it was based on data
relating to a only a small part of the region.127 In a subsequent statement, that echoed closely the official Rwandan
position, the U.S. ambassador in Kigali claimed that refugccs remaining in Zaïre numbered only in "the tens of
thousands."121 At the Deccmber 4, 1996 hearing before the House Intemaitonal Relations Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights, U.S. officiais finally agreed that between 200,000 and 400,000
Rwandans were left in Congo, an estimate at least in the general range ofthat given by humanitarian NGOs in the
field and the UNHCR, which put the number at between 400,000 and 450,000.129
The debate over numbers provided a pretext for delaying the force, as was pointed out by critical observers
like Representatives Lee Hamilton and Christopher Smith. At the December 4 hearing, Hamilton stated:
I cert.ainly understand that we don't bave all the information we want, you never have all the
infonnation you want. ..• You always have to operate on less-than-perfect information ... .'3°
By the time there was general agreement that a minimum of 200,000 persans were still in need of aid, the U.S.,
followed by the U.K. and Canada, had concluded that a multinational force was not the best way to deliver that aid,
thus ensuring its demise.131
124Human Rights Watch/FIDH field notes, August 1995.
125John Pomfret, Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
126Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews by telephone, one with a senior administration official, October 3, 1997.
127Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview by telephonc , London, October 6; Chris Mc Great, "Officiais Play Numbers
With Missing Refugees," The Guardian, November 25, 1996.
'
21Refugees International, "Refugees International Demands Recall ofU.S. Envoy from Kigali," November
21, 1996, November 1997.
129Conversation with UNHCR Depuly High Cornmissioner, Kinshasa, December, 1997.
130Hearing of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittec of the House International Relations
Committee, December 4, 1996.
131Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Attacked by Alt Sides,'' page 13.
Human Rights Watch/Afiica and FIDH 35 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
Throughout this period, the govemments of Rwanda and Uganda consistently denicd that their soldicrs wcre
fighting in ~ongo, a dcception which the U.S. did not publicly question. Like others in Europe, the U.S. knew from
the start that Rwanda and Uganda had each sent at least 1,000 troops to support Kabila, but for months it maintained
the position that the ADFL was a purely Congolese force. 132 In February 1997, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the
Kigali embassy told Human Rights Watch/FIDH that "there was no proof' whatsoever that Rwandan troops were
present in Congo.'" Only the U.S. ambassador in Kinshasa, particularly concemed about the territorial integrity of
Congo, broke ran1cs to denounce a Rwandan invasion in January 1997. At about the same time, Washington and Paris
moved towards acknowledging the reality by .urging Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to stay out of the fighting:"On
March 17, the State Department spokesman fmally admittcd that the U.S. was "still concerned by the flood° of
reports" about Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian assistance to the ADFL.134 Severa} days later, a high-ranking Staté
Department official confinned to Human Rights Watch/FIDH that Rwandan troops were playing an important part
in Congo conflict us
At the December 4, 1996 hearing, Ambassador Richard Bogosian told the congressional panel that the U.S.
was "concemc;d" about reports of human tjghts violations by the rebels. He went on to say that the u.s: had raised
the issue with the govemments ofUganda and Rwanda. Implicitly acknowledging the rote they played in the abuses,
be stated that the U.S. had sent out instructions "to urge restraint on their part ••.. "136 ·
The extent ofU.S. political, econo~ic and milîtary support for Rwanda raised the question of whether such
assistance was also benefiting the ADFL. Questioned closely about this possibility by Representative Smith on
December 4, administration officiais downplayed U.S. military assistance to Rwanda. Vincent Kem, Deputy
Assistant Secretary ofDefense described these military programs as the "softer, kinder, gentler" side of military
training, void of any instruction for combat situations or "any of the sort of basic military training that you would
get at Fort Bragg; officer training, those sorts of things."137
At a hearing by the House International Relations Committee on July 16, 1997, however, testimony by
Physicians for Human Rights raised new questions both about massacres iQ Congo and about u:s. military presence
in the region. Following questions by members of Congress, the Department ofDefense released a report on August
19, 1997 detailing one training program that included marksmanship, tactical skills ànd.patrolling, small unit leader
training, and leadership development training, some ofwhich was conducted by U.S. Anny Special Forces, in fact,
from Fort Bragg. 131
At the July 16 hearings, Amb. Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, reiterated the
administration position from the December hearings, catling the Kabila govemment's early human rights record
"troubling." He also said that neighboring govenunents were pressed "to use their influence with the ADFL to ensure
respect for internationally recognized human rights.
In August and September, Europeanjoumalists, citing French intelligence and other sources, charged the U.S.
with having its own soldiers in Congo. Witnesses in Kinshasa and Goma reported to Human Rights Watch/FIDH that
they had seen U.S. military in Congolese territory on different occasions between November 1996 and August 1997.
132Hwnan Rigbts Watch/FIDH interview, by telephone, Washington, October 29, 1996; James Rupert and Thomas W.
Lippman, ''U.S. Stance on Zaire Draws Foreign Fire,'' Washington Post, March 15, 1997.
mHuman Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Kigali, February 12, 1997.
134Reuter, "U.S. Troubled by Reports of Aid to Zaïre Rebets," March 17, 1997.
135Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Washington, March 20, 1997.
136U.S. House of Representatives Conunittec on International Relations hcaring, Decembcr 4, 1996.
137Ibid.
mîhe report was written in response to a request from U.S. House of Reprcsentatives Committee on international
Relations Chainnan Benjamin A. Gilman.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 36 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. S (A)
One eyewitness with extensive mititary cxperience reported seeing U.S. Army Special Forces in unifonn in the
villages ofWalikale and Kanyabayonga in North-Kivu on July 23 and July 24, 1997, apparently advising and training
RPA soldiers.139 Other witnesses rcportcd U.S. military in Goma in November 1996 as well as accompanying
U gandan troops in the Ruwenzori arca of Congo as recently as August 1997 .1
•
0 Senior officials from the National
Security Council and the Department ofS tate denied that there had been any U.~. military presence in Congo~14 1
Unwilling to confront Ka bila• s allies on their rote in the massacres, the U .S. took a clearer position on the
rcsponsibility ofKabila himsclf due to increasing reports of massacres in late February and early March 1997. In
early April, a high-ranking U.S. official telephoncd Kabîla to express concem about allegations of massacres and
about the problem of access for humanitarian workers.142 By late April, the· U.s : felt compelled to publicly wam
Kabila that failing to act "in a credible way and a humanitarian way" could damage his standing in the international
community.143
Although the U.S. apparently did no more than issue wamings white killings were taking place, it did later
support the investigation. When Kabila rejected the presence of Garret6n on the investigating team, however, the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson played a leading rote in negotiating an acc~modatiori"witli Kabi!a; Faced
with mounting evidence of gross violations of international humanitarian law,. officiais at the State Department
bitterly debated how much human rights considerations should influence policy towards Kabila's new govemment.
In July, they decided that the U.S. could not grant aid to the new govemment until it had cooperated with the U.N.
investigation.
After the team of investigators arrived in Kinshasa on August 24, Kabila··attached new ëonditions·to'the
investigation, as described in the United Nations section below. U.S. officiais hesitated and again debated whether
taking a strong stand on massive human rights abuses would lead to greater stability in the region, their ultimate goal.
Sorne argued that to do so would rupture relations with Kabila and so end the possibility of future influence in this
nation of major importance. Others arguèd that buying stability by silence was too high a price and would at best
produce only a briefhalt in violence in the region."• By Octo!,er 1, the U.S. appeared to have decided to insist on
some measure of accountability for the massacres and Ambassador Richardson declared that "there should be no
negotiations on whether the team would have unimpeded access. lt should." On the same day, U.S. Ambassador at
Large for War Crimes David Scheffer stated that U.S. aid to Congo would depend on how the Congolese govemment
received the U.N. Mission: "Such assistance is contingent on cooperation with the U.N. investigating team," said
Scheffer, adding that "Kinshasa has nothing to gain and much to lose if it continues to obstruct."145 Also on October
1, State Department Spokesperson James Foley wamed that "it would be an enormously significant setback to the
goal of achieving accountability in Central Africa" ifKabila evicted the U.N. team.146 ·
Europe and Africa
In November 1996 France and Spain proposed a multinational force to assist the refugees, an effort which
France repeated in early March 1997 foll~wing publication of dramatic accounts of massacres in the French press.
139.Hwnan Rights Watch/FIDH interview in Congo, August, 1997; an August 19 Defcnse Dcpartment report, as well as
statements by the U.S. ambassasor to Rwanda during the samc month, confinncd that there wcre U.S. Anny Special Forces
involved in a training program in August at the Gako military camp in Rwanda. ·
H°Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews in Kinshasa and Goma, August, 1997; during this period, U.S. Anny Special
Forces were conducting trainings for the African Crisis Response Initiative in nearby Fort Portal, Uganda.
141Human Rights Watcb/FIDH interview in Washington, D.C., September 8 and 9, 1997.
'
0 Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, by telephone, Washington, April 2, 1997.
'
0 Reuters, "AMan and the United States Wam Zairean Rebets," April 24, 1997.
'
44Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Washington, September 8 and 9, 1997.
145"U.S. Withholds Congo Aid," Associated Press wire story, Septembcr 24, 1997.
146AFP wire story, "U.S. Wams K.abila Aid at Stake over Human Rigbts Probe," October 1, 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 37 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
The long French alliance with Mobutu and larger French political interests in the region raised questions about its
objectives in urging intervention, however, and other govemments refused the March initiative, despite backing from
the U.N. secreta.ry-general. France berated other govemments for a "conpiracy of silence," but in fact the massacres
were frequently denounced by many officials ofEuropean govemments as well as of the U.N., including Belgian
Secretary of State for Development Cooperation Reginald Moreels, European Union Humanitarian Commission cr
Emma Bonino, and U.N. and OAU special envoy Ambassador Mahmoud Sahnoun.
Morcels and Salmoun both evoked the Rwandan genocide in their statements, a reference accurate for the
pattern ofinternatiorial behavior: as in 1994, the international community at times denounced but took no effective
action to stop the killings and then demanded accountability from the parties responsible only after the fact.
Once Kabila's govemment was established, some European officiais appeared ready to place reconstruction
over the needs of justice. On May 28, 1997, European Development .Commissioner Ioao de deus Pinheiro sent
encouraging signals to Kabila and, in August, two delegations visiting Kinshasa, one from Belgium led by Moreels,
and one from the European Union, both concluded that the environment in Congo was largely favorable for reestablishing
cooperation. More recently, however, on September 24, 1997, the European ynion adopted a position
similar to that of the U.S. and stated that aid to Congo would be conditioned upon Kabila's cooperation with the U.N.
investigative team.
Sorne ofKabila's military supporters, including Rwanda, Uganda; and Angola, have been joined by others
who have offered their encouragement to the new Congolese government. South African President Nelson Mandela
referred to Kabila as "an outstanding figure, a dynamic leader"147 and appeared ready to accept Kabila 's assurances
that allegations of m~ssacres were false.1•• • Other leaders from the region have also sought to protect Ka bila 's human
rights record. Representatives of African states,14
' meeting in Kinshasa at the invitation ofOrganization of African
Unity Chairman and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, expressed their support for Kabila in the face of
accusations of mass killings. They deno~ced with "dismay the persistent unsubstantiated disinformation campaign
against the Democratic Republic of Congo" and "condemned this campaign of vilification and the unjustified
pressures being exerted on the Democratic Republic of the Congo."150
The United Nations
With mounting reports of massacres and other atrocities coming out of the areas of Zaïre occupied by the
ADFL, on March 6, 1997 the High Commissioner for Human Rights requested that the U.N. special rapporteur for
Zaire investigate the allegations. After a short mission to the region, Rapporteur Roberto Garret6n issued a
preliminary report in which he identified more than forty massacre sites and recommended further investigation by
the Commission on Human Rights. 151 Such information led Secretary-General Kofi Annan to denounce the
inhumanity of the rebels and to speak of "killing by starvation."
The Commission then directed him, togcther with the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, sum.mary or
arbitrary executions and a member of the Working Group on Disappearances, to carry out an inquiry into massacres
147Sapa-dpa wire story, Harare, May 21, 1997.
141Integrated Regional Information Network, Emergency Update 235 for August 26, 1997.
149In attendance at the meeting were representatives of Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Mozambique, Nanu'bia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. IRIN, "DRC: Joint Communique
of the Kinshasa Meeting 20 July 1997."
l.SOJbid,
UIEfCN.4/1997 /6/ Add.2
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 38 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
alleged to have taken place since Septembcr 1996. The team was mandated to report to the General Assembly (GA)
by June 30 and to the Commission's Fifty-Fourth Session in March/April 1998.m
When the team, accompanied by forensic experts, arrived in the region in early May, Kabi)a refused to admit
team leader Garret6n into Congo, apparently in retaliation for bis previous report. After a brief standoff, the team
left the region but prepared a reporfbased on sources already available toit. · ·
In separate meetings in early JW1e, Secretary-General Annan and Ambassador Richardson obtained Kabila's
agreement that the U.N. investigation would start within a month. In its JW1e 9, 1997 press release, the U.N. implied
that the investigation team was to be that appointed by the Commission. But sources both within the U.S.
administration and the U.N. to)d Human Rights Watch that Kabila had been assured that Garret6n would not be
heading the investigation. "3
The team headed by Garret6n, known as the Joint Investigative Team of the Commission on Human Rights,
published a report on July 2, 1997 stating that some of the alleged massacres could constitute acts of genocide (para.
80). lt also concluded that "there are reliable indications that persans belonging to one or other of the parties to the
conflict ... probably committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, particularly article 3 common
to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949" and that "[s]uch crimes seem to be sufficiently massive and systematic to
be characterized as crimes against humanity" (para. 95).154 ·
Although the team had not been able to visit sites in Congo, its conclusions could not be ignored and
compelled further investigation. On July 8, the secretary-general was ·authorized by the Security Council to create
an investigative team under bis own authority. It was not until more than a mon th la ter, however, that the team was
actually set up, consisting of Atsu Koffi Amega of Togo, Andrew Chigovera of Zimbabwe, and Reed Brod y of the
United States, and a support team of several forensic and human rights experts.·
Within a few days of the team's arrivai in Kinshasa, the Congolese government set new conditions for its
work. In an August 27 letter, Minister of Reconstruction Etienne-Richard Mbaya and Minister of International
Cooperation Thomas Kanza insisted that: (1) team's Togolese chainnan, Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega, be replaced by
someone from a neutral coW1try-an apparent allusion to Togo's close relationship with the prior Zairian government
of former President Mobutu Sese Seko; (2) it not be accompanied by its unanned U.N. security personnel; and, (3)
the U.N. investigation be conducted in conjunction with a proposed parallel investigation by the O_rganization of
African Unity. ·
The secretary-general rejected the additional conditions on August 29 and gave Kabila a deadline ofnoon
September 2 to confirm that the team could begin its work. us Foreign Minister Bizima Karaha delivered the
assurance by telephone but the secretary-general reportedly insisted on a written confirmation from the country's
president.
On September 6 the letter from Kabila finally arrived.156 It stated that the teàm could start its work, but
insisted that the investigatjon was to be "limited in time and space" to the period before May 17, the date wheri
152Commission on Human Rigbts Resolution 1997/58, para. 6.
tSJThe June 9, 1997 statement in which Ralph Zacklin, the Officer-in-Charge of the High Commissioner/Centre for
Human Rights, welcomed the arrangement reachcd bctween the U.N. and Laurent Kabila, mentioned, among other things. that
members of the Commission's Joint Investigative Team had bcen infonned of the developments; HR/97/35.
"
4AJ5 l/942.
"
5 August 29, 1997 letter by Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan to President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
"
6September 6, 1997 letter from Laurent-Désiré Kabila addresscd to the Secrctary-Gencral.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 39 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
\
Kabila took power, and to the eastem part of the country. In addition, the govemment insisted that its own team
participate in the investigation.
Having by then spent three weeks in Kinshasa without being able to conduct its work, the team decided to
test the limits of government compliance. A few members traveled to a refugee camp in Congo-Brazzaville and, on
September 13, the team attempted to purchase plane tickets to Mbandaka, in the northwestern part of the country,
where a massacre was alleged to have occurred in May. The travel agent refused to sell the tickets and said it was
acting under instructions from the govemment Meanwhile, the govemment presented the U.N. with a budget request
for $1.7 million to pay the costs of its own team to accompany the investigators, including a per diem payment of
$700 for each Congolese member.
On September 16, Minister Mbaya, designated as the government's chiefliaison with the team, invited its
members to a meeting which turned out to be a media event complete withjournalists and five television cameras.
The minister informed the team that they were not authorized to go to Mbandaka and, further, should not attempt to
go. The minister also read a press statemen~ in which he reiterated all previous govenunent objections and demands,
including those related to the time, space, and budget.
Secretary-General Annan and Ambassador Richardson continue to make public statements putting pressure
on Kabila to cooperate. A.mbassador Richardson recently declared:
We very much wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt and to help him, but when it appears that
bis government turns its back on important international commitments made to the international
community, be leaves us with few options. 157
Following a series of phone and direct contacts between the secretary-general aI_ld members of the Congolese
government, on October 1, 1997 the sec~etary-general decided to s~mmon the leaders of the team to the U.N.
headquarters in New York for consultations. The forensic and human rights experts remained iri Kinshasa as of this
writing.
After the Rwandan genocide, the international community insisted on justice for the victims. It bas
encountered many financial and logistical problems in carrying out that commibnent, but its efforts have been made
casier because those responsible for the crimes had been defeated. Because the ADFL bas been victorious,
international actors are finding their_ C(?mmitment to justice complicated by a desire to ensure future good relations
with the authorities who may well be charged with serious violations of international law. lt remains to be seen if
they will realize that fumness in demanding justice does not require ignoring the objectives of stability and prosperity
for the region but rather is the best way of promoting those goals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was written by Scott Campbell, a consultant to Human Rights Watch/Africa/FIDH, on the basis
interviews and research conducted in Congo and elsewhere in the sub-region in July/August 1997. Joanna Weschler,
U.N. Representative ofHuman Rights Watc~ contributed to the writing of the report. The report was cdited by Peter
Takirambudde, Executive Director for Africa at Human Rights Watch, Alison DesForges, consultant to Human
Rights Watch/Afiica, Janet Fleischman, Washington Director for Human Rights Watch/Afiica, and Peter Bouckaert,
Orville Schell Fellow at Human Rights Watch/Africa. Ariana Pearlroth, Elizabeth Reynoso, and Patrick Minges
provided production assistance.
mEditorial. "Cloud Over Congo," Washington Post, September 1997.
Human Rights Watch/Africa and FIDH 40 October 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5 (A)
UCMANNEX
____________________ ...,, ______ ~---------------------------------------
Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 -.------~-----------------------------
THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT
Developments in Children's Rights
Abuses that uniquely affect children pose particular challenges for human rights action. Researcb requires new and
specialized methodology; the assessment and development of policy options must address the special circwnstances and
vulnerabilities of cbildren in need and the problems they confront; and to raise awareness, build coalitions, and bring
about change, unique campaigning initiatives are needed. The range of abuses requiring attention include those carried out
by govemments as well as those in which govemments do not exercise due diligence in protecting the rights of the child.
Abuses by armed opposition groups are also crucial children's right issues, not least the use of children as soldiers.
Effective work toward an end to the abuses that expressly affect the rights of children requires devising innovative
researcb and advocacy strategies, drawing·on strong partnerships with local activists world-wide in their formulation and
implementation. A crucial goal of an effective program for the rights of children is to bring international and national
children's groups together with the larger buman rights comrnunity.
In 1997 children continued to be victimized and exploited around the world. ln some countries, eight-year-old children
were forced to become child soldiers; some were forced to beat or back other children to death. ln other countries, five
and six-year-old children worked as bonded laborers, laboring in dreadful conditions for long hours to try to pay offloans
made to their families. In many countries, children were routinely beaten by police officers, arbitrarily detained, and sent
without due process to appalling institutions that provided no education or rehabilitation, wbile governments and the
general public ignored their distress.
These are just some of the children's rights issues that required researcb and action for change in 1997. The sections that
follow examine some of the unique human rigbts dimensions of the issues of cbild tabor, child soldiers, street children,
andjuvenile justice, drawing from the work ofHuman Rigbts Watcb in these areas over the past year.
Child Labor
My sister is ten years old. Every moming at seven she goes to the bonded labor man, and every night at nine she cornes
home. He treats ber badly; be bits ber if be thinks she is working slowly or if sbe talles to other children be yells at ber. He
cornes looking for ber if she is sick and cannot work . AU I want is to bring
my sister home. For 600 rupees I can bring ber home. But we will never bave 600 rupees.
- Lakshmi, a nine-year-old beedi (cigarette) roller in Tamil Nadu in lndia, in an interview with Human Rights
One of the most alanning trends in contemporary armed conflicts is the reliance on children as combatants. An estimated
quarter of a nùllion children under the age of eighteen serve as soldiers in government forces or armed opposition groups
around the world. Children as young as eight are being forcibly recruited, coerced, or induced to become combatants,
targeted to become soldiers because of their unique wlnerability as children. Their emotional and physical immaturity
make them particularly malleable and easily susceptible to psychological and physical control. Manipulated by adults,
children are drawn into violence that they are too young to resist, white th.ey are too young to appreciate and cope with its
consequences.
Children are recruited in a variety of ways. Some are conscripted, otbers are forcibly recroited, press-ganged or kidnaped
and literally dragged from their homes, schools, and villages. Sorne familles offer their children for military service,
driven by poverty and hunger, and sometimes children become soldiers simply in order to survive, when their families are
dead or the children have become lost or separated from their familles. Without other means of support, for some children
becoming a soldier may be a means of guaranteeing meals, clothing, and security in troubling times.
Child soldiers perform a variety of duties, ranging from support functions as cooks, porters, messengers and spies, to
actually fighting as combatants-due in part to the increased availability of light weight, simple to operate, and inexpensive
autornatic weapons. Girls are also often forced to provide sexual services to other soldiers. Whether serving in support
functions or as combatants, ail children are likely to find themselves at times in the midst of heated battle, where their
inexperience and physical immaturity make them particularly vulnerable to injury and death.
Even after children are demobilized, their future is often tragically bleak. Effective planning and long-term support for
demobilized children is essential for the meaningful reintegration of children into their families and into civilian society.
In addition to meeting children's immediate physical, emotional, and psychological needs, children must be equipped with
the skills and education necessary in order for them to survive and live productively as civilians. This is true for all
children, but especially so for those who remain separated from their familles or whose familles have been killed or whose
whereabouts are unknown. Without families that are able and willing to accept, support and nurture the children upon
return, prospects for their future are especially grim without strong governrnent and community support.
Children were used as soldiers by ail of the warring factions in Liberia's long civil war, including the National Patriotic
Front, led by Charles Taylor, whose election to the presidency in July 1997 appears to have brought an end to the conflict.
In 1994, UNICEF estimated that some 10 percent of the 40,000 to 60,000 fighters were children under the age of fifteen.
A major challenge in the rebuilding of Liberia will be the rehabilitation of tens of thousands of children- traumatized by
their experiences as child soldiers and eut off from any access to education in their formative years-so they can become a
part of civil society. In southem Sudan, the long war between the (Muslim) Khartoum government in the north and (nonMuslim)
southem secessionist movements continued. The southem rebel movements, in particular the Southern People's
Liberation Movement (SPLA), continued their longstanding practice of mass abductions of young boys, for indoctrination
and mobilization as child soldiers, and the employment bf children in combat. At the same time, the abduction of children
by Sudanese govemment troops and govemment-backed militia, for child soldiers or sale as slaves, continued to be
reported.
The abduction of children by the northem Ugandan opposition group calling itself the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is
only the most recent situation of the exploitation of child soldiers to be the object of intensive buman rights field research
and international attention. Over the past two years, between three and five thousand children have escaped from LRA
captivity; a total of between six and ten thousand children were estimated to have been abducted. Former child captives
who had managed to escape said ihat heavily armed LRA rebels abducted children as young as eight from their schools
and homes, and forced children to march to rebel base camps in southem Sudan, carrying beavy loads, without rest and
with very little food and water. Children who protested, or who could not keep up or attempted to escape, were killed,
often by other child captives who were forced to participa te in killings as a means of breaking their spirits and initiating
them into the ways of the LRA. In Sudan the children received rudimentary military training and were armed and sent into
combat. The children were forced to fight against the Ugandan governrnent army and against an armed Sudanese rebel
group. They were forced to loot and destroy villages and to abduct other children, during the course of which they often
became involved in combat. Abducted girls, in addition to performing duties as servants, cooks, and sometimes fighters,
were also given as "wives" to LRA soldiers. The abducted children became virtual slaves; their tabor, their bodies, and
their lives were all at the disposai of their captors.
Those who were lucky enough to escape or be captured alive by the Ugandan governrnent soldiers faced a harsh reality
upon their return to civilïan life in Uganda. With many of their farnily members dead, displaced, unlocatable, or fearful of
baving the children retum home, many children found that they had nowhere to go and no means of supporting
themselves. In addition to dealing with severe emotional and psychological trauma, rnalnourishment, disease and physical
injuries suffered while in captivity, many children faced worries about their basic survival- how they would feed, clothe,
and shelter themselves.
Street Children
W e didn't sleep at all last night. That's why we're sleeping now, during the day. Night is the most dangerous for us. The
police corne white we're sleeping and catch you off guard, and grab and hit you. They'll take you to Makadara court and
then you'll be sent to remand [detention] for months. Last night there was a big roundup and we bad to move so many
times to avoid being caught. There was a large group of police in a big lorry, driving around, looking for kids. They're
cleaning up the streets now to prepare for the Nairobi International Show [an annual international commerce and trade fair
beld in Nairobi] .
-Moses, a Nairobi street boy, interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Nairobi, Kenya in September 1996.
Street children throughout the world have been subjected to physical abuse by police or been murdered outright, as
governments bave treated them as a blight to be eradicated-rather than as children to be nurtured and protected. They were
frequently arbitrarily detained by police simply because they were bomeless, or charged with vague offenses such as
loitering or vagrancy, or petty theft. They have been tortured or beaten by police and often beld for long periods in poor
conditions. Girls were sometimes sexually abused, coerced into sexual acts, or raped by police. Few advocates bave
spoken up for these children, and few street children have had family members or concemed individuals willing and able
to intervene on their behalf.
The term street children refers to children for whom the street more than their family bas become their real home. lt
includes children who might not necessarily be bomeless or without families, but wbo live in situations where there is no
protection, supervision, or direction from responsible adults.
While street children have received a fair amount of national and international public attention, that attention bas been
focused largely on social, economic and bealth problems of the children-poverty, Jack of education, AIDS, prostitution
and substance abuse. With the exception of the massive killings of street children in Brazil and Colombia, often by police,
which Human Rigbts Watch reported in 1994, very little attention bas been paid to the constant police violence and abuse
from which many children suffer. This oftèn neglected side of street children's lives bas been a focus ofHuman Rights
W atch's research and action.
The public view of street children in many countries bas been overwbelmingly negative. Police round ups-or even murderof
the children, as means to get them off the street, bave bad public support. There bas been an alarming tendency by some
law enforcement personnel and civilians, business proprietors and their private security firms, to view street children as
almost sub-human. In several countries, notably Brazil, Bulgaria, and Sudan, the racial, ethnie. or religious identification
of street children bas played a significant role in their treatment. The disturbing notion of "social-cleansing" bas been
applied to street cbildren even when they were not distinguished as members of a particular racial, ethnie, or religious
group; branded as "anti-social," or demonstrating "anti-social bebavior," street children have been viewed with suspicion
and fear by many who would simply like to see street children disappear.
In India, Kenya and Guatemala, police violence against street children was pervasive in 1997, and impunity was the norm
The failure of law enforcement bodies promptly and effectively to investigate and prosecute cases of abuses against street
children allowed the violence to continue. Establishing police accountability was further hampered by the fact that street
children often bad no recourse but to complain directly to police about police abuses. The threat of police reprisais against
them served as a serious deterrent to any child coming forward to testify or make a complaint against an officer. In Kenya,
Human Rights Watch worked with NGOs and street workcrs to encourage the establishment ofa network for docwnenting
and reporting police abuses against s~eet children, and to follow up on individual cases. Yet. ~ven in Guatemala, where
the organization Casa Alianza bas been particularly active in this regard and bas filed approximately 300 criminal
complaints on behalf of street children, only a handful have resulted in prosecutions. Clearly, even where there are
advocates willing and able to assist street children in seeking justice, police accountability and an end to the abuses will
not be achieved without the commitment of govemrnents.
Street children make up a large proportion of the children wbo entered the cri.minal or juvenile justice systems and who
end up being committed, often without due process, to correctional institutions. Street children who entered the criminal
Guatemala's Forgotten Children: Police Violence and Arbitrary Detention, 7/97
Juvenile Injustice: Police Abuse and Detention of Street Children in Kenya, 6/97
Slipping Through the Cracks: Unaccompanied Children Detained by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
4/97
Bunna: Children's Rights and the Rule of Law, 1/97
This page last modifled 04/09/2001 18:24:05
Human Rights Watch
350 Fifth Ave 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
(212) 216-1219
UCMANNEXl
THE REPUBLIC OF UGA:NDA
TRAINING AGREEl\1ENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA . .. .
AND
THE GOVERNl\tlENT OF THE DEl\!IOCRA TIC REPUBLIC OF·
CONGO
FOR
THE TRAINING IN PUBLIC ORDER FOR THE POLICE OF
THE DEl\10CRA TIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
r
I
TlilS AGilEEMENT is made this ......................... day of ..................................... .
1998 between THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA .
representcd by the Ministry of Internai Affairs, of P. O. Box 7191, Kampala,
Uganda (hcrcinnfer called the "trainer") of the one part;
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRA TIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
represented by the Minist_ry of Internai Aff airs (héreinafter called the "recipient")
which expression shall whcr~ the context rcquires, include thcir lawful successors, of
the other part.
NOW THEilEFORE 1T IS HEREBY AGR.EED AS FOLLOWS:ARTICLE
1
ODJECT OF THE AGREEMENT
The recipicnt ngrees to reccive and the trainer agrees to provide training for the
Congo Police in Public orc!'h.
ARTICLE 2
DUT[ES OF THE TRAINER
The dutics of the trainer shall be:
(a) Provision of twenty Police Instructors
(b) Provision of training cquipmcnt for the first initial training.
ART(CLE3
DUTIES OF THE RECIPIENT
(a) Pro~ision of rcturn airfarc and airport tax to the instructors
(b) .. Provision of a training institution with adequatc facilitics
(c) Provision of sccurc and :idcquate accommod:ition for the instructors
2
(u) Provision o·f training equipment for public orucr h:rnuling arter first initial
training.
(c) Provision of inland transport for the instructors
(f) Provision of meals to the ins~ructors.
ARTICLE4
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE
(a) There shall be a tcam leader of the instructors who will supervise the others
in liaison with one officer front the Congo Police.
(b) The tcam leader of the training team shall be rcsponsible for the immcdiate
comman<l, disdpline, efficicncy, administration nnd security control of the
team. ·
ARTICLE 5
DURATION OFTRAINtNG
(a) The training shall be carried out within a period not excccding 31st
Dccember, 1998 subjcct to revicw by both parties.
(b) The trainer shall perform the requircd training and must achievc the
rcquircd objectives within the specificd period.
ARTICLE 6
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRAINING
Performance under this Agreement shall commence immediatcty upon exccution
thcrcaftcr. ·
J
r
'
,
ARTICLE 7
STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE
, .
(n) The trainer shall carry out the trnining with duc diligence, cfficicncy nnd in
accordance with accepted training techniques and skills applicable in
training institutions.
(b) The trainer rescrvcs the right to withdraw an individual m~mber of the team ·
or nll of thcm.
ARTICLES
ALLOWANCES
. ; .
(a) The rccipicnf. sl~all pay US S 70 pcr day as allowaucc for each instructor
upon siguing of this agreement or as agrccd othcnvisc by both parties on a
pcriodic basis.
(b) Mcmbers of the training tcam shall be exempt from incomc tax by the
Dcmocratic Republic of Congo on thcir allowances or any othcr forru of
direct taxation.
ARTICLE9
MEDICAL FACILITJES
The recipicnt shall take rcsponsibility for providing frec suitable mcdical services to
the trnining team.
ARTICLE 10
TERMINATION OF THIS AGREEMENT
(a) i This agreement shall terminale:
\\'hcn a ll the obligations by eithcr party hcrcin containcd ha,•e bccn
fulfillcd.
ii By cithcr pnrty nflcr gh·ing fourlccn days wriflcn notice to the othcr party.
4
(IJ) Upon lcrmirrntion of this Agreement, or upon the expiration thcrcof, nll
rights and ol,ligations of the parties hcrcundcr shall ceasc, cxccp~ such rights
and obligations as may have accru cd on the date of tcrmination or
cxpin~tion.
(c) Upon termina lion of tlais Agreement, IJoth parties shall t:ike all riecessary and
rcaso_rrnl>le steps to l>ring the obligations hcrcundcr to a clos.e in a prompt
ancl ordcrly manner.
ARTICLE 11
LA \V APPLICABLE
This Agreement shall IJe governed in ail respects by the laws of the Republic of
Uganda.
ARTICLE 12
LANGUAGE
The l:mguagc :1cconli11g t9, which titis Agreement is to be conslrued, inlerpreted and
irnplcmentcd is English.
ARTICLE 13
SETTLEMENT Oli' DISPUTES
Any dispute or diffcrcnces arising out of this Agreement sh:ill l,e settled amicnbly,
f:tilurc of which it slaall be scttlcd l>y arbitrnlion in ncconhmce with the Àrbitr:ition
Act, of Ug:ind:1.
ARTICLE 14
NOTICES
(a) A notice, rcqucst or consent rcquirctl or permittctl to be givcn or made
(llll"su:111t to. lltis agreement shall be in writing.
5
.,.
Any such notice, rcquest or cQnscnl shnll bc dcemcd to have bcen givcn or
m:uJc when dclivcrcd in pcrson to nn nuthorisec.1 rcprcsentativc of the party
to whom the communication is acJcJressec.l, or whcn sent I,y rcgistercc.l mail,
tclcx, tclcgr:un or fox to such party at the following acJc.lress:-
For fhc ~overnmcnt of the Republic of Ug:mcJa:The
lnspector Gencral of Police,
Police Henclquarters,
P. O. Box 7055
Knmpnln.
Telex 61194 Fax:345035
For the Government of The Dcmocratic Republic of Congo:Thc
nmb:,ss:,c.lor of the Dcmocratic Republic of Congo,
K:uupnl:,
IN \\'ITNESS \VIIEREOF, the nuthorisec.l rcprcscntatives of the parties
lfnve signed this Agreement on the dntc nnd year first nl,ove wrilten.
SIGNJ.t:l>
............................................................................................. , .......... .
(FOR J\ND ON UEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF UGANDN 1
\VITNESS:
........•................................................................................................
SlGNEU:
····································································································•····
..
(FOR AND ON UEHALF OF THE DEl\10CRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO)
WITNESS:
........................... ..... ................. ..
6
-.
'
d 1
DATE:
SUBJ: .
UCMANNEX J
. J
~TH FEbRUARY, 1998
1
.:z::.:~:.;.:..~/_!!ILI!~Hl._!!TUATION IN EASTERN CONGQ-RWENZORI,
.J!AN6A . BULON60_~ENI& Q!~tl~«.J!!AU, ERINGETI,_HAUT-CON60
_ NIA, :BOGORO, BàG!-§~!~ ANl>TCt!ABI (27TH JAN,. - 4TH FEB. 1~81
SOURCE(S) DE~CRlPfilON: MULTI-~OURCE:
Nilitary Co~andets, Government Otfieial, Chiefs and Case Offic~rs f~nd4ngs
. 1 ..
in the Field
1~ RECENT JtINT OPEBATIQNS AGAINST ADF LNALU:
On 31/01 98 UPDF and Army Nationale Congolese (ANC) mounted an oper.ation
1 . . .
in Rwent ri collect1v1ty and hit the enemy at ~!~~~!Y where there were
three enemy amps ~djacent to each other . _UPOF los~ one soldier and two were
1 . • . •
injured. The camps wh1ch were hit are Nging1, Bukira, Busolo, Kasale,
Kighuthu Buhi ~~; : Mu~~~b~, -~~munyu . a~d K~k~_!J~ T~~§a!:~ and !S!i~~,:tf!J' .
are not . et oceupied by the ermy <UPDF + ·ANC>~ ln Bukira most of the
li . -- ····· - . ,·.. . . . .. .. . , ;
rebel le ers àre reported .·to be there. The hit rebel camps territoty
1 - • . • • ·' .... •
ate under the ~ccupation of UPDF and' ANC - Army National Congolese.
1
• 1 In the on~go1ng joint operations of UPDF and ANC aRainst the enemy the
Two Force ar~ ;opêi-ating separately_ - d1ffer.ently~' The~ (UPDF-.and ANC)
are not u der one Central - Commander~ It . is eyJ~~[l~ -~hat. ANC .::-., ~f:~I
have poor Commanders who''iire '1nexperianced Ind .. la'cli"'comniittment.
1 · - - · --\..,.•' '\ • •
There i s ack of f!Elli!!!.!2!.'.! to the guides - reekers - pister., 'in
..,..,c,01., u 11 i. ttrells. rn,s nas aemoral-ised the111 which would jeopardis•
success o the ~peration. The guides are Congolese who identify routes,
paths hid ous a~d time of the enemy to get goods.
There 1 s r porte·d information that UPDF executes del 1berate delays to
keep t he o eration going on due to the operational fùnds they are rec~~yino.
·'
2~ filt_EJIIY LOgATÏONS:
1 • • •
The ~ne~~ À~'.~~ ,/ MAYf , and Interahàm~e operating in the Mounta1ns are
reported ! t~.l~e ~!b!B_AT~· rbov11: LUme whore Vonu Kisokerahio has four
sons who'ar~ ' fighting with him . The Camps are Buhanga, Tunge, Kamunyu,
Kayimbi,: Kafaliso, Lugetsi, Lume and Bu _hira. The enemy i s moving
in the lpwe~ lands· of the Mountains of the ~ational Park with intetions
of escap~ng ·to Bataninge Via River Semuliki. ~ABYB~~! in Semuliki
Valley ip occupied by the enemy.
3. ATTITUDg ON AHC CFORN~!LY AFDL) IN TitE JO!!fl:_OPERATIONS C~LI!!!.:.
There his been propaga~da / belief amongst ANC Soldiers, some of thej~·
Commandtrs that the enemy is for Uganda, therefore they should not die 1
nothingt This led to desertions ·from the battle front by ANC - soldier i
Mid Jan~ary, 1998 25 ANC ran away in Mutwanga leaving Major Kasereka thi
Command,r alone. A road block was set- up at river Semul1k1 - · bridge to
arrest ~hos.e running 1rom the f.-iMt-l ine. ·•
A well placed secur1ty personnel in Beni revea~ed that ~ajor Enti~nne
Kasere~a then Batallion Commander of 105 Batallion based in Beni was an
accomplice :in Lume his home area and led to death of 17 UPDF Soldiers.
1 . •
Kasere~a 1~ a Munande - born in Lume, he is a weak Commandèr who does n
tàke a4tion against hi~ troops who are involved in indis cipline act.
His se,ond in Command C21C) based at Kasindi - Commander Eric Habimana
CNyamu~eng~> is vigilant good at enforcing discipline amongst his troop
;
On ~/0~/98 _Col. Jame~ Kabarebe the Army Chief convened a Me~ting in Ben
and explained to ANC and their Commanders that the enemy in Rwenzori • 1 • • •
Mountattns is nota Ugandan problem às propagattèd by negative elements.
: : ... . ~.-. . ... .. . . - ... .
Col. l<Jaba,:ebe cautioned ,those who .are~not .,flling to fight ·to surrende,
. . . . ' ·P :·. . . ::.- . -. ,_ . . - ·. . . . - . . . . . .
their 1Unif9rm or join the énemy in Rwenzori Hoûntain aware that those
t - · ·~- . • •J .• • who :wiltl join the en"i~mt;.~:Hl be follôwëct there. :This e xplained to ANC
to no~fee !hat t~~v s~oJld fight the war beca~se it i s on Congo
terri1ory.'~. · · · . · · · . . ·, .
Col. Kabarebe toured tr6ni Benj , ._Mutwaniia .and :Kasi.nd1 basically ~o '• . . .. ...
raise ,the !IIOrâle of the·"·arm)/ °in 'thè ·.<:'p~rëtfoiïat · area.
1 .
on 3/2/98_ the're was arrival of a mixture of a new troops - AN.C comprised
of both f~rmÙ eK-FAI and newly recruited ANC - Soldiers.
. '
They wer~1 two batallions for re-enforcing the old batallion which was
based in Aeni. (105 batallion) . The new plan of action was to withdraw the
previouslr fighting batallion and freshly re-deploy the newly brought
2 battaLLli~ns in a bid to flush out insurgency in the Rwenzori Mountains.
The platqo~s and sections were to be based in the operational battle
a rea$ not; : n Beni town as p.rev ious ly wiss the case.
Fifty CSO>
Four whe~l Landcruiser vehicles were brought through Mahagi to pèni ~ean't
for use ~n the operat1onal area. Officers from Kinshasa came with
instructijons to distribute them.
S. ~~ilf_U~E / INOI§gPLlNE.
lt was rjportèd that UPDF in the operat1onal area has exh1b1ted exemplary
descipli e. The Wana1nchi in areas where rebels have been tl~shed out ort
harmonio sly cooperat1ng with UPDF. i.e in Kamango, Buswagha under the
Gommande .. of Major Okcllo rrono1~ io likcd by Chi•fo and W~n•4nch4 •
M(.Cl
bHfi Thil army in the operat1onal~consists majority of EX-FAZ who still
harass W nanch1, rob Wanainchi's property i.e. goats, Chicken, Coftee
and mone. În Maboniyo barracks extortions _are made at semulik1 road
block de and for money is the target from tra~ellers and the public.
On Frida~ J0/1/98 in Lubi~iha Market, ANC-Sold1ers on receipt of their
payment 1n Nwe-Currency notes of Neaveaux Za1re caused chaos in the
market wlich Led to Wanainchi running for their· Life. Money chagers in
the mark t we~e forced to exchange on rates which were not favourable
ta them. The ANC Paying Officer had an interest in pocketing the difference.
·
6 •• BUNIA -H~?' CONGO COR!~!!L?•
There was a COY of ANC - Soldiers stationed in Bunia - Township. This Coy
was of a orce of 39 soldiers. This lett the rest of the vast parts of
Irumu - t rritory empty subject to be sanctuary for the fleeing en~my
from the wenzori mountains which was under pressure 1.e Bagoro, K~enyi,
1 1
..... '·
: ·r>
1
~ st·~t~-~~f
1
~~~b~e '·ter :e:nemy sanctuary ~
-: 1 =1· · · · ,1 : .
. :.,In Bog~ .. u -{habi coltectivit)!, there ate air fields which are used by
small Ae oplanes i.e MAF Missionary Aviation Friendship.
flO!ld dllU T&;lntl.J1 are z:, kms to uganda-tsuna, Dugyo - Rweb1 sengo •border .
The Boga airfield 1s mostly used by ~he Anglican Diocese of
Archibis p GRACE - NJONJO.
There arel §2â displaced Ugandans in Mutwanga in areas of Kikura, Bulongo,
Lume and ~amango. Formerly they were 1914 majoritY. · . have returned to
Uganda.
In Bunia ~own there are 250 Ugandans of 46 famil1es majority are Nubians,
W•~t-Ni Let; and Mo&le1110 ·:,omc of them are w-\ lling to rcturn home.
In Boga, ~~ere ~as formely 3000 Ugandans and Congolese displaced.
Major1ty pave · returned leaving ~~!,Ugandans i.e- 75 men, 100 women,
96 boys and 7t girls of Bamba / Bakonjo tribe at ~!~Y~~iQdQ Budundu Settlement.
The 334 ar _willing all to return home and the easiest way is to use a
helicopter.; 1.e 3 trips because Boga is very far to use the V!h~cle and
i mpassa~_L el
Eastern C~ngo in a potentiel practical market for Uganda products.
The Visa las normal1sed at 20 dollars for Nationals of both Countries,
Tarrifs fr Congo are to be harmonised - Centralised, free- border trade
was encou~aged.and ~asindi_~!!!:~~! was agreed upon to be alternating to
either si1es of the two countries.
; l
'.
1 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
\. .
Note tha~ Boga, Tchabi, Getf,lsula Kasenyi and Bunia are vast parts of
• • 1 ' • 1 1
UKt; ancs U~anCfa border and yet tin: μuntuc'1 enen1y 'f, 0111 the pu, socd c. .cmJ
1
from the dou~ta1ns 1~ travelling along Semulik! River to Kichanga,
Watal1nga ,whÎc~ are void_ of ANC Soldiers. Hence there is need for
deployrnenjs of ANC Soldiers in those areas.
There is ~eed to use a similtaneous military and politisation - mobili-
1
sation aptroach of target groups i.e. Commissar de zones, Chiefs and
Wanainchit
freq~ent lis{ts by the Senior UPDF Officers in the joint operational
area 1s v ~a~. This morale b~u~t.~ Ll,e 1.roop:s ond o:s:sc:sscs the progrcss of
the opera ion.
The issue:of recognition, token to guides is crucial.
' ..
Bunia Staton ~eeds deployment of an Officer prefe~ably under 1 •
1 caver. Th s ofticer should have attributes of tribê.$ bordering there. e.g
Lugbara, . ~rurL, AchoL 1-'o~Jswah:H i s~eaking.
l!g~f:. , · ~~~ nelwork is iniJlae~· it needs facilitation for routine
1 . 1
follow•upl.. j
'1"\.._,.r·j \· ··i.~.· ··- ·u/\.•:..· 1. . . ~' ... .. . ~. .. ,, . .
UCMAN1'
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t.1 •• •

/
UCMANN
PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO AND REPUBLIC ·oF UGANDA ON
SECURITY ALONG THE COMMON BORDER
Upon the invitation of His Excellency the State Minister ·and Minister of
Interior visited Kinshasa from 24Lh till 27'h of April within the framework of ·a
bilateral meeting between the DRC and the Republic of Uganda.
This meeting is a logical follow up the first two which took place in Kinshasa
from the 11 Ui till the 13 Lh of August 1997 and in Kampala from the 6111 till the 7'11
of April 1998.
The two delegations pursued their discussions on the preoccupy
situation that prevails along the common border.
a ln order to put an end to the existence _of the rebels groups
operating on either side of the common border, namely in the
Ruwenzori,
• Whereas the two delegations would like to see their people live
in peace in accordance with the will expressed by the two Heads
of State to guarantee and strengthen peace, security and stability
in the Great Lakes Regions; which are important factors for the
social and economic development;
• Given that an in-depth-analysis of the mi)itary, security and
immigration aspects has been done.
The following two parties agreed as follows:
Conceming the Military
The two parties recognised the existence. of enemy groups which operate on
either sicle of the common border. Coqsequently, the two armies. agreed to
co-operate ~n order to insure security and peace along the common border.
As security services
The two security services concurred on the strengthening of their .co-operation.
In so far as immigration is concerned
Thé two parties agreed to convene a meeting of the relevant authorities in order
to set up an adequate mechanism to allow for free rnovement of people and
goods.
For and on ~e behalf of
the Repubrf~-of Uganda
~
Hon. Tom Butime
Minister of In ternal Affairs
Done in Kinshasa,
For and on the behalf of the
Democratic Republic of Congo
Interîor
.-
,,. UCMANN
C O N F I D E N T I A L
l
UPDF
2 DIV TAC HQS
KASESE •
. THE DIV I.O
2 DIV TAC HQS
TrASESE. 270900c Jun 98
CAPI'URED ADF REBEL, ADF 104; TUKORE FRED.
NAMES: TUKORE FRED
AGE: 25 YRS
RANK: PTE
CAMP: KAMBASA - B'GYO
PLACE OF BIRTH: KITAGATA - MAREMBO
RESIDENCE: KYAKAS! - MUBENDE DISTRICT
S/0: LATE AUGUSTINE KANYA11KOLE
MOTIIER: MARG RET KYOGAMBIRw'E
MARITAL STATUS : SINGLE
DATE 0F JOINING ADF: 17 AUG 97
RECRUITED BY: JOHN MtJHWEZI(BROTHER)
rntroduction:
1. The above mentioned rebel claim to have been recruited into
the rebel camp by his brother J. Muhwezi who owns a local bar and
a shop in the çentre of Kyakasi. These are manned by the wife,
Kedress l{yomuhangi, black with only 2 boy children. This captive
was arrested while on his recce journey to rbanda. He accepts .
having take~ part in the Kit~wamba T/college attack where manystudents
were brutally burnt to death and others abducted.
2. Kitcwamba attack:
According to this rebel captive, . Kitcw~ll;l~S,. ·.wa~ attacked by
a group of .100 r~bels \divided into three(03)' groupa and prongs as
follows:- . .
a. 24 stage~ an, ambush on the way Jto Kitc~amba T/college to
, further a,ct as a . eut~~ : off~forèËtf.: _ .
b . 36 attacked . t~e- t/college with 08· jellicans of petrol
which· they had got from' ·Karugutu. .. ·
c. 41 att~cked~K~oyam:ura~~.~t~ .pf_ .. ~t:~q.. .. . ·- . .
NB :-This grouP. steme_q. ·f!'~m·. Kambasa camp where there 1.s .)
an enemy defence of about · 114 rebels.
- This offensive had Lt Kyarigonza as the overall comdr.
3. commandera:
a. BeDZ .
b. Henry Matovu
n8tt·sccampàf: .
Qverall commander
2ic
1
C O N F I D E N T I A L
strength:
Not known
150
1 .
' " ..
.. :
C-0 NF IDE NT I AL
êommander: nett ~ camps 2: strength:
c. Muhamad ,Muzei Kakuka ".100
1
d. Alex Muktilu Kaindangoma 25
e. Kyeyune Kaindangoma 25
f. Matovu Kabango II 80
g. yusufu Baluku Njrume 97
h. aeofrey l(yalingoza Kamunyu 64
i. Kasimu J'1Eisereka Kabango I 87
j. Cpl Kaweaa Joseph Kambasa 68
According to. this rebel captive, there are very many cmdrs
whose names he had not known. There are two lady comdrs; Kasifa
and -Rose Nabirumbi. Kasifu is about 25 yrs, short, brown, mid size
and a Mukonjo by ·tribe. Rose Nabirumbi is tall, small, chocolate
complexion and a Muganda by tribe. These two ladies are the intelligence
staffs for ADF. Tukore Fred asserta that Kitcwamba
t /college and the'. sorrounding are as were recced· by Kasifa who
spent about 04 days around the same location ••
According to this rebel captive, the following are suspected
enemy hideouts:-1 . xasanz~ hill
2. Kabango 11
3. Butama "
4. Kagugu 11
5. Bunyamwera hills
6. Malindi "
1. Kakuk~ "
All the above bave mo~ile forces codenamed Mobile r,rr •••• vr
with a task·o~ making abductiops for manpower, killing for popular!'
ty ana-i::liscrediting gov•t, âriipping and ambushing own forces to
demoralise our troops and attacking thin manned detts for arms,
uniform and drugs. Theae 06 mobile units· consists of about 25
rebels and dressed in Jja army green uniform for deception; not to
be easily detected by the population.
4. TacticsjMode of attack:
a. A reéce· party of about 04 - 06 rebela dressed either in
civilian or Jja army green uniform conducts this near the targeted
'atrea.
b. rn ·attack, they form either u or L shape which becomes
quite hard for own forces to react adequately as the attacker has
more initiative than the defender.
c. In all cases, they have a eut - off force laying in await
to deny any reinforcement.
5. command and its quality:
rt is only the top brass who are trained but most of the
junoir commanders are not to the sta.JJdard.
2
C O N F I D E N T I A L
1 1
CONFIDENTIAL
~. rntentions and plans:
a. Attaclq.ng thin manned detts of Mpanga bridge, Kamweng,
and Kamw~nge police post, Eitcwamba and the lowlandJ' pppulate<
areas1 purposely to make enough abductions, get life eesentia:
and forceful solicitation of support from the local populatio1
b. Recruiting up to 2000 who will be used to launch biggE
attacks after 04 months.
c. Getting more collaborators and sympathizers who will
ease their supplies and routes.
d. Making. an alliance with the Mai-Mai and other rebel
a lement.s around the great lakes region and plan ar.d opera te
massively; capturing, dominating and holding ground. ;
e. Acquiring more high ranking army officers from FAZ- Ne
so far as collaborators from this aide are: col ~bamba (Beni)
and col Mayala·, Bde comdr Bunia·. The se are to act as a go-bet.,,
the rebels and. the DRC 1gov 1 t for logistical support and sactué
in case the going becomes tuff.
7. ADF Routes:
a. Bunyamwera
b. Kilamia - Rwenzori f~rest - Kaeese or Kabarole
c • Kagugu - Kakuka - DRC ·• ..
d. Kagugu - Bulimba - Butama - Kabango - Kasanzi finally
to Bwamba bills.
e. MPOCha forest - .Ibuga - Rugendabara - Rwesanda - Kanya
Mbata - Ndara - B'gyo or DRC.
f. River valleys of Ruimi, semuliki, Nyamugasani, Hululu
through Q.E.1': .P at points between L• Edward and B\·:era
Mpondwe border town( The }O'abinyonge park route).
NB: The enemy at times cuts and creates new routes side ~
side to old onee dodging deployments on the ground.
8. Enemy composition:·
a. ttuslim fundamentalists
b. rnterahamwe (Th~ defeated ~orees)
c. Fresh recruits(abductees)
d. sudanesë fundamentalists.
9. Collaborators:
a. JOHtSON MUGABI - Nyankole by tribe.
- Has a family in Kabingo before UEB sté
- Has a farm in Mabonwa few kms to MbârE
- Has a wholesale merchadise shop in thE
of ttbarara.
- Ras a bedford Reg No. UXL 167 with al
bonnet and cream coloured body which i
always seen in ADF camps bringing logi
and other supplies. This bedford tippe
often garaged at the t/centre after KJ
3
C O N .F I D E N T I A L
b. Y..AFERO MATIYA
c. BYANYIMA ASUMA~
10. Arms & Ammos:
C O N F I D E N T I A L
The driver is tall, black about 35yre with
a long beard.
Johnson Mugabi is short, fat, brown and about
43:yrà of age. He is believed to have a star
pietol which be got from ADF in May 98. Among
items he passes over to ADF are:-
Recruits and Transport.
uniform as on 18 May 98 using a minbus Reg No
UXF 128.
Monay and civiliaLn clothes.
He ie the head - co-ordinator of the weste»n
region. He also provides info to the rebel
leaders like Matovu.
Johnson Mugabi claims to be a protestant but
reality a moslem.
- A taxi driver of minibus 543 UDB·
- He atays in Katsyamba 10kms on ~ubende Rd.
- Has a conductor by the names of Byakatonda
uman short, brown and about 25 yrs .old.
- (Kamwenge)
He is a Kiiga by tribe
- He haa a w/talkie and often communicates wi·
comdrs of ADF• He uses a call sign 1769. He
bas a radio charger and ia resposible for
charging of all A.DF radios.
He acts as a link between ADF camps and the
lowlands for food, medicine and providing
info on own forces _deployments.
- SMG approx 3000 - 4000
- LMGs
RPGs
- MGL
- G2
- 60mm Mortar ·
1
11. conditions· favouring ADF:
: .
a. MOSt places are rich in food
b. plenty of water
c. Terrain· (Nature of the landsca~e) . .•
·, ,, 1 ..
12. Logistical Ba6kup - support:
a. Kenya(u"-1e.rificd)
b. DRO C Conf ,~c:0 ·
c. Sudan(11 : 11)
d. WithiD - uganda collaborators (Col'\rrm.d)
1
suggestions &'. aecommendatione:
a. nomina ting ~ all food are as and thOlS8 which cannot be dorninated
be destryed.
4
C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I . ... .11 JJ
i p. Blocking all supply routes and sources
c.·Mobilisinglthe population to reduce on collaboration.
d. Tightenin~ .secur~ty of docs, pers·, property, eqpts througt
constant inspections. · .
e. nevelopinglnew tactics - becoming more offensive than
defensive. l
f. Mountainn mopping • .
g. Eliminating a.11 chances and means of ADF making alliances
with other ·rebel factions in the great lakes region by
keeping them apart.
h. rncreasing the dette strength to avoid being submerged.
i. All levels of leadership should get committed and put alot
of effort to resolving this insurgency.
Tukore Fred should face the Law of the LS-Dd. He took part in
the Kitcwamba attack on 08.06.98 where many students were brutally
burDt to death and :others abducted.
The execution and success of the above may see the end of the
rebellion and insurgency in the western zone.
1 1
solidarity,
5 and last
PK RUBA1'1IHA
2 Lt
I/C INVESTIGATIONS DE
2 DIV TAC HQ KASESE.
/
C O N F I D E N T I A L
UCMANNEX :
THE REPUOLIC Or UOANDA
STATEMENT BY
H.IE. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
PRESIDE.N'l1 OF THE REPUBLIC OF
UGANDA
ON
BACKGROUND TO THE
SITUATION IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION
9 August 1998
Harare/Zi1nbabwe
STATEMENT BY
H.E. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
UGANDA
ON
1. "UGANDA'S1NVOLVE'AfENTIN1WE
WARS OF THE GREAT LAIOES
REGION"
2. . 'VEALINGS WITH H.E. L. IvOEILA"
9 August 1998
Harare/Zi1nbabzve
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. FRONASA ................................................................................... 1
2. AFTERMATH OF AMIN'S REGIME .................................•.......... 2
3. THE REBELLION IN RWANDA .................................................. 3
4. BACKGROUND TO THE ZAIRE (CONGO REBELLION) ......... 5
1996/97
5. DANGER OF TARGETING ETHNIC GROUPS .....................• 16
UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WARS IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION AND MY DEALINGS WITH H.E.
L. KABILA.
Our involuntary involvement in the conflicts of the Great
Lakes Region beyond Uganda, starts, probably, in 1976.
FRONASA:
Since 1971 , FRONASA had been helping us in fighting ldi
Amin through the clandestine· r~cruitment of young pp~i~S
they took them ta either Tanzania or the liberated areas of
Mozambique for training.
Between 1976 and 1978, 1, as a n1ember of FRONASA was
responsible for preparing one of such batches of trainees
at Monte puez in Mozambique. ln the process of gathering
that particular group in Nairobi, three young boys W(?,re
sent tome from Uganda by one of my comrades, Kahinda
Otafiire. One of the young boys was, as it turned out, a
son of Rwar:,desè refugees that had been in Uganda since
1959 ,. being part of the Diaspora tJ1at was generated by the
first genocide in Rwanda of 1959, by Belgians. The boy
was Fred Rwigyema (guerre de nomme)- alias Gisa.
The other two were Ugandans. This particular group that 1
trained in Montepeuz, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique,
comprised of twenty eight fighters. Needless to
state our eternal gratitude to FRELIMO and late Comrade ·
Samora Machel , for this.
1
T~~ MqD.t~p~e~ group.help~q me in c~eating a force of ni~.e.
thousand fighters (by April 1979) that took part alongs1de
our Tanzani~n brot~ers. (who put in ~ _forçe .of Jorty-.fi.ve.
thousand officers a~d ·mèn) in ·exp·elling~ A'rràri"" and 'hÎs~
criminal army, from Ug.anda.
AFTERMATH OF AMIN'S REGIME:
After the ousting of Amin, Uganda had an interim period of
two years of political confusion and, eventually, the rigged
elections of ·1980. We, as revolutionaries, cou Id not
accept another round of rigging elections. This had been
the fa if ure of the constitutional dispensation of the 1960s.
We launched our second war of liberation, this tin1e on
our own without external support being prin1ary; different
from the first anti-Amin war.
Starting with twenty-seven rifles, we eventually, built up a
force of twenty thousand rifles, mainly captured from our
opponents in the Obote regime. We, however, got a
modest contribution of nine hundred rifles from President ·
Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Towards the ·end of.1985, ·we . . .
got a sizeable contribution of five thousand rifles from
Mwalimu Nyerere, just before he retired . We had repaired
our earlier misunderstandirigs with Mwalimu by this time. ·
2
We shall never forget such brotherly gestures from our
Tanzanian brothers.
By Jan·uary 1986, the National Resistançe Movement took.
contrai of State power in Uganda:. ln the sixteen years,
since· the seizure of power by ldi Amin in 1971, eight
hundred thousand Ugandans had. died in extra-judicial
murders.
By absorbing the myriad of security forces of the previous
armies, militi,a.m~n _pl~s tr~.~n ·x~.crujtmeht,· wë. ·.bui,r::ç~~ir.:
force to one hundred thousand.officers and rnén in cirder
to try and cape with the unstable situation in our ~re~ ..
(Sudan, Mobutu's Congo, and others).
THE REBELLION IN RWANDA:
ln our new army, in addition to Fred Rwigyema, the young
Rwandese boy of 1976 (by that time a Major-General in our
Army), there were_ ~bout four thousand other officers and
men of Rwan_~ese origin - either part of the Diaspora of
1959 .or earlier immigrants that had started coming to ·
Uganda since 1910, mainly due to ha~sh Belgian rule or
simply in search of econon1ic opportunities. ln addition to
the Rwandese of the Diaspora and the Rwandese
immigrants, there is a small community of Ugandans of
Rwandese culture that had been incorporated in Uganda,
as there were Rwandese of Ugandan culture (Nkole-l<iga) ,
3
that had been put in Rwanda by the colonial boundaries.
However, the Ugandans of Rwandese culture did not
participate in the fighting that developed -in Rwanda, fater.
Four thousand. soldiers of the Rwandese origin in the
National Resistance Army of Uganda, started organizing
un der Fred ·Rwigyem~. The·y tofd me of their intention tà
organize to regain their rights in Rwanda, which had been
nuflified ever since the 1959 genocide. Uganda rendered
some modest financial assistance to these Rwandese
soldiers but on condition that they exllausted political and
diplomatie channefs such as: petitioning the United
Nations organization, the Organization of African Unity,
the neighbouring countries and olhers, before resorting to
a military struggle.
ln October, 1990, however, these Rwandese soldiers,
without prior consultation, escaped enmasse and invaded
Rwanda while I was in USA, atlending tll~ U.N. Conference
on the "Year of the Child". 1 immediately, contacted the late
President Habyarimana of Rwanda and offered to assist
him in restoring peace in Rwanda, provided he also agreed
to have a dialogue with the Rwandese in the Diaspora,
leading to a · national agreement to elimin~te the
consequences of the genocide of 1959.
Numerous efforts were made to realise a dialogue between
late President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in Mwanza,
Arusha, Kyanika and others but there was no political will ·
1
4
to conclude this problem. The war continued . Faced with
this fait accomp/ïsituation by our Rwandese brothers, who
had invaded Rwanda without consultation, Uganda decided
on a two course action: ·
1. TO help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), materially,
so that they are not defeated because that would have
been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and
would not have been good for Uganda's stability.
2. To encourage the dialogue between President
Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the Diaspora.
Unfortunately, the agreement did not occur. The fighting
went on until the demise of President Habyarin1ana, the
collapse of the Habyarimana Government a_nd the
genocide of about one million people.
BACKGROUND TO THE ZAIRE (CONGO) REBELLION
1996/97
AfJer the defeat. of ..the Hutu reactionaries, about one
- million Hutu refugees fled to Gama in Zaïre (now Congo).
Along them, went the whole former army of ~wanda (FAR)
and the criminal Hutu militias that had killed people in
Rwanda known as the lnterahamwe.·:the latè P·resident
Mobutu Ssese Sseko decided to.ke.ëp.thi.s mob right at the
border, contrary to the UHffëël1 .'J\faffofis' ·regulatfons
5
thereby posing a permanent danger to the population of
Rwanda. Uganda and Rwanda called for the separatiqn o'f
armed elements from the hon-combatants, to no avail/ This
set the stage for .events that I will narrate later involving
Congo-Kinshasa, then Zaire.
However, let me go back a bit to recollect .my interaction·
with. H. E. Laurent Kabila. Soon after our yictory of 1986,.
Mr. Kabila came to see me in Entebbe. This was the first
time for me to meet hirn. He was coming out of Tanzània
where he had, apparently, lived. While in Tanzania, during
the anti-Amin struggle, 1 had lleard of Mr. Kabila, having·
some bases in the eastern mountains of Congo, around
Kalemie, but I had never met him. He was introduced to
me, by a Tanzanian Intelligence officer that I had known by
the names of James Nzagi. Mr. KabHa warJted me to give.
hin1 arms to fight Mobutu. 1 told him two things:
1. Uganda would not allow him to start operations on the • ,. , .,..... • • *. •
Uganda-Congo ~order! given the prejudice that existed
in the reg ion against us having corne to power through a
protracted peoples' struggle. · Sorne of the leaders
thought that we were a bad example and that we would
influence their own people; ·
ln any case, at that time. th~ late Presiden.t Mobutu had
not yet given ùs c·auseto' \Ai~int~t9~·figtÎ't 'hffn.ltJtl~i trué·;he
6
was .nJismanag!ng qongo; bl:Jt it.was.n9t our duty to .solv
interhal 'prôbîems'oi ôttîer êot.i'ntries . . s·es .. ides,' we 'di
··.· . . .. .
not want to intensify that prejudice; · ~=...
. .
2. 1 offered to give hin:, a few rifles if he cou Id get a way c
officially transporting them through Tanzania to hi
traditional base a.round Lake Tanganyika - that i~
beyond Burundi. ln order to do this, H.E. Presiden
Mwinyi's consent had to be sought. Mr. Kabila
however, failed to secure President Mwinyi':
concurrence . We, therefàtef, did not proceed ôîi'.J_t:l.E
question of arms but I gave him a modest financia
contribution a part from lin king him with the Libyans te
see if they cou Id a·ssist him in a·ny way without 1nvofvin~
Uganda.
When, however, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)
captured· power in Kig~li, in 1994, M.r .. K.~. "b'• ila. returned to
Uganda. By this time, the problem of the Hutu menace had
emerged on the Rwanda border with Congo .. l, therefore,
advised fy1r. Kabila to \vo'rk\viff{ thê'-,Rwanaése b.~cau~e
they had a sharper quar"rer with President Mobutu thâri
ourselves, the fac~ .~~at_ M.2.putJr.WJ~s::.by~}ù)w.· in .éièti_ve
collaboration withthe Sutia,,-e·ie,· notwithst'andiï1g . .
There was another Congolese who had contacts with me,
by the names of Kissasse Ngandu (the late) whom I also
referred to our Rwandese brothers. My aides forwarded
7
both Mr. Ka bila and Mr.· Kissasse to the Rwandese Vice
President, Major-General Kagame.
Apparently, M~jor-General Kagame tasked the two
brothers to recruit a force of Zaïrois (Congolese) to be
trained by the Rwandese and be kept as a stand-by force
to be used in case President Mobutu unleashed the Hutu
criminals on the people of Rwanda for another round of
genocide.
According to later inforrnation, Mr. Kabila and Mr.
Kissasse did not succeed in raising the necessary
manpower. When l later met Major-General Kagame, he
informed me of his frustrations. Then, an idea oc~urred to
,ne. 1 had heard that forty thous_and Masisi Tutsis of
Congo's Kivu province had beeri hunted out of their
ancestral land by the Hutu reactionaries and President
Mobutu's gangs; and had taken refuge in Rwanda.
1, then, sugg·ested to Major-General Kagame to recruit a
force of about one thousand two hundred soldiers from
among the Masisi Tutsis, train them and make them part of
the Rwanda Patriotic Ar.my, in order to keep them as a
stand-by .force. Major-General Kagame liked the idea. ln
fact, thereafter, 1 forgot about- it; but Vi-ce . President
Kagame went ahead and operationalised the idea.
Meanwhile, the stalemate of the Hutu criminals and the
8
masses whom they had stampeded across the border
persisted and grew worse. H·avii'fg·_·_-ë·ariièd-· out · thff
g~no.~idè : · agàinst the Tutsis·. in . R\vanda, . the Hufu i
reactioriariëà rf6w\,varited to do the-same in Kivu Province.
of Congo actively sùppoi·tèd by Mobutu's adn1i,nistraji~1i/
They had already uprooted the ~Aasisi Tuts(a·s aÏreâcJy
pointed out. They now he~ded for another group· known as· .
the Banyamulenge, around Uvira. This must n~ye ~-e~p
a round. Aügùst 1996 or thereàboùt. The next timè Ï nïët ·
Major-General Kagame, he informed me that he had,
actually, trained a group of two thousand rather than the
one thousand two hundred we had talked about. He now
sought rny opinion regarding how they cou Id be utilized in
view of all the chaos in the Great Lakes Reg ion.
1, then suggested to H.E. Kagame, that it would be better
for us to contact Mwalimu Nyerere on the issue in order to
avoid the isolation we had experienced from the other
African countries du ring the Rwandese conflict. H.E. Vice
President Kagame concurred with nie and 1, accordingly, ·
contacted Mwalimu Nyerere and briefed him about the
force of twô th-ousand and the thre~t to the Banyamu~enge.
He informed me that he would invite·the European Union
Ambassadors to enlist their support. He duly called them
but, of course , they must have filed reports to their
headquarters and that was that, since the d~nger of
genocide of the Banyamulenge persisted. lt w~s·at that
stage, that the Rwandese brothers,'decided to send in the • . •• .. ;·~ .. •.:..:~ '··:!·-: .. • ,: ; . .. .; .. , .
9
force of two thousand ta defend the Banyamulenge and.,
la ter on, help in disry,antling the c.a.~p~_Ç)f the crimin~ls in. . .. . . .
the Bukavu and Gama areas. ·Appare"ntly, thëY 'r"ë·ctüited
a nç,the(_ . two·. t.hoffsand. fig htê'ri/·:·., from· ., ··aïîiôri~f-~·· th-~::·.
Banyamùlenge, ·rùtsis arid other Côngàlese of Rwandes~·.
cultt..ire·~.: The Rwandese can tell the story better at this
stage.
However, according to what the Rwande~e told rrie, i~_i,~..-
this force of four thousand that defë"rided the ~ills :of.
Mulenge, liberated Uvira, Bukavu and Gomà;·'··As ..t t:i-~~~,g.
tow.~s ...w ~~:.t _~11ïn~_,, -,t~--~-~:~~(~~.g-~J~.. --'.DIB..r.~.~:~. ~ ~r~)~-?~-,~?~~;.
had now brought four groups of Congolese together: · tfie·
four thôusan·d or ·sa· Cài,-golësë fightérs···of Rwiüïaèisë;
. . ... . ... ... • . . .·· . .. ... .... ,. ....... .
culture, Mr. Kabila, Mr. Kissas·se (the late) arid ariothef:
gentleman of the Bashi tri be knowr, as Masa$U (in p-ri.s on) ... ·. ;
This is how the word "Alliance" wa·s used in desig.nating ·
their organization; it was the "Alliance'' of the four or sb
groups. At this stagé·, through frater·nal ·cont~cts, ~numbèr
of African èoûntries likê Zimbabwe, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Zallibia and Uganda,. gave·. materlal Sl:1PPO~i; . . ,·
Angol-a, even contributed troops, and Tanzania, later gave
the "Alliance" training personnel.
Congo, having been a hunting ground for ·prafits for so
rnany external interests, there was intensive press1,re ta
influence events as the struggle proceed~d. We tried our
best to galvanize African opinion. 1 remember in the early
10
days of that conflict I briefed Their Excellencies: Mandela,
Mugabe and Chissano in South Africa about this Congo
situation which they had not known much about.
Progressive African opinion was galvanized. ln particular,
1 knew that the posit,ion of H.E. Mandela was ·very
important. The major danger to Congolese liberation, ever
since the days of Lumumba, had been external antidemocratic
involvement
ln recent times, some European circles had assumed the
vanguard raie of frustrating the peoples' aspirations. lt
was clear tome that there were only four deterrents to such
Europeans' negative involvement:
(a) they feared a protracte.d peoples' struggle, Vietnam
style if the Congolese could organize it; the
Congolese had, however, failed once before in the·
1964-.::-1966 Congo war in spite of considerable
solidarity from Africa and the Communist bloc;
(b) they would be cautious of-American wishes - in this
case the Americans wanted rylobutu to go but they di~
not favour Mr. Kabila; they wanted a thir~ force; .
( c) to some extent they feared the man if est. unpopularity
of Mobutu . However, the popularity, or otherwise, of
Mobutu's regime had never been a major factor in
Congo ever since the days of Lumumba; Lumumba
11
had been the most popular politician but he had been
deposed and, then, killed with impunity; and
(d) these exter,nal forces feared going against South
Africa because of the rather hi-tech weapons that
South J\frica commands; These European circles
knew that if African freedom fighters g.9t tf'Jose
. weapons, and progressive Africa was unanimous, the
battle-field would be levelled unlike in the past when it
was never levelled. :
shared all these views with the corn rades· that. were
involved including H.E. Kabila and H.E. Kaga111e. 1 was,
therefore, ~ost surprised when H.E. Kabila refused_to go
to H.E. Mandela's ship in the Atlantic, citing security
reasons. This worried rne and I invited Mr. Kabila to
Uganda. We had discussions for hours on this one subject
and, then, parted. To rny amazement, H.E. Kabila refused
to return the second time; and when I contacted him on
satellite telephone, he engaged me in a shouting match on
the telephone.
Fortunately, for the struggle, events were moving fast.
After thè Banyamu/enj]°~:.nç!.Q,:.~-~pturé·d 'Gbma~· B'ùkàvu and
Uvira, assisted by troop$~.o.fJb.e.._Rw~'f,d.~_rf A:rrnY.1.· ~.rnassi.ve
recruitm~nt of figh\èr$ '::fr_om" ôth'ér. ~:".Cofrgê>lese·: .. tribes_,·,
started. As the training· proceeqëë(thè fightirig:·c;ontiiï.,Jëd·;
being executed, mainly, · :tiy ftfe· · ·Rtt~h'dan ·· army, ÜÙ:;
12
Banyamule(lge and <?ommanded by a young officer, py the · .
na mes qf James Kabareebe of the Rwanda Pâtriotic Army."·
(RPAf Apparently, that young officer had been recruited
and trained in Uganda by the Tanzania Training Team· that
had be~n assisting us in Jinja. As time went on, more and
more Congolese fighte rs from tribes other than the
Banyamulenge joined the fight after the training. , 1 w~~tt
however, worried about the direct involve·ment of thë.
• .• • • .. • • • • ····.:;:,1 ·, · .· ... ... } -· ... - · ·~ •'':.",'". ·,,'j ' 1::;···:""":·::-:-:-;-:-··:', .... ~·{ff·,"'.:~-,r--J,
Rwandése troops in the-'êombafrblê. l'r:frefe'rrèd that the'y·
only remain in a train'in·g r'oie. ln.factat'oriè 'time·:·1 alniost' .
succeeded in getting H.~: Kag_a,rne to withdraw th~m~:
However, H.E. Kabila resisted this; a move, 1 did no,t l_iké
because, even in our own experi~r,ce in 1978/79, 1 did not
support the invqlvement of Tanzanian troops in the combat
raie in Uganda beyond the. retaliâtiô'if agairisCAr11ir)'s ·
invasion of the Kagera salient.· 1· war·Ùed us to fight for
.... ., ....... .,.~ • , •:,,"'r..-:~1,, .. 1 ' , t l· , ·• , ourselves. When we supported RPF, We never allowed our
troops to play a direct ~~mbat r?.le e>Ççept)n limitetj;
retaliatory strikes again~t _:. tja~y~fimana'.~~:·.Ar.my. for
• . ,_.-'\t .• ..,, • • • ' • • .. -·71, ,' •; ,~ . indiscriminate shelling ofcivilia·n · h·amlets>::and·. villages.
This has ?lway? been our po§i!!QD .. QhJht:fSüdarY:~~ç~p~ la~.t.
year, March -April, when we Wer.e-'forcedt6-take de:cisive . .. ·~~-·-4-., .. •• (' ::. .. .. .. .• ,J
action against the Suda('!~~8..,q.ffQY.J?. .. ~.9fl}:!.~~.9~,Ûf.T}.ÎJL~1
terrorist attacks on civilians in Nor_tbg.rn Ugàri.dâ;.Y.Y_~st ~il~
• • ~ ç. ~a .. ..,.• 't•"" "t • • ., .. •-r. ... - - ·-.- -· • .... , • .,,. and also Rwenzori mountain·s·go1ng·1hrough~·Mobutu s
Congo. We also destroye·d the Sudanese armv in Western
Equatoria be cause. th.e..v . w·ere:~d!_oecri.y:_" t.hr.P.ateriiruf jfte
. . . ,' .. ,.,. ~ ~._t".t,t,••"'11.•"'~·~·.,·· !".. , . • Rwandese troops in Congo andttîë';Côhgolese treedom
13
fighters from their base~ in Kaaya, Baazi, Morobo and
otl1er;{ . Ag~În,··this was limited; not·aimed at iristalli.ng Dr.
Garâng .. in· povv°er, in Sudan . .
1 feared two ·situ_ations in using outside troops, even the
fratefr1\al orïë·s:
(a) lt artificially distorts the outcome of the conflicts; one
gets _artificial "winners" and "lasers"; the political
problems, therefore remain unresolved because the
winners win artifici~lly and the "lasers", lose
artificially. This cou Id, however, be compensated for,
if the artificial "winners", brought in all the legitimate,
political forces so th~t they all plan for theJuture,
together. If, however,· one co.mbines a ·sêè'n"'ario\>(
"artificial winners" and poJitical exclu s.iqn, one is
setting a stagP for. f~t~~e politi~c;1I . P~9.-RL~}!!~.;..
Furthermore,-sihëe somëbÔdy.is relying··on extèrn.â(
support prima.rily,, he negl~_cts internai, polj,tical
in~egration}:; ·~~,ë ··neg.leas ~~ -aking the neC(is's\iry
compromise internally because he is relying on
external support to muffle internai fissures.
(b) The internai lit?~r.~tt9.[ffo}·_çe,s· Q.o .~ot.bμiJ.cf capacity.
However, my opinion was not acêepted\ es.pecially by
H. E. Kabila. 1 ncidentally, this usedto be one of the ..
differences between Obote and myself during the
anti-Amin struggle.
14
.Furthermore, from · the little I cou Id gather, th.e. Jack .o.f
structures· and . lack . of · broad· represent~ti.o~ in the
"Alliary.ce", yva.s 'J!Orrying: Since this was quite a big war,
involving regional troops, 1 was of the opinion that a
nation·a1 conference of ail anti-Mobutu political forces
should have been organized into an ultimate body that
would select the future government of Congo instead of
leaving it to the "Alliance", whose internai mechanisms of
decision-making, were not known tous. My fear was that
any future complications in Congo would be blamed on the ·.
regional leaders that, without doubt, decisively and
quickly, tilted the balance of forces in favour of
H.E. Kabila and the "Alliance".
Therefore, just before the fall of Kinshasa, 1 suggested the
idea of holding a national conference of ail a:iti-Mobutu
political forces, to H.E. Bizimungu, H.E. Mkapa, Mwalimu
Nyerere and H.E.Kagame. The majority of them, however,
thought it was a "bit late" and that we should remain "close"
to H.E. Kabila, "advïsing" him and so on. 1 was, however,
not interested in the role of "advisor" to (H~E~Kabila,
because the few times I had tried to "advise" him, he
appeared to resent my advice. He only ;"aavi~J~d": ·mE:fto ·
get involved in the internai affaît$..J~f C.ong9;--9n his ~ide
when I preferred not to be; but he rës.ented ttïe "few· pieces
of advice" that I proffered to h.irn.as·."int.erferen~e in his
internai affairs".
15 .
Sim •."1 that tir,:1e. l.Jg_and~·~ only involv,em~nt in. Congo, was~:
to send a ..,once tramnino team followinci the oeëis,ôn of the
. - - . -- -- -· .
HararA Breakfast Grouï::ï, to train the Congolese in riot . . . . · - - --- - . .
contrai.. Recent1y, however, 1 neard that rresn tension vvas .
mounnng with H.E. Ka.bila falling outwith the very allies he
had started off the struggle with, in Kigali a11d Gomà, last
year. That is when I suggested this meeting during the
S'ADC Forum, in Namibia. 1 am glad Your Excellencies
agreed to the meeting.
DANGER OF TARGETING PARTICULAR ETHNIC
GROUPS.
May I end by painting out one particular danger. The
danger of targeting particular ethnie groups whenever we
face political challenges. We, Ugandans, have
experienced this situation. 1 reject this type of politics. lt is ·
not possible for the whole ethnie group to be bad or good.
There ar~ good and bad people in each ethnie group.
Then why talk of th is ethnie group and that ethnie group?
To do so, in my opinion, is to abdicate our legitimacy,
whatever the initial source of that legitimacy. When we
accept leadership of diverse nations, we must doit without
any equivocation. To start saying that the whole of this
natural identity group is like this or that, is to abdicate our
duty and, therefore, ou r legitimacy.
16
ln my opinion, it is not too late to re-launch the democratit
movement in thé Congo, doing what we should have donc
before the fall of Kinshasa·. If H. E. Ka bila agrees, . th1
different Congolese political tendencies could convene é
conference in an agreed venue and hammer out a national
interim compromi_se, pending popular elections thatwoulc
decide the future leadership of the country. Even t.hos1
surviving members of the Alliance who have split and an
now fighting H.E. Kabila should be·engaged in a dialogUE
supported by the region. Political issues should bE
resolved by political dialogue. Violence, should only bt
reserved for dealing with those that seek to destroy é
popularly agreed constitutional dispensation .
... .
YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
PRESIDENT OF THE R.EPUBLIC OF UGANDA
8 August, 1998
Harare/Zimbabwe
17
UCMANNEX22
HRW Alarmed About Hate Radio Broadcasts and the Incitement of Ethnie Violence
in tbeDRC
Human Rigbts Watch calls on
the government of the DRC
to guarantee the rights and
protect the safety of ethnie
Tutsis who are in its custody
or are living in areas under
its control. We urge the
government to graot the
International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) and
the DRC Field Office of the
U.N. Righ Commissiooer for
Human Rights full access to
the detainees in accordance
with international standards.
(New York, August 13, 1998) -
Human Rights Watch today
expressed alann about the
increasing use of ethnie hate
propaganda by officiais of the
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). Officiais rely on hate
radio to rally popular support
against the current rebellion in the
country and to further an ethnie
witch hunt in the capital
Kinshasa. Human Rights Watch
also expressed deep concem
about reports of wide-scale
abuses, looting and anned robbery
Related Mate.r ial
HRW Condemns Recruitment of
Child Soldiers in Congo
HRW Press Release, August 11,
1998
HRW Urges Ail Sides In Congo To
Refrain From Attacks On Civilians
HRW Press Release, August 5,
1998
Goverrunents Urged To Stop The
Use OfChild Soldiers
HRW Press Release, June 30, 1998
in the rebel-controlled town of Bukavu.
Radio broadcasts on August 8 from a goverrunent regional radio in
the eastem town ofBunia monitored by the BBC called on the local population to use "a machete, a
spear, an arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones, and the
like, in order, dear listeners, to kill the Rwandan Tutsis." On Wednesday the 12th, a local commander
of the Congolese army called on Bunia residents to "take revenge" on the Rwandans and "massacre
them without mercy."
The DRC goverrunent bas accused the smaU minority ofCongolese ethnie Tutsis ofleading the
current rebellion and credibly alleges that Rwanda has invaded its territory in support of the rebels.
This stimulation of ethnie hatred by government officiais raises serious human rights concems
because of its sadly well-proven record for triggering large-scale kiJlings. Hate radio broadcasts
prepared the stage for the 1994 Hutu-led genocide in neighboring Rwanda against the minority Tutsi
population in which at least half a million were killed. The conflict spilled over in neigbboring DRC,
contributing to the destabilization of the country and the spread ofpolitical violence in its eastem
provinces ever since. Ethnie bloodletting continued on Congolese territory during the 1996-97
military campaign tbat brought President Kabila to power when bis former allies reportedly
massacred thousands ofunarmed Hutu refugees in apparent retribution for the 1994 killings in
Rwanda. ·
Human Rights Watch views with deep concem the continuation of the ethnie witch hunt in the capital
Kinshasa. Hundreds of ethnie Tutsis continue to be detained in Kokolo military camp in Kinshasa,
and hundreds more are beld in unknown places. The increasing use of bate propaganda by DRC
officials exposes these detainees and other Tutsis to potential ill-treatment and even random killings
as the public may interpret these messages as prior approval or a guarantee of impunity if they were
to engage in such atrocities.
Human Rights Watch received credible reports from rebel-held Bukavu about atrocities committed by
rebel soldiers against residents during a house-to-bouse search in the "Essence" neighborhood. Rebel
soldiers were looking for alleged infiltrators from the anti-rebel Mayi-Mayi warrior groups. Widescale
looting and armed robbery were also reported by town residents as well as by departing
bumanitarian workers. The offices and warehouses of a bumanitarian agency in Bukavu were looted
by soldiers who held employees at gunpoint and threatened to kill them.
Human Rights Watch calls on the govemment of the DRC to guarantee the rights and protect the
safety of ethnie Tutsis who are in its custody or are living in areas under its control. We urge the
government to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the DRC Field Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights full access to the detainees in accordance with
international standards. The govemment should also facilitate the departure of ethnie Tutsis who wish
to leave the country. We urge the rebel authorities to guarantee the rights and safety of civilian
populations in areas under their control and to abstain from any attacks on rights defenders and
community leaders in these areas.
Human Rights Watch calls on the international community to assume its full responsibility in taking
firm steps to denounce abuses against civilians by ail parties to the present conflict in the DRC, and
to hold perpetrators ofsuch abuses responsible.
iEi.fGAAMS : , UGADEM86,SSYM
F.61.001·212·3723516
!NA"lr'CCARESPQl(;ENoeON
THIS SUBJECT :>LEASE CUO TE N' .... !{.UU.U., .•
UCMANNEX23
. ~-· . . ::. ·.·,EMBASSY OF J8!.:.:-::L1C OF UGANDA "fa K!NSHASAICONGO
TNt RCPUDIJC OF UOAl<OA
Thr. E~baasy of th~ Republic of Uganda presaota ~ts . co~plicencs to the Minietry
of Foroign Affaire of the Democratic Repùblic of Congo and ho• the nonour to atrngly pro·
test to the lacccr on th~ tollowing' inhumàn treatmenc of Ucaud3 diplomate, .uid national~
At Ndjili
0 Intei;Q&tf.onal Airpotf on .August 20, 199.8: :
· Durinc the evaculltf.on of ~evenceen Ugand1.ne accomp,nied '!!y Uganda df.plo111atee an,
Congoleee Protocol Officer from the Ministry of Foreigo Affair3; ,~me ele111ente of .Congo!,
Arrued Forces atacLoned ac the Airport decained and inhWllanily 111i1traated the uaandane an,
tho protocol officer for. ov.er three houra. lnepite o! ucplanatiou by t ~,e rrotocol Offic•1
that the evacuation was· authorised by ·tho co111pètent · authority1 the ,oldiorl rafuaed to
~llow tha 611\oot~ cvacuatioo. lnstead, they brutal~y be~t, inaulted &0.d 1pat on ·e~é- Ugand1
and Congol~ae Protocol Officer f~r .t he dur.a t.i. ,o, ..n.· . ..o. f t.h e detention.
. • . -.r.- ..
Before tho eoldiera re1uctant1y allowed .the evacuation to take place, they '
r ..
forcetully removed money, ocher valuablea such aa .. ~ecklaces, watehu and in a.om, c~eu
bU.d cases troni the Ugandan~ . Accordingly, the E111basay feared to concloue vith t~e eracustion
until adequate ~ecurity meaeuree are provided for the exercice.
ln thie connection, the Embaesy wiebe, to .r•quoat the Miniatry, a• it éid initi~
lly in ite lettar of requeat for ov~cuation to cha M1n1Dt~t of Stata fer Incornal Aff
~hich vas copied to the Min1stry among othera, for appropriate eecurity to en4bla the a•
co111plec:1on of the evacuation exercice. The Embessy will appreciate if the above re'lueat
urgontly conaidered and it i,$ 'lnformed of •t, he outc0tue ._, aoon u possible.
The tmbaasy of the Republic of Uganda avaih its,elf of çt>it opportuniey co
rcn~w co ~he Hini~cry of• Foreign Affain' of elle De~occatic Republic of Cooco the ass\:nn
c:.,( i~~ ni,ïi .. .,c· coui1derat1ons.
)UHS!lASA I August 21, 1990,
, ;,e Xini.stry 'o! Foreisn Affaira
of the Dcoeocratic Republic of Con~o
l(.foeh,1u.
... ..,. ....
• 1
. •.
: ,· .. .
i\
i:i0·3oed Z080Eè Tt:> 9Së
•r•, ,., u1n1at·er· of State for Internal
- o_ .f. . thl'le Democr4ti c Repu bl1. c o f Congo
Affaire
Kinshasa •
• 'Ihe Vice Miniater of Iate~nal Affairs
of the Dem.ccratic lepub~ic ·of Congo
Xinshaea
-· l'he M1nister ~f HW!lan ·lti!ht•
o! the Deoeocrat!c Republic of Congo
J(inc,hau
The Miniater of Justice
of the Democratic Republic of Coago
Kinsh~aa
- The Dean of Dipl~matic Corpe
. Kinahaea..
I
\. ..
.9
è080Eë Tt> 9Së 'ON Xt/.::J
8(:t:>0 î00ë Tt ~t/W
S~HWH) S,lt/~3N38 A3N~Ollt/ WO~
COMMUNIQU.li OF Tii'.E SUMMIT MEETING OF TH!: SADC ON TH...E
D~MOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
1. A ·summit of the Sl\.DC Heads of State and Government
together with those of Kenya, Rwanèa and Uganda took
place in Pretoria, South Africa on 23 ~ug~st 1998.
UCMANNEX:
2. The Summi~ was convened by ~he Chairperson.of the
SADC, H.E. President N R Mandela and attêndGd by th~
follow~ng Presidents: H.t. Mogae of Botswana, H. E.
Nujoma of Namibia, H.E. Chissano of Mozilmbigue, H.E.
Chiluba of Za.?nbia, H.E. Mul~zi of ~alawi, H.E. Moi of
Kenya. H.E . Museveni of U~anda, H.E. Bizimungu of
Rwanda, His Majesty Klng Ms~ati !Il of Swaziland,
Prime Minister P..E . Ra.rngoola.in of Mauritius, roreign
Ministers, Honou4able Tabane of Lesotho and Honourable
Kikwete of Tanzania, Mir.ister of Justice of the DRC,
Honouraol0 Kongclo, txecutive Secretary of SADC Or K
~buende and IHgh Commisslone.c t-toyo of Zimbabwe.
3. The Sununit deliberated on the current situation ln the
Democratic Republic of Congo and noted:
3.1 That the Democratic:: Republic of Congo is affl1cted
1,1lth military conflict which the Summit considers to
be an unacceptable way of addr~5sing ~ny problems
which oi:cas ioned the conflict.
3.2 The Sumrnit corrunitted it~elf to seek an end to the
military conflict immediately.
4 . Th~ Summit resolved that the !ollowing ar~ the basic
prir.ciple5 and obj~ctives 1,1hich should .infor-m t.h1S
soh:tlcn:
4,1 The DRC has a Government in place ~hich the Surnmit
recognises and whlch ls headed by President Kablla;
4.2 The Summit accepted that, regardless of the
contribucion that Afriean Governments m!ght make
towards the accomplishment of this dim, the prlncipal
responsibil1ty to realise this end rests with the
people of the DRC themselves.
4.3 îhe Surnnit called for an immediate ce-ase-fire, a troop
stand-6till and the initiation of a peaceful process
of political dialogue aimed at finding a solution to
all the relevant problems and undertook to do
everything possible, both as a Sum.~it and ~s
lndividual components which constitute i~, to ensure
that a cease-fire are enforced ané maintained.
:urthermore, the countries directly af!ected by the
situation in the Congo undertook to desist f~om any
hos~ile propaganda ag~inst one another and any other
activities which might ~esult in increasing tensions
among themselves and elsewhere.
4-~ ~he Surnmit mandated th~ Chairperson of SADC to create,
in consultat~on wi~h the SQcretary-General of the
Organisation of A!rican Unity; the ~echanisms for the
iraplerr.entation of this decisior., as well as
instituting measures to regularly consult the
countries repre~ented at this meeting and haI"li\onislng
this initiative with the VLctorLa Falls lnitiative.
4.5 The Sum.~it agraed that the reconstruction of the DRC
as an independent, sovereign, united, democra~ic,
?eaceful, stable and prosperous country is critical to
the achieveffient of the same objectives in our own
ccuntries and in the rest of our Continent.
4.6 T~e Surr.mit recognised that the indepandence and ::
securit~ of all the countries 1n the ri:spec:tive ..
regions is an important objective which all agreed to
pursue. Ta thls end the Summit conunitted it6elf to do
everything in its power to ensure the achievement of
this goal.
4.7 The Suramit noted with appreciation the cor.unitment o!
the Government of the DRC to the hclding of democratic
elections to enable the people of that country to
elect a Gove~nment of their choice.
4 . e The Summit urgeù that such elections should take place
within ~ r~asonable period of time, taking into
account the reaLities of the DRC.
4.9 The Summit comr.litted itself to assisting in ensurlng
th~t this aim is achi~ved, including the contribution
of material resources and the mobilisation of the rest
of t.he international com.i"T\unity to support. this effort .
4.10 The Swnmit expressed its support for the approach of
the Gover~üent of :he DRC which seeks to ensure that
all thP. Congolese people are represented in the
mechanisrns !or t~e preparation o( the elections in~
~anner which will rasult in an acceptance of the
outcorne cf elections which mu~t be truly democratic,
!ree an<! falr.
4.11 The Summlt reaffir~ed that, consistent with the
Charter of the OAU, all ethnie groups and
~ationali~ies whoso people and territory çonstituted
what became Congo (now DRC) at independence, should
enjoy equal righcs and protection under the law, as
cit:izen~.
UCM ANI'
Page î of 14
Amnesty International
ai-index AFR 62/033/1998 03/09/1998
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
A long-standing crisis spinning out of
control
1. Introduction
The latest phase of anned conflict which started on 2 August 1998 in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) is a brutal reminder to the international community that stability and
prosperity cannot be built on violations ofhuman rights. Parties to this conflict forged a
coalition in late 1996 to dismantle refugee camps inhabited by members of the Hutu ethnie
group, most ofthem from Rwanda and others from Burundi, and overtbrow former President
Mobutu Sese Seko. =The coalition, which brought President Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power in
May 1997, was known as the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo
(AFDL), Alliance ofDemocratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo. During a seven-month
war, tens of thousands of unarmed refugees and Congolese citizens were massacred by
members of the AFDL and other combatants, particularly members of the Rwandese Patriotic
Anny (RP A), the Rwandese government army. These victims were added to an estimated more
than one million others who have been massacred in the Great Lakes region since 1990.
The alliance which perpetrated the atrocities in 1996 and 1997 has now collapsed and the lives
of millions of people in the DRC and in neighbouring countries are once again atrisk.
Govemment opponents have accused President Kabila of conuption, nepotism, dictatorship
and failure to protect a Tutsi right to Congolese citizenship. Initial signs of the collapse of the
alliance became apparent at the start of 1997. In January 1997, General André Kisasse Ngandu,
a leader of one of the armed groups in the AFDL coalition, was reportedly killed, apparently
because he was opposed to the dominant role of Rwanda and Tutsi in the AFDL. When his
death was reported, then AFDL spokesman Laurent-Désiré Kabila claimed that General
Ngandu had been wounded in combat and was undergoing treatment. The AFDL and the DRC
Government have never explained the circumstances ofhis death. Sorne of General Ngandu's
supporters in the alliance reportedly joined armed groups in North and South-Kivu provinces
opposed to the AFDL and its allies. Anned groups opposed to the AFDL and to perceived Tutsi
domination, collectively known as mai-mai, include members of the Hutu, Tembo, Nande and
Nyanga ethnie groups in North-Kivu, and members of the Bembe and Fuliru and Vira ethnie
groups in South-Kivu. Another leader of the AFDL coalition, Anselme Masasu Nindaga, was
arrested in November 1997 and was sentenced in May 1998 to 20 years' imprisonment by a
military court which found him guilty of endangering the security of the state, treason and
forming a private militia. A third leader of the coalition, Deogratias Bugera, as well as
President Kabila's Foreign Minister Bizima Karaha,joined a new Rwandese govemmentPage
2 of 14
backed alliance known as the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), Congolese
Rally for Democracy, at the start of August 1998.
Amnesty International is publishing this report to place the fighting which started on 2 August
1998 in a broader historical and regional context and to highlight the potential risk of further
massive human rights abuses in the DRC and in neighbouring countries. The report also
highlights Amnesty International's coilcern about the link between human rights abuses in the
Great Lakes region and military training and transfer by governments and arms dealers in and
outside the region. The organization is concemed that given the appalling recent human rights
record of former members of the AFDL coalition and its former military allies, particularly
Rwanda and Burundi, any further support, including military transfer and training, is likely to
lead to an escalation in violations ofhuman rights and of international humanitarian law in the
DRC and in neighbouring countries. Details of the organization's human rights concems in the
DRC are contained in its reports [ See AI DRC reports entitled "Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests", AI Index: AFR 62/33/97, published on 3 December 1997, and ''A year of dashed
hopes", Al Index: AFR 62/18/98, published on 15 May 1998.], urgent actions and press
releases published since December 1997.
For many decades - during and after Belgian colonial rule - people in the DRC (ex-Zaïre) have
suffered a seemingly unbreakable cycle of human rights abuses by successive govemments and
armed opposition groups. The abuses include extrajudicial executions and other deliberate and
arbitrary killings, mutilations, "disappearances", arbitrary arrests, detention of prisoners of
conscience, torture, including rape, and other fonns of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. They have continued to occur because they were ordered or condoned by the
country's political and security force leaders who had a responsibility to prevent them. Instead
ofbeing brought to justice, the perpetrators went on to take their place as political leaders on
the national and international stage.
Despite the widespread massacres and other human rights abuses committed during the war
that culminated in the overthrow of former President Mobutu in May 1997 [ See AI DRC report
entitled "Deadly alliances in Congoleseforests", Al Index: AFR 62/33/97, published on 3
December 1997.], many Congolese citizens hoped the worst was over and a new beginning was
in the offing under the AFDL-led government. T~irty-two years under Mobutu Sese Seko had
been characterized by an erosion of the rule of law and gross human rights violations, and no
sector of Zairian society had remained unaffected. Most people in the newly renamed
Democratic Republic of Congo did not know the new President Kabila, but believed any
government that replaced Mobutu Sese Seko's had to be better. These illusions have since been
shattered.
Much of the international community chose to ignore the atrocities committed by forces
supporting President Kabila, including Rwandese government troops. In addition to having
failed to take measures in 1996 to protect unarmed civilian [ Tens of thousands of unarmed
civilians were killed in former Zaire after the UN Security Council decided in December 1996
not to deploy a Canadian-led UN force to protect unarmed refugees and other civilians, as well
as humanitarian organizations.), the UN Security Council failed in July 1998 to respond
adequately to a report of the UN Secretary-General's Investigative Team (SGIT) [ The UN
Secretary-General set up the Team in July 1997 to "investigate gross violations ofhuman rights
and international humanitarian law committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former
Zaire) from 1 March 1993 ... ". ]submitted to the Council in June 1998. The SGIT had failed to
Page 3 of 14
complete its investigations due to obstructions of its work by the DRC Govemment and the UN
Secretary-General withdrew the Team in April 1998. The SGIT report confirmed what other
organizations and individuals had documented: that combatants loyal to President Kabila,
including Rwandese troops, had comrnitted atrocities amounting to violations of international
humanitarian law, some ofwhich could amount to genocide. The Investigative Team's
recomrnendation that further investigation be carried out by a competent, independent and
impartial body to identify those responsible was ignored by the Council. Jnstead, the Security
Council asked the two govemments of the DRC and Rwanda, which continue to deny that their
troops were directly responsible for human rights violations, to investigate the crimes and bring
the perpetrators to justice. Meanwhile, the same forces responsible for most of these atrocities
have now tumed against each other and are likely to add to the number and gravity of crimes
requiring investigation and redress.
2. Current human rights situation in the DRC
The human rights situation in the DRC was already very grave before war broke out on 2
August 1998. Abuses included extrajudicial executions by government forces, including by
those now in opposition to President Kabila, and deliberate and arbitrary killings by armed
groups, particularly in eastem DRC. Dozens of people accused of flouting a ban imposed by
the govemment on opposition political party activity have been imprisoned. Others targeted for
detention include journalists and human rights activists [ See AI DRC report entitled ''A year of
dashed hopes", AI Index: AFR 62/18/98, published on 15 May 1998.]. Many ofthose arrested
have been subjected to beatings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the time of their
arrest and in custody. Severa! dozen people were executed in 1998 alone, after they were
sentenced to death by a military court with no right to appeal to a higher court. Most of the
trials were unfair and most of those executed were civilians.
Since 2 August 1998, very little information on the human rights situation in the DRC bas
corne out of the country. The armed opposition has seized communication equipment and
threatened human rights activists and witnesses in areas under its control. As in 1996 and 1997,
this measure is being used to prevent information about human rights abuses reaching the
outside world. Witnesses in areas under govemment control fear being accused of supporting
the armed opposition if they denounce human rights violations by government forces.
Amnesty International has received reports ofhundreds of arbitrary and unlawful arrests in
Kinshasa, in particular of ethnie Tutsi civilians, of people ofRwandese origin, of Congolese
married to Rwandese, and of others perceived as sympathizers of the rebellion. The detainees
have been taken away to unknown destinations by members of the security forces, amidst
reports that some may already have been killed. Sorne DRC senior Congolese govemment
officiais and media have incited civilians to take up arms and attack Tutsi. For example, on 8
August an official made a statement on the Congolese radio from Bunia in eastem DRC calling
on listeners to " ... jump on the people with long nos es, who are tall and slim [ reference to
Tutsi] and want to dominate us ... Wake up, be aware of our destiny so as to defeat the enemy."
Simil~ broadcasts in neighbouring Rwanda incited killings of Tutsi and led to the massacre of
as many as one million people in 1994. On 25 August President Kabila was reported to have
called on people in the DRC to take up arms, including traditional weapons such as bows and
arrows, to crush the enemy and prevent their becoming slaves of the Tutsi.
Search operations in the capital are reported to be continuing and many people with Tutsi or
Page 4 of 14
Rwandese connections have reportedly gone into hiding. Congolese Interior Minister Gaetan
Kakudji claimed that Tutsi civilians were being held in 'preventive' detention in Kinshasa to
shield them from lynch mobs. Amnesty International has received credible reports that most of
those arrested are accused by the DRC authorities of supporting the armed opposition because
they are Tutsi or with links to Tutsi, but without any legal evidence to justify such accusations.
Amnesty International is further concerned that the DRC Government has denied humanitarian
organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detainees
and captured combatants. The ICRC was only allowed in mid-August 1998 to visit detainees
held at Kokolo military barracks in Kinshasa in connection with the armed conflict. By the end
of August the ICRC bad not yet been allowed access to other detention centres under
government or RCD control.
In areas held by the armed opposition, there have been reports of deliberate and arbitrary
killings since 2 August 1998. Members of the RCD reportedly summarily executed govemment
soldiers at Kavumu, near Bukavu in South-Kivu province, at the start of August. During the
initial days of the fighting, members of the RCD, RPA and Burundi government forces
reportedly massacred civilians near Uvira. The victims were reportedly targeted because they
were suspected by their killers of supporting local armed groups hostile to Tutsi. Members of
the RCD and RP A soldiers are reported to have killed 37 people, including one Roman
Catholic priest and three nuns and seminarian, at Kasika Roman Catholic parish near Uvira on
24 August. RCD and RP A combatants reportedly killed as many as 200 more unarmed
civilians in surrounding villages. The killings were reportedly a reprisai for killings ofRCD
and RP A combatants by mai-mai fighters in nearby M wenga.
3. Regional dimension of the DRC conflict
As in the past, all countries close to the DRC, and some beyond, will be affected by the latest
phase of armed conflict there either because of their proximity to the DRC or because of their
involvement in the conflict. Similarly, the DRC has equally been for long affected by conflicts
in other countries in central Africa.
3.1 The Rwandese connection
The Rwandese Government and security forces played a critical role in the war in the former
Zaïre in late 1996. Their political and military support to the AFDL was instrumental in
ensuring the overthrow of former President Mobutu Sese Seko and the formation of a new
govemment headed by President Kabila in May 1997. Rwandese govemment troops also
participated in grave human rights violations - including killings of unarmed civilians - in
eastem DRC alongside AFDL forces [ See AI Rwanda report entitled "Ending the silence", AI
Index: AFR 47/32/97, published on 25 September 1997 and DRC report entitled "Deadly
alliances in Congoleseforests", AI Index: AFR 62/33/97, published on 3 December 1997.].
The UN Secretary-General's Investigative Team reported that it found evidence ofRPA
participation in massive human rights violations against refugees and other unarmed civilians.
Initially, the Rwandese authorities denied playing an active role in the conflict and claimed that
they were only giving moral support to Congolese Tutsi who had been persecuted and denied
citizenship by the then Zai1ian authorities. Subsequently, they admitted taking part in the
confl.ict and justified dismantling the refugee camps in eastem Zaire by evoking the presence of
their armed opponents in the camps, including those responsible for the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, who were mounting cross-border incursions into Rwanda.
Page 5 of 14
Two years later, a quasi-identical scenario is being repeated. As it first did in 1996, the
Rwandese Government is officially denying playing arole in backing the latest insurgency in
the DRC, yet reports abound of RP A troop participation in the fighting in eastem and
southwestern DRC. In 1997 the Rwandese Government hadjustified its military support to the
AFDL by accusing the former Zairian Government of supporting or tuming a blind eye to Hutu
armed opposition groups in former Zaire. In 1998, while denying involvement in the conflict,
the Rwandese authorities are reported to have accused President Kabila's government of
training former Rwandese militia to attack Rwanda. As in 1996, an anti-Tutsi hate campaign is
being waged in the DRC, this time by Rwanda's former allies in the DRC Government.
In Rwanda, the overthrow in 1959 of a Tutsi monarchy by Hutu politicians culminated in
massacres ofthousands of Tutsi. Tens ofthousands of Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries,
particularly Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and U ganda. The countries that hosted these refugees
already had their own indigenous Tutsi and Hutu populations, as well as those who had
voluntarily emigrated there during previous decades. In former Zaire, the government failed to
take measures to prevent the persecution of Hutu and Tutsi, commonly known as Banyarwanda
[ Hutu and Tutsi are commonly referred to as Banyarwanda by members of other ethnie groups
in central Africa because they are respectively ethnically related to Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda,
and generally speak Kinyarwanda, the national language of Rwanda.], or to distinguish
refugees from nationals. Prominent members of other ethnie groups in Zaire competing for
political positions repeatedly branded all Tutsi and Hutu foreigners. This political conflict
culrninated in early 1993 in arrned clashes in North-Kivu province between Hutu and Tutsi on
one side and members of several other ethnie groups on the other. At least 6,000 civilians were
killed and several hundred thousand others were displaced.
The alliance between Hutu and Tutsi in Zaïre became increasingly strained after October 1990
when fighting began in Rwanda between the Hutu-dominated Rwandese government and a
Tutsi-dominated armed group known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) - which went on
to form the current government of Rwanda. Outside Rwanda, Hutu accused Tutsi of supplying
money, arrns and fighters to the RPF. The conflict in Rwanda culminated in the genocide of
1994, in which as many as one million people - most of them Tutsi but also man y Hutu - were
killed by Hutu-dominated government forces and militia. Thousands of unarrned Hutu were
also killed by RPF combatants.
lt is to this already volatile envirorunent that more than one million Hutu, some ofthem former
members of militia and government forces who participated in the genocide in Rwanda, fled
when the Rwandese Government was overthrown by the RPF in July 1994. Once in Zaïre,
arrned Hutu participated in attacks on Tutsi and other groups, and launched arrned attacks from
Zaïre into Rwanda. Sorne members of the Zairian government and other prominent Zairians
threatened to expel Tutsi, including Zairian Tutsi. The new Rwandese Government and Tutsi in
Zaïre found common cause to launch a war on the government of former President Mobutu and
Hutu in Zaire, and were joined by Zairian government opponents, including leaders of the
current government of President Kabila. The international community, which had failed to
protect Tutsi in Rwanda and in Zaire, this time failèd to protect Hutu refugees and Zairians.
After the Tutsi-led alliance took power in the newly named DRC in 1997, Rwandese Hutu and
Congolese arrned groups opposed to Tutsi and to the new DRC Government remained active,
particularly in eastem DRC. Since 1997, insurgency in Rwanda, which the Rwandese
Governrnent claims is based in the DRC, has escalated; thousands of unarmed civilians have
Page 6 of 14
been killed both by the insurgents and by the Rwandese security forces. In 1998, the conflict in
Rwanda has shown no sign of abating and massive human rights abuses by both parties
continue to occur, especially in areas bordering the DRC [ See Al Rwanda report entitled "The
hidden violence: 11disappearances11 and killings continue", AI Index: AFR 47/23/98, published
on 23 June 1998.].
Since taking power, President Kabila has faced increased political pressure from his supporters
and opponents to remove Tutsi from key positions in the government and security forces.
Killings of and by Tutsi have been reported in Kivu since 1997 after Tutsi were appointed to
replace local government officiais from rival etlmic groups in the region. In early July 1998
President Kabila replaced the then anny Chief of Staff, James Kabarebe, who was previously
an officer in the Ugandan and Rwandese arrnies. Tutsi and members of other etlmic groups
increasingly accused President Kabila of filling key positions with people from his own
Katanga province. On 27 July 1998, he ordered all Rwandese and other foreign troops out of
the DRC and on 2 August his Rwandese-backed opponents, many ofthem members of the
DRC Government and the Forces armées congolaises (FAC), Congolese Anned Forces, who
later formed the RCD coalition, began an armed carnpaign to overthrow him. Amnesty
International has received reports that by mid-August 1998 men of fighting age in Rwanda
were being forcibly recruited into the RP A and sent to fight in the DRC.
3.2 The Ugandan influence
Until 1994, Uganda was home to several hundred thousand Tutsi and some Hutu refugees from
Rwanda and Burundi. In the early 1980s the then govemment of President Milton Obote
accused Tutsi of supporting the National Resistance Army (NRA) armed group, although the
armed conflict involved combatants from a number of other Ugandan ethnie groups. The NRA
leader, Yoweri Museveni, was himself accused by some ofhis Ugandan political opponents of
originating from Rwanda. In 1982 the Ugandan authorities forcibly returned thousands of
Rwandese Tutsi refugees to Rwanda. The Rwandese authorities refused to accept them as
returnees and they subsequently returned to Uganda. Sorne Rwandese Tutsi didjoin the NRA
wlùch eventually took power in 1986. Sorne Tutsi NRA soldiers were joined by other
Rwandese exiles to plan a return to Rwanda by force of arms. Many ofthose who led the 1990
attack on Rwanda from Uganda, including current Rwandese Vice-President Paul Kagame,
were members of the NRA. From October 1990 Uganda gave military and political support to
the RPF and has remained a close ally of the RPF-led Rwandese Government. Uganda was also
a key supporter of President Kabila before and soon after he carne to power.
Since the 1960s, thousands of Zairians who fled Congolese civil wars and government
repression settled in Uganda. Sorne ofthese Zairian exiles were involved in armed attacks on
Zairian goverrunent forces, particularly in the early 1980s. The attacks were followed by severe
human rights violations, including killings and torture by government forces, against the
civilian population in North-Kivu. Sorne of the Zairian exilesjoined the AFDL in 1996 to fight
the Zairian Goverrunent.
During 1996 and 1997 Ugandan troops were reported to have assisted AFDL forces,
particularly in northeastern Zaïre, in response to the presence ofUgandan anned opposition
groups based in eastern Zaire. Uganda has close military links with Rwanda and the USA and
has since 1990 been a conduit for military supplies to Rwanda and Burundi, which reportedly
reached the AFDL. Ugandan troops and AFDL combatants are said to have pursued and killed
or captured suspected U gandan members of armed opposition groups in Zaïre. However,
Page 7 of 14
insurgency in western Uganda continued even after President Kabila came to power. The DRC
Govemment had apparently failed to prevent Ugandan anned groups, particularly the Alliance
ofDemocratic Forces (ADF) from using eastern DRC as a base to launch attacks on western
Uganda. Amidst reports that the Ugandan authorities were unhappy that President Kabila had
failed to prevent ADF attacks on U ganda, the U gandan army had by mid-1988 established at
least one military base in northeastern DRC. In May 1998, a DRC government minister
publicly accused U gandan President Museveni of interfering in the affairs of the DRC. In
August the DRC Government accused Uganda of sending troops into the DRC to support the
RCD. Ugandan initially denied that it had any forces in the DRC but on 25 August the
Ugandan authorities admitted that their government had troops in the DRC. They denied
reports that U gandan troops were fighting alongside members of the RCD and RP A, and
claimed that their troops were in the DRC solely to prevent ADF incursions from there into
Uganda.
Human rights abuses cornmitted during the armed conflict in western Uganda have included
the killing and abduction ofmany unarmed civilians there. In 1997 and early 1998 the Ugandan
army was reported to be holding scores of persons suspected of being supporters of the ADF in
illegal detention in military barracks in western Uganda. In July 1998 the Ugandan army Chief
of Staff reportedly admitted that govemment forces had tortured suspected supporters of the
ADF in the region.
3.3 Tanzania: host to Great Lakes refugees
Political turmoil in the Great Lakes region has led to large in fluxes of refugees from the region
into Tanzania since the 1960s. Sorne of the Zairian exiles in Tanzania, including President
Kabila, were involved in armed attacks against former President Mobutu's government,
particularly during the 1980s. Zairian govemment forces carried put numerous atrocities
against unarmed civilians in South-Kivu and then Shaba region during counter-insurgency
operations. During the 1996-97 war that led to the overthrow of former President Mobutu tens
ofthousands of people from South-Kivu province considered to be opposed to Tutsi
domination fled into Tanzania [ See AI Zaïre report entitled "Hidden from scrutiny: human
rights abuses in eastern Zaire", Al Index: AFR 62/29/96, published on 19 December 1996.].
The United Nations High Cornmissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started assisting refugees to
return to the DRC in recent months but stopped the repatriation at the start of August 1998
when the fighting broke out and over 1,000 more Congolese refugees have since fled to
Tanzania. Congolese refugees in Tanzania have for several years complained that they were
being subjected to human rights violations, including unlawful detentions and ill-treatment in
custody, in Tanzania. The refugees have claimed in recent months that they were under
pressure to return home on the grounds that the DRC was stable under President Kabila. Sorne
of the refugees are believed to be supporters of armed groups opposed to President Kabila who
they accuse of allowing Rwanda's involvement in Congolese affairs. On the other hand, some
members of the FAC are reported to have recently received training in Tanzania. On 24 August
the Tanzanian Govenunent reportedly announced that it had ordered out of the DRC members
of its armed forces training DRC govemment soldiers.
Competition for diminishing resources in Tanzania is increasingly straining relations between
the local population and several hundred thousand refugees from the DRC, Rwanda and
Burundi, as well as the hospitality of the Tanzanian Government. This situation partly led to a
decision in Iate 1996 by the Tanzanian Govemment to forcibly return more than 500,000
Rwandese refugees to Rwanda. Sorne ofthese refugees and others have since fled back to
Tanzania as a result of continuing violence and hurnan rights abuses in Rwanda.
3.4 Burundian violence
Page 8 of 14
Burundian and Congolese refugees have often been forced to move simultaneously as they fled
armed conflicts in their respective countries. Thousands of Congolese refugees have entered
Burundi since the 1960s, just as tens of thousands of Burundian, mainly Hutu, refugees have
repeatedly fled to and from former Zaïre. Many Congolese refugees have been caught up and
been killed during Burundian intercommunal fighting. In 1994, Tutsi-dominated Burundian
govemment forces and militia attacked Hutu and Zairian civilians in Bujumbura, forcing many
ofthem to flee to former Zaire. Burundian Hutu-dominated armed groups recruited combatants
from this Burundian refugee community to fight the Burundi Government. When war broke out
in South-Kivu in 1996, Burundi govern.ment forces and Tutsi militia were reportedly involved,
together with AFDL and Rwandese government forces, in killing Hutu refugees in former
Zaïre, including Burundian refugees suspected of supporting or belonging to Burundian Hutudominated
armed opposition groups. Burundi was also reported to be a conduit for military
supplies to the AFDL. Thousands of other refugees and some Zairian civilians were forced to
cross to Burundi, to insecure areas where hundreds were extrajudicially executed by members
of the Burundian security forces. As many as 200,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed
by govemment forces and armed groups in Burundi since October 1993. Burundi government
troops are reported to have fought alongside RP A soldiers and RCD combatants during fighting
in South-Kivu in early August 1998, during which they reportedly killed many unanned
civilians in the area.
3.5 The Republic of Congo
The Republic of Congo to the west of the DRC has itselfbarely corne out of anned conflict
which started in 1993 and cuhninated in the overthrow of former President Pascal Lissouba in
October 1997. Former President Pascal Lissouba's govemment forces and militia belonging to
various political factions killed thousands - as many as 15,000 according to President Denis
Sassou Nguesso's new government - during the conflict. Sorne of the arms used by President
Denis Sassou Nguesso came from neighbouring Angola through the DRC. Angolan troops
helped both Presidents Kabila and Nguesso to overthrow their predecessors and are still
deployed in the Republic of Congo. Former Presidents Lissouba and Mobutu were supported
by combatants from the Angolan armed opposition group, known as the Uniao Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola (UNIT A), National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola. Mercenaries from the former Yugoslavia and others who had been recruited by former
President Mobutu's govemment are reported to have been subsequently hired in late 1997 by
former President Lissquba in the war against Nguesso's militia. In both countries, the
mercenaries killed unarmed civilians. Nguesso is also reported to have hired former Zairian and
Rwandese soldiers who had been forced out oftbe DRC by combined forces of the AFDL and
Rwandese troops. Many Hutu refugees, as well as former Zairian soldiers and civilians, still
live in the Republic of Congo and some are likely to get involved in fighting in the DRC.
3.6 Angolan war in the DRC
The Angolan Government provided military assistance to the AFDL which overthrew the
former Zaïrian Government in May 1997. In August 1998 Angola was providing military
support to forces loyal to President Kabila. Zairian refugees who had lived in Angola for many
years also joined the AFDL in 1996. The Angolan govemment was anxious to prevent UNIT A
Page 9 of 14
from using Zaïre as a rear base. During the 1980s and early 1990s it was widely reported that
the United States of America (USA) used the Zairian Karnina airbase and other routes to
suppl y weapons to UNIT A. In recent months, members of the DRC police are reported to have
received training in Angola. UNIT A itselfused Zairian airports to import weapons and export
diarnonds. As the AFDL forces swept towards Kinshasa in early 1997, UNIT A troops retumed
to Angola, foUowed by Rwandese refugees, including former Rwandese soldiers, and Zairian
governrnent troops. UNIT Ais reported to have an anny of more than 20,000, including some
former Rwandese and Zairian soldiers, despite declaring in March 1998 that it had demobilized
ail its troops under the terms of the peace agreement signed in 1994.
The Angolan enclave of Cabinda shares borders with both the DRC and the Republic of
Congo. In Cabinda, the Angolan govemment troops fighting factions of the Frente da
Libertaçào do Enclave de Cabinda (flec), Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front, have been
responsible for torturing and killing unarmed civilians [ See AI Angola report entitled
"Extrajudicia/ executions and torture in Cabinda", AI Index: AFR 12/02/98, published in April
1998.). In August 1998, some Angolan govemment troops are reported to have Jaunched an
attack on forces opposed to President Kabila from Cabinda.
The Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister was reported to have said on 19 August 1998 that his
country and several others had agreed to provide military and other support to the DRC
Governrnent. It has been reported that UNIT A might itself get involved on the side of armed
opponents of the DRC Government.
The conflicts in the DRC and Angola have generated a new flood of refugees and intemaJJy
displaced people. In May 1998 some 2,000 Rwandese refugees were reported to have entered
Angola through the DRC. In July 1998, 39,000 people reportedly fled from Angola to Katanga
province in the DRC while more than 1,000 more crossed over into Bandundu and Bas-Congo.
Two thousand Rwandese Hutu refugees reportedly fled from Angola to Zambia in early August
1998.
4. Involvement by countries outside central Africa
Govemments outside central Afiica have played varying roles in armed conflicts in the Great
Lakes region. Sorne govemments have actively supported parties to the conflicts by supplying
troops, weapons and other military equipment, while others have provided training. Other
governrnents have effectively condoned human rights abuses by failing to acknowledge human
rights abuses committed by various parties to the conflicts. Armed forces supporting or
opposed to President Kabila have since September 1996 been responsible for massacres,
"disappearances" and abductions, torture and rape against tens of thousands of unarmed
civilians. Governments supporting the warring parties have failed to seek or obtain assurances
that arms and military training they or anns traffickers in their countries provide are not used to
commit human rights violations against unarmed civilians. Despite abundant reports of
widespread massive violations ofhuman rights and international humanitarian law comrnitted
principally by DRC and Rwandese govemment forces, as well as by armed groups opposed to
the two govemments, virtually no-one bas been brought to justice.
United States of America
As mentioned above, Rwanda continues to be a key participant in the armed con:flict in the
Page 10 of 14
DRC. In 1998, as in 1996, the US Govemment has again denied any involvement in the
conflict in the DRC. However, it has admitted lhat its armed forces had, at least until July
1998, been training Rwandese government soldiers in counter-insurgency and other techniques.
US military personnel have been training RP A soldiers during a period when Rwandese
govemment forces have been involved in violations ofhuman rights and international
humanitarian law in Rwanda and the DRC. When fighting broke out in the DRC on 2 August
1998 an American delegation comprising representatives of the Departments ofDefence and
Foreign Affairs was visiting areas along the Rwandese border with the DRC. The US
govemment reportedly claimed that its representatives were in Rwanda to "assess the
Rwandese govemment's capacity to prevent another genocide". lt was unclear whether the
assessment included the Rwandese government's ability to prevent continuing atrocities by its
own troops in Rwanda and in the DRC. The US Govemment stated at the start of August 1998
that it was due to withdraw its military experts from Rwanda. In light of the persistent and
appalling RP A human rigbts record, Amnesty International is concemed that the US military
and security assistance to the RP A could be used to commit atrocities in the DRC and in
Rwanda. US government forces have provided military training to members of the Ugandan
army, while private US security firms have been involved in military training for Rwandese
govemrnent forces.
Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwean Govemment is reported to have given substantial military support to the
AFDL during 1996 and 1997
[ See AI DRC report entitled "Deadly alliances in Congolese forests", AI Index AFR 62/33/97,
published on 3 December 1997.). During this period, members of the AFDL and their allies are
likely to have used some of the military equipment supplied by Zimbabwe and other countries
to commit atrocities against tens ofthousands ofunarmed civilians. Zimbabwe is also reported
to have been a conduit for arrns imported by the DRC from China and North Korea. The staterun
Zimbabwe Defence Industries was reportedly contracted in 1997 to supply arms and
ammunition, uniforms, boots and dry food rations to the DRC worth over US$500,000. Further
reports indicate that such supplies continued and that Zimbabwe provided military advisors and
military air transport to the DRC during 1997 and 1998. On 17 and 18 August 1998, the
Ministers ofDefence of Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe met in the Zimbabwean
capital, Harare, to discuss the DRC crisis. Soon after, the Zimbabwean authorities reported!ly
announced that they and some other Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Member States wouJd provide military and other assistance to the DRC Govemment. From
mid-August, the Zimbabwean Government reportedly deployed several hundred soldiers and
jet fighters to the DRC to support DRC government troops against the RCD and its allies.
South Africa
The South African Govemment bas given significant politicaJ and some security support to the
DRC Govemment and has been critical of organizations and govemments which have
expressed concern about human rights violations by the AFDL and the goverrunent led by
President Kabila. However, in mid-August 1998 South Africa rejected Zimbabwe's proposai to
give military assistance to the DRC Government. South African President Nelson Mandela and
his government have since taken a lead in a search for a negotiated settlement to the armed
conflict in the DRC. On the other hand, South Africa has in recent years supplied military
equipment to Rwanda and Uganda. The South African Government has authorized the supply
of military equipment to Rwanda, despite public knowledge that in addition to human rights
Page 11 of 14
violations in Rwanda, the RP A had played a major role in the armed conflict and human rights
violations in the DRC. Private arms traders based in South Afüca have also been involved in
supplying small arms to the DRC.
Zambia and Namibia
Zambia has provided training to the DRC police. It has also been reported to be a conduit for
small arms to the DRC Government and to armed opposition forces. Namibia was reported in
mid-August 1998 to have provided about 20 tons ofmilitary weapons and otber supplies to the
DRC Government. In late August the Namibian Govermnent admitted to supplying arms and
other equipment to the DRC but continued to deny reports that it had also sent troops there.
Most such small arms to the DRC originale in eastem Europe or from recycled stocks in central
and southem Afüca.
5. Conclusion
Parties to the armed conflicts in the DRC and in neighbouring countries have committed
horrendous atrocities. Opposition groups which have taken up arms on the grounds that the
govemments they are fighting violate human rights have themselves been responsible for
abuses ofhuman rights and breacbes of international humanitarian law, particularly deliberate
and arbitrary killings ofhundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians, including women and
children not taking part in the hostilities. Millions of people have been forced to flee to areas
inside or outside their countries where they have been subjected to further human rights abuses.
These abuses will continue unless the international community resolves to place itself on the
side ofvictims, regardless oftbeir identity or that of the perpetrators, and takes a decisive
position against human rights violators.
Mucb of the international community has, so far, eitber remained silent as unarmed civilians
have been massacred or has taken sides with groups or governments responsible for human
rights abuses. With a few exceptions, much of the international community has failed to
condemn the overall climate of impunity in the region and thus fed the seemingly endless cycle
of violence, human rights violations and crimes against hurnanity.
Amnesty International believes that although the current situation in the DRC is already
critical, there is stiJI an opportunity to prevent needless Joss oflife and suffering for millions of
innocent civilians. Foreign powers and others have provided arms or funds to buy them to
parties to the armed conflict in the DRC. The abundance of weapons channelled to all si des to
the armed conflict has contributed to a climate of violence and impunity in which defenceless
people are routinely ill-treated or killed. Despite this, none of the countries that have supplied
weapons to the DRC and other countries involved in the conflict have taken any steps to ensure
that their weapons would not be used to perpetrate human rights abuses. Furthermore, they
have failed to acknowledge the part they and anns dealers in their countries have played in
enabling arrned forces in the Great Lakes region to commit human rights abuses.
Amnesty International believes that all govemments have a responsibility to ensure that arms
and training which they orthose under their jurisdiction supply are not used to commit human
rights abuses. The organization is opposed as a matter of principle to military, security or police
transfers to government and anned opposition groups that can reasonably be assumed to
contribute to human rights abuses such as deliberate andl arbitrary killings, torture and other
Page 12 of 14
forms of ill-treatment. Sucb transfers may include equipment, personnel or training, as well as
proven financial or logistical support for such transfers. Governments should prohibit such
transfers unless it can be reasonably demonstrated tbat they will not contribute to human rights
abuses.
6. Recommendations
The international community needs to leam from its mistakes which bave led to unacceptable
levels ofhuman rights abuses in the DRC and the central Africa region as a wbole. Parties to
the conflict, govemments and intergovernmental organizations should urgently institute
mechanisms to preveot an escalation of atrocities, particularly against uoanned civilians.
To governments and armed groups participating in the armed cooflict
• Give public instructions to ail combatants and supporters that human rights
abuses will not be tolerated and that those responsible will be brought to
justice;
• Instruct al! combatants to abide by international humanitarian law, in
particular Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which
specifically prohibits ail parties to the conflict from targeting people talcing
no active part in the hostilities; in particular from carrying out acts of
violence or torture against them, including rape, as well as taking hostages;
• Foreign governments participating in the anned conflict should ensure that
their national annies abide by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
of the Geneva Conventions. The fundamental provisions of Protocol I,
including for the most part those conceming the protection of the civilian
population, are considered to reflect customary intemational law and
therefore binding on ail states. Sucb provisions include a requirement to
protect civilian lives, including the principle of distinction between military
targets and civilians. lts Article 51 (2) states that the civilian population
shall not be the object of attack and its Article 51 (4) prohibits indiscriminate
attacks. The Protocol also probibits reprisai attacks against civilians and
using civilians as shields.
• Announce and implement specific measures to prevent human rights abuses,
including competent, independent and impartial human rights or judicial
bodies to wbich victims or witnesses can report human rights abuses;
• Allow members of Congolese human rights organizations and other
independent buman rights observers to investigate and report on allegations
ofbuman rights abuses in areas under their control, and ensure that the
investigators have unhindered and safe access to all such areas;
• Prevent any incitement to violence, discrimination or hatred against any
groups or individuals and ensure their protection from human rights abuses,
regardless oftheir ethnie, political or other affiliation;
• Publicly undertake to implement the recommendations of the UN SecretaryGeneral's
Investigative Team, including cooperating with a follow-up UN
inquiry into the atrocities committed in the DRC since 1993 once
established and to ensure that those found responsible will be brought to
justice in trials that conforrn to international standards for faimess and
exclude the use of the death penalty;
• Release ail detainees held outside the law, prevent any arbitrary arrests, and
Page 13 of 14
ensure that humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC, have access to
and are allowed to assist ail detainees in ail detention centres;
• Give clear public instructions to armed force commanders not to recroit
children and to exclude from their ranks any children that may already have
been recruited.
To other governmeots, in particular Members of the UN, the OAU and SADC
• Publicly condemn ail human rights abuses that have been and are being
committed in the DRC, regardless of the identity of the perpetrators or the
victims.
• Prevent supplies of light weapons and other types of military, security or
police equipment to all governments and anned groups implicated in the war
in the DRC, which would be used by parties to the conflict or by their allies
to commit hurnan rights abuses. Given the persistent and well-documented
patterns of arbitrary killings of unarmed civilians by ail parties to the
conflict in the Great Lakes region, it is clear that in the present situation,
such equipment is likely to contribute directly to further human rights
abuses. Security equipment classed as "non-lethal" (such as military
transport, including armoured vehicles and helicopters) is also being used to
facilitate human rights abuses and should not be supplied to either side.
• Support the work of the UN Commission oflnquiry into anns transfers to
the former Rwandese anned forces and urge the UN Security Council to
extend its mandate to cover ail arms transfers which are being used for grave
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights standards in
the Great Lakes region, including in the DRC, and other countries involved
in the conflict there. This would include a mandate to investigate and report
on transfers to Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
• The OAU and the SADC should state very clearly their commitrnent and
determination to ensuring that irnpunity is ended in the region once and for
ail in order to ensure lasting protection from human rights abuses for the
people of central Africa;
• To ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice, investigations should
continue through the establishment by the UN Security Council of a
competent, independent an:d impartial investigative body. This body should
pursue the work carried out by the SGIT. The Security Council should exert
political pressure to ensure that the investigative body has unfettered access
to the DRC, but in the event of access being denied, the body should gather
testimonies from victims, witnesses and other sources outside the DRC.
• The UN should seek safety guarantees for, reopen and strengthen the office
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC to monitor and
report on the human rights situation in the country, and recommend
measures which should be taken by the DRC Government and the
international community to address impunity for past violations and to
prevent further hurnan rights abuses in the DRC;
• Provide support to and reaffirm the importance of the mandate of the three
experts of the Commission on Human Rights on the DRC, Rwanda and
Burundi. The experts shoumd submit their reports to the UN General
Assembly for consideration at its regular session including specific
recommendations to address the current deterioration of the situation. The
experts should be given political and material support to carry out a visit to
Page 14 of 14
the DRC in order to report on the human rights situation there when it is safe
to do so.
• Request the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene another
extraordinary coordination meeting of the UN human rights experts on the
Great Lakes region, following on the one convened by the previous UN
Commission on Human Rights in 1996, to draw up recommendations to
prevent a deterioration of the human rights situation in the region. The
meeting sbouJd also receive contributions from UN agencies and relevant
treaty bodies, as well as other inter-govemmental and non-govemmental
bodies which have expertise relevant to addressing the current buman rights
crisis. A report containing their .findings and recommendations should be
dmscussed at the UN General Assembly at its forthcoming session in order to
allow this body to make concrete recommendations to address the present
human rights situation.
• Urge the Rwandese Government to allow a redeployment of the UN Human
Rights Operation in Rwanda (UNHRFOR), which was withdrawn in July
1998, and to allow the Operation to investigate and report on the human
rights situation in Rwanda. Ask for a reinforcement of the UN human rights
field presences in the Great Lakes region, including deploying human rights
monitors in the DRC.
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JOINT COM:My"NIOU& OF TH' SECOND VI~TORIA FALLS
SUMM!'l'
UCMANN
We, the Heaàs of State and Governraent of the Republic
of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Republic o! N~mibia, the ~epublic ot Rwanda, the
Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Zambio and the
Republic o~ Zimbabwe as well as the Sccretary Gen~ral
of the Organisation of African Unity, ,net f=om 07 to
08 September 1998 at Victori~ Falls, Zimbabwe.
The meeting which ~as chaired by President F=ederick
Chiluba of Zaml:lia was a follow up to th@ p4evious
ef!orts made to end the crisis in the Democrat!c
~epublic of Congo. Those efforts include the Victoria
Fal.ls Summic. of 07-08 August 1998, the Pretoria SADC
Summit of 23 August 1998 and the Durban consultations
of OJ September 1996, as well a~ other efforts made to
t i~d a peace!ul solution to :he confllr.t in :he
Oemocratic Republic of Congo.
:ollowing our frank anct in-depth discussion on the
o:igin and evolution of the conflict in the Democrattc
Republic of Congo, we believe that in the interest of
~he people of chat country, the region and Africa,
there m~st be an end to the war in the Democratlc
ReFublic or Congo. we aecor.dingly call for the
; CIITlediate cessaticn of hostilities.
We rea!firm our support for the uni ty, stability ilnd
ter~itoria l integrity or the Cemocratic Republic of
Congo. In acr:oc-dance ,ti. c.h the relevant provisions o r
t!':e lli'I and OAU Cha:.:t~rs, as wel l as th~ provisions o!
Resolution AHG / 16/l adopteù in Cairo in 1961 on
territorial integrity and the inviolability of
national boundaries ~s inherited ac ind~pendence.
We agreed on the need to address the security concerns
of ~he Oemocratlc Republic of Conge and those of the
nei9hbouring eountries. In this regard, we declare
our pr~paredness to assise 1n whatever ways possible,
to ach1eve that objective.
we hereby mandata our Ministe·rs of Defence and other
officials "orklng in close coope~ation with the OAU
and the United Nations to meet at the OAU HeadquartP.rs
in Addis Ababa, Ethicpia, on Thursday 10 Septem.ber
1998 to establish the modalities for effecting an
immediate cease-fire and a ~echanism for monitoring.
COffipliance ~ith the cease-fire provisions, especially,
those relating to the ~1thdra~al of foreign Eorces
from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
we also aff~nr. our support for the Gover~ment o! tne
oemocra~ic Republic of Congo under the leadership o!
Presid~nt Laurent Kabila, to achieve lts declared
intention of broadening the political dialogue wnich
will ta~e into account the interest of all tte
citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
VICTORIA FALLS, Z!~SA.3We
es SEPTEMBER 1998
UCMANNEC
·POSITION OF. THE IDGH COMMAND ON THE PRESENCE OF
THE UPDF IN THE DRC: . --------...--- --------------- ---~-~· · ..., ...
WHEREAS for a long tirne the DRC bas been used by the enemies of
Uganda as a base and launching p;id for attacks against Uganda;
AND
WHEREAS the successive governments of the DRC have not been IIJ.
effective control of all the terri tory of the Congo;
AND
•
WHEREAS in May 1997, on the basis of a mutual understanding the
Government of Uganda deployed UPDF to jointly operate with the
Congolese Army against Uganda enemy forces in the DRC;
AND
WHEREAS when an anti-Kabila rebellion erupted in the DRC the forces of
the UPDF were still operating along side the Congolese Army in the DRC,
against Uganda enemy forces who had fled back to the DRC;
NO\V THEREFORE the High Command sitting in Kampala this 11 th day
of~ !ptember, 1998 resolves to maintain forces of he UPDF in the DRC in
ordt-: to secure Uganda's legitimate security nterests which are the
foll, wing:
1 To deny the Sudan opportunity to use the territory of the DRC to
destabilize Uganda. ·
2 To enable UPDF neutralize Uganda dissiden1 groups which have been
receiving assistance from the Governrnent of :he DRC and the Sudan .
. :.
3
4
5
To ensure that the political and administrative vacuum. and instability
c:au::sdby oe fLghtüig between Uie rébets and-Oie LOn!)CHese Arm9
llld its allies do not adversely affect the security ofUganda.
To prevent the genocidal elements, narnely: the Interahamwe, and exF
AR, wbich have been launching attacks on the people of Uganda
from.the DRC, from continuing to do so.
To be in position to safeguard the territorial integrity of Uganda
against irresponsible threats of invasion from certain forces.
2
UCMANN
COMMUNIQUE OF THE EAST AFRICAN
co .. OPERATION HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT
ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
1. At the invitation of H.E. President Daniel T. Arap Moi,
President of the Republic of Kenya, H.E. lYir. ·Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni, Pr.esident of the Republic of Uganda
and H.E. Mr. ,villiam Benjamin Mkapa, President of
the United Republic of Tanzania, attended the East
African Co-operation Consultativ~ Sumn1it on the
security situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (D.R.C.) in Nairobi on 18th October, 1998.
2. The Summit noted with grave concern the escalntion of
the conflict, which has taloen a wider dimen.sion
threatening to engulf the whole region, including the
East Africa sub-region.
3. Observing that the crisis was impacting negatively on
the region, precipitating·an influx of refugees into
nelghbouring countries, the displacement of
populations, threats of genociùe and dcclinc in trade
ancl investments, the Sum1nit underscored. the urgent
ncc<l to address the situation.
.. . .. ..... ; .. .
.. : .
. . . , .
4. The . summit :: re-affir~e~ ·: tf:ie · :: un.ity and territorial
integrity of o ·.R~C .. in.·acco.rdànc_e with the principles of
0.A.U. and u.·N.:chai-ter · .. . · .. •, ·. · . . . .. .. . . . . : • ...
~ . . . ~·
. .
5. The Summit further· re~affirmed the need to address
the genuine security concerns of the countries
ncighbouring D.R.C. ·
6. The Summit examined _ ail options for speeding up ·a
resolution to the D.R.C. crisis and called for:
i. immediatc cessation of hostilities.
ii. Immediate negotfation of. a cease-fire agreement
and a troop standstilt : : 1 • • •• ••• ,• •
iii. Security for inarg1~·aliseci groups.
iv. Tnke measures to address security concerns. of
neighbouring countries~
v. Orderly withdrawal of ail foreign troops.
vL lnitinte an ail inclusive p9Iitical dialogue.
vii. Emplacement of a neutral international peace
keeping force under .t4~ ·auspices of O.A.U. and
U.N. ' ·
7. The summit resolvcd that urgent 111casures be taken to
facilitnte the implcmentatio1i'of these decisions. In this
regard, they mandnted their ministers in-charge of
Foreign Affnirs, Regional Corporation and Defence to
make a follow-up of the decisions.
8. The East African Co-operation member states
cxpressed their deep colicern with the maintenance of
peacc and scc.urity in the region. ln this regard, thcy
agrecd to support efforts already under way by SADC
member statcs in consultation with O.A.U. and U.N.
9. The lleads of State visited the site of the Bo1nb lllast of
7th August, 1998 and laid wreaths in remembrance of
ail those who lost their lives in the terrorist attack.
The Summit condemned··all acts of terrorism and callecl
for concerted efforts to combat aud eradicate
terrorism in all its forms.
10. II.E. President Yoweri Kaguta Muscveni and H.E.
I>resident William Benjamin Mkapa, cxpressed·their
appreciation to tbeir bost H.E. President Daniel Arap
Moi, the Government and the people of I{enya for the
,varnt welcome and hospîtality extended to tbem
during tbcir stay in Kenya.
Done in Nairobi on 18th Octobcr, 1998
UCMANNEX2
.0/98: The Congo Conflict http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/ l 998/ps98 l 020.ht
U .S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman
Press Statement
Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman
October 20, 1998
The Congo Conflict
The United States supports the multiple efforts of regional leaders to end the Congo conflict,
including the efforts of the OAU, President Chiluba ofZambia, President Mandela of South
Africa and the recent summit in Nairobi of Presidents Moi of Kenya, Mkapa ofTanzania and
Museveni ofUganda. We share their deep concems about the escalation of the conflict.
The United States has consistently called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign
forces, an end to ethnic-based killing, respect for human rights and the safety of humanitarian
workers and other non-combattants. We urg~. all sides to hait further offensive action a~d~~i
pursue immediate negotiations to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict: the security
concems of Congo's neighbors, the Jack of broad-based participation in the political process,
and full rights for ail ethnie groups in the Congo.
We also reiterate our unequivocal support for the territorial integrity of the Congo and
condemn any violation ofthis fundamental principle ofboth the United Nations Charter and
the Organization of African Unity.
We are gravely concemed about reports that insurgent grou'ps·motivated by ethnie hatred ·
such as the Interahamwe militia and the ex-Rwandan armed forces are actively involved in ,
the conflict. We condemn the Congolese governrnent's efforts to recroit and train these
groups and view with alarm the fact that this conflict is strengthening the hand of the
perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide.
In the wake of recent fighting in which large numbers of prisoners were reportedly captured,
we call on all parties to the conflict to respect international law, including applicable
conventional law on prisoners of war, assume their responsibilities for their protection and
allow the Red Cross access to them.
(end of document)
Il Press Statements Index I State Department Home Page Il
This is an official U.S. govemment source for information on the World Wide Web.
Inclusion ofnon-U.S. Governrnent links does not îrnply endorsement of contents.
,
UCMANr
MEDIA STATt:MENT ISSlTED BY .THE REGIONAL MEtTING OF MlNtST'E RS OF
F·oREIGN AFf'AIRS AND DEFENCE ON THE SITUATION IN THt OEMOCAATtC
REPUBLIC or CONGO HELD IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA FROM 26 - 27 OCT08t~
1998
At th~ lnv.i.t:ation of President Frec::ierick J T Chiluba o! the
Republic of Zambia, the Reglonal meeting of MinistGrs of Foreign
Atfairs and De!ence on the situation in the Demoeratic Republic
of Congo took place in Lusaka, Za.mbia from 26-27 October 1998.
The meeting which was chaired by Hon.ES Silwamba, MP, Minis~er
for Preside~tial Atfairs of Zatlbia, was attended by M1n1sters
from Angola, the Oemocratic Republic o! Congo. Burundi, Gabon,
Kenya, tlbya, Moz~mbique, Namibia, Rwanda, South AfricA,
Tanzania, Uganda. Zambia and Zimbabwe. Also in attendance were
the rP.presentatives of the Unite-d Nations and Southern African
Devclopment Community.
The Opening session of the meeting ~as addressed by the
President of the Republic of. Zambia Mr Frederick J T Chiluba,
the Secretary-General of the OAU and a representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Na~ions and the Executive
~cretary of SADC.
The meeting _fo.cus~d .?n issues ;~l.ating t~.r~~~, .cessation of
hostili t!es in the'.. o~c r the ~stabl~_st:une.n~ . of :a c~~~-~-_f i.;:~.
Agreement, the mechan.isms fo;_ · i~l?~em~J!.!;.~~9,.r...S.l!!,.ï~!~.~!:::f~E~ ... .
Agreement, the . withdrawal of -.f:~.~eign. f9.r_c,$.;.~··addressin9 .. ~t~~.1 .
securi ty conç:.e~ns .,o.f the D~C .... and .. t~~...:.r~.~~.9!1Ç.?,u.r~~.g.,c~~r:tJ.F~e.~ ,~~
well as ot!ler ~o~~éw-up mechariisms · for : f~c~litating ·the' peace
proc&ss in the DRc·;--. ·· ...
At the end of a comprehensive review of all these issues, the
meeting: ..
1. Adopted ln principle a draf~ Cease-fire Agreement and also
a Mechenl~m for Irnplementing and Monitoring a Cease-f1re
Agreement, pending further consultations with all
concerned. In this regacd. ~here was an acknowledgement by
Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Uganda of the presence of
t.heir troops in t.he DRC, Rwanda di<i not acknowledge the
presence of 1ts troops in the DRC,
2. Established a Mechanism for the involvQment of the rebels
in working out the modalities for the implementation of the
cease-!ire. In this regard, proxlmity ~alks with the
rebels were to be fncilitated by .the following:
J.
Z~rr.bia as Chcl ircnan of the Meeting
The OAU
The UN
SJ\DC
MOZ<lr:\bique
South A!rica
Tan2~nia
Within the framcwork of the established Mechanis~,
con~ultat ions were unoertaken with the =ebels in Lusaka on
26 and 27 october 1998.
r1ith .regard to the secur1ty concerrï$l otf tïie---- .ôïic · and t.~e
n·e.tghbour ing countries, the f ollowin'g', c;·untrfës - Angola, f
Bururldi ; ··Rwanda; Uganda explained in detail, their sëè~1:..:.ty
concerns. The meeting resolve~ to address these ~oncerns
t.hrough· a Mec:hanis.ra invcl ving mili tary experts to be X·-
establ ished in the future. · ·
4. The meeting expressed lts gratitude to the Government and
the people of Zatubia for the warm xeception and hospitality
extended to all participants in the mee~ing.
LUSAKA, ZA.MBIA, 27 OCTOBER 1998
J
.. UCMANN
- ......... ....,....._.~...,.. Ott nstr• wa cnme s 1 ~
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
UGANDA'S POSITION
Oh\J
. r~ ~:: ~' ffl H rJ: s tl1l f· ~~~HUL U .
PEACE AND SECU,'IITY
. IN THE
GREA~!~ lAKES REGION .
THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO·
------------------------------------------------------------------------~-------.------------------
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS
INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest problems in addressing the current political
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ORC) has been the
DRC government's stance that there is no rebellion in the DRC, but
rather an invasion of DRC by Uganda·and Rwanda.
Contrary to DRC's deliberate stance, the crisis in that country is
fundamentally an internai confl\ct with external dimensions. This
fact is- now regionally and internationa.lly acknowledged. lnternally,
there is political resentment and an armed opposition by Congolese ·
parties, in the DRC. Externally, some neighbourir,g countries, .
including Uganda, have leginiate concerns as a result of internai
weaknesses and/or deliberate policies in the DRC.
The internai dimesions· are for the Congolese people to determine
their own destiny and indeed they coalesced and ·contributed to the
eventual ouster of former President Mobutu Sese Seko. During the
current regime of President Laurent Desire Kabila, internai concerns
remain at the centre of the crisis in the DRC.
Nhat is, however, of great concern to outsiders like Uganda is Ç)RC's
persistent support for dissident groups from neighbouring countries
and its conriiv9nce with the pef petrators of the 1994 genocide in.
Rwanda. -
The Grisis was ignited in 1996 when Mobutu's regime disowned
Congolese · of Tutsi origin (the Masisi and Banyamulenge) and
threatened to evict them from their ancestral land which they had
occupied long before the present porder~ were drawn. This was with
the full connivance of the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda.· ·. Rwanda whièh saw themselves threatened joined forces
with the Alliance of Dernocratic Forces for the Liberatiori of Congo,'
Zaïre (ADFUCongo-Zaire) and brought down to a tragic end Mobutu's
reg1me.
DRC LINDER H.E. PRESIDENT LAURENT DESIRE KABILA
When Mr. Laurent Desire Kabila was sworn in as President of the
DRC on 2.9. Mav 19~7, he enjoyed wide support internally as well as
regionally.· There was hope that his immediate preoccupation would
be to reverse the negative attributes inherited from the Mobutu era.
lndeed, with Mobutu gone and Kabila in power everyone assumed the
sitμation in DRC cou Id only change for the better.
lnstead, President Kabila .concentrated on monopolising power,
thereby alien.ating the opposition groups to his method of rulè .. ·civil
oppositior)' .lead~r, l;tlene. Ts.hisekedi;: was $en.t:)nt9 internai ,exile.·
Tho.së' whé criticized hirh were saéked or impris.onëd. -: Pr~$.!_Qent
Kabila became suspicious of the very forces that brought him ·intô .
power. Consequently, the Congolese Banyamulenge were targeted
and President Kabila increasingly started to recruit his own tribesmen
from Katanga lnto the .national arrny to the chagrin of. other social
groups in DRC .. He failed ·to endear himself to·the Cori:golese people.
. .
The human rights r~cord in the DRC has been mostly negative which
came to light with impediments that the DRC leadership put to the
work of the UN Investigation Team on hum~n rights .abuses. The
much hoped for accomplishments in economic reform ~nd growth
have ~ot been realised with the country's rich resources mostly being.
plundered. There has been no credible open system or transition to
good governance.
Moreover, President Kabila continued to antagonize the ï"nternational
community over human rights abuses during the war that bro.ught him
to power as well as over economic interests (mining concessions) and
the repayment of external debts owed to multilateral · Financial
Institutions (IMF/World Bank). Corruption and nepotism have
remained endemic as during the· Mobutu regime.
)f particular concern to Uganda, Sudan-backed( Ugandan rebels
:ontinued to l~unch attacks on Uganda from DR'c territory. The
2
,,
lnterahamwe and Ex-FAR were also gaining renewed ground in
President Kabila's DRC. Rwanda which had thought the . Kabila
regime wou_ld now put to an end the Ex-FAR and lnterahamwe
incursions ïnto Rwanda, was grossly disappointed and in fact its
efforts for permanent security in Rwanda threatened. Uganda·wn-1ch
~Il along had been threatened by incursions of the rebel groups
mostly of ADF in Western Uganda, but also West Nile Bank Front
.(WNBF) and Uganda National Rescue Front Il (UNRF Il) using secure
bases in DRC during Mobutu's regime also thought with Kabila in
power, these incur~i~ns would cease. ·This was n·ot to be the ca?e
DRC's woes and President Kabila's troubles should be traced from
there where rebellioU$ g'roups Within DRC starteq to wage war against
his regime. This has nothing to do with the. so call.ed building .of a
Hima-Tutsi empire nor the. alleg·ed invasion by Uganda and Rwanda.
The.troubles stem largely from inside the belly of the DRC. On the so
called re-est_ablishing of a Hima-Tutsi . empire, those propagating the
idea are obscurants trying to make smoky what is otherwis.e clear to
see. From a historical point of view, there has never existed such an
empire in the interlacustrine reg ion, nor anywhere else, because the
two groups have never been rulers·.
As a neighbouring country and because of its own security conc~rns,
Uganda had been following t8e developments il! DRC with keen
interest. lt had been hoped that Mr. Laurent Desire Kabila, who by
circumstances had emerged as the Leader of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, would overcome
his past weaknesses through regional advice and counsel. Ffrsf, H..E. ·
President Yoweri Kaguta. Museveni tried.:-to-:·draw his attention to 'the • ; .• .. ,,. :\ : . :51.;: • ~. . -'1., ...-. tl,~t<.:. •, • ,•'»f . , .._. .......". :'11,' 1• ••
issues at hand, with .no avail.:~:Other .regiorial' le_ao~rs: tri_ed. As tension
• .. • • • • , • .... s• .-, , ,-.;- -.· , r•· ;"' ~ '' " • J ' " ·:\'"'-"" ·---r·l~.- ···: ... ~V:"!'~,... .... :. 1 · • • mounted with H.E. Pr~sidénf ~~bila fa!li~~j_'put_\,vitb_:t_H.e_·very allies· he
had started off the strugglé w·ifh,·_,H.E. Prê?içi~nfMû:seveni, on ·the
occasion of the SADC Economie Forum·...-s ·è"Îtlii=l~r""~· in ·Namibia:,
·propos·ed a regional s·ummfCon DRC. The_rft'airï ,·reason for the .
Summit was to pre-empt ~nv ... br~.êk;üp ·of a -rebelliori of Côrf§olesé
parties a·gainst their goverrimënf" .. . ·.
The regional Sümmit was co~verië.dJiy"H:~::-·Prëside~t Robert Mugabe
of Zimbabwe on 7 - 8 August ·19H8îil'Vfétoria Falls, five ·days after the
3
' .
'-'.V~.f)[l. RRÇ_..0,§l.? ... ~[μpJ~gJ2 __ Au_gu_st 1998) between·Preside·Dt ·Kabiléf~
, • '.. . ~. :) - '1··-·· ., r.i • .\ , ••• •• "' ..... •' ·· """' ·· '• .:•• • , . .. •. •· • '• • ... . • • ,. government-·and the ·Congole·se armed oppos•t1on/ At the tim~. the
chance to reverse the eve!')ts was not entirely lost if only the issues a1
han~ .. ~~!~:--~.q~_r.~~~-eçj__ip _their rig~tful ~9nte~t. l.iultê ·divè·rsiohary _'is
DRC's~.ii:fsisten~~ -~~:a.tJ~er.~:.i~ -.h.~. lo.t.ernal. r~.~~!lion ïri the count.ry arid , • ., • \./·' · ~···,·--- ~·:-.. , .. _. ••: • •• , •••. • ,• • ,. • • . C.: -' r .J; , , • .• - • - .,.·., _. • • .. . .. • ,.
; irist~~(çfJ~~'=.all.egatJ.qr:(rrùtâEf,by _ l;)RC thàt Uganda and Rwanda had . . ·, ~ ., (, \.,, . - .• .. ';" • . ,- . . : ...... ~ . . : .. .
committed ·ag~j'ressior;, ag·arnst the country . .
THE ISSUES ..
As stated above, the inte_r_nal issues are for the Congoles people to
determine their own destiny.
The · re.gional pr6blems .rriainly affect. Rwanda (ex-FAR · and
• . ·• . .• ,,.'.r-•,i4·- ... --. • . ·.- _ ,. •••••• ,"'1. ' ' • lnterahamwe), Angola (Savimb1 and UNITA) and Uga·nda (activ1t1ës of
Suçf ~n-backed Ugànèf'an reb.els_. -~sp~çia,J_ly :th~f: ADF).' . ù~j"anda's:
• l · • • •, ~ . .. · , -: ... . ., .... •;. • • • • • • ••• • • • .• : .••••• • ,I •. • •• ·1. ··· · ·.;·· • ~ • : .. . • .-•t • ... . ... . .. . • . •. .
supp~~t f9~ the .. anti.:-M.9..9..Y~U ·camp'aigri was actua'lly becai.Js'e·_.ôf..t.his ..
problëm'/· ug·arida's·~·,.fnv·81vemenf:ag'aïnst rvîë&uh:r was·--~1st{J)~rt1y
because of the impend1ng gèhoéide ·a,gainsf Ban:yàniuiéng~·.:; Rwa.nda
'«as more involved on this particular issue for very understandable
reasons.
The actions of lnterahamwe and . ex-FAR Rwandese, constitu'te a
regional threat. For examp°ie~ fri.' Garà'mbâ_Pcfr~ (OF{Ç.). ~t to_e__pordèr
between Sudari. 'bRC :Iihd _CAR:····1nterahaïiïwè ân'ê:J Ex-FAR were
tra1_ning toçie.ther witb .Ugandan rebels to des_tabil~~ U_g_~in~a.
lt will be recalled that only recently, the lnterahamwe massacred over
one million people in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: Surely, the
region and the international community cannot forget the gruesorne
experiences .of 1994 so soon. ln Uganda, we cannot forget the
inhumanity inflicted ~:m those victims when bodies, in parts, appeared
on our part of Lake Victoria. Imagine a baby still tied to its mother
with both missing their heads! Heads and éther ~imbs pierced on
pales ·as if ready for roasting! A repeat of that vivid experience should
never be allowed; and the whistle has already been blown. ·
There is an opinion which is unacceptable ~o the Government of
Uganda. This opinion is that a Governrrient, because it is ruling over
. 4
. .
a sovereign country, like DRC or Uganda, has got a right, if it so.
chooses, to exterminate any group of people within that country.'
According to this opinion, Rwanda1 Uganda and ott)ers were wrong to
oppose- Mob,utu's genocide schemes over the Banyamulenge.'
Tanzania was wrong to oppose ldi Amin in the 1970s because he was
just killing Ugandans who were his subjects. The Americans, the
Europeans and others are wrong in opposing genocide in Bosnia.
Many of us have been wrong in OP.posing the slow genocide of black
people in· the Sudan·. lndeed we were wrong to oppose the racist
minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. -· .
Uganda has never agreed with this vulgarization oJ the concept of
sovereignty of the state. Uganda is qn ·record, during the 1986 OAU
Summit to have criticised the OAU for having looked on, under the.
guise of S~)Vereignty, when close to 800,000 Ugandans wère
murdered by the state under the regin1es of Amin and Obote. There
are certain matters that must be universal. Among these, we can cite
two: sovereignty of the population and not just the regimes and the
inviolability of the sanctity · of life, especially the banishment ·of
genocide but also extra-judicial killings.
While Uganda recognizes the soverajg_nty of st~tes and sùp·ports. the.
inviolability of borders as i[lhéritéd at irïde_pèndehce. U_g_ahçla remains
opposed to the violation of ~n evEfn _mot~ fundamental sovereigntythe
sovereignty of thé: peopfe; ·moré p'articularly ·by the gèno~idiares.
s .ome p~op1e as~: .i'Wh°Y...:~.n.oy1d ,q _g~~9a_ arrog~te_.,to ïtself the ~oie of.
stopping ge·nocidè irf thë' Grêat Lâkes Régioh?t :·T.he answer is. t~a.t in . . . . . ... .. . ... .. ' .... .. .. .. ' . ... " ...... \ .. '\ .,.,., ,. .. . . . . "'·
. · ·1994 in Rwanda one· million Africâns ·wëre)r\tis$·acred ~nd no body
did anything.
. . .
The genocide only stopped when the Rwandese Pafriotic Front (RPF)
swept the rotten group of killers out of power and out of the coyntry.
The same thing would have happened to the Banyamulenge in 1996,
if the Rwanda army and the Banyamulenge themselves had not acted
intime. ln Uganda, du ring the time of Amin and Obote, eight hundred
thousand Ugandans were killed. ln the Luwero Triangle there are
thirty mass graves. This· genocide only stop·ped when the criminal
regimes of Obote and Okello were routed. We were supported by a
few friends like the Tanzanians in our lonely struggle. ·ln East Africa,
5
some cûuntïi6S have, therefore , resoived that we shall never tolerate
genocide again. We believe, it is this resolve that. has, for instance,
deterred the leaders of the ~urundi junta from launching a new
· genocide.
On the question of not interfering in the 11internal affairs" of sovereign ·
states. First of all, Uganda was rescued by "interfering · in those
internai affairs" by our Tanzanian brothers and others. Secondly;
President Kabila was put in power by, especially, Rwanda, but also
others by, "interfering" in the "internai affairs of M·obutu's Z_aire to
defend themselves but aise to help the Congolese patriots. If you
reject, "interfering in internai affairs11 under all circunistances, then the
government of President Kabila should resign and we install Mr.
Likulia Bolongo, thè last Prime Minister of President Mobutu . .
Otherwise we become inconsistent and we transform the otherwise
laudable principle of non-interference into a charade behind which we
commit evil.
There has been talk that there are good and bad foreign countries
that are. involved in the DRC con~lict. The so called good countries
are those invited by President Kabila, which countries have sent
troops that are fighting on President Kabila's side. The so called bad
countries are those that are alieged to be supporting the rebels or the
ordinary people of Congo. We are convinced that foreign interference .
is bad. lt becomes even worse when those foreign forces support one
faction or the other in a country and end up distorting the politics of'
that country. Foreign interven~ion can only be posi.!)ve if lt prçmote~
national reconciliation ~nd national ~arn1?D~/e w~re t:~e first to be
invited over a vear berore .the eruptton of the rebellton tn DRÇ. We
are in the Coniio .6ùrely be·caus~ 0.t~-~-s'écunty"1ntërestà of U~anda. ·
We are nOt there to t1gh(othër peop1e·s wars.· \0[.ë _wfi["°pùïï"O~Iofthë
Congo ·-it wè are a~S~re~ -of a11 . ~çë~o.{ançt::. _ ~.rr~.n..9..e_cn~nt Jhat
addre·sse·s Uganda's security conterns. Our viev,1 1~ that all foreign ·
tro"ôps sho·ucërïeavé cne ùRC .. 11ietwTt°hdrawaÏ shoÛ-ld. he .. done after
a cééise=lïre ana \,,;n_~n-. niiJjJ~J rn111t1}f~tfüriâl fôrç~~ b.aY~ taKe1!. up
positions" fn the o·Rc to superv:se strj c~ 09se1val"1ce· qt t~_e C~.§S_e~fire
and ensure s"e curity ôr Lrie n e1gnooL1rinq countnes.
6
•
The problem in the DRC is essentially political and requires a political
settlement between President Kabila's government and the entire
Congolese opposition. bath armed and un-arme'd. This necessitates
an internally negotiated political settlement. with regional countries,
the OAU ·and the UN acting as guarantors to the political process:Security
concerns of neighbouring countries will need t(? ·be
addressed within ttJe comprehensive framework for a permanent
solution to the problem. Suffice is to give below here fμrther details
of Uganda's security concerns.
UGANDA'S SECURITY CONCçRNS
lt is a fact that son1e neighbouring countries. to the DRC have
legitimate security concerns emanating from· the latter's terri~ory.
lndeed the Regional Heads of State have not only discussed the issue
":'· ..... - .1 . .. .. t ;- .. , ._ _...,.,,., · - • • ..... . . ...
but also pro_n9un~eqJ.hems~lve? qn it. At thèir .Sümmm~ .'Jn .Yi~tqria
·Falls. Durban· and Nairobi, amonçi 6ttîirs. tri"e Reads -oi' -State·
recog niié~-tfi?t tne_re .-ar~ .s~~ç~ur1Jy _ çof1~e~nsqr Q~ry rjbo~ nqg':ë~üntries
to thè. ORG tnat ·neea 16 ·ô·è aJrirè'ss-ed- wttiilit à. ·cbq1prètïëns1ve
framewérk-·tor . a f.Je,-manent. soiùuun- to üie orèuiem.·:·. -As-ëarlier
m·entioned, Ugand~s secunty concc-rns d1d n-ot start with President
Kabila's DRC. President Kabila's government was itself partly a direct
result of security concerns of ne_ighbouring countries. DuriT1q
Mobutu's reaime, Mobutu in collaboration with Sudan chose tô 91va
support to Ugandar:t···rebèls· who~ h'aq :·a prog~-~m.me to destabilize:
Uganèia. From· 1 ~·HS-we -expène, ,èeêJ rre·q-uerrrarra-ct<s-,aun_g_n_eâ \Yorr1 r ·-- - • • .,. .. - . • - . • . ._ ,. . "' . . ... .. . • .,. -
the DRC terntorv. · · . ·
u g and a I s _i ~~o lvem~~~. i ~..J~i}? ~ÇJi.r .~ i.(~:stf t ;g,RJlq9, -~:h.~. K~ ~i la -~~ruggle
and mqre d1rectly th1s .year)..1.s ,be~auseJh~(~ has been a threat to ournatloh'~(
·s:gêûrityl ehi~ÎJ;èlCn.~l ft~m~~ii1?t~~-,Johi{?8t~~su~p_qr.ùtor .
Nàt1o~~é:t~ :n:rmv_ rot 'tt:1i?· ÇioërâtÎQh .o.f Q_ianda~T~.A~·u) ·au.riig ~~~ufui
r~gime,_·and more !ec_ent1~;· tr~e ~1~1_eu ':Jerrr~-~~ ~t~~~~~-prces .(AD6)i
The AOF (military· grou6 )_ s_tarted as a · RP.lt9i°dUs.Jslaoeiç~S1~ctoJ .
Taoi1q$- Ïn . ·, 993 . With·· the·t~,;â'j~t~of.~.'ôvértnroVvin~·t'he . traël1tio,·,~i .-
( conservat1ve) n·aûoriaî -is1am1c --îéaderstiii? . ini-the. -"-11on:~1n-i1amic
govèrn~ent'i in Ûgànda< -~udàn ... ) _h:roüg_h.Ùs _E~p~_§~y i.n_ Wganq~.I
faciiitàtmrâ Jiudêus SalaâfgtÔüp:otTa~li:9s~frorr1 wbiç~ ~p9ut ??.0 .
rf
t·
J~,gtls ~ -~t~~~{-~~r.yit~9~J9·~~r$i.ni~~(~~n~~-~!1gbt·... Ligcih~à~iye~n~~.bt~::i
, ·groü~-~~~'!l..E~.9 al: _a Qlac.e ca_11_eq·~8ü_seru~_a in_ Wester!1_ Ugàf19.§l.:.~
starfe.d. militàry.tra1h1riq .:: ·Gover.menfforces;J,o_wèver. attacKed th ........ .,.,. . - .... _ - .... ~ ~ .... - ~, .. ··--··-· - ·- .... _ .. .
in'.-1.S~o an·d.destr.oy~~q=~~Ep c~·b'i-2 ~:::'.Ap,oqt f9.'1tJI~-~ ,04?r sùrv1vor.s f
tc{,.Zâfre .fnRG) -whère thev~wer:e re-o'r :Janised a11d I e-·equ1·pped
Mobutu ;:)nd ~üd~D;: .. 1 hey.1~1~·r ~oitéd wifh~the :rer.n_n-a_ht.§ ofN.A~.W-~
, 1 for'nléd·':±he··AqE·~ -.. â~acked Uaa·~~a ·oo_ 1..~~Nove_m!:er j9~6
. Mpo'nd~e o~_!h$ bOr~~_r;~h Zaj~e b~t Wer~ rer.,uls~g_ _9_nd_ i1E.9 LJdC.~
Zaire: The attaçK ·wps ·planr 1t;;d in Kaya(~udan rand the reoels WE
_/ infilfr.atëëf' frîtà _üg~-odàthrôugh~Zaire Wllrl th~ full Knéw1edge art
Mobutu-ffôvernnïent.': . .. . . . ... . .. . .
Wh.~h fy19butU._W'?S 9usted, we '1ac!_ ho.Qed. [email protected].C .. c6.nç'erb.§. wguld
addrèss-·e-d ·-by- ïn·-~~Ji.e~ ?Uthontjes in..Kin.sbr3~a~. l "ln.fo.rt.~.ll~L~ly, this ~ . . -
. ncit ~_a_epe"~:. _Pre~id~f1t_!_\~_biJ.a solved his qwn .P!O~lem of asce, ;d:1
to power but forqot 9~C.O}Y_n gJoblem. Wé coo.tinueg·to ex1:ieriencë tl
. attacks· under Presideù\t Kâb11â's;1i9" ernment · ·:
Of coûrsë_ L).àaoâa çiid riofêxoëéf an ÜDD..I:Q1!AmP.oi1Q hêPQ8fl so soc
because or capacitv con~traints ~ th..e.12.PC..gov~rru::oent.. .' 1 tiât is' wl
the tw·--o. cou- ntries i--ë.a .. che'd- a:· .m ··-üt· u-al- arr.a.n. q·eménr that ïed to 0 "- . .. -· -- --..
mi,lit~ry presence. in the DRC. to ioiotlv termu1ate.~anv .CittaçKs. fro
either ternotorv. 1n'clüdinq_ biL~i ïda"o-:backed U~. oebels
Eastern DRC.
, The ProtocollQ tb.i.s èffect was si~ned betwee11_the two·countries .o
. 27 }\pril 1998; intë"f.'a11.a;-"td coooerate iif .order to· insure security an
, pe·ace a1ong !ne common border~
lnitially, Uqanda received . coopèration <troîn ·the Rwandese officer
wh·o ~ere rnannina th·e L:1tieô'~Er3steJo area bo~dering Ugandc
Uganda carried out joint ob~ratio.ns· with .. ttiif Roc· Armed Force:
. (F6ë)'ag?iris~ ADl:_and the operations reaistered success at least fn
soniëtime·.
. '1":"'.-r""!r..·- .~ · . . • ••. : ,·· ·. <:." ·1\" .... ""!."'t .. t-,'"'I•','\~ •. ~ • >.. .
Howèver. when the Rwandese· p·atri0tic" Army'(RPF)_Officers..§.tqrtec
pulllng out of DRC, the cooperanon rrom FAÇ officers startec
dwino11ng. t::v-ën when tne -Kwandese_were still there. some t-AC
con1manoers would cohabit' peaêëfüllT~.ît.ft ADF fèbêls saying 'th·at the . . .
latter were enemies of Uganda and not DRC .and in some· cases
faciTitated the rÀbels. ·_1-dr examole. one -Col. Ebemba, Mobutu's
Commander who _planne_ci 8nrl led ADF ta attack Uganda on 13
Novémber 19961 was re-deployed in the Eastern province of DR~,
where ADF wa~ ooeratina .frnm oeL..-the Kabila reqime . . îhis meant
that Ebemba woulci co,:1tin1Je to .facilita1A ADF activities 1wst ·as he
used-to do durin_g Mob~tu dàvs. He was trans{êred after Uganda had
bitt~clv .Prot~sted.
Since 1996, ADF from bases in DRC has raided Uganda and killed
many people, lnJUred otners and destroyed pr.operty. t-rom f.Jovember
1996 wh~~ ADF started its act1v1t1es.Jdp to 24th f::f0.vembeT1998, about
551 people have be~n killed. over 256 iniured. 904 abducted and
about 35,UOO have been internally displaced (IDPs). However, most
of tne iibductees have b-een rescued. -The m_os.t q[Ui3SOme attack Wa~
the Kichwamba Technical School massacre ot 8 Jupe 1998 .._in
\f'Jes·tern Uqanda in which over 80 students were burnt to death and
~100 âbducted. The most promine·nt ADF attacks are the foflowmg:-
Date District Place People People Abducted
killed injured
13.11.96 Kasese Mpondwe 20 - 400
30.04.97 Kasese Kasese 50 - -
23.07.97 Bundibugyo Ntoroko 28 12 14
August
1
Kabarole Karambi 35 14 7
1997
1
14.09.97 Bundibugyo Nyakahuka 30 - -
Refugee
Camp
08.06.98 1 Kasese Kichwamba Over 80 several 100
Technical
College
101.08.98 Kasese Kasese 8 6 -
! Town
- -
ADF rebP-ÎS c.o.ntin·~~d· tô' 1àùnch attacks Qn Western Ug~_nda distrié1
frorn . tneir·. ·J:iasês~·-,n~~DRë . unt11 .. 0§an.. q a -P-edpiès Defencè ~orce
· (UPDF) hic,eas·èo 1ts ·trgog_sJ 1ô Eâst~r.h lSRc· ~n_u. ëv"e;·r.:rùn serven
r . AOF e;;amps there .. ,\·
The situation was ri_ot helpeçj ·when th~ current rebellion erupted in th
oRë._8ii''2°.Àù~iust 1·g·sâ\·,- .su.dari, thè în~lri ·batker .. o(Uqandan· rebel.~
h~~-contirfQê<;i_ tçj _p:lai.an· adïvA· roië: Ug8ndâ·cànnot affÔ.rcf°tb ~fêavé:
:yac\.~1=J.rn~.l~s1:. ~L;JQ8[1.:rt~kës· aëfv~ntage ofthë situation ~u.1d .. irit~-ns1fy it
$UP.Pôrf.tq_ ug_a!)ç!~o-·rëtJ_?l·s -91J -BRt tefritorv ::.. lndèéd:-=südan-ii.~
since ~qbJIJ~é~:tb1_<?r~ ug·.?fldc!ri .f~b~I Ja.cti6ris _ar,~· f!1bveq th.e111 ta" tH.
DRC w1th rnouVP~ tb taünch ·ma~s,ve att~cks· ori Uqan.. d a:.· Tfüs èoul1
onl'i_J;appén witb the tacJLrnoval of the-autbqrities in-Kinshasa .. :·
The military incursions that h9y~ been inflict~d on Uganda by Suda,
are well known. Tnêse·irÏcludé.'fhËtyeadv âè'rfâYS'èfrnbardméhts ·an.1 • • • • . ,1
cross border · incursions on · uqanoan · terntory':"· 1 nitially Sud a ci wa:
using fts own terrifory~as the.:.launChing paa for Ugandari\::fèbels · · '. · .. , ... ~;: .. .:.. ,·.-.,.:.::-·: ,·. , .. •, ' .. ,,,.:1,"-·~· · ... ··,;· ~ '• ' • :.. :_·~ · :·· .:. ,-; \ , :~·.- · ,:·,, ,·.•' '"'!i"'"'.;:0,.!';';.,:1:., ·
When they lost m~c~· of iJ i_n S9t..itherri ·sudaJi to the SPLM/SPLA·: thë:
increasîrigly start~~ ~o· us.~ t~e··oRC térritory .. There. is e.vi,d~~ce th~
du ring ·the fight f~fr K'jndu .betw'een _DRC force~ an~ Çq~golese reb~ls
the _!atter.~aptured many Ugandan rebels· of diffe·rent ·facÜons backec
by Sudan·: Sudan also nursed the idea that its atrocious activities ir
Northern Uganda were not being felt by the Uganda governmen
since, to thern, the latter cared less about its nationals in Northen
Uganda. Therefore, Sudan wanted to hit where it hurts most
we·stern Uganda. Of course,this is rubbish; Sudan has simply failec
to over-run Northern _Uganda ever since.
. . . . . ... ,._ .. , .. .. . ,r·: - . . ..
Ali alona. Sudan has .. been. d~sigrJi.og_)jJans· .to ·use the many anc
larger afrpofts/àirffeids· 1n '·~asrern ~DRÇ~, fo-: ·faûriëh .. massivë· aeri~
at~aè1<s ôri- Ogano~ .. ·. FoHgwi.~.i the eyênfs: ~or2~-A~ugTisf..,f~l9'8:- .thi~
advantag·e. could not t?.8 all_o~ed them . ."f~pr i.ts_.·security arid .becausë
there was· rio· ·semblan-ë·e·~·ôt.7.<iongole.se a·uthb'fity !-iffE~t§tètri'1Corigc
bordenny ·u;-,· Ug.anda ·haC:Crio.· a1tèrnative; .. b:i.i...to .takè. ·confro[o-t .Rey
airp.'orts1a·1rfielas 1h Èasfei'fi fJKGt . . .
Sudan has- ~_een __i!J _d~~g_t!Y. .9 e$,t~p1Lzfo~_]' çi911<;J~ fr9rn QRC.~ir:1ce 1.993;
aJtd s·f'nëe erùption ot war. in~:;ttte}IDKG.~6h:.0f. ALJqus·t. ·1998'. diulamatie::
10
and' ··oth~r·.·. ccintacts. b·ètwe·en DRC. ·and. ·sudah_ h~ve incre·aséd'.
Con.seqüéritly Suda·n;sÎhvolvement ln the DKC-war 1'rn:ensmédle.ading
to _.the .·c;1~p10*1' .. ~!1:t qf.il§ trc;,~es (incl~ding .Ugj~da:l re~~ls ba~e~) fi
s,ud~_~) .. to·.- K1~ang~!1' . an~t. K_,_r:1a_u: .. : f?m~ . OLJn_e_ · Vg~h~a-~ _.r~6e1~
r captUr~~ wnen th~~~ tvyo towns f~II t9 Congolese rebefs,Jesflfiea 1h~t
t~~y6 ... 0.ere.-.,r,ec/~ .. 1~e~d .. Jr~rj1 . refugeE;i_ ç~rn·p.s ... /n · .suaàn by Pr~~iaei)f".
. Kàbiîa'·s SOtl ai ,d iaban 'A'm1rï, ·so·n 6rug·i:tncfa ~ lormËfr-d1cfator tdd
Am;;,·wh_ë 1~-atso s~onsû, ,ng Ûganê:ta_n rëbeis.- - . ' . - .. . ·-·
-· - ... .. -. .
Suâàrf"èf ireêtîy iP.~~~:~.r~ ~~d· provide,s ba.sës to sev~ral rebel g_rOUR~
opposeç:t to the __ -U~~r:tPa·:QQy~rr,ment._ ~These includ~ .We.st Nile. Ban}
Front (WNBF), Uganda Nation91 Rescue Front Il (UNRF îl), ·and_
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) woose Camps in Sudan are at Jabelin,
r:-,Jesitu, Lilia, Roja Hills and Juba. ·
An Amnesty International (Al) report on Hu01an Rights violations by
LRA entitled "Breaking God's Commands-The destruction of
Children by LRA" 18 September 1993, says:
"Sudan government's support for the· Lords Resi$tance Army
(LRA) rebe/s has been a crucial factor in the movements
operations since 1994. Sudan provides weapons and a secure
rear .base where abducted children are tra1ned. Sudan a/so
uses LRA as a proxy army ( a .militia) to fight ifs own SPLA . ...
abdUcted children who escape tell stori.es abo[!t "ArEJbs" bringing
LRA food, guns, and giving advice. Sudan government can
therefore be held responsible for human rights abuses
committed by LRA because it is the . one facilitating and
sanctioning the method used in their abuse".
Since 1995, betw~eh.,·~o.9q·c;3~d 8.00Ô ch1ldren aged 11. to ·1s years
from Northern Uganda have· been abdütred .·p~C.LRA; the mosf
no~ori_o~s. o~e -~e1ng .the abduëtiqr.(Qf).~.9 ~.:boke SP-nio~ Se'?ondaty
. School Girls: in ôètôheF 1996·:···AlH:irt from ·thesff childrën","·hundreds
of people (Uga_n_d~ns)· have .:b.een ~:-killed·.:ia:Od: .. prôperty ·.de~t_royed.
Notable among the se atrocitie·s· àré::: . .. .
11
Date District Place Peopl Pe~ple People
e injured abducted
killed :
',
22.04.96 Gulu Atiak Over - -
200
04.03.96 ·Gulu Karuma 130 - -
29.07.96 Gulu Kilak 8 - -
13.09.96 Gulu - 24 - 16
25.09.96 Gulu - 26 - 24
08.10.96 Apac Aboke - - 139
S.S.S
08.11.96 Moyo - - - 25
12.01.97 Kitgum Palabek . 312 - -
14.01.97 Gulu Kilak 26 - -
19.01.97 Kitgum Atanga 41 - -
09.02.97 Kitgum · - 24 8 10
04.07.97 Gulu Nwoya - - 50
14.07.97 Kitgum Acholi Pii 110 - -
14.12.97 Apac Kamdini 32 12 24
The ·above incidences are the orlly or.ies cited ~-~~-a.~se people .were
either massacred or .abç1u.cJ~ç1 .. in hig nU)]b~rs .. . 9.thë'rwise! there are·
·very màny tnore people· (irî tHeir. thoüs'aifêfs) ·who ·ha\,e · beén killed bf
the Sudan ·qacked rebels in 'Nôrthérn ·ugâhdai
As early as 1995; Uganda registere·d criminal acts akin to terrorist
activities. By 1997, _thP.~e t~r~erist ~ctivities spon.$.9.f~d by Sqdan had
actually progressed into full..:blowr.l'terrorist·activ.i~i,ëS:~ Since J.LI.IY.J~97,
there have been nirie {9) têrrôrfsf c3tffiëks carned àut in Kampala using
grenades and home-made bornR'$. ln all, 16 persans died and other
60 have been injured.
12
$.udan has ~1~9 persi,$.têntly .vic;>l.é~üed Ugaf"!da's airspace and its plane$ .. ' . :. . .. • .... \ , .... ,.. . . . · .~ " ... _ . . • . • . • . ... ·. . • • . li:'
:haye cp,rfs.ist~ntly bombed oyr territe:ry 1n w~1ch: :_people have-been'
killed, ·others injured and prop~rty destroyed·. Despite all the above.
support, Uganda has managed to contain the re.bels and had it not
been the rebel bases inside the Sudan, Northern Uganda would be
peaceful. Sorne ·bomb,ing incidents by Sudan include:{' ,. :: · .. · . '. . ... . ' \ , ':
Date District/Reg ion Place
22.09.95 West Nile Moyo town
08.04.96 Koboko Keri
13.02.97 West Nile Moyo town
27.09.98 Bundibugyo Bukaka
03.10.98 Adjumani Pakele
08.10.98 Adjun1ani Unyama & Mugali
Sudan sought for bases in DRC to attack Uganda from the West so
as "to hit where if hurts most" and to compliment the Northern·
(Uganda) r~bel activities. Sudan's threat to Uganda from DRC is
worse than the threat from northern Uganda because Sudan Peoples
Liberation Army (SPLA) to some extent shields Uganda from direct
attacks by Sudanese Armed Forces. ·
Internai we~knesses in the D~Ç_ hav~_f9rced ·P.r~~Jçf~o! Ka.b.H~. to look
fo(foreign trociu~ 8Vt1y.WhArA indudinq Sudan .. : ~LJdan, like any other
co'ùntry' that oave_: Pre~iclioL_K~bila· riiilit'arv :.?.ssi_?J?8C~~-ci'{e its
. demands that t<~hila . a1làws Su.dan tcf·ûsËfEast~rn_ .Ç)R<;, .. especially ·
the airpci~ts~·to l~~n~~~§.!!~çks~;'o·t,~ Uti_ânfi.~~ng·. 'téf suQ.Qjy~l/gandari
rebeÏs with arms -and 9.~h.~r..lo.gîstics.: 'p ·re'sident Kâbila's ciemand for
foreign Troops hâs tn·èrèlorè- provided Suda,n with. t.he rare· oppprtunity
she;· rias-all a10ng chënsheci':::- . . - ...... ·--·
. . .
. .. - · . . • . .. ·.:,.•j'.:~~~ --. . . · - - · ...... .... :\'- . . . . .... . ~ ..,. ' .. ..
Ugandan troobs-t~'e,r~fqre :~dXê'nç~d~ t~ thé stratê'qiè;'))ositi9Q~ _iri :oR.~
as d pre::~.QJPt~ve measure of màkiri'g. it ;r ,,possible r0r Suda_n to resupp1y'
arms to Uoandan -rèbe1s··:arîi·1.tin-force·. is, troops usinq DRC
airports/a1rt1elds ln-the Eâstern .. P.r9~18.CJ:?f -· .
13
The. genociô~ threaj in PRC. is ·appa_rent, more so,. when at the
- ........ ...-. .• ,. .. • 1"-t..•,1:: "" ··..<.=~ ,• • •' • , ' ,• _:, •. '• ~ :.• • •
bE?ginnïn-~f ~of ·ttHf' prese~t cri?ïs, the· government encouragëd its
.citizens·'.to liquidat~ all people of Rwande$e. extraqtion. Repq"rfs
indicate that the UN itself has been worried about the . impending
catastrophe . . A. U:f:..J rènort dated 23 November 1°998 authored by
!Ylahnio'i:iëf}.<asse·m~ -Lntet àlia: say~j . . . .
"The situation in the region is rapid/y heading for a catastrophe.
The danger of the repetition of tt:,e tragedy comparable to the
Rwandan genocide of 1994; but on a sub-regional stage cannot
. be ruled out. "
The report says that s.ome other tw~nty (20) rebel grèups in additio.n
to thosè from 'Rwànda, ~re now .ôperating in the_ reg ion and forgfng·
1in ks·. wlth ... oth e(:a rméd ·' .çj rà up ·sr·in Angola, ·--Bü ru nd.i, ~. U g ~ ~~·a:"a ·hq'
e.l s. ewhe-.r.é ·.. lt a. . d. ds, : -
" .. . this time the rebels are not on/y a/igned among themse/ves
but they are aligned with governments which are using them for
their own purpose".
The governments which are giving· these killers legitimacy and help
are Sudan and DRC. If an International body (UN) itself is worried
about the dangers of these genocidaires, how about those in the
region who are going to be directly affected by the genocide? ·
These concerns and others enumerated herein are real and they m'ust
be addressed in any at.tempJJo fir)d a jusJ _a~d lasting solution .. On its·
pa"rt, Ug~nda is ready_'to p4_ll :~:)l~t.Bf}hi. Pf:fÇ.:~~---~9~~: a~ a·ppropriate ·
measures that guarantee our" security' are put irï plêçe.~i
DRC ALLIES
The Victoria! Falls ·sùmmit'df7'.~JJ} ~~ùgûsf 1 ~9~$:.~âs-éhàràctëri~~d ~y
accusations and counter ac~u;atlOtJ;:, ~::DRCïrYs1stëd~thàt Rwar1'â~tând ·.
• ' - -, •• • • ,• • ' V 'T-):.J~ 0 0
, " •' • \ , • ' •' .~ •141';,:;...;a:,là:,:+("'• , 0
Ugarida had irivadèd DRC~ On the other hand, Rwanda and Ugânda ·
maintained that what was· tïà'pp~oiÎJg_·Jn .. .the .. D.BÇ ,w_9-~ an interna! • , ., . •. r__E,,,. , -~ \' , •' •,,r -; • ... , •·• •, • • . • • • , •.• : 1 , • ., • •
rebel I io ~. :::Co n~eq u~ntly,, ~ n~~,9.f:JIJë:.§4têôihés '.of. thé Su mm it was: ta ...
appoint a Ministerial Com·mittee::-tci'ëstablish·thê iacts·i Members of
14
the Committee moved arou~d the region. S~_oel.l.si_nçilv, :_ev~b.b~fqrf.
the end of the-:Cèmmitfee's mission and withoùt further consÜltatioils.
somè' 1éaders ~who feàred ·that Prësidènf~Kao11à wâ~ cioout to fall
·decicliëJ. \:> ·.1.nterven·è . rD.ilitaJ!!Y~~rf.th~- LlRC·. :T~is inl~rvintfon . by_. ,
Zir,i:,paowe. An·Q.Olq. Nami~ia ~nd 1ateri:Ict1ac;i _wâs i:nost iriaj:>pr_ooriate~:·
because it works to distort the interests of the nationals of the DRC
who end up getting completely rnarginalised . lt distorts the
· understanding of the issues at hand. ...
An_gola'.s strategic interests in the DRC are understandable. lt is a
neighbouring country to DRC and Savimbi's UNITA can ç>nly be
checked by ensuring an ally in Western Congo. Perhaps, Angola
prematurely determined that collaboration with the Congolese rebels
wa·s not going to be certain. . '
However, the involvement of Zimbabwe and N·amibia, which 90 not
share a border with DRC, is incomprehensible. They cannot be
playing the raie of region_al peace-makers because then they .would
be on the side of the majority ·cong9lese who are fighting for their
human rights. Moreover, now that the allies have saved Pre~ident
Kabila from collapsing, the logical thing to do would be to urge
President Kabila to enter into ·internai dialogue with the opposition
grqups in DRC. ·
The dimension that is increasingly becoming apparent, though, is the
commercial interest of the rich picking to be derived frorri the minerai
riches of . the DRC. The DRC Government Mining Company,
GECOMIN, is said to have almost been ceded to Zimbabwe. About
80o/o of MIMBA (diarnond Co.) i~. said tb hav~ passed on to Zimqabwe.
Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) is said to be enjoying monopoly
power as the supplier of DRC ry1ilitary and other requirements·. lt ·is,
therefore, not surprsing that hardline positions against dialogue are
being ta ken at the expense of justice in the DRC. ·
REGIONAL EFFORTS
Since the eruption of the rebellion in the DRÇ, ~here have been
concerted regional efforts to try and resolv~ the crisis. ln additi9n to
constant çpn~u!tations, regionaL.Surnmits _or:-i. DRC have bee·n held in
15
Victoria Falls;: Port l c)Lils, bûrban, Pretoria and Nairobi. The crisis ir
DRC.:f~âtSréé{ promiif~·ntly ât the ·recent (27-28 ·Nov~ .98) Afrièa-Fr"arice
Sürnr:nifir(P.~:rli. °fviinf~ùerial meetings have aise been held in Addh
.i• ' . • ...... ·~:;(. .- .. !. .. ·.: •. •. ~-: i" •, • • • ' · • • • •
Ababa ·ana-· Lusaka: · Uganda has been â keen part1c1pant at all thE .. .. -.. .-...... -.. , , ; - ... ~ '· . . . ... ('- ..
meétings:·on the DRG ç_risis/
The majority in the region are desirous of a peaceful solution to thE
crisjs. Already there is some movement on the need for an immediatE
ceasefire and troop standstill followed by the putting in place of é
neutral multi-national peace-keeping force and the withdrawal o
foreign troops as well as the enhancem'ent of the process of dialogw
between the Congolese internai forces. Regarding the legitimatE
concerns of neighbouring countries, there .
is acknowledgement that these be addressed by putting in place thE
necessary measures.
Th~ second Vict9ri.a.Falls_Summit heid in $~ptember 1.99$_, .u.n.d~~.tt~H
• •• : • • • • ....~· .• • • . , . • . ... _.. • - · • .• ,fi. t : . .;,,' ·-·. , · ··· . ' .~ . ..• , .
Chairmanship of .H.E. President Chiluba of Zambia wa~ .signif.1can
bec~use it re_su lted jntp. agreer:r,ent_ on ~he des_ira~il_ity of_ a ·cê~sefir~
and introd uced the êoricept of proximity. talks·.. with" trî~L.rèp:els~· .. Ttien
was fu(~her progress . in Lusaka ·during thè Ministerial. meeting it
o ·ctober 1998 when thè Dr~ft ·cë9$~fire Agreêmént wa·s ,·adopted ir
pririciple and the concept .· of> prôxi.mity , talks. wi.t~ the rebeli
operationaliz~d. .At-· the: Af.r.iè'à-F:rancà Summit i~ Paris, .. the U~
Secretary GE?ner~I ~.h..nôun·é·e'd thàtthe.-DRC and the other cqnc~rne~
.. ~- • • • • • 1 • • ••
regional countries h'âd corrùnitted th .. ems~lves. ta" a ceasefire' l:l,hd :te
enter into a Céasefire· Agree:m~rit withfn ·thè'.·;fit>rtest: pèriod poss-ible
•• 1, • • • • .. •
The major obstaciè~~however, fèm~Jn.i"?..thâf'P.Pesfdent Kabilà stil
refuse;:to recognize t.~..a J he has an internai problem andto·ehter intc
direct negotiations with· 'the rebels. ·~:~ His backers have not ·beer
encouraging him to do so either.
lt '-'.:Jill be a myth to expect the ceasefire agreement to hold without thE
input and cooperation of the reb°els. If there is to be a cea~efire, thE
Congolese rebels must be involved in the arrangemènts because the~
are the ones primarily involved in the conflict. Consequently, direc
negotiations between the DRC government and the Congolese rebel!
l 1
. is necessary. The compromise concept of proxirl)ity_ talks may work
to delay the process. Moreover, what will happen-when it cornes to
discussing the substantive issues during the inevitable political
dialogue? This is a fundamental matter which the DRC government
must acknowledge.
CONCLUSION
As modalities and mechanisms for an immediate ceasefire in the DRC
are being worked out by the region, the fundamental issue in the crisis
in the DRC is the urgent need for internai dialogue between all
Congolese parties . .
lt i? through dialogue that. ail issues of concern to: the Congolese
parties will be mutually adqressed and resolv~d. To this effect, DRC
must accept the fact that there is internai resentment in the country
and therefore enter into direct negotiations with all the opposition
groups.
Security concerns of neighbouring countries are legitimate. Measures ·
must be put in place to ensure that no security threats emanate fr~_m;
the DRC territory.
The international community must take responsiqility to ens.ure that ·
another geno~ide does not take place in the Great Lakes reg ion.
Efforts to find settlement to the. current crisis. in the DRC should be
geared towards a comprehensive ançj permanent solution. We
should not !ose track. We should address the issues before us and
bring lasting peace to the Great Lakes region so that our energies are
devoted to the much needed area of development cpncerns.
On its part, Uganda's immediate interests have alwa·ys been a·nd still·
are based "6ri: - · · ·• ··· ~«·· ' •• o . . , ..... .. .
The· need to ënsu~e total ·.sec.urity,-iq qll pa-rts of Uganda as
welf as 'thè protectlôrtôi livês\ihd pro-perty of the people of
Uganda.
17
·rhe desire to ensure maximum sfabiltty in the Great Lakes
-region because iristabflity in ariy rieigbbouring country
directly impinges on our own security ~nd economic
rèsoûrëes. Mo.reover·,·we befiëve in the benefits· .tha1 .. · . . ..
accru.è. fror:n regional economic cooperation · and . . .. . . . .·
· ïntegratioh:
These interests are legitirnate and permanent. Our position on the
crisis in the DRC therefore reflects our efforts to pursue those
interests.
ln doing so, Uganda is éommitted_ to the prinçiple of ·non-interference
and go.ad neighbourliness in accordarice with thé UN and .OAU
Charters''.. ln its broader context, the principle guides our relations with
ail neighbouring countries, including the DRC.
APPENDIX.
Photographs of victims of LRA and ADF rebels.
11 . 1, ii, · and iii are photographs of Konis LRA atro~ities ( cuttihg oft
of lips and lin1bs) in Northern Uganda.
u 1v, v, vi, vii and viii are photographs of ADF atrocities in Western
Uganda
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
KAMPALA,UGANDA
KAMPALA NOVEMBER 1998·
18
UCMANNEX 3
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
Distr .
GENERAL
S/1998/1180
16 December 1998
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 15 DECEMBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF UGANDA.TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to reply to the
memorandum of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, circulated as document
S/1998/1146, and to request that this reply be circulated as a document of the
Security Council.
(Signed) Prof. SEMA.KOLA KIWANUKA Ph.D.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda
to the United Nations
s/19n/11eo
English
Page 2
Annex
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Uganda replying to
the memorandum dated 2 December 1998 from the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Government of Uganda categorically refutes the baseless allegations,
made in the above-mentioned memorandum, that Uganda has committed crimes against
humanity and engaged in human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Below we shall give a gruesome picture of the situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo based on investigations by international
agencies. We shall show that it is the authorities in that country who have
committed grave human rights violations against their own people.
Today it is internationally acknowledged by Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch and many other international rights and humanitarian agenciea that,
since coming to power, the Kabila regime bas been responsible for gross human
~ights abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In order to hide these
gross violations, the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are
looking for scapegoats. The fact of the matter is that the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is an internal crisia that has spun out of
control because of the absence of an effective democratic government at the
centre .
The conflict began in the towns of Goma and Bukavu in August 1998. Since
then, Democratic Republic of the Congo government forces are reported by Amnesty
International to have made arbitrary and unlawful arrests and killed hundreds of
Congolese because of their ethnie origins. Government officials as well as the
media have repeatedly incited the populace to attack the Tutsi. For example, on
8 August 1998, radio broadcasts incited listeners to jump on the people with
long noses.
At the ministerial meeting on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo held in Lusaka on 26 and 27 October 1998, Amama Mbabazi, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs (regional cooperation) made the following statement,
whose content the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have never
refuged because they are so true:
"The internal issues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are as
follows - tendencies towards genocide, our troops in eastern Congo have
corne across many massacres committed before our arrival and there were
/ ...
S/1998/1180
English
Page 3
threats of more had we not arrived. Furthermore, there is evidence of
extrajudicial massacres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This
evidence exista in Kisangani, Bunia and Moba. In Isiro, machetes were
distributed in preparation for a possible genocide publicized by the Kabila
Government officials on radio and television. This was done by those in
authority before the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie rebels
captured Isiro."
The leaders of the present regime promised to uphold human rights when they
came to power, but their record has been lamentable. Unarmed civilian
opponents, journalists, as well as human rights activiste, have been detained,
tortured and government forces have repeatedly engaged in extrajudicial
executions. Here below is another damning catalogue of gross violations
confirmed by international human rights and humanitarian agencies. What we know
for a fact is that Kabila has failed to abide by the binding norms of
international humanitarian law applicable to current situations of armed
conflict. In particular, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has refused to
prohibit the targeting of civilians and civilian abjects in military operations .
The record of indiscriminate attacks is endless.
Furthermore, the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have
not only failed to, but have resisted:
Ensuring humane treatment for all persons detained in connection with
the conflict;
Permitting and facilitating access by relief assistance programmes so
that non-combatants in war-affected areas may receive food, medicine
and other relief, and providing safe land, river and air access for
the provision of humanitarian aid;
Permitting international and humanitarian agencies to visit persona
detained in connection with the conflict;
Prohibiting the recruitment and use of child soldiers and facilitating
the demobilization, rehabilitation and return to society of such
children;
Investigating the violation of international humanitarian law by
members of the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the
Congo and holding them accountable for such abuses in procedures that
meet the minimum standards of due process established in international
/ ...
English
Page 4
humanitarian law.
In view of the above record, it is an unacceptable distortion of the truth
for the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to accuse Uganda of
human rights violations against the Congolese. What we can conclude from this
evidence is that the current conflict is the climax of massive human rights
abuses and it has rightly been described by Amnesty International as a brutal
reminder that stability and prosperity cannot be built on violations of human
rights. It is these gross abuses of power that are fuelling the crisis. It is
of course convenient for the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
te blame their neighbours, but that will not make the interna! criais go away.
An examination of the politics clearly exposes the bankruptcy of the
allegations. What the world bas seen is an appalling and disastrous political
record. A record of political nepotism and exclusion. Numerous democratic
opposition groupe, which for years had battled against Mobutu's dictatorship,
were excluded from power. Prominent among these is Etienne Tshise Ked, who was
sent into interna! exile. Criticism of the regime often resulted in
imprisonment. Those who are lucky escaped by being removed from their jobs.
What we see in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the appalling results of
the absence of a credible open political system. Arbitrary rule, tribalism and
nepotism have eroded the confidence of those Congolese who had fought and hoped
that the fall of Mobutu would usher in democratic governance .
It is not Uganda that is responsible for the woes of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It is the failed State at the centre whose connivance
with and support of rebel groupa based on its soil has forced its neighbours to
defend themselves.
For example, Uganda has, for a very long time, been concerned by the Sudanbacked
rebels who operate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These
groupe include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the West Nile Bank as well as
the Uganda National Rescue Front II. All these have secure bases in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo from ~hich they periodically invade Uganda and
commit atrocities.
As a matter of fact, it is Uganda that has a serious case to make against
the Democratic Republic of the Congo because of its connivance with the rebel
movements based on its territory who have been responsible for crimes against
humanity committed against Ugandans. Below are some of the details .
Colonel Ebemba, Mobutu•s Commander, who planned and led ADF to attack Uganda on
13 November 1996, was redeployed in the eastern Province of the Democratic
/ ...
S/1998/1180
English
Page 5
Republic of the Congo, where ADF was operating from, by the Kabila regime. This
meant that Ebemba would continue to facilitate ADF activities just as he used to
do during the Mobutu days. He was transferred after Uganda bitterly protested.
Since 1996, ADF, from bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has
raided Uganda and killed many people, injured others and destroyed property.
From November 1996, when ADF started its activities, until 24 November 1998,
about 552 people have been killed, over 256 injured, 904 abducted and about
35,000 internally displaced. However, most of the abductees have been rescued.
The most gruesome attack was the Kichwamba Technical College massacre of
8 June 1998 in western Uganda, in which over 80 students were burned to death
and 100 abducted. The most prominent ADF attacks are the following:
/ ...
S/199A/11AO
English
Page 6
Date
13 November 1996
30 April 1997
23 July 1997
August 1997
14 September 1997
8 June 1998
1 August 1998
Conclusion
District
Kasese
Kasese
Bundibugyo
Kabarole
Bundibugyo
Kasese
Kasese
People People
Place killed injured Abducted
Mpondwe 20 400
Kasese 50
Ntoroko 28 12 14
Karambi 35 14 7
Nyakahuka 30
Refugee
Camp
Kichwamba Over 80 Several 100
Technical
College
Kasese 8 6
Town
Uganda is not responsible for human rights abuses in the Democrat.ic
Republic of the Congo. Uganda has committed no atrocities. On the contrary,
Uganda is keen to see peace restored in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
because the unstable situation there has created a colossal humanitarian problem
and the destabilization of its neighbours. But, at the same time, we
categorically state that, as the modalities and mechanisms for an immediate
ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are being worked out by the
region, the fundamental issue of the criais is the urgent need for internal
dialogue between all Congolese parties. Muchas the Democratic Republic of the
Congo may wish to divert attention, we categorically say that it is through
dialogue that all issues of concern ·to the Congolese parties will be mutually
addressed and resolved. To this effect, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
must accept the fact that there is internal resentment in the country and
therefore the authorities should enter into direct negotiations with all the
opposition groupe. It is equally important to recognize that the security
concerna of neighbouring countries are legitimate. Measures must be put in
place to ensure that no security threats against its neighbours emanate from the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
/ ...
S/1998/1180
English
Page 7
For its part, Uganda's immediate interests have always been and still are
based on:
The need to ensure total security in all parts of Uganda as well as
the protection of lives and property of the people of Uganda;
The desire to ensure maximum stability in the Great Lakes region since
instability in any neighbouring country directly impinges on our own
security and economic resources. Moreover, we believe in the benefits
that accrue from regional economic cooperation and integration.
These interests are legitimate and permanent. Our position on the criais
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo therefore reflects our efforts to pursue
those interests .
In doing so, Uganda is committed to the principle of non-interference and
good neighbourliness in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the organization of African Unity. In its broader context, this principle
guides our relations with all neighbouring countries, including the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
/ ...
Ttlogr1m1 E)(TERIOR, KAMPALA
, Te1tpllon1: 257S251258251
Teln: 151007. AOMINISTER
Fu· 258722/232874
UCMANl\
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
P.O. Box 7048,
Kampala,
ln111ycortupo"danuo11 VC[A. 1'11504/12
lhl& •ÛIIJICI pltUI q11ot• ~ - , ,r.:,./,.,l .. THE REPIJILIC 01' UGANOA
Uganda.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic
of Congo and hij.S the honour to communicate and protest as follows:
1. ln September 1998, Military Personnel of the Democratic
Republic of Congo forced their way into Uganda Embassy
Official Residence located at 12 Avenue de'Ouganda, Zone de
la Gombre in Kinshasa, and took away properties. including the
following:
(a) The Embassy Representational · car (Mercedes Benz
Mode! E 240, 1998 Year of Manufacture); Registration
No. 042 cmd 01.
(b) îhe Embassy Utility Car (M~rcedes Benz Model 200);
Registration No. 042 CD 07.
(c) The Ambassador's Personal car (Nissan Madel 1997};
and Registration No. KN 2408 BC
(d) A Persona! Car belonging to a member of Uganda
Embassy diplomatie staff (Mazda). Registration No. 042
CD02.
2. On 23rd November 1998, the Military personnel of the
Democratic Republic of Congo again forced their way into
Uganda Embassy Official Residence and the Chancery, in
Kinshasa, and took away other properties, including the
following:
(a) Embassy Funiture, household and persona! effects of the
Ambassador and other Ugandan diplomatie staff;
(b) Embassy Office equipment and other utility materials,
includlng Uganda flags; ·
(c) Four other separate Vehicles(Mercedes Benz Car,
Nissan car. Mazda Car and a Ford Car) belonging to
Ugandan nationals and under the protection of the
Embassy on diplomatie premises.
3. The violations did not stop at that. The Congolese Military
Per~onnel have since chased away the Caretakers and
occupied the Embassy Official Residence and Chancery.
4. The Ministry protests in the strongest terms possible the above
actions which are in contravention of International Law and the
Vienna Conventions on the inviolability of diplomatie premises .
..
5. The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo need not
be reminded of its obligations under international law and the
relevant provisions in the Vienna Conventions regarding the
Sanctity of diplomatie premises. property and personnel. On its
part and despite the current relations between the two
countries1 Uganda government has held onto its obligations
under international law and has not interfered with the Embassy
of the Democratic Republic of Congo in Kampala. Uganda
government expects this gesture to be reciprocated by the
government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
6. Therefore the government of the Republic of Uganda ho Ids the
government of the Democratic Republic of Congo responsible
for the violations meted on its diplomatie premises and
properties in Kinshasa and demands as follows:
(a) The immediate return of ail properties taken away from the
Embassy Official Resistance and Chancery;
(b) The immediate vacation of the two premises by the Military
Personnel of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
( c) Allowing the Caretakers back to look after the premises and the
properties therein. according to the instructions given to them:
(d) The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo is under
obligation, under International Law and the Vienna Convention
to protect the two premises from any further Intrusions.
I
By copy of this Note, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the
Secretary General of the organization of African Unity are accordingly
informed and requested to urge the government of the Democratic Republic
of Congo to live up to its obligations under International Law and in
accordance with the tenets of the Vienna Conventions. The Secretaries
General are als,.o requested to circulate this Note to ail the respective
Member States.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda avails itself of this
opport~nity to renew to the Ministry o.f Fo_reign Affair~ of t.~~ Pn~ocr,tic
Republic of Congo the assurances of 1ts h1ghest cons1d~(aJ'.o.~;J '<. =.,-.•
KAMPALA: 18TH DECEMBER 1998. ' , . ,-: A ~ ·: , ; .
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kinshasa
c.c. The Secretary General
United Nations,
New York.
c.c. The Secretary General
Organisation of African Unity,
Addis Ababa
• • • n ~ :• ... • . • • J •:
: ' I .:· ;•
/.J• '
. •,.. .. ·.,- ~~·~' I , .... : ..
UCMANNEX :
Jean-Claude Willame
L'ODYSSÉE
Trajectoire pour un Congo nouveau ?
KABILA
.• ,r.
~,~~~·~-' ) ~• •. -,.1\. .~ ~ '1.t...*S.. ,~ ~ . ; .. - ~~ --
1 KARTHALA .--------------------
Jean-Claude Willame est professeur à l'Université Catholique de
Louvain et chercheur à l'Institut Africain-Cedaf (Bruxelles). Consultant
occasionnel auprès de diverses organisations internationales dans le
cadre de la prévention des conflits, il a publié de nombreux ouvrages et
articles sur l'Afrique Centrale.
KARTHALA sur internet: http://www.karthala.com
Couverture : Laurent-Désiré Kabila, .
Président de la République démocratique du Congo,
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), le 16 décembre 1998
Photo AFP/lssouf Sanogo/lS-GL
© Éditions KARTHALA, 1999
ISBN 2-86537-926-4
Jean-Claude Willame
\\
L'odyssée Kabila
Trajectoire pour un Congo nouveau?
Édition KARTHALA
22-24, boulevard Arago
75013 PARIS
222 L'OP,YSSÉE KABILA
venance de Butembo, le commandant local, le rwando-ougandais
Aboubakar, qui s'était illustré dans les massacres de février (voir
supra). n'a pas réagi à la rébeJJion et la population a continué « à
vaquer à ses occupations». Par contre à Beni, où les« rebelles»
avaient rencontré quelque résistance,« les forces régulières composées
principalement de la Police d'intervention rapide (PIR)
ont vite été convaincues de l'inanité (de se battre). Surtout qu'une
rumeur persistante faisait état de 1 'entrée en lice de colonnes blindées
en provenance d'Ouganda »28.
Très vite survient un événement qui montre si besoin ~n est
qu'un« plan » a été mûri avec l'aide de Kigali : dès le 4 aol'.lt, un
pont aérien de fortune a été établi entre Goma, Kigali et la base
militaire de Kitona dans le Bas-Congo. Un véritable corps expéditionnaire
de quelques milliers de soidats est ainsi transporté à
plus de 1500 km de ses bases arrières. Sur base du témoignage
du pilote nigérian d'un appareil privé qui a été « réquisitionné »
par les rebelles, voici comment le correspondant de Libération
peut résumer ce « coup » particulièrement audacieux.
« Le mardi 4 août, le « commandant James » embarque avec
environ quatre cents soldats tu1si dans trois avions civils, confisqués
sur l'aéroport de Gama( ... ). L'un des appareils de la compagnie
privée Air Atlantic est piloté par un commandant nigé rian,
Raymond Gnang. Selon son témoignage, les avions se
rendent d 'abord à Kigali ( ... ) pour faire le plein de kérosène el
« pour charger des caisses de munitions ». Ensuite. ils redécollenl
pour Kitona. la grande base militaire à côté de Moanda, à
l'embouchure du fleuve Congo. Sur cette base, depuis quinze
mois. des milliers de soldats de l'ancienne armée de Mobutu
subissent un « stage de rééducation ». Au départ, il y étaient
40000, encadrés par des instructeurs tutsi. Mais, mal nourris et
plus ou moins oubliés, il n'en reste plus que 12000, le reste
s'étant égaillé en jetant l' uniforme. Le « commandant James»
compte rall ier ces mécontents. Cependant, en se posant à Kitona.
ses avions essuient des tirs29• C'est seulement en s'imposant par
la prise de l'aérodrome que les forces tutsi vont faire changer
d'avis les anciens de Mobutu. Qui retrouvent leurs réflexes en
28. REC-info n° 8/98, p. 6.
29. Un témoin a vu ces avions à leur retour à Goma el nous a déclaré qu·ils
n'étaient plus utilisables. Communication personnelle.
A NQ.UVEAU LE KIVU 223
demandant un << délai de réflexion » et en ouvrant des négociations
sur leur rémunération, équipement, « statut » dans le futur
régime ...
James Kabare fait la part du feu. li abandonne la ville de Moanda,
désertée par les gouvernementaux, au pillage des anciens soldats
de Mobutu. Entre-temps, pour sécuriser ses arrières, il met en
place un pont aérien avec Goma et Kigali. Une noria d'appareils
hétéroclites. du moyen porteur au Fokker, feront venir des hommes,
des annes et des munitions. Petite erreur : on laisse repartir
le pilote nigérian sans canon de fusil sur la tempe30
• N'étant pas
spécialement attiré par Kigali, la destination qu'on lui a enjointe,
Raymond Gnang se pose à Lagos. chez lui, au Nigeria. Ayant
pris contact avec Air Atlantic, il rapatrie son Boeing 707 à Kinshasa
et raconte ses mésaventures à la radio nationale. Autre
pépin : un avion est accidenté, un autre tombe en panne. Mais le
« commandant James » tient bon. Largué avec ses hommes au
coeur du territoire ennemi, à environ 600 km au sud-ouest de la
capitale, il commence sa progression. Après avoir neuoyé dans
son dos la façade maritime de l'ex-Zaïre, autour du port de
Banana, ses forces se dirigent vers Borna, à une centaine de kilomètres
sur la route de Kinshasa. Mardi, une semaine après le
débarquement, Borna tombe sans résistance. La gendanncrie
d'intervention, corps d'élite envoyé par Kabila, a décroché après
un pillage en règle de toutes les maisons. Chargés de réfrigérateurs,
de meubles et de grappes de soldats. ses véhicules raclent
le macadam en rebroussant chemin »
31
•
Ce récit met en lumière un fait qui mérite d' être mis en exergue,
surtout à la lumière de certaines interprétations qui ont voulu faire
accroire à une guerre menée de bout en bout par les seuls
« Banyamulenge » congolais et des« Rwandais». Ce seraient surtout
des mutins congolais, basés en grand nombre à Kitona et encadrés
d'une poignée de Tutsi congolais et/ou rwandais, qui ont été
le fer de lance de toute l'offensive sur Kinshasa. A ce stade, la rapidité
et l'efficacité dans le montage de l'intervention, l' effet de surprise
qu'elle a pu créer à Kinshasa démontre l'échec de L. D.
Kabila en tant que« chef de guerre» : même s' il n'a pas pu béné-
30. Comme ce sera le cas pour un autre pilote, belge celui-là. Communication
personnelle.
31. Ubém1io11. Paris. 22-23 août 1998.
I
COMMUNJOUE
OFTHE
UCMANN
REGIONAL MEETING OF MtNISTERS OF F.OREl(i,,N AFF'AlRS AND
DEFENCE ON ïHE SITUATfQN IN THE DEMOCRATJC REPUBLIC Ot=
CONGO HELD TN LL!SAKA, ZAMBf A FROM 14TH TO 16TH
JANUARY. 1999
At the invitation of Mr. Frederick J.T. Chiluba, Presjdent of the
Republic of Zambia, the Regionar Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, and Oefence on the situation in the Democratic Republic of
C~.n go !vvas held in Lusaka, Zambia from 14th to · 1 eth January. 1999.
2. Trra· meeting was attended by Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Chad,
~e Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, M(?zambique,
Namibia. Rwanda. South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Aise in attendance wera the Secretary.General of the OAU. the
Executive Secretary of SADC and Representative of the ·uN SecretaryGeneral.
3. . Prior to the meeting, the Ministers were receives1 in aud~ence by
.President Chiluba .
4. The meeting \Nas officially opened by Hon. Eric S. Silwamba.
M.?., Minister for P;-esicential Affairs and Chairman of the meeting.
o. The meeting reviewed the current status of the peace process in
the Oemocratic . Republic of Congo. sin ce the Lusaka and Gaborone
meetings.
ê. After extensive de!iberations, the meeting agreed on the
mechanisms for moving the peace process fo~ward. To thiQ end, the
rnee!ing established the following Working Groups:
A. Committee on Security Concerns in the DRC and
nei9hbourin9 covm:ries comprïsing:
Zambia
Kenya
80-::s-wana
MaW"Jtius
ù~( .
ÔÀU
SADC
2
B. Committee on the lmplementation of the Ceasefire
Agreement coniprising: •
Zambia - Chairman
Arr beUigerents
UN .
OAU
SADC
ï. ïhe Commrttees are to begin work immediately and submit
reports to the next regional Ministerial meeting which should be
convened as soon as possible.
8. The Ministers expressed their appreciation to the Government and
people of Zambia fo:-- t!ie ~ospitality accorded to them during their stay
in Zambia.
Done at L!Jsaka, Zambia, 16th January, 1999
t
'
-rnESS llELE+sE
ON
SUMMlT 01" ItEÇIONAL LÉAt>ERS
011{ TllE SITUATION · ,
1N TJIE Jl~MOCRA TIC RF.PUDI..1C OF TUIC CONOO
tlEJ.,s, IN WINDI-IOEJ<, NAMJ.BIA,
ON J8 JANUARV 1~99
UCMANN
Al the invitntion or Hi:. Exccllcncy Dr Snn\ N\ljoma. Pre!:!ldent of the Republic of
Natllihi~ a Summit of l'lcgionnl Leaders wai; hcld in Windhoek. ·Namibia, on t 8 January
1999. The Smnmil, whid, wn~ h~lct in A cordial and con$truCltve ipirlt, came llt the
,cq,,r,.1,f hy 1 fü; l:.x('~ll~m:y Mr Yuweri Mrnmvcni, J'rf'.si<Jcnt orthe Rept~1>1ic of Ugand11
l'rc.-:id~nl Nujorn" n0lci11lly openc:d the s,,mmit. 111 ~ils y.,elt'.Qming si.-tt:ment, rre.'lidcrtt
Nujoma extr.nrlcd wurm g1cdings to nll the dclcgnlio11s. ,ic e,cpre~~clt thl'l hopc that the
Wlmlhoek Sun11ni1 wm•ltt \:ontrilmte ~ignlficnnlly ·10 a ,,ccdy ,ignlne of the CcKseOre
Areemcnt on the DR.C.
Tlm 8ummit rc.vicw,:cl the eurr~nt shttus of the cmgoing peacc procf'~'SS in the l)c1111.,crntic
Republic of the Ct'mgo in the lisht of thr:. ·Summil of H..ceional I.adcra. wl,id, was
~chcd11h•cl {(\ 111kt": pince 11\ l ..1 1!:.ika hui wns pn!itpom:11 to a later dt'tc lo ullow for furthcr
t:01\Sll ltl\1Ît"IIIR.
Tt:,~ S11m11\lt r.xpn~\:•:t:t1 ,:;:'.lli slnction l.hl\t !-lignil'kt'lnt p,c.,Rress hl!S be.en tnnde towards
nchic.-.vinJ~ srcatc1 11111111nl ,,mlt~rr.tnndin1i bctwc~c.!11 Ili~ wrê:. group of cpuntrir.s lnvolvcd ln
th~ conflict li, the- DRC, which should C-.('lntribute slAnificantly tnwuds n ~peedy 11ig11ing
of a Ce::isdirc J\f.',r,•c111c.11l.
Th~ Stmmllt wa!i «llertdcd l,y che folluwioA Hca<is of St.at<'I: His Excellcncy. })r. Robe~
J\foenh~. Prci-ident (lfthc Republir: of7..imb~bwe; His 'B?(r..eHeney, Mr. Yoweri Musevcni,
f'r csict~ut of the H cpublic-. ur llgl\tld11; l lis Ex.c~llcncy, Mr. Pt!.!>teur 8i1:imunnu. President
or the lt~pubti,: 11f R.v;in<ia: nnd His Hxcellcncy. Dr. Snm Nujom3, President of the
Republic of Namibio. The del ... citt1on of the Republie of Angola wws led l,y Honourablç
Pedro Scbnsliao, Mini,;ter or National Defcncu. Also in auen&,nce wa~ Dr. Kaire·.
Mbuencie. the Exccutlve Sct:1etnry ofSAOC.
·rttc vi:;iting delcgl!l i1)1\!I cxprc~sed lhci, npprççiati,~n to Preak!cnt Nujoma. the
<;ovemrnenl ,met llCnplc or the Rcr,ulilic of Na mibia f"or the w•m, walcotne and eencrous
hn~pilality C;'(lr.ndcd to thcm dmins their st•y in \Vindhn1:k.
'WINDHOEIC
18 JANUARV 1999.
UCMANNEX3
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT; COPYRIGHT © 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH; ISSN: 1079-2325
February 1999 Vol. 11, No. Ol(A)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
CASUALTIES OF WAR
Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms
1. INTRODUCTION ....... . ....................................... . ........................ 2
II. RECOMMENDA TI ONS ....... . .......................................................... 4
To the Forces in Western Congo: ........................................................... 4
To the Forces in Eastern Congo: ................................. . .......... .... ........... 5
To the International Community: ........................................................... 6
III. HUMAN R1GHTS ABUSES IN WESTERN CONGO .. ............... ......................... 8
Arbitrary Arrest, Illegal Detentions, and the Military Court ........................ .. . . ...... .. .. 8
Ethnie Persecution .............. ....... ......... . . ........... .... .. . ................... 10
Violations Committed in Areas of Combat .. . ....... . ..... .. ..... . ..... . ... . ......... . . . .... 14
Recruitment ofChild Soldiers ..................... . ................................. ..... 17
The Democratization Process and Civil Society .............................................. 17
IV. EASTERN CONGO: FINDINGS ............. .... .................................. . ...... 19
Extrajudicial Executions and Indiscriminate Attacks Against Civilians ...... . ......... . .. . . . .... . . 21
Arbitrary Arrests, Illegal Detentions, and "Disappearances ..................................... 24
Harassment of Human Rights Defenders . . ............ . ...... ... . . .. . ....... . ........ . ...... 26
Abuses Against Women ................................................................. 27
Recruitment of Child Soldiers .... . . . .................. . ........ . ...... ......... .......... 28
V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE .......... . ...... . ..................................... . ... 28
The Southern Africa Development Community, the Organization of African Unity,
the European Union, and the United Nations .... . . .. ..... ... ...... . ..... . ............. . .. 28
The European Union ......... . ................... . ........ . . . .. . .. . . .. . ............. ... 29
The United States ........ . .................................. . .. . ... . ............. . ..... 30
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the war that broke out in August 1998 in Congo continued into its seventh month, the central African region
slipped further into the cycle ofhuman rights abuses and impunity. The Congolese government has violated the rights
of its citizens through incitement to ethnie hatred, resulting in hundreds· of deaths, the interning of Tutsis; through
arrest and trial procedures that violate due process; and by suppressing political life through censorship, arbitrary
arrests, and bans on the exercise of freedoms of association and assembly. The rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD), whose forces operate in conjunction with the Rwandan and
Ugandan militaries, have committed war crimes by killing civilians in massacres, have caused people to ''disappear,"
and have carried out arbitrary arrests without regard to due process. International inertia in the face of these violations,
as in the face of massacres of the 1996-97 war in Congo, encourages political leaders and militia henchmen alike to
believe that they can commit abuses without serious consequence.
In late July 1998, Congolese President Laurent Kabila sent home ail Rwandan soldiers, thus officially breaking
ties with the allies who, together with Ugandan forces, had helped sweep him into power fourteen months before.
Rwanda and Uganda responded by invading Congo andjoining forces with troops from the Congolese arrny (Forces
Armées Congolaises, FAC) that had mutinied against the government in Gama and Bukavu. The RCD, composed
of former Tutsi members of Kabila's government, former Mobutists, a number of intellectuals, and others, soon
emerged as the political leadership of this coalition. The conflict in Congo grew during August and September,
eventually drawing in other states from the region, including Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad on the
government side, and with Burundi apparently joining the Rwandans and Ugandans to support the RCD and the FAC
defectors. Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had sent forces across the border to protect themselves against various
. armed groups which had been attacking them from bases in the eastern Congo, operating without hindrance from the
Congolese govemment. Burundi continued to deny its involvement in the conflict despite regular sightings oftheir
troops in South Kivu. The RCD proclaimed its goal to be the ouster of Kabila, while his backers stated they were
protecting a Jegitimate govemment from foreign aggression. Outside observers suspected that the prospect of
exploiting Congo' s vast minerai wealth had attracted man y of the warring parties. A number of other m ilitia and rebel
groups from the region joined the fray, while alliances between them and the warring parties were often unclear.
Human Rights Watch takes no position on the merits of conflicts between states, but examines the conduct of all
parties during the course of a conflict, focusing on whether violations of international humanitarian law have been
committed.
In their efforts to maintain or to seize power, both sides to the cooflict in Congo have failed to protect civilians
from abuse and have at times committed gross violations against them. When the Congolese government was
attacked in August, some important officiais fostered popular hatred and fear of Congolese of Tutsi origin, whom they
linked with Rwandans, Burundians, and even Ugandans said to constitute part of a larger Tutsi-Hima cluster of
peoples. In calling for so-called "popular self-defense," they encouraged other Congolese to attack Tutsi orthose
thoughtto look like Tutsi. As of mid-January, hundreds of Tutsi in detention or intemed in government-held territory
because of their ethnicity represented vulnerable targets for any future reprisais by government forces or by civilian
crowds incited to attack them. The Kabila govemment chose to intern the Tutsi, claiming this was necessary for their
protection, rather than taking other necessary measures to ensure their safety.
Kabila continued to proclaim his commitment to democratization, including to hold elections in April 1999, but
in the meantime his government proclaimed astate of emergency ("Etat de siège", state of siege) throughout most
of the country which placed sweeping powers over justice and the civilian administration in the hands of the military.
A military court, which superseded civilian courts, conducted trials without due process guarantees and imposed death
sentences on political suspects and criminals, some ofwhom were executed immediately, without the possibility of
appeal. Despite a January 29 decree law that called for a return to multi-party politics, excessive registration
Human Rights Watch 2 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
requirements for political parties effectively excluded many of them from participation in the political process.
Arrests of civilians and leading politicians increased in early in 1999.
As the conflict continued, the situation in eastem Congo became particularly explosive. Forces backing the RCD
committed numerous killings of civilians from almost ail different ethnk groups in the east, creating a resentment
of the RCD, its military backers, and ethnie Tutsi in general. Kîllings of villagers were often in retaliation for their
supposed support of local militia known as "Mai-Mai," or former Rwandan soldiers or militia, known as
"lnterahamwe." Soldîers acting for the RCD movement arbitrarily detained many of its supposed opponents, often
holding them in irregular facilities to which their families and humanitarian agencies had no access. Once arrested,
some individuals were not seen again.
The term "Mai-Mai" has been used to describe indigenous militia involved in a number of uprisings in the Great
Lakes Region since the colonial era. Mai-Mai fighters often undergo traditional initiation rites which are intended
to make them invulnerable to bu Ilets and other weapons of their enemies. Today, the term "Mai-Mai" is used to refer
to many of the groups of indigenous militia of different ethnie origins in eastern Congo opposed to the RCD and its
ail ies. lt appears that these groups are not well-organized and econom ic hardsh ip may have encouraged man y young
men to join. Sorne of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) in the east who did not join RCD forces and former
members of the Zairian Armed Forces ( ex-F AZ) also reportedly joined forces with groups of Mai-Mai.
The Interahamwe militia were organized by former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's political party.
During the genocide in Rwanda, the militia were transformed into bands of killers. Since the flight of many
Interahamwe to eastern Congo following the genocide, Congolese increasingly referred to any ethnie Hutu combatant
in Congo as lnterahamwe, including Hutu who have lived in Congo for generations. Many residents of eastern Congo
claimed that the Interahamwe had formed an alliance with the Mai-Mai in their fight against the RCD, Rwandan,
Ugandan and Burundian militaries, confounding the exact identification of militia.
Both si des to the confl ict have made statements pledging to guarantee hum an rights in terri tory un der their control
while carrying out limited measures to protect some populations. In addition to public declarations regarding their
adherence to the human rights standards established by the major international treaties, the RCD established a human
rights branch within its Department of Justice and Human Rights. White the department carried out a number of
investigations ofhuman rights violations allegedly committed by Kabila's forces-and televised ceremonies related
to them-their pledges to investi gate abuses committed by their own troops, such as in the Kasika area of South Kivu,
did not materialize. In early January 1999, the Congolese government, after blocking a United Nations investigation
throughout much of 1997 and 1998, invited the U.N. special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Congo to
investigate massacres of Hutu refugees, allegedly carried out by Rwandan forces, and other human rights violations.
It remained to be seen, however, if these declarations by both sides would translate into serious investigations and
prosecutions of their own agents who were responsible for abuses.
The international community, led by the 0.A.U. and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC},
organized a series of efforts to negotiate a solution to the conflict, thus far without success. Discussions of human
rights issues or calls for accountability for those responsible for abuses committed during the conflict were notably
missing from the negotiations. White precise and vigorous public catis from donor states and others to respect human
rights du ring the conflict had given at least limited results, such as an apparent end to large-scale killings of Tutsis
in August, the international community largely confined its intervention to assessment missions, quietdiplomacy, and
vague condemnations of abuses on ail sides without stressing the need to hold perpetrators accountable for abuses.
The Congolese govemment reportedly participated in the recruitment of combatants from refugee camps in
neighboring countries, including some that provided refuge to members of the former army of Rwanda (ex-FAR) and
the lnterahamwe militia which fled into exile after perpetrating the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Sorne of those
recruited from these camps, reportedly sent to the front lines in Congo, may have participated in the genocide.
Human Rights Watch 3 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
With the disintegration of the rule of law in Congo and elsewhere in the region, Congo has become the battle
ground for the interests of its neighbors and a Congolese political and military elite-all at the expense of Congolese
civilians. In this context, neither the Congolese govemment and its allies, the RCD and its backers, nor the myriad
of militia and rebel groups in Congo have made respect for human rights a priority. Without tirm action from
international players in the region and elsewhere, the results for the Congolese are likely to be more abuses and a
further degradation of t_he situation. .
This report is based on Human Rights Watch field investigations in November and December of 1998 to eastem
and western Congo as well as other countries in the region. Many of the sources in this report are not named due to
the serious danger faced by witnesses and local human rights defenders.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Forces in Western Congo:
Human Rigltts Watclt calls upon tlte Congolese govemme11t to:
• Instruct ail Congolese soldiers to protect the civilian population and uphold international humanitarian law.
lnvestigate accusations of deliberate executions of civilians by Congolese soldiers and prosecute those
responsible.
• lnvestigate and prosecute those within and outside the government responsible for using media to foster
hatred and incite to violence. The govemment must take ail necessary measures to ensure the safety of ail
civilians throughout government-held territory, including those interned or in detention.
• Those arbitrarily arrested solely on ethnie or political grounds should be freed immediately; all detainees
should be charged with a recognizable offense or released.
• Guarantee the right to retum for ail Congolese outside the country. The government should continue to
facilitate the safe departure of Tutsi or other civilians wishing to leave the country voluntarily.
• Abolish the special Military Court and establish an independentjudiciary that respects due process. Regular
military courts should handle the cases of military in detention in accordance with international norms and
the Congolese military justice code, including the right to appeal and the right to counsel. The government
should guarantee the independence of both the military and the civilian courts and ensure that civilians are
not tried before military courts. Civilian and military judges, prosecutors, and other court officiais should
not be subject to intimidation or harassment related to their duties.
• Desist from the recruitment of chi Id soldiers underthe age of eighteen and demobilize those already enlisted.
• Refrain from the recruitment of refugees from camps in neighbouring countries and respect the strictly
civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps and settlements.
• Screen potential military recruits and exclude any who may have participated in war crimes or crimes against
humanity, including the Rwandan genocide. Any against whom evidence of such crimes is found must be
prosecuted or delivered to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) at Arusha.
Human Rights Watch 4 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
• Guarantee freedom of expression and freedom of association for ail Congolese. This includes lifting
excessive regulations on political activities and ceasing harassment and intimidation of human rights
defenders and joumalists.
• Fulfill the govemment's pledge to allow access and the neutral provision of humanitarian assistance to ail
populations in need in territory under their control.
• Fulfill its obligation to carry out an impartial investigation into massacres and other crimes against humanity
committed during the 1996-1997 war in Congo. The Congolese government should make public its findings
and where possible hold perpetrators accountable, including members of the AFDL. The· government's
decision on January 11 to allow Roberto Garret6n, the U.N.'s special rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Congo, to retum to the country to investigate bath the 1996-97 massacres and the current situation
should be given full effect. He should be given full access and cooperation to conduct his independent
investigations.
• Allow independent human rights investigators full access to investi gate allegations of hum an rights abuses
and violations of international humanitarian law.
H11man Rights Watc/1 cal/s upon tlte governments of Zimbabwe, Angola, ami otlter co11ntries s11pporting tlte
government of tl,e Congo to:
• Uphold international humanitarian law, and en sure that any violations are immediately investigated, including
killings of noncombatants, rape, looting and destruction of infrastructure essential to public well-being. Ail
military operations, including shelling and aerial bombings, should be carried out in a manner that strictly
limits the toll on civilians and civilian structures and is consistent with the laws of war; information necessary
to establish that international standards were respected should be made public. Clear and public instructions
should be given to troops to prevent abuses.
• Press the Congolese govemment to improve respect for human rights and democratic principles. This includes
protection for ail Congolese citizens from summary executions, arbitrary arrest and detention; guaranteeing
freedom of expression and association; allowing the political opposition and organizations of civil society to
operate without harassment or intimidation; establishing an independentjudiciary that respects due process;
and instituting an inclusive and transparent transition to democracy.
To the Forces in Eastern Congo:
Human Rigltts Watc/1 calls on tl,e Congo/ese Rai/y for Democracy, tl,e govemment of Rwanda, the govemment of
Uganda, and tl,e government of Burundi to:
• Put an end to civilian killings in territory under RCD control. The RCD authorities and the Rwandan,
Ugandan, and Burundian govemments should give clear instructions to their troops to cease civilian killings
and to respect international humanitarian law. Those suspected of committing abuses should be arrested,
investigated, and punished where appropriate.
• Investi gate allegations of gross human rights abuses including large-scale killings, summary executions, rape,
and forced "disappearances" of civilians. Given the failure thus far of the RCD to investigate the August
massacres in the Kasika area, the RCD must take concrete steps to reinforce the Department of Justice and
Human Rights or to create an independent commission of inquiry with the power to carry out investigations
and make their findings public. In addition to the Kasika massacres, other killings including those in the
Makobola area of South Kivu must also be investigated. The RCD authorities and the govemments of Rwanda,
Human Rights Watch 5 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
Uganda, and Burundi should instruct their military forces in Congo to cooperate with these and ail other
investigations and punish perpetrators where appropriate.
• Haltarbitrary arrest, illegal detentions, and forced "disappearances" and eliminate private and illegal detention
centers. Detainees should be held under humane conditions in rccognized detention centers and provided with
adequate food and access to medical care. Ensure that prisoners are held only in publicly recognized places
of detention, · and that up-to-date registers of ail pr1soriers are maintained in every detention center and
centrally. This information should be freely available to relatives, lawyers, and others with a legitimate
interest.
• Prisoners of war in custody should be protected in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
• Stop the recruitment of child soldiers under the age of eighteen. Combatants under the age of eighteen should
be demobilized.
• Guarantee freedom of expression and freedom of association in territory under RCD contrai.
• Ensure that members of organizations of civil society, including human rights defenders, joumalists, and
others, are free from harassment and intimidation.
• Allow access and the neutral provision of humanitarian assistance to ail populations in need in terri tory under
their control. Protect humanitarian assistance from looting or being diverted for military use.
• Allow independent hum an rights investigators full access to investi gate allegations ofhuman rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law.
• Ensure the protection of and facilitate assistance to residual Rwandan and Burundian refugee populations in
eastem Congo whose presence may date from 1994. The RCD authorities and their military allies should work
closely with international humanitarian organizations to assure the protection of and assistance to these
populations.
To the International Community:
Human Rigl,ts Watc/1 calfs upon the United Nations (U.N.), Organization of African Unity (O.A. U.), the Southern
Africa Development Community (S.A.D.C.) or ot!,er parties i11volved in negotiatio11s on tl,e conflict in Congo to:
• Ensure that peace negotiations between warring parties do not serve as a mechanism of further impunity in
the Great Lakes Region. Negotiated solutions must include provisions to hold political leaders and members
of the armies and militias in Congo accountable for human rights violations during the conflict.
• Insist that ail parties to the conflict instruct their troops to respect international humanitarian law and that they
investigate fully ail alleged violations. Abuses by foreign militaries participating on both sides should also be
investigated. ln particular, cati upon the RCD to follow through on its pledges to launch investigations of the
Kasika and Makobola massacres and punish those responsible. Cali upon the Congolese govemment to cease
ongoing abuses against civilians, including increased arbitrary arrests of political opponenets and others, such
as the recent round-up of civilians, mostly ethnie Tutsis, from the Bethanie Center in Kinshasa.
• Support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Office in Congo and
increase its monitoring and technical assistance programs. ln particular, the U.N. Office should be given the
necessary support to place field officers in RCD-held eastem Congo and throughout government territory.
Human Rights Watch 6 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. l.
Among other duties, these monitors should have capacity to monitor and tape radio broadcasts for hate speech
and incitement to violence.
• The U.N. Security Council should follow through on its July 1998 request that Congo and Rwanda carry out
investigations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo during the 1996-1997 war and
hold perpetrators accountable for human rights violations.
Human Rig!,ts Watcl, calfs 11pon the United Natio11s Higl, Commissio11er for Refugees (UNHCR), /,ost co,mtries
a11d tlte international community to:
• Take measures to secure the exclusively civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps, including
mechanisms to disarrn and separate armed elements from civilian refugees, particularly those who leave camps
for military purposes; and to exclude from international refugee protection those suspected of participation
in war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a view to investigate and prosecute where appropriate in
accordance with international standards.
Humm, Rigltts Watc/1 cal/s 11po11 the United States, tlte European U11io11, Îlltematio11alfinancia/ instit11tio11s, ami
otlter donors to:
• Make any bilateral or multilateral aid to the central govemment of Congo contingent upon improved respect
for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles.
• Vigorously and publicly denounce violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by ail sides
involved in the conflict. This requires condemnation of specific abuses by ail parties to the conflict, not simply
general admonishments to respect human rights.
• Urge full investigations into human rights abuses by ail parties to the Congo conflict. Foreign militaries
participating on both sides should also be investigated. In particular, call upon the RCD to follow through on
its pledges to launch investigations of the Kasika and Makobola massacres and punish those responsible. Cali
upon the Congolese govemment to cease ongoing abuses against civilians.
• Condition any military training or assistance to any parties to the conflict on adherence to international
humanitarian law and an investigation of reported abuses by their troops.
• The U .S. govemment should comply with Section 570 of the Foreign Operations Authorization Act, known
as the Leahy amendment, by ensuring that no U.S. assistance is provided to units of security forces if there
is credible evidence that such a unit has committed gross human rights abuses, unless those responsible for
abuses have been brought to justice. In general, the U.S. should strengthen its monitoring of militaries that
receive U.S. aid.
• Support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Office in Congo and
increase its monitoring and technical assistance programs. In particular, the U.N. Office should be given the
necessary support to place field officers in RCD-held eastem Congo and throughout govemment territory.
Among other duties, these monitors should have the capacity to monitor and tape radio broadcasts that
propagate hate speech that incites violence.
• Provide moral, financial, and technical support to organizations of civil society. This should focus on
humanitarian needs and development projects, as well as human rights and pro-democracy in itiatives.
• Urge all parties to the contlict protect organizations of civil society, including human rights defenders,
journalists, and others, from harassment and intimidation. In addition to guaranteeing freedom of expression
Human Rights Watch 7 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. t.
and freedom of association, the international community should insist that the excessive regulations on
political activities be lifted and that representatives of civil society and the political opposition be included in
the democratic transition process.
Ill. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN WESTERN CONGO
Many chronic human rights problems in Congo have worsened since the beginning of the conflict. Other
problems have emerged as a result of abusive military operations by the Congolese Anned Forces (FAC) and its allies.
A lack of accountability, fissures within the government and the military, rule by an increasingly isolated group of
leaders, and general administrative disorganization have made prospects for the respect of hum an rights and the rule
of law even more distant. In addition to aggravating the human rights situation, the·se factors have at times hampered
efforts by individual members of the govemrnent to protect rights.
Arbitrary Arrest, Illegal Detentions, and the Military Court
Civilians and military are frequently subject to arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without trial in
government-controlled areas of Congo. The Military Court, established in 1997, was in the process of expansion at
the end of 1998 with the addition of new chambers at Lubumbashi, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kamina, Matadi, Likasi,
and the establishment of roving courts.1 The jurisdiction of the Military Court was further expanded on January 2,
1999 by Decree Law 171, which declared a state of emergency ("Etat de siège", state of siege) in Equateur, Katanga,
North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Province Orientale. The state of siege was justified by the "danger constituted
by the aggression and invasion of DRC by foreign armies" and "considering that this barbarie and un fair war places
the Congolese nation in danger and disturbs the functioning of the state and the Govemment of Public Salvation."2
While the decree Jaw has drawn little international attention, it granted the military sweeping powers over civilian
administration. Decree No. 172 outlines the provisions of the state of siege, giving the military the authority to replace
civilian authorities, appropriate private property, and to forcibly recruit civilians for the "benefit, directly or indirectly,
ofnational defense and the safeguarding of public security and interest."3 Following the new decree, the m ilitary courts
would presumably have jurisdiction over ail cases handled by the civilian court system in those provinces declared
under siege. Human rights lawyers in Lubumbashi confirmed that the civilian courts were no longer handling criminal
cases.4 At the end of the year, the Military Court hadjurisdiction over the cases ofnearly 800 Congolese military held
in the Reeducation and Penitentiary Center of Kinshasa (formerly the Makala Central Prison) and another 1,400 held
in Katanga, as well as hundreds of cases of civilians, including common criminal suspects, political prisoners, and
suspected rebel collaborators.5
Sin ce its establishment, the functioning of this court has been marked by prolonged delays, a lack of due process,
and a propensity to apply and execute the death sentence.6 Many of the military in custody have not been charged.
1Human Rights Watch interview with second president of the Military Court, Military Court, Kinshasa, November. 1998.
According to the second president, roving or pennanent military courts had been or would be established in these cities and in
the interior.
2The state of siege was proclaimed in Decree No. 171 by President Kabila, Kinshasa, January 2, 1999.
3Decree No. 172, Kinshasa, January 2, 1999.
4Human Rights Watch interview by telephone, Lubumbashi, January
sThe Military Court (Cour d'ordre militaire) was established by Decree-Law No.019, of August 23, 1997. Article 3 spells
out its purpose as being "to bring to light ail the infractions committed by elements from the 50th brigade of the anny, the soldiers
of the fonner Zairean Anned Forces as well as elements of the police."
6Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all cases due toits inherent cruelty and irreversible nature. In addition,
the death sentence is most often carried out in a discriminatory manner. In some cases, such discrimination may be on ethnie,
religious, or political grounds. Furthennore, the inherent fallibility of all criminal justice systems assures that even when full
due process oflaw is respected innocent persans are sometimes executed. Because an execution is irreversible, such miscarriages
Human Rights Watch 8 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
Many civilians who have been politically active are charged with such catchait offenses as endangering the security
of the state or "association with wrongdoers. "7
Public prosecutors often seek the death penalty for civilians and military personnel alike, and over seventy-three
death sentences have been carried out since the creation of the court. In violation of international norms, the court
lacks an appeal process, even for those sentenced to death.8 In interviews with Human Rights Watch, court officiais,
including the acting commander president of the court and a military public prosecutor, expressed their strong support
for death sentences in orderto eliminate suspected rebels, corn mon cri minais, ill-disciplined military, and collaborators
with the enemy.
Decree Law O 19 stipulates that ail death sèntences must be followed by an automatic plea, to be submitted by the
Minister of Justice, for presidential pardon. Despite this regulation, many executiôns were carried out the same day
as sentencing or shortly after, raising doubts that presidential pardon had been sought.9 Since the clemency procedure
is secret, it is difficult to know in how many cases pardon was actually requested and denied. President Kabila, who
alone is empowered to commute the death sentences, is known to have granted only one pardon: a thirteen-year-old
soldier who had been sentenced to death in late March for killing a Red Cross worker in Kinshasa was granted
clemency on April 18, 1998. In addition, a convicted pregnant woman in the town of Uvira was granted a stay of
execution until she gave birth to her chi Id.
The second president of the Military Court told Human Rights Watch that under the decree law establishing the
court those condemned to death could be legally executed immediately followingjudgment. This violates principles
both of the Congolese code of criminal justice and international norms. On November 14, thirteen FAC officers
accused of cowardice and fleeing before the enemy were sentenced to death by the Military Court in Lubumbashi.
Public prosecutors and defense lawyers for the thirteen were reportedly given only twenty-four hours to prepare the
cases. The thirteen were executed later the same day; it is highly improbable that the time between the sentencing and
execution permitted time for the administrative procedures to seek presidential clemency as stipulated by regulations. 10
ln the Military Court, evenjudges and prosecutors fear retribution by soldiers ifthey issue orders that displease
them. Mukuntu Kiyana, the president of the Military Court, was himself arrested on August 6 and released after four
days, only to be rearrested on August 28 reportedly for having ordered the death sentence for a group of twenty-four
soldiers. Following their execution, he was accused of "intelligence with the enemy," reportedly at the request of
military allies of the twenty-four. He remained in detention as of early January. Under sway of the military, prosecutors
and judges request and hand down the maximum allowable penalties for those found guilty. According to defense
lawyers, judicial personnel also hesitate to give or execute orders to release detainees who might later join the RCD.
Many of the arrests appeared arbitrary, often based on ethnie rivalries, settling scores, or membership in an
opposition political party. Those arrested were frequently accused of complicity with rebel forces. Release from
detention was uncertain even for those who had been issued release orders, having been acquitted or having no charges
against them. According to a court document shown to a Human Rights Watch researcher by a military prosecutor,
of justice can never be corrected.
7Human Rights Watch interview with the Toges noires (Black Robes), an NGO providing pro-bono Jegal assistance for
military and civilians before of the Military Court, Kinshasa, November 18, 1998.
8Congo is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which in Article 14 (5) guarantees
review of sentences by a higher tribunal. This right is non-derrogable, even during a state of emergency.
91n addition to Article 14 (5) which guarantees the right to review by a higher tribunal, the ICCPR furthennore provides
in Article 6 (4) that "anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty,
pardon or commutation of the sentence may be granted in ail cases."
10Human Rights Watch interview with Military Court defense lawyer, Kinshasa, November 19, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 9 February 1999, Vol. li, No. 1.
two well-known political prisoners, Professor Kabila Kalele, a lecturer of sociology at Kinshasa University, and hii
collaborator Jean-Francois Kabanda, a free lance joumalist, both prominent members of the UDPS political party, wert
ordered to be released in mid-November.11 The two were arrested on October 24, 1997 following the publication o1
an article in which they alleged that President Kabila had "sold the country" to the Rwandan Tutsis. Despite the writter
release order dated mid-November 1998, the two remained in detention as of early January 1999.
White the Congolese government has made efforts to reform the penitentiary system, including a renovation ol
the Reeducation and Penitentiary Center ofKinshasa,'2 persons in detention remained subject to harsh and arbitrary
treatment. On August 19, following an escape of approximately 180 prisoners from the prison, seventeen prisoners
and one prison official were summarily executed by Congolese military inside the prison grounds for having allegedl)
assisted in the escape. According to one source, one of those executed was an imprisoned television repairman who
was actually shot because a soldier was displeased with a repair job on his television. 13
Ethnie Persecution
ln addition to those facing trial by the military courts, another group of persons at risk of execution or other human
rights abuse are ethnie Tutsi civilians in govemment-held territory, including those in detention or intemed. As of
early January, nearly 140 Tutsi civilians were in detention in Kinshasa at the military Camp Kokolo, headquarters of
the 50th brigade of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC). Others are concentrated with the knowledge of the
govemment in various private locations, including hotels and religious establishments that serve as temporary places
of safety, totaling approximately 520 in Katanga and some 450 in Kinshasa by early January. An additional unknown
number of Tutsi remained dispersed, often in hiding, in private residences throughout government-held territory,
including Kinshasa and Katanga.
Des pite some efforts and proclamations from mem bers of the Congolese govemment, Tutsi in detention or interned
in govemment-held territory-including Tutsi purportedly under the protection of the government-remained easy
targets for Congolese military or other state agents well into January 1999. On January 12, a group of around thirtyfive
individuals, mostly Tutsi women, were rounded up from their lodgings at the Catholic Bethanie Center in Kinshasa
by military from the 50th brigade and taken to Camp Kokolo. The military accused those arrested ofbeing rebels or
rebel-supporters, threatened to kill one of the Catholic sisters, and looted and destroyed property at the center. The
operation was reportedly carried out without the knowledge of the Minister ofHuman Rights, who, along with other
members of the government, had arranged or facilitated protection of the Tutsi sheltered at the center. Those arrested
included two Congolese human rights activists lodged at the center and at least one of the center's employees.
Following their arrest, the military at Camp Kokolo claimed that the detainees were being held "for their protection,"
but gave only limited access to international humanitarian groups or U .N. agencies attempting to provide hum an itarian
assistance to the detainees,
This most recent round of persecution of Tutsi began in late July 1998 following President Kabila's expulsion of
Rwandan military from Congo.14 Many Tutsi civilians of Congolese and other nationalities fled Kinshasa during this
11Human Rights Watch interview with military prosecutor, Military Court, Kinshasa, November 16, 1998. Headed by
Etienne Tshisekedi, the Union pour la démocracie et le progrès social, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, is one of the
major long-standing opposition parties in Congo.
DWhile the general situation for most prison ers was markedly improved, conditions outs ide of pavilions one and eight cou Id
not be verified as these reportedly decrepit sections were not accessible to visitors.
13Human Rights Watch interview with an NGO representative working in prisons of Kinshasa, November 19, 1998.
14Tutsi in Kinshasa and elsewhere in Congo were attacked, killed, or forced to flee due to persecution by the Mobutu
govemment and militia in 1996 and 1997. ln an effort to assert their right to Zairian citizenship, Tutsi from South Kivu, known
generally as Banyamulenge, supported Kabila and his allies in their overthrow of Mobutu in 1997. Politicians and others who
resented the economic and potential political power of the significant number of people of Rwandan origin in eastem Congo
Human Rights Watch 10 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. l.
period. As the RCD forces advanced on Kinshasa in August, the Congolese government exploited existing tension
between Tutsi in Kinshasa and other ethnie groups as well as a general state of fear to help defend the capital and
maintain their hold on power. During this period of widespread panic, members of the Congolese government made
dangerous, xenophobic statements, including virulent catis for the population to pick up anns and kill "the
enemy"-defined broadly as Rwandans or Tutsis-that created an environment in which civilians could kilt with
impunity. On August 4, President Kabila's cabinet director Abdoulaye Yerodia made a public declaration on national
television in Kikongo, the language of Bas-Congo, addressed to the population ofthat region that was a thinly veiled
call for ethnie attacks on Tutsis. Yerodia instructed "his brothers" to "rise upas one man to kick out he who looks like
the common enemy." He further stated that the population should use any weapons available, including hunting guns,
mach et es, axes, arrows, sticks and rocks to contribute to this effort. •s On August 6, Govemor of Kinshasa Théophile
Mbemba organized a "march of anger against the Rwandan aggression" at the Kinshasa central market, attended by
Yerodia, Minister oflnformation Didier Mumengi, and Minister of Transportation and Communications Henry Mova
Sakanyi.16 The march featured anti-Tutsi songs and slogans including "better to spare a snake than a Rwandan" and
"Kinshasans say no to the presence of Tutsi Banyamulengue in Congo."17 Radio broadcasts on August 8 from a
govemment regional radio in the eastern town ofBunia called on the local population to use "a machete, a spear, an
arrow, a hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire, stones, and the like, in order, dear listeners,
to kill the Rwandan Tutsis." On Wednesday the 12th, a local commander of the Congolese arrny called on Bunia
residents to "be ferocious" with the Rwandans and "massacre them without mercy."18
These catis from the govemment resulted in the slaughter of a large number of Tutsis in govemment-held terri tory
by Congolese military and civilians, sometimes following arrest by military. Wh ile the number of civilians killed will
never be known, the total for Kinshasa atone was probably several hundred.19 Those killed were predominantly Tutsi,
although Congolese human rights NGOs noted that those killed included the homeless, mentally ill, and individuals
who vaguely resembled ethnie Tutsi, while others took advantage of the environment of impunity to settle old scores.20
Severa! includ ing former detainees described in detail to Hu man Rights Watch the kil lings of dozens of people arrested
by Congolese military and detained in Camp Kokolo during the period of ethnie slaughter in August.21 Witnesses,
including military personnel from Camp Kokolo, gave testimony and independently drew similar maps for Human
Rights Watch which identified the locations of killings and subsequent buming of bodies and burials in mass graves
in Camp Kokolo. Sorne testimonies indicated that other mass grave sites existed in Kinshasa, including in the grounds
outside the former parliament building, the present location of the office of the presidency. When looking for her
husband at Camp Kokolo on August 5, one spouse of a Tutsi detainee was told by an officer at Camp Kokolo that "it
increasingly challenged their right to citizenship in an effort to den y their ability to vote or hold political office. For more details,
see Hu man Rights Watch and the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits del' Homme, (FIDH), "Forced to Flee, Violence
Against the Tutsi in Zaïre," A Human Righrs Warch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 2 (A), July 1996; and Human Rights Watch
"Transition War and Human Rights," A Human Righrs Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 2 (A), April 1997.
15"The Palmares," Kinshasa-based newspaper, No. 1301, August 5, 1998.
16"Le Soft," Kinshasa and Brussels-based newspaper, No. 892, August 8, 1998.
17The march also included the public slaying oftwo goats representing fonner Foreign Minister Bizima Karaha and fonner
AFDL leader Déogracias Bugera, two Tutsi who defected from Kabila's ranks to join the RCD.
11"DRC: Hate Radio Reemerges as rebels push toward Bunia," Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, August
12, 1998.
19This estimate is based on multiple interviews and reports from local and international organizations based in Kinshasa.
No comprehensive report or breakdowns of the number of combatants and civilians killed were available from these organizations
regarding killings during this period.
20A govemment statement in August wamed the population that rebels were infiltrating Kinshasa disguised as people who
were mentally ill. This led to the killing of numerous mentally ill persons by mobs. Another govemment declaration instructed
the population to beware ofwomen with thick or braided hair who may be smuggling grenades into the city. This led to the
harassment of numerous women and reportedly several incidents of rape.
21Human Rights Watch interviews, Kinshasa, November 15, 17, and November 21, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 1 l February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
was not worth it to go looking for him. We're liquidating them at the president's office and putting them in a big holt
over there."21 While Human Rights Watch received other reports indicating that some ofthose summarily executed
in August had been buried in a mass grave on these grounds, limited access to this heavily-militarized area prevented
verification.
The virulent discourse and incitement to violence from state agents, at times broadcast over national radio and
television, ended only in mid-August after international pressure led to a moderation of the public position of the
govemment. In mid-August, President Kabila gave a press conference calling for the protection of civilians, although
many Congolese listeners claimed that his speech was not as "heartfelt11 as previous speeches from members of his
govemment inciting the population to violence against ethnie Tutsis.13 The calls to violence, however, were replaced
by a more subtle discourse from some officiais, who continued to portray all Tutsi as "evil" and "the common enemy.11
The minister of transportation and communications, for example, published a document in October 1998 drawing
parallels between a 11Hima-Tutsi" phenomenon in the Great Lakes Region and Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s.2''
White killings were greatly reduced following Kabila's August speech, no public actions have been taken to date by
the Kinshasa government to punish those responsible for incitement to hatred or violence, and the potential for future
violence against ethnie minorities remains.
Tutsi women were also subject to arrest, ill-treatment, and rape in detention. One widow from the Kintambo
neighborhood of Kinshasa was arrested on August 7 and held at the office of the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR)
known as "ex-Circo."2s Upon arrest she was beaten along with her thirteen- and fifteen-year-old children by police
who accused them ofbeing "Rwandans." The widow was bom in Congo, the daughter of a Tutsi and a Bango, an
ethnie group unquestionably indigenous to Congo. She stated that during her twenty-four hour detention she was raped
by a member of the PIR and that she believed that at least one other women from her cell who was taken away by
police and retumed in tears was raped.
The absence of prosecution for any killings of Tutsi thus far, the verbal attacks carried out without punishment,
and the existence of the "model" of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda, combined to make an atmosphere highly
dangerous to Tutsi. As the war-time scarcities and sufferings due to the war continue to mount on the Congolese
population, they become an increasingly vulnerable target to any future hate speech or calls from the govemment to
take public defense into their own hands, including caUs to kil!. During interviews with Human Rights Watch,
Congolese of diverse backgrounds in the east and west-including members of the Congolese govemment-made
allusion to the serious danger that civilian Tutsi could face were the war not to go well for the Congolese govemment.
Rather than acting firmly to protect Tutsi, some govemment officiais suggest that further killings, under the guise of
supposedly "spontaneous" acts by the population may be inevitable. During an interview with Human Rights Watch
an official of the Military Court stated that,
nHuman Rights Watch interview with spouse of a Camp Kokolo detainee, Kinshasa, November 21, 1998.
23Human Rights Watch interview with Congolese human rights NGO activists, Kinshasa, November 17, 1998.
2~"War in Congo: The effect ofHima-Tutsi ethno-fascism in the Great Lakes Region," Henri Mova Sakayani, Minister of
Transport and Communications, Kinshasa, October, 1998. With the ethnie polarization of the last thirty years, people in the Great
Lakes reg ion have increasingly identified themselves as part the group of cultivators, sometimes called "Ban tu," or as part of other
groups identified as cattle-raisers. Those of one group have corne to fear people of the other, a fear often manipulated by
politicians who claim to have discovered genocidal plans among people of the opposing group. Hima and Tutsi were
cattle-raisers, the former found mostly in Uganda and Tanzania, the second in Rwanda and Burundi and in Eastern Congo.
25Human Rights Watch interview, Kinshasa, November 16, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 12 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
If the rebels corne here, there may be another genocide, a spontaneous rebellion. They corne with
a virus. We know who the Rwandans are just by looking at them. ln the case that they win, life for
them will be impossible. You may see something not at ail planned.26
In this explosive environment, future incitement from members of the govemment or the public cou Id ignite
existing anti-Tutsi sentiment into further killings by civilians or military. At the same time, public statements
suggesting genocidal violence could emerge in response to battlefield losses for the Congolese government. This
cou Id create the preconditions for ethnie slaughter, effectively designating a part of the Congolese population hostage
to govemment fortunes in the conflict.
Sorne members of the govemment and military took action to protect the rights of Tutsi and others in Congo, at
times at great persona! risk, reflecting widely differing points of view among members of the Congolese govemment
regarding human rights. On November 21, Congolese Minster of H~man Rights Leonard Okitundu personally
escorted a group of approximately nineteen Rwandan nationals to the airport in Kinshasa during their evacuation to
Kigali. Mr. Okitundu gave an interview at the airport explaining that this was a voluntary repatriation supported by
the Congolese govemment, which had made provisions for Tutsi of any nationality wishing to leave the country. In
an interview with Human Rights Watch, Okitunu said the Congolese govemment has established a procedure
involving the ministries of the interior and human rights to faci litate the departure of any Tutsi wishing to leave the
country. Numerous military and civilian officiais a lso housed Tutsi in their own residences or elsewhere in efforts
to protect them.
The assistance and protection provided Tutsi by other govemments (in the region and e lsewhere), international
organizations, and embassies was inconsistent, especially as it concemed the needs of evacuation. In the first months
of the war, some diplomats, members of local human rights and rel igious groups, and officiais from international
organizations took measures to protect and assist with the evacuation of Tutsi from govemment-held areas. As of
early January 1999, however, many Tutsi were still living in fear in Kinshasa, urgently wanting to leave the country,
but unable to do so because of visa requirements or a Jack of financial means to support themselves abroad. Severa!
diplomats in Kinshasa-some ofwhom had actively protected Tutsi during the period of killings in August-stated
to Human Rights Watch that their inability to grant visas or their slowness in doing so was due to the policies and
procedures of their respective govemments.
Sorne members of the diplomatie community in Kinshasa and representatives of international organizations
privately expressed fears that they would be participating in "ethnie cleansing" if their assistance in evacuations was
not accompanied by a govemment guarantee of the right ofCongolese Tutsi to retum as citizens. This may also have
s lowed the granting of visas or other assistance to Tutsi seeking to leave. Efrorts had been made by several embassies,
church representatives, and international organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights Field Office in Congo, to locally protect Tutsi and/or faci litate their departure, but many Tutsi remained in
hiding or in detention without assistance.
One key initiative to protect Tutsi in Kinshasa by this group was an attempt to relocate the nearly 140 Tutsi in
Camp Kokolo to a safer, more easily accessible location in Kinshasa. Wh ile the plan had been approved by a number
of high-level govemment officiais, as of early February, President Kabila had yet to sign an order approving the
assignment of security personnel to this site.
26Human Rights Watch interview with the second president of the Military c;ourt (Cour d'ordre militaire), Kinshasa,
November 20, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 13 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
Violations Committed in Areas of Combat
White taking no position on why countries go to war, Human Rights Watch has examined the application ol
international humanitarian law, the rules ofwar, in numerous conflicts over the past two decades. While there art
internai rebellions taking place simultaneously, the hostilities in Congo involve several states from the region, makin1
it an international anned conflict as defined in Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949
As such, the conduct of military operations by ail states involved in the conflict are governed by the Genev2
Conventions, as well as the customary laws·ofwar.
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection ofVictim~
oflnternational Anned Conflicts (Protocol 1) contains detailed ru les, mostly reaffinnations or clarifications of existini
customary law, which implement the customary principles thata distinction should be made between combatants anc
civilians and that civilian objects may not be the object of m ilitary attacks. 27 In particular, Article 51 (2) reaffinns that
"The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of an attack.11
Furthermore, Article 57 (2) of Protocol I provides that those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are no1
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that i1
is not prohibited by the provisions of this protocol to attack them. The requirements to do "everything feasible" te
verify that the target se)ected is a military objective involves, according to Michael Bothe's New Rulesfor Victùm
of Armed Conjlicts, "a continuing obligation to assigna high priority to the collection, evaluation, and disseminatior
of timely target intell igence. "28
Articles 51 (5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b) contain the first codification of the customary rule of proportionality
as it relates to collateral civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. Article 51 (5)(b) formulates this rule a~
fo llows:
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
This rule, according to Bothe's authoritative commentary on the protocol:
Clearly requires that those who plan or decide upon an attack must take into account the civilian population
in their pre-attack estimate. They must determine whether those effects are excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Obviously this decision will have to be based on a
balancing of:
(1) the foreseeable extent of incidental or collateral civilian casualties or damage, and
(2) the relative importance of the military objective as a target.29
Accounts from witnesses in areas of combat of the behavior of the Congo-allied forces30 from August through
mid-January 1999 suggest that these standards were often disregarded. Wh ile information from areas of fighting or
21Protoco/ Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of
International Armed Conjlicts (Protoco/ /) of June 8, 1977.
28Michael Bothe et al, New Ru/es for Victims of Armed Conjlicts (Martinus Nijohoff Publishers, Boston; 1982, p. 326).
29New Ru/es, p. 31 O.
3°This refers to the govemments of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad, which have ail sent troops to support the war
effort of the Congolese govemment, as well as the forces of the Congolese government as well.
Human Rights Watch 14 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. 1.
bombing was at times difficult to verify, reports of violations ofhumanitarian law were regularly received. NGOs,
joumalists, and missionaries on the ground gave eyewitness accounts to Human Rights Watch of the damage to
civilians and humanitarian infrastructure following the bombing of RCD-held areas by the FAC and their allies,
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad. Most reports of violations came from areas of combat du ring or shortly after
fighting.
RCD military and their allies also committed abuses during their offensive in western Congo. During August and
September in Bas-Congo, RCD forces were responsible for extensive looting, especially of vehicles and
communications equipment, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and reportedly rape and arbitrary killings.31 Later
in August, RCD forces overran the Inga hydroelectric dam in Bas-Congo and repeatedly interrupted the power supply
to the capital. This led to the disruption of running water supplies to the population and had serious effect on medical
and other essential services in the capital. RCD forces committed further looting as they retreated from Kinshasa,
including at hospitals, schools, and the Catholic mission at Kisantu.32
As they began their assault in the Borna area in mid-August and progressively recaptured towns in Bas-Congo,
Angolan forces and FAC reportedly committed killings of civilians and rape during house-to-house searches for RCD
soldiers in Borna and Moanda.33 Human Rights Watch also received several credible accounts of extensive looting
by Angolan forces throughout Bas-Congo, including hospitals at Kangu and Kuimba, where even office fumiture of
the hospitals was taken.34 Following the recapture of the city of Borna by the Angolans on August 26, Angolan troops
took part in widespread looting including theft from private residences, fann animais, and vehicles, many ofwhich
were transported to Angola. 35
White combat had largely ceased in Bas-Congo by mid-September, the humanitarian situation remained serious
at least through late November due to the extensive looting, destruction of infrastructure, and other abuses that had
taken place earlier as well as difficulties for humanitarian NGOs to access the region. One local humanitarian worker
who visited the Bas-Congo province in November described FAC roadblocks as "economic barriers" in reference to
the blatant and high lev el of extortion by members of the F AC.36 Govemment restrictions denied access to the reg ion
by international humanitarian agencies until November, when unclear administrative requirements and multiple
govemment interlocutors continued to slow the delivery of aid. Severa! humanitarian groups in Kinshasa expressed
their frustration at not being able to rely on govemment authorizations as these were often disregarded at FAC
barriers.
Sorne members of the Congolese govemment suspected members of the international community in Congo,
especially international humanitarian workers, ofbeing spi es or sympathizers of the RCD, further hampering access
to areas of humanitarian need. ln one instance, a member of an international humanitarian NGO was arrested and
detained for several days for carrying a report which stated, "it is not certain that the population of Mbuji-Mayi would
be hostile to the rebels were they to take the city."37 True security concems also prevented access to many areas of
31 According to Human Rights Watch interviews with witness who were in Bas-Congo at that time and several reports from
church officiais, humanitarian organizations, and NGOs from Bas-Congo.
32Human Rights Watch te le phone interview with missionaries from Bas-Congo, Boston, Massachusetts, November2, 1998.
33 According to Human Rights Watch interviews with witness who were in Bas-Congo at that lime and several reports from
church officiais, humanitarian organizations, and NGOs from Bas-Congo. In the Moanda-Borna area, RCD soldiers reportedly
wore civilian clothing as they fled, probably exacerbating the civilian death toll.
34Report from church in Bas-Congo, September, 1998.
35This testimony, taken from humanitarian organizations who were in Bas-Congo at the time, corroborated reports from
joumalists and dock workers in Angola conceming the arrivai oflooted goods in Luanda port on a state-owned Angoship boat.
36 Human Rights Watch interview with international aid organization in Kinshasa, November 13, 1998.
37Human Rights Watch interview with international aid organization, Kinshasa, November 20, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 15 February 1999, Vol. 11,No.1.
humanitarian need, especially those near the front lines. While high-levels of extortion by the FAC and harassmen1
ofhumanitarian workers were perhaps similar to pre-war levels, Kinshasa residents pointed out the effects could be
potentially more severe during the war due to increased socio-economic pressure on the civilian population and an
increased need for humanitarian assistance.
Aid workers described the behavior ofNamibian and Zimbabwean forces at checkpoints a~ "professional" in
several regions. Severa! reports from humanitarian organizations indicated that Zimbabwean forces had respected
international norrns regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and had on occasion protected them from the FAC.
A humanitarian official working in Bas-Congo reported that Zimbabwean soldiers had intervened on their behalf
when unruly FAC harassed them at checkpoints.38
Human Rights Watch received reports of civilian casualties and the destruction of medical and other civilian
infrastructure due to aerial bombardments by FAC allies from August 1998 through mid-January 1999, raising the
concern that bombings may have deliberately targeted civilian abjects, or at best failed to take into account the
obligation to protect civilians and civilian property. Witnesses in Shabunda stated that in mid-September, bombs from
planes assumed to be allied with the FAC hit civilian targets including the Shabunda hospital.39 Reports from
journalists and others in Kalemie and other cities under RCD control in Katanga and Maniema stated that dozens of
civilians had been killed or wounded as a result ofbombings by the Zimbabwean air force.4° Local sources confirrned
that on the night of January 10 and 11, FAC-allied forces carried out bombing raids in Kisangani that killed at least
sixteen civilians.41 These attacks appeared to be indiscriminate in that they did not distinguish military objectives from
civilians and civilian abjects.
The Congolese govemment has reportedly recruited soldiers and militia accused of involvement in the Rwandan
genocide of 1994 from refugee camps in Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic and possibly other
countries.42 The recruitment ofrefugees by govemments from camps severely undermines the strictly humanitarian,
civilian and peaceful character of refugee camps and intemationally protected refugee populations.43 The Congolese
government has a responsibility to examine the past conduct of ail combatants, in particular those known to be
· Rwandan, that is, those recruited in refugee camps housing only Rwandans, and particularly any who registered with
local authorities as former members of the Rwandan Arrned Forces. Any such persans against whom there are
credible charges of genocide or crimes against humanity must be not only excluded from Congolese forces but also
prosecuted or delivered to the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Human Rights Watch also interviewed Ugandans in detention in Goma who claimed to have been recruited from
refugee camps in the Juba area of southern Sudan.44 The detainees, who spoke freely and appeared to be free of
intimidation, claimed that they had been promised repatriation to Uganda, but were instead flown to Kindu, Maniema
province, where they were instructed to join the FAC. They claimed that members of the West Nile Bank Front
38Human Rights Watch interview with international humanitarian organization, Kinshasa, November 23, 1998.
39Human Rights Watch interview with missionaries in Bukavu, December 10, 1998.
40Agence France Presse, "Zimbabwean bombs kill 20 civilians in rebel-held DR Congo town," December 11, 1998.
41Human Rights Watch telephone interview from New York with resident of Kisangani, January 13, 1998.
4~Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian organization operating in the camps, Kinshasa, November 19, 1998.
°Conclusion No. 48 of the 1987 Executive Committee ofUNHCR stipulates "the exclusively civilian and humanitarian
character of refugee camps" and "the principle that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act that is not to be
regarded as unfriendly by another state". Such principles are reiterated in the preamble to the 1969 OAU O.A.U. Convention
Goveming the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, to which Congo is a party.
4~Human Rights Watch interview with prisoners of war held at the RCD arrny security headquarters known as "fonner
ANR," Goma, December 5, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 16 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. l.
(WNBF) in the Sudanese camps were also flown voluntarily to Kindu to fight on behalf of the FAC. They were
subsequently captured by RCD forces du ring the battle of Kindu.
Recruitment of Child Soldiers
Since the beginning of the conflict on August 2, recruitment of children has increased. An official communique
aired on national radio on August 7, 1998 called for children and youth between twelve and twenty years old to enlist
in the armed forces, in response to the RCD insurgency. In addition to Kinshasa, recruitment reportedly took place
at the ai.rport in Mbuji-Mayi in Western Kasai, and Kamina, Kaniema, and Manono in Katanga. A FAC commander
in Kinshasa who had done an informai survey of troops stationed there in November, 1998 found that one out of every
fourteen FAC soldiers was under the age of thirteen.45
Kabila bas used child soldiers to support his military since 1996.46 As the rebel leader of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), be recruited thousands ofyoung child soldiers, known as
"Kadogo," or "the little ones," to support his military campaign against the Mobutu govemment.47 Oespite pledges
from the Congolese government to demobilize children from the FAC since the end of the 1996-1997 war and the
establishment of several fledgling demobilization programs, the Kabila government has continued to recruit children
as young as seven years old for military service.48 White no reliable statistics were available regarding the number
of child soldiers, the total number is likely to be at least several thousand.49
Conditions for chi Id soldiers appeared to be deplorable. Aid groups working in the interior of Congo said that
they frequently saw Kabila's young "volunteers" in tattered clothes and in a precarious nutritional state. A doctor of
a humanitarian aid agency who had spoken with child soldiers deployed in Bas-Congo, including one only thirteen
years old, feared that the child soldiers in this area would fall victim to epidemics.
International Iaw prohibits the recruitment of any children under the age of fifteen, and an optional protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child is being drafted that would raise the minimum legal age for soldiers to
eighteen.50 Human Rights Watch supports this protocol.
The Democratization Process and Civil Society
President Kabila's declaration of astate of siege on January 2, 1999 gave sweeping powers to the military and
again called into question whether the government will carry out its pledges to move towards a more representative
govemment. Wh ile this move did not constitute a violation of international law, as Congo is in astate of war, the
transfer of powers and other measures ta ken by the govemment sin ce the beginning of the war made it clear that any
credible transition to democracy was at least temporarily stalled.
45Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian agency, Kinshasa, November 15, 1998.
46Persons below the age of eighteen are considered children, (Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Septernber 2, 1990). Ali states are party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child except for the United States of America
and Somalia.
47 Led by then-rebel Kabila, the Alliance des forces démocratique pour la libération du Congo (ADFL) was a coalition of
political parties from eastem Congo that, with support from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Burundi, overthrew Zairian President
Mobutu in a seven-month war beginning in October 1996. For more details, see the following Human Rights Watch short
reports: "What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and lmpunity in Congo," vol. 9, no. 5 (A), October, 1997; "Uncertain Course:
Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo," vol. 9, no. 9 (A), (also available in French).
48Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian agency, Kinshasa, November 15, 1998. The seven-year-old soldier
had been seen by a doctor frorn the aid agency in the Kapalata demobilization camp near Kisangani early in 1998.
~
9 ln mid-1997, national television featured a parade of what the government claimed were 5,900 FAC child soldiers in
Mbuji-Mayi. Organizations involved in dernobilization estimated that the total number in November had likely increased by
several thousand.
soconvention on the Rights of the Child, Article 38 (2) and (3).
Human Rights Watch 17 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. l.
Despite the January 29, 1999 decree law that lifted the ban on political activity imposed by Kabila upon taking
power in May 1997, party politics remained prohibited for another three months pending the registration of parties
with the ministry of interior.51 While "recognizing" and "guaranteeing" political pluralism, the decree nevertheless
sets forth a series of conditions which must be met first by parties applying for registration, including the payment
of a USD $10,000 fee, and the deposition by founding members of seven copies of a range of documents, such as
certificates of birth, residence, payment of state dues, and an attestation from a doctor that they are in good physical
and mental health . .s2 Founding members must also prove that they and both their parents are of Congolese nationality.
The ban had by then accomplished the total paralysis of the entire political process in the country, withoui a
credible bid from the ruling party to occupy the political vacuum it so aggressively sought to create. Because of the
continuing crackdown on the opposition and other dissenting voices even from within the govemment's ranks, the
decree liberalizing party politics left Congolese politicians skeptical. Spokespersons for the opposition Union for
Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) told Human Rights Watch that their party, which had persistently rejected
President Kabila's ban on political activities, had no intention ofbecoming a "state enterprise" by registering under
the provisions of the new law . .s3
As was the case before the war, policemen and soldiers conducted unprovoked raids on the headquarters of
political parties. The raid in mid-December on the home of veteran politician Antoine Gezenga, which doubles as
headquarters of the Parti Lumumbist Unifié (PALU), was typical ofthese attacks. Agents, with no warrants, seized
documents and persona! property and rounded up twenty-eight party activists who were brietly detained.54
Criticism of the constitutional review process-whether from inside or outside the government-was a sensitive
issue. When the ministerofhealth, Jean-Baptiste Sondji, publicly questioned the wisdom oflimiting the consultations
to hand-picked individuals and groups, he was dismissed and brietly detained without further ado. Asked to explain
why he fired Mr. Sondji, President Kabila had this to say: "he practically banished himselffrom the government! He
criticized the draft constitution so vehemently ( .. .. ) that is why he has been dismissed."55 On January 14, elements
of the special group for presidential security arrested the director of the central bank and three senior aids, reportedly
in retaliation for their opposition to monetary stabilization policies announced by the government.
Arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians and activists and suppression of their rights to free expression and
movement continued unabated even when the govemment prepared to "liberalize" party politics. On January 16, the
national intelligence agency summoned five leading members of prom inent opposition parties, sternly reminded them
that the ban on political activities was still in force, and detained them without charges for varying periods.56 One
of the five, Mukendi wa Mulumba, of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress, was prevented days
earlier from boarding a flight to Brussels where he was to represent his party in a conference organized by Congolese
civil society groups. In late October, the government placed Etienne Tshisekedi, UDPS leader, under virtual bouse
arrest and denied him an exit visa when he attempted to travel to Brussels to address a session of the European
Parliament on his party's peace plan for the Congo.
51"Décret-Loi No. 194 relatif aux partis et aux groupements politiques," signed on January 29, 1999, Daily Bulletin of the
Congolese Press Agency (in French), Monday February 1, 1998.
s:rbid.
53Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with UDPS spokespersons, New York/ Brussels & Kinshasa, February 3, 1999.
54"Congo- Kinshasa: DRCongo--Security forces raid party headquarters," Kinshasa, AFP, Dec. 16.
55"Congo - Kinshasa: Kabila on Brussels visit, Congo conflict," Le Soir, Brussels, November 19, 1998.
56The five were: Adrien Phongo, general secretary of the UDPS and Mukendi wa Mulumba, a lawyer and advisor to the
party's leader; Kami ta tu Masamba, leader of the Democratic and Social Christian Party; Bofassa Djema, leading member of the
Popular Movement for the Revolution; and Kisimba Ngoy, a leader of the National Federalist Party.
Human Rights Watch 18 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Kabila has continued to push forward pre-electoral and electoral activities in
a superficial fashion that appeared designed to ensure his own grip on power rather than to move the country toward
a representative democracy. Despite bis own pledges, the most important steps taken thus far to pave the way for a
retum to multi-party politics have largely excluded the political opposition and organizations of civil society. ln
November 1998, the govemment submitted the draft constitution to hand-picked "groups of opinion" from the civil
society in Kinshasa.57 The process was widely criticized by the organizations of the civil society and political parties
alike: many organizations, including some ofthose included in the review, claimed that the time allowed for review
was insufficient; political parties had been excluded from the process; the review was limited to organizations in
Kinshasa only; and there was no guarantee that the govemrnent would take into consideration their points ofview.
With a view to preparing a national referendum on the constitutional draft, the govemment created a committee to
organize a population census despite the fact that almost half the country was inaccessible due to the conflict; the
committee invited several NGOs to assist in the process.
President Kabila's govemment has a long record of harsh treatment of critical nongovemmental organizations,
and particularly human rights groups. Although the govemment had coopted a number of prominent civil society
activists and rights advocates in its ranks, and avoided open confrontation with the nongovemmental sector, it found
it difficult in many instances to hide its irritation and distrust of the sector's strengths and autonomy.
Most human rights groups stepped up their work on constitutional and electoral issues and civic education in
advance of elections promised for 1999. A cluster of organizations came together to provide legal assistance to cases
before the m ilitary court. Few took on the 'sensitive' issues generated by the war, particularly ethnie persecution, due
to a fear . of association with the RCD and its allies and a general sense of nationalism. Most civil society
organizations made their priority promoting a transition to peace and democracy by publishing proposais for peace
and organizing numerous conferences, notably a mid-January meeting in Belgium of organizations of civil society
from both govemment and rebel-held Congo.
IV. EASTERN CONGO: FINDINGS
Clear trends of human rights abuses have developed in eastern Congo since early August 1998. The RCD,
supported by regular troops of the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian militaries have committed a range of abuses
against Congolese civilians, including deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, "disappearances",
harassment ofhuman rights defenders, abuses against women, and recruitment of child soldiers in efforts to combat
Interahamwe and Mai-Mai insurgencies and to exert political control over opposition voices.58 Unlike the 1996-1997
conflict, when many of the victims were Rwandan and Burundian refugees, the present war has involved abuses
againstCongolese from almostall major ethnie groups in eastem Congo. Residual refugee populations from Rwanda
and Burundi, man y of which had integrated themselves into local communities, were also targeted for attack by RCD
forces.
57A hand-picked constitutional committee handed a draft constitution to the president in March 1998 for approval. A
procedure to create a constituent assembly was nominally established by the govemment in May to review the draft. Authorities
adopted a cumbersome procedure for the selection of assembly members from lists of applicants who, by mid-June, had
reportedly reached 10,000. The assembly was never fonned. Instead, the task ofreviewing the draft constitution was entrusted
to a "Technical Commission" headed by the minister of justice after the war broke out.
58"RCD military and its allies" or "RCD forces" in this report refers to forces from the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian
militaries, and/or members of the FAC (referred to as the "RCD anny") that have defected to the RCD and are under the
command of Congolese officers.
Human Rights Watch 19 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. l.
While the current level of human rights abuses against civilians in eastern Congo is already cause for serious
concern, the situation risks further deterioration and even more egregious abuses. The growing number of anned
groups in the east-both militia and national armies, often with tensions among alleged allies-constitute a real threat
to the civilian population. A primary concem is the large number of abuses committed against civilians in areas of
combat between Interahamwe and Mai-Mai militia and their adversaries from the RCD and its allies.59 The militia
groups use guerrilla warfare tactics against the RCD forces, which is often followed by heavy-handed reprisais against
civilians by the RCD military. This bas led to the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians in North Kivu, South
Kivu, and Katanga. Militia in North Kivu attack civilian vehicles, strangling local economies and making travel
dangerous outside of urban centers. Ail sides act in an atmosphere of effective impunity with little or no regard for
the protection of civilians, which fuels the cycles of attacks and counter-attacks.
Victims and witnesses of abuses in eastem Congo frequently described perpetrators as "Rwandan,"
"Banyamulengue," or "Tutsi" military allied with the RCD, but were often unable to conclusively identify them as
belonging to a particular army. Establishing the national identity of perpetrators was complicated by the fact that
some Tutsi military among the Rwandan and Ugandan forces were bom in Congo but have lived in ail three countries;
Kinyarwanda and Swahili are spoken in ail three countries; and the use of uniforms by RCD forces was often
haphazard. Commanders fighting on behalf of the RCD frequently wore civilian clothes and, in an apparent attempt
to further hide their itlentity, often used their first names or pseudonyms only. Many residents of the east claimed
that the RCD military was dominated by Tutsi from the Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian or Congolese armies,
increasing resentment among other Congolese ethnie groups vis-à-vis Tutsi in general. This development has further
complicated long-standing conflicts in eastem Congo over customary power, land, administrative posts, and
nationality, and may endanger the long-term protection of the rights of Tutsi in Congo.60
Despite their administrative rote throughout territory under their control, RCD civilian and military authorities
lacked contrai over their foreign allies, including Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan forces. This weakened their
ability to respect human rights in territory under their control, despite their public commitments to uphold
international human rights standards.61 One Congolese commander of RCD fore.es told Human Rights Watch that
he did not have control over the actions of the Rwandan commander allegedly serving as his deputy.62 This R wandan
commander was one of several in the east who was repeatedly cited by victims and witnesses as being responsible
for nurnerous cases of arrests, illegal detentions, and "disappearances".
This report highlights several patterns of human rights violations by RCD forces. The cases described below
illustrate the kinds of abuses being perpetrated by RCD forces and clearly establish the need for further investigation
and punishment ofthose found responsible.
s9Most of the abuses committed by the FAC and their allies in the front line areas are described in the western Congo section
of this report.
~hese intertwined conflicts between different ethnie groups in eastem Congo have been exacerbated by the absence of
rule oflaw by the govemments of President Kabila and former President Mobutu. People whose ancestors were Rwandan have
been subject to a number of changes in Congolese law which could arbitrarily deprive them oftheir right to nationality. These
changes and a threat by the vice-govemor of South-Kivu to expel Tutsi in 1996 were among the contributing factors to the 1996-
1997 war. Many politicians and others in the Mobutu and Kabila administrations have sought to tailor nationality laws in a
fashion that would exclu de man y ethnie Hutu and ethnie Tutsi from citizenship, thus depriving them of man y important rights,
including the right to vote and the right to hold office. See Human Rights Watch and FIDH report "Forced to Flee."
61During interviews with Human Rights Watch, RCD authorities repeatedly expressed their adherence to international
human rights standards. ln a public RCD "Political Declaration" delivered in Goma, August 12, 1998, they further proclaimed
their recognition of the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights, and the "international pacts."
62Human Rights Watch interview with RCD military commander, December 8, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 20 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. l.
Extrajudicial Executioos and lndiscrimioate Attacks Against Civilians
Civilians have been the primary victims of the conflict in eastem Congo. Forces aligned with the RCD committed
summary executions in eastem Congo from August to early January in eastem Congo. Executions of unarmed
civilians often were carried out near areas of combat between militia and RCD forces, while other killings took place
in detention centers or following arrests. Most large-scale killings took place in South Kivu, where combat between
RCD forces and militia was frequent. Human Rights Watch received numerous reports of extrajudicial executions
by RCD forces which continued at the time of this writing, in January 1999.
The most well-known and possibly the Jargest massacre of civilians took place on August 24 in villages near
Kasika in the Lwindi collectivity of South Kivu. The killings were carried out by RCD forces who had suffered
casualties following an ambush by Mai-Mai in the Lwindi collectivity on August 23. Reportedly angered by the
deaths of several officers during the ambush, the RCD forces, described by witnesses as "Rwandan and Ugandan"
or "Banyamulenge", attacked the Catholic church atKasika the following day where they killed thirty-seven civilians,
including the Abbey Stanislas, three sisters, and parishioners.63 Many witnesses and residents of Bukavu considered
the killings as "a punishment" for the Mai-Mai ambush the day before. Others were killed in the surrounding
communities; estimates of the total number of dead, probably at least several hundred, and the extent of destruction
of houses and other infrastructure were impossible to verify due to poor security conditions and, in particular,
uncertainty regarding the protection of witnesses. 6,1
The RCD forces continued killing near the house of the traditional chief of Lwindi, Mr. Mubeza, where
approximately twenty-nine people were executed, including the chief and his family, according to a local church
official.6
~ Many victims were executed by machete or other sharp abjects; a smaller number were shot.66 One church
official stated that a nun had been eut entirely in two from the head through the entire body.67 Many bodies of children
and babies were found in latrines. One witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch had identified many of the
church officiais before their burial in Kasika and assisted with the extrication of corpses and children survivors from
latrines.68
On August 24, the RCD forces carried out a scorched earth campaign along the main road through the Lwindi
collectivity, killing civilians and buming houses. Among the villages attacked in this fashion were Kilongutwe,
Kalama, and Kalambi. Severa! Congolese investigators who had participated in burials and/or investigations in the
days following the massacres claimed that the RCD forces destroyed many houses, at times burning civilians al ive
inside them.69 Most of the killings took place in Kilongutwe, where it was market day. The destruction of civilian
63Details of the church killings were obtained by Human Rights Watch through a telephone interview with church officiais
in Kinshasa, New York, September 1, 1998. These details were confirmed by several witnesses interviewed by Human Rights
Watch in Bukavu who had carried out investigations in Kasika.
64Estimates vary of the total number of victims in the area of the four villages. One investigation conducted by individuals
who participated in burials and spoke with witnesses claimed that the total number killed included sixty-six at Kasika, 618 at
Kilongutwe, and approximately twenty in Kalambi. They claimed to have the names of the victims. Another investigation, carried
out in part by witnesses of the events at Kasika, found that the total killed included 385 at Kasika, forty-three at Zokwe, ninetyfive
at Kalama, and 373 at Kilongutwe. This second investigation identified by name forty-two of the dead. Catholic clergy
estimate that a total of over 1300 were killed during these incidents.
6~Human Rights Watch interview with official of Catholic church from Kasika area, Panzi, December 9, 1998.
66"Massacres-Genocides at Kasika-Kilungutwe, territory of Mwenga, South Kivu by Tutsi rebel troops in DRC", report by
the NGO CADDHOM, September 9, 1998.
67Human Rights Watch interview with a relative of one of the victims of Kasika, Bukavu, December 16, 1998.
68Human Rights Watch interview with official of Catholic church from Kasika area, Panzi, December 9, 1998.
69Report following field investigation by local NGO, Bukavu, September 9, 1998. In an interview with Hum an Rights Watch
on December 15, 1998, the author of this report explained that in one village he looked inside a round, adobe hut which had been
set afire with gasoline and saw a waist-high pile of the remains of bodies. The flesh and clothes of the victims had bumed into
Human Rights Watch 21 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. l.
infrastructure, displacement of much of the local population, and widespread fear resulting from the kill ings continued
to make it difficult for residents in the Kasika-Mwenga area to find food, water, or access to health care. Many
villagers had not yet returned to their homes as ofDecember.
Authorities from the RCO have publicly acknowledged that these killings were carried out by their own forces
and appointed a commission to investigate the incident, headed by the Oepartment of Justice and Human Rights.
However, as of early January 1998, the commission of inquiry had failed to conduct any investigation of the killings,
and was evidently being stalled by the military authorities. 7° RCO authorities claimed that several factors had blocked
the commission, including the failure of the military to appoint a member to the commission, and a lack of funds .
..
White the killings in the Kasika area and other reports ofhuman rights abuses have not been publicly investigated
by the RCD, the RCD has proven its capacity to investigate and draw attention to human rights violations committed
by Kabila's forces, including the killing of Tutsi. A report from the Oepartment of Justice and Human Rights on
violations from August to September 1998 was devoted almost entirely to abuses committed by the Kinshasa
govemment, making only a passing reference to the killings at Kasika.71 The report included an analysis of the norms
of international law violated by Kabila's forces and recommended that Kabila and his allies be held accountable for
abuses. The RCO made resources available for a televised exhumation and reburial ceremony on Oecember9 in Uvira
of Congolese Tutsi, reportedly civilians killed in Kalemie and Vyura by forces loyal to Kabila.
The Kalehe-Kabare area of South Kivu was another site of fighting between RCD allies and militia that was
followed by RCD reprisais against civilians. On the night of October 21 and October 22, RCD forces reportedly
killed ten residents, including the village chief Kashera, in the village of Bushaku, in Kalehe. 72 RCD forces based
in Lemera, a few kilometers from Bushaku, attacked residents of Bushaku due to a suspicion that they were
supporting Mai-Mai and lnterahamwe.73 In addition to the killings, twenty-six houses were bumed-the bodies of
the ten killed were inside some ofthem-and others were looted. This pattern of fighting between militia and RCD
forces followed by RCD reprisai attacks against civilians continued in the area at least into December.
Killings by RCD forces also took place during the night of Oecember 3 and 4, near the villages of Chipaho and
Lemera in South Kivu, where traders and other civilians were going to the market.74 Many ofthose killed, suspected
ofbeing supporters of the Mai-Mai, were palm oil merchants who had left their homes in the Katana-Kalehe area at
night to arrive for the moming market in Chipaho. The traders had received permission from RCD authorities in
Katana and Kalehe to travel this route in order to circumvent other roads presumed to be more dangerous due to
fighting. Bodies of the dead were found in the Lemera area by travelers on the morning of December 4. White
survivors in a local hospital and family members of the victims provided the names of fifteen men, women, and
. . ..
a substance that looked like tar. Similar circumstances elsewhere made it impossible to tell how many people had been
incinerated at this and other sites.
10Jn addition to the Department of Justice and Human Rights, the commission was to include representatives from the
Department ofTerritorial Administration, the Department off oreign Affairs, the Governor's Office of South Kivu, and the RCD
anny.
711'Les Violations des droits de l'Homme commises sur le territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo entre août
et septembre 1998," Rapport Bimensuel, Department of Justice and Human Rights, Goma, September, 1998.
72"Rapport on the massacres of people at Bushaku and Lemera, terri tory ofKalehe, 21-22 October, 1998," report from NGO
in Kalehe, November 3, 1998. The author and researcher of the report, interviewed by Human Rights watch in Bukavu on
December 9, provided the family names of the ten people killed, who included six children, one a ten-year-old girl.
71lbid.
7~Human Rights Watch interview, Bukavu, December 10, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 22 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. 1.
children who were killed in the Chipaho-Lemera area on that night, the total number of dead is likely to be
significantly higher.7s Most of the victims were killed by bayonet, machete, or other hand weapons.
Reports from organizations working with refugee populations in South Kivu described attacks on Burundian Hutu
refugees in South Kivu by RCD forces and their allies. On severnl occasions, RCD forces reportedly rounded up
groups of refugees who had integrated themselves into the local communities. One report described three round-ups
which took place at the weekly market at Runingo, in the Uvira area, on August 15, August 22, and August 29 of
twenty-two, eighteen, and eight refugees respectively.76 Refugees were also rounded up from their homes in Kaliba
on the night ofNovember28 and 29.77 On each occasion, the refugees were loaded onto military trucks and not seen
again.
Fighting between the Congolese govemment's FAC and the RCD in Uvira from August 4 to 7 also led to
widespread abuses against civilians. Apparently in reprisai for their own losses, the rebel military reportedly arrested
and killed many civilians suspected of opposing the RCD in the days that followed their takeover of the town.
Volunteers with the local Red Cross reportedly buried dozens of civilians, mostly men killed by bu Ilets from August
4 to 11. Human Rights Watch is in possession of a list of 119 names of these victims including their addresses and
occupations. A participant in the burials told Human Rights Watch "some bodies were tied up, some had their penises
chopped off, there were also bodies of young women, aged fifteen, sixteen, seventeen and nineteen, with their
underclothes to one side who had been raped and killed. A few victims had been tortured. "78
Uvira residents reported the "disappearance" of many young men who were detained in safe houses in the
luxurious Quartier des Biens Mal Acquis neighborhood that rebel commanders and their men expropriated for their
private use after the eviction of many owners and tenants. One particular residence of an RCD commander was
dubbed the "slaughterhouse" by Uvira residents because of the torture and killings which reportedly took place behind
its walls. 79 Following many corn plaints from the population, the killings and looting by RCD forces in Uvira subsided
for about two months, reportedly after the replacement of the military commander of the town in mid-October.
However, this more positive trend seems to have been shattered with reports of a massacre in and around the
village of Makobola, approximately fifteen kilometers south of Uvira. Over the New Year period, hundreds of
civilians in this area were killed by RCD forces and their backers.80 Among those killed were volunteer Red Cross
workers, and Catho 1 ic and Protestant priests with mem bers of their fam i 1 ies. 81 The massacre was reportedly in reprisa l
for rebel tosses in confrontations the previous day with Mai-Mai. Following initial pledges to investigate the incident,
members of the RCD leadership issued stem denials that civilians were killed at Makobola.82 As was the case
following the Kasika massacre, this again put in question the Rally's stated commitment to uphold the rule of law,
respect human rights, and to protect civilians in areas it contrais.
The various militia in eastem Congo that are fighting the RCD and its allies also committed abuses against the
civilian population. It was unclear to what extent these forces were coordinated or even ifthey were fighting on behalf
of the Congolese govemment. Residents of eastern Congo claimed that lnterahamwe and Mai-Mai militia demanded
750ne investigator of a Congolese NGO who had interviewed survivors and visited the sites where killings took place stated
that the total number of dead was sixty-six.
76Human Rights Watch interview, Bujumbura, December 11, 1998.
77Human Rights Watch interview with NGO, Bukavu, December 11, 1998.
71Human Rights Watch interview with Congolese from Uvira, Bujumbura, December 12, 1998.
79Ibid.
80"500 Civilians Reportedly Massacred by Rebels in DRCongo," Agence France Presse, January 5, 1999.
81 Report from nongovemmental organization from Uvira, January 2, 1999.
82Jude Webber, "Rebets Deny Congo New Year Massacre of 500," Reuters, January 5, 1999.
Human Rights Watch 23 February 1999,Vol. 11 , No. 1.
food, supplies, and monetary support from civilian populations. Since unarmed villagers had :tittle choice but to
accept the militia and their demands, their presence put the residents in direct danger of reprisai attacks by RCD
forces. The militia were also responsible for attacks on civilian vehicles, including seventeen atone during the month
ofOctoberon the Goma-Rutshuru road.13 At roadblocks set up throughout eastem Congo, Mai-Mai and lnterahamwe
demanded fees from travelers and merchants.
ln addition to hit-and-run attacks on RCD forces in the east, militia would occasionally attack and temporarily
hold villages or larger urban centers. The most significant ofthese incidents was the September 14 attack on Goma
by militia, described by the local population as Mai-Mai and/or lnterahamwe. During their brief control of Goma,
they killed a number of civilians, including a group oftwelve Tutsi who had sought refuge at Ndosho orphanage. The
twelve had fled killings of Tutsi in Kisangani. Among the dead were fourchildren and one infant.l,lj As was frequently
the case, attacks such as these led to reprisais against civilians when the RCD forces recaptured towns. Severa!
examples of such reprisais are described below.
Other armed groups, including forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) operating in the Congo,
which intervened presumably on the side of the RCD, also committed abuses against civilian populations in eastem
Congo. ln early October, some 17,000 Sudanese refugees were chased back to Yambio in southem Sudan, following
attacks on their settlements in the Dungu area of northeastem Congo by SPLA troops. ln a statement issued on
October 8, the UNHCR complained that SPLA soldiers ransacked its offices in Dungu and Doruma and stole its
vehiclesand communication equipment." Other humanitarian sources and local monitoring groupsalso reported wide
scale looting by SPLA soldiers ofvehicles, dispensaries, and food supplies in the area during September, and their
forcible recruitment of refugees. The looting also caused many civilians to abandon their homes and fields.86
Arbitrary Arrests, lllegal Detentions, and "Disappearances"
The RCD military and the Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan forces supporting them have been responsible for
a pattern of arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, and "disappearances."87 The rate ofthese abuses varied overtime and
differed between provinces in the east. Arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, and "disappearances" in North Kivu have
decreased significantly since August and September, apparently due to efforts by the RCD mi.litary and civilian
authorities to respond to cases raised by lawyers and human rights defenders." ln Goma, several NGOs stated that
regional pacification committees, originally set up under Kabila, had also been used by the RCD to help resolve
conflicts and cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. White these violations continue, the efforts by RCD
authorities to eliminate illegal detention centers and reduce arbitrary arrests and "disappearances" have increased the
generally low levels of public confidenc.e in the RCD administration in North Kivu.
nHuman Rights Watcb interview with traders in Goma market, December 4, 1998 .
... "Bimonthly Report: Human Rights Violations Committed in Congo between August and September 1998," Department
of Justice and Human Right:s, RCD, Goma, September, 1998.
11"UNHCR expresses concem over forced retums to Sudan," UNHCR Press Release, October 8, 1998, Geneva.
16Human Rights Watch interview, humanitarian NGO, Nairobi, November 25, 1998.
170n December 18, 1992, in resolution 47/133, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Protection of Ali Persons from Enforced Disappearance which states that enforced disappearances occur when "persons are
arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived oftheir liberty by officiais of different branches or levels
of Govemment, or by organized groups or private individu ais acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent
oracquiescence of the Govemment, followed by a refusai to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concemed ora refusai
to acknowledge the deprivation oftheir liberty, thereby placing such persons outside the protection of the law." The govemments
of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, are subject 10 this declaration. White the RCD is not recognized as a govemment, il has
publicly adhered to the international bill ofhuman rights and claimed responsibility for protecting human rights in territory under
its control.
11Human Rights Watch interviews, Kigali, November 19, 1998 and Goma, December 1, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 24 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
ln South Kivu, however, these types of violations continued at an elevated rate into December, highlighted by
a wave ofarrests and intimidation ofacademics, NGO leaders, and other members of civil society in late November
and early Oecember. RCD authorities and their military allies frequently accused thosearrested ofbeingcollaborators
with Mai-Mai, Interahamwe, orofbeing distributors ofhate propaganda. These arrests contributed to the unpopularity
of RCD authorities and to public indignation regarding the presence ofRwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan military
forces, as well as to a resentment of ethnie Tutsi in general.
Human Rights Watch interviewed present and former detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) in the east,
including some who had been held in illegal detention centers. Sorne arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions were
accompanied by killings, torture, and inhumane treatment by RCD and allied forces. Human Rights Watch
interviewed survivors from a group of approximately forty-eight young men and one young woman, most of whom
were arrested by RCD military on September 14 in Goma in the wake of the Mai-Mai attack on the town. The fortynine
detainees were held by the military in a shipping container at Goma International Airport without food, water,
or ventilation. The shipping container, typical of many used as detention centers in the east, measured approximately
six feet by six feet by fifteen feet with no windows or light. By September 16, twenty-seven of the detainees had died
of suffocation. Three of the survivors, who had helped with removal of the bodies, had scars on their backs which
corresponded with their testimony that the military had eut them with knives and beat them during their arrest.0
During a site visit by Human Rights Watch to a container at Goma International Airport, an RCD military
commander confirmed that he had used shipping containers there until mid- to late-November as holding places for
civilians arrested by RCD military and their allies. The commander stated that the containers, empty upon inspection
by Human Rights Watch, were presently used only for short-term detentions and that he now transferred prisoners
to the appropriate civilian or military authorities in Goma.90
Other containers and private residences throughout the east are reportedly still in use as detention centers,
especially for those suspected of collaboration with Jnterahamwe or Mai-Mai. One young man arrested near Goma
in early October by Kinyarwanda-speaking members of the RCD military told Human Rights Watch he was held for
two days without food or water in a container located in a quarry just north of Goma. He said four of the
approximately fifteen others held with him died from dehydration, exhaustion, and a lack of medical care on the
second day ofhis detention. Many of the detainees, including those that died, were from the Monigi village on the
northern outskirts ofGoma, a predominantly Hutu area suspected ofsupporting lnterahainwe. The young man was
subsequently transferred to a private residence in Goma, known as the house ofMr. Hakazimana, where he was held
for approximately two months. He said the approximately ten detainees who were held in this residence were beaten
four times a day, fed every other day, and forced to use a hole in the Ooor of their holding room for a toilet.
According to the young man, some of the detainees were transferred to Rwanda. After almost two months in
detention, the young man was transferred to the jail of the RCD army known as "Bureau two" where he was
interrogated by ajudicial police officer and accused ofbeing Interahamwe. The young man was released without
explanation in early December. One ofhis arrns, still in a bandage when interviewed by Human Rights Watch on
December 6, was partially paralyzed from being tied for extended periods oftime during his detention.91
Other illegal detention centers in the east were reportedly located at the homes of Rwandan and Congolese
military commanders in cities throughout the east, including Uvira, Bukavu, and Goma. One such centerwas located
at the residence of an RCD officer in Goma known Iocally as commander "Celestin,"92 who was reportedly a member
19Human Rights Watch interview with survivors, Goma, December 11, 1998.
90Site visit to Goma International Airport by Human Rights Watch, December 5, 1998.
91During an interview with Human Rights Watch in Goma on December 6, the subject was unable to use his arm.
92Many RCD commanders, including those from the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries, often used first names only and
sometimes changed their names or altered them to "Congolese-sounding" names. Many did not wear uniforms. These practices,
Human Rights Watch 25 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
of the Rwandan anny. One fonner detainee at this residence described how he and other detainees were beaten and
tortured in Commander Celestin's custody and, upon their release, threatened with death ifthey spoke about their
experience.93 An RCD military commander confirmed that the location had been used for detentions up until late
November.91 One room previously used for detentions was being cleaned during the Human Rights Watch visit.
Commander Celestin had reportedly been transferred to Rwanda following protests from lawyers and human rights
defenders about the detentions and inhumane treatment at his cesidence. Human Rights Watch received numerous
other reports of detention centers still in use at private residences commandeered by RCD military in North and South
Kivu. One woman interviewed by Human Rights Watch claimed that her husband was béing held in the residence
of a Rwandan commander in Goma known Jocally as commander "Ngoyi."95 When asked why her husband was
arrested, she claimed that "ifyou're Hutu, you're Interahamwe; ifyou're Hunde, you're Mai-Mai. There is no other
motivation." Many Congolese in the east felt that the RCD and their predominantly Tutsi military allies were
arresting Congolese based on their ethnicity alone.
Many individuals arrested by the RCD military were never acknowledged to be in detention, they "disappeared"
and remain unaccounted for. One such incident occurred in late November when nine men were abducted by troops
during a service at the Neo-Apostolic church in the village of Monigi. Witnesses including the wives of the
"disappeared" claimed that the men had been abducted by Rwandan forces and that the nine had been taken to
Rwanda.96 Witnesses recognized one of the soldiers that had grown up in Monigi and laterjoined the Rwandan army.
As ofmid-December, RCD authorities had not provided information on the whereabouts of the nine. Many human
rights reports received by Human Rights Watch claimed that people abducted were transferred to Rwanda, with some
sources claiming prisoners were sent to a detention center at Rugerero in Gisenyi prefecture. One high-ranking RCD
official confirmed that individuals arrested in eastem Congo were at times transferred to Rwanda.97 Other reports
claimed that arrests followed by "disappearances" were frequently carried out by members of the RP A' s own troops
in the Congo. Numerous witnesses cited commander "Gapari" in Goma and commanders "Pascal" and "!lias" in
Bukavu, ail reportedly members of the RPA, as being responsible for many incidents of arbitrary arrest, illegal
detention, including at their own residences, and ill-treatment in Goma and Bukavu.
Harassmeot ofHumao Rights Defenders
Despite few guarantees for their security, members of civil society and human rights defenders in eastem Congo
attempted to continue their efforts to protect and promote human rights. Working conditions ranged from province
to province: mostNGOs in North Kivu and Kisangani were able to opera te openly and discuss human rights concems
with RCD military and civilian authorities, while in South Kivu, NGOs worked under significant pressure, some in
clandestinity.
After the out break of war in August, several members ofNGOs fled the east following threats, harassment oftheir
organizations, or visits to their homes by RCD military. The RCD encouraged the members ofseveral NGOs tojoin
the RCD and harassed them when they refused.91 As was the case under the Ka bila administration, members ofNGOs
which had reported on killings ofBurundian and Rwandan refügees in 1996 and 1997 were at particular risk, due to
similar to those used by Rwandan forces in Congo du ring the 1996· 1997 war, complicated the identification of these officers.
91Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee, Nairobi, November 28, 1998.
9'Site visit by Human Rights Watch, Goma, December 5, l 998.
95Human Rights Watch interview, December 11, 1998. "Ngoyi," a Congolese name, was reportedly one of the many
officers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army fighting in Congo who had assumed Congolese names to hide their identity.
96Human Rights Watch interview with lawyer of t.he wives of the nine victims, Goma, December 5, 1998. One of the
military involved in the abduction was a Congolese from Monigi who hadjoined the RPA.
v,Human Rights Watch interview, Goma, December 1, 1998.
91Human Rights Watch interviews with human rights NGOs in Goma and Bukavu, December 4 and December 7, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 26 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. 1.
the continued presence of the Rwandan military, who were implicated in the massacres.99 People who signed public
documents discussing the war, political situation, or human rights were also at risk. Many NGOs were hesitant to
document and protest human rights abuses and instead limited their work to the promotion of peace or educational
activities, areas considered less sensitive to the authorities. 100
Several university professors and members ofNGOs in Bukavu, such as the Groupe Jeremie, the Collective of
Youth Organizations of South Kivu (COJESKI), and the Coordination Office of the Civil Society were arrested during
a wave of arrests in late November and early December. RCD authorities, including the governor and RCD
coordinator of South Kivu, accused various institutions of civil society of being responsible for disseminating antiTutsi
hale speech and collaborating with Mai-Mai militia.101 ln particular, the govemor denounced a document
entitled "Plan for Peace" developed by the Coordination Office of the Civil Society of South Kivu.102 The peace plan,
addressed to the RCD, the Congolese govemment, the United Nations, and others, analyzed the human rights,
humanitarian, political, and security situation in the east and called for an end to the conflict. Severa! individuals
who signed this document were arrested or summoned for repeated interrogations by the RCD authorities; others fled
or went into hiding due to threats from RCD military.
Abuses Against Women
Women accused of supportingMai-Mai or lnterahamwe militia have been subjected toarbitrary arrestand torture,
including rape. On September 16 in Goma, RCD military arrested one woman they suspected ofhiding Mai-Mai. The
woman was held for three days in a pit near the northern end of Goma known as "Jolis Bois" where she was
repeatedly beaten and forced to eat mud. Two months later, she still suffered from back injuries resulting from her
beating
Hum an Rights Watch also received reports of rape by RCD military during cordon and search operations in late
August in the Bagira and Kadutu residential areas of Bukavu. Young women were targeted for rape again in the
Chimpunda area of Bukavu in mid September by military reportedly looking for arms or militia. One NGO that had
interviewed women in the Kalehe area of South Kivu stated that women were beaten or raped by RCD military
looking for Mai-Mai or lnterahamwe in thecountryside.103 Human Rights Watch received inforrnation from Kisangani
indicating that rape, and other forms of sexual abuse of women by soldiers, was a growing problem there as well,
*This pressure on rights activists increased dramatically following an incident, in early April 1998, in which the Congolese
govemment arrested an investigator from the U.N. Secretary-General's lnvestigative Team (UNSGIT) in Goma and expelled
him to Kinshasa, where govemment officiais seized and photocopied sensitive documents, including names of informants and
their signatures on their testimonies about the massacres. ln the following weeks, the National Intelligence Agency (Agence
nationale de renseignements, ANR) questioned leading activists in Goma about their contacts with the United Nations Secretary
General's lnvestigative Team (UNSGin and asked them to submit copies oftheir monitoring reports and lists oftheir projects,
and names oftheir international partners and funding agencies. Monitoring groups were particularly targeted, forcing at least a
dozen prominent rights defenders from north and south Kivu into exile, some ofthem after going through horrendous ordeals
of arbitrary detention and repeated torture. One member of the Grande Vision for Human Rights NGO in Goma, Gallican
Ntirivamunda, was arrested and accused of cooperating with the U.N. investigation. Ntirivamunda was held for several months
and repeatedly tortured. He remained in detention under the rebel RCD administration, reportedly at the military lockup known
as "Bureau two" in Goma, accused ofbeing a collaboratorwith lnterahamwe. Du ring a Hum an Rights watch site visit to Bureau
two, RCD military commander Sylvain Mbuchi stated that Ntirivamunda had "gone missing" on November 17 during a military
operation which anempted to use him to trap lnterahamwe.
100Human Rights Watch interview with local NGOs, Goma, December 2, 1998.
101Human Rights Watch interviews, Bukavu, December 8 and December 10, 1998.
102Human Rights Watch interview with the govemor of South Kivu, Bukavu, December 7, 1998. He referred to the
November 14, 1998 "Plan de Paix" a twelve-page document signed by eight members of the Coordination Office of the Civil
Society of South Kivu.
103Human Rights watch interview with women's development and human rights NGO, Panzi, December 10, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 27 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
leading local activists and other observers to express concem about the possible spread of AIDS as a long tenn
consequence of this war. •04
Recruitment of Child Sold.iers
The rebel anny reenlisted about a hundred demobilized child soldit:rs in early August from a transit center in
Bukavu, and another 500 upon taking Kisangani in late August. The transit centers were part of an experimental
program which UNICEF ran for fonnerchild soldiers in cooperation with the Congolese authorities. The fonnerch ild
soldiers leamed technical skills and followed classes in the centers, prior to their reunification with their famil ies.
"The rebels went in and recruited the children wbo were tbere," a spokesperson for UNICEF complained.10
' The RCD
continued to recruit children for combat as recently as December 1998. Human Rights Watch interviewed several
boys from a group of new recruits from Bunia and Kisangani that varied in age from fifteen to seventeen. In Bukavu,
RCD military had abducted or threatened to abduct children, apparently for use in the anny, from several local
organizations working with unaccompanied minors. 106 White many other boys were among this group ofrecruits,
the actual number of children recruited into RCD forces is unknown.
As noted, although international law currently prohibits the use of soldiers under the age offifteen, Human Rights
Watch supports the principle of an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Chi Id that would rai se
the minimum legal age for soldiers to eighteen.
V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The Southern Africa Development Community, the Organization of African Unity,
the European Union, and the United Nations
Since shortly after the outbreak ofhostilities in August, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
has played a leading role in a succession of regional summits that attempted to mediate a peaceful solution to the
conflict in the DRC. Human rights co111cems did not figure prominently in these summits, nor were they incorporated
into the plan which emerged from the process as a basis for ending the conflict. The fai lure to incorporate rights
issues into the negotiating process and assure that political and military leaders would be held responsible for abuses
during the conflict ra ised concerns that negotiations may serve as a way of avoiding accountability and foster the
culture of impunity in central Africa. White the European Union threatened to eut off aid to states involved in the
conflict if a negotiated solution cou Id not be found, the respect of human rights by the annies of E.U. aid recipients
was not specifically mentioned as a condition to avoid a suspension of aid.
SADC's peace initiative was seriously compromised from the onset by the internai rift within SADC between
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, wbich intervened militarily on behalf of the Congolese govemment, and South
Africa, SADC's chair, which has persistently pushed for a political settlement. South Africa initially opposed the
military intervention by SADC members in Congolese affairs, but later accepted it as legitimate.107 The armed confl ict
has shattered the regional alliance that backed President Kabila's own rebellion less than two years ago and now pits
Angola and Zimbabwe against their former allies Rwanda and Uganda, who back the rebels.
Successive rounds ofregional talks broke down, mainly due to president Kabila's adamant refusai to negotiate
face to face with the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy. Another major hurdle in the negotiations was the
persistent denial of Rwanda, until early November, of its direct involvement in the conflict. Rwanda and Uganda
'°'Human Rights Watch telephone interview to Brussels, New York, December 14, 1998.
101"UNICEF condemns recruitment ofDRC children by rebels, govemment," AFP, Geneva, August 14, 1998.
106Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian NGO, Bukavu, December 8, 1998.
107"Congo military intervention isjustified - Mandela," Reuters, September 3, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 28 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
backed the rebels' demand to be present in any peace negotiations, short ofwhich, the Rally threatened, it will not
be bound by any cease-fire deal. The SADC meetings were coordinated by a regional heads of state committee
chaired by Zambia and supported bythe Organization of African Unity(O.A.U.) and the United Nations (U.N.). Both
the 0.A.U. and the U.N., as well as other leading members of the international community, initially took back seats
in the search for peace, leaving the lead to SADC's committee.
The role of the Organization of African Unity in the search for peace also failed to resolve the conflict. France,
the O.A.U., and the U.N. attempted to arrange a "pre-cease-fire agreement" between the key players in the conflict
in Paris in late November, during the 20th Franco-African Summit. An expected formai agreement again failed to
materialize in a summit of the 0.A.U. 's Mechanism for Conflict Prevent ion, Management, and Resolution held in
Ouagadougou on December 17. The meeting, which was to last two days, adjoumed after twelve hours, exposing
a lack of direction and effectiveness in O.A.U. 's mediation efforts.
On August 31, the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement that expressed alarrn at the plight of the
civilian population throughout the country and urged ail parties to respect and protect human rights and respect
humanitarian law. The statement also called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal offoreign forces, and the engagement
of a political dialogue to end the war in the Congo. ln another statement issued on December 11, the council reiterated
its call for a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Congo, and said it would consider "the active engagement of the
United Nations" to assist in implementing an effective cease-fire there, as well as a political settlement. The council
also condemned violations ofhuman rights and humanitarian law and pressed for unhindered humanitarian access
to those displaced by the war.
The collapse of the close alliance between Rwanda and Congo appeared to have encouraged the latter to revise
its relationship with the United Nations. On January 11, Leonard Okitundu, the DRC's minister for human rights,
extended a written invitation to the U.N. speciaJ rapporteur on human rights in Congo, Roberto Garret6n, to retum
to the country, and prom ised that the rapporteur "will be able to work freely and transparently" to investi gate hum an
rights conditions in the country. Garreton subsequently planned a mission to Congo for February 16-23, 1999.
Appointed under a 1994 resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, Garreton was effectively barred from
entering the country in 1997 following stinging reports he issued about human rights conditions under President
Ka bila, including massacres of Hutu refugees during the 1996-1997 war which brought Kabila to power. Okitundu
also stated that the government planned to establish a national commission of inquiry into the massacres, and
reiterated his country's readiness tocooperate with a renewed U.N. probe of the massacres, a promise repeatedly made
by DRC officiais since the start of hostilities with Rwanda, reflecting a clear reversai in their position. Up until
August 1998, Kabila's govemment had consistently blocked attempts by the United Nations to carry out a complete
investigation ofthese massacres. A previous Human Rights Watch investigation found that Rwandan forces were
responsible for the majority of the massacres of Hutu refugees during the 1996-1997 war. The Congolese government
has yet to show that it is willing to investigate and hold accountable its own soldiers who may have participated in
these and other abuses. The failure to date of the international community to do so and punish those found responsible
has contributed to the growing culture of impunity in the region.
The European Union
The E.U. repeatedly expressed concem about the Congo crisis, including a rhetorical commitment to human
rights, but neither its statements northe missionsconducted by its special envoy had anydiscemible impact. However,
E.U. representatives have taken an increasingly public stance threatening to link E.U. aid programs to the ongoing
Congo crisis. ln September, Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, stated that the European Union
should revise its assistance programs to ensure that no aid was being used to further the conflict.1°' ln November,
during President Kabila's visit to Brussels, E.U. Development Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro referred to
'°'"L'aide de l'UE devrait être refusée aux belligérents, selon Jacques Santer," Agence France-Presse, September 6, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 29 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
Congo's human rights obligations under article S of the Lome Convention and made it clear that the resumption of
E.U. development assistance to Congo would depend on preconditions including the establishment of the rule oflaw
and a process of democratization.1oe
A strooger line more directly threatening E.U. aid to countries involved in the Congo crisis was taken in
December with an E.U. statement issued at the Paris Club consultative group meeting in Kampala: "If no political
solution is aggressively pursued, the E.U. might find it increasingly difficult to continue its present level ofbudgetary
assistance to countries involved in the conflict, should they persist on the military option." The statement went on
to call for an immediate cease-fire and the beginning of a process leading to the withdrawal of ail foreign troops.
Ugandan involvement in Congo was also singled out by the E.U. statement, which acknowledged Uganda 's legitimate
security concems along its border with Congo but continued: "it is doubtful that the current level of military presence
and activity up to 700 kilometers away from the Ugandan border solely serves that purpose.111 10
The United States
Although the U .S. has repeatedly called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, U .S. officiais
have missed many opportunities to raise concems about human rights violations by all parties to the conflict and to
exert pressure on those parties to abide by international human rights standards. The early reluctance of the U.S. to
publicly criticize reported abuses by the RCD forces and the anned forces of the allied Rwandan and Ugandan
govemments fueled a widespread perception that its policy is skewed in favor ofthose parties, especially since it is
toward those forces that the U.S. has the most immediate forrns of leverage and influence. Unfortunately, even the
U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice that visited the region in late
October-early November 1998 failed to transmit a clear and public message about the need for all parties to respect
fundamental human rights and for those responsible for abuses to be held accountable.
On the Congolese govemment side, U.S. policy has been considerably more forceful. Condemnation of the
round-up and killing of ethnie Tutsis, the use ofhate radio, and the potential for a new round of genocide have figured
prominently in U.S. statements, as have calls for the Kabila govemment to institute an inclusive and participatory
transition to democracy. More recently, the U.S. has also stressed its concem about reports that elements of the exF
AR and Interahamwe are being recruited by Kabila, condemning "any collaboration or cooperation with these
individuals or the genocidal policies they espouse."111
Regarding the rebel forces, however, U.S. statements have been limited to general admonishments to respect
hum an rights and the safety of humanitarian workers. Throughout 1998, no specific mention was made about reports
of massacres and summary and arbitrary executions, such as the Kasika massacre, or of the rebel practices of
arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, and "disappearances" or killings of those suspected of opposing their policies.
On January 7, 1999, however, the State Department issued a statement raising concems about press reports of a
massacre of civilians by RCD forces between December 30 and January 1-obviously referring to the Makabola
massacre, but not naming this locality-and urging the rebels to allow access to the site by independent investigators.
The confused messages being sent bythe Clinton'administration were particularly muddled in mid-October, when
the U.S. went forward with an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for the Rwandan
military, even though the other African countries scheduled to participate had pulled out. Although the program 's
reported content was not controversial, focusing on military administration, the U.S. decision to continue military
109 Agence Europe, "E. U ./Congo: Mr. Pinheiro specifies conditions under which E. U. cou Id resume cooperation and financial
support to Congo," Brussels, November 27, 1998.
110"E.U. wams of aid cutoffto countries with troops in DR Congo," Agence France-Presse, December 9, 1998.
111"United States Concemed about Rwandan Refugee Movements," Statement by James Rubin, Spokesman, U.S.
Department of State, November 13, 1998.
Human Rights Watch 30 February 1999, Vol.11,No. l.
training for one of the parties to the Congo connict which has been accused of involvement in atrocities against
civilians only serves to reduce credibility for U.S. policy.
ln its overriding concem about genocide in the region, the U.S. administration frequently lost opportunities to
condemn other instances of crimes against humanity. As Ambassador nt large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer
acknowledged in a December l O address, "[h]istory ... teaches us that we have to be prepared to respond to situations
of widespread or systematic killing, rape or other abuses-and that those deserve the same moral condemnation,
criminal prosecution, and efforts to prevent and punish that we give to the crime of genocide. Crimes against
humanity can occur-and have occurred-in situations where the specific requirements of genocide have not been met.
We must not underestimate their significance. "112 This recognition of the broader problem of crimes against humanity
in the region has not been given sufficient attention by U.S. policy makers.
Beyond the current political considerations, U .S. assistance to the Congo remains subject to legislative constraints,
primarily the Brooke amendment and the F aircloth amendment. 113 Un der the State Department' s Office of Transition
Initiatives, however, in December 1998 the U.S. re-opened two ofthree regional offices (Kananga and Lubumbashi;
Bukavu in the east remains closed) that had been effectively closed sin ce the start of the crisis in early August. The
stated purpose of the regional offices has been revised, toward the support of civil society and support for the creation
of conditions that would make a viable transition to democracy possible.
112Ambassador David J. Scheffer Delivers Remarks on Genocide Recognition and Prevention at Genocide Convention at
the Holocaust Museum, Washington D.C., December 10, 1998.
113The Brooke amendment prohibits U.S. assistance to countries in arrears on their debL Section 575 of the 1999
appropriations bill, known as the Faircloth amendment, states that no funds can be provided to the central govemment of Congo
until the President reports to Congress that the central govemment is: 1) investigating and prosecuting th ose responsible for
human rights abuses in Congo and 2) implementing a credible democratic transition. Assistance can be provided to promote
democracy and the rule of law as part of a transition program.
Human Rights Watch 31 February 1999, Vol. 11 , No. 1.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report, based on findings from a November and December 1998 mission to Congo and states in the region,
was written by Scott Campbell, consultant to the Africa division of Human Rights Watch, and Su liman Ali Baldo,
senior researcher in the Africa division. The report was edited by Alison DesForges, consultant to the Africa division
of Human Rights Watch, Janet Fleischman, Washington director of the Africa division, Wilder Taylor, general
counsel, and Michael McClintock, deputy program director. Production assistance was provided by Zachary
Freeman, associate for the Africa division, Patrick Minges, publications director, and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.
Human Rights Watch
Africa Division
Hu~an Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom
and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights
law.
We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for ail.
The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele Alexander, development director; Reed Brody,
advocacy director; Carroll Bogert, communications director; Cynthia Brown, program director; Barbara Guglielmo,
finance and administration director; Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Patrick Minges,
publications director; Susan Osnos, associate director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Wilder Tayler, general counsel; and
Joanna Weschler, United Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L. Bernstein is the
founding chair.
Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takirambudde is the executive director; Janet Fleischman is the
Washington director; Suliman Ali Baldo is the senior researcher; Alex Vines is the research associate; Bronwen
Manby and Binaifer Nowrojee are counsels; Zachary Freeman and Juliet Wilson are associates; Alison DesForges
is a consultant; and Peter Bouckaert is the Orville Schell Fellow. William Carmichael is the chair of the advisory
committee.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
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Human Rights Watch 32 February 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1.
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HRW Backgr01md Paper on Slavery and Slavery Redemption in the Sudan
Marc/11999
Human Rights Watch has long denounced the contemporary form
of slavery practiced in Sudan ln the context of the fifteen-year civil
war. This practice is conducted atmost entirely by governmentbacked
and armed militia of the Baggara tribe in western Sudan,
and it is directed mostly at the clvilian Dlnka population of the
southem region of Bahr El Ghazal. The govemment's purpose in
armlng this tribal militia, known as muraheleen, seems to be to
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conduct a cost-reduced counterinsurgency war agalnst the Sudan People's Liberation MovemenVArmy
(SPLM/A), which is identified with the Dinka tribe of southern Sudan. Thus the tribal militia, ofteii operatlng
with govemment troops and usually transported into Bahr El Ghazal by military train, raids with impunity
civilian Dinka villages, lootlng cattle and food as well as abducting women and children for use as domestic
slaves and sometimes as "wives" or concubines. The abductees are considered war booty, although the
muraheleen diligently avoid any attacks on military targets and do not attack villages where the SPLA might
be present. Their purpose is to abduct and foot, not to rlsk themselves in combat. Their "war" effort is directed
exclusively towards civilians, which is a gross violation of international humanitarian law.
ln its reports Children of Sudan: Slaves, Street Children and Child Soldiers (1995) and Behtnd the Red Une
(1996) as well as ln its forlhcoming report Famine in Sudan, 1998: the Human Rights Causes, Human Rights
Watch describes the practice of slavery and provides testimonles of its victims. The abducted children and
women often lead lives of extreme deprivation and cruelty at the hands of their masters. Many are physicaliy
and sexually abused, and forced to live at a standard well below that of their captors (sleeping on the floor,
minimum food, no chance for educatlon). Beatlngs for "disobedience" are common. They are denled their
ethnie heritage, language, religion, and identity as they are eut off from their familias and are held by Arabicspeaklng
captors, most of whom rename the abductees with Arable names and some of whom coerce the
children and women into adopting Islam. Those who force these changes on their captives often are
convinced that they are dolng a favor for the captives; they regard the Dinka culture as inferior and believe
that the abductees are fortunate to have been incorporated into a superior culture. This notion of beneficial
side effects to the practice of war booty or slavery is a self -serving sop to the conscience of those who
engage in abductions or reap the benefits of this practice, particularly where the incorporating family is
childless and treats the children kindly - a rare event in any case. lt aise makes lt lmperative for the
government to engage in an educational campaign of toleration for diverslty.
Human Rights Watch has called on the govemment of Sudan to take firm measures to stamp out this
practice and prosecute those responsible for it, including law enforcement officers who fail to asslst the
victims and their familles who are searchlng for them. The victims' families have consistently complained that
the local govemment officiais, including police, have rarely helped them when they have traveled to western
Sudan in an attempt to locate and free their abducted children. Thus the govemment of Sudan ls guilty not
only of knowingly arming, tran~porting and assisting·the slave-raiding militia, it also is gullty of not enforcing its
own laws against kidnaplng, .assault, and foroed tabor. There is no prohibition in the Sudan Crimlnal Code of
1991 agalnst slavery, however.
The government of Sudan, until recently, has stonewalled on the issue of slavery, claiming it was a matter of
rival tribes engaging in hostage-taking, over which they had little control. That is simply untrue, as myriad
reports coming out of southern Sudan have made abundantly clear. Recently, on the eve of the arrivai in
Sudan of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on human rights in Sudan, the govemment announced that it will
prosecute slavers and urged the population to report cases of slavery. This ls a smalt but positive move in the
right direction. Whether the announcement will be followed up with concrete action is uncertain, since the
Sudan government has a long hlstory of press releases promising changes that are forgotten by the next
news cycle. What is required is a proactive government campaign to stamp out this practice, and effective
assistance to the familias in locating and freeing (without compensation to the masters) their abducted
relatives. Human Rights Watch has long urged the govemment to set up a tracing agency for families
' HRW Background Paper on Slavery and Slavery Redemption in the Sudan [March 1999] Page 2 of3
separated during the war, or permit other experienced agencies, such as the International Committee for the
Red Cross or UNICEF, to freely conduct tracing and family reunification throughout Sudan. Even if the
government of Sudan suddenly began to enforce its crlminal laws, that would not address the problem of the
people - possibly numbering in the thousands -- who still live in captivity.
Since 1995, several groups of non-Sudanese Christians have endeavored to assist the Dinka to redeem their
abducted children and female relatives. These efforts are in addition to efforts that the Dinka have been
taking for many years, including networking to identify Dinka children not living with thelr familias ln non-Dinka
areas, and a variety of other methods designed to free the identified children and women without attracting
the attention of the obstructionist local authorities. The families, through middlemen or directly, have long
been paying the masters to secure the freedom of abducted relatives - when they could locate the
abductees. At times, committees consisting of Dinka chiefs and eiders have made formai approaches to
Baggara chiefs, appealing to them to free the abductees or to assist the chiefs in locating them. Sorne of
these efforts have borne fruit, and some have not. There are those among the Baggara and local officiais
(usually from the Dinka or Nuba tribes) who cooperate with the familias when asked. They are not in the
majority, however. As a result, these self-help measures have been excruciatingly piecemeal.
Without doubt, the familias of the abductees and their chiefs welcome the assistance they receive from
outside groups to redeem the slaves. They put the welfare of the individual children and women first,
regardless of larger policy considerations raised by concerned agencles and individuels. This is entirely
understandable: those relatives and chiefs whom Human Rights Watch has interviewed have stressed that
this outside assistance enables them to free larger numbers of slaves than they were able to do on a
piecemeal basis before.
The danger of continued redemptions is several-fold. Knowledge that there are foreigners (with presumably
deep pockets) willlng to pay to redeem slaves can only spur on unscrupulous individuels to make a business
out of redemption. When the practice started in the mid-1980s, it seemed that the primary motivation of the
raiders (in addition to weakening the Dinka population) was to acquire cattle, with slavery as a secondary
consideration. The avallability of foreign funds poses the risk that those who already conduct the slaving raids
on Dinka villages may make abduction the primary motivation, or may abduct children and women for the
explicit purpose of gain from the sale or redemption of abductees, even if cattle remain the primary war spoils
attraction.
Furthermore, such a monetary incentive for raiding and abduction may work against local agreements
between Baggara and Dinka to hait raiding in exchange for access for Baggara cattle to pastures and rivers
during the dry season; ln past years these local agreements have provided intermittent relief from raiding but
are not approved of by the government. which tries to thwart them to preserve raiding as a counterinsurgency
tool. Providing the raiders with additional material incentives to raid may well undercut peace efforts.
Finally, there is the risk of fraud in the redemption process. Redemptions are now conducted without
reference to lists of mlssing children and women; the middlemen seem to secure the release of the
abductees from their masters without knowing whether there is a family member ready to assume
responsibility for the released abductee. This gives rise to the risk of fraud: for instance, unscrupulous
middlemen may "borrow" children -- with or without the knowledge of their caretakers - who have never been
abducted, for the purpose of enlarging a group of slaves {and thus lncreaslng the proceeds from the
redemption). Thus foreigners intending to do good may be deceived by middlemen. While Human Rights
Watch cannot cite a specific instance of this, many have voiced concern about the potential for such fraud in
this entirely unregulated environment.
These concerns argue for an effective Sudanese and international program to stop abductions and return
abductees to their familias. While Human Rights Watch does not condone or condemn the current outside
assistance for redemption of slaves, it does urge those concerned, including agencies that have until now not
had arole in the process such as the ICRC and UNICEF, to address the humanltarian needs of those who
are redeemed and to devise approaches that will forestall fraud. There are increasing numbers of slaves
redeemed; in January 1999 alone one transaction involved 1,050 children and women, not all of whom had
familias waiting to receive them. This is a large number of needy people turned loose in a zone which has not
yet recovered from famine. Since UNICEF has included in its categories of children in especially difficult
clrcumstances "former abductees" and "abductees," it can proceed to the creation of a census of all
abductees (by name, date of birth, place of birth, ethnie origlri, names of family members, and date and place
of abduction) by interviewing those in the affected zones. This census would be a valuable tool to assist in the
., HR W Background Paper on Slavery and Slavery Redemption in the Su dan [March 1999] Page 3 of3
tracing of abductees and to deter potential fraud.
The focus must remain on the victims, however, which requires stepped-up international action - notjust to
end the war but to end slavery in Sudan now. Postponing measures to tackle this problem until the end of the
war may mean that thousands more are taken captive while the parties remain milltarily and politically
stalemated.
UCMANNl
TO: H.E THE PRESIDENT
FM: Cl'v11
DT: i MAR99
SUBJ: KJ DNAP OF FOREIGN TOURISTS IN BWINDT
SOURCES: PELTOER ANNA~ · •,
LT BAM·. UTEG.A (Kyantorogo denach Comd)
1. Today 01 Mar 99 between 06:30 hrs and 09:30 hrs a group of
anned people numbering between 130 - 150 people attacked
Bwindi Tourist Camp atBuhoma.
2. They attacked A, K, Kitandara and community camps as
another diversionary group sirnultaneously launched a deceptive.
attack on Butogota. ·
3. Th~ assailants had radios and·were anned with assault rifles. '
4. They y;ere aged mostly betwèen 18 - 30.years, spoke French
and Kinyarwanda included won,en.
5. The following detaÙs have so far been availed:
a. It was coordinated shooting and they destroyed the
following: ·
(1) Burnt 05 vehicles;
1
(2) Charged 04 guns of thé rangers, 03radio sets and 04
walkie talkies;
(3) Bumt the tourist site;~~
(4) Bumt 02 motor cycles.·
h. There are 02 dead bodies· of the assailants left behind and
o 1 SMG ass~ult rifle aftèr an encounter with Kanyantorogo
force of Platoon strength. .
c. 01 civilian was injured in the ~ttack.
• I·
d. There were foreign tourists of different nationali~e~ at the
time of the attack namely: ·
( 1) Americans;
(2)French;
(3) British;
(4) Swiss;
(5) Australian;
(6) Canadian;
(7) Danes and
(8) Newzéalanders.
. '
e. The tourists were asked to identify themselves by the
assailants according to nationality &id .separated.
•
f. The French nationals were' released.
...
g. 01 game warden was kille~.
h. 14 people were abducted jncludingthe pilot of the camp
aircraft 02 ofwhom (white.men) have already been .
_confjnned dead leaving 12· people still missing
including;
..
·.2- ..
, •\ \ . ,, . ,
( 1 ) 05 Am ricans;
::?. ) 03 Brii ·,s;
( J) 0 l Ne, l~calander girl; .
(4)01Can ,dian;and .. : .
(5) 01 Aus, ralian. ·:
(6) The pilqt of the camp aircraft.
j. The ~ssailants spoke with one ofthe source (PELTIER
ANNA) who is now in White Herse Inn Kabale and she
believes they are lnterahamwe.
k. She revealed that they got ~nterested in ber when they
reaJized she could speak FreiJ.;~h and sustained a
conversation with her as she pleaded for the release of the
abductees whom the attackers said they were taking to the
moμn.tains .
I. They however gave a mes~age to her in the following
words; ·· .: . · · ·
''We are not happy with the Americans and the British
They have preffered to support the, Tutsi ethnie minority
against the ethnie Hutu majority."
'
·m. There was an impression according to this source that
they w~ted the message communicated to the Embassies
concerned but they did not exl?ressly seem keen on publicity.
6. The reaction of the Americans was $at they are sending a
rer.ce helicopter in the area to loo~ for their abducted nationals.
3
,
7. · Own force a1 Kanyàntorogo is in pursuit of the assa_ilants
who·are heading ;owards DRC.
Il
IJJJ
HENRY TUMUKUNDE (psc)
·.Col
·CMI&S
.
4' .
UCMANl'
ROUGH..IRANSLATIONS OFNOTE.5 LEFI' ON BODIES OFPJ;c:trOED HOSTAG~
AND LETIER SENT WlTIJ REIJ:ASED HOSTAGE: MON 1 MAR~ 1N BWJNQI
IMPENETRABLE NATIONAL PARK UGANDA·:· •:--.:.
- . : .; ·:, ...
NOTE l. . ...
HERE LIES THE ANGLOSAXONS WHO BETRAYED US, FAVOURING THE NILOTICS
TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE BANTU CULTIVATORS/FA:RMERS. IF YOU DO NOT
LEARN THESE LESSONS, IT IS BECAUSE YOU .DO NOT WANT TO ONDERSTAND.
YOU WILL NOW UNDERSTAND BY ~E FORCES OF. NATURE.
NOTE 2.
THIS IS THE PUNISHMENT Of THE ANGLOSAXSONS WHO SOLO US. YOU
PROTECT THE MINORIT~ AND YO~ OPPRESS .THE .MAJORI~Y.
. . ' .
LETTER..
·j
PZOPLE CANNOT IGNORE OUR PRQBLEM. YOU. HAVE SUPPORTED THE TUTSI
MINORITY IN RWANDA IN OPPRESSING AND MASSACRING THE HUTUS WITHOUT
CONSTRAINT, YOU HAVE LOOKEQ ON AS THEY HAVE KILLED THE BANTUS .IN.
ORC. YOU HAVE ENCOURAGEO TRIS ·wtTHOUT SHAME. ·
THE NILOTICS CAN NEVER COLONXZE .THE WHOLE OF AFIUCA • . ALL AFRICANS
I<NOW YOUR IMPERIALIST SEcRE-r:' •••• \. ·wm:ca IS ONLY 'CONCERNED WITH
GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS INTGaR EAT LAKES~ HISTORY WILL DEMAND
HOW YOU HAVE CONDUCTED .ARUS ·• , . ·. WH:ICH. :IS NOTH'ING MORE THAN YOUR
. JUSTIFICATION FOR ~ILLING US IN CENTRAL AFRICA. IF HISTORY
OOES NOT DEMAND THIS THE BIG\;MAN (GOD) WILL MAKE YOU PAY... WE
' AllE ADDRESSING THIS TO 'WESTEf.NERS ABOVE ALL AM.ERICANS AND
. ANGLOSAXSONS. ' . :
SIGNEO: ALIR: TH. LIBERATI~N· ARMY OF RWANDA r .
.• ~
(~ t ~r~
~c.J lo
t (L L V U l.:lt) fc- ---------)
Procecdiogs of the Cou oeil
UCMANNEX,
~~ d /G/rû
M.to ~ ïll lSlli. - (;ftt\/./n) Pr
M-v ~bs T~~~ t>/
fh.,- ,~
~-Uj
ln his opening rernarks, the Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite referrcd the
Members to the statements of the UN Security Council and UN Secretary General's
Press Release on the confüct in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The statements
and the press release copies of which are attached did not specifically address the
DRC complaints before the !CAO Cowicil, but broadly expressed tlle conccm of the
Security Council and Secretary General on the nature and gravity of the conflict in
DRC. Also expressed in the statements is the Security Council'~ appreciarion and
support for the regional organisations such as OAU, SADC, etc. whose initiatives are
seeking lasting solution in DRC.
After his remarks, the President called upon the Delegates of DRC, Uganda and
Rwanda respectively to present their positions. In his presentation, the DRC Delegate
repeated complaints against Rwanda and Uganda, which the President had already
communicated to the respective Goverrunents. The Rwandan Delegate gave an
elaborate background in which like Uganda, Rwanda argues that the con.filet in DRC
is complex and much wider than the aviation issues raised by DRC against Uganda
and Rwanda. The slatement furthcr él.rgues that the con.filet requires an ailencompassing
solution, thst addresses the concems of all pmies. Copies of the
Rwanda and DRC statcments wiU be sent to ail Contracti.ng States along with the
official version of General Declaration made by the Council.
Following the three presentations the President invited interventions from the Council
Membcrs. Ail the nine (9) members who spoke viz: Cameroon, Senegal, Kenya,
Nigeria, Sp.ain, France, Colombia, Algeria and Argenùna expressed Ûleir deep
concem on the continued loss of innocent lives in the Great Lakes Region.
Like the Delegates of Uganda and Rwanda, the Council Members observed that the
situation in the DRC is complex and necds a comprehensive approach/solution that
addresses the conce.rns of à.li parties involved. Mernbers further noted that the
complaints raised by DRC aeainst Ug?,Oda and Rwanda cannot ~e verifie_cl.
Due to the complex nature of the conflict and the inability to verify the DRC
complaints, the Council decided to adopt a General Declaration urging all lCAO
Member States to adhere to the principles, rules, Standards and Recoffi!Ilended.
Practiccs laid down in the Convection on International Civil Aviation and Annexes
thereof in exercising their authority. A copy of the draft Declaration is attached
hereto.
Conclusion:
The issue was t/rus concluded and rested.
Lastly, it is worth noting that before the session opened, I paid a counesy call on the
Cowicil President, Dr. Assad Kotaite. During the brief discussion, he asked me to
convey his persona! regards to the Gove.mment of U ganda and in particular the
:Minister of Works, Housing and Cornmurucations. He expressed appreciation for the
effective policies, which have revolutionised civil aviation industry in Uganda and
tumed it into a model for other States to emulate. He reiterated ICAO asswances
and readiness to render any support or assistance that U ganda might require as she
slrives to modernise ber air transport industry.
Compiled by Kabbs Twijuke
Director Air Tr:insport
Civil A viatioo Authority
A TT,\CJI.MENT ln St:ate lcncr LE 6/4 - 99149
Ofo:CLAR.ATION ADOrTED BYTIOE COUNCIL
OF1llE lNTEil!'IATION/\L CIVlL ,\VlAiJON ORCr\NIZATION
AT THf. NJNTH i\tEETlNC OF JTS 156TII SESSION ON 10 MARCII 1999
THECOUNC:L
HA V/NG CONSIDERED the rcquc:s1 of the Govc:mment of the Dcmocr.111c Republic of the Congo
for cons,denm>n 1Jf the marters referrcd 10 in iu leners d:ued 9 and 20 Oc1obcr l 998 to the President o( the
C1Junc1I 3nd in iu verbal statemcnl to the Coundl on 10 Ma.rch 1999;
HAVfNG CONSJDERED the Sl3temcnLS of the G1>vemment of Rwand:I and the: Govc:mmenl of
Uganda rc:spectivc:ly 10 the Council on 10 March 1999 in relation 10 the: lbovc-mcntioncd rcquest;
HA VING NOTED A.LSD the St:ucments by the Presidcnr oC the Sc:c.urity Council o( the United
Nations datc:d 31 August and 11 Decembc:r 1998 and lhc Press R.clelsc of the U.N. Sc:crc:tary G(nc:r.il dated
6 January l999;
,t,,ffNDFUL 1hat any conOicc could neg:mve)y affect the progrc:ss and devclopment ofintemational
ci vil a via1ion, noc only as a mclns oCtransport bue also as an cssenrial fac cor of socio-c:conorruc devclopment;
DECLARES as follows:
l. The pre:unble of the Conve!llion on lnremtJrional Civil Aviarion sripulares chat the development of
imernational civil aviation can gre:u.!y help 10 create and preserv.e friendship ·an~ uoderstandiog amoog cbe
nations and peopl~s of the world, yet it:ï abuse can becorne a chreat to the geoeral s.ecuricy;
\
2. îbe Assembly aod the Cou oeil affumed in their rcsolutions t.ba! ùie unJawful seizure of aircraft and
other acts of ualawful iocerfercoce against civil aviation, iocluding acts aimed at the destruction ofaircraft,
have serious adverse effccts oa !be safety, efficicocy, and regularicy of inrernacional civil aviaûo41,
endanger the lives of aircraft passengers a.od crew, and undenniDe the confidence of tlle peoples of Lbe
world in the safecy of inceroatiooal civil aviation;
3. ln accorda.ace witb Articles l and 2 of me Convention on /memationaÎ Civil Aviation, the Cou~cil
recognizes lhe principle that evcry Stace has complecc and exclusive sovereigncy over the a.irspace above
its terri tory, and L1at the terri tory of a Stace shall be deemed ro be t.he land areas a.ad terricorial wac.~rs
adjacent thereto; 1
4. · In accordance wilh Anicle 3 bis of lhe Convention. States musc refrain from the use of weapons
againsc civil aircraft in fligbc as being incompatible with elemenc.ary consideraùons of bumanicy:
5. The procecùon of civil aviacion fiom actS of unlawfulimerference has been cnhanccd by the -Tokyo ·- .
Convention (1963), The Hague Coovencion (1970), the Moncreal Convention (1971) and the 1988 Prorocol
Supplement.ary co the Moncreal Convention of 1971 as well as by AMex 17 co the Convenrion on
JruemarionAl Civil Aviation;
A-2
6. The Council urges ail States irJ eioertising their authorhy under the Convention on J,uemalÛJnal
Civil Aviation and lhe aviation security conventions to be guided by the principles, rules, Standards and
Recommeoded Practices laid down in these Conventions and in the Annexes to the ûmvenri.em on
lntemarional OEvil Aviorion~
7':. The Council urges all States whicb'have not yec done so to ratify as soon as possible Article 3 bis
oflJte Con venrion on [nremarional Civil Aviorion and to .comply with ail the provisions of this Article.
- END -
•
United Nations
Gener·aJ Ass~~mbly
Flfiy-thlrd Se.salon
95th pleury meeting
Tue.sday, 23 tv.:auch 1999, 3 p.m.
New York
UCMANNEX4
A/Sl/PV.95
Official Reamb
PresidenJ: Mr. Openti . . • • • • • • • . . . • • • . . • . . . . • . . . . . . • . (Urugu~y)
Tribute to the memory of Bis IDglmcs: Sb&ûkh Isa Bin
Salman Al·Khallra, Jate Amîr of the S·:ate of Bahrain
The Presidmt (lnwpr,iation jro, 1 Spanlsh): This
a:fternoon it i.s my sad duty to pay tribute to the memory of
the la.te A.mir of the State of B ahrain. His Higbness Sb~
Isa Bin SallIWl Al-Khalifa, 9'ho passed : M'iY on 6 March
1999.
. On behalf of the Geoe1~ Asscmb ly, l request the
representative of Bahrain to ccmvey our c mdolences to the
ùoverrunent and the people of Bahrain ai d to the bereaved
family of His Highness Shaikh Isa Bin s, lman Al-Khalifa.
I invite rtpreseatatives Il) stand and observe a minute
of silence in uibute to the memory of Hi: Higbness ShaiJch
Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa.
Tht munbers of rhe G!llual A.m mbly ob.servtd a
minute of stknce.
The President (.spolu in Spanuh): I now call on the
representative of Tunisia, whl will spea, on bchalf of the
Africa.n States.
Mr. Hacbluû (Tunisia) (.spou ln A rabic): On behalf
of the New York deJcgatious of th~ ( lroup of African
States l would first liloe te, express . rur most sincerc
condolences to the leadership and the pC( pie of the State of
Bahrain on the sllddco passin;~ of His Hi ~css Shaikh Isa
Bin Salman Al-Khalifa. I w,,utd lilcc t<, express to you,
Mr. Chah:man, · our since{e thanb fo; · organ.lzlog Chis
meeting to pay trlbutc to this great man who suddenly
passed away in the prime of life.
Today we pay tribute to an eminent leader whose
wi.tdom and kindne-5$ were weU known. a. leadet who
devoted bis life to building the modem State of Bahrain
and to establlsbing iu capacity to progress and prosper.
He adopte.d foreisn policies that made Bahrain a force for
stability in the reglon and a focua of international
admiration, trust and respect .
The African States join the international comrnunity
ln e~pressing their t~ibutc to His Highliess Sbaikh Isa Bin
Salman A1-Khalifa and their appi:eclation for hb great
achievcments bolh withiD Bahrain and extemally. Africa .
pays rribute to lhe effective rolc hc playcd in promoting
security for and coopen.tion with all peace-loving States
and people.
Africa, which greatly appreciateJ ils strong ti~ witb
all Arab countrles, includiog Babrain, considers the
passlng of His Highness a great Joss to the whole wodd.
Wc find consolation in the smooth transfer or power to
His. Excellency the new Amir of Bahrain, Shailch Hamad
Bin Isa AJ-Khalifa. 'Ibis ensures continued progress on
the path towards peacc, security and prospericy in the
region.
The African Group, looking forward to m.aictalniog
lts mong ties with Bahrain, wishci thàt country all
success in ita prcsent cndeavours. ·
ririiiiRi111i11111111111111111111,111111111,
Tbi.t rccard cona.iru the orisin&l text otspe.edles dellvcrcd in Engfuh and in1c,prrt1ri.ons of speechl!ct
dclivcrcd ln lhc: olttcr b.nguai;es. Cornctfons should be submiacd to orii;inal spcechea only. They
sbould be incorporau:d ln & copy of lhc record 1nd be 11:1\l l(Mcr cJu: 5ian1.nire or a mcmber ohhc
detcsuion concemcd, wi1hfn ont ""'11"' of 1ht datt o/lilt ~,,;.,,. to the Chief of the Verbatim
Rq,on.ing Se..:vict, lloom C-l'78, Co~ctiona W\l\ be iKucd "!\et lhc end of 1ho union in 'l
c:01Uolid1tc.d c:onigcnd11m •.
Ge!ieral Aseembly
Fifty-third s~sion
monitoring force. The ~ p11115e iB thar of poac-con.tlict
peac»bu.ild.ing, and in thls respect we beli~e that the
White Hclmcts initiative cm 1.nake a use rul contribution.
During those three important stages the United Natlom
must vigorously support reglo::ial effons, and Argentina 1s
ready to coopetate to the best of ita abfü; ie.s.
The:re are, however, certain prlo.ciplc s of international
llw that must be take.n lnto account. 1 irat, there ia an
obligation to resolve the dispute peacdull: ,. Mcchanisma to
achieve an inclusive dialope must be found, without
prejudging the legal atatus of the varimu a.dors involved.
ln this context, Argcntlna suongly supJ oru the regional
efforts and the Lusaka proces:;.
SeGOndly, the rule of rbe iuviolal •ility of colonial
borders ls a principle of general inter ,ational law and
applies to the African contineut a., it do~ to me American.
'Ilmdly, within the framewo.t., of respec· for the principle
of the territorial integrity of the DemocnJ le Republic of the
Congo, a system of safeguai:ds that pr >teeu minorities'
ethnie. culrural and religious identities c.m be established,
as bas be.en successfully do11e elsewhe :e. Pounhly, we
reiterate the principle of noi:1•lntcrferen. :e in the internai
affairs of other Swes, a princ.iple th.al il nCQJ]Il)atibJe with
the presence of foreig.n fore.es witbout th ~ prior agreement
of the legitimate Govermnenr.
finally, the scrlous violations of Ulll::,.&n rights and
intematiolll hwnanitarian law that hav? occurrcd in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and that are offen,ive
to the conscience of humanklnd as , whole must be
properly investigated and punished. The prèSence of
Mr. Roberto Garret6n will ,;crtainly b ~ uscful, and we
hope that the Goveromtnt oi the Demo- :ratic Republic of
l.he Congo will fully coopera:e wlth hin . ·
The cause!! of conflict iI. Africa are mmy and requi~
comprehensive re.sponses. 1~at il wl 1y we sbare the
Secrewy-General's vlew, ~ expreased in his repon on
Africa (A/Sl/871), submitted tous ln April 1998, that such
conflicts must be taclded t;)Jlll)rebensi vcly, uniting the
essemi~ ~lement! of pe.ace 11nd securlt: · with sustalnable
developmc.ru, democucy and good gove nance. In keeping
witll thRt approach, Argentiou. bas maint: lncd a pr~ce in
Afric.a to the- best of its abili::y, and it b lS endeavoured. to
make muiually beneficial tt>ntributlon.: in the areu of
peacclceeping, humanitarian assistance, good govcmance
and technical cooperation für develop nent. Toda y, we
· renew tllis commitment ..
95ùi pi~.uy mi.c;t,ü~
23 March 1999
ln concloslon, 1 sbould lilce to say that, as the
currcnt coordinator of the Zone of Peace and Cooperatioo
of the South Atlantic, Argentina is particularly interested
in ensuring that the princlple of the peaccful seulement of
dlsputet and the values of frcedom, democracy and
respect for bu.man righta prevail and prosper among all
its membcr States.
Mr. Mbabul (Uganda): In the early part of this
session, my cowitry had the opportunity to congratulate
you, Sir, on your unarumous election to the prcsidcncy of
the Gen.cral Aasem.bly at ita fit\y-third session. On ûù.s
occasion, allow me once again to express our full
confidence in you. My delegation, and indeed my
country, bas no doubt that lhe work of the Gcneral
Asaembly bu been proceeding smoothly and productively
under your expert guidance.
Because of a laclc of thorougb }cnowledge of the
procedures here, my swement has not been distributed.
As 1 undc:ntand it, the pbotographs that 1 attached to my
statement as evidence of some of the things I am going
to say oould not be distributed by the Secretariat. But 1
am happy to say that the document will be available at
the table as soon as I finish speaking.
The Govemment of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo decided to prcsent the crisis obtaining in that
counuy to the ·oeneral Assembly ror debate. In
particular, as mcmbers heard from il! represcntative, the
DemocratJc Republic of the Congo accused Uganda,
among others, of aggression. At the outset, let me assure
the A!sembly of Uganda's reaffirmation of, and
commitment to, the United Nations Charter, the Charter
of the Organizltion of Afrlcan Unity (OAU) and other
rcgional and international conventions. Uganda has not
bchaved aggressively towards the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and neither is it tesponsiblc for the currcnt
crisit iD that country, as the Govemment of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo alleges. Ugaoda h.as
neithu territorial ambitions nor economic interests
beyond the normal course of bllatcral and regional
economic cooperation. As I bad occasion to mention to
the Securlty Council last wedc, and as I have had
occasion to say elsewbere, the érlsis in the Democratic
Republlc of the Congo bas intem.al and e,:temàx
dimensions, a flet that is regionally and internationally
a.clcnowledged now.
. Allow me therefore to e1aborate· on this point in
greater deta.il. When the National Resistance Moveme1n
(NRM) Govermnent took power io Uganda in 1986.
13
General Assembly
fifty~third seseiou
Preddcnt Mobutu bad been il power : or lO yean.
President Mobutu wu not exactly our hem in the pollciea
he pursued and ln the way he maaaged publi c affain in the
Congo, but !or 10 yeara wc coe,tlsted.
Aftcr the 1994 Rwanda gcn,,cide. the .t lnoddoern -
the people who were rcspoasible for tb 1t horrendous
genocide, namcly, the formc:.t Rwandan bmed Forces
(PAR) and inttrahamwt militis - croned lnto what waa
then Zaire with bundreds of thousand& o· · milgeea. Al
everyonc bowe, tbey then proceeded o bold theae
rctugees hostagc inaide Zaïre. ·Che Mobut .i Govemment
then helped these ginoeldalrti• rcorganii e, reann and
retrain and gave them territorial !~rl to r-·lCapture power
in Rwanda. Toc Ugan.da Govemment total! y oppoaed thJa
move and made its position verr clear.
In prcparation for the intcnrled recapt\l cc of power by
the ginocidlJ{rts l.o Rwanda. PJ,:;aidcnt Mo :rutu forged an
alliance with the National 11.lamic: Pre nt regîmc in
Khartoum, Sudan, not only to 1ùd and ab1 t the c:rlme of
genoclde in Rwanda but ~ :ipecificall;y to destablllz:e
Uga.o.da in the hope that Uganda would tt en o.ot be in a
position to support Rwanda. 111 falfllmeo : of thia plan,
atb.cka were launcbed on two fronts; one lt nonh-weatem
Uganda, in a rcgion called West Nlle, ar d the othcr in
western Uganda, in the clistricl of Kasesc . Both aaacb
wett from Zairian territocy. At the SJ me tùne, the
reorganization and rearmiog of gbwci. talrts ln the
Dcmocratlc Republic of the Congo h1.d reached an
advanctd stage. The Uganda Go-11emment d ~ded to act in
self-defence by flm recapturlng \:he territo~ · thesc crirninal
elcmcnts had occupled and f0Uc1wing thcn in hot pursuit
into Zaïre, as wc arc fully c:mpowcrcd to d > under Article
51 of the United Nations Cbart·~r. It was t bis ace of aelfdefence
against the Oemocratic Republic of the Con,gobased
rebels, which wa.s undcrtaloeo witl I regional and
international undcntandi.ng and suppon, tba; resulted in the
fall of President Mobutu. Prcsld,~t KabUa I vas a direct byproducc
of tbls process.
After President K.abila a.ssumed · ,owcr ln the
De.ruocratic Republic of the Congo, we : n Uganda had
boped that since be k:new our security eonc ems, be would
add.ress them. Unfo~tely, lie did not. At that e..rly
stage, we understood the wcaki,ess of the structures tbal
President Kabila b.ad inhc:rlted ·from the ?l lobutu regime.
President Kabila hltruelf inltially ple&dec incçacity to
handle this situation. That is why he inv. ted Uganda to
d~loy the Uganda People., Defence Forces (UPDP) il15ide
ÛlC Congo to flush .out the Jùlied Den ocratic Potces
(ADF) rebcls who wetc op~atin,g fr, 1m Congolesc
14
9Sth plcoary meeting
23 Mucll 1999
tmitory. A protOCOl to mi8 effect was slgncd betWeen the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and U ganda on 27
April 1998.
Por some time, the joint operations that were the
result of this protocol wcre su.ccessful. But tbis was not
to last. The situ1tion steadlly deteriorated to the cxtent
that aome commanders ln the armed forces of the
Democratic R.cpublic of the Congo not only became
uucooperatlve but alao started eojoyl.ng peaceful rtlationa
with commandera of the ADF rebels. Lattr, when the
Congoleac armed. forcea unit& in the&e 8ICiS mutinie.d, a
leading rebel. whô was the son of one of the senior
commanders of the ADP, wu found and caprured in tbe
bouse of President Kabila's brigade commander iD that
acctor. The choice U ganda had waa cithcr to put down by
force this muriny, in suppon of Kabila, or to remain
ru:uual u long as whoever wu in control understood out
primlly objective of punuùig the ADP rebela. Uganda
chose the lattet precisely bec:ause the Ugand.a
Govmunent did not want to intcrfere in the intemal
affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
As the sltu.ation of the rebelUon in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo woncnr.d, President Kabila - likc
bis predeeessor, Mobutu - went to Khartoum and
worJoed out a deal with President Al-J3asbtr of the Sudan
for the latter to step up stippon to the U gandan rebcls on
the terrltory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Indeed, after that more U gandan rebcl groups were
mobilized by the Sudan and moved . to the Democr.e.tlc
Republic of the Coogo. The suppon to Ugandan rebels
by President Kabila'a Govem.me.o.t b.as itself sinc:e bec.orne
evidcnt. The Uganda Pcoples Ocfence Forces and the
Congolete rebèls bave captuoed many Ugandans
belongiug to various rebel groups operating inside tbc
Congo. The Lord's Rcaistance Army, the Uganda
National Rescue Prout, the West Nile Bank Front, the
Alllecl Democratic Forces, which I have just mentioned,
and the former Uganda army, uuder the command of Idi
Amln's son, Tabao. Amin, arc now pan and parcel of the
pro-K.lbila armcd alliance led by Zimbabwe. This is in
addition to the ginocidfara of Rwanda, the inrerahamwe
and the former FAR. 'Ibese are criminal gangs tbat have
.intlic~ wuold misecy on the people of Uganda. They
auacked, for example. Kichwamba Technical College in
westcm Ugll!lc1a in June 1998. The Jtudenrs were locked
imide thelr dormitories, whicb werc then dowsed With
pettol and set on füe. Those who tricd to escape were
gunned down. More than 50 srudents werc bumt to
death, and mo1e thm 100 of the sutvivora wcrc abducted.
6. Th~ Congolese Rally for Democracy requested to hold
bilateral talks with the tlelegation of the Democratic
Repu.büc of Congo and th.Ill this forms the only agenda
·item.
7. After extensive cor.zsultations on the matter1 tlie
Chairman ruled that neither the DRC nor the Commàtee
had the mandate to f aeiütate bilateral talks within the
framework. Fu:rtlte,., the delegation of tlze DRC had ·
.. : declare.d the willingness of the DRC Government to hold
bila.ter al talles with tire rebels in a different framework
8. In the course of deliberations, the Committee expressed
disappointment at the wàlk out of the delegation of the
Con'golese Rally for Democr.acy./1'.()'/11. lite meeting at this ·-·
stage a1td hoped that il would involve itse[f in the peace
process ùi the fut ure.
9. However, the Committ.ee decided to continue with its
meeting in accordance ~ith the prepared agenda.
JO. At the en.d of the meetihg, the Committee agreed to
submit a report to the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers on its deliherations on the draft document on
the Modalities for tlie lmplementation of the Ceasejire
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including the draft
Cal.endar of the Implementation of the Cease·:fire
Agreement.
11. The Comniiitee expressed its gratitude to His Exaellency,
Mr F J .T CHILUBA, the President of Zambia, the
Govern.ment a11d the people of Zambia for their warm
welcoine and liospitality.
LUSAKA, 17 April, 1999
PRESS STATEMENT
1. The . s'econd meeting of the Committee on the
Implementation df the Cease-fire Agreement ln the
Democratlc Republic of Congo was heltl in 'Lusakà 'from
16°' to .17"' April, 1999, uttder tlte Chairmanship of
Zamhia.
2. The Commi'ttee was estab/ished by. the Regional
Ministers of Foreign Aff airs and Defence at their second
.Lusaka meeting, whi.ch was held from 15"' ro· 16"'
January, 1999.
3. The Committee comprises the fol/owing; Zambia
(Chairman), all bel/tgerents, the. Or.gani-sa(ion of African
Unity (OAU), the United Nations Organisation (UNO)
and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC):
4. The meeting was attended hy representatives of the
Republic of Zamhia (Chairman), the Republic of Angola,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of
Namibia, the Republic of Uganda , the Republic of
Zimhabwe and the Organisation of African Unir:y (OAU).
The delegation of the Congolese Rally for Democracy
was invited for the first time. The Republic of Chad was
represented hy the Democratic Republic of Congo. The
Republic of Rwanda, Southern African .Deyelopment
Community (SADC) and United Nations Organisation
(UNO) did not attend.
•
5. The delegatir.m of the DemocraJic Republic of Congo and
the delegation of the Congolese Rally for Democracy
expressed tlieir commitme11t to the peace process. In
addttion, the Co.ngole.se Rally for l>emocracy attended
the meeting.
UCMANNEX43
6. The Congo/ese RaUy for Democracy requested to holtl
bilateral talks with tke delegaticn of the Democroeic
Republic of Congo and tJuzt this forms the only agenda
·item.
7. Afler extensive cotJSultatums on the matt.er, tlie
Chairman ruled ~hat neither the DRC nor the Committee
had the mandate to faciütate bilateral talks within the
frl(lmework. Furtlter, the delegation of tise DRC had ·
.. : declared the wil/ingn.ess of the DRC Government to hold
bilateral talks with tlte rebels in a di.ffercntframework.
8. ln the course of deliberations, the Committee expressed
disappointment at the walk out of the delegation of the
Congolese Rally for Democr.acy.ft.crn the meeting at this -·
stage o.Jtd hoped that it would involve itself in the peace
process in the future.
9. However: the Committee decided to continue with its
meeting in accordance with the prepared agenda.
JO. At die end of the meeting, the Committee agreed to
suhmit a report to the Chairman. of the Council of
Ministers 011 its deliberations on the draft document on
the Modalities for t!ie Implementation of the Ceasejire
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ûtcluding tlze draft
Calendar of the Implementation of the Cease:fire
Agreement.
11. The Commiitee expressed its gratitude to His Exsellency,
Mr F J T CHILUBA, the President of Zambia, the
Government a11d the people of Zambia for their warm
welcoine attd lto~pitality.
LUSAKA, 17 April, 1999
... , ...... . . . .
.; Tl•i·E··· · .R. EPU.B I.TC OF UGA-'IIOA . . . .•. .
. . .
Joint Conirriüniqué
UCMANNEX4
i :A t ·th~.1~yit_àfichïofthèf.Govemm~nt ~ff.~~ Rëpub_l,ic ofQ.. ga~da, a . . ..
delëgationJï:om ~e·"n~mocratic Republic of Congo (DRC), led by Hon.
. . . . . . . .
M~è~ïc Kon'goJo.·-Minis.tér:.of Ïustice, paid a work.in-g visit to Uganda .
. . . . .
froni 28ui May Jç>.J~t Jtme 1999. )ne President of the Republic of . . . . .. . .
. Ü g~~.~ ~s J~~ç-~ij.~~çy ,Y èi~en }cagutà ~us~_ven{ graiite~ ·audi~l:1-ce to
.. . . . . . . .
.~ ë.. O . kO .û ov~frjrp.ënt ,çielega)io.o/H1e P.F ;G. . Qo._ .y emμi~q.~ ~9.~J~~tlçm: h~ld
. ·discqs510·1rs;·with !théii :u gati~. ~Qtmterpait5. on. the praétical .mê?~litjes
. f~f fuii~Plè~~nfa~ô·n·~oîlli~i ~~i·:r~a~~ A~èement. ;ign~-~-~. L1bya ~n
1 f April "l 999 .:.Tiiè)is t ·or th~ ~vo. ci~legati.ons ·ap~~ar; in Aniiex .
- . . : ·- . . .. · . ... · .. .. ; . •, . . . . . . ·. . . .
, . - ,' . ... . -. . . ':.
2.::~A.s {r~:s~Ù· b:f_t~êru;'à~~si~ns>thë:f~ll.o~\mg .. positions' w~r(a~opt~9:
..... --. ·: - . . . • .,.
. .
( a) . ··:: tr'·ias· if~t~~ t4~ti~ë ·sii-té" P~ac{Agre~m~nt .is. 4: ~~c~~~ti~n of . . . . . . . . .
comniituieo.t -··to-::thè'.·:ong·oing ·Lusaka regiooal péace··process. 'In . tbis
_;;espeèr:·<t1l/::"1:~,.:o -:~fdèl~g~ti~~'::'\eaffinned tl~eir c·o~~~nt 'ta the
. s_treng~~~~ )i.the·~·~irie .·$pirit by h~p-lementi~g the b-~~-~d.:~rfuciples
- . .
stipÙlated m ·i.b.é-;Â.grc;e~enr.
. .... _ ..
m· . . RE:PUDÙC OlfUC,\.."'-10.\.
undertook to promote, io the shortest time possible. the Sirte spirit to all · . . . ... .... . . . .
the parties involved in t.h e DRC. .
.. Cb)
.. . . -
• • • • t t -· - . .. The .rwo Gç,yerrupents would convince their re~p~~Y~ allies to -· . .. . . .... - . ... . . . .....
. re~pgtμje tp~~:pÏ;incipl~.~. i~ th~ . Sirte 'Àgre~[!tCnt in ·order for a1I the
. . . ~· .. . . . . . . . . ~ . . .. . ~- .
parties invÇ>lvec;l iri the DRC ta contnoüte to a comprehènsive and . . .
( c ) The ~o ·~~lègation.s ~derscor~d tJ1e fac~ tbatthé ·~sûë of ~e kill~~
an<l mass inurdeters reμi~ÜlS thomy in tb.~-i~pJë~è#~aj:ÏOil
or°the Sirte ... A~ië~~e~t.::: , · : · .: .... :. :·· · · · · -~ ·
. .. :
(dj° Toè.,.~ô·:a~lega~on$· cô_~~{~ed)jià.tst~strun~~l·e pe_aç~~ $e~utjtyâild
. ~~iliti':iç~_:<>~y))e .~cb:leve4 .tbrough ~~-~f .deinocracy ~ ~ ~the
.c'àûritnes ot·th·ètegion:<·This impltes pu~g ·tn· place c·oncret~ steps
: . . .. . . . . -
}~.~~4s--~:e ~e~$:~!iq~ of gooq ·gc,vc-111~ce.:
. .
·rhë mec;upg, ~ereforè; \.Vèlcomè~ .the ëftoz:ts)ëiqgi:i:i~â~.'by tll~·DRC
Go\~c~âieÏÏC)o ··.m~;t .. ) rin~i -~:nd .1:1flaim.cd'. ~6~;~;}~;; ~/ .tts
c.omm. .-iuiJ.enc to ·opéning national. dialo2ue . .I n a ]i.~e manner, the· two •. . ., . . . . - . . .
de}egat~9ns·e·ri~o~1rage~ pgan~!a.t~ do tbe SëL-ne.
. . ·.
Uganda will continl!e to ericourag~ th~ 2r.r.ed and wiarmc:d opposition
to ta~e pan: in the iriitiatives oeken by the DRC Government in its
• . .. • . - •• • • • . • • • • I • • ~ • •. • • •
/efforts_ to demyc~atis~ th~ country . . r]a!) .
t
( ~) The· two de.legi~o~s· fürther agrè_~d th~t the ·anticipatcd peace ~eeping
.• • • .... .. .. • , t•. • . ' • . • •• • • . • • • • . fore~ shouië( in the meantûn'ë, stùdythe situation on the ground fÔr . •. . . .
· . _· ·. the .,.eyentμ~.-depl<?~e;:it:.
(:t) Tn. e two dclegatlons will meet in. Km.s has. à .à .fier _th;e ·discussions by· . . . · . .
tn~ Experts. The dates of the meetmg wilÏ be· set .throtigh the normal . . . . . . . . . ,
di0Iomat1c c.llarw.els. ·
3. :Tue'ni"é.éting tookplace in ·a franl(and br"ëtq.étly atmosphere: . . . . .. -·· .. . .. .
4. At tti.~.-.e~d:·ofth~:visit,'tbc; Cong61ese=ciéÎeg~no'ri tha.nkêd ipé
. . .
U ~aiidan govef}1:qiétit for" t~S \vaJ'U'. WelCO~-~ -~4. ~q?.Ï)i~éùÏtY:; ~d for
. . . .. .
its: c.orL.rru:çui~nfto'the seàich for a Pè?:iCeful ~êqle. #ic..ù(oft.h e . con.l lic..; t
m thë DRC. .
Signêd at .Kaïlipala· èri. the· 1 S: of June, f999: ·. . .
. .
f or the Republic of U gamia
. . :• . / :
. ~.\......S)r.~
on. ~~ Mbabazi
: ~ . ; ; . . . '. ~ . . . ;
:\lL'\lSTER Of .JüS11CE iYIINISTE.I:{ OF STA TE .. ..· . • .. ... 4 • •
FOR FOREIG~(A.IftAJ.J<.~
. . ;._fREdjë>i'fXL=·të50PER..~ fi6N1
• 1
:
·: .. ! .·: . ..
THE. . RE'PU. B.L !C OF ÛGANDA. • ' .. . ..
·néteg .. ~tiÔÜ of the Govèrnment of Ùganda
3· .. Col. Hénrv Tumukunde,
5. ·.H.E · Kanianda Bat:âringaya,
•:".. .....
. . . . , .: - .
. . .
..1 vfinister of. State for Foreign.. . A. .f fairs . . . . . .
(Regional Coopération)
. . . . .
Pérmanent Secretarv/tvf.inistry of
F:àt~fgi{A:ffaiis • I · ·: ; :· • • •
. éhlef ofMilifurv Intellig~nce
Uepùty"Direé~r Geneial ~f
Exteri)hl ·seçüiity' Organisation
.-i\mbëssador ofUganda to the DRC
·Head c;,f East African Coopèra.tion
and Ri.tg St3tes
! !nterpréte~
noe. R&P.U BÎ:r.é .·. é >F UCM. "DA
.ANNEX
. .
· · ~ μ~Iég~ti~~~o.(t_he'Gov·crnm·ent of th~ D~è·~. .. :· ·
. .•
·Ï.· Hou.·M. wen.ze Kong-olo, ·
't .. . ..... . • ... . . ·- . • • • • • . ·2.1l'fqn B~fub~i.Saqlô~tâ,.
· =- -:: 4.··)ifrs IsaLe11e·1b6tila, . · :. ' :
· ·. 6: Mr 'Munèlà<li Ntiti. ..
· ·-,ï.-Mr1<âta1aylvfanyêka,
.. .
8. iv1r Ngw~-~-Ri~h;d,
1 ... · .
. .
- Minis ter of Justice,
.. . . . . . . ; . .
11ïfl:ister of É~'onomy -ân~. ~dus~
' ..... . . . .'·· : .... ...
Spec)a(A4visôr to the President on . . .:. . . . .. ·. . . . . . . .
. . . S~r.-:1ritv -~ ·:.. : : . . : .. -
: . ·Chargée d\~~aires ·of the DRC
· .. · ~EmbassYin Uga.r,ida · · · ·.
' .·: ·.~.C h·:·.i .e.f. .o..f· S...t.a..f.l..l..M ,· ..u .u stry ot Just:.J .ce
In:te~retêr ..
.. Pèisona.1 As·s1stant fo thé' Minis ter of
·Economy and lndustry
Counscllor of the Embassy of DRC
in U !!arïda:· .
UCMANN
" AGREEMENT FOR A CEASEFIRE
IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO. ··
'.. ·~ I ' •
.. .. • • 1 • • .. .. • - • •
CEA.- SF..·F· ·I·R···E-·- AGREEMENT
We the Parties to this Agreement;
CONSIDERING Article 52 of the UN Charter on regional arrangement~ for
<lealing with mallers relaling to the maintenance of international peacc an<l
secmity as arc appropriate for regional action:
REAFFIRMING the provisions of Article 3 of the OAU Charter which.
inter alia, guaranlce ail Member States the right to their sovereignty an<l
territ~~al integrity~
REAFFIRMING further Resolution AHG/16/1 a<loptc<l by the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and Govemment in 1964 in Cairo~ Eg.ypl. on
territorial integrity and the inviolability of national boundaries as inherited at
i ndependence.
RECA LLING the Pretoria Summit Communique date<l 23rJ Aug.ust. \~948
re-aflïnning that ail ethnie groups and nationalities whose people and
territory constituted what becamc Congo (now DRC) at independence must
enjoy equal rights and protection under the law as citizens.
. ~
DETERMINED to ensure the respect. by ail Pa11ies signalory to this
Agreement, for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional
Protocols of 1977. and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 1948. as reiterated at the Entebbe Regional
Summit of 25 March. l 998~
DETERMINED further to put to an immediatc hait to any assistance.
collaboration or giving of sancluary to negalive forces bent on deslabilising
neighbouring cuuntries:
EMPHASlSlNG the need to ensure lhat the princip\es of good
neighbourliness and non-int~rfeoence in the internai afTairs of olher countries
are respectcd:
....
/
CON CERN ED about the conflicl in lhc Dcmocratic Republic of Congo an
its ncgativc impac~ on the country and otlu::r coùntrics in lhe· Great Lakè
Rcgion·:. ,.. · · .., .. ·· · · ·
REITERATING the call made al the Second Victoiia Falls Summil hel
from 7 lo 8 September, 1998, as contained in the Joint Communiqué of th
Summit, for the immediate cessation of hostilitics:
COGNISANT of the fac! that addressing the sccurity concems of the OR
and neighbouring countries is central and would contribute to the peac
process:
RECALLING the mandate, containcd in the Victoria Falls Il Joi:
Communiqué, given to the Ministcrs of Dcfence and other officiais workh
in close cooperation with the OAU and the UN to establish the modalitic
for effecting an immediate censefire and pul in place a mechanism fi
monito~ing compliance with the ccascfire provisions:
RECALLING the United Nations Security Council Resolution 12]
or 9 April. 1999 and ail other Resolutions anù Dt:cisions on thl· DR1
sincc 2 August.1998.
RECALLING furthcr the Summil meetings of Victoria Falls I and
Pretoria. Durban. 1'011 Louis. Nairobi. Windhoek. Dodoma and the Lu~a
and Gaborone Ministerial peace efforts on the DRC conllict:
RECALLING further the Peacc Al,rreement signed on t 8 Ap1il. l 999
Sirte (Libya):
RECOCNISING that the conflict in the DRC has both internai and ext~n
dimensions thal requin: intra-Congolese political negotialions a
commitment of the· Parties to the implementation of this Agreement
resolve:
TAKl~G note of the commitment of the Congolese Govemment, the RC
the MLC and ail other Congolese political an<l civil organisatio9s lo hol<l
ail inclusive National Dialogue aimed at realising national reconciliation ,
a new political dispensation in the ORC:
HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:-
, . ..
. .' . ~ -
ARTICLE 1
Tll E CEASE-14~1 RE
1. TI1c Parties agrce to a ccasc-firc among. ail thcir forces m the
DRC.
2. ll1c cease-firc shall mean:
a. the cessation of hostilities between all the bclligcrcnt forces in
the DRC. as provide<l for in this Ceasc-fire Agreement
(hereinaftcr referred to as .. the Agreement''):
l>. the effective cessation of hostilitics. military movements and
rcinforcemt::nts. as wdl as hostile actions. induding. hostile
propagan<la~
c. a cessation of hostilitics within 24 hours of the signing of -(l;?è
Cease-fire Agreement:
3. l11e Ceasetïrc shall entail the cessation of:-
a. all air. land, and sea attacks as well as ail actions of sabotag.e:
b. attempts to occupy m!w ground positions and the movement of
military forces and oesources from one area lo another. without
prior agreement between the parties:
c . all acts of violence against the civilian population by respecting
and prolecting human righls. 111e acls of violence include
summary executions. torture. harassment. detention and
executiun or civilians based on their t:lhnic origiri; propagan<la
inciting ethnie and tribal hatred; anning civilians; recruitment
and use of child soldiers~ sexual violence: training and use of
...
d.
.• .• tll•l•, •. ,: •. ,:.:,,.,;;,:\o\.l, ;l;,i;;:, •
.. _... ...... ........ _. ... .
tcrrnr;sts; masl\a\;rcs, ôowning oï civiiian airera fi; and bombing
the civilian population;
svpplics of ammunition and wcaponry and other war-relatéd
stores to the field;
c. any othcr actions that may impcdc the normal cvolution of lhc
ccasc-firc process.
ARTICLE li
SECURITY CONCERNS
4. On the coming into force of this Agreement lhc Parties commit
thcmsclvcs to immcdiatcly addrcs.c; the security conccrns of the DRC
and hcr ncighbouring countrics.
ARTICLE Ill
PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT . Jt !
6 . . ,
7.
8.
.•
The provisions of paragraph 3 (c) do not prccludc the supply of food.
clothing and mcdical support for the military forces in the field.
The ceasc-tirc shall guarantce the fi-cc rnovcmcnt of pcrsons and
goods throughout the national tcrritory or the Dcmocrntic Republic or
Congo.
On the corning inlo force of the Agreement. the Parties shall rclcasc
persons detaincd or takcn hostage and shall givc thcm the latitude to
rclocatc to any .provinces within the ORC or country whcrc thcir
security will be guarantccd.
fhe Parties lo the Agreement commit themselvcs 'to exchangc
prisoncrs of war and releasc any other pcrsons detained as a rcsult of
the war.
9. 'll1c Parties shall allow immc<lialc and unhindcrc<l acccss lo the
International Commillcc o_f the; Red Cross (ICRC) and Rc<l Crcscenl
for the purposc <;f arnmgiilg;·tli"c relcase of prisoners of war and other
pcrsons detained as a rc~mll of the war as wcll as the rccovcry or the
<lcad and the lreatmcnt of the wounded.
l O. 1l1e Parties shall facilitatc humanilarian assistance through the ·
opening up of humanitarian corridors and creation of conditions
conducivc to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to
displaced persans. refugccs and other affected persons.
t 1. a. 11,c Unite<l Nations Sccurity Council. acting. un<lcr
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the
OAU. shall be rcqucstcd to constitutc. facilitatc and <lcploy an
appropriatc pcacckccping force in the DRC lo ensure
implementation of this Agreement: and taking into account the
peculiar situation of the DRC. mandate the pcacekecpinl! force
to track <lown ail anncd groups in the DRC. ln this respect. the
UN Security Council shall pn.wide the requisite mandate for the
pcacc-kecping. force.
_.,..,.
b. The Partic;i shall constitute a Joint Military Commission (JMC)
which shaÜ. tôgcther with the UN/OAU Observer g.nmp be
responsiblc for e:oecuting.. immcdiatcly after the coming inlo
force of this Agreement, peace-keeping operations until the ·
deployment of the UN peace-keeping. force. lts composition
and mandale shall be as stipulated in Chapler 7 of Annex ·A' of
this Agreem. ent.
12. l11e final withdrawal or all forcign forces from the national territory
uf the DRC shall be caiTied out in accorda.nec! with the Cal~ndt!r in
Annex · B' of tl~is Ag.recment and a withdrawal schedule to be
prepared by the UN. the OAU and the JMC.
13 . ll1e laying of mines or whatever type shall be prohibited.
14. ll1ere shall be immediate disengagement of forces in the areas wherc
they are in direct tontact.
h
\
/
. ' . .... ...... .. .
. : .. :::: .. ~; .. ... : ...
15. Nothing in the Agreement shall in any way undcrminc the sovercignty
and territorial-intcgrily -of the Dcmocmtic Republic of Congo:
16. The Parties re-aflirm that all ethnie groups and nationalitics whosc
people and tcrritory constitutcd what bccamc Congo (now DRC) at
indcpendcncc must cnjoy cqual rights and protection under the law as
citizcns.
17. The Parties to lhc Agreement shall takc ail ncccssary measures aimcd
at securing the normalisation of the situation along the international
hurdcrs of the Dcmocratic Republic of Congo. including the conlrol o!
illicit lrafticking of arms and the infiltration of armcd groups.
18. ln accordancc with the Lerms of the Agreement and upon conclusion
of the lntcr-Congolesc po1itical negotiations. stalc administration shall
be re-cstablishcd lhroughout the national tcrritory or the Dcmocratic
Republic of Congo.
, J
19. On the coming inlo force or the Agreement. lhl.· Govcrnmcnt of tnc
D~}C, the arrncd opposition, namcly. the RCD and MLC as well as th
u~drmed opposition shall enter into an open national dialogue. Thcs
intcr-Congolcsc political negotiations involving les forces vives sha
l~ad lo a new political dispcnsation and national rcconciliation ·ïn tt
D.~C. The inter-Congolesc political negotiations shall be under t~
a~gis of a ncutral facilitator to be agrec<l upon by the Congolcs
p:lrties. Ail the Parties commit themselves lo supporting this dialogu
and shall cnsurc that the inter-Congolesc political ncgotiations ar
conductc<l in accordancc with the provisions of Chaptcr 5 o
Annex • A'.
20. ln accordancc with the tcrms of the Agreement and upon the
conclusion of the national dialogue, therc shall be a mcchanism fort
formation of a national. rcstructured and integrated army. including
the forces of the Congolesc Parties who arc signatorics lo this
/\greemenl. on the basis of ncgotiations betwecn the ' Govcrnmc
of the Dcmocratic Republic of Congo and the RCD and MLC .
••
7
21. The Parties allinn the nccd to addrcss the sccurity concèrns of the
DRC: amf her ncighbouring countries.
22. Thcrc shall be a mcchanism for disarming militias and armcd
groups. including the gcnocidal forces. ln this· conlexl, all
Parties commit thcmsclvcs lo the proccss or locating. idcntifying, .
disarming and asscmbling ail mcmbcrs of armcd groups in the DRC.
Countrics of origin of mcmbcrs of the armcd groups, commit
thcmsclvcs lo taking ail · the neccssary mcasurcs lo facilitatc thcir
rcpatriation. Such measurcs may includc the granting or amncsty in
countrics whcre such a measure has bccn dccmcd beneficial. ll shall,
howcvcr. not apply in the case of suspects of the crime of genocide.
The Parties assume fuit responsibility of cnsuring that armcd groups
.uperating alongsidc thcir lroops or on the tcrrilory undcr their control,
comply with the proccsscs lcading lo the dismantling of thosc groups
in particular.
23. The Parties shall cnsurc the implemcntation of the tcrms o~~
the Agreement and its Annexes ·A' anJ • L3' which form~ ln
intcgral part of the /\greem~1t. 4
24. The definitions or common1erms uscd are al Anncx "(".
25. The Agreement shall takc cffect 24 hours aller ::.ignaturc.
26. The Agreement may be amcnded by agreement of the Parties and any
such amcndment shall be in writing and shall be signcd by thcm in the
same way as the Agreement.
. ;
\
/
IN .WITNESS WitEREOF the duly authorised representatives of the
Parties have signed the Agreement in the English. French and Portugucse
languages, ail texts being cqually authcntic.
DONE AT I.USAKA {7.AMBIA) ON TH1s.f:(?._c{fA Y OF .J..1f.[1.,/.9.~
FOR THE REPUBLIC QE..ANGOLA;
FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO;
~..... . ..................... .
BLlC OF NAMlBIA;
···· ····· ······························-~···<=·
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF RW A ~ . -------,-,
!=:, • _.,.
-
.•
HE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA;
.~!f:!P. .. §.~.ff!../?.~r:..Af..~!Yd lis t =
FOR THE CONGOLESE RALL Y FOR
DEMOCRACY (RCD);
FOR THE MOVEMENT FORT LIBERATION OF
THE CONGO (MLC);
.9 ..
. ~ .
AS . .· '";.. - ....,
FOR THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
. . ·.· .................................. ................. .
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
~>JtLL,ctL
····· ·· ······ ····· ·· ··· ······ ······· ········ ··· ············ · ······ ······· ········· ·· ·· ··
FOR THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
•• _.,. .,·
10
····· ........... ~ ............ -. ····· ... .
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE CONGOLESE RALL Y FOR
DEMOCRACY, THE FOLLOWING F DER MEMBERS HEREBY
APPENO THEIR SIGNA TIJRES:- .J
BAITSURA MUSOWA
·············;:;:.:.- -·-······-····~···1--'>. .... ~ ....· ...· ········ ......... .
BALIKWISHA Jlm
·····-............................... ····~···· ........................ .
BAMPA MfLIABYO
/ /.,, -~ ./JrA,t~
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••:::.,)1u ...... •••••••••--•
BARÏHIMA eJn-Bosco
,/ ,, J. • .
. "' .•
. -...................... /::.. ~ -.. . ............ .
RIZI~ K
1
A ~A --.
.....................0 ..~. ./..'..{..I.f.. .. ........................ .
BUGERA Déogratias
······-·-········································ ..................... .
. D~N Jacque: ,
...•...••....... ...••• ~ ....•....•.. :..:~~~~--~---··
.Eë~N~\~. _,.,.
-~ . -· .. . ·········-······································· ................. .
ENDUNDO BONONGE José
11
,. .
Jt :
······························· .............•....•••.................
GASANA KARAKE Guillaume
---=!_'--& f 1 1 • 42- -1
GASHINGE1>a-otc
................... ~t.~.:~.::>. ............................ . HABARUGIRA Tharcisse
/.,,,,, ~r-· ..- "- ""-- ...... ·---.. - . - ·- :::- - . ..... --· ··-- ----·---
··············································· ························
ILUNGA KALAMBO Emile
.......................................................................
KALALA SHAMBUYI
·~···-..····
KAMANZI Emmanuel
.......................................................................
KAMBALE BAHEK~
' . ~--{)~·-----· -
·...... ··········· ............ ··-··············· ........................ .
KANANURA Stanislas
Léonard
( \11/:;~~~;·;~"----> ·\~~\"'.
12 ···---. . ) -- \.
,:
,
........................................................................
KIRIVITA Bcrt. l.~ a
. ,\ . y t
......... ······································ ....................... .
KITEMBO Gertrude Kl\,H,~~
LU
l -- . ···-· - -..
. ························-·················· ...... ········-··---
__'.JNDA BULULU t
............. ~ ........................................... .
. ........ J .LU::SE~EKA .................... .
0
MAKA;~~A~xi,
- ~"··: 21:?
MBUSA NYAMWISI
..... ;;
.......................................................................
MUKINGI Oswald
... - -"" I , .. ""·/·, l ' ... ' •
•; I ,, •; ·i /
····················•················•········ ........................ .
.....
M UTUMBI Sylvain
................................................................. ······
NGANGURA Etienne
,-1'f NYANGI Oda
:::_,r
.,
.............. ..............
.,_ ... ..-
..
.. ··W,.,.,; .
......................... R.üiiiïiï:i~;•···~~··~, ( g /qq
RUBONEKA Gervais
.......................................................................
./
..........................,.. ..............................................
TANSIA Je11n·Claudc
TOMYTAMBWE
~---- - -, -=r? . ············~::i~J!q:. ..... -
•i
15
,,
•
~ • • . i l i.:. : t.. , ··.' ~ :· 1· \ l· t :. ~ ; : ! • . ~ •
t.._- - .... ,~- ,·
.. . .. '1', - ... - ·- - .
ANNEX 'A' TO
THE CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT
MODALITIES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
·"
t
CHAPTER 1
CESSATION OF-HOSTILITIIt:S
1.1 The Parties, shall announce a cessation of hostilities, to be
effective 24 hours aller the signing of the Cease-fire
Agreement. The announcement of cessation of hostilities
shall be disseminated by the parties through command
channels, and il shall concurrently be ·communicated to the
civil population via prinl and electronic media.
1.2 Unlil the deploymcnl of United Nations/Organisation of
.. African Unity (UN!OAU) observers, the cessation of
hostilities shall be regulated and monitored by the Parties
through the Joint Military Commission. With the
deployment of UN/OAU observers~ the responsibility of
verification, control and monitoring of the cessation of
hostilities and subsequcnt disengagement shall be reported
through UN/OAU. ,. .
1.3 Any violation of the cessation of hostilities and subsequcnt
events shall be reportcd to the Joint Military Commission and
to the UN/OAU mechanisms through the agrccd chain of
command for investigation and action as necessary.
CHAPTER 2
DISENGAGEMENT
2.1 The disengagement of forces shall mean the immediate
breaking of tactical contact between the -opposing Military
Forces of the Parties to this Agreement at places where they
are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the
Cease-Firc Agreement.
2
2.2
2.3
2.4.
Wherc imrnediatc discngagcmcnt is not possible. a
fra.a:ncwork -and·.,sequcnéc 1ôf-disëngàgèmënt . is ·to 'l>c'~âgr~ed
by ail Parties through the Joint Military Commission/UN and
OAlJ.
lmmcdiatc disengagement al the initiative of ail military units
shall be limitcd Lo the effective range of direct lire wcapons.
·Further discngagcmenl to pull all wcapons out of range, shall
be conducte.d under the guidance of the Joint Military
Commission/UN/OAU .
Whercvcr discngagemcnt by movemcnt is impossible or
impractical, alternative solutions rcquiring that wcapons are
rendercd safc shall be dcsigned by the Joint Milita{)'
Commission/UN and OAU ..
..,,, .r
CHAPTER 3
RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND EXCHANGE OF PRISONEF.. •.
OFWAR
3.1 Upon the ccasc-firc taking effecl, ail Parties shall providc
ICRC/Rcd Crcscent with relevant information conceming
thcir prisoners of war or persons dctaincd becausc of the war.
They shal i subscqucntly accord every assistance to the
ICRC/Red Crcsccnt r~prescntatives to cnablc thcm to visit
the prisoners and detainccs and veri fy any < dctai ls and
ascertain thcir condition and status.
3
3 .2 On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall
rclease pcrsons detaincd because of the war or taken hostage,
rv, .h_ . ... :- ··"·, -· ... ; ..• :wi\4in .thrcc.days:-ofth~.:signing.0Fthc- Ceasc;.fire -Agreemctit
·"'· .. ·· and the ICRC/Red Crcscent shall give thcm ail the neccssary
assistance including relocation to any provinces within the
DRC or any othcr country wherc their s_ecurity will be
guaranteed.
CHAPTER4
ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES
4.1 The final orderly withdrawal of all toreign forces from the
national territory of the Dcmoératic Republic ot· Congo shall
be in accordance with J\nnex "B' of this Agreement.
4.::?. The Joint Military Commission/GAU and UN shall draw upâ
definitive schedule for the orderly withdrawal of all forcign
forces from the Oemocratic Republic of Congo.
CHAPTER 5
NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND
RECONCILIATION
5.1 On the. coming into force of the Ccasc-fire Agreement in the
DRC~ the Parties agree to do their utmost to fàcilitate the
intcr-Congolese political negotiations which should lead to a
new political dispensation in the Dcmocratic Republic of
Congo.
••"•'-•' ,\., .... :• ..... -·
5.2 ln 9rdcr Lo arrive at a new political dispensation and national ~
. ... ,. ··· ·-::,:: .. , ·. recoriéiliaÙon arising from the intcr-Congolese political
I
negotiations, the Parties agrcc upon the implcmcntation of
the f ollowing principlcs:
i. the intcr-Congolese political ncgotiations process shall
include beside the Congolese parties. namely the
Govemment of the Democratic Republic of Congo .. the
Congolese Rally for Dcmocracy and the Movement for
the Libcration of Congo, the political opposition as well
as representatives of the forces vives:
11. ail the participants in the inter-Congolese political
negotiations shall enjoy equal status:
111. ail the rcsolutions adopted by the inter-Congolese .
political negotiations shall b~ binding on an the
participants~ _.,. .,-
5 .3 The Parties agrec that the Organisation of African Unity shall
assist the Democratic Republic of Congo in organising· the .
inter-Congolese political negotiations under the aegis of a
neutral facilitator chosen by the Parties by virtue of his/her
moral authority, his/her international credibility and his/her
expenence.
5.4 For the success of the all inclusive inter-Congolese political
negotiations ~eading to national reconciliation, the facilitator
shall be responsible for:
t. making the necessary contacts pertaining to the
organisation of the inter-Congo\ese political
negotiations within an environment which will cater for
the security of al\ participants:
,:
11 organising, in conjunctiori with the Congolcse Parties,
.. , , . . ,consultat~ons ' with a view to inviting ail the · major
organisations and groups of the rccogniscd
representative political opposition as well as the main
rcpresentatives of theforces vives:
nt. conducting. in accordancc with the timetable. the
discussions lcading to the establishment of a new
political dispensation in the Den1ocratic Republic of
Congo.
5.5 Without prejudice to other points that n1ay be raiscd by the .,
participants, the Congôlese Parties shall agree:-
i. the timetable and the mies of procedure of the interCongolese
political negotiations:
ii. the formation of a new Congolese National army whose
soldiers shall originale from the Congolese At:}lltcl
Forces. the am1ed forces of the RCD and the anned
forces of the MLC:
111. the new political dispensation in the DRC~ in particular
the institutions to be established for good governance
purposcs in the DRC:
iv. the process of free. democratic and transparent elections
in the DRC:
v. the draft of the Constitution \vhich shall govem the
DRC after the holding of the elections~
5.6 The calendar of the inter-Congolese political negotiations
shall be as follows:
<,
.. ~~ .. '··· ... . ..-:
.
t. D-Day + 15 days
11. Bcginning of national dialogue 0-Day +45 days
ttt. Deadline for the close of national dialogue
0-Day +90 days
1v. Establishment of new institutions D-Day+9 l days
. CHAPTER6
RE -ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ST A l'E
ADMINISTRATION OVER THE TERRITORY OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
6.1 ln accordance with the terms of the Agreement and upon
conclusion of the lnter-Congolese political negotiations, state.
administration shall be re-established throughout the national
terri tory of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
6.2 On the coming into force of the Agreement .. there shall be a
consultative mechanism among the Congolese Parties which
shall make it possible to carry out operations or actions
throughout the national tenitory which are of general interest,
more particularly in the fields of public hea\th (e.g. national
immunisation campaign), education (e.g. marking of
secondary school leavers exan1inations), migrations.
movement of persans and goods.
7
CHAPTER 7
THE JOINT MILITA,R,V COMMISSION ·
7 .1. The Joint Military Commission shall be answcrable to a
Political Committee composed of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Dcfcncc or any olhcr represcnlative duly
appointed by each Party.
7 .2 The Joint Military Commission shall be a decision making
body composed of two representatives from each Party under
a neutral Chairman appointed by the OA U in consul talion
~ with the Parties. ·
7 .3 The Joint Military Commision shall reach ils decisions by
consensus.
7.4 The n1andate of ti\e Joint Militai)' Commission
be to :-
.. -~ '
shall
a. establish the :,location of Units at the time of
the Cease-fire; ·
b. facilitate liaison between the Parties for the
purpose of the Cease-fire;
c. assist in the disengagement of forces and the
investigation of any cease-fire violations~
d. verify all information, data and activ ities
relating to military forces of the Parties;
.;
'
#
e. verify the disengagement of the
military forces of the Parties where they are in
direct contact;
f. work out mechanisms tor disarming armed
groups;
g. verify the disannament and quartering of ail
armed groups;
h. and verify the disarmament of all
Congolese civilians who are illegally armed; and
i. monitor and verify orderly ,vithdrawal of ail
forcign f'orces.
7.5 The Parties commit themselves to providing the JMC
with any relevant information on the organisati~.P:r ··
equipment and locations of th~jr forces, on ·lhe
understanding that such information will be kept
con fidential.
'
CHAPTER 8 ·
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING MANDATE
8. 1 The UN in collaboration with the OAU shall constitute,
facilitatc and dcploy an appropriatc force in the DRC to
ensurc implcmcntation of this Agreement.
. ;
"
8.2 The mandale of the IJN !brcc :;hall iuciude pcacckccping anc
peacc cnforccmcnt opcmtions as outlincd bclow:-
,
8.2.1 Pcacckccping:
a. Work with the JMC/OAU in the implcn:icntation of this
Agreement;
b. Observe and monitor the cessation of hostilities;
c. lnvestigatc violations of the Ccase-firc Agreement and
takc necessary mcasurcs to ensurc compli~ce;
d. Supervise discngagemcnt of fè.lrces of the Parties as
stipulatcd in chaplcr 2 of this Ann\!x;
e. Supervise the re-deployment of forces of the Parties to
Oefcnsive Positions in contlict i'.oncs in accordance
with Chaplcr l l of this Agrec111cnt~- ·
f. Provide and maintain humanitarian assistance to · â'n'd
!-:j 4
protect displaced :pcrsons, rcfugees and othcr alTected
persons;
g. Keep the Parties L~ the Ccase-lirc Agreement infonned
of ils pcacc-keeping operations;
h. Collcct wcapons from civitians and ensure that the
wcapons so collectcd are property accountcd for and
adequatcly securcd;
t. ln collaboration with JMC/OAU, schedutc and
supervise the withdrawal or atl torcign forces;
.; Hl
•
. ;
j. V crify all infonnation, . data and activities rclating to .
military forces of the Parties.
8.2.2 Pcace Enforcemcnt:
a. Tracking down and disanning Anned Groups;
b. Screening mass killers, pcrpetrators of crimes against
humanity and other war criminals~
c. l landing over ugcnocidaircs" to the International
Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda;
d. Rcpatriation;
c. Working out such measurcs (persuasive or cocrcivc) as
are app~opriate for the attainmcnt of the objectives or
disanning, asscmbling, rcpatriation and rcintcgration
into society of mcmbcrs of the Anned Groups.
8.3 Composition of the UN Peacc-kccping forces shall. lfé"
selcctcd from countrics acceptable to ail the Parties.
8.4 The Joint Military Commission shall, immcdiately upon
the coming into f orcc of the Agreement, be r<..~ponsiblè ·for ·
exccuting pcace-kccping opcrations until the deployment
or the UN Pcace-keeping force.
9.1
CHAPTER 9
DISARMAMENT OF ARMED CROUPS
The JMC with the assistance of the UN/OAU sha\\ work
out mcchanisms for the tracking, disarming. cantoning and
Il
9.2
..
documcntiog of an mmcd grcups in the DRC, ia-aduding
ex-FAR. ADF. LRA, UNRFI 1, lnterahamwe, FUNA,
FDD, WNRF, lJNITA and put in place mcasurcs lor.:-
a. handing ovcr lo the UN International Tribunal and
national courts, ma~s killers and pcrpetn1tors of
crimes against humanity; and
b. handling of other war criminals.
The Parties togcthcr wilh the UN and other countries with
security concems, shall creatc conditions conducivc to the
attainmcnl of the objective set out in 9.1 abovc, ,vhich
conditions may include the granting of amnesty and
political a~ylum, cxccpl for genocidaircs. The Parties
shall also encourage intcr-community dialogue.
CHAPTER10
FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY
. •
. ,. .
l 0.1 ln accordance with the tcnns of the Agreement and following ·
the irμ~r-C.ongolesc political ncgotiations, there shall· be a
mechanism taking into account, among others, the physical
check of troops, the precise identification of troops, the
precise identification or ait elements with regard to thcir
origin, date of .their cnlistmcnt, the units to which they
bclong, as wcll as the identification of terrorists and the count
of weapons of war distributed in the framework of irregular
("parallel") civil defence groups, for the formation of a
national army, restructured and integrated, inciuding the
forces of the Congolcse Parties signatories to the Agreement,
on the basis of ncgotiations between the Government of the
12
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese Rally for
Democracy and the Movement f9_r _ the Liberation. of the
, ·· Congo.
CHAPTER 11
RE-DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES OF THE PARTIES,
TO DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN CONFLICT ZONES
.11. l following disengagement, ail forces shall re-deploy to
def ensive positions.
11.~ The positions where Ùnits are located shall be identified and
recorded by the JMC/OAU and UN. ·
11.3 Upon re-deployment to defensive positions, ail forces shall
provide relevant information on troop stren~ armaments
and weapons th~y hold in each location, to the JMC, OA~ ...
and UN mechan1sms. · ·
11 .4 The JMC shall verify the reported data and information.
Ali forces shall be restricted to the declared and recorded
locatiol)fl and all movements shall be authorised by ·the JMC,
OAU and UN mechanisms. All forces shall remain in· the
declared and recorded locations until:
a. in the case of foreign forces, withdrawal bas started in
accordance with JMC/OAU, UN withdrawal schedule;
and
b. in the case of FAC and RCD/MLC forces, tn
accordance with their negotiated agreement.
lJ
f
1
CHAPTER 12
NORMALISATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION
ALONG THE COMMON BORDERS BETWEEN THE
.. ~ · ., - .... · -··" .... .:. DEMO.CRATIC REPUBL1c·oF CONGO AND ITS
••
NEIGHBOURS
12.1 Nonnalisation of the security situation along the common
borders betwccn the Dcmocratic Republic or Congo and it
ncighbours rcquircs cach country:-
a. Not lo ann, trnin, harbour on its tcrritory, or rcndcr .
fonn of support to subversive clcments or am
opposition movcmcnts lèlr the purposc of dcstabilis
the othcrs;
b. To report ail slrangc or hostile movcmcnts dctcctcd
cithcr coui1try along the crnnrnon bordcrs;
c. To idcnli (y and cvaluatc border problcms and co<... ?p.cr
in dcfining mcthods lo pcaccfully solvc thcn1:
d. To addrcss the problcm of armcd groups in
Dcmocratic Republic of Congo in accordancc with
tcnns or the A!:,rrccmcnt.
14
CHAPTER13
CALENDAR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE " ... . - -~ . . .. . . . . .
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
The Calendar for the implementation of the Ccase-fire Agreement
is contained in annex B.
IS
r
ANNEX 'B' TO CEASE-FIRE
AGREEMENT
CALENDAR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
Maior Cease-fire Events Proposed Calendar
l. Fonnal signing of the D-Day
Cease-fire.
2. Announcement of and D - Day + 24 hours
dissemination of information
on cease-fire by ail Parties.
.•
3. Cessation of Hostilities, D - Day + 24 hours
including cessation of
Hostile Propaganda.
4. Release of hostages D - Day + 3 days
5. Establishment of Joint 0 - Day + 0 hours +
Military Commission and D - Day + 7 days
Observer Groups.
l
/t .,·
... .. ...
6. Disengagement of Forces D - Day + 14 days
7. Selection of a facilitator D - Day + l S days
8. Rcdeployment of the Forces D - Day+ l S days -..
of the Parties in the conflicl 0-Day + 30 days
Zones.
9. Provide infonnation to the D -- Day+ 21 days
JMC, OAU and UN
Mechanism.
~
l O. Mobilisation of OAU Observers D -- Day + 30 days
lL Rclease/Exchange of Prisoners D- Day +7 days_. D + 30
of War days
12_ Bcginning of National Dialogue D - Day + 45 days
. ./t ,~
l ! f .,1. Dcadline for the closure of the D ·-Day+ 90 days
. ,
National Dialogue.
1~ Establishment of New D - Day + 91 days
Institutions.
15. Deployment of UN Peace D - Day+ 120 days
Keeping Mission.
2
...
·.,
••
16. Disannamcnt of Anncd
· Groups
l 7. Orderly Withdrawal of ait
Foreign Forces.
18. V crification and Monitoring
l 9. Re-establishment of Statc
Administration
20. Disarmament of NonMilitary
Personnel
21. Measures to normalise the
sccurily situation along the
International borders.
3
D - Day + 30 davs _ ., ~
D - Day + 120 days
D - Day 1 180 days
D -· Day + 7 days ~
0 · Day .. 180 days
(rcncwablc)
D - Day~ 90 days-+
D - Day ·f 270 days
D - Day f· 360 days
D - Day 1 30 days-+
D ·- Day 1 360 days
.•
,. .,-
DEFINITIONS
ANNEX 'C' TO THE
CEASEFIRE AGREEi\·IENT
"Armed groups", means forces orher than Govemment forces, RCD and
MLC that are not signatories to 1hi:; agreement. The_,,,. indude e;r-F.A.R. ).DF,
LRA, UNRF Jl,NALU lnler::ihamwe mililias, FUNA. FDD. iYHBF, r..,:VJTA
and any other forces.
"Forces of the Parr.es", means the forces of 1.1e signatorfes m the
Agreement.
"Parties", means signatcrfes :o :he Agreement.
"Great Lakes region ", means rhe grûup of stmes ·érhin o;· .~ùrt!i.":i":J :lu
Great Rift Valley syste,'?1 of Ec:.~1 :::ne :~:em,~al .--lJ;'·icc.
"National Dialogue", means !lu prGcr::s.'i involvmg ai! :;rakeiwic:'~rs f;,; :/1:
inter-Congolese political negoliatwns wirh a vie·.,· ro insral!ir.g a :?ew
political dispensa/ion which wiil bri;1g aoG'î.JI narionci rzconciiic:ion ::r:d :.~e
early holding of free and fair democr.::lic eiections.
"Forces Vives" means al/ the stakehoiders representatt·:~; :;( ihe civil
~:;ciety such as the churches. T, .. ade Unions etc.
"Cease-fue Agreement", means this documem and ils A.nne:oes.
"lnterahamwe" means armed mililie:s who car;iedo~i genocide in Rwcndc
in 1994 .
. ,
..
f{BBREVIATIONS
'4DF
°p:x-FAR
f'DD
FUNA
LRA
UNRFII
UN
OAU
RCD
MLC
SADC
DRC
·JMC
ICRC
FAC
JVNBF
UN/TA
NALU
A llied Democratic For ces
;;-,.._.,.,.,cr 7', ·an,Jene J,:m.,a' ;:"r, ... . ,,,. J .;/ ,,. _ j\ '" u, ..; , .. ,,,_ • '-' .-C:.!
Force;s for the Defence of Oemcc.-c,:·:: o_(
Burundi
Former Uganda National Arm;.-·
Lord':; R.esistance Armv
{Jgar.d!_; Nc,ional Re~cue Epom /:·
United .r.farions Organfsatfo11
Orcr.,.,;:;atkn or Jfr;"r··~,z T l~j...,_,
0-·• "' .., -' ·'J •J.• I --· \,,,,# • •,"
Congcfose Ral{vfor Democrac_\·
·r r I. , .. • • - /1t.:0Y·e.,1er.!_t;;r tt:e ;_;:_i~.tr~:zon ·7./ ._ ··.-:·~~-;
Souther-n Afi·ica Deve!'opment CCi.'!rr::mi:y
~ • ~ t • • .,, ._1em:;,:;ra11c :"t e_:;iucl:<.' ,~! '-or.g~)
,.,, : •·( i ;:,·: •c.,...-; · ("', m ,.,,,,: \··· :o.,. · V J
1;1 i .:;; -~ ·.' '--''/ ,ii,, :~,.: . · .•
t • , r- . .• t .., -
! ,~!-:r:-:.~:tr:.t:a; ~- (;,?:/rr:tt.:t.. . t!l !.Y!.:! .- .;.. ~-;. ~-:· :· :·. . •
Re:i :-.. ~,:::~zn!
,--"' ...,,_,.... tc,,·o •f ... :""""':>1,: :::,,,-,-.. :,,r ._.t.Jl•.,[, •;J ___ • I •·' - • ' v, -ei.J
Hli.s.: .\i!;'ç .. 3c.~.< .~~L~r.,
/f: 2tic,~c{ ;_:l'!it,'l"! .,: Î)r ti!e f '),':-1/ l.~~'!e~. -:.'Yfai!.J1CE
·.~.... -·," ' .:·;s, ,,..~-"-·;,/_,_•.
l'lationcl A.rm:.,•for the Liberation of [./gand.::i
2
CERTIFICATION
The undersigned Agent of the Republic of Uganda
hereby certifies that the texts of the Documents
reproduced in this Volume, as attachments to the
Counter-Memorial submitted by Uganda in the
proceedings relating to Democratic of the Congo v.
Uganda, are accurate copies of the texts of the
documents they purport to reproduce.
21 April 2001
Honourable Bart M. Katureebe
Attorney General
Republic ofUganda
(signed)
Agent of the Republic of Uganda