SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE CASTRO
[Translation]
While 1fully concur in the operative part of the Advisory Opinion and
in the reasoning upon which it is based,1venture to exercise the faculty
conferred by Article 57 of the Statute in order to set forth in greater
detail the legal reasons which decided my vote.
A. Does the Request for an Opinion Relate to a Legal Question?
Article 65 of the Statute states that "the Court may give an advisory
opinion on any Eegalquestion. . .".Consequently, the Court may not
give an opinion on a non-legal question, and should decline to give one
on a purely political question.
On the other hand, the Court cannot arbitrarily refuse to give an opin-
ion; itcan only do so if "the circumstances of the case are of such a
character as should lead it to decline to answer the Request" (I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 72). It should be borne in mind that when the Court is
requested to givean opinion "the reply ofthe Court, itself an 'organof the
United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the-
ization, and, in principle, should not be refused"(ibid p..,1).
Refusal to give an opinion is admissible only if the question addressed
to the Court is essentially political or non-legal, for it would seem that
the determining factor is the positive one of "legal-ness", and not the
negative one of political motivation. It would be difficult for requests
emanating from the General Assembly or the Security Council, in view
of the nature of those organs of the United Nations, not to relate to
political questions: thats "in the nature of things" (I.C.JReports 1962,
p. 155).
The present request for an advisory opinion (Security Council resolu-
tion 284 of 29 July 1970)!ays before the Court the question of the legal
consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). The
Court is thus faced with a question of a purely legal nature and does not
have to take into account the possible underlying political motivations
(I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 61). It is true that the question put relates NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTKO) 171
to a particular issue, but it must not be forgotten that the General As-
sembly and the Security Council can request an opinion "on any legal
question", including therefore matters which concern the interests of
particular States or certain concrete situations. (This was so in the case
not only of the three Opinions relating to South West Africa, but also of
the Opinions relating to interpretation of Peace Treaties, Effecof Awards
of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governrnentcl
Maritime ConsuldativeOrganization, and even that relating toReservations
to the Convention orz the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.)
The fact that the subject-matter of the question is the legal conse-
quences for States doec not deprive the request of its legal nature or make
it any less the business of the United Nations. It relates to the conduct
which may be expected of States in law, or which the Security Council
may if need be require.
B. Does the Question -Pelate to a Dispute Between States?
(a)The Jurisdiction of the Court
1. The competence of the Court hss been denied because of the alleged
existence of a dispute between States, and it has been asserted that a
preliminary question exists.
In this connection it may be as wellto recall a few elementary notions.
The Court is here confronted with two problems-a preliminary one
as to its competence and another, in limine,concerning the procedure to
be followed-which have a point in common: the existence or non-
existence of a dispute or legal question pending between States. Neither-
arises if there is ndispute or pending question.
2. In its Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia (P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 5, p. 29) the Permanent Court of International Justice
declared itself incompetent, ai the question put to it concerned a dispute
between States, this being properly a matter for contentious proceedings.
TFis decision car be explained by the circumstances of the case, which
are weil known.
The Court .vas faced with an insuperable difficulty. To give its opinion
it needed to know the truth about the facts contested, which was not
possible in the absence of one of the parties.
Another difficulty, of a general nature, lay in theules of procedure in
force at the time. On the date of the Advisory Opinion (23 July 1923)
the Rules of Court did not offer States adequate safeguards in the event
of a request for an advisory opinion on an existing dispute between two
or more States. It was not until a paragraph had been added in 1927
to what was then Article 71 of the Rules that the appointment of judges ad hoc was permitted when an advisory opinion had been sought on a
question relating to an existing dispute between two or more States. And
only in 1929,when the Statute was amended, was the further step taken
of adopting Article 68, still in force, whereby the Court may in advisory
proceedings be guided by the provisions of the Statute which apply in
contentious cases.
These rules opened the waytothe givingof advisory opinions on quasi-
contentious matters. After the Opinion on the Status of EasternCarelia,
the Permanent Court did indeed give several on legal questions pending
between States l.
The abandonment of the precedent comprised in the Opinion on the
Status of EasternCareliahas been confirmed by the International Court
of Justice, for two reasons:
In the first place, the constitutional or organic position of the Court
has changed. Technicallyspeaking, the Permanent Court was not a part
of the League of Nations. But the International Court of Justice is both
a creation of the Charter and an organ of the United Nations (Art. 92 of
the Charter; Art. 1of the Statute) 2.The Court hasthe duty to CO-operate
with the General Assembly and the Security Council, as organs of the
sarne Organization :
"It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United
Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion
which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to
obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take."
(I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 71 .)
As in Znterpretationof Peace Treaties, the Court can now say: "In the
present case the Court is dealing with a Request for an Opinion, the sole
object of which is to enlighten [an organ of the United Nations] (ibid.,
p. 72.) Hence it is also because the Court's decision, being of a purely
advisory nature, has a very different force from that of a judgment
disposing of a contentious case that the 1923 precedent has been dis-
regarded (ibid., p. 71).
Above all, the doctrine of the Advisory Opinion on the Status of
Eastern Carelia can be considered as outworn in view of the terms of
Articles 82 and 83 of the Rules of Court. The Court has to consider
whether the request for advisory opinion relatesto alegalquestion actually
pending between two or more States (Art. 82),and this it has to do, not in
case it should declare its lack of jurisdiction, but in order to take that
See Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1942), p. 496.
behalf of the British Governrnent on March 1950 (I.C.J. Pleadings, Interpretation
ofPeace Treaties, pp. 305 f.). See also the staternent on behalf of the United States,
in which attention israwn to the new phrase inserted in the Statute of the Inter-
national Court: "and al1rnatters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations" (ibid., p. 276).factorinto account in the procedure to be followed and with respect to the
applicability of therules concerning judges ad hoc (Art. 83). There could
thus be no clearer indication that the Court is competent to deal with
a request for advisory opinion relating to a question actually pending
betweenStates ("You could hardly have put it more strongly than that"-
statement on behalf of the British Government, I.C.J. Pleadings,
Interprefation of Peace Treaties, p. 308).
It is easy to comprehend the concern felt by zealous defenders of un-
touchable State sovereignty at the abandonment of the doctrine enun-
ciated in the Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia.
But, as Judge Azevedo recognized in a separate opinion, the present
Rules in force admit of no other solution, which is why he asked for the
abrogation of Articles 82 and 83 (I.C.J. Reports 1950,pp. 86f.).
3. The Court may give an opinion (Statute, Art. 65), therefore it rnay
decline to give one. But, as an organ of the United Nations (Charter,
Art. 92), it has a duty to collaborate with the other organs of the United
Nations. In what circumstances is the Court incompetent to give an
opinion? It would seem that it is in the case of a question not nleriting
the description of "legal question".
The Sec~rity Council has requested an opinion because it "would be
useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question
of Namibia and in furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking"
(resolution 284 (1970)). The Court, as a judicial organ of the United
Nations, should therefore not refuse its collaboration.
4. The position of the Court, as the principal .judicial organ of the
United Nations, may have led to misunderstandina and given rise to the
beliefthat al1its functions are of a purelyjudicative cr contentious nature.
But in advisory proceedings, even when they relate to questions pending
between States, there are no 'parties-there are States or organizations
which provide the Court with information, by means of written or oral
communications (Statute, Art. 66). Moreover, advisory opinions are not
endowed with binding force, either for the requesting organ or organiza-
tion, orfor the States and organizations which pr~vide information.
An organ may have functions of different kinds, both advisory and
contentious; such, for example, is the case of a Council of State, a court
of arhitration or a tribunal.
But in ail circumstances the Court retains the elevated dignity deriving
from its constitutionai status and independence, and its authority may
never be compared to that of a legalconsultant or advisor; it must remain
faithfuI to itsjudicial character.
Its advisory opinions do not carry less authority than its judgments.
There is, to be sure, a Jifference, stemming from the visrejudicata of the
judgments, but this is lirnited to the parties to the dispute (vis relativa:
Statute, Art. 59j.
On the other hand, the reasons on whichjudgments are based (Statute,
Art. 56) are considered to constitute dictapruderztium,and their force as a source of law (Statute, Art. 38) derives not from any hierarchic power
(tantum valet auctoritas quantum valet ratio) but from the validity of the
reasoning (non ratione imperio, sed rafionis imperio).
Theessentialdifferencesbetweenjudgments and advisoryopinions liesin
the binding force oftheformer (Charter, Art. 94)andit is on that account
that the Court'sjurisdiction was established on a voluntary basis (Statute,
Art. 36) and the effect ofjudgments limited to the parties and the parti-
cular case (Statute, Art. 59). However, like the reasons on which a judg-
ment is based, the reasoning and operative part of an advisory opinion
are, at least potentially, clothed with a general authority, even vis-à-vis
States which have not participated in the proceedings, and may therefore
contribute to the formation of new rules of international law (Statute,
Art. 38, para. 1 (d)).
For these reasons, the voluntary nature of the Court's jurisdiction does
not operate where advisory opinions are concerned.
5. A request having been made for an advisory opinion, does it relate
to a dispute or legal question pending between States?
It is important to settle this point, in order to be in a position to settle
others.
(a) If there is no question pending, al1doubt as to the Court's compe-
tence on the basis of the Status of Eastern Carelia case is removed.
(b) The existenceor non-existence of a question pending between States
has to be considered first and foremost in order that, in the affirma-
tive, it may be possible to determine the rules of contentious proce-
dure applicable, and more particularly those providing for the
application of Article 3 1 of the Statute.
For there is a very close relation between the Court's task of deter-
mining the nature of the question put by the request for advisory opinion,
and the task of deciding whether any request for the appointment of a
judge ad hoc shall be granted.
Itis evident that no decision as to the applicability of Article 31 of the
Statute can be taken before it has been ascertainedwhether the request for
an opinion relates to a legal question pending between States. That is
what the letter ofArticle 82ofthe Rules requires, and also common sense :
it would be most incongruous for the position of any judge to be subject
to a built-in risk of invalidation.
6. For there to exist a dispute or legal question between States with the
effect of causing the Court either to declare itself incompetent (Statute,
Art. 65; Status of Eastern Carelia doctrine) or to apply by analogy the
provisions which apply to contentious proceedings (Rules, Arts. 82 and
83; Statute, Art. 68), the question or dispute must be of a potentially
contentious nature and inherently amenable to the Court's jurisdiction,
so that it could have Chapter II of the Statute applied to itand be decided
by ajudgment. (b) Procedure to Be Followed
The Court "shall above al1consider whether the request for the advi-
sory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two
or more States" (Rules, Art. 82)in order to determine the procedure to be
followed (Rules, Art. 83; Statute, Art. 68).
For the request to relate to a legal question pending between States, or
to a pending dispute, there must be identity of subject-matter between the
question and the request for opinion; there must be States in the position
of parties, and the question must be actually pending.
1. South Africa has defined the subject-matter of the question pending
inseveralways.It has been said that it is that to which the judgments of
1962and 1966 weredirected (question of apartheid, and the existence of
norms and standards whereby that policy would stand condemned). It
has also been said that in order to reply to the request for advisory
opinion the Court must pronounce on the validity and interpretation
of these resolutions concerning which there is a divergence of views
between South Africa and other States. Finaily it has been pointed out
that there exists a dispute as to South Africa's accessionto the Interna-
tional Convention on Telecommunications adopted at Montreux in 1965.
A certain effort of the imagination is necessary to see any resemblance
between these questions and that which is the subject of the request for
advisory opinion, which relates only to the legal consequences for States
of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).
2. A further Iegal obstacle to the contentions of South Africa lies in
the difficultyof particularizing the other States and the fact that they are
not in the position of parties.
Between South Africa and whom is a question pending? The answer
runs, according to the occasion: Liberia and Ethiopia, the Organization
of AfricanUnity, the States which voted in favour of certain resolutions,
or the United Nations.
How can it be argued that tkre is here a question of a quasi-conten-
tious nature, to which Article 83 of the Rules could apply? How can it be
argued that these States or Organizations are in the position of opposing
parties with regard to South Africa? In its observations South Africa
endeavoured to do so by relying on the doctrine of the 1962Judgment in
the South West Africa cases (discussions and negotiations in the United
Nations), but it should be observed that the standing of Ethiopia and
Liberia as parties was based upon the special provision ofArticle 7 of the
Mandate, and that this jurisdictional clause operated in favour ofMem-
bers of the League of Nations. Above ail, the doctrine of the 1966Judg-
ment in the South West Africa casesshouid be taken into account. To be a
party to a dispute, each State must have a legal right or interest in the
subject-matter of the daim "which is a different thing from a political
interest" (Z.C. Reports 1966, p. 22). In the separate opinion of Judge
Morelli it is explained that:". ..standing. ..means the possession by
one person rather than another of the substantive rig-t relied on in the
proceedings" (ibid., p. 65). As will be apparent, there is no other State in the legal position of a
Party, as between which State and South Africa there might be a legal
question pending within the meaning of Article 82 of the Rules of Court.
Again, it is inconceivable,that there could be a question or dispute
between those States which have voted for a resolution and a State which
denies validity thereof. In public and in private law, a resolution adopted
by the majority of the members of an organization is regarded as a reso-
lution of the organization, and if a member seeksto dispute its validity, it
is the organization that he must approach, and he cannot approach the
other members for that purpose. In the present case, if there were a
pending question, it would be between South Africa and the United Na-
tions-in other words, there would be no question between States.
Thus a difference of views between States at the United Nations, a
division of opinion, or opposition between a majority and a minority,
does not constitute a dispute or legal question pending between States,
within the meaning of Articles 82and 83of the Rules of Court. The organs
of the United Nations request advisory opinions when there is a diversity
of views, and the main function of advisory opinions is to clarify the
questions argued over and to dispelthe doubts raised by the opposition of
a minority l.
A difference of viewsbetween a State and the United Nations is not
a dispute or legal question between States, the only kind contemplated
by the applicable legal texts (Statute, Art. 34; Rules, Arts. 82 and 83).
3. The qualification "pending" applied to a question makes it requisite
that the already existingquestion should be thesameas the question which
is the subject of the request for an opinion-a necessary identity which
means that, if the question had been decided by ajudgment, an objection
of res judicata could be raised against any new application by way of
request.
Are the questions between Ethiopia and Liberia, on the one hand, and
South Africa, on the other, identical with that raised by the request for
an advisory opinion? To establish such identity,there would have to be an
identity of claim, the same basis of application, and the same parties act-
ing in the same capacity (cf. Art. 1351of the French Civil Code), i.e., in
the classic formula: eadempersona, eadem res, eadem causapetendi.
In the contentious cases concerning South West Africa, the parties
opposingSouth Africa weretwo States,former Members of the League of
Nations, acting in pursuance of Article 7of the Mandate on account of the
infringement of obligations under that instrument which the introduc-
tion of apartheidinto South West Africa represented.
The request for an advisory opinion has been made by the Security
l Such was the case in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (I.C.J. Reports
1962) ; the Court gave its Opinion on a question concerning which there was bitter
controversy wiihin the Organization.Council in its capacity as an organ of the international community,
and it has asked the Court what are the legal consequences for States of
South Africa's conduct (its continued presence in Namibia) contrary to
one of its resolutions: resolution 276 (1970).
This lack of identity is also apparent with respect to the preliminary
questions raised by South Africa regarding the request for advisory
opinion.
4. While there is no identity between the question which was the sub-
ject of the 1962 and 1966Judgments and that concerned in the present
request, therecan be no denying that thelatter is of the same nature asthe
question answered by the 1950 Advisory Opinion and partly coincides
with it in subject-matter.
Invited to give an opinion on the legal status of South West Africa,
the Court found it necessary to make pronouncements on the legal title
of SouehAfrica and that of the United Nations in respect of the Territory,
and also on the legal consequences for States of the existence of those
titles, because a legal status-like the iura inre with which it is sometimes
confused-is effectiveinter omnes and erga omnes.
To request an advisory opinion on the consequences for States of the
presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) is another way
of asking what the legal status of South West Africa is here and now, i.e.,
in the situation prevailing since the adoption of resolution 276 (1970).
It is from that Territory's legal status, and from it alone, that the lrgal
consequences for States flow.
The implication of this coincidence of underlying subject-matter is that
the competence of the Court has at present the same basis as in the 1950
proceedings.
C. The FactualIssues
South Africa's proposition that the Court should examine factual
issues requires some reflection as to the Court's competence in this
connection and on the pertinance of the suggestion.
(a) The Conzperenceof the Court ;o enter intofactunl issues
In view of the terms of the request for advisory opinion is South
Africa's proposition a matter ultra vires? The request for advisory
opinion takes as point of departure a particular fact-resolution 276
(1970)of the Security Council-and seeks the Court's opinion on the
legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia notwithstanding that resolution. The South
African proposition seeks the admission by the Court of evidence
regarding a diferent fact, or a dzferent question, namely whether or
not South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations to promote the
moral and material well-being of South West Africa. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP . P. DE CASTRO) 178
It would therefore seem that the South African proposition, if
accepted, would alter the very subject-matterof the request for advi-
sory opinion; it would amount to asking the Court to giveits opinion
on a subject quite differentfrom that on which the Security Council
seeksguidance; in other words, there would beadanger ofrecognizing
something inthenature ofa counter-claim or a request fora "counter-
opinion".
It may be doubted that the Court would be entitled to allow any
such proposition, when it cornes not from an organ or agency
authorized by the Charter to request an opinion, but from one of the
States permitted to furnish information. In such a case, would the
Court be acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of Article 96
of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute? Could the Court dis-
regard those provisions by giving effectto Article 68 of the Statute?
With al1respect, 1would find that difficultto accept.
(ii) Taking into account the arguments of South Africa, has the Court
jurisdiction to proceed to examine factual issues?
It is well known, and South Africa reminds us of it, that, in the
words of the Permanent Court, "under ordinary circumstances it
is.. .expedientthat the facts upon which the opinion of the Court is
desired should not be in controversy" (Status of Eastern Carelia,
Advisory Opinion, 1923,P.C.Z.J.,SeriesB, No. 5, p. 28).Furthermore,
advisory opinions have as their subject-matter legalquestions (Art. 96
of the Charter, Art. 65 of the Statute) and not questions concerning
facts of primary importance-such as those which South Africa
wishesto have established.
(b) Pertinence oftheproposition that theCourt should enter intofactual
issues
(i) The argument of South Africa on the need to go into factual issues,
and thus, it would maintain, the duty of the Court to declare its own
lack of jurisdiction if it considers that an examination of the factss
indispensable, runs as follows: SecurityCouncilresolution 276(1970)
and General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are based on the
postulate that South Africa has not ensured the moral and material
well-beingof the natives of South West Africa. South Afnca denies
and offersto disprove this, the implication being that, if it be estab-
lished that South Africa has ensured such well-being, the two
resolutions would lackany basis, and would forthat reason be invalid
and void.
This reasoning would be valid if the sole basis for the resolutions
were the conduct of South Africa with regard to the well-being of
the natives; but such is not the case. There are other bases, equally
important or more important than the question of well-being, which
may be said to underlie the declaration oftermination ofthe Mandate. General Assemblyresolution 2145(XXI) stressedthat South Africa
had refusedto continue fulfillingitsobligations under the Mandate or
to recognizethat the United Nations had powers of supeivision over
South West Africa, and also referred to the fact that South Africa had
carried on a policy of apartheid despite the condemnation thereof.
These are well-known and uncontroverted fa~ts.~Security Council
resolution 276 (1970) reaffirms General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI), and its factual basis is the same.
It is a matter of established generalteaching that for an act or grant
to be declared void, or forit to be declared terminated, only one cause
is necessary and that single cause sufficient (ex unacausa, nullitas) ;
there is no need to establish al1or even a multiplicity of the causes
adduced.
It follows that, if the Court decides to consider the contentions of
South Africa as to the invalidity of the resolutions, it will give due
weight to the existence of uncontroverted facts which may serve as a
basisfor those resolutions.
(ii) The observations already made regarding the non-existence of a
question pending between States and the subject-matter of the
request for advisory opinion also argue the exclusionof factual issues:
for it is the existence of a pending question which could justify the
opening of a quasi-contentious procedure, including the production
of evidence. But even in such a context it is hard to see how the
absence of an opposing party and a juge instructeurcould be made
good, if the procedure for taking evidence is to feature the necessary
safeguards.
D. The Question of aPlebiscite
TheCourt should not concern itselfwithconsiderations asto the object,
the practical possibilities, and the outcome of such a plebiscite; these are
political aspects of the matter which fa11outside the competence of the
Court.
But it could have drawn immediate attention to the procedural impossi-
bility, in advisory proceedings, of its participating in a plebiscitein which
South Africa was also to takepart.
It is furthermore apparent that such a plebiscite or its outcome would
lack al1legal relevanceto the Court's reply to the request for an advisory
opinion. For the purpose of answering the question put by that request it
makes no difference whether the population would vote in favour of
administration by South Africa or by the United Nations l,nor would it
possess any significancein the treatment of the problems raised by South
Africa in its written and oral statements.
l The plebiscite envisaged is not one which wodd posit the independence of
Namibia or a change of administration; it would only be held for theurpose of
obtaining information.II. ANTECEDENT QS:ESTION CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTIONS
A. Cornpetenceof the Court
Does the Court have the power to pronounce as to the invalidity or
nullity of resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council?
It is difficultto answer yes or no to this question. The interplay of two
principles, which one might have thought contradictory, must be taken
into account.
1. The principle of division of powers-the Charter set up three
organs, each having sovereignpowers in the sphere of its own competence :
the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court
of Justice. The first two have powers analogous to those of legislative
chambers, and the third has judicial powers.
Each of these has the power to interpret the provisions of the Charter
verbis et factis. Such interpretation must be respected by the other
organs providing it does not encroach upon their own jurisdiction. Any
other solution would be inconsistent with the independence or sovereignty
of each organ. On this view of the matter, the Court does not have the
powers of a constitutional court to pass judgment on the validity or the
resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council l.
Naturally, it could do so if the General Assembly or Security Council
were to ask, expressly or impliedly (Certain Expenses of the United
Nations), for an opinion on the interpretation of the Charter,and on the
consistency of the resolutions with the Charter.
As a result ofthis mutual respect, neither the General Assemblynor the
Council can declare a judgment of the Court to be invalid, even if it be
contrary to the wishesof the majority in those organs.
2. The principle of "legal-nessW-the Court, as a legal organ, cannot
CO-operatewith a resolution which is clearlyvoid, contrary to the rules of
the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law 2.
Furthermore, the Court must act as a judicial organ, so that no
limitations can be placed upon it as regards the logical processes to be
followed in answering the question put to it (separate opinion of Judge
Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 217).
l It has been said that everything "makes it necessary to put a very strict construc-
tion on theules by which the conditions for the validity of acts of the Organization
are determined and hence to regard to a largextent the non-conformity of the
act with a legalle as a mere irregularity", and also that "each organ of the United
Nations is the judge of its own competence" (separate opinion of Judge Morelli,
Z.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 223, 224).
"Examples might be a resolution which had not obtained the required majority,
or a resolution initiatby a manifest excès de pouvoir (such as, in particular, a
zation)": separate opinion of Judge Morelli, Z.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 223.ni- NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA (SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 181
3. Beforeordinary municipal courts, the result of the interplay of these
two principles is that such courts refrain from passing judgment on the
validity of laws, with the sole exception of casesin which it is clear and
indisputable that the alleged lawdoes not in fact rank as a law, in which
there is only an apparent law. In any other case, in general, either the
courts refrain from considering the question of the validity of laws, or
they consider that they must indicate the reasons for their validity; there
is alwaysa presumption infavour of the validity oflaws.
The Court may derive inspiration from this example. Should it derline
to givean opinion on the validity ofthe resolutions? The Court is not, in
the structure of the United Nations, a super-organ, and it is not entitled
to giveany sort of "counter-opinion".
4. The Opinion relating to Certain Expensesof the UnitedNations may
have giventhe impression that the Court has the power to passjudgment,
in al1casesand without any limitation, upon the validity ofthe resolutions
of the General Assembly and Security Council. But the Court was on
that occasion asked to give its opinion on the question whether the
expenditures authorized by a series of General Assembly resolutions
were "'expenses ofthe Organization' within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 152),that is, to Saywhetherthose expenditureshad been validlyauthor-
ized. Btwas possible to observe in that case with perfect correctnessthat
there cannot be placed "any limitations on the Court as regards the
logical processes to be followed in answering the question", even when
it related to the validity of the said resolutions. This statement was
qualified as follows:
"This freedom [i.e., the Court's freedom] can however be under-
stood only as subordinated both to the rules of law and logic by
which the Court is bound and also to the objective which the Court
must pursue, which is the solution of the question submitted to it"
(separateopinion ofJudge Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 217-218).
The Court stated, in the Opinion referred to, that "each organ [of the
United Nations] must, in the first place at least, determine its own
jurisdiction" (ibid.,p.168).
In its resolution 284of 29 July 1970,the SecurityCouncil does not cal1
in question, either impIicitIy or explicitly, the validity of resolution 276
(19701,and no rule of logic makesit necessaryto consider such validity in
order to answer the question put to the Court.
It was because of other considerations that the Court dealt with the
validity of SecurityCoun~ilresolution 276 (1970)and General Assembly
resolution 2145 (XXI). The Court has the duty to CO-operatein the
efficient functioning of the other organs of the United Nations. The
opinion has been sought because it would be useful for the Security
Council "in its further consideration of the question of Namibia and in furtherance of the objectivesthe Council is seeking". For such considera-
tion, and for such objectives to be attained, it will be as well to dissipate
the doubts which have accumulated in the course of many years on a
whole series of legal questions, which are preliminary to the question
which is the subject-matter of the Opinion. These doubts emerged in the
course of the discussions of tHeSecurity Council and the Assembly, and
their importance is clear from the attention paid to the question of the
validity of the resolutions, not only by the representative of South Africa
but also bythe representative of the Secretary-General,the representatives
of the States which furnished information, in the form of written or oral
statements, and the representative of the Organization of African Unity.
In any event, the place for considerations of the validity of theresolu-
tions is in the reasoning of the Opinion and not in its operative clause
(separate opinion of Judge Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 216-217;
dissenting opinion of Judge Bustamante, ibid., p. 288; this was also the
solution adopted by the Court in its Opinion on CertainExpensesof the
UnitedNations, ibid., pp. 155-181).
B. Interpretative klethod
In its written contentions and its oral statement, South Africa has
expounded at length its theory as to the interpretation of legal texts, and
rightly so, because the method chosen by it is the basis of the solutions it
puts forward. It defends the technique of literal interpretation of texts,
restrictive interpretation of powers conferred on international organi-
zations, and it vigorously condemns teleological methods.
Without indulging here in an academic study of interpretation, it would
nevertheless appear-useful to make certain observations on the question,
since it will thus be possible to avoid repetitions.
1. It would seem that a distinction should first of al1be made between
the various types of legal texts. For our purposes, it will be useful to take
into account the particular characteristics of: (a) treaties dominated by
bargaining, each party seeking its own advantage, to obtain the maximum
and give the minimum; (b) agreements by which an organization grants
certain powers or privileges to a State, which the latter accepts; (c)
treaties by which an international organization is set up, and the reso-
lutions of such an organization.
2. The prudent rule of considering prima faciethe letter of conventions
and treaties has been distorted into the literalistic interpretation which
condemns any element not to be found in the text (quodnonest incodice
nonest in mundo).
As early a writer as Grotius pointed out that this was a vain tendency,
as is also the so-called principle of contemporaneity. He showed that in
addition to what is said, there is the force of the development of the
convention (potentia moraliter considerata: Dejure bellias pacis, II, 16,
25). NAMIBlA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 183
While it is true that the common intention of the parties must be taken
into account, it is also true that in al1systems of law it has been necessary
to provide for the possibility of lacune; there are rules for fillingout the
parties' expressions of their will, and for this purpose the case law of
municipal courtstakes into account what the parties may reasonably have
intended; it is in this way that endeavours have been made to fil1the gaps
in texts.
For this purpose the subject and purpose of the convention is to be
taken into account. The rule in claris nonJifitinterpretatio has been well
commented on by Anzilotti, who pointed out that it is not possible to say
that an article is clear so long as oneis unaware of its subject; one only
knows the will of the parties when one knows what the aim intended was
(dissentingopinion, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 50, p. 383; an idea accepted
by the American Law Institute, Restatement 1965, para. 147, p. 455).
Much earlier, Vattel had drawn attention to the importance of the reason
for an act: "when once the purpose which has led the speaker to act is
clearly known his words must be interpreted and applied in the light of
that purpose only" (The Law of Nations, Book 2, Chap. 17, para. 287,
Fenwick's translation). Finally, it has been possible to assert that it is
thanks to the aim indicated by the expressions of willthat the convention
as awhole acquires an objective unity of meaning (objektive Sinneinheit)
(Dahm, Vo/kerrecht, Vol. III, p. 50).
It is ofinterest for the question now under study to observe that in al1
interna1 systems of legislation, in order to reach this result, the nature of
contracts and agreements is taken into account. "Contracts bind not only
to what is expressly stated therein, but in addition to al1consequences
attached to the obligation according to its nature by equity, custom, or
law" (French Civil Code, Article 1135; for the Cornmon Law see Wind-
Jield on Contracts,p. 38). It should also be remarked that technical terms.
like "mandate" or "trust", should be interpreted in accordance with their
technical meaning (Lauterpacht, TheDevelopmenfof InternationalLaw by
the International Court, p. 60). The necessary conclusion is that even a
clause which is reasonably clear cannot be interpreted literally if by so
doing one reaches a result which is contrary to the purpose of the treaty
(P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 64, p. 19; contra, see dissenting opinion of
three judges, ibid., p. 26). If, in the case just referred to, the Court had
proceeded in accordance with the majority view, it wouId have lent its
sanction to the fraus legis proposed by the Albanian Government.
Contralegemfacit, quiidfacit quodlexprohibet, infraudem vero,quisalvis
verbislegissententiam eius circumvenit(Digest, 1, 3, 29). Al1treaties must
be interpreted so as to exclude fraud and so as to make their operation
consistent with good faith (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. 1, Sec. 544,
para. 13).
Finally, it may be observed that a modern author, and one made much
of in the arguments of South Africa, states and emphasizes the need to use
the teleological method (Dahm, VQlkerrecht,Vol. III, pp. 43 ff.). 3. Multilateral treaties, conventions establishing an international
organization and above al1the Charter, are subject to particular rules of
interpretation.
The Charter would appear not to fa11within the framework of the
Convention on the Law of Treaties. To interpretit, one shduld not apply
by analogy the rules of municipal law on contracts, but rather rules for
the interpretation of laws and statutes (Restatement, loc. cit., para. 146,
p. 1965; Dahm, loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 55).
It should not be forgotten that the General Assembly and Security
Council have the responsibility of promoting the gurposes laid down in
the Charter. They cannot remain bound by the possible intentions of the
draftsmen, not only because it is difficultto know what those intentions
were(whilethe intentions of those who speak are known, the intentions of
those who give their vote in silence are not), but also because inter-
pretation necessarily undergoes a process of development, and, as in
municipal law,must adapt itself to the circumstance ofthe time'andto the
requirements, so far as they are foreseeable, ofthe future. The text breaks
away from its authors and lives a life of its own (dissentingopinions of
Judge Alvarez, I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 18,and I.C.J. Reports 1951,p. 53;
Dahm, loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 55).
In the United Nations, "each organ must, in the first place, at least,
deîermine its own jurisdiction" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168). When an
organ adopts a resolution, "there must arise at the least a strong prima
facie presumption" of validity and propriety (separate opinion of Judge
SirGerald Fitzmaurice, ibid.,p. 204).It has even been considered that the
resolutions of the Assemblyand the Council, the practice ofthose organs,
facta concludentia,could be considered as constituting an officia1inter-
pretation (interprétation authentique()cf.Dahm, loc. cit., p. 50),involving
in any case a duty to carry thern out so far as questions which relate to
"peace-keeping, dispute-settling and, indeed, most of the political
activities of the Organization" are concerned (separate opinion of Judge
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 213).
Concerning the United Nations Organization, the Court has said:
"It must be acknowledgedthat its Members, by entrusting certain
functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have
cloéhedit with the competence required to enable those functions to
be effectivelydischarged" (I.C.J. Reports 1949,p. 179);
". ..the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must
depend upon its purposes and functions as specifiedor implied in its
constituent documents and developed in practice" (I.C.J. Reports
1949,p. 180).
On the interpretation of the Charter it has been said that:
"It may with confidence be assertedthat its particular provisions should receivea broad and liberal interpretation unless the context of
any particular provision requires, or there is to be found elsewhere in
the Charter, something to compel a narrower and restricted inter-
pretation" (separateopinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender, I.C.J. Re-
ports 1962, p. 185).
The teaching of the Court is, in fact, that for the interpretation of the
Charter account must be taken of its fundamental purposes, and it must
be recognized that it has the powers which are necessary to achieve
them "by necessary implication" (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 182; separate
opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 208-
215); "when the Organization takes action which . ..[is]appropriate for
the fulfilrnent of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization"
(I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 168).One may therefore regard as an authoritative
criterion the following conclusion: "The meaning of the text will be
illuminated by the stated purposes to achieve which the terms of the
Charter were drafted" (separate opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender,
ibid., p. 187).
III. THEVALIDITY OF THE RESOLUTIONS
A. Genrral Observation
In view of the nature of the Charter and the powers of the principal
organs of the United Nations, the presumption in favour of the.validity of
the resolutions of those organs must be taken to be based upon their
powes to interpret the Charter, and to do so exfactis, that is to say by the
very fact that they have adopted a resolution.
To challenge the validity of a resolution, it is not sufficient merely to
allege that it is possible to find a better interpretation; a resolution can
only be criticized if it is demonstrably absolutely impossible to find any
reason whatsoever, even a debatable one, upon which an interpretation
favourable to the validity of the resolution may be based.
B. The Abstention of the Permanent Members
It has been said that:
"It is already well known that an unwritten amendment to the
Charter has taken place in the practice of the Security Council,
namely, to the effect that the abstention of a permanent member
present at a meeting is not assimilated to the exercise of the right to
veto" (dissenting opinion of Judge Bustamante, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 291; see also I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 172, 175and 176, and with
certain reservations, separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice, ibid., p. 210). In fact this interpretation of abstentions is not merely based upon an
undisputed practice l, it also necessarily follows from the nature of
silence, and from the purpose of the right of veto 2.
Silence must be interpreted according to the situation and the circum-
stances, it may indicate a negation, but it may also mean an acceptance.
In the voting of the Security Council, according to the customary inter-
pretation, the abstention of a member may mean that that member has
some doubt as to the validity of the resolution, but does not wish to
prevent it being adopted. It is not a matter of mere silence, but of an
abstention which, it is known, will be taken as an intention not to prevent
the adoption of the resolution.
Furthermore, the condition of the "affirmative vote", required by
Article 27 of the Charter, may just as well apply to the content of the
resolution as to the adoption of the resolution. At the last moment,
subject to the possibility of an express reservation by one member, an
affirmative vote takes place on the validity of the resolution. The per-
manent members are not obliged to vote in any particular way, and they
iay express their position by abstaining.
Nor can it be overlooked that the right of veto is a privilege, and that
therefore it can be renounced and can be modified in meius; and in any
case that it should not be interpreted extensively (privilegia restringenda
sunt) .
The 1965amendment of the Charter confirms this interpretation. The
practice ofthe Councilregardingabstentions was known to the draftsmen,
and if the text was not altered on this point, it would appear that it was
because it was not intended to change the previous practice.
C. The Resolutions of the Security Council
(a) Article 24 of the Charter
The restrictive interpretation proposed by South Africa cannot be
accepted.
The Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of. ..
peace". It seems undeniable thatthe illegal occupation of a territory with
Stavropoulos, "The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members
of the Security Councilunder Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 3, July 1967,
pp. 737-752.
In the time of the League of Nations, Art. 19, para. 5, of the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly provided that representatives who abstained from voting were to be
considered asnot present. Rolinexplains this by saying that it is undesirable that the
indifference or doubts felt by certain Members on a question on which it is certain
that the other Members will be unanimous should be able to prevent it being voted;
if one Member does not consider itself justified in using its right of opposition when
interpretation, accordingto Riches, by which those who abstain are regarded ass an
having given tacit approval to the action of the Assembly:he Unanimity Rule and
the League of Ndtions, Baltimore, 1933, p. 43. regard to which the United Nations has accepted "a sacred trust" is an
ac?contrary to the maintenance of peace.
The Court has said that it must be acknowledgedthat the Charter, by
entrusting certain functions to an organ, with the attendant duties and
responsibilities, has conferred upon that organ the competence required
duly to discharge them (I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 179 and 182; I.C.J.
Reports 1954,p. 57).
Paragraph 2 of Article 24 does not make a restrictive interpretation
inevitable'.The reference to the "specificpowers granted to the Security
Council" by Chapters VI, VII, VI11and XII does not mean that it has
only those powers. Not merely may it have those provided for in other
provisions of the Charter, but in addition it rnust have those which are
necessary to it for the fulfilment of its duties. The words "the specific
powers granted .. ."simply mean that in the Chapters referred to, these
powers are regulated in a particular way forthe fulfilment of the duties
and responsibilities in question.
For the purpose of examining the jurisdiction of the Security Council
with regard to mandates, the mention of Chapter XII in Article 24 of the
Charter is of great importance.
The principal purpose of Article 80, as we shall have to demonstrate,
is to avoid any alteration of the rights of peoples subject to mandate,
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever. When the League of
Nations came to an end, the United Nations took over the responsibility
of the League towards those peoples. The mention of Chapter XII in
Article 24 leads to the view that the Council has the specific powers
necessaryforthe fulfilmentofitsdutiestoward the peoples under mandate.
It is very possible thathose who drafted Article 24 were not thinking
of Article 80,but it is also probable that those who drafted Article 80, or
the majority of them, would have acceptedthis interpretation, in view of
theirinterest in the conservation of the rights of the peoples subject to
mandate.
However that may be, the wording of Article 24 does not permit of
Article 80 of Chapter XII being excluded without special reason; the
purpose of Article 24, which isto maintain international peace and secu-
rity, thr~ugh respect for the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions, calls for Article 80to be taken into account. The object of Article
80 with regard to the conservation of the rights of the peoples subjectto
mandate can only be achieved if the Security Council possesses the
necessary competence.
This being so,if there is no convincingreason whyArticle 24 should be
given an interpretation which is restrictive and contrary to its clear
The principal responsibility entrusted to the Council requires that it be regarded
as having a residual competence: Castafieda,l Effects of UnifedNations ResoZu-
fions, 1969, p. 72.
175terms, Article 24 must be interpreted as meaning that the Organization
has entrusted to the Council powers which are sufficient for the United
Nations to perform its duties, in accordance with Article 80.
(b) The Non-Abstention of the Members Parties to a Dispute (Art. 27,
para. 3, of the Charter)
The argument based on this observation by South Africa loses its
force once it is cPearthat it is impossible to describe its refusal to fulfil
its obligations as Mandatory as a "dispute", as has just been observed.
(c) South Africa Was not Invited to Participate in the Discussionsof the
Security Council (Art. 32 of the Charter)
This argument falls away if there is no dispute. South Africa had an
interest in the discussions; but not merely was it not a party to a dispute,
but also it did not take the trouble to see that it was invited, which is an
indication that it did not, at that time, consider that it was a party to a
dispute in the legal sense.
D. GeneralAssembly Resolution 2145 (XXI)
Doubt has been cast on the validity of this Assembly resolution, onthe
ground that the competence of the Assembly is confined to making
recommendations (Art. 10and Art. 11,para. 2, ofthe Charter).The Court
has already endeavoured to resolve this doubt. "While it is the Security
Council which, exclusively,may order coercive action, the functions and
powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not con-
fined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies, the making of
recommendations; they are not merely hortatory" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 163)."The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Article
11, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action" (ibid.,p. 164).
It should not be forgotten that Article 18refers without distinction to
recommendations and to decisions of the Assembly. Among the recom-
mendations an "important questions", there are some which "have dispo-
sitive.. .effect" (ibid., p. 163).
Among these "important questions", mention is made of "questions
relating to the operation of the trusteeship system", that is to say, ques-
tions relating to Chapter XII of the Charter ("international trusteeship
system"). One of the rules in question is Article 80, which settled what
the position of mandates would be up to the time when the mandated
territories would be placed under the trusteeship system '.
At the 37th meeting of the Coordination Committit wa.ssaid that "Discussion
of the new phrase from Committee 1111'questions relating to the operations of the
trusteeship system' brought an understandingthat the questions embraced trust
agreements, decisions on reports, and everything relating to the system"(UNCI0
relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Africa,ons
p. 49).
176 If it is recognized that the United Nations accepted the transfer from
the League of Nations of the "sacred trust" of guarding against any
modification of the rights of any people under mandate, and if it is
recognized that this is one of the purposes of the Charter, it must also be
admitted that the Assembly has the powers necessary for the fulfilment
of itsduties (see separate opinion of Sir Percy Spender, ibid.,pp. 186-187).
The terms of the resolution, which declares that South Africa "has
failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the man-
dated territory", and that it "has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate", and
thatthe Mandate is"terminated", clearly showthe nature andthe purpose
of the resolution.
The resolution does not of itself lay any svecial obligation on States
other than South Africa. It confines itself to noting and declaring the
forfeiture of the Mandate '.Sincethe resolution waspassed, the Mandate,
the onlytitle justifying possession of the Territory of South West Africa,
has lost any appearance of continued existence. This is a new situation
and one which must be respected by all, in view of the competence of
the United Nations in this regard.
Resolution 2145 (XXI) is certainly not judicial in nature, it does not
encroach, and does not involve any encroachment, on the competence of
the Court. The United Nations believed that the time had come to fulfil
its duties towards the people of Namibia by solemnly withdrawing any
semblance of legality from South Africa's occupation of the Territory.
The resolution "calls theattention ofthe Security Council to the present
resolution". This shows that the Assembly is confining itself to its decla-
ratory function, in accordance with Articles 80and 18of the Charter, and
that it is requesting the CO-operationof the Security Council so that the
latter may determine the kind of action appropriate to the situation.
The Security Council has reaffirmed the special responsibility of the
United Nations with regard to the people of Namibia (resolution 264
(1969)), called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from
theTerritory of Namibia (resolution 269(1969))and reaffirmedresolution
2145(XXI). Inother words ithas adoptedthe resolutions ofthe Assembly,
affirmed them afresh, and taken a step towards coercive measures.
Resolution 2145 (XXI) is the manifestation of the exercise of a power coupled
with a duty (oficium) of the Assembly, with a view to the fulfilment of the "sacred
trust" entrusted to it by the Organization. Through tthe Assembly has the faculty
the internationalcommunity to the Mandatory,isto be exercised on its behalf, when
the Mandatory has shown itself unworthy of that confidence. By resolution 2145
(XXI), the General Assembly modified the legal situation of the mandated territory,
and with that resolution theegal title of the former Mandatorto possession of the
Territory of South West Africa or Namibia disappeared: thiis a change in the status
of the Territory which must be respected byall.
Examples might be given of earlier resolutions which change a legal situation, and
also giverise to legal consequences (obligations, rigon the basis of other provi-
sions of the Charter or other resolutions (forple of the Council); seeCastafieda,
/oc. cit., p. 121. IV. TRANSMISSIO ONPOWERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
A. Article 80 of the Charter
1. South Africa is the only mandatory State ever to have raised this
question. According to its contention, the Mandate for South West
Africa came to an end with the dissolution of the League of Nations or,
at any event, the obligation to make annual reports concerning the
Territory came to anend. In its 1950Advisory Opinion the Court affirmed
that the Territory was stillder mandate and that South Africa still had
the obligations fiowing from the Mandate, the supervisory functions
being exercised by the United Nations.
Judges McNair and Read expressed a contrary view. They considered
that the League of Nations' supervision of the Mandatory had corneto an
end, because, the organs designated to receivethe reports no longer exist-
ing, it had becorne impossible to perform this obligation (I.C.J. Reports
1950,.pp. 159 and 169; dissenting opinion of Judge van Wyk, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 648) '.
This narrow interpretation has been clearly discarded by the Court.
In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary
Objections, the Court had to decide whether it had jurisdiction on the
basis of a treaty containing a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Per-
manent Court. It was argued that the dissolution of the Permanent Court
made it impossible to apply that provision (dissenting opinion of Judge
Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1964, pp. 95 f.). But the Court found on the
contrary that the Permanent Court "was merely a means for achieving
that object", namely "judicial settlement"; while it was true that the
former Court no longer existed, the obligation remained "substantively
in existence, though not functionally capable of beingmplemenied", and
if another tribunal were "supplied by the automatic operation of some
other instrument by which both parties are bound", the clausegain came
into force(ibid., pp. 38 f.). The important thing was the purpose and not
the instrument. Consent to the transfer of powers resulted frommember-
ship of the United Nations (ibid., p. 35).
The authority of the 1950Opinion has been firmly established. It was
confirmëd not only by the 1955and 1956Opinions, but also by the 1962
Judgment in the South West Africa cases (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp333 f.).
Moreover the Court has clearly rejected the arguments of Judges McNair
and Read (Barcelona Traction case).
The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice in the South West Africa cases reverted to the prob-
Judges McNair and Read did not consider that South Africa had been relieved
of its obligations as the Mandatory, but that their performance could be demanded
only by former Members of the League and by application to the International
Court of Justice.lem of the transmission of powers, rejecting the 1950Opinion as "defin-
itelywrong" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 532,note 2). As this criticism relates
to the interpretation of Article 80 and to its background, careful study of
these matters would seem to be called for (ibid., p. 516, note I), particu-
larly as the Court stated in 1966 that it did not wish to prejudice the
question (I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 19).
Article 80 cannot be properly interpreted without considering its pur-
poses and the historical context of the time when it was drafted. The
framers ofthe Charter weredetermined not only to maintain the progress
made in the protection of indigenous peoples by the League of Nations
under the mandates system, but also to intensify it through the trustee-
ship system.
The Charter, including Article 80, was signed on 26 June 1945. The
League of Nations still existed. Before its dissolution, the trusteeship
system and Article 80 could not be implemented. As the States and
experts involved in the creation of the United Nations and the liquida-
tion of the League of Nations were practically the same, it was possible
to frame the Charter with the forthcoming liquidation of the League of
Nations in mind.
Article 80 could not be applied at once. It had no function until the
League of Nations was liquidated. The mandata were still exercised on
behalf of the League of Nations, and until its liquidation they could not
be converted into trusteeships or come under the supervision of the
United Nations. The operation of Article 80 was subject to a suspensive
condition. It was with a view to the time when it would come into opera-
tion that the provision which has been called a "conservatory" clause was
included. This clause stipulates that the provisions of Chapter XII
(particularly Arts. 75 and 77) would not alter the existing mandates
régime. But inaddition provision was made for a transitional régime,
for the period which must elapse between the liquidation of the League of
Nations and the conclusion of trusteeship agreements. This transitional
régime related onlyto the territories administered under the mandates
system, namely "territories now held under mandate", because there was
no possibility of placing the other territories listed in Article 77 under
the transitional régime bythe mere application of the provisions of the
Charter.
For the territories still heldnder mandate, it was provided that none
of the new provisions of the Charter would "in or of itself . . alter in any
manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms
of existing international instruments to which Members of the United
Nations may respectivelybe parties". Theseterritoriesthereforeremained,
until the conclusion of trusteeship agreements, "held under mandate"
(Art. 80; Art. 77).
2. The interpretation proposed seems closely in accordance with the
Advisory Opinion of 1950.But one may not overlook the fact that that
Opinion has been criticized by certain authorities. It has been main- tained that Article 80 is no more than a "saving clause" designed to
prevent the provisions of Chapter XII from "being interpreted so as to
operate beyond their intendment" and that its "sole purpose" is to pre-
vent them from "being construed so as to alter existing rights prior to
acertain event" (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 516, note).
These assertions are based on a phrase in the Article ("nothing ...
shall be construed . ..to alter ..."),but they fail to give any explanation
as to the purpose of the Article orthe rights it is meant to conserve. Now
it is impossible to admit without any explanation that the sole function
of Article 80can have been that of an interpretation clause in the technical
sense.
Certain explanations have therefore been put forward. Article 80
has been said to relate to the rights conferred by mandates, but only
for the period intervening between the entry into force of the Charter
and the liquidation of the League of Nations. It has also been regarded
as concerning the rights derived from trusteeship agreements.
But these efforts have been of no avail. They do not take account of
the fact that the rule embodied in Article 80 is applicable only "until such
[trusteeship] agreements have been concluded". Thus it is applicable
after the liquidation of the League of Nations and until the conclusion of
süch agreements, and it is not applicable after the conclusion of the
agreements.
The interpretation put forward by the 1950 Advisory Opinion would
therefore appear to be the only one in conformity with the purpose and
the letter of Article 80. It is true that the wordingL,f that clause is not
very clear, but a reading of the travaux préparatoires givesthe impression
that it is the result of the draftsmen's concern to take several purposes
into account and to harmonize them in the Article.
Nor should the desiderata of the international trusteeship system be
forgotten. Its establishment depended on the trusteeship agreements, and
it was desired to maintain the status quo until they had been concluded.
The Charter declares, in Article 76,that the basic objectives of the trustee-
ship system are in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations
laid down in Article 1.The question was whether that declaration affected
the rights of the mandatory Powers. To remove doubt on that score, it
was decided to provide that nothing in Chapter XII should be construed
to alter the rights whatsoever of any State (the reservation at the end of
Art. 76 (d) was inserted with the sameend in view).To keep the mandates
systern as such intact, it was also thought necessary to provide that
nothing in the Chapter concerning the end of mandates could be con-
strued to alter the rights of peoples. Finally, to avoid any form of words
capable of suggesting a prolonged survival of mandates, they were not
referred to, except by way of a reminder that they should be replaced by
trusteeship agreements. Using the term "interpret" in the somewhat
non-technical sense in which "interpréter" is employed in the French NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 193
text (the English text has "construe"), paragraph 2 of Article 80 States
that paragraph 1should not be "interpreted" as giving grounds for delay
or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of trusteeship agree-
ments.
There are also other reasons for considering that the interpretation
given by the 1950Advisory Opinion was correct.
Interpreted as a mere "saving clause", Article 80 is really reduced to
nothing, to total pointlessness. If the view is taken that the liquidation of
the League of Nations put an end to the mandates or to the obligations
of the mandatories, the Article is deprived of al1practical meaning. In
this sense Judge MacNair was right in saying "that it is difficultto seethe
relevance of this Article"(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 160).But can a method
of interpretation be a good one if it leads to the absurd conclusion that
an Article of the Charter is totally pointless?
3. The history of Article 80has been thoroughly studied, as is apparent
in the Court's publications in the South West Africa cases. To examine it
afresh would be unnecessarily to burden this opinion; but it may be of use
to reproduce a few texts with which the Court was already acquainted
in 1950.
On 14 May 1945at San Francisco, in Committee 1114,the delegate of
South Africa said that "the terms of existing mandates could not be
altered without the consent of the mandatory Power". It was his concern
to protect the rights of States in the period preceding the conclusion of
trusteeship agreements, whereas the delegate of Egypt expressed concern
forthe preservation of the rights of peoples administered under mandate.
This led to the proposition ofthe United States delegate, to the effectthat:
"al1rights, whatever they may be, remain exactly the same as they exist-
that they are neither increased nor diminished..." (UNCIO docs., Vol. X,
pp. 439 and 486, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, InternationalStatus of South
West Africa, p. 98). In the same sense, Mr. Stassen said that the purpose
was "to preserve the rights during that in-between period fromthe time
this Charter isadoptedand thetime that the new agreements are negotiated
and completed" (8 June 1945: running numbers 24, 25. UN Archives,
Vol. 70, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, ibid.,p. 217).
In Commission II of the San Francisco Conference, Mr. Fraser (Prime
Minister of New Zealand), the president of the Trusteeship Committee,
said with regard to the report of that Committee: "The Mandate does
not belong to my country or any other country. It is held intrust for the
world." He also stated that:
"The work immediately ahead is how those mandates that were
previously supervised by the Mandate Commission of the League of
Nations can now be supervised by the Tru'steehipCouncil."
Mr. Fraser was the last speaker on the report, and when he had finished, NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 194
Field Marshal Smuts, presiding, declared it adopted in full (UNCIO
docs.,. 1144(21 June 1945) and 1208 (27 June 1945), quoted in I.C.J.
Pleadings,ibid., p. 108).
Field Marshal Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa,
replied to a question put to him on the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
80 by saying:
"That was to prevent a situation where the mandatory says: 'I do
not want to make an agreement ai all'. He takes this position, that
the League of Nations having disappeared we are now free, that we
can do what we like" (Union of South Africa, Debates of the House
of Assembly, 13March 1946,quoted in the statement by Mr. Ingles
(Philippines),Z.C.J. Pleadings, ibid.,p. 242).
4. Article 80 is also the basis of reference or support for the League of
Nations resolution of 18April 1946 '.The dying League of Nations could
be easy in its mind because the principles of the Charter werethe same as
those of Article 22 of the Covenant, the principle of the well-being and
development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves being
preserved. Having by their signature of the Charter endorsed Article 80,
the mandatories manifested their intention to continue to administer the
territories in accordance with Article 22of the Covenant and the mandate
instruments.
The conclusion that South Africa remained subject to the international
obligations contained in Article 22 of the Covenant and that the super-
visory functions with regard to their performance were to be carried out
by the United Nations is thus based on the acceptance by the mandatory
of Article 80 (because it signed the Charter), the resolution of 18 April
1946(whichdeclaredthe f~nctions ofthe Leagueof Nations to be at an end
and stated its agreement with the provisions of the Charter) and the
statements whereby the mandatories announced their intention of con-
tinuing. to administer the mandated territories in accordance with the
"
obligations set out in the various mandates.
5. These conclusions have been severelycriticized and doubt has been
cast on the authority of the 1950Opinion on the basis of what has been
called the "new facts2'-facts which it is claimed were unknown to the
Court in 1950.But the study of the background, looked at with an open
mind, would seemto lead to a contrary result2.The basic concern of most
of the frarners of the Charter and of the liquidators of the League of
On the subject of the understanding that the United Natiwas to continue
the work of the League, see the preamble to the League Assembly's resolution of
Committee (cited in I.C.J. Pleadings, International Status of South West Africa, pp.
209 f.).
See the excellent account of the matter given by Judge Jessup in a dissenting
opinion:Z.C.J Reports 1966, pp. 339-351. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 195
Nations was to preserve the rights of peoples and the safeguards for
those rights, and only secondarily the rights of States (the open-door
question).
From the information provided by South Africa itself at the hearing of
15March 1971concerning the background to the drafting of Article 80,
it appears that, in the text proposed by the Technical Committee, it was
provided that nothing should in and of itself alter the rights of any States
or any peoples "or the terms of any mandate". An Egyptian proposal
also referred to "the terms of any mandate". The United States spoke of
"a conservatory or safeguarding clause", whereby al1 rights would
remain the same and be "neither increased nor diminished". The Syrian
proposa1 also referred to "the terms of any mandate". The Consultative
Group proposed that what should be specified as not being altered were
the rights whatsoever ... "or the terms of existing international instru-
ments". The United States asked that it should be placed on record that
among "rights whatsoever" were included any rights provided by Article
22,paragraph 4, ofthe Covenant. The Coordination Committee indicated
that the intention of Committee 1114was "to freezethe present position".
In these discussions the SovietUnion said itfeared that the preservation
of the former mandate régime unchanged might be usedas a pretext to
delay the conclusion of trusteeship agreements and indefinitelyperpetuate
the mandates.
Once the Charter had been signed l,the League of Nations concerned
itself with ensuring the continuation of jts work with a view to the
protection of the peoples under mandate. Dr. Liang proposed in the
First Committee, which was discussing the transmission of the League of
Nations' functions, a draft recommending that the mandatory Powers
should submit annual reports to the United Nations until the Trusteeship
Council had been constituted. This draft was not accepted, as it was
outside the Committee's terms of reference. Later, when the time came to
discuss the mandates, Dr. Liang submitted another draft in which no
reference was made to annual reports, and which was to provide the basis
for the resolution of 18 April 1946.The withdrawal of Dr. Liang's first
draft, and the wording of the new draft, have been regarded as providing
a reason for rejecting the view of the 1950 Advisory Opinion that the
League's functions passed to the United Nations (separate opinion of
Judge van Wyk, citing the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy
Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 112).But if
the Liang draft was abandoned, it was not because it provided for the
transmission of functions; it was because it was unrealistic in the sense
that reports could not simply be sent to the General Assembly. Some
It is noteworthy that during the ten meetings heId by Committee 1114Argentina,
Ethiopia and Guatemala expressed reservations in respect of Articleut South
Africa did not. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 196
specialized machinery was necessary and that, in the view of the Soviet
Union, could be a pretext for delaying the institution of the Trusteeship
system.
There was also concern in the United Nations with regard to the need
for some organized machinery to supervise the administration of the
mandatories, hence the idea of a ternporary trusteeship committee as
proposed by the United States. If this met with no success it wasbecause
of the opposition of the Soviet Union, which regarded al1these proposals
as a way of prolonging the mandates system and staving off the trustee-
ship system.
There is no reference to non-transmission of functions to the United
Nations, or to the extinction of the rnandatories' obligations.
On the contrary, States affirmed their readiness to discharge their
obligations as mandatories in accordance with the spirit of the mandates.
The general interest appeared to be toseek to ensure the transfer to the
United Nations of the functions and responsibilities of the mandates
systern (South African written statement, Chap. VIII, para. 13).
For its part,Belgiurnstated (11 April 1946)that it was "Sully alive to
al1the obligations devolving on Members of the United Nations under
Article 80of the Charter".
South Africa stated that it was prepared to apply the principles laid
down in the Charter (23 December 1945),that it was conscious of its
obligations and responsibilities as a signatory of the Charter (17 January
1946),and that "according to paragraph 1of Article 80, no rights would
be altered until individual trusteeship agreements were concluded"
(22 January 1946).South Africa also recognized the transmission to the
United Nations of the powers concerning the mandates, sinceit requested
the General Assembly to agree to the annexation of South West Africa.
Finally, in the letter of 23July 1947,there was a reference to the continua-
tion of the submission of reports.
The Assembly's resolution of 18 April 1946 is of great importance.
It is based on Dr. Liang's draft. In proposing the new draft, Dr. Liang
indicated that the functions ofthe League of Nations were not transferred
automatically to the United Nations. The appropriate administrative
organ was lacking. The League of Nations should take steps to secure
"the continued application of the principles of the mandates system".
He quoted Professor Baileyto the effectthat "the League would wishto be
assured as to the future of mandated territories". In supporting Dr.
Liang'sproposal, France stated that the dissolution of the League was not
to be regarded as weakening the obligations of the mandatory States.
6. The resolution of 18April 1946recalled the basic principle of the
mandates system, which was to ensure the well-being and the protection
of the peoplesunder mandate (Art. 22 of the Covenant). It recognized the
ending of the functions of the League of Nations while accepting its
replacement by the United Nations (the Charter containing provisionswhich could be implemented on the dissolution ofthe League of Nations),
and notingthat the principles ofArticle 22had been ernbodied in Chapters
XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter. The concordance with Article 80will be
noted. The League of Nations was satisfied that the protection of the
peoples under mandate would be ensured by the United Nations, as it had
been under Article 22 of the Covenant.
To make doubly sure, the resolution solemnly placed on record the
staternents whereby the Mernbers of the League administering territories
under mandate expressed their intention of continuing to adrninister them
in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates.
Once the League of Nations had been dissolved, the concern of al1
States except South Africa was the rapid conclusion of trusteeship
agreements. The lack of any body to which reports could be submitted
is attributable to th.e fear of delaying the conclusion of trusteeship
agreements. However there is no evidence that there was any doubt as
to thetransmission to the United Nations ofthepowers regardingmandates.
On the contrary, the decision of the Organization was awaited (even by
South Africa) before declaring that the mandates had come to an end.
7. To dispel misunderstanding, it would be as well to clarify the
significance of Chapter XI of the Charter and of Article 73, which forms
part of it.
To consider the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories as
applying only to territories under neither mandate nor trusteeship is to
obscure the sense of it. Both the wording and the history of Article 73
show that it is of general application.
In the course of the first stages of drafting the Charter, the provisions
of Chapter XI were in the same chapter as the articles of what is now
Chapter XII. If Section A becarne a separate chapter (now Chap. XI), it
was because it was thought inappropriate to include a general declara-
tion in the chapter governing the trusteeship systern. But this has not
diminished the general nature of Article 73.
When presenting the report of Cornmittee 1114to Commission II,
Field Marshal Smuts explained the scope of Section A (which became
Chap. XI) by saying that Section A applied the trustee principle to al1
dependent territories, whether they were mandated, territories taken from
defeated countries, or existing colonies of Powers. That covered the
whole field of non-self-governing territories. (UNCIO docs., Vol. VIII,
p. 127.) Mr. van der Plas pointed out that the declaration in Article 73
applied to al1non-self-governing territories, to those of colonial status on
a voluntary basis and to those of a trust status, among the obligations
assumed for them, on a contractual basis (Coordination Committee,
surnmary record of 37th Meeting, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings,International
Status of South West Africa, p. 39).
The text of Article 73 shows that the declaration regarding non-self-
governing territories applies to "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government", without mention of any
exception. It does not appear that anyone interpreting the text is entitled
to exclude non-self-governing territories such as mandated or trusteeship
territories.
Of course the obligations imposed upon the States administering man-
daced or trusteeship territories are wider than those provided in the case
of other non-self-governing territories, but the declaration in Article 73,
being general and supplementary, is applicable to al1non-self-governing
territories.
Article 73 took over from Article 22 of the Covenant the principle
of the "sacred trust" and of the temporary nature of the administration
of the territories ("territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government"). This explains the reference made by the
League of Nations resolution of 18 April 1946 to Chapter XI of the
Charter.
During the first few years South Africa submitted reports to the
United Nations. It stated at times that it was a matter of supplying in-
formation in accordance with Article 73. But the fact that South Africa
1 ouchsafed certain interpretations a posteriori and referred expressly to
Article 73 does not imply that it had thereby cast off its position and
obligations as a mandatory; it was carrying out the duties generally laid
upon mandatories.
8. An additional argument against the transmission of powers has
been sought in resolution XIV of 12February 1946concerning thetransfer
of certain functions and activities. It contains no reference to the man-
dates, and the conclusion has been drawn from this omission that there
was no transmission. This is an inexplicable argument, as the Sub-Com-
mittee of the Execut've Committee which dealt with the possible transfer
of League of Nations functions and activities expressly stated that the
question of the mandates was outside its terms of reference. This is
natural, for the question had already been settled by Article 80 of the
Charter on the United Nations' part and by the resolution of 18 April
1946on the League of Nations' part l.
9. There is alsc powerful support for the 1950 Advisory Opinion in
the principles of municipal law.
Lauterpacht recalls that the essence of the mandates system was the
administration of the territory in the interests of the indigenous peoples;
to hold that this could be secured without supervision would have been to
reduce to a form of words the decision of the Court. He adds that seldom
was there a more compelling occasion for applying-as the Court did in
Nations is political, not functional; see the observations of Bailey and Bourquin
and the preamble of the League resolutionof 18 April 1946, inZ.C.JP.leadings,
Internationalrarus of South West Africa, p. 209 and note 1. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 199
fact-the cy-prèsdoctrine (The Development ofInternatiolzalLaw by the
International Court, p. 279).
Under that doctrine, which applies specificallyin the case of charitable
trusts, a court must decide "as near as possible", by changing the trustee
or the method of administration in the interests of the beneficiary when
this is necessary in view of the circumstances (Bogert, Handbook of the
Law of Trusts, 1952, p. 568; Keeton, Law of Trusts, 1939, pp. 148 f.;
Hanbury, Modern Equity, 1946, p. 227; Keeton, Social Change in the
Law of Trusrs, 1958,p. 96).
In other systems of law there isno doubtthat if the existing supervisory
organ in a tutelage situation is abolished and another is established (if for
example a conseil defamille is replaced byjudicial supervision) the guard-
ian becomes accountable to the new organ.
10. In reality the interpretation of Article 80 by the Court in 1950has
the virtue of preventing the mandate being used to create a title for
annexation; it has the virtue of preventing fraus legis.
B. The Unanimity Rule in the Covenant ofthe League of Nations
1. An indirect but effectiveway of arguing against anytransmission of
powers to the United Nations in respect of the mandates is to point to
its practical impossibility,ecause the unanimity rule operated in respect
of decisions by the League Council, and because the mandatory was
present at the meetings of the Council either as a member or on the in-
vitation of the Council owing to its interests being specially affected
(Covenant, Art. 5, para. 1, and Art. 4, para. 5). A right of veto was thus
conferred on the mandatory, emptying the League's supervisory rights
and duties of any substance and making it impossible for the League to
transmit them; no power or practical function could have passed to the
United Nations.
2. It is therefore necessary to study the unanimity rule and the possi-
bility of itsapplication to a Member of the League of Nations which was a
mandatory.
At the time of the Opinion requested of the Court on the International
Status of South West Africa, South Africa argued energetically and
forcibly that the Mandate had lapsed, but did not mention the unanimity
rule. It was only after the 1950Opinion and the setting up of the Com-
mittee on South West Africa, in the discussions of the Committee and of
the Assembly devoted to the implementation of the Opinion, that the
Government of the Union of South Africa opposed the proposals of the
Committee, claiming that they "would not, inter alia, safeguard the
rule of unanimity which was provided for in the Covenant of the League
of Nations l".
l Letter of 25 March 1954 from Permanent Representative of South Africa to
187 This argument impressed the Committee, whose members were divided
in their views. The General Assembly found itself faced with two pro-
posals. Under one of them, resolutions were to be ta~en "subject to the
concurring vote of the Union of South Africa"; this proposal did not
obtain the necessary majority. The other culminated in resolution 844
(IX) of 11 October 1954,by which the Court was asked to givean opinion
on the voting procedure on questions relating to South West Africa, in
particular on the question whether the application cf Article 18, para-
graph 2, of the Charter was in conformity with the 1950 Opinion, and
in the affirmative, aso the voting procedure which the General Assembly
should follow. (See the Dossier transmittea by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions
relating to Reports and Petitions concerningthe Territory of South West
Africu, pp. 21ff. The Government of South Africa did not take part in
the proceedings, but in the Additional Notes in the Dossier transmitted
by the Secretary-General (ibid.,pp. 38-48)and in the written statement of
the United States (ibid.,pp. 57-60),the question of unanimity was studied.
In the 1955Opinion, the Court considered that despite the arguments
on the unanimity rule advanced before the General Assembly and the
United Nations Committees, it was unnecessary "to deal with the issues
raised by these contentions or to examine the extent and scope of the
operation of the rule of unanimity under the Covenant of the League of
Nations", because the question of the degree of supervision did not in-
clude or relate to the system of voting (I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 74). The
Opinion States that:
"The voting system is related to the composition and functions
of the organ. It forms one of the characteristics of the constitution
of the organ.Taking decisions by a two-thirds majority vote or by a
simple majority vote is one of the distinguishing features of the
General Assembly, while the unanimity rule was one of the distin-
guishing features of the Council of the League of Nations." (I.C.J.
Reports 1955, p. 75.)
Consequently, the Court rejected the contention of South Africa that
there was incompatibility between the voting procedure conternplated
by the General Assembly and the unanimity rule.
The 1950Opinion had recognized that the General Assembly had the
right to exercise the supervisory functions. The1955Opinion recognized
that it had the power to take decisions regarding the Mandate by a two-
thirds majority of Members present and voting. Judge Lauterpacbt would
have wished the Court to examine the problem of the unanimity rule in
Chairman of Committee on South West Africa, Annex 1to Report to the Committee
on South West Africa,GA, OR, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 14, A/2666.
188 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 20 1
ail its aspects (I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 98). The Court did not do so and
the question of the application to mandates of the unanimity rule, pro-
vided for in the Covenant, remains open.
The Court has nonetheless held, in two successive Judgrnents that,
according to the Covenant and within the framework of the League of
Nations, the unanimity rule was applicable to mandates, without having
subjected the question to special study.
The 1962 Judgment endeavours to show that the system of judicial
protection of the sacred trust contained in each mandate was an essential
feature of the mandates system; itstressed the raison d'êtreand the
necessity of this evident security, because wikout it the supervision by
the League, and the steps to be taken by the Council, could not be
effective,"in either case the approval meant the unanimous agreement of
al1the representatives including that of the mandatory" (I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 336).
Later the Court based an argument on the unanimity ruie, but in order
to contradict the necessity argument. The functioning of the mandates
systenl was otherwise, given the unanimity rule (I.C.J. Reports 1966, pp.
44-47); "the Council had no means of imposing its views on the man-
datory", "in relation to the 'conduct' provisions of the mandates, it was
never the intention that the Council should be able to impose its views
on the various rnandatories". "As regards the possibility that a manda-
tory might be acting contrary not only to the views of the rest of the
Council but to the mandate itself, the risk of this was evidently taken
with open eyes" (ibid., p. 46).
Theauthority of the 1962and 1966Judgments seemsrather weak. They
are in clear contradiction with each other and the references to the una-
nimity rule are obiter dicta ntended to reinforce the argument, but
which are not the outcome of a special and thorough study of the ques-
tion '.
Nonetheless one cannot ignore them. The 1966Judgment amounts to
saying that the unanimity rule laid down inthe Covenant isnot merelya
rule of voting procedure, but it also touches the very essence of the
mandates. As a result one must question whether mandates are not thus
disguised cessions. Do mandatories have no legal obligations, but only
moral obligations? Could the Council of the League of Nations do
nothing to check the annexation of a mandated territory?
It therefore seerns that the counsel of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht should
be followed, and that the question of the unanimity rule should be
examined in al1its aspects.
l There were not taken into consideration thearguments and facts based on
practice indicatein I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions relating to
Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, pp. 38-48 and
57-60: I.C.J. Reports 1955, pp. 98-106, and by legal writerg, J. F. Williams, "The
League of Nations and Unanimity",American Journal of Internafional Law, Vol. 19,
1925:p. 475; C. A. Riches, The Unanimity Rule and the Leagweof Nations, Baltimore,
1933. 3. If the unanimity rule gives rise to difficultiesfor anyone who seeks
to understand the mandates system, this results in the first place from an
error of perspective. Should the question be seen from the point of view
of Article 22? It is that Article which we are attempting to interpret.
According to its provisions, the purpose of the mandate is the sacred
trust towards the natives; the mandatory is the instrument by which the
League of Nations effects its civilising task, the admitted consequence
being the exclusion of any possibility of open or disguised annexation on
the part of the mandatory.
To appreciate the significanceof Article 22, its originInust be recalled.
Mandates were founded on the Treaty of Versailles. Germany ceded its
African colonies on condition that they became mandated territories.
The Allied Powers and the League of Nations accepted the territories
subject to the duty to ensure that the mandatories to which the territories
were entrusted duly accomplished their sacred trust of civilization.
Germany, as a party to the Treaty of Versailles, had a legal interest
in the observance by the League of Nations of Article 22. Germany had
no right to supervise the administration of the territories ',but it could
complain if the mandates system were transformed into another régime,
if a mandated territory became a colony or were annexed.
Article22plays averyspecialpart in the Covenant. It created a situation
or institution which was independent of the will of the Members of the
League. The provisions of the Covenant could be altered by majority
vote (Art. 26); the Mandate for South West Africa could be modified
with the consent of the Council (Art. 7 of the Mandate). But Article 22
could not be abrogated or modified. The regime was set up for the benefit
of the peoples of the territories, andhese territories were assigned subject
to the obligation to respect Article 22.
This special status of Article 22 is apparent if one considers the
structure of the Covenant. This Article is an independent normative
entity, foreign even to the remainder of the provisions of the Covenant.
Those who drafted it had in fact contemplated that agreements for man-
dates could be inserted into the Peace Treaty (Hymans Report, quoted in
the separate opinion of Judge Jessup, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 391).
4. The relation between a mandatory and the Council is not the srime
as that between a Member of the League and the Council. According to
the mandate instrument for South West Africa, the Mandatory exercises
administration on behalf of the League of Nations (Preamble to the
Mandate); it may apply its own legislation to the Territory (Art. 2);
it undertakes a series of obligations (Arts. 2-5); it is to make to the
Council an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council with full
Ruanda-Urundi twas rejected.Germany's protest against Belgium with regard toinformation with regard to the Territory and indicating the measures
taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5
(Art. 6).
The mandatory therefore comes down from the "platform" of sover-
eignty. The administration of a mandated territory is not something
which falls, either essentially or fortuitously, within the national com-
petence proper to States. The relationship between the Mandator
(League of Nations) and Mandatory (South Africa) or, if preferred,
between theguardian (tuteur)and the authority called upon to supervise
its management, is not a relation of equality inter aequales, but one of
subordination in the field of mandates. A mandatory does not have to
administer nor present reports to the satisfaction of the Council as a
Member, with the conditions and prerogatives involved in that relation-
ship; it does so as a mandatory which has to give an account of its
mandate.
The mandatory cannot play two different and inconsistent parts. It
cannot enjoy the advantages connected with the administration of the
territory in the robe of a mandatory, and then, after having doffed that,
put on-the robe of Member of the League of Nations, make use of its
right of veto, and evade its obligations as mandatory.
5. Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant lays down the unanimity
rule as general "except where otherwise expressly provided in this
Covenant". A decisiveprovision, which appears to exclude the possibility
of any implied derogation, or derogation by analogy, if there is no
provision expressly contrary to the rule.
But interpretation does not deserve to be so called if it sticks in the
bark of the words, superstitiously sacrificing the otherrules of law, in the
present case, by neglecting Article 22 of the Covenant and the principles
inspiring it.
(a) To ascertain the significance of Articles 4 and 5 of the Covenant, it
is necessary first of al1to study their particular purpose.
At the time of the drafting of the Covenant, the unanimity rule
was fundamental as an expression and a safeguard of the sovereignty
and independence of States. On the birth of the League of Nations,
the need was felt to reassure governments. It was said that "no
nation, whether small or great, need fear oppression from the organs
of the League" (Lord Cecil, quoted by Riches, /oc. cit.p. 22); and
it was alsosaid that any scheme would be avoided "under which our
own country [the United Kingdom] should be rendered liable to have
a recommendation passed against it by a majority vote in a matter
vitally affecting the national interests". (Interim Report of the
Phillimore Committee, 1918, Riches, foc. cit.p. 3.)
Since such was the purpose, and the sole purpose, of the rule, it
was logical for the First Committee of the Second Assembly to accept the report of the London Committee, which after having
explained that the unanimity rule served to safeguard the sovereignty
of States, deduced therefrom that unanimity could not be necessary
except in cases in which the sovereignty of States was in jeopardy
(Riches, loc. cit., p. 98).The Second Assembly "again explained the
adoption of the unanimity rule in the first place as a means of
protecting 'the rights of State sovereignty', and they further stated
that it only needed to be maintained where it served that end
(Riches, !oc. cit., p. 117).
Thisunanimity rule protected not only the Members of the League,
but al1 States. In the practice of the Council, it was customary to
consider that the right to sitas a member, implying the right to vote,
must be applicable also by analogy to countries which were not
mernbers of the League.
In addition to this. the reason is well known whv there was a
divergence between the absolute form of the rule and the limited
nature of its objecî and purpose.
Two of the draftsmen of the Covenant, Lord Cecil of Chelwood
and Mr. Scialoja, suggested in 1930,when amendment to Article 13
of the Covenant was under consideration, that it was only by
inadvertence that a provision on qualified unanimity had been
inserted in some of the articles concerning disputes and omitted
from others l.
(b) The Pei,manent Court has stated that:
"It follows from the foregoing that, according to the Covenant
itself, in certain cases and more particularly in the case of the
settlernent of a dispute, the rule of unanimity is applicable,
subject to the limitation that the votes cast by representatives
of the interestedParties do not affect the required unanimity.
......................
The well-known rule that no-one can be judge in his own suit
holds good.
From a practical standpoint, to require that the representa-
tives of the Parties should accept the Council's decision would
be tantamount to giving them the right of veto enabling them
to prevent any decision being reached . . .(P.C.I.J., Series B,
NO. 12, pp. 31-32).
Lord Cecil: "had always held that it must have been by some accident that the
rule in the Covenant providing that unanimity should not comprise the parties to the
dispute had only been enacted in certaincases. Obviously if it were the rightle
itMr.ouScialoja: "There was no doubt thatt. .it had been simply by an oversight
that it had not beensaid that the votes of the interested parties should not figure in
oalculating unanimity." (Dossier transmittby the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and
Petitions concerning the Territory of South Westrica, p. 41.) Consequently, it has been possible to observe that:
"The requirement of unanimity, however expressly stated,
is implicitly qualified by the latter principle [the principle that
a party may not bejudge in its own suit]; and .. .nothing short
ofits express exclusion is sufficientto justify a State in insisting
that it should, by acting as judge in its own case, possess the
right to render inoperative a solemn international obligation
to which it has subscribed." (Separate opinion of Judge Lauter-
pacht, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 104.)
(c) In a study of the unanimity rule, it has been said that "law is the
expression of the will of a living organism", and that "the perma-
nency of the organism requires that its constitution should be
subject to readjustment to the conditions of its life" (Williams, loc.
cit., pp. 475, 485). This is what the League of Nations did.
As early as 1921it was recommended in a resolution that "pending
the ratification of the amendment [of Article 161,the votes of the
parties be excluded in determining whether unanimity had in fact
been achieved" (Riches, loc. cit., p. 141).
In the same way, and also to avoid the absurd result whereby un-
animity rule might prevent the application of Article 26 of the
Covenant, it was considered that for the proposal of amendments to
the Covenant, unanimity was not necessary and the majority required
for amendments was sufficient (Riches, loc. cit., pp. 109, 115).
For disputes might also be cited in which the Council considered
its resolutions to be binding despite the contrary vote of one of the
parties (see separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports
1955, p. 101 ;Riches, loc. cit., p. 145)'.Finally one might quote al1
the resolutions on questions in which the League had to carry out
administrative functions (Riches, loc. cit., pp. 161, 166).
(d) After a thorough examination of the practice of the League, it has
been possible to conclude that "it shows a decided disposition on
the part of the Members not to allow the unanimity rule to make
the League impotent, and this in spite of the explicit provisions
of the legal instrument which forms its fundamental law" (Riches,
loc. cit., p. 117).
(e) The apparent contradiction between Article 22 and Articles 4 and 5
of the Covenant is to be overcome by taking into account the
relative value of those provisions.
Articles 4 and 5 are rules of an abstract and general nature;
their purpose lies outside the relationshrp of the mandatory with
Naturally, for political reasthe Council could regardas not binding reso-
lutions opposed by one of the parties-caseof Lithuania and Japan (Riches, loc.
cit.pp. 148-152). the mandator on behalf of which it exercises its administration.
Thus, the non-application of the unanimity rule to the Council's
functions regarding the mandate does not contradict the object and
purpose of Articles 4 and 5, namely respect for the exclusive juris-
diction of States. Article 22 on the other hand, gave birth to an
institution the nature of which is incompatible with the possibility
of the exercise of a veto by the mandatory.
It is so contrary to the concepts of mandate and of tutelage, and
to good faith, to set up and regulate supervision of the mandatory
while rendering "that supervision nominal and ineffeciive", while
leavingit to the good will of the mandatory to fulfil his obligations,
that this "cannot be conclusively inferred from the mere fact that
the basic instrument provides forthe rule of unanimity" (seeseparate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 99).
Furthermore, the principle nerno-judex in re sua prohibits an
administrator, guardian (tuteur) or mandatory from being the
person who decides or judges whether or not he has fulfilled his
obligations as such-"there is no valid reason for distinguishing, in
connection with the applicability of the principle that no-one isjudge
in his own cause, between the judicial and the supervisory organs"
(separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ibid., p. 100).
The question raised by the unanimity rule is the same as that
which arises in practice in municipal law, where it is answered by an
appeal to the concept of fraus legis. The mark of this concept is
the fact that the protection of an abstract generaI rule is sought
in order to avoid the application of another rule intended to settle
a concrete point. In cases where the purpose of the abstract rule is
not to settle the concrete point, therule which directly contemplates
that point is to be applied.
south Africa's claim for the application of the unanimity rule can
therefore be classified as agere in,fraudemIegis.An interpretation of
Articles 22, 4 and 5 of the Covenant which would justify the refusal
of the mandatory to fulfil the obligations which it has accepted by
the mandate instrument and by the signature of the Covenant, could
be classified asinterpretatio in$raudem legis.
To the same effect it should be added that the idea of the application
'the unanimity rule to mandates was not generally accepted by writers
'the time of the League. Wright rejected it decisively on the basis of
e Opinion given in tk so-called Mosul case, and of Articles 15and 16
the Covenant (Mandates Under the League of Nations, pp. 132 and
2). At the 1931 session of the Institut de Droit International held at
imbridge, which discussed international mandates, Borel raised the
iestion of the unanimity rule in connection with the revocation of
andates. Seferiades then argued that although the Council's decisions
:re taken unanimously, the mandatory's vote was disregarded. Rolin stated that unanimity was not necessary but that discussion of the ques-
tion was untimely. The discussion was not pursued, but the vote in
favour of revocation impliedrejection of the application of the unanimity
rule to mandates (Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. II,
p. 58). The many writers who assert that the League was entitled to
revoke the mandates appear by implication to share the same view.
Quite recently Dugard has maintained that the unanimity rule was not
applicable to mandates ("The Revocation of the Mandate for South
West Africa", A.J.Z.L., 1968,pp. 89 ff.).
V. POSSIBILIT OF FORFEITUR BEY THE MANDATORY-
THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE
Itis necessary to reîall the characteristics of the mandate régime,for
only in the light ofits nature will it be possible to say what powers were
possessed by the League of Nations and are now possessed by the United
Nations in its place.
The mandates are not a simple concession granted by the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers to the mandatory States. The mandate is a
very complex institution.
It was based on the cession by Germany of its colonies in Africa (Arts.
Il8 and 119 of the Treaty of Peace). This cession was not pure and
simple, but szcbmodo. The territories concerned did not pass under the
sovereignty of the mandatory States. In the Treaty, the mandatory States
were designated as the "governments exercising authority over those
territories" (Art. 127); the territories were transferred "to the Mandatory
Power in its capacity as such" ;the territories were to be "administered
by a Mandatory under Article 22 of Part 1 (League of Nations) of the
present Treaty" (Art. 257); reference was also made to any Power "ad-
ministering former German territory as a mandatory under Article 22,
Part 1 (League of Nations)" (Art. 312). It was this Article 22 which
laid down the principles of the new institution.
The League of Nations assumed the responsibility for a "sacred trust
of ci~ilization"~, "in the interests of the indigenous population", until
such time as the peoples in question should be "able to stand by them-
selves". It was in this way that the Covenant pointed to the temporary
nature of mandates; they were to come to an end when the indigenous
populations were capable of governing themselves. General Smuts tried
to get this reference to the chronologically finite nature of mandates
l Mr. Fraser (NewZealand), tthen chairrnan of Cornmittee 1114,concluded his
report to the Secondrnmittee with the following words: "The manddoes not
belong to my country or any other country. It isheld in trust for the world." (21June
1945, UNCIO doc. 1144, Vol. VIII, p. 154; cineZ.C.J. Pleadings, International
Status of South West Africa, p. 222. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 208
deleted, and for this purpose proposed the removal of the word "yet" in
the phrase "not yet able to stand by themselves"; but this amendment
was rejected.
The League of Nations entrusted "the tutelage of such peoples . ..to
advanced nations" the method being that "this tutelage should be
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League"'. Powers of
administration were entrusted to the mandatories by the League "subject
to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous
population". More particularly, there was constituted a Permanent
Commission to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandato-
ries andto advise the Council on al1matters relating to the observance of
the mandates. In the Mandate for South West Africa, in addition to the
reference to Article 22 of the Covenant, it was provided that the Manda-
tory should make to the Council of the League of Nations annual reports
to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard
to the Territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out certain
specified obligations (Art. 6).
Supervision by the organ of the international community is a dis-
tinctive feature of the mandate (Wright, Mandates under the League of
Nations, 1930, p. 64) and is in conformity with its very nature (I.C.J.
Reports 1950, pp. 133 and 136). "Tndeed, to exclude the obligations
connected with the Mandate would be to exclude the very essence of the
Mandate" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 334)'. The "sacred trust" in respect of
the indigenous peoples was a grave responsibility for the League of
Nations and now for the United Nations, and one which can only be
discharged through the modality of supervision and the possibilities
which it provides 3.
The task which the mandatory States have to perform "on behalf" of
the League is qualified as a "mandatory" function and consists in the
exercise of "tutelage". It is characterized, as the same terms imply in
municipal law, by absence of self-interest. This was solemnly proclaimed
by the Allied Powers (16 June 1919)in reply to a protest by the German
'The New Zealand Government said in 1926: "Western Samoa is not an integral
part of the British Empire, but a child of which we have assumed the guardianship"
(Minutes of the Tenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1926,
p. 24: cited in I.C.J. Pleadings, International Sfatus oj" South-West Africa, p. 203).
"The international supervision provided for in paragraphs7 and 9 of Article
22 of the Covenant is the cornerstoneof the whole mandaies system"; "It clearly
emerges . ..from ... the decisions of the Council that what is intended is an effective
and genuine, not a purely theoretical ormal, supervision." (The Mandates System.
Hearings of Petitioners by the Cornrnirree on South-West Afrip. 28.)missibiliof
"With regard to the responsibility of the League for securing the observance of
the terrns of the mandates, the Counciinterprets its duties in this connection in the
widest manner." (Op. cit., p. 34, quoting a report presented by the Council to the
Assembly on 6 December 3920, League Assembly Doc. 20/48/161 ; cited in I.C.J.
Pleadings, ihid., p. 29.)Government at the Peace Conference: "The Mandatory Powers which, in
so far as they may be appointed Trustees by the League of Nations, will
derive no benefit from such Trusteeship ..." This conception is reflected
in Article 257 of the Treaty of Peace, the effect of which is that the
value of the German possessions thus transferred was not taken into
account in calculating the reparations to be paid by Germany (van Rees,
Les mandats internationaux, 1927, pp. 18 f.). The same argument of
absence of interest was used by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
when Italy claimed territorial compensation on the basis of promises
made by France and Great Britain :
"The territoriesentrusted to them under mandate do not represent
any increase in their colonial possessions; the territories in question
can only belong, under the mandates system, to the peoples inha-
biting them" (Stoyanovski, La théorie générale de msandats inter-
nationaux, 1925,p. 18).
Cansequently the rights of the mandatory "are, so to speak, mere tools
given to enable it to fulfil its obligations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 329).
This conception has important practical consequences. The mandatory
has no power to cede or lease any part of themandated territory (Sjoberg
report, quoted by Wright, op. cit., p. 122). The Permanent Mandates
Commission protested against the statement by South Africa in the 1926
boundary agreement between South Africa and Portugal that South
Africa "possesses sovereignty" in the mandated area (Wright, op. cit.,
pp. 121,201f., 446)'. The Commission insisted that "as a direct corollary
to the lack of sovereignty . . the mandatory make no direct profit from
the territory" (ibid., p. 214), and that "even in C territories economic
discriminations are scrutinized to see that they are not against the in-
terests of the inhabitants of the area" (ibid., p. 215).
Van Rees finds that the mandated territories have a distinct indivi-
duality; the mandatory Powers are managers under an obligation of
strict respect for the integrity of the territories; unoccupied or ownerless
land is part of the property of the territory (Les mandats internationaux,
p. 22). The Permanent Mandates Commission also stated in 1925 that
contributions or gifts made by the mandated territories to the mandatory
Power were only admissible if they concerned institutions or works which
could be said to benefit the mandated territory materially or morally
' On that occasion the representative of South Africa, Mr. Smit, said "the
Government of the Union of South Africa exercised and possessed that sovereignty
was his position: therecould be no question of annexation."ir(Minutes of theed. That
Eleventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1927, p. 92; cited in
I.C.J.Pleadings, International Status of South- West Ap.i197.) (Bentwich, The Mandates System, pp. 106 f.). In 1927 the Commission
stated that therailways and harbours built by the Germans in South West
Africa could not be regarded as having passed to the dominium of South
Africa; it urged that they should be declared to belong to the territory
administered by the Union; in 1929 South Africa gave explanations in
accordance with the request made to it (ibid., p. 96).
The instrument embodying the Mandate for German South West
Africa, dated 17December 1920,took the form of a declaration made by
the Council of the League of Nations. Its nature has been discussed by
jurists, who have been unable to classify it as belonging to any one of the
known legalcategories. It was brought into being, like theothermandates,
asfollows. Germany ceded German South West Africa to the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, to be administered by the mandatory in
accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant. The Principal Powers agreed
that a mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty to be
exercised on his behalf by the Union of South Africa, in accordance with
Article 22 of the Covenant. His Britannic Majesty, acting for South
Africa, undertook to accept the Mandate and exercise iton behalf of the
League of Nations. The Council of the League of Nations, having regard
to Article 22, paragraph 8, took a decision on the points referred to in
that provision, and confirmed the Mandate.
This was a complicated process, in which the contributions of the dif-
ferent participants varied in significance. South Africa's was the most
passive: His Britannic Majesty made the undertaking to accept the
Mandate on its behalf. In this way was born an international institution
the essence of which is in Article 22 of the Covenant-as is moreover
apparent from the continuous references to this Article in the Versailles
Treaty and in the mandate instrument. Tt was reaily also to the basic
principles of Article 22 that the resolution of 18April 1946constituting
the final will and testament of the League of Nations referred back;
it is those principles which give meaning to the mandates system.
The sacred trust in respect of the indigenous people of the mandated
territories is a direct responsibility of the organized internationalmu-
nity. The League of Nations and, since 18April 1946,the United Nations,
is in duty bound to guarantee those peoples that this trust will not be
betrayed by the conduct of the mandatories acting, as they do, on its
behalf. It is those principles which give rise to well-defined obligations for
the United Nations and the mandatories.
A. Revocabilo iftyandates
Taking into account what has gone before, the key prior question for
the response to be given to the request for opinion is whether the GeneralAssembly took a decision ultra vireswhen it declared that the Mandate
entrusted to South Africa was terminated. Even if it is admitted that the
United Nations succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League of
Nations, it is clear that if the League of Nations could not withdraw the
mandate from South Africa, the United Nations could not have received
powers which the League did not have. It is necessary therefore to con-
sider whether the League of Nations had the power to put an end to
mandates.
The struggle between the colonialists and progressives did not end with
the signature of the Covenant. It is understandable that colonialists
consider and averthat the mandates system is a veiled form of annexation,
that sovereignty over the mandated territories belongs to themandatories,
and that the grant of a mandate is definitive and irrevocable. In order to
defend the colonial interest, its partisans have to overcome the obstacle
of the expression of the purposes of the mandates system to be found in
Article 22 of the Covenant. In order to achieve this, they put forward the
following arguments: Article 22 does not mention any right of revoca-
tion; but if it had been intended to confer such a right on the League of
Nations, it would have been expressly provided for in the Covenant. The
mandatory States, or the majority of them, frankly revealed, in the course
of the discussions preceding the drawing-up of Article 22, their desire to
obtain annexation pure and simple. Mandates were granted to States by
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and not by the League of
Nations; and since the Principal Powers had acquired those territories
by conquest, they alone, and not the League, could have retained the
power to revoke a mandate.
These arguments seem somewhat weak. The rule inclusiouniusexclusio
alteriusmay not be applied when the purpose of a norm shows that an
interPretadion in haimony with the ratio iuriis necessary if effectis to be
given to it. There is no ground for taking into account the desires and
hopes of certain parties-to the Covenant, any more than any mental
reservation, if they were disregarded by the other parties at the time of
signature, even if South Africa now relies on them. The Principal Powers
did not acquire the territories by way of conquest (there wasnodebellatio),
and if Germany ceded those territories in the Treaty of Versailles, it
was so that they might be placed under mandate, in accordance with
Article 22 of the Covenant.
In view of the weakness of the arguments just discussed, it is the con-
trary position, favouring the right of the League of Nations to put an end
to a mandate, which must prevail. But those who hold this view are
themselves divided as to the basis of the right.
It is clear that the original idea of the mandates system involved the
possibility of revocation. For General Smuts, who put it into words, the
allocation of a mandate was a mark of great trust and an honour, and
a mandate should not be a source of profit or private advantage for the
nationals of the mandatory (The League of Nations: A Practical Sugges- tion,1918, pp. 21 f.); he goes on to Saythat the League should reserve to
itself "complete power to ultimate control and supervision, as well as
the right of appeal toit from the territory or people affected against any
gross breach of the mandate by the mandatory State" (ibid., p. 23).
But it was European territories which General Smuts was thinking of as
possible mandates, and it was he who later was to cal1for annexation for
the African territories. It was Wilson who was to have the mandates
system extended to the African territories, while retaining the principles
formulated by General Smuts.
The silenceof Article 22 on the question of revocation can be explained
by the circumstances under which it was drawn up. Unlike the other
Articles of the Covenant, it was not drawn up by experts acquainted with
the finer points of legal interpretation: it is well known that it was
worked out by politicians, without being revised by experts. International
society of the belleépoque did not like to mention disagreeable matters
and preferrec!to leave them to be understood. It would have been in bad
tasle to refer to the possibility that one of the Principal Powers might
betray the sacred trust conferred upon it. This remote risk was, however,
covered, thanks to the terms used.
That such was the situation at that time seems to be confirmed by what
is known of the preliminary discussions preceding the drafting of the
Covenant, and what is known of the opinion of the members of the
Permanent Mandates Commission.
In the preliminary meetings prior to the drafting of the Covenant,
certain governments showed concern as to the conditions which were to
be applicable to mandates; there might be no interest in having a man-
date if it were revocable at any moment. These doubts were put at
rest by the statement that such a revocation was practically impossible.
The legal possibility of revocation was not denied, but an attempt was
made to calm their fears by explaining that such a possibility wasnot to be
foreseen, taking into account whichPowersit had beenagreedto grantman-
dates to, and which Powers made up the Council of the League of Nations.
The inembers of the Permanent Mandates Commission had to discuss
\ the question of revocability. They were under a duty to favour the
economic development of the mandated territories. But some of them had
expressed fears that the possibility of revocation might scare off investors.
What could be done to assuage these fears? From the reports of the
discussions one gets the impression that it was desired not to give a
definite negative answer, but that no effort was spared to strengthen the
assurance that a revocation was inconceivable in practice. Only van Rees
considers that he has found legal support for his view in that of Rolin;
but it may be said in reply that the latter author considers revocation to be
possible in the case ofserious abuse of a mandate l.The opinion of those
After having said that a mandate is an irrevocable alienatiogoes on: "It
would not be subject to revocation as against the latter [themandatory] except for a
200 best acquainted with the mandated territories, and of the colonial ad-
ministrators, seems somewhat unfavourable to irrevocability. Van Rees,
who is so much concerned to reassure investors, mentions among the
questions which the article leaves unanswered: are mandates revocable,
and if so what is the authority competent to take such a decision? He
gives no reply to the question (Les mandats internationaux,1927,p. 14).
Sir Frederick Lugard, who before the Commission had stressed the
inconceivability of the hypothesis of revocation, admits the possibility
of revocation without any doubt whatsoever in his fundamental book.
He does so when he is dealing with the legal situation of persons under
mandate: "the person 'protected under mandate' shares with the owner
of an estate 'un titre précaire' subjectto the contingencies of revocation,
rendition, or resignation of the mandate" (The Dual Mandate in British
Tropical Africa, 2nd ed., 1923,p. 56; 5th ed., 1965,p. 56) l.
Those writers who uphold revocability support their viewwith various
arguments adducing: the basically temporary nature of the Mandates;
the need for them to come to an end in the case of a people ripe for
independence; the sovereignty of the League of Nations; sanctions
following from a breach of duty; general principles governing mandates,
trusts and tutelage; manifestation of powers of supervision and control;
impossibility of CO-operation,and the need to protect the peoples. This
abundance of grounds does not prove the weakness of the argument, but
is the consequence of the variety of aspects of the mandate as an institu-
tion, and the possibility of envisaging various causes for termination.
It is not, legally speaking, entirely correct to Saythat the powers of the
League of Nations corresponded to the exerciseof exceptio nonadimpleti.
That is one of the characteristics of bilateral contracts. but it is also the
manifestation of a general principle. In the case of contracts, if oneparty
defaults it is open to the other, who ishonouring his own basic contractual
obligations, not only to declare the contract terminated but to claim
damages and the restitution of the thing received under the contract (an
example lies in the grant of military bases: if the treaty is terminated for
breach onthe part of the grantee State, that Statemust make restitution).
But there are other relationships which feature an especially stringent
breach of the conditions of the grant so serious as to show the basic unfitness of the
système des mandatsstecoloniaux",tRevue de droit international et de législation
comparée,1920,pp. 352 f.)
Rappard, having observed before the Permanent Mandates Commission that
the revocability of mandates was in conformity with general principles, added: "To
state that, however unworthy in theory a mandatory Power might be, its misdeed
could never in any conceivable circumstances lead to revocation, would be to
weaken, before public opinion, that sentiment which gives its special value to the
institution of which we are the recognized defenders" (Minutes ofixth Session,
1925, p.157;cited in Z.C.J. Pleadings, International Status of South-West Africa,
p. 230, note 3).power to putan end tothe contractual bond and claim restitution. In the
case of mandates, tutelage and trusts, a particular power to put an end
to the situation is vested in one party or in an authority. The party
granting powers to administer in his name or on his behalf may withdraw
them (and must withdraw them if conferred for the discharge of his own
duties to a third party) inthe eventthat their recipientils to discharge the
obligations assumed, expresses unwillingness to discharge them or denies
their existence. The particular legal nature of international mandates is
such that these considerations must be taken into account.
It does seem that in the drafting of Article 22 an effort was made to
lay stress on the fundamental purposes of the mandate. The terms
employed-mandate, trust, tutelage-evidence each in their own way
the common character of the committal of a trust (fidesfacta) protective
functions exercisedfor the international organizationand on its behalf by
the mandatory. The latter is bound by the mandate, like the organization,
with power of of3ciurn.It is for this reason, it would seem, that the term
"tute1age" was chosen. One of the expressions to be found in paragraph 1
of Article 22 is practically the same as the standard definition of tutelage
(quipropter aetatem suam sponte se defendere nequit; Digest, 26, 1,1,pr.).
This accords also with the nature of a trust, which mandates are also
regarded as having. A guardian under the Common-Law system is inthe
position of a trustee ("the relation of guardian and ward is strictly that
of trustee and cestui que trust"). As these legal concepts essentially
contemplate the protection of persons (in this case, who cannot
govern themselves,the necessaryconsequence isthe exerciseof supervision
over the penon entrusted with guardianship, "supervision of the guard-
ian", and in case of serious breaches of his duties($desfracta) the loss or
forfeiture of guardianship.
It willthus be observed that in view of the wording of Article 22 and
the terms used therein there was no need to mention revocation of the
mandates. The essential nature of this concept implies, clearly and
evidently, the possibility of putting an end to the mandate, and even the
duty laid upon the organization to do so in the case of serious breaches of
obligations on the part of the mandatory. A mandate which could not be
revoked in such a case would not be a mandate, but a cession of territory
or a disguised annexation.
It is difficultto believe that, on the one hand, the working of the man-
dates system was organized to include a Permanent Commission to
control the mandatory's administration and that, on the other hand, the
mandatory was left free to do what he thought fit, even if it were to run
counter to the very nature of the mandate, that one should put him in
possession of the territory without any obligation on his part (sub hac
corzditione:si volanz,nulla,fit obligatio; Digest,44, 7, 8). It would really
be too much if the mandatory were permitted to do what he wished, to
commit, on behalf of the organization, acts contrary to the purposes of NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 215
Article22. Any interpretation which denied the possibility of putting an
end to the mandate in the case of flagrant violation by a mandatory of its
obligations would reduce Article 22 to a j7atus vocis, or rather to a
"damnable mockery", by giving somecolour of legality to the annexation
of mandated territories.
These considerations explain why the communis opinio is favourable
to the power of revocation. At the Cambridge session of the Institut de
droitinternational (July 1931),aresolution was adopted on "International
Mandates". Article VI1 reads: "The functions of the mandatory State
come to an end on the resignation or removal (révocation) of the man-
datory ..." The removal of the mandatory State and the abrogation of
themandate are to be decided on by the Council of the League of Nations;
such abrogation may also result from admission of the entity under
mandate as a Member of the League of Nations. The word révocation
was included by a vote of 27 to 15 (Annuaire de l'Institut, 1931,Vol. II,
p. 60: for the text of the resolution see ibid., pp. 233 f.). The objections
raised against this expression fa11into different categories. Wehberg
thought that the League could unilaterally withdraw a niandate, even in
the absence of serious fault by the mandatory, since the League had
sovereignty over the territory. Verdross stressed that termination of the
mandate should be based on the principles of law which permit of
forfeiture for non-observation of obligations. Gide1quoted the exceptio
non adimpleti contractus. But the Rapporteur, Rolin, defended the term
révocationby saying that it was of the essence of control to involve
adequate sanctions: "by agreeing to administer a territory under the
control of the League of Nations, the mandatory State had implicitly
accepted the sanction of revocation of its trust" (for the discussion see
ibid.,pp. 54-59).
It has been pointed out that the function of the Institut is only de Iege
ferenda, and that consequently one cannot seek support from this
quarter for interpretationof Article 22 of the Covenant. This argument
seemsto overlook that, onthe finalvote on this occasion, severalmembers
abstained and explained their abstention by saying that the resolution
related to the interpretation of the Covenant (thus James Brown Scott,
Huber, Fischer Williams, and probably Diéna:ibid., pp. 66 f.).
More recently, since the dissolution of the League of Nations, inde-
pendent writers have argued for the temporary nature of mandates and
the possibility of their revocation (Crawford, "South West Africa:
Mandate Termination in Historical Perspective", The Columbia Journal
of International Law, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1967, pp. 95, 100, 107, 109, 119;
Dugard, "The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa",
American Journal of International Law, in toto and particularly pp. 85 ff.).
It has been argued that the silence of the Charter on the possibility
lThere were 18 abstentions, 38 votes for and none against the resolution.
203 of revoking trusteeships is conclusive in the sense that it establishes the
irrevocability thereof. This therefore, the argument continues, is an
additional argument in favour of the irrevocability of mandates, in view
of the analogy between the two concepts. But the lack of any provision
for revocation of trusteeshipsdoes not mean that such is excluded; on the
contrary, the purpose of the institution would appear to require the
possibility of revocation. An express declaration would have been neces-
sary to bring about irrevocability. The Charter does not seem to have
intended to leave the administration of territoriesunder trusteeship to the
unfettered will of the administrators, insuch a way that the Organization
would be deprived of any authority to impose sanctions for violation
of their05liga.tions. South Africa does not appear to have differed from
this view when it brushed aside al1requests by the United Nations con-
cerning the signature of a trusteeship agreement.
In a study of the question of trusteeships, it has been mentioned that by
virtue of Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and in accordance with
the procedure laid down by Article 18, paragraph 2, thereof, a trustee-
ship may be terminated for substantial violation thereof (Marston,
"Termination of Trusteeship", International and Conzparatii-e Law
Quarterly, XVIII, 1969,p. 18).
B. TheFacts Which Led to the Withdrawal of the Mandate
With reference to the considerable amount of information presented
in the written and oral statements of South Africa, an offer has been made
by the South African Government to produce evidence to refute the
accusations made against it of breaches of its duties as Mandatory. But
there is nonetheless one fact as to which South Africa does not seek to
adduce evidence, a fact which it concedes, the existence of which it
proclaims. This is its refusa1to fulfilits obligations as Mandatory towards
the organization on behalf of which it hasto carry on its administration,
and upon which depends its legal title to occupy and administer Narnibia
(South West Africa).
This contravention of the Mandate is the most serious of al1from the
formal legal point of view. In its submissions, South Africa denies the
continued existence ofthe Mandate, which it considers to have lapsed, or,
in the alternative, it claims that the essential obligations of the Mandate
have disappeared. ln this way, South Africa is preventing the United
Nations from fulfilling its "sacred trust" towards the people of Namibia.
South Africa has failed in its duties as Mandatory and it has solemnly
and repeatedly declared its decision not to fulfil thern; it has denied their
existence. The Court, for its part, has declared, in its Opinions of 1950,
1955and 1956,and in the 1962Judgment, that South Africa is subject to
the international obligations resulting from its Mandate for South West
Africa, and that the functions of the League of Nations are now exercised
by the United Nations. South Africa cannot allege that it is unaware ofthe existence of its duties, nor can litigious cavils bring to nought the
authority of the Court.
In fact, we are dealing with a case of violation of obligations, and it
can be said, as was said by Rolin in his early study of mandates, with
reference to the conditions foï revocation, that this breach indicates the
"basic unfitness of the mandatory to administer the territory in accor-
dance with the Covenant" ("Le Système desmandats coloniaux", Revue
de droit internationalet de législation comparée,20,p. 353).
Furthermore, in applying the Iaws of apartheid in South West Africa
(Namibia), South Africa is in breach of its duties as the mandatory
Power; it is not permissible to administer an entrusted territory in a
manner contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter (Art. 1,
para. 3; Art. 76(c)).
VII. REPLY TO THE REQUES FOR ADVISORO YPINION
A. Legal Consequences
It would seem that, before anything else, the scope of the question
should be clearly defined. For this purpose the terms thereof must be
considered. It has been asked what are "the legal consequences": there-
fore everything relating to economic, social, practical and political con-
sequences should be left aside. For this reason, it would seem that the
Court should not concern itself with what States are to do within the
framework of the United Nations organs in order to put an end to the
abnormal situation in Namibia and thus enable the United Nations to
discharge its duties towards the people of Namibia in accordance with
the "sacred trust" confided to it. The mention of consequences "for
States" implies that the Court will not have to examine the consequences
of resolution 276 (1970)for international organizations, not even for the
United Nations, so far as responsibility to the Namibian people is
concerned. Finally, the fact that resolution 276 (1970)is specificallycited
prompts the supposition that the Courtdoes not have to consider the legal
consequences of the other resolutions of the Security Council.
The Court's reply should, it seems, be drawn up in general terms for
the guidance of the United Nations, and should not go into details which
might give rise to confusion.
B. Consequences,forSouth Africa
The immediate and fundamental consequence is the loss of the legal
title which might, up to the present, have justified the possession of the
Territory of South West Africa by South Africa. Of course it may be
considered that, eversinceit declared that it was not bound by the obliga-
tions deriving from the Mandate, it has forfeited its position as Manda-tory. But until resolution 2145 (XXI), no solemn declaration of the cessa-
tion of the Mandate had been made, and it was conceivable to hold that
the Mandatory still had a title.
The declaration to the effect that the Mandate conferred upon His
Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by South Africa was
"terminated" (resolution 2145 (XXI)) involved the consequence that,
from that time on,the occupation of the Territory of Namibia was devoid
of any legal justification. The same resolution provides for South West
Africa to come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, so
that the presence of South Africa is somewhat in the nature of usurpation
and an occupation mala jde. These consequences have acquired execu-
tory force by virtue of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).
The immediate consequence for South Africa is that it is under obliga-
tion to withdraw its administration from the Territory of Namibia and
take al1 necessary steps to put the United Nations administration into
possession.
The Government of South Africa, as a possessor in bad faith, is
responsible to the people of Namibia forthe restitution of property, assets
and the fruits thereof.
It should not be forgotten that, as the Permanent Mandates Commis-
sion had declared, the assets transferred by Germany (railways, tram-
ways, ports, etc.) and public assets of al1 kinds (mines, bona vacantia,
non-private waterways, etc.) have remained the exclusiveproperty of the
Namibian people and, since these are assets in the public domain, there
can be no bar of limitation to their restitution.
This being the case, the South African Government is under an obliga-
tion to indemnify the people of Namibia for damage suffered.An account
should be struck in respect of the administration of the Mandatory, in
which investments made for the benefit of the Namibian people by
South Africa should be taken into consideration.
C. The Consequences,for Member States of the United Nations
The Security Council, by giving its support to resolution 2145 (XXI)
in its resolution 276 (1970),lays upon the Members of the Organization
the obligation to accept and apply what is laid down in those resolutions,
and to CO-operateto ensure the fullest possible implementation thereof.
In the present case, the acts of thz occupying authorities cannot be
considered as those of a legitimate government, but must be likened to
those of a defacto and usurping government.
A distinction must be made between the private and the public sector.
It would seem that the acts of the defacto authorities relating to the acts
and rights of private persons should be regarded as valid (validity of
entries in the civilregisters and in the Land Registry, validity of marriages,
validity of judgments of the civil courts, etc.). On the other hand, other
States should not regard as valid any acts and transactions of the autho-rities in Namibia relating to public property, concessions, etc. States will
thus not be able to exercise protection of their nationals with regard to
any acquisitions of this kind.
In the field of international relations, the duty of CO-operation of
States implies that they must refrain from al1 diplomatic, consular and
cther relations with South Africa whichmight indicate that they recognize
the authority of the South African Government over the Territory of
Namibia-and more particularly they must not have consuls, agents, etc.,
in Namibia, except for such as are of a nature appropriate to territories
whichare under defacto occupation (in the senseofresolution 283(1970)).
States should regard as ineffectiveclausesin any treaty which recognize
the authority of South Africa in the Territory of South West Africa. New
treaties with South Africa may not contain such clauses.
In treaties for avoidance of double taxation, no account may be taken
of taxes paid in Namibia. Extradition treaties may not have effect with
regard to Namibians, because they cannot be handed over to illegal
authorities, etc.
D. Consequencesfor States not Members of the UnitedNations
These States have no obligaiions under the Charter Nonetheless they
should respect a declaration of the forfeiture of the legal ti~leto possess
the Territory, pronounced by a legitimate authority, against a State which
received the territory inorder to administer it in the name of the inter-
national 0rgan;zation. Such declaration should, it appears, be respected
in the same way as that of an owner of property who withdraws the
mandate given by him to administer his property.
(Signed) F. DE CASTRO.
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. DE CASTRO
Tout en acceptant pleinement le dispositif de l'avis et les motifs sur
lesquels il est fondé,je me permets d'utiliser la faculté accordéepar
l'article 57 du Statut pour exposer plus en détail les raisons juridiques
qui ont déterminémon vote.
A. La requête porte-t-ellesur une question juridique?
L'article 65 du Statut dit: (1La Cour peut donner un avis consultatif
sur toute question juridique ». En conséquence, la Cour ne peut donner
un avis sur une question non juridique et doit le refuser sur une question
purement politique.
En revanche, la Cour ne peut pas se refuser à donner un avis d'une
manière arbitraire; elle peut seulement le faire (1si les circonstances de
l'espècesont telles qu'elles doivent la déterminer à ne pas répondre à
une demande d'avis ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 72). Il convient de rappeler
que, quand la Cour reçoit une demande d'avis, sa réponse ((constitue
une participation de la Cour, elle-même (organe des Nations Unies)),
à l'action de l'Organisation et, en principe, elle ne devrait pas être
refusée ))(ibid., p. 71).
Le refus de rendre un avis est admissible seulement si la question posée
à la Cour est essentiellement politique ou non juridique, car ce qui est
décisif, semble-t-il, c'est l'élément positd ife juridicité etnm l'élément
négatif constitué par les motivations politiques. Il est difficile que les
demandes d'avis de l'Assemblée générale ou du Conseil de sécurité,
étant donnéle caractère de ces organes des Nations Unies, ne touchent
pas à des questions d'ordre politique, et cela ((par la nature des choses ))
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 155).
La requêtepour avis consultatif (résolution284 du Conseil de sécurité
en date du 29juillet 1970)soumet à la Cour la question des conséquences
juridiques pour les Etats de la présencecontinue de l'Afrique du Sud en
Namibie nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité.
On est donc devant une question de nature purement juridique et la Cour
n'a pas à tenir compte de ses motivations politiques possibles (C.I.J.
Recueil 1947-1948, p. 61). Il est vrai que la question posée concerneun cas SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE CASTRO
[Translation]
While 1fully concur in the operative part of the Advisory Opinion and
in the reasoning upon which it is based,1venture to exercise the faculty
conferred by Article 57 of the Statute in order to set forth in greater
detail the legal reasons which decided my vote.
A. Does the Request for an Opinion Relate to a Legal Question?
Article 65 of the Statute states that "the Court may give an advisory
opinion on any Eegalquestion. . .".Consequently, the Court may not
give an opinion on a non-legal question, and should decline to give one
on a purely political question.
On the other hand, the Court cannot arbitrarily refuse to give an opin-
ion; itcan only do so if "the circumstances of the case are of such a
character as should lead it to decline to answer the Request" (I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 72). It should be borne in mind that when the Court is
requested to givean opinion "the reply ofthe Court, itself an 'organof the
United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the-
ization, and, in principle, should not be refused"(ibid p..,1).
Refusal to give an opinion is admissible only if the question addressed
to the Court is essentially political or non-legal, for it would seem that
the determining factor is the positive one of "legal-ness", and not the
negative one of political motivation. It would be difficult for requests
emanating from the General Assembly or the Security Council, in view
of the nature of those organs of the United Nations, not to relate to
political questions: thats "in the nature of things" (I.C.JReports 1962,
p. 155).
The present request for an advisory opinion (Security Council resolu-
tion 284 of 29 July 1970)!ays before the Court the question of the legal
consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). The
Court is thus faced with a question of a purely legal nature and does not
have to take into account the possible underlying political motivations
(I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 61). It is true that the question put relatesparticulier mais on ne doit pas oublier que l'Assembléegénéraleou le
Conseil de sécuritépeut demanderun avis (surtoute questionjuridique »,
c'est-à-dire aussisur des cas qui touchent les intérêtsd7Etats déterminés
ou certaines situations concrètes.(Il en a été aini on seulement dans les
trois avis sur le Sud-Ouest africain, mais aussi dans les avis concernant
l'Interprétation detsraitésdepaix, l'Effetdejugements duTribunaladminis-
tratif des Nations Unies'accordant indemnité, la Composition du Comité
de sécurité maritime de l'organisation intergouvernementale consultative
de la navigationmaritime et mêmeles Réserves à la conventionpour lapré-
ventionet la répressiondu crime de génocide.)
Que la question porte sur les conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats
ne prive pas la demande de son caractèrejuridique et de son intérêp tour
les Nations Unies. Elle fait référenceà la conduite qu'on peut espéreren
droit des Etats, ou que le Conseil peut le cas échéantexiger.
B. Y a-t-il un dzfférendentre Etats?
a) Juridictionde la Cour
1. On a niéla compétence dela Cour parce qu'il y avait un différend
entre Etats, et affirmé l'existence d'unequestion préliminaire.
A ce propos il est peut-êtreutile de rappeler quelques notions élémen-
taires.
La Cour est icidevant deux interrogations -préliminaire sur sa compé-
tence, préalablesur la procédure à suivre - qui ont un point comm.un,
l'existence ou inexistence d'un différend ou d'une question juridique
pendante entre Etats. Aucune des deux ne se pose s'il n'y apas de
différend oude question pendante.
2. Dans l'affaire du Statut de la Carélie orientale (C.P.J.Z. séieno 5,
p. 29), la Cour permanente de Justice internationale s'est déclaréein-
compétente, l'affaire ayant pour objet un différendentre Etats, ce qui
est le propre d'une procédurecontentieuse.
La décisionde la Cour s'expliquepar les circonstances bien connues de
l'espèce.
La Cour s'esttrouvée devantune difficultéinsurmontable. Pour donner
son opinion, elle avait besoin de connaître la véritédes faits contestés,
ce qui n'étaitpas possible en l'absence de l'une desparties.
Une autre difficulté,de caractère général, résidaid tans les règlesde
procédureen vigueur à l'époque. Ala date de l'avis (23juillet 1923),le
Règlement de la Cour n'offrait pas aux Etats de garanties suffisantes
quand un avis étaitrequis sur un différend néentre deux ou plusieurs
Etats. Ce n'est que par la revision de l'article 71 du Règlementen 1927et
l'adjonction d'un deuxièmealinéa à cette disposition que la désignation NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTKO) 171
to a particular issue, but it must not be forgotten that the General As-
sembly and the Security Council can request an opinion "on any legal
question", including therefore matters which concern the interests of
particular States or certain concrete situations. (This was so in the case
not only of the three Opinions relating to South West Africa, but also of
the Opinions relating to interpretation of Peace Treaties, Effecof Awards
of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governrnentcl
Maritime ConsuldativeOrganization, and even that relating toReservations
to the Convention orz the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.)
The fact that the subject-matter of the question is the legal conse-
quences for States doec not deprive the request of its legal nature or make
it any less the business of the United Nations. It relates to the conduct
which may be expected of States in law, or which the Security Council
may if need be require.
B. Does the Question -Pelate to a Dispute Between States?
(a)The Jurisdiction of the Court
1. The competence of the Court hss been denied because of the alleged
existence of a dispute between States, and it has been asserted that a
preliminary question exists.
In this connection it may be as wellto recall a few elementary notions.
The Court is here confronted with two problems-a preliminary one
as to its competence and another, in limine,concerning the procedure to
be followed-which have a point in common: the existence or non-
existence of a dispute or legal question pending between States. Neither-
arises if there is ndispute or pending question.
2. In its Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia (P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 5, p. 29) the Permanent Court of International Justice
declared itself incompetent, ai the question put to it concerned a dispute
between States, this being properly a matter for contentious proceedings.
TFis decision car be explained by the circumstances of the case, which
are weil known.
The Court .vas faced with an insuperable difficulty. To give its opinion
it needed to know the truth about the facts contested, which was not
possible in the absence of one of the parties.
Another difficulty, of a general nature, lay in theules of procedure in
force at the time. On the date of the Advisory Opinion (23 July 1923)
the Rules of Court did not offer States adequate safeguards in the event
of a request for an advisory opinion on an existing dispute between two
or more States. It was not until a paragraph had been added in 1927
to what was then Article 71 of the Rules that the appointment of judges dejuges ad hoca été admise lorsquel'avisétait demandésur une question
relative à un différend né entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. C'est seulement
en 1929,lors de la revision du Statut, qu'un nouveau pas a étéfranchi
avec l'adoption del'article 68, encore en vigueur aujourd'hui, permettant
à la Cour de s'inspirer des dispositions du Statut qui s'appliquent en
matière contentieuse.
Avec ces règless'est ouverte la voie des avis donnésen matière quasi
contentieuse. En effet, après I'avis sur le Statut de la Carélie orientale,
plusieurs autres ont été renduspar la Cour permanente sur des questions
juridiques pendantes entre Etats l.
L'abandon du précédent constitué par I'avissur le Statut de la Carélie
orientales'est trouvé confirmé avecla nouvelle Cour, et cela pour une
double raison.
D'une part, la situation constitutionnelle ou organique de la Cour a
changé. LaCour permanente ne faisait pas techniquement partie de la
Sociétédes Nations. La Cour internationale de Justice est à la fois une
création dela Charte etun organe des Nations Unies (art. 92de la Charte;
art. 1" du Statut) " La Cour a le devoir de coopéreravec l'Assembléeetle
Conseil de sécurité,comme organes de la mêmeorganisation.
(11en résultequ'aucun Etat, Membre ou non membre des Nations
Unies, n'aqualitépour empêcherque soit donnésuite à une demande
d'avisdont lesNations Unies, pour s'éclairerdans leur actionpropre,
auraient reconnu l'opportunité. ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 71.)
Comme dans l'affairede l'Interprétationdes traitédsepaix, la Cour peut
dire: (Dans le cas actuel, la Cour se trouve en présenced'une demande
d'avisqui ne tend pas à autre chose qu'à éclairer» un organe des Nations
Unies (ibid., p. 72). C'estdonc aussi parce que, la réponse n'ayantqu'un
caractère consultatif, sa force est bien différentede celle d'un arrêt-qui
met fin à un procès contentieux que le précédent de1923a étéécarté
(C.Z.J.Recueil 1950,p. 71).
D'autre part et surtout, on peut considérer commepériméela doctrine
énoncée dans I'avissur leStatut de la Carélieorientaleen raison du libellé
des articles 82et 83 du Règlementde la Cour. La Cour doit rechercher si
la demande d'avis a trait ou non à une question juridique actuellement
pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats (art. 82); elle doit le faire, non
pour déclarer son incompétence,mais pour tenir compte de cet élément
l Voir Hudson, ThePermanent Court of lnternational Justice, 1920-19p.496.
Sur ces questions, voir l'excellent exposé dureprésentant duRoyaume-Uni,
2 mars 1950, C.Z.J. Mémoires, Interprétation des traités de paix, p. 305-306. Voir
aussi l'exposédu représentantdes Etats-Unis, ibid., p. 276; il signale le nouveau
membre de phrase introduit dansle texte du Statut de la Cour internationale de
Justice (((ainsiqu'Atous les cas spécialementprévusdans la Charter). ad hoc was permitted when an advisory opinion had been sought on a
question relating to an existing dispute between two or more States. And
only in 1929,when the Statute was amended, was the further step taken
of adopting Article 68, still in force, whereby the Court may in advisory
proceedings be guided by the provisions of the Statute which apply in
contentious cases.
These rules opened the waytothe givingof advisory opinions on quasi-
contentious matters. After the Opinion on the Status of EasternCarelia,
the Permanent Court did indeed give several on legal questions pending
between States l.
The abandonment of the precedent comprised in the Opinion on the
Status of EasternCareliahas been confirmed by the International Court
of Justice, for two reasons:
In the first place, the constitutional or organic position of the Court
has changed. Technicallyspeaking, the Permanent Court was not a part
of the League of Nations. But the International Court of Justice is both
a creation of the Charter and an organ of the United Nations (Art. 92 of
the Charter; Art. 1of the Statute) 2.The Court hasthe duty to CO-operate
with the General Assembly and the Security Council, as organs of the
sarne Organization :
"It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United
Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion
which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to
obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take."
(I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 71 .)
As in Znterpretationof Peace Treaties, the Court can now say: "In the
present case the Court is dealing with a Request for an Opinion, the sole
object of which is to enlighten [an organ of the United Nations] (ibid.,
p. 72.) Hence it is also because the Court's decision, being of a purely
advisory nature, has a very different force from that of a judgment
disposing of a contentious case that the 1923 precedent has been dis-
regarded (ibid., p. 71).
Above all, the doctrine of the Advisory Opinion on the Status of
Eastern Carelia can be considered as outworn in view of the terms of
Articles 82 and 83 of the Rules of Court. The Court has to consider
whether the request for advisory opinion relatesto alegalquestion actually
pending between two or more States (Art. 82),and this it has to do, not in
case it should declare its lack of jurisdiction, but in order to take that
See Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1942), p. 496.
behalf of the British Governrnent on March 1950 (I.C.J. Pleadings, Interpretation
ofPeace Treaties, pp. 305 f.). See also the staternent on behalf of the United States,
in which attention israwn to the new phrase inserted in the Statute of the Inter-
national Court: "and al1rnatters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations" (ibid., p. 276). 173 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND. DE CASTRO)
dans la procédure à suivre et dans l'application des règlessur lesjuges
adhoc (art. 83). On ne peut donc indiquer plus clairement que la Cour a
compétence en ce qui concerne une demande d'avis ayant trait une à
question actuellement pendante entre Etats (You couldhardly have it put
more strongly than that, exposédu représentant du Royaume-Uni men-
tionnéci-dessus, loc. cit., p. 308).
On comprend bien les soucis des défenseursacharnés de l'intangibilité
dela souveraineté desEtats, en face de l'abandon de la doctrine énoncée
dans l'avis sur le Statut de la Carélieorientale. Mais comme le juge
Azevedo le reconnaît dans une opinion individuelle, le Règlement en
vigueur impose cette solution et c'est pourquoi il demande l'abrogation
des articles 82et 83 du Règlement (C.I.J.Recueil 1950,p. 86et 87).
3. La Cour peut (may) donner un avis (art. 65 du Statut); donc elle
peut ne pas le donner. Mais, comme organe des Nations Unies (art. 92 de
la Charte),,elle doit coIlaborer avec les autres orga"es des Nations
Unies. Dans quelle hypothèsela Cour n'a-t-elle pascompétencepour don-
ner un avis?Il semble que cesoit dans lecas d'une question ne méritant pas
la qualification de((question juridique».
Le Conseil de sécuritérequiert un avis, parce qu'il ((serait utile au
Conseil de sécuritépour continuer àexaminer la question de Namibie et
pour la réalisationdes objectifs recherchéspar le Conseil» (résolution284
(1970)). La Cour, comme organe judiciaire des Nations Unies, ne doit
donc pas refuser cette collaboration.
4. La situation de la Cour, en tant qu'organe judiciaire principal des
Nations Unies, a pu entraîner des confusions et amener à croire que
toutes ses fonctions sont d'ordre purement juridictionnel ou contentieux.
Mais, dans la procédure consultative, même relative à des questions
pendantesentreEtats, il n'ya pas departies -il ya des Etats ou organisa-
tions qui informent la Cour, par des communications écriteset orales (art.
66du Statut). De plus, lesavisn'ont pas force obligatoire pour lesorganes
ou organisations qui les demandent, ni pour les Etats et organisations
qui informent la Cour.
Un organepeut avoir des fonctions de nature différente,consultative et
contentieuse; c'est le cas par exemple d'un conseil d'Etat, d'une cour
arbitrale ou d'un tribunal.
La Cour garde en tout cas la haute dignitéqu'elle tient de sa consti-
tution et de son indépendance,et son autoriténe peutjamais être compa-
rée à celle d'un consultant ou conseiller juridique; elle doit rester fidèle
à son caractèrejudiciaire.
L'autoritédes avis n'est pas moindre que celle des arrêts.Il y a certes
une différence,qui tient àla visrejudicata des arrêts,mais elleest limitée
aux parties au litige(visrelativa,art. 59du Statut).
Au contraire, les motifs des arrêts(art. 56 du Statut), comme ceux des
avis, sont considérés dicta prudenfiurn, et leur force comme source dufactorinto account in the procedure to be followed and with respect to the
applicability of therules concerning judges ad hoc (Art. 83). There could
thus be no clearer indication that the Court is competent to deal with
a request for advisory opinion relating to a question actually pending
betweenStates ("You could hardly have put it more strongly than that"-
statement on behalf of the British Government, I.C.J. Pleadings,
Interprefation of Peace Treaties, p. 308).
It is easy to comprehend the concern felt by zealous defenders of un-
touchable State sovereignty at the abandonment of the doctrine enun-
ciated in the Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia.
But, as Judge Azevedo recognized in a separate opinion, the present
Rules in force admit of no other solution, which is why he asked for the
abrogation of Articles 82 and 83 (I.C.J. Reports 1950,pp. 86f.).
3. The Court may give an opinion (Statute, Art. 65), therefore it rnay
decline to give one. But, as an organ of the United Nations (Charter,
Art. 92), it has a duty to collaborate with the other organs of the United
Nations. In what circumstances is the Court incompetent to give an
opinion? It would seem that it is in the case of a question not nleriting
the description of "legal question".
The Sec~rity Council has requested an opinion because it "would be
useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question
of Namibia and in furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking"
(resolution 284 (1970)). The Court, as a judicial organ of the United
Nations, should therefore not refuse its collaboration.
4. The position of the Court, as the principal .judicial organ of the
United Nations, may have led to misunderstandina and given rise to the
beliefthat al1its functions are of a purelyjudicative cr contentious nature.
But in advisory proceedings, even when they relate to questions pending
between States, there are no 'parties-there are States or organizations
which provide the Court with information, by means of written or oral
communications (Statute, Art. 66). Moreover, advisory opinions are not
endowed with binding force, either for the requesting organ or organiza-
tion, orfor the States and organizations which pr~vide information.
An organ may have functions of different kinds, both advisory and
contentious; such, for example, is the case of a Council of State, a court
of arhitration or a tribunal.
But in ail circumstances the Court retains the elevated dignity deriving
from its constitutionai status and independence, and its authority may
never be compared to that of a legalconsultant or advisor; it must remain
faithfuI to itsjudicial character.
Its advisory opinions do not carry less authority than its judgments.
There is, to be sure, a Jifference, stemming from the visrejudicata of the
judgments, but this is lirnited to the parties to the dispute (vis relativa:
Statute, Art. 59j.
On the other hand, the reasons on whichjudgments are based (Statute,
Art. 56) are considered to constitute dictapruderztium,and their force as a174 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () PIND. DE CASTRO)
droit (art. 38 du Statut) dérivenon d'un pouvoir hiérarchique (tantum
valetauctoritas quantumvaletratio), mais de la valeur des raisonnements
(non ratione imperii, sed rationis imperio).
La différenceessentielleentre arrêts etavis résidedans la force obliga-
toire des premiers (art. 94 de la Charte) et c'est cause d'elle qu'on a
établi le caractère volontaire de la juridiction de la Cour (art. 36 du
Statut)et limitél'effetdes arrêts auxparties et aux casparticuliers décidés
(art. 59 du Statut). Mais, comme les motifs d'un arrêt,le raisonnement et
le dispositif d'un avis ont ou peuvent avoir une autoritégénérale, même
envers des Etats qui n'ont pas participé I'affaire,de sorte que les uns et
les autres peuvent contribuer à la création denouvelles règlesdu droit
international (art. 38 d) du Statut).
Pour ces raisons le caractère volontaire dela juridiction nejoue pas en
ce qui concerne les avis consultatifs.
5. S'agissant d'une demande d'avis, y a-t-il un différend ou une
questionjuridique pendante entre Etats?
Il importe de répondre àcette interrogation, pour pouvoir répondre à
d'autres questions.
a) S'iln'y a pas de question pendante, tout doute sur la compétencede
la Cour, sur la base de I'affairedu Statut de la Carélie orientaest
dissipé.
b) L'existenceou inexistence d'une question pendante entre Etats doit
êtreconsidéréeavant tout, pour que, dans l'affirmative, on déter-
mine les règlesde la procédure contentieuse applicableset spéciale-
ment celles qui pourvoient à l'application de l'article 31 du Statut.
II y a en effet une relation très étroite entre la tâche de la Cour qui
consiste à déterminer la nature de la question poséedans la demande
d'avis et la tâche qui consiste se prononcer sur une demande de nomil
nation de juge ad hoc.
On ne peut certainement pas prendre une décisionsur l'application de
l'article 31 avant de préciser s'il y a ou non une question juridique
pendante entre Etats. C'est ce qu'exigent la lettre de l'article 82 du
Règlementet le bon sens. La situation des juges soumis à une condition
résolutoire seraitsurprenante.
6. Pour qu'il y ait un différend ouune question juridique entre Etats,
de telle sorte que la Cour déclare son incompétence(art. 65 du Statut,
doctrine énoncéedans I'affairedu Statut de la Carélieorientale)ou bien
applique par analogie les dispositions concernant la procédure conten-
tieuse (art. 82 et 83 du Règlement; art. 68 du Statut), il faut que la
question ou le différend puissepar nature relever du contentieux, qu'il
soit apteà tomber sous la juridiction de la Cour, qu'on puisse lui appli-
quer le chapitre II du Statut et qu'il puisseêtretranchépar un arrêt. source of law (Statute, Art. 38) derives not from any hierarchic power
(tantum valet auctoritas quantum valet ratio) but from the validity of the
reasoning (non ratione imperio, sed rafionis imperio).
Theessentialdifferencesbetweenjudgments and advisoryopinions liesin
the binding force oftheformer (Charter, Art. 94)andit is on that account
that the Court'sjurisdiction was established on a voluntary basis (Statute,
Art. 36) and the effect ofjudgments limited to the parties and the parti-
cular case (Statute, Art. 59). However, like the reasons on which a judg-
ment is based, the reasoning and operative part of an advisory opinion
are, at least potentially, clothed with a general authority, even vis-à-vis
States which have not participated in the proceedings, and may therefore
contribute to the formation of new rules of international law (Statute,
Art. 38, para. 1 (d)).
For these reasons, the voluntary nature of the Court's jurisdiction does
not operate where advisory opinions are concerned.
5. A request having been made for an advisory opinion, does it relate
to a dispute or legal question pending between States?
It is important to settle this point, in order to be in a position to settle
others.
(a) If there is no question pending, al1doubt as to the Court's compe-
tence on the basis of the Status of Eastern Carelia case is removed.
(b) The existenceor non-existence of a question pending between States
has to be considered first and foremost in order that, in the affirma-
tive, it may be possible to determine the rules of contentious proce-
dure applicable, and more particularly those providing for the
application of Article 3 1 of the Statute.
For there is a very close relation between the Court's task of deter-
mining the nature of the question put by the request for advisory opinion,
and the task of deciding whether any request for the appointment of a
judge ad hoc shall be granted.
Itis evident that no decision as to the applicability of Article 31 of the
Statute can be taken before it has been ascertainedwhether the request for
an opinion relates to a legal question pending between States. That is
what the letter ofArticle 82ofthe Rules requires, and also common sense :
it would be most incongruous for the position of any judge to be subject
to a built-in risk of invalidation.
6. For there to exist a dispute or legal question between States with the
effect of causing the Court either to declare itself incompetent (Statute,
Art. 65; Status of Eastern Carelia doctrine) or to apply by analogy the
provisions which apply to contentious proceedings (Rules, Arts. 82 and
83; Statute, Art. 68), the question or dispute must be of a potentially
contentious nature and inherently amenable to the Court's jurisdiction,
so that it could have Chapter II of the Statute applied to itand be decided
by ajudgment.b) Procédure à suivre
La Cour recherche avant tout si la demande d'avis a trait ou non à
une question juridique actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs
Etats (art. 82 du Règlement)pour déterminerla procédure à suivre (art.
83du Règlement;art. 68 du Statut).
Pour qu'il existe une question juridique pendante entre Etats comme
pour qu'un différendsoitpendant, il faut une identité entre l'objet de la
question et l'objet de la demande d'avis; ilfaut des Etats qui aient la
qualitéde parties, et ilfaut que la question soit actuellement pendante.
1. L'Afrique du Sud a défini de plusieurs manières l'objet de la
question pendante. Il s'agit, a-t-on dit, de ce sur quoi les arrêtsde 1962et
1966 ont porté (question de l'apartheid et existence de normes et stan-
dards le condamnant). On a dit aussi que, pour répondre à la demande
d'avis,la Cour doit se prononcer sur la validitéet sur l'interprétationdes
résolutions, à propos desquelles l'Afrique du Sud et d'autres Etats ont
des opinions divergentes. Enfin, on a signalé l'existenced'un différend
sur l'adhésion de l'Afriquedu Sud à la convention internationale des
télécommunicationsadoptée à Montreux en 1965.
Il faut faire un effort d'imagination pour voir quelque ressemblance
entre ces questions et celle qui est l'objet de la demande d'avis et qui
a trait seulement aux conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats de la résolu-
tion 276 (1970)du Conseil de sécurité.
2. Les observations de l'Afrique du Sud trouvent un autre obstacle
juridique dans l'indéterminationdes autres Etats et lefait qu'ilsn'ont pas
qualitéde parties.
Entre l'Afrique du Sud et qui une question est-ellependante? Selon les
occasion9, ce sera le Libéria et l'Ethiopie, l'organisation de l'unité
africaine, les Etats qui ont votéen faveur des résolutions, les Nations
Unies.
Comment expliquer l'existenced'une question de nature quasi conten-
tieuse,à laquelle l'article 83 du Règlement puisse s'appliquer? Comment
expliquer que ces Etats ou organisations aient la qualité de partiesoppo-
sées àl'Afrique du Sud? Dans ses observations, l'Afrique du Sud a tâché
de le faireen invoquant la doctrine de l'arrêtde 1962 sur les affaires du
Sud-Ouest africain (discussions et négociationsaux Nations Unies), mais
on doit noter que la qualité de1'Ethiopieet du Eibéria est fondée sur la
règle spécialede l'article 7 du mandat, et que cette clausejuridictionnelle
jouait en faveur des Membres de la Société des Nations. On doit surtout
tenir compte de la doctrine de l'arrêt de1966 relatif aux affaires du
Sud-Ouestafricain. Pour êtrepartie à un différend,chaque Etat doit avoir
un droit ou intérêjturidique quantà l'objet dela demande, «cequidiffère
d'un intérêt politique))(C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 22). Dans l'opinion
individuelle de M. Morelli, il est précisé:((Par qualitéon n'entend pas
autre chose ..que l'appartenance à un sujet plutôt qu'à un autre sujet
du droit substantiel invoquédans le procès »(ibid.,p. 65). (b) Procedure to Be Followed
The Court "shall above al1consider whether the request for the advi-
sory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two
or more States" (Rules, Art. 82)in order to determine the procedure to be
followed (Rules, Art. 83; Statute, Art. 68).
For the request to relate to a legal question pending between States, or
to a pending dispute, there must be identity of subject-matter between the
question and the request for opinion; there must be States in the position
of parties, and the question must be actually pending.
1. South Africa has defined the subject-matter of the question pending
inseveralways.It has been said that it is that to which the judgments of
1962and 1966 weredirected (question of apartheid, and the existence of
norms and standards whereby that policy would stand condemned). It
has also been said that in order to reply to the request for advisory
opinion the Court must pronounce on the validity and interpretation
of these resolutions concerning which there is a divergence of views
between South Africa and other States. Finaily it has been pointed out
that there exists a dispute as to South Africa's accessionto the Interna-
tional Convention on Telecommunications adopted at Montreux in 1965.
A certain effort of the imagination is necessary to see any resemblance
between these questions and that which is the subject of the request for
advisory opinion, which relates only to the legal consequences for States
of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).
2. A further Iegal obstacle to the contentions of South Africa lies in
the difficultyof particularizing the other States and the fact that they are
not in the position of parties.
Between South Africa and whom is a question pending? The answer
runs, according to the occasion: Liberia and Ethiopia, the Organization
of AfricanUnity, the States which voted in favour of certain resolutions,
or the United Nations.
How can it be argued that tkre is here a question of a quasi-conten-
tious nature, to which Article 83 of the Rules could apply? How can it be
argued that these States or Organizations are in the position of opposing
parties with regard to South Africa? In its observations South Africa
endeavoured to do so by relying on the doctrine of the 1962Judgment in
the South West Africa cases (discussions and negotiations in the United
Nations), but it should be observed that the standing of Ethiopia and
Liberia as parties was based upon the special provision ofArticle 7 of the
Mandate, and that this jurisdictional clause operated in favour ofMem-
bers of the League of Nations. Above ail, the doctrine of the 1966Judg-
ment in the South West Africa casesshouid be taken into account. To be a
party to a dispute, each State must have a legal right or interest in the
subject-matter of the daim "which is a different thing from a political
interest" (Z.C. Reports 1966, p. 22). In the separate opinion of Judge
Morelli it is explained that:". ..standing. ..means the possession by
one person rather than another of the substantive rig-t relied on in the
proceedings" (ibid., p. 65). Comme on voit, il n'ya pas d'autre Etat ayant la situationjuridique de
partie, avec lequell'Afrique du Sud ait une question juridique pendante
au sensde l'article2du Règlement.
D'autre part, on ne peut pas concevoir qu'ilpuisse exister unequestion
ou un différendentre les Etats qui ont votéune résolution etun Etat qui
nie sa validité. Endroit public et privé, unerésolutionadoptée par la
majorité des membres d'une organisation est considérée comme une
résolution de cette organisation, et si un membre désirecontester sa
validité,il doit s'adresser à l'organisation, et ne peut pas, à cet effet,
s'adresser aux autres membres. Dans cette affaire, s'il y a une question
pendante, ce sera entre l'Afriquedu Sud etlesNations Unies - autrement
dit, il n'existera pas de question entre Etats.
Une divergenced'opinions entre Etats aux Nations Unies, une division
d'opinions ou une opposition entre majorité et minorité,ne constituent
donc pas un différendou une questionjuridique pendante entre Etats, au
sens des articles82 et 83 du Règlement. Lesorganes des Nations Unies
demandent des avis quand il y a diversitéd'opinions et la fonction princi-
pale des avis est d'éclairerles questions discutées,de dissiper des doutes
soulevéspar l'opposition d'une minorité l.
Une divergenceentre un Etat et l'Organisation desNations Unies n'est
pas un différendouune questionjuridique entreEtats, seuleconsidérée par
les textesjuridiques applicables(art.34du Statut; art. 82et 83du Règle-
ment).
3. La qualification de ((pendante »appliquée à une question exige que
laquestion déjà existantesoitla même que la question objet de la demande
d'avis-identité nécessairequi ferait que, sila question avait ététranchée
par un arrêt, on pourrait opposer à une nouvelle demande I'exceptiores
judicata.
Les questions entre 1'Ethiopieet le Libériad'une part et l'Afrique.du
Sud de l'autre sont-elles identiques à celle que pose la demande d'avis?
Pour qu'une telleidentitéexiste,ilfaudrait identité dela chose demandée,
même cause, mêmp earties agissant en la mêmequalité (art. 1351 du
codecivilfrançais), c'est-à-dire, selonla formule classiqueeadempersona,
eadem res, eadem causa petendi.
Dans les affaires contentieuses relatives au Sud-Ouest africain, les
Parties opposées àl'Afrique du Sud étaientdeux Etats, anciens membres
dela Société deN s ations, agissant en application de l'articleu mandat,
en raison de l'infraction aux obligations de ce mandat que constitue
l'introduction de l'apartheiddans le Sud-Ouest africain.
La requêtepour avisprovient du Conseilde sécurité, comme organe de
l Ilen a étéainsi dans l'affaire Certaines dépenses des Nations Unies (C.Z.J.
Recueil 1962); la Cour a donnéson avis sur unequestion âprementdiscutéeau sein
de t'organisation, As will be apparent, there is no other State in the legal position of a
Party, as between which State and South Africa there might be a legal
question pending within the meaning of Article 82 of the Rules of Court.
Again, it is inconceivable,that there could be a question or dispute
between those States which have voted for a resolution and a State which
denies validity thereof. In public and in private law, a resolution adopted
by the majority of the members of an organization is regarded as a reso-
lution of the organization, and if a member seeksto dispute its validity, it
is the organization that he must approach, and he cannot approach the
other members for that purpose. In the present case, if there were a
pending question, it would be between South Africa and the United Na-
tions-in other words, there would be no question between States.
Thus a difference of views between States at the United Nations, a
division of opinion, or opposition between a majority and a minority,
does not constitute a dispute or legal question pending between States,
within the meaning of Articles 82and 83of the Rules of Court. The organs
of the United Nations request advisory opinions when there is a diversity
of views, and the main function of advisory opinions is to clarify the
questions argued over and to dispelthe doubts raised by the opposition of
a minority l.
A difference of viewsbetween a State and the United Nations is not
a dispute or legal question between States, the only kind contemplated
by the applicable legal texts (Statute, Art. 34; Rules, Arts. 82 and 83).
3. The qualification "pending" applied to a question makes it requisite
that the already existingquestion should be thesameas the question which
is the subject of the request for an opinion-a necessary identity which
means that, if the question had been decided by ajudgment, an objection
of res judicata could be raised against any new application by way of
request.
Are the questions between Ethiopia and Liberia, on the one hand, and
South Africa, on the other, identical with that raised by the request for
an advisory opinion? To establish such identity,there would have to be an
identity of claim, the same basis of application, and the same parties act-
ing in the same capacity (cf. Art. 1351of the French Civil Code), i.e., in
the classic formula: eadempersona, eadem res, eadem causapetendi.
In the contentious cases concerning South West Africa, the parties
opposingSouth Africa weretwo States,former Members of the League of
Nations, acting in pursuance of Article 7of the Mandate on account of the
infringement of obligations under that instrument which the introduc-
tion of apartheidinto South West Africa represented.
The request for an advisory opinion has been made by the Security
l Such was the case in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (I.C.J. Reports
1962) ; the Court gave its Opinion on a question concerning which there was bitter
controversy wiihin the Organization.la communauté internationale; il demande à la Cour quelles sont les
conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats de la conduite de l'Afrique du
Sud (son maintien en Namibie), contrairement à une de ses résolutions,
la résolution276 (1970).
Cette absence d'identité se retrouve aussi en ce qui concerne les
questions préalables que l'Afrique du Sud a soulevéesquant àla demande
d'avis.
4. S'il n'y a pas identité entre la question objet des arrêtsde 1962 et
1966et cellesur laquelle porte l'actuelledemande d'avis, on ne peut pas se
dissimuler que celle-ci a la mêmenature que la question à laquelle la
Cour a répondu dans l'avis de 1950,et coïncide en partie avec son objet.
Invitée à donner son opinion sur le régimejuridique du Sud-Ouest
africain, sur sonstatus, la Cour a dû se prononcer sur le titre juridique de
l'Afrique du Sud et sur le titre juridique des Nations Uniesà l'égardde ce
territoire, et aussi sur les conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats de
l'existencede ces titres, parce que lestatus, comme lesjura in re - avec
lesquels on le confond -, a une efficacitéinter omnesou ergaomnes.
Demander un avis sur les conséquencespour les Etats de la présence de
l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain), c'est une autre
manièrede demander quel est, en ce moment et dans la présente situation
(hic et nunc), après la résolution 276 (19701,le status juridique du Sud-
Ouest africain. C'est du statusjuridique de ce territoire que découlentdes
conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats et seulement de lui.
Cette coïncidence quant à la nature de l'objet fait que la compétence
de la Cour aujourd'hui a le mêmefondement que dans la procédure de
1950.
C. Les questions defait
La demande de l'Afrique du Sud tendant à ce que la Cour examine Ies
questions de fait exige que l'on réfléchissesur la compétence dela Cour
à cet égardet sur la pertinence de l'invitation qui lui est adressée.
a) Compétencede la Courpour connaître des questionsdefait
i) Vules termes de la requêtepour avis, la demande de l'Afrique du Sud
est-elle ou non ultra vires?La requêtepart d'un fait - la résolution
276 \,970) du Conseil de sécurité - et invite la Cour à donner un
avis sur les conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats de la présence
continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, nonobstant ladite résolu-
tion. La demande de l'Afrique du Sud a pour but que la Cour admette
desmoyens de preuve sur un autrefait, ou une autre question,celle de
savoir si l'Afrique du Sud a failli ou nonà son obligation de promou-
voir le bien-êtremoral et matérieldu Sud-Ouest africain.Council in its capacity as an organ of the international community,
and it has asked the Court what are the legal consequences for States of
South Africa's conduct (its continued presence in Namibia) contrary to
one of its resolutions: resolution 276 (1970).
This lack of identity is also apparent with respect to the preliminary
questions raised by South Africa regarding the request for advisory
opinion.
4. While there is no identity between the question which was the sub-
ject of the 1962 and 1966Judgments and that concerned in the present
request, therecan be no denying that thelatter is of the same nature asthe
question answered by the 1950 Advisory Opinion and partly coincides
with it in subject-matter.
Invited to give an opinion on the legal status of South West Africa,
the Court found it necessary to make pronouncements on the legal title
of SouehAfrica and that of the United Nations in respect of the Territory,
and also on the legal consequences for States of the existence of those
titles, because a legal status-like the iura inre with which it is sometimes
confused-is effectiveinter omnes and erga omnes.
To request an advisory opinion on the consequences for States of the
presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) is another way
of asking what the legal status of South West Africa is here and now, i.e.,
in the situation prevailing since the adoption of resolution 276 (1970).
It is from that Territory's legal status, and from it alone, that the lrgal
consequences for States flow.
The implication of this coincidence of underlying subject-matter is that
the competence of the Court has at present the same basis as in the 1950
proceedings.
C. The FactualIssues
South Africa's proposition that the Court should examine factual
issues requires some reflection as to the Court's competence in this
connection and on the pertinance of the suggestion.
(a) The Conzperenceof the Court ;o enter intofactunl issues
In view of the terms of the request for advisory opinion is South
Africa's proposition a matter ultra vires? The request for advisory
opinion takes as point of departure a particular fact-resolution 276
(1970)of the Security Council-and seeks the Court's opinion on the
legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia notwithstanding that resolution. The South
African proposition seeks the admission by the Court of evidence
regarding a diferent fact, or a dzferent question, namely whether or
not South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations to promote the
moral and material well-being of South West Africa. Admettre la demande de l'Afrique du Sud serait donc, semble-t-il,
changer l'objet même de la requêtepour avis; ce serait prier la Cour
dedonner son avissur un sujettout à fait différentdeceluiqu'a sollicité
le Conseil de sécurité;en d'autres termes, ce serait admettre quelque
chose comme une demande reconventionnelle d'avis ou avis recon-
ventionnel.
On peut se demander si la Cour est fondée à admettre cela, alors
que cette invitation émanenon pas d'un organe ou d'une institution
autoriséepar la Charte, mais de l'un des Etats admis à fournir des
renseignements. La Cour agirait-elle dans ce cas conformément à la
lettre et l'esprit des articles 96 de la Charte et 65 du Statut? La Cour
pourrait-elle méconnaîtreces dispositions en faisant jouer l'article 68
du Statut? Cela me semble, soit dit avec respect, bien difficile.
ii) Compte tenu des observations de i'Afrique du Sud, la Cour est-elie
compétentepour procéder à l'examen desquestions de fait?
On sait, et l'Afrique du Sud le rappelle, que selon la Cour perma-
nente ((dans des circonstances ordinaires, il serait... utile que les
faits sur lesquels l'avis de la Cour est demandéfussent constants 1)
(Statut de la Carélie orientale,C.P.J.I. sérieB no5, p. 28). Au surplus,
les avis ont pour objet des questionsjuridiques (art.96 de la Charte;
art. 65 du Statut) et non des questions portant sur des faits d'impor-
tanceprimaire, comme ceuxque l'Afrique du Sud voudrait justement
qu'on établisse.
b) Pertinence de l'invitationfaiteà la Cour de connaître des questionsde
fait
i) L'argument de l'Afrique du Sud sur la nécessité d'examiner les gues-
tions de fait, et donc, toujours selon elle, l'obligation pour la Cour
de déclarersa propre incompétence,si elle estime indispensable un
examen des faits, est le suivant: la résolution276(1970)du Conseilde
sécuritéet larésolution2145(XXI)de l'Assembléegénérao lnt comme
fondement lefaitque l'Afriquedu Sudn'apas assurélebien-êtremoral
et matériel desautochtones du Sud-Ouest africain. L'Afrique du Sud
conteste ce fait et offre de prouver sa fausseté,la conséquenceétant
que, si la preuve qu'elle a assuréce bien-êtreest faite, les deux ré-
solutions sont dépourvuesde fondement et pour cette raison inva-
lides et nulles.
Ce raisonnement serait valide si le seul et unique fondement des
résolutionsétaitla conduite de l'Afrique du Sud en ce qui concerne
le bien-être des indigènesM . ais il n'en est pas ainsi.l y a d'autres
fondements possibles, aussi importants ou plus importants que la
question du bien-être, à la déclaration prononçant la cessation du
mandat. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP . P. DE CASTRO) 178
It would therefore seem that the South African proposition, if
accepted, would alter the very subject-matterof the request for advi-
sory opinion; it would amount to asking the Court to giveits opinion
on a subject quite differentfrom that on which the Security Council
seeksguidance; in other words, there would beadanger ofrecognizing
something inthenature ofa counter-claim or a request fora "counter-
opinion".
It may be doubted that the Court would be entitled to allow any
such proposition, when it cornes not from an organ or agency
authorized by the Charter to request an opinion, but from one of the
States permitted to furnish information. In such a case, would the
Court be acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of Article 96
of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute? Could the Court dis-
regard those provisions by giving effectto Article 68 of the Statute?
With al1respect, 1would find that difficultto accept.
(ii) Taking into account the arguments of South Africa, has the Court
jurisdiction to proceed to examine factual issues?
It is well known, and South Africa reminds us of it, that, in the
words of the Permanent Court, "under ordinary circumstances it
is.. .expedientthat the facts upon which the opinion of the Court is
desired should not be in controversy" (Status of Eastern Carelia,
Advisory Opinion, 1923,P.C.Z.J.,SeriesB, No. 5, p. 28).Furthermore,
advisory opinions have as their subject-matter legalquestions (Art. 96
of the Charter, Art. 65 of the Statute) and not questions concerning
facts of primary importance-such as those which South Africa
wishesto have established.
(b) Pertinence oftheproposition that theCourt should enter intofactual
issues
(i) The argument of South Africa on the need to go into factual issues,
and thus, it would maintain, the duty of the Court to declare its own
lack of jurisdiction if it considers that an examination of the factss
indispensable, runs as follows: SecurityCouncilresolution 276(1970)
and General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are based on the
postulate that South Africa has not ensured the moral and material
well-beingof the natives of South West Africa. South Afnca denies
and offersto disprove this, the implication being that, if it be estab-
lished that South Africa has ensured such well-being, the two
resolutions would lackany basis, and would forthat reason be invalid
and void.
This reasoning would be valid if the sole basis for the resolutions
were the conduct of South Africa with regard to the well-being of
the natives; but such is not the case. There are other bases, equally
important or more important than the question of well-being, which
may be said to underlie the declaration oftermination ofthe Mandate. La résolution2145 (XXI) de l'Assembléesouligne que l'Afrique du
Sud a refusé decontinuer à remplir sesobligations en vertu du mandat,
et de reconnaître que l'organisation des Nations Unies a des pouvoirs
decontrôle surleSud-Ouestafricain, etfait étataussideceque l'Afrique
du Sud a poursuivi la politique d'apartheid, malgrésa condamnation.
Ce sont là des faits incontestés et notoires. La résolution 276 (1970)
du Conseil de sécurité réasrme la résolution2145 (XXI) de 1'Assem-
blée,et a la même basedans les faits.
C'est une doctrine généraleet ferme que, pour déclarerla nullité
d'un acte ou d'une concession, comme pour déclarersa terminaison,
une seule cause est suffisante et nécessaire (ex una causa, nullitas);
on n'a pas besoin de plusieurs des preuves ou de toutes les preuves
mentionnées.
Donc, si la Cour décidede considérerles observations de l'Afrique
du Sud sur l'invaliditédes résolutions, elle le fera en tenant compte
de l'existence des faits incontestés, qui sont le fondement possible de
ces résolutions.
ii) Les considérations déjàprésentéessur l'inexistence d'une question
pendante entre Etats et sur l'objet de la demande d'avis, imposent
aussi l'exclusion desquestions de fait: c'est en effet l'existence d'une
question pendante qui pourrait donner lieu à l'ouverture d'une procé-
dure quasi contentieuse avec production de preuves. Et mêmedans
le cadre d'une telle procédure,il est difficilede voir comment on pour-
rait remédier à l'absence d'une autre partie et d'un juge instructeur,
si l'on veut que la procédure de preuve s'accompagne des garanties
nécessaires.
D. La question duplébiscite
La Cour ne doit pas entrer dans des considérationssur le but, lespossi-
bilitéspratiques et les résultats d'un tel plébiscite; ce sont des aspects
politiques hors de la compétencede la Cour.
Mais elle aurait pu signaler immédiatementl'impossibilitéprocédurale,
dans une procédure d'avis consultatif, d'intervenir dans un plébiscite
auquel l'Afrique du Sud participerait.
En outre, on peut remarquer le manque de pertinence juridique du
plébisciteet de sesrésultatspour la réponse àdonner à la demande d'avis.
Un vote de la population en faveur de l'administration de l'Afrique du
Sud ou de celledesNations Unies 'n'a pasdesignificationpour laquestion
poséedans la demande d'avis, et n'en a pas non plus pour ce qui est de
déciderdes problèmes soulevéspar l'Afrique du Sud dans ses exposés
écritset oraux.
Il ne s'agit pas d'un plébiscite concernant l'indépendance de la Namibie ou un
changement d'administration mais seulement d'uplébiscite des fins d'informa-
tion. General Assemblyresolution 2145(XXI) stressedthat South Africa
had refusedto continue fulfillingitsobligations under the Mandate or
to recognizethat the United Nations had powers of supeivision over
South West Africa, and also referred to the fact that South Africa had
carried on a policy of apartheid despite the condemnation thereof.
These are well-known and uncontroverted fa~ts.~Security Council
resolution 276 (1970) reaffirms General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI), and its factual basis is the same.
It is a matter of established generalteaching that for an act or grant
to be declared void, or forit to be declared terminated, only one cause
is necessary and that single cause sufficient (ex unacausa, nullitas) ;
there is no need to establish al1or even a multiplicity of the causes
adduced.
It follows that, if the Court decides to consider the contentions of
South Africa as to the invalidity of the resolutions, it will give due
weight to the existence of uncontroverted facts which may serve as a
basisfor those resolutions.
(ii) The observations already made regarding the non-existence of a
question pending between States and the subject-matter of the
request for advisory opinion also argue the exclusionof factual issues:
for it is the existence of a pending question which could justify the
opening of a quasi-contentious procedure, including the production
of evidence. But even in such a context it is hard to see how the
absence of an opposing party and a juge instructeurcould be made
good, if the procedure for taking evidence is to feature the necessary
safeguards.
D. The Question of aPlebiscite
TheCourt should not concern itselfwithconsiderations asto the object,
the practical possibilities, and the outcome of such a plebiscite; these are
political aspects of the matter which fa11outside the competence of the
Court.
But it could have drawn immediate attention to the procedural impossi-
bility, in advisory proceedings, of its participating in a plebiscitein which
South Africa was also to takepart.
It is furthermore apparent that such a plebiscite or its outcome would
lack al1legal relevanceto the Court's reply to the request for an advisory
opinion. For the purpose of answering the question put by that request it
makes no difference whether the population would vote in favour of
administration by South Africa or by the United Nations l,nor would it
possess any significancein the treatment of the problems raised by South
Africa in its written and oral statements.
l The plebiscite envisaged is not one which wodd posit the independence of
Namibia or a change of administration; it would only be held for theurpose of
obtaining information. II. ANTÉCÉDENT SU: ESTION RSELATIVES À LA VALIDITÉ
DES RÉSOLUTIONS
A. Compétence dela Cou;
La Cour a-t-elle le pouvoir de se prononcer sur l'invaliditéou la
nullitt des résolutions del'Assembléegénéraleet du Conseil de sécurité?
Il est difficilede répondreà la question par oui ou non. On doit tenir
compte du jeu de deux principes, qu'on pourrait croire contradictoires.
1. Le principe de la division des pouvoirs. - La Charte a établitrois
organes dotés chacun de pouvoirs souverains dans la sphère de sa com-
pétence:Assemblée générale, Consed ile sécuritéet Cour internationale
de Justice. Les deux premiers ont des facultés analogues à des chambres
législatives,la troisième a des pouvoirs judiciaires.
Chacun d'entre eux a le pouvoir d'interpréter les dispositions de la
Charte, verbis et factis. Cette interprétation doit êtrerespectéepar les
autres organes, si elle ne touche pas à leur propre compétence.Toute
autre solution irait à l'encontre de l'indépendanceou de la souveraineté
de chaque organe. Conformément à ce point de vue, la Cour n'a pas les
pouvoirs d'une cour constitutionnelle de juger de la validité des résolu-
tions de l'Assembléeet du Conseil l.
Naturellement elle pourrait le faire si l'Assembléeou le Conseil de-
mandait d'une manière explicite ou implicite (affaire Certaines dépenses
des Nations Unies) un avis sur l'interprétation dela Charte et sur la con-
formitédes résolutionsavec la Charte.
Ce respect mutuel fait que ni l'Assemblée nile Conseil ne peuvent
déclarerinvalide un arrêtde la Cour, mêmes'il est contraire aux vŒux
de la majorité desdits organes.
2. Le principe de la juridicité.- La Cour comme organejuridique ne
peut pas collaborer à une résolutionmanifestement nulle, contraire aux
règlesde la Charte ou aux principes du droit 2.
De plus, la Cour doit agir comme un organe judiciaire, de sorte qu'on
ne peut lui assigner aucune limite en ce qui concerne le procédélogique
à suivre pour résoudrela question (opinion individuelle de M. Morelli,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962,p. 217).
l On a dit que tout oblige .d'interpréter d'une façon très restrictive les régles
par lesquelles les conditions de validité desactes de l'organisation sont fixéeset,
par conséquent, de considérer, dans une large mesure, la non-conformité de l'acte
avec la règlede droit comme une simple irrégular»,et aussi que «chaque organe
des Nations Unies est juge de sa propre compétence 11Opinion individuelle de
M. Morelli, C.Z.J. Recueil 1962, p. 223 et 224.
1On pourrait faire l'exempled'une résolution qui n'aurait pasobtenu la majorité
requise ou d'une résolution entachéed'excèsde pouvoir évident (telle,notamment,
une résolution ayant un objet toutà fait étranger aux buts de l'organisation))
Opinion individuelle de M. Morelli, C.Z.J.Recueil 1962, p. 223.II. ANTECEDENT QS:ESTION CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTIONS
A. Cornpetenceof the Court
Does the Court have the power to pronounce as to the invalidity or
nullity of resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council?
It is difficultto answer yes or no to this question. The interplay of two
principles, which one might have thought contradictory, must be taken
into account.
1. The principle of division of powers-the Charter set up three
organs, each having sovereignpowers in the sphere of its own competence :
the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court
of Justice. The first two have powers analogous to those of legislative
chambers, and the third has judicial powers.
Each of these has the power to interpret the provisions of the Charter
verbis et factis. Such interpretation must be respected by the other
organs providing it does not encroach upon their own jurisdiction. Any
other solution would be inconsistent with the independence or sovereignty
of each organ. On this view of the matter, the Court does not have the
powers of a constitutional court to pass judgment on the validity or the
resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council l.
Naturally, it could do so if the General Assembly or Security Council
were to ask, expressly or impliedly (Certain Expenses of the United
Nations), for an opinion on the interpretation of the Charter,and on the
consistency of the resolutions with the Charter.
As a result ofthis mutual respect, neither the General Assemblynor the
Council can declare a judgment of the Court to be invalid, even if it be
contrary to the wishesof the majority in those organs.
2. The principle of "legal-nessW-the Court, as a legal organ, cannot
CO-operatewith a resolution which is clearlyvoid, contrary to the rules of
the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law 2.
Furthermore, the Court must act as a judicial organ, so that no
limitations can be placed upon it as regards the logical processes to be
followed in answering the question put to it (separate opinion of Judge
Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 217).
l It has been said that everything "makes it necessary to put a very strict construc-
tion on theules by which the conditions for the validity of acts of the Organization
are determined and hence to regard to a largextent the non-conformity of the
act with a legalle as a mere irregularity", and also that "each organ of the United
Nations is the judge of its own competence" (separate opinion of Judge Morelli,
Z.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 223, 224).
"Examples might be a resolution which had not obtained the required majority,
or a resolution initiatby a manifest excès de pouvoir (such as, in particular, a
zation)": separate opinion of Judge Morelli, Z.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 223.ni- 3. Dans les tribunaux ordinaires de droit interne, le jeu de ces deux
principes aboutit àce qu'ils s'abstiennent dejuger de la validité des lois,
à la seule exception du cas où, de façon évidenteet indiscutable, la pré-
tendue loi n'a pas le caractèrede loi, où elle en a seulement l'apparence.
En tout autre cas, en général,ou bien les tribunaux s'abstiennent d'exa-
miner la question de la validitédes lois, ou bien ils croient devoir in-
diquer les raisons de sa validité; ilexiste toujours une présomption en
faveur de la validité deslois.
La Cour peut s'inspirer de cet exemple. Doit-elle se refuser à donner
un avis sur la validitédesrésolutions?Elle n'estpas un super-organe dans
le cadre des Nations Unies et ellen'est pas autoriséeàrendre une espèce
d'avis reconventionnel.
4. L'avissur Certainesdépensesdes Nations Uniesa pu donner à croire
que la Cour aurait le pouvoir de statuer dans tous les cas et sans limite
sur la validité desrésolutionsde l'Assembléeet du Conseil de sécurité.
Mais on demandait alors à la Cour de donner son avis sur la auestion
de savoir si les dépensesautoriséespar une sériede résolutions del'As-
sembléeétaientdes «dépensesde l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2
de l'article 12dela Charte desNations Unies» (C.I.J. Recueil1962,p. 152),
donc de dire si ces dépensesavaient été valablement autoriséesO . n a pu
dire avec raison que dans ce cas on ne pouvait (poser àla Cour aucune
limitepour cequi concerne leprocédé logique àsuivre pour ...résoudre ))
la question, mêmelorsque celle-citouche à la validité desrésolutions.
Affirmation que l'on a nuancéeen ajoutant:
(Mais une telleliberté[cellede la Cour] ne peut êtreentendue que
comme liberté subordonnée,non seulement aux règlesdu droit et de
la logique par lesquelles la Cour est liée,mais aussi au but que la
Cour doit poursuivre et qui consiste dans la solutioà donner à la
question qui lui est soumise.»(Opinion individuelle de M. Morelli,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962,p. 217-218.)
La Cour, dans le même avis,a dit que ((chaque organe [des Nations
Unies] doit donc, tout au moins en premier lieu, déterminersa propre
compétence » (ibid., p. 168).
Dans sa résolution284du 29juillet 1970,le Conseilde sécurité ne met
pas en cause, implicitement ou explicitement,la validitéde la résolution
276 (1970)et aucune règlede la logique n'oblige à traiter de cette validité
pour répondre à la question posée à la Cour.
C'esten raison d'autres considérations quela Cour examine la validitt
de la résolution276 (1970)du Conseilet cellede la résolution2145(XXI)
de l'Assemblée.La Cour a le devoir de coopérerau bon fonctionnement
des autres organes des Nations Unies. L'avisa étésollicitécar il serait
utile au Conseil ((pour continuer à examiner la question de Namibie et
pour la réalisation des objectifs recherchéspar le Conseil ».Pour cet NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA (SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 181
3. Beforeordinary municipal courts, the result of the interplay of these
two principles is that such courts refrain from passing judgment on the
validity of laws, with the sole exception of casesin which it is clear and
indisputable that the alleged lawdoes not in fact rank as a law, in which
there is only an apparent law. In any other case, in general, either the
courts refrain from considering the question of the validity of laws, or
they consider that they must indicate the reasons for their validity; there
is alwaysa presumption infavour of the validity oflaws.
The Court may derive inspiration from this example. Should it derline
to givean opinion on the validity ofthe resolutions? The Court is not, in
the structure of the United Nations, a super-organ, and it is not entitled
to giveany sort of "counter-opinion".
4. The Opinion relating to Certain Expensesof the UnitedNations may
have giventhe impression that the Court has the power to passjudgment,
in al1casesand without any limitation, upon the validity ofthe resolutions
of the General Assembly and Security Council. But the Court was on
that occasion asked to give its opinion on the question whether the
expenditures authorized by a series of General Assembly resolutions
were "'expenses ofthe Organization' within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 152),that is, to Saywhetherthose expenditureshad been validlyauthor-
ized. Btwas possible to observe in that case with perfect correctnessthat
there cannot be placed "any limitations on the Court as regards the
logical processes to be followed in answering the question", even when
it related to the validity of the said resolutions. This statement was
qualified as follows:
"This freedom [i.e., the Court's freedom] can however be under-
stood only as subordinated both to the rules of law and logic by
which the Court is bound and also to the objective which the Court
must pursue, which is the solution of the question submitted to it"
(separateopinion ofJudge Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 217-218).
The Court stated, in the Opinion referred to, that "each organ [of the
United Nations] must, in the first place at least, determine its own
jurisdiction" (ibid.,p.168).
In its resolution 284of 29 July 1970,the SecurityCouncil does not cal1
in question, either impIicitIy or explicitly, the validity of resolution 276
(19701,and no rule of logic makesit necessaryto consider such validity in
order to answer the question put to the Court.
It was because of other considerations that the Court dealt with the
validity of SecurityCoun~ilresolution 276 (1970)and General Assembly
resolution 2145 (XXI). The Court has the duty to CO-operatein the
efficient functioning of the other organs of the United Nations. The
opinion has been sought because it would be useful for the Security
Council "in its further consideration of the question of Namibia and inexamen etpour que ces objectifs soient atteints, il conviendra de dissiper
les doutes accumulésdepuis de longues annéessur une sériede questions
juridiques, préalablesà celle qui est l'objet de l'avis. Cesdoutes se sont
manifestésau cours des débatsdu Conseil et de l'Assemblée,et leur im-
portance ressort de l'attention qui a étportée à la question de la validité
des résolutions,non seulement par les représentants de l'Afriquedu Sud
mais aussi par le représentantdu Secrétaire généralle,s représentantsdes
Etats qui ont fourni des renseignements, sous forme d'exposés écrite st
oraux, et par le représentant del'organisation de l'unité africaine.
En tout cas, les considérations sur lavaliditédes résolutionsont leur
place dans les motifs de l'avis et non dans son dispositif. (Opinion in-
dividuelle de M. Morelli, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 216-217; opinion dissi-
dente de M. Bustamante, ibid., p. 288. C'est aussila solution de la Cour
dans l'avis sur Certaines dépenses des Nations Uniesi,bid., p. 155-181.)
B. Méthoded'interprétation
Dans sesécrituresetdans son exposéoral, l'Afriquedu Sud a développé
amplement sa théorie de l'interprétationdes textes juridiques et elle l'a
fait àjuste titre, parce que la méthodepar elle choisie est le fondement
des solutions proposées.Elle défendl'interprétation littéraledes textes,
l'interprétation restrictive des pouvoirs accordés aux organisations
internationales et ellecondamne avecforcelesméthodes téléologiques.
Sans présenter ici une étude théorique de l'interprétation,il n'en
semble pas moins utile de formuler quelques observations à son sujet, ce
qui permettra d'éviter desrépétitions.
1.Il semble que l'on doit distinguer avant tout entre les divers types
de textes juridiques. Pour notre objet, il sera utile de tenir compte des
caractéristiques que présentent: a) les traitésdans lesquels le marchan-
dagedomine,chacune des parties cherchant son propre profit, obtenir le
plus et donner le moins; b) les accords par lesquels une organisation
concèdecertains pouvoirs ou privilèges à un Etat, et que celui-ciaccepte;
c) les traitéspar lesquels on constitue une organisation internationale et
les résolutionsde cette organisation.
2. La règleprudente qui consiste à considérerprimafacie la lettre des
conventions et traités s'est pervertie dans un littéralismequi condamne
tout élémené t trangerau texte (quodnonest in Codicenonest inmundo).
Grotius avait déjà signaléla vanitéde cette tendance, comme celle du
soi-disant principe de la contemporanéité. Il montre qu'à côté dece qui
est dit, ily a la force de développement(potentia moraliterconsiderata) de
la convention (Dejure belli ac pacis, II, 16, 25). furtherance of the objectivesthe Council is seeking". For such considera-
tion, and for such objectives to be attained, it will be as well to dissipate
the doubts which have accumulated in the course of many years on a
whole series of legal questions, which are preliminary to the question
which is the subject-matter of the Opinion. These doubts emerged in the
course of the discussions of tHeSecurity Council and the Assembly, and
their importance is clear from the attention paid to the question of the
validity of the resolutions, not only by the representative of South Africa
but also bythe representative of the Secretary-General,the representatives
of the States which furnished information, in the form of written or oral
statements, and the representative of the Organization of African Unity.
In any event, the place for considerations of the validity of theresolu-
tions is in the reasoning of the Opinion and not in its operative clause
(separate opinion of Judge Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 216-217;
dissenting opinion of Judge Bustamante, ibid., p. 288; this was also the
solution adopted by the Court in its Opinion on CertainExpensesof the
UnitedNations, ibid., pp. 155-181).
B. Interpretative klethod
In its written contentions and its oral statement, South Africa has
expounded at length its theory as to the interpretation of legal texts, and
rightly so, because the method chosen by it is the basis of the solutions it
puts forward. It defends the technique of literal interpretation of texts,
restrictive interpretation of powers conferred on international organi-
zations, and it vigorously condemns teleological methods.
Without indulging here in an academic study of interpretation, it would
nevertheless appear-useful to make certain observations on the question,
since it will thus be possible to avoid repetitions.
1. It would seem that a distinction should first of al1be made between
the various types of legal texts. For our purposes, it will be useful to take
into account the particular characteristics of: (a) treaties dominated by
bargaining, each party seeking its own advantage, to obtain the maximum
and give the minimum; (b) agreements by which an organization grants
certain powers or privileges to a State, which the latter accepts; (c)
treaties by which an international organization is set up, and the reso-
lutions of such an organization.
2. The prudent rule of considering prima faciethe letter of conventions
and treaties has been distorted into the literalistic interpretation which
condemns any element not to be found in the text (quodnonest incodice
nonest in mundo).
As early a writer as Grotius pointed out that this was a vain tendency,
as is also the so-called principle of contemporaneity. He showed that in
addition to what is said, there is the force of the development of the
convention (potentia moraliter considerata: Dejure bellias pacis, II, 16,
25). S'il est vrai qu'on doit tenir compte des intentions communes des
parties, il est vrai aussi que, dans tous les droits, on a dû envisager les
lacunae.Il existe desrègles pourcompléterlesdéclarations de volontédes
parties, et la jurisprudence des tribunaux prend en considération à cet
effet ce que les parties peuvent avoir voulu rationnellement; c'est ainsi
que l'on s'est efforde cbmbler leslacunes des textes.
A cette fin, on tient compte de l'objet et du but de la convention. La
règlein clarisnonjt interpretatioa étébien commentéepar Anzilotti, qui
fait remarquer qu'il n'est pas possiblede dire si un article est clair tant
qu'on ignore son objet; on ne connaît la volontédes parties que quand
on sait le but proposé (C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no 50, opinion dissidente,
p. 383; idée acceptée par le American Law Institute, Restatement 1965,
par. 147, p. 455). Bien avant, Vattel avait signalé l'importancede la
raison de l'acte:«Dèsque l'on connaît certainement la raison qui seule a
déterminéla volonté de celuiqui parle, ilfaut interprétersesparoles et les
appliquer d'une manière convenable à cette raison unique)) (livre 2,
chap. 17,par. 287). En conclusion, on a pu dire que c'est grâceau but
indiquépar lesdéclarations de volontéquetoute la conventionprend une
unitéde sens objectif (objektive Sinneinheit) (Dahm, Volkerrecht, III,
p. 50).
11est intéressanten ce qui concerne la question étudiéede releverque,
pour arriver à ce résultat, on tient compte, dans toutes les législations
internes, de la nature des contrats et accords.((Lesconventions obligent
non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, maisencore à toutes les suites que
l'équité, l'usage ou la loi donnent à l'obligation d'après sa nature))
(art. 1135du code civil français; pour le droit de la common law, voir
WindJieldon Contracts, p. 38). On doit signaler aussi que les termini
technici,comme mandate ou trust, doivent être interprétés conformément
à leur signification technique (Lauterpacht, The Development of Inter-
nationalLaw by the International Court, p. 60). On doit conclure qu'une
clause mêmeraisonnablement claire ne peut pas êtreinterprétée à la
lettre, si de cette manièreon arriveà un résultat contraire au propos du
traité(C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no64, p. 19; contra, opinion dissidente de trois
juges, p.26). En I'occurrence, si la Cour avait procédé conformémenà t
l'opinion minoritaire, elle aurait consacréla fraudeà la loi préparéepar
le Gouvernement albanais. Contra legem facit, qui id facit quod lex
prohiber,infraudem vero, quisalvis verbislegissententiam eiuscircumvenit
(Digeste 1,3, 29). Tous les traités doiventêtreinterprétésde telle manière
que la fraude soit éliminée eqt ue leur exécutionsoit compatible avec la
bonne foi (Oppenheim, éd. Lauterpacht,vol. 1,par. 544,point 13).
Enfin, on peut noter qu'un auteur moderne et dont les observations
de l'Afrique du S. font grand cas affirmeet souligne la nécessité d'utili-
ser la méthodetéléologique (Dahm, Volkerrecht,III, p. 43 et suiv.). NAMIBlA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 183
While it is true that the common intention of the parties must be taken
into account, it is also true that in al1systems of law it has been necessary
to provide for the possibility of lacune; there are rules for fillingout the
parties' expressions of their will, and for this purpose the case law of
municipal courtstakes into account what the parties may reasonably have
intended; it is in this way that endeavours have been made to fil1the gaps
in texts.
For this purpose the subject and purpose of the convention is to be
taken into account. The rule in claris nonJifitinterpretatio has been well
commented on by Anzilotti, who pointed out that it is not possible to say
that an article is clear so long as oneis unaware of its subject; one only
knows the will of the parties when one knows what the aim intended was
(dissentingopinion, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 50, p. 383; an idea accepted
by the American Law Institute, Restatement 1965, para. 147, p. 455).
Much earlier, Vattel had drawn attention to the importance of the reason
for an act: "when once the purpose which has led the speaker to act is
clearly known his words must be interpreted and applied in the light of
that purpose only" (The Law of Nations, Book 2, Chap. 17, para. 287,
Fenwick's translation). Finally, it has been possible to assert that it is
thanks to the aim indicated by the expressions of willthat the convention
as awhole acquires an objective unity of meaning (objektive Sinneinheit)
(Dahm, Vo/kerrecht, Vol. III, p. 50).
It is ofinterest for the question now under study to observe that in al1
interna1 systems of legislation, in order to reach this result, the nature of
contracts and agreements is taken into account. "Contracts bind not only
to what is expressly stated therein, but in addition to al1consequences
attached to the obligation according to its nature by equity, custom, or
law" (French Civil Code, Article 1135; for the Cornmon Law see Wind-
Jield on Contracts,p. 38). It should also be remarked that technical terms.
like "mandate" or "trust", should be interpreted in accordance with their
technical meaning (Lauterpacht, TheDevelopmenfof InternationalLaw by
the International Court, p. 60). The necessary conclusion is that even a
clause which is reasonably clear cannot be interpreted literally if by so
doing one reaches a result which is contrary to the purpose of the treaty
(P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 64, p. 19; contra, see dissenting opinion of
three judges, ibid., p. 26). If, in the case just referred to, the Court had
proceeded in accordance with the majority view, it wouId have lent its
sanction to the fraus legis proposed by the Albanian Government.
Contralegemfacit, quiidfacit quodlexprohibet, infraudem vero,quisalvis
verbislegissententiam eius circumvenit(Digest, 1, 3, 29). Al1treaties must
be interpreted so as to exclude fraud and so as to make their operation
consistent with good faith (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, Vol. 1, Sec. 544,
para. 13).
Finally, it may be observed that a modern author, and one made much
of in the arguments of South Africa, states and emphasizes the need to use
the teleological method (Dahm, VQlkerrecht,Vol. III, pp. 43 ff.). 3. Les traités multilatéraux,les conventions qui ont crééune organisa-
tion et surtout la Chartesont soumis à des règles propres d'interprétation.
La Charte ne semble pas se situer dans le cadre de la convention sur
le droit des traités.Pour l'interpréter,on ne doit pas appliquer par analo-
gie les règlesde droit interne sur les contrats, mais plutôt les règlessur
l'interprétationdes lois et statutes (Restament, loc. cit., par. 146,p. 1965;
Dahm, loc. cit., III, p. 55).
On ne doit pas oublier que l'Assemblée généraleet le Conseil de sécu-
ritéont la responsabilitéde promouvoir les buts énoncésdans la Charte.
Ils ne peuvent pas rester liéspar les intentions possibles des rédacteurs,
non seulement parce qu'il estdifficilede ronnaitre ces intentions (sil'on
connaît lesintentions de ceux qui parlent, on ignore lesintentions de ceux
qui se taisent et votent), mais-aussi parce que l'interprétation subitune
évolutionnécessairequi, comme dans le droit interne, doit s'adapter aux
circonstances du moment et aux exigences prévisiblesde l'avenir. Le
texte se séparede ses auteurs et vit de sa propre vie (opinions dissidentes
d'Alvarez dans C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 18,et C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 53;
Dahm, loc. cit., III, p. 55).
Aux Nations Unies ((chaque organe doit donc, tout au moins en pre-
mier lieu, déterminersa propre compétence ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1962,p. 168).
Quand un organe prend une résolution, (cilexiste au moins une forte
présomption prima facie de validitéet de régularité ))(opinion individuelle
de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ibid., p. 204). On a été jusqu'à penser que les
résolutionsde l'Assembléeet du Conseil, la pratique de l'un et de l'autre,
facta concludentia,pouvaient êtreconsidérées comme uneinterprétation
authentique (comp. Dahm, loc. cit., p. 501,ayant en tout cas un caractère
obligatoire pour ce qui est des questions qui touchent le ((maintien dela
paix, le règlement des conflitset mêmela plupart des activitésde I'Organi-
sation ))(opinion individuelle de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, C.I.J. Recueil
1962,p. 213).
Sur l'organisation des Nations-Unies, la Cour a dit:
((On doit admettre que ses Membres, en lui assignant certaines
fonctions, avec les devoirs et les responsabilités qui les accom-
pagnent, l'ont revêtue de la compétence nécessaire pour lui permettre
de s'acquitter effectivement de ces fonctions ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1949,
p. 179);
((les droits et devoirs d'une entitételle que l'organisation doivent
dépendredes buts et des fonctions de celle-ci,énoncésou impliqués
par son acte constitutif et développésdans la pratique » (C.I.J.
Recueil 1949,p. 180).
Sur l'interprétation dela Charte, on a dit ceci :
(Onpeut affirmer en toute confiance que les dispositions particu- 3. Multilateral treaties, conventions establishing an international
organization and above al1the Charter, are subject to particular rules of
interpretation.
The Charter would appear not to fa11within the framework of the
Convention on the Law of Treaties. To interpretit, one shduld not apply
by analogy the rules of municipal law on contracts, but rather rules for
the interpretation of laws and statutes (Restatement, loc. cit., para. 146,
p. 1965; Dahm, loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 55).
It should not be forgotten that the General Assembly and Security
Council have the responsibility of promoting the gurposes laid down in
the Charter. They cannot remain bound by the possible intentions of the
draftsmen, not only because it is difficultto know what those intentions
were(whilethe intentions of those who speak are known, the intentions of
those who give their vote in silence are not), but also because inter-
pretation necessarily undergoes a process of development, and, as in
municipal law,must adapt itself to the circumstance ofthe time'andto the
requirements, so far as they are foreseeable, ofthe future. The text breaks
away from its authors and lives a life of its own (dissentingopinions of
Judge Alvarez, I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 18,and I.C.J. Reports 1951,p. 53;
Dahm, loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 55).
In the United Nations, "each organ must, in the first place, at least,
deîermine its own jurisdiction" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168). When an
organ adopts a resolution, "there must arise at the least a strong prima
facie presumption" of validity and propriety (separate opinion of Judge
SirGerald Fitzmaurice, ibid.,p. 204).It has even been considered that the
resolutions of the Assemblyand the Council, the practice ofthose organs,
facta concludentia,could be considered as constituting an officia1inter-
pretation (interprétation authentique()cf.Dahm, loc. cit., p. 50),involving
in any case a duty to carry thern out so far as questions which relate to
"peace-keeping, dispute-settling and, indeed, most of the political
activities of the Organization" are concerned (separate opinion of Judge
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 213).
Concerning the United Nations Organization, the Court has said:
"It must be acknowledgedthat its Members, by entrusting certain
functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have
cloéhedit with the competence required to enable those functions to
be effectivelydischarged" (I.C.J. Reports 1949,p. 179);
". ..the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must
depend upon its purposes and functions as specifiedor implied in its
constituent documents and developed in practice" (I.C.J. Reports
1949,p. 180).
On the interpretation of the Charter it has been said that:
"It may with confidence be assertedthat its particular provisions lièresdela Charte doivent recevoir une large et libéraleinterprétation,
à moins que le contexte d'une disposition particulière n'exige le
contraire, ou qu'il ne se trouve ailleurs dans la Charte quelque chose
qui impose une interprétation plus étroiteet plus limitée » (opinion
individuelle de sir Percy Spender, C.I.J. Recueil 1962,p. 185).
En effet, la Cour enseigne que, pour l'interprétation dela Charte, on doit
tenir compte de ses buts fondamentaux, et admettre qu'elle a lespouvoirs
nécessairespour les accomplir, «par une conséquence nécessaire )(C.I.J.
Recueil 1949, p. 182; opinion individuelle de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 208-215); lorsque l'organisation prend des
mesures ... appropriées à I'accomplissement des buts déclarésdes
Nations Unies, il est à présumer que cette action ne dépasse pas les
pouvoirs de l'organisation » (ibid., p. 168). On peut donc tenir pour un
critère autorisé la conclusion suivante: (1Le sens du texte en question
sera élucidé par les buts énoncés envue desquels les termes de la Charte
ont étérédigés »(opinion individuelle de sir Percy Spender, ibid., p. 187).
A. Obseri~aîiongénérale
Etant donné la nature de la Charte et les pouvoirs des principaux
organes de l'ONU, on doit considérerque la présomption en faveur de
la validité des résolutions de ces organes est fondée sur leur faculté
d'interpréterla Charte, et de la fairexfactis, c'est-à-dire par lefait même
qu'ilsontadopté une résolution.
Pour contester la validité d'une résolution, on ne peut se borner à
soutenir qu'il est possiblede trouver une meilleure interprétation; on ne
pourra la critiquer que si l'on montre l'impossibilitéabsolue de trouver
une raison quelconque, mêmediscutable, sur laquelle fonder i'inter-
prétation favorable à la validité.
B. L'abstentiondes membrespermanents
On a dit:
IIIl est déjàbien connu qu'un amendement coutumier de la Charte
est intervenu dans la pratique du Conseil de sécurité, ence sens que
l'abstention d'un Membre permanent présent à la séance n'estpas
assimilée à l'exercice du droit de veto)] (opinion dissidente de
M. Bustamante, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 291; voir aussi ibid., p. 172,
175, 176; avec certaines réserves,opinion individuelle de sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, ibid., p. 210). should receivea broad and liberal interpretation unless the context of
any particular provision requires, or there is to be found elsewhere in
the Charter, something to compel a narrower and restricted inter-
pretation" (separateopinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender, I.C.J. Re-
ports 1962, p. 185).
The teaching of the Court is, in fact, that for the interpretation of the
Charter account must be taken of its fundamental purposes, and it must
be recognized that it has the powers which are necessary to achieve
them "by necessary implication" (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 182; separate
opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 208-
215); "when the Organization takes action which . ..[is]appropriate for
the fulfilrnent of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization"
(I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 168).One may therefore regard as an authoritative
criterion the following conclusion: "The meaning of the text will be
illuminated by the stated purposes to achieve which the terms of the
Charter were drafted" (separate opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender,
ibid., p. 187).
III. THEVALIDITY OF THE RESOLUTIONS
A. Genrral Observation
In view of the nature of the Charter and the powers of the principal
organs of the United Nations, the presumption in favour of the.validity of
the resolutions of those organs must be taken to be based upon their
powes to interpret the Charter, and to do so exfactis, that is to say by the
very fact that they have adopted a resolution.
To challenge the validity of a resolution, it is not sufficient merely to
allege that it is possible to find a better interpretation; a resolution can
only be criticized if it is demonstrably absolutely impossible to find any
reason whatsoever, even a debatable one, upon which an interpretation
favourable to the validity of the resolution may be based.
B. The Abstention of the Permanent Members
It has been said that:
"It is already well known that an unwritten amendment to the
Charter has taken place in the practice of the Security Council,
namely, to the effect that the abstention of a permanent member
present at a meeting is not assimilated to the exercise of the right to
veto" (dissenting opinion of Judge Bustamante, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 291; see also I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 172, 175and 176, and with
certain reservations, separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice, ibid., p. 210). En vérité cetteappréciation de l'abstention n'est pas seulement basée
sur une pratique incontestée l,ellerésulte aussiforcément dela nature du
silenceet du but du droit de veto 2.
Le silence doit être interprétés ;elon la situatian et les circonstances, il
peut signifier une négation, mais aussi une acceptation. D'après l'inter-
prétation coutumière, dans un scrutin au Conseil, l'abstention d'un
membre peut signifier que ce membre a un doute sur le bien-fondé dela
résolution,mais qu'il ne veutpas empêcherson adoption. Il s'agitnon pas
d'un simple silence mais d'une abstention dont on sait qu'elle sera
considéréecomme une intention de ne pas empêcherl'adoption de la
résolution.
En outre, la condition du ((voteaffirmatif )exigéepar l'article 27 de la
Charte peut s'appliquer aussi bien au contenu de la résolution qu'à
l'adoption de la résolution. Au dernier moment, sauf réserve expresse
d'un membre, un vote affirmatifintervient sur la validitéde la résolution.
Les membres permanents ne sont pas obligésde voter d'une manière
déterminéeet ilspeuvent seprononcer en s'abstenant.
On ne peut pas oublier non plus que le droit de veto est un privilège,
qu'on peut donc y renoncer et le modifier in rneius;et, en tout cas, qu'on
ne doitpas l'interpréterextensivement (privilegia restringendasunt).
L'amendement apporté à la Charte en 1965confirme cette interpréta-
tion. La pratique du Conseil sur les abstentions étantconnue des rédac-
teurs, si l'on n'a pas changéle texte sur cette question, c'estsemble-t-il
parce qu'on n'a pasvoulu changer la pratique antérieure.
C. Les résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité
a) L'article 24 de la Charte
L'interprétationrestrictive proposéepar l'Afrique du Sud ne peut pas
êtreacceptée.
Le Conseil a ((laresponsabilité principale du maintien de la paix ),On
ne peut pas nier, semble-t-il, que l'occupation illégale d'unterritoire
' Stavropoulos, 1The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members
of the Security Councilunder Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations 11(The American Journal of International Law, vol. 61, no 3, juillet 1967,
p. 737-752).
Déjà a la Société desNations, l'article 19, paragraphe 5, du Règlement intérieur
de l'Assembléedisposait que les représentants s'abstenant de voter devaient être
considéréscomme non présents. Rolin l'explique en dipant qu'on ne désirepas que
l'indifférence ou les doutes de certains Membres sur une question à propos de
laquelle l'unanimité des autres Membres est certaine puisse empêcher le vote; si
l'un des Membres ne se considère pas fondé à user de son droit d'opposition quand
l'unanimité est requise,l peut s'abstenir sans invalider le vote. Interprétation selon
laquelle, d'après Riches, on considère que ceux qui s'abstiennent ont donné leur
approbation taciteà l'action de l'Assemblée.The Unanimity Rule and the League of
Nations, Baltimore, 1933, p. 43. In fact this interpretation of abstentions is not merely based upon an
undisputed practice l, it also necessarily follows from the nature of
silence, and from the purpose of the right of veto 2.
Silence must be interpreted according to the situation and the circum-
stances, it may indicate a negation, but it may also mean an acceptance.
In the voting of the Security Council, according to the customary inter-
pretation, the abstention of a member may mean that that member has
some doubt as to the validity of the resolution, but does not wish to
prevent it being adopted. It is not a matter of mere silence, but of an
abstention which, it is known, will be taken as an intention not to prevent
the adoption of the resolution.
Furthermore, the condition of the "affirmative vote", required by
Article 27 of the Charter, may just as well apply to the content of the
resolution as to the adoption of the resolution. At the last moment,
subject to the possibility of an express reservation by one member, an
affirmative vote takes place on the validity of the resolution. The per-
manent members are not obliged to vote in any particular way, and they
iay express their position by abstaining.
Nor can it be overlooked that the right of veto is a privilege, and that
therefore it can be renounced and can be modified in meius; and in any
case that it should not be interpreted extensively (privilegia restringenda
sunt) .
The 1965amendment of the Charter confirms this interpretation. The
practice ofthe Councilregardingabstentions was known to the draftsmen,
and if the text was not altered on this point, it would appear that it was
because it was not intended to change the previous practice.
C. The Resolutions of the Security Council
(a) Article 24 of the Charter
The restrictive interpretation proposed by South Africa cannot be
accepted.
The Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of. ..
peace". It seems undeniable thatthe illegal occupation of a territory with
Stavropoulos, "The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members
of the Security Councilunder Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 3, July 1967,
pp. 737-752.
In the time of the League of Nations, Art. 19, para. 5, of the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly provided that representatives who abstained from voting were to be
considered asnot present. Rolinexplains this by saying that it is undesirable that the
indifference or doubts felt by certain Members on a question on which it is certain
that the other Members will be unanimous should be able to prevent it being voted;
if one Member does not consider itself justified in using its right of opposition when
interpretation, accordingto Riches, by which those who abstain are regarded ass an
having given tacit approval to the action of the Assembly:he Unanimity Rule and
the League of Ndtions, Baltimore, 1933, p. 43.envers lequel les Nations Unies ont accepté «une mission sacrée » soit un
acte contraire au maintien dela paix.
La Cour a dit qu'on doit reconnaître que la Charte, en confiant à un
organe certaines fonctions, avec lesresponsabilitéset les devoirs corréla-
tifs, a donné à l'organe la compétence nécessaire.pour s'en acquitter
dûment (C.I.J.Recueil 1949,p. 179et 182; C.I.J.Recueil 1954, p. 57).
Le paragraphe 2 de I'article 24 n'imposepas une interprétation restric-
tivel.La référence aux (pouvoirs spécifiquesaccordésau Conseil »par les
chapitres VI, VII, VI11et XII ne veut pas dire qu'il possèdeuniquement
ces pouvoirs. Non seulement il peut avoir ceux que prévoient d'autres
règlesde la Charte, mais encore il doit avoir ceux qui lui sont nécessaires
pour accomplir ses devoirs. Les mots ((pouvoirs spécifiquesaccordés ))
signifient simplement que, dans les chapitres en question, ces pouvoirs
sont réglésd'une manière particulièrepour I'accomplissement desdevoirs
et responsabilitésdont il s'agit.
Pour examiner la compétence du Conseil de sécurité à l'égarddes
mandats, la mention du chapitre XII faite à l'article 24 de la Charte
présenteune grande importance.
L'article 80, comme on aura l'occasion de le montrer, a pour but
principal d'éviterque les droits des peuples sous mandat soient modifiés
directement ou indirectement de quelque manière que ce soit. Lorsque la
Société des Nations s'estéteinte,les Nations Unies ont assuméla respon-
sabilité qui incombait à la SdN envers ces peuples. La mention du
chapitre XII dans l'article 24 fait penser que le Conseil a les pouvoirs
spécifiques nécessairespour s'acquitter de ses devoirs envers les peuples
sous mandat.
Il est fort possible que les rédacteursde l'article 24 n'aient pas penàé
I'article 80mais il est probable aussi que les rédacteurs deI'article 80,ou
la plupart d'entre eux, auraient accepté cetteinterprétation, étantdonné
leur intérêptour le maintien des droits des peuples sous mandat.
Quoi qu'il en soit, la lettre de I'article24 ne permet pas d'exclure, sans
une raison spéciale, l'article du chapitre XII; l'objet de I'article24, qui
est de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationalesdans le respect des
buts et principes des Nations Unies, invite à tenir conipte de l'article 80.
L'objet de l'article 80en ce qui concerne la conservation des droits des
peuples sous mandat ne peut être atteint quesi le Conseil de sécurité ala
compétence voulue.
Cela étant,s'iln'yapas une raison convaincante de donner à l'article24
une interprétation restrictive et contrairàsestermes clairs, on est obligé
La responsabilité principale confiée au Conseil impose qu'on lui ?econnaisse
UnitedNationsgResolutions, 1969, p. 72.petence. Voir Castafieda, Legal Efects of regard to which the United Nations has accepted "a sacred trust" is an
ac?contrary to the maintenance of peace.
The Court has said that it must be acknowledgedthat the Charter, by
entrusting certain functions to an organ, with the attendant duties and
responsibilities, has conferred upon that organ the competence required
duly to discharge them (I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 179 and 182; I.C.J.
Reports 1954,p. 57).
Paragraph 2 of Article 24 does not make a restrictive interpretation
inevitable'.The reference to the "specificpowers granted to the Security
Council" by Chapters VI, VII, VI11and XII does not mean that it has
only those powers. Not merely may it have those provided for in other
provisions of the Charter, but in addition it rnust have those which are
necessary to it for the fulfilment of its duties. The words "the specific
powers granted .. ."simply mean that in the Chapters referred to, these
powers are regulated in a particular way forthe fulfilment of the duties
and responsibilities in question.
For the purpose of examining the jurisdiction of the Security Council
with regard to mandates, the mention of Chapter XII in Article 24 of the
Charter is of great importance.
The principal purpose of Article 80, as we shall have to demonstrate,
is to avoid any alteration of the rights of peoples subject to mandate,
directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever. When the League of
Nations came to an end, the United Nations took over the responsibility
of the League towards those peoples. The mention of Chapter XII in
Article 24 leads to the view that the Council has the specific powers
necessaryforthe fulfilmentofitsdutiestoward the peoples under mandate.
It is very possible thathose who drafted Article 24 were not thinking
of Article 80,but it is also probable that those who drafted Article 80, or
the majority of them, would have acceptedthis interpretation, in view of
theirinterest in the conservation of the rights of the peoples subject to
mandate.
However that may be, the wording of Article 24 does not permit of
Article 80 of Chapter XII being excluded without special reason; the
purpose of Article 24, which isto maintain international peace and secu-
rity, thr~ugh respect for the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions, calls for Article 80to be taken into account. The object of Article
80 with regard to the conservation of the rights of the peoples subjectto
mandate can only be achieved if the Security Council possesses the
necessary competence.
This being so,if there is no convincingreason whyArticle 24 should be
given an interpretation which is restrictive and contrary to its clear
The principal responsibility entrusted to the Council requires that it be regarded
as having a residual competence: Castafieda,l Effects of UnifedNations ResoZu-
fions, 1969, p. 72.
175 188 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND. DE CASTRO)
d'interpréter l'article24 en cesens que l'organisation a confiéau Conseil
les pouvoirs suffisantspour que les Nations Unies s'acquittent de leurs
devoirs, selon l'article 80.
b) La non-abstention desmembres parties à un diférend (art. 27, par. 3,
de la Charte)
L'argument tiré de cette observation par l'Afrique du Sud est sans
force du moment que l'on ne peut pas qualifier de différendson refus de
remplir ses obligations de mandataire, comme on vient de le voir.
c) L'Afrique du Sud n'a pas étéconviée à participer aux discussions du
Conseil (art. 32 de la Charte)
L'argument tiré de cette observation tombe dès lors qu'il n'y a pas
de différend. L'Afriquedu Sud avait un intérêtdans les discussions;
non seulement elle n'étaitpas partie à un différend, maisencore elle
ne s'est pas préoccupéede se faire convier, ce qui est un indice qu'elle
ne se considérait pas. à ce moment-là, comme partie à un différendau
sensjuridique.
D. La résolution2145 (XXI) de l'Assembléegénérale
On a mis en doute la validitéde cette résolution de l'Assemblée, en
soutenant que la compétence de l'Assemblée est limitée à des recom-
mandations (art. 10 et art. 11, par. 2 de la Charte). La Cour a déjà
essayéde dissiper ce doute. ((Tandis que c'est leConseil de sécurité qui
possède le droit exclusif d'ordonner une action coercitive, les fonctions
et pouvoirs de l'Assemblée générale seloln a Charte ne sont pas limités
à la discussion, à l'examen, à l'étude età la recommandation; ses attri-
butions ne sont pas simplement de caractère exhortatif » (C.I.J. Recueil
1962,p. 163).((LaCour estime que la sorte d'action dont il est question
à l'article 11, paragraphe 2, est une action coercitive ))(ibid., p. 164).
On ne doit pas oublier que l'article 18parle indistinctement des recom-
mandations et des décisionsde l'Assemblée.Parmi les recommandations
sur les ccquestions importantes 11il y en a qui ont « un effet de caractère
impératif »(ibid., p. 163).
Parmi ces ((questions importantes »sont mentionnées ales questions
relatives au fonctionnement du régimede tutelle ))c'est-à-dire celles qui
relèventdu chapitre XII dela Charte ((Régimeinternational de tutelle ))).
Une des règlesen cause est l'article 80, qui a établile régime desmandats
jusqu'au moment où les territoires sous mandat seraient placéssous le
régimede tutelle l.
' Lors de la 37e séance du Comité de coordination on a dit: 11L'examen du
nouveau membre de phrase proposé par le Comité 1111 1Les questions relatives
au fonctionnement du système de tutelle )Iamène le Comité à conclure que ces
questions comprennent les accords de tutelle, les décisions relatives au rapport et
tout ce qui a trait au régime de tutelle.UNCIO, vol. XIX, p. 324, citation de
C.I.J. Mémoires,Procédurede vote applicable aux questions touchant les rapports et
pétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 49.)terms, Article 24 must be interpreted as meaning that the Organization
has entrusted to the Council powers which are sufficient for the United
Nations to perform its duties, in accordance with Article 80.
(b) The Non-Abstention of the Members Parties to a Dispute (Art. 27,
para. 3, of the Charter)
The argument based on this observation by South Africa loses its
force once it is cPearthat it is impossible to describe its refusal to fulfil
its obligations as Mandatory as a "dispute", as has just been observed.
(c) South Africa Was not Invited to Participate in the Discussionsof the
Security Council (Art. 32 of the Charter)
This argument falls away if there is no dispute. South Africa had an
interest in the discussions; but not merely was it not a party to a dispute,
but also it did not take the trouble to see that it was invited, which is an
indication that it did not, at that time, consider that it was a party to a
dispute in the legal sense.
D. GeneralAssembly Resolution 2145 (XXI)
Doubt has been cast on the validity of this Assembly resolution, onthe
ground that the competence of the Assembly is confined to making
recommendations (Art. 10and Art. 11,para. 2, ofthe Charter).The Court
has already endeavoured to resolve this doubt. "While it is the Security
Council which, exclusively,may order coercive action, the functions and
powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not con-
fined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies, the making of
recommendations; they are not merely hortatory" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 163)."The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Article
11, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action" (ibid.,p. 164).
It should not be forgotten that Article 18refers without distinction to
recommendations and to decisions of the Assembly. Among the recom-
mendations an "important questions", there are some which "have dispo-
sitive.. .effect" (ibid., p. 163).
Among these "important questions", mention is made of "questions
relating to the operation of the trusteeship system", that is to say, ques-
tions relating to Chapter XII of the Charter ("international trusteeship
system"). One of the rules in question is Article 80, which settled what
the position of mandates would be up to the time when the mandated
territories would be placed under the trusteeship system '.
At the 37th meeting of the Coordination Committit wa.ssaid that "Discussion
of the new phrase from Committee 1111'questions relating to the operations of the
trusteeship system' brought an understandingthat the questions embraced trust
agreements, decisions on reports, and everything relating to the system"(UNCI0
relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South West Africa,ons
p. 49).
176 Si l'on admet que les Nations Unies ont accepté de recevoir de la
Sociétédes Nations la ((mission sacrée ))de veiller à ce que les droits
d'aucun peuple sous mandat ne soient modifiés,et si l'on admet que
c'estlà un des buts de la Charte, on doit aussi reconnaître que 1'Assem-
bléea les pouvoirs nécessairespour remplir ses devoirs (voir opinion
individuelle de sirPercy Spender, ibid., p. 186-187).
Les termes de la résolution, en déclarant que l'Afrique du Sud «a
faillià ses obligations en ce qui concerne l'administration du Territoire »,
qu'elle (a, en fait, dénoncéle mandat ))et que le mandat est ((terminé D,
montrent clairement le caractère et le but de la résolution.
La résolution n'impose par elle-mêmeaucune obligation spécialeou
charge aux Etats, hormis l'Afrique du Sud. Elle se limite à constater et
à déclarerla déchéancedu mandat l.Depuis la résolution, le mandat,
seul titre qui pouvait légitimerla possession du territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain, a perdu son apparence d'existence. Situation nouvelle et qui
doit êtrerespectéepar tous, étant donné la compétence des Nations
Unies à cet effet.
La résolution2145 (XXI) n'a certainement pas un caractèrejudiciaire,
elle n'empiète ni ne suppose un empiètement sur la compétencede la
Cour. Les Nations Unies ont estiméle moment venu de s'acquitter de
leurs devoirs envers lepeuple deNamibie, enretirant solennellement tout
semblant de légalité àl'occupation de son territoire par l'Afrique du Sud.
La résolution ((appellel'attention du Conseil de sécuritésur la pré-
sente résolution ».Cela montre que l'Assemblée se limite à sa fonction
déclaratoire, en conformité avec les articles 80 et 18 de la Charte et
qu'elle demande la coopération du Conseil pour que celui-ci détermine
la sorte d'action appropriée à la situation.
Le Conseil de sécurité aréaffirmé la responsabilitéspéciale desNations
Unies à l'égarddu peuple namibien (résolution264 (1969)), a demandé
à l'Afrique du Sud de retirer son administration du territoire de la
Namibie (résolution269 (1969))et a réaffirmé la résolution2145 (XXI).
Autrement dit, il a fait siennes les résolutions de l'Assemblée, il lesa
affirmées à nouveau, et s'est engagédans la voie des mesures coercitives.
' La résolution 2145 (XXI) est la manifestation de l'exercice d'un pouvoir-
devoir loficium) de l'Assemblée. en vue d'accom~lir la 11mission sacrée» aue
l'organisation1;i a confiée. Par ille, l'Assemblaela possibilité et le devoirAde
déclarer terminéel'administration aue la communauté internationale a confiéeau
mandataire, pour qu'il l'exerceenin nom, quand le mandataire s'est révindigne
de cette confiance. Par la résolution (XXI), l'Assembléea modifié la situation
juridique du territoire sous mandat, et avec elle a disparu le titre juridique de
l'ancien mandataireà la possession du territoire du Sud-Ouest africain ou Namibie.
C'est un changement dans le statut du territoire qui doit être respecté par tous.
On peut citer des résolutions antérieures qui changent une situation juridique,
et font naître aussi des conséquences juridiques (obligations, droits), sbasea
d'autres dispositions de la Charte ou d'autres résolutions (émanant par exemple du
Conseil); voir sur ce pointstafieda, loc. cit., p. 121. If it is recognized that the United Nations accepted the transfer from
the League of Nations of the "sacred trust" of guarding against any
modification of the rights of any people under mandate, and if it is
recognized that this is one of the purposes of the Charter, it must also be
admitted that the Assembly has the powers necessary for the fulfilment
of itsduties (see separate opinion of Sir Percy Spender, ibid.,pp. 186-187).
The terms of the resolution, which declares that South Africa "has
failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the man-
dated territory", and that it "has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate", and
thatthe Mandate is"terminated", clearly showthe nature andthe purpose
of the resolution.
The resolution does not of itself lay any svecial obligation on States
other than South Africa. It confines itself to noting and declaring the
forfeiture of the Mandate '.Sincethe resolution waspassed, the Mandate,
the onlytitle justifying possession of the Territory of South West Africa,
has lost any appearance of continued existence. This is a new situation
and one which must be respected by all, in view of the competence of
the United Nations in this regard.
Resolution 2145 (XXI) is certainly not judicial in nature, it does not
encroach, and does not involve any encroachment, on the competence of
the Court. The United Nations believed that the time had come to fulfil
its duties towards the people of Namibia by solemnly withdrawing any
semblance of legality from South Africa's occupation of the Territory.
The resolution "calls theattention ofthe Security Council to the present
resolution". This shows that the Assembly is confining itself to its decla-
ratory function, in accordance with Articles 80and 18of the Charter, and
that it is requesting the CO-operationof the Security Council so that the
latter may determine the kind of action appropriate to the situation.
The Security Council has reaffirmed the special responsibility of the
United Nations with regard to the people of Namibia (resolution 264
(1969)), called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from
theTerritory of Namibia (resolution 269(1969))and reaffirmedresolution
2145(XXI). Inother words ithas adoptedthe resolutions ofthe Assembly,
affirmed them afresh, and taken a step towards coercive measures.
Resolution 2145 (XXI) is the manifestation of the exercise of a power coupled
with a duty (oficium) of the Assembly, with a view to the fulfilment of the "sacred
trust" entrusted to it by the Organization. Through tthe Assembly has the faculty
the internationalcommunity to the Mandatory,isto be exercised on its behalf, when
the Mandatory has shown itself unworthy of that confidence. By resolution 2145
(XXI), the General Assembly modified the legal situation of the mandated territory,
and with that resolution theegal title of the former Mandatorto possession of the
Territory of South West Africa or Namibia disappeared: thiis a change in the status
of the Territory which must be respected byall.
Examples might be given of earlier resolutions which change a legal situation, and
also giverise to legal consequences (obligations, rigon the basis of other provi-
sions of the Charter or other resolutions (forple of the Council); seeCastafieda,
/oc. cit., p. 121. IV. LA TRANSMISSION DES POUVOIRS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS
AUX NATIONU SNIES
A. L'article 80 de la Charte
1. L'Afrique du Sud est le seul de tous les Etats mandataires à avoir
poséla question. Selon sa thèse, le mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain
s'est éteintavec la dissolution de la Société desNations ou, en tout cas,
l'obligation d'envoyer des rapports annuels concernant le territoire a
pris fin. De son côtéla Cour affirme, dans son avis de 1950,que ce terri-
toire est soumis au mandat et que l'Afrique du Sud est assujettie aux
obligations du mandat, les Nations Unies exerçant les fonctions de
surveillance.
MM. McNair et Read ont expriméune opinion contraire. Ils croient
que la surveillance de la Société desNations sur le mandataire a cessé,
parce que les organes destinés à recevoir les rapports n'existant plus,
il est ainsi devenu impossible de remplir cette obligation (C.I.J. Recueil
1950, p. 159 et 169; opinion dissidente de M. van Wyk, C.I.J. Recueil
1962,p. 648) '.
Cette interprétation étroite a été clairementrepoussée par la Cour.
Dans l'affaire de la Barcelona Traction (exceptions préliminaires) s'est
poséela question de la juridiction de la Cour, sur la base d'un traité
possédant une clause qui conférait juridiction à la Cour permanente.
On a dit que la dissolution de la Cour permanente rendait impossible
l'application de cette clause (opinion dissidente de M. Morelli, C.I.J.
Recueil 1964, p. 95-96). Mais la Cour a déclaréau contraire que la Cour
permanente ((étaitsimplement un moyen d'atteindre cet objet »,c'est-
à-dire (le règlementjudiciaire »;il est vrai que l'ancienne Cour n'existe
plus, mais l'obligation ((survit en substance, bien qu'elle ne puisse être
exécutéefonctionnellement ));et «si un autre tribunal est fourni par le
jeu automatique d'un autre instrument liant les deux parties »,la clause
entre à nouveau en vigueur (C.I.J. Recueil1964,p. 38-39).Ce qui importe,
c'est le but et non l'instrument. Le consentement à la transmission de
pouvoirs résulte de la condition de Membre des Nations Unies (ibid.,
p. 35).
L'autorité de l'avis de 1950 est bien établie.Elle a étéconfirméenon
seulement par les avis de 1955et de 1956,mais aussi par l'arrêtde 1962
sur les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 333-334).
Au surplus, la Cour a rejeténettement les arguments de MM. McNair
et Read (affaire de la Barcelona Traction).
L'opinion dissidente commune de sir Percy Spender et sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain rouvre le probème
McNair et Read ont estiménon pas que l'Afrique du Sud était libéréede ses
obligations de mandataire, mais que leur mise en Œuvre pouvait êtreexigéeseule-
ment par les anciens Membres de la Société desNations et devant la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice.
178 IV. TRANSMISSIO ONPOWERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
A. Article 80 of the Charter
1. South Africa is the only mandatory State ever to have raised this
question. According to its contention, the Mandate for South West
Africa came to an end with the dissolution of the League of Nations or,
at any event, the obligation to make annual reports concerning the
Territory came to anend. In its 1950Advisory Opinion the Court affirmed
that the Territory was stillder mandate and that South Africa still had
the obligations fiowing from the Mandate, the supervisory functions
being exercised by the United Nations.
Judges McNair and Read expressed a contrary view. They considered
that the League of Nations' supervision of the Mandatory had corneto an
end, because, the organs designated to receivethe reports no longer exist-
ing, it had becorne impossible to perform this obligation (I.C.J. Reports
1950,.pp. 159 and 169; dissenting opinion of Judge van Wyk, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 648) '.
This narrow interpretation has been clearly discarded by the Court.
In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary
Objections, the Court had to decide whether it had jurisdiction on the
basis of a treaty containing a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Per-
manent Court. It was argued that the dissolution of the Permanent Court
made it impossible to apply that provision (dissenting opinion of Judge
Morelli, I.C.J. Reports 1964, pp. 95 f.). But the Court found on the
contrary that the Permanent Court "was merely a means for achieving
that object", namely "judicial settlement"; while it was true that the
former Court no longer existed, the obligation remained "substantively
in existence, though not functionally capable of beingmplemenied", and
if another tribunal were "supplied by the automatic operation of some
other instrument by which both parties are bound", the clausegain came
into force(ibid., pp. 38 f.). The important thing was the purpose and not
the instrument. Consent to the transfer of powers resulted frommember-
ship of the United Nations (ibid., p. 35).
The authority of the 1950Opinion has been firmly established. It was
confirmëd not only by the 1955and 1956Opinions, but also by the 1962
Judgment in the South West Africa cases (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp333 f.).
Moreover the Court has clearly rejected the arguments of Judges McNair
and Read (Barcelona Traction case).
The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice in the South West Africa cases reverted to the prob-
Judges McNair and Read did not consider that South Africa had been relieved
of its obligations as the Mandatory, but that their performance could be demanded
only by former Members of the League and by application to the International
Court of Justice.de la transmission des pouvoirs, en rejetant l'opinion de 1950 comme
((certainementerronée 1(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 532, note 2). Attendu
que la critique porte sur l'interprétation del'article 80et sur ses antécé-
dents (ibid., p. 516, note l), il semble nécessaire de les étudier avec
d'autant plus d'attention que la Cour a dit en 1966ne pas vouloir pré-
juger la question (C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 19).
On ne saurait bien interpréter l'article 80sans considérer ses buts et
les circonstances historiques de sa rédaction. Les auteurs de la Charte
avaient le ferme propos non seulement de maintenir les progrès faits
par la Société desNations sous le régime desmandats, pour la protec-
tion des peuples indigènes, mais aussi de les accroître grâce au régime
de tutelle.
La Charte, et notamment son article 80, est signée le 26 juin 1945.
La Sociétédes Nations existe encore. Mais avant sa dissolution. le
régimede tutelle et l'article 80 ne pourront pas êtreappliqués. Comme
les Etats et les experts qui s'occupent de la création des Nations Unies
et de la liquidation de la Société desNations sont pratiquement les
mêmes, il est possiblede rédigerla Charte en envisageant la liquidation
prochaine de la Société desNations.
L'article 80 ne pouvait pas être appliquéimmédiatement. Jusqu'au
moment de la liquidation de la SdN, il n'a aucunefonction. Les mandats
sont encore exercésau nom de la Société desNations, et jusqu'à la
liquidation ils ne peuvent êtreconvertis en tutelles ou passer sous le
contrôle des Nations Unies. L'action de l'article 80 est soumise à une
condition suspensive. C'est en prévisiondu moment où il jouera qu'on
établitla clause qu'on a cru pouvoir qualifier de ((conservatoire B.Celle-ci
préciseque les dispositions du chapitre XII (spécialement lesart. 75 et
77)ne modifieront pas lesrégimesexistants des mandats. Mais on prévoit
en outre un régimetransitoire, pour la périodequi doit s'écoulerentre
la liauidation de la Société desNations et la conclusion des accords de
tutelle. Ce régime transitoire vise seulement les territoires soumis au
système des mandats, c'est-à-dire les ((territoires actuellement sous
Mandat ))parce qu'on n'avait pas la possibilité desoumettre au régime
transitoire, par la simple application des dispositions de la Charte, les
autres territoires énuméréd sans l'article77.
Pour ces territoires encore sous mandat, on stipule que les nouvelles
dispositions de la Charte ne modifieront ((directement ou indirectement
en aucune manière les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat ou d'aucun
peuple ou les dispositions d'actes internationaux en vigueur auxquels
des Membres de l'organisation peuvent être parties ».Ces territoires
restent donc, jusqu'au moment de la conclusion des accords de tutelle,
(sous Mandat » (art. 80; art. 77).
2. L'interprétation proposée semble êtrebien dans la ligne de l'avis
de 1950.Il ne faut pas oublier néanmoinsque l'avis a été critiquépar des
autorités. On a soutenu que l'article 80 n'est plus qu'une ((clause delem of the transmission of powers, rejecting the 1950Opinion as "defin-
itelywrong" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 532,note 2). As this criticism relates
to the interpretation of Article 80 and to its background, careful study of
these matters would seem to be called for (ibid., p. 516, note I), particu-
larly as the Court stated in 1966 that it did not wish to prejudice the
question (I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 19).
Article 80 cannot be properly interpreted without considering its pur-
poses and the historical context of the time when it was drafted. The
framers ofthe Charter weredetermined not only to maintain the progress
made in the protection of indigenous peoples by the League of Nations
under the mandates system, but also to intensify it through the trustee-
ship system.
The Charter, including Article 80, was signed on 26 June 1945. The
League of Nations still existed. Before its dissolution, the trusteeship
system and Article 80 could not be implemented. As the States and
experts involved in the creation of the United Nations and the liquida-
tion of the League of Nations were practically the same, it was possible
to frame the Charter with the forthcoming liquidation of the League of
Nations in mind.
Article 80 could not be applied at once. It had no function until the
League of Nations was liquidated. The mandata were still exercised on
behalf of the League of Nations, and until its liquidation they could not
be converted into trusteeships or come under the supervision of the
United Nations. The operation of Article 80 was subject to a suspensive
condition. It was with a view to the time when it would come into opera-
tion that the provision which has been called a "conservatory" clause was
included. This clause stipulates that the provisions of Chapter XII
(particularly Arts. 75 and 77) would not alter the existing mandates
régime. But inaddition provision was made for a transitional régime,
for the period which must elapse between the liquidation of the League of
Nations and the conclusion of trusteeship agreements. This transitional
régime related onlyto the territories administered under the mandates
system, namely "territories now held under mandate", because there was
no possibility of placing the other territories listed in Article 77 under
the transitional régime bythe mere application of the provisions of the
Charter.
For the territories still heldnder mandate, it was provided that none
of the new provisions of the Charter would "in or of itself . . alter in any
manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms
of existing international instruments to which Members of the United
Nations may respectivelybe parties". Theseterritoriesthereforeremained,
until the conclusion of trusteeship agreements, "held under mandate"
(Art. 80; Art. 77).
2. The interpretation proposed seems closely in accordance with the
Advisory Opinion of 1950.But one may not overlook the fact that that
Opinion has been criticized by certain authorities. It has been main-sauvegarde )),destinée à empêcher queles dispositions du chapitre XII
((soient interprétéesde façon à avoir des effets dépassant leur objectif »,
et que son (cseul but» est d'empêcher uneinterprétation permettant de
cmodifier des droits existant antérieurement à un certain événemen t
(opinion dissidente commune Spender et Fitzmaurice, C.I.J. Recueil1962,
p. 516, note).
Ces affirmations s'appuient sur un membre de phrase de l'article (((ne
sera interprétée commemodifiant ..»), mais elles ne donnent d'expli-
cation ni sur l'objet de l'article ni sur les droits qu'il viseà conserver.
Or on ne peut accepter sans explication que la seule fonction de l'article
80 soit celle d'une clause interprétative au sens technique.
C'estpourquoi des explications ont été proposées.On a ditque l'article
80 concernait les droits conféréspar les mandats, mais seulement pour
la périodeallant de l'entréeen vigueur de la Charte à la liquidation de
la Société des Nations. On a pensé aussi qu'il visait lesdroits qui dérivent
des accords de tutelle.
Ces efforts se sont révéléisnutiles. Ils ne tiennent pas compte de ce
que la règlede l'article 80est applicable seulement ((jusqu'à ce que ces
accords [les accords particuliers de tutelle] aient étéconclus 1)Donc, elle
est applicable après laliquidationde la Société desNations etjusqu'à la
conclusion des accords, et elle n'est pas applicable après laconclusion
des accords.
L'interprétation proposée par l'avis de 1950 semble donc la seule
conforme au but et à la lettre de l'article 80.Il est vrai aue le libelléde
cette disposition n'est pas très clair, mais la lecture des travaux prépa-
ratoires donne l'impression qu'il résultedu souci des rédacteurs de tenir
compte de plusieurs buts et de les harmoniser dans cet article.
Il convient de ne pas oublier les desiderata du régimeinternational de
tutelle. Son établissement dépenddes accords de tutelle et jusqu'à la
conclusion de ces accords on veut maintenir le statu quo. 11est déclaré
dans la Charte (art. 76) que les fins essentiellesdu régimede tutelle sont
conformes aux buts des Nations Unies, énoncés à l'article premier. Cette
déclarationaffecte-t-elle les droits des Etats mandataires? Pour lever les
doutes, on dira qu'aucune disposition du chapitre XII ne sera interprétée
comme modifiant les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat (la réserve finale
de l'article76 d) a le mêmebut). Pour conserver dans son intégritéle
régime desmandats, on croit nécessairede dire aussi que les dispositions
du chapitrequi concernent la fin des mandats ne peuvent êtreinterprétées
comme modifiant les droits des peuples. Enfin, pour évitertoute phrase
qui fasse penser à une survivance prolongéedes mandats, on ne s'occupe
pas d'eux, sauf pour rappeler qu'ils doivent êtreremplacéspar des ac-
cords de tutelle. Utilisant le mot ((interprété1)dans le sens peu technique
où il est emp!oyéau paragraphe 1 (le texte anglais dit: construe),le pa-
ragraphe 2 de l'article 80 dit que le paragraphe 1 ne doit pas être((inter- tained that Article 80 is no more than a "saving clause" designed to
prevent the provisions of Chapter XII from "being interpreted so as to
operate beyond their intendment" and that its "sole purpose" is to pre-
vent them from "being construed so as to alter existing rights prior to
acertain event" (joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 516, note).
These assertions are based on a phrase in the Article ("nothing ...
shall be construed . ..to alter ..."),but they fail to give any explanation
as to the purpose of the Article orthe rights it is meant to conserve. Now
it is impossible to admit without any explanation that the sole function
of Article 80can have been that of an interpretation clause in the technical
sense.
Certain explanations have therefore been put forward. Article 80
has been said to relate to the rights conferred by mandates, but only
for the period intervening between the entry into force of the Charter
and the liquidation of the League of Nations. It has also been regarded
as concerning the rights derived from trusteeship agreements.
But these efforts have been of no avail. They do not take account of
the fact that the rule embodied in Article 80 is applicable only "until such
[trusteeship] agreements have been concluded". Thus it is applicable
after the liquidation of the League of Nations and until the conclusion of
süch agreements, and it is not applicable after the conclusion of the
agreements.
The interpretation put forward by the 1950 Advisory Opinion would
therefore appear to be the only one in conformity with the purpose and
the letter of Article 80. It is true that the wordingL,f that clause is not
very clear, but a reading of the travaux préparatoires givesthe impression
that it is the result of the draftsmen's concern to take several purposes
into account and to harmonize them in the Article.
Nor should the desiderata of the international trusteeship system be
forgotten. Its establishment depended on the trusteeship agreements, and
it was desired to maintain the status quo until they had been concluded.
The Charter declares, in Article 76,that the basic objectives of the trustee-
ship system are in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations
laid down in Article 1.The question was whether that declaration affected
the rights of the mandatory Powers. To remove doubt on that score, it
was decided to provide that nothing in Chapter XII should be construed
to alter the rights whatsoever of any State (the reservation at the end of
Art. 76 (d) was inserted with the sameend in view).To keep the mandates
systern as such intact, it was also thought necessary to provide that
nothing in the Chapter concerning the end of mandates could be con-
strued to alter the rights of peoples. Finally, to avoid any form of words
capable of suggesting a prolonged survival of mandates, they were not
referred to, except by way of a reminder that they should be replaced by
trusteeship agreements. Using the term "interpret" in the somewhat
non-technical sense in which "interpréter" is employed in the Frenchprété 1)comme motivant un retard ou un ajournement de la négociation
et de la conclusion d'accords de tutelle.
11y a aussi d'autres raisons de tenir pour fondéel'interprétation faite
par l'avisde 1950.
Interprétécomme une simple (clause de sauvegarde )),l'article 80 est
en réalité réduit à néant, à l'inutilitéabsolue. Si l'on considère que la
liquidation de la Sociétédes Nations avait mis fin aux mandats ou aux
obligations des mandataires, l'article est privéde toute signification
pratique. Dans ce sens McNair avait raison de dire «qu'il est difficile
d'apercevoir la pertinence de cet article 1)(C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 160).
Mais est-ce une bonne méthoded'interprétationd'arriver à la conclusion
absurde qu'un article de la Charte présenteune inutilité totale?
3. Les antécédents del'article 80 ont étébien étudiés,comme on peut
le voir dans les publications de la Cour sur les affaires du Sud-Ouest
africain. Lesexaminer à nouveau serait alourdir inutilement cette opinion.
Mais il pourra êtreutile de reproduire quelques textes déjàconnus de la
Cour en 1950.
Le 14mai 1945, à San Francisco, au comité 4 dela Commission II, le
délégué de l'Afrique du Sud a dit que ((les conditions des mandats actuels
ne pourraient êtremodifiéessans le consentement de la Puissance man-
dataire )).Son souci était ladéfense desdroits des Etats, dans la période
antérieure aux accords de tutelle. Le délégué de 1'Egyptes'est intéressé
à la sauvegarde des droits des peuples sous mandat. De là, la proposition
du délégué deE stats-Unis d'aprèslaquelle tous les droits existants ((de-
meurent exactement tels qu'ils sont ))- (cilsne sont ni augmentés ni
diminués ))- (UNCIO, vol. X, p. 442et 49 1;citations dans C.I.J. Mémoi-
res, Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 98). Dans le même
sens,Stassena dit que lebut est ((deprotégerles droits pendant la période
transitoire qui s'écouleraentre l'adoption de la Charte et la négociation
etla conclusion denouveaux accords )(8juin 1945,n0Y4, 25, UN Arch.,
vol. 70, citation dans C.I.J. Mémoires,ibid., p. 217).
A la Commission II de la conférencede San Francisco, Fraser (premier
ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande), président du comité de tutelle, dit à
propos du rapport de ce comité: ILe mandat n'appartient pas à mon
pays ou à un autre pays. On le tient en trust pour le monde. ))Il a déclaré
aussi :
((L'Œuvrequi s'imposeimmédiatement ànous consiste à rechercher
comment ces mandats, qui étaient précédemmentplacés sous la
surveillance de la commission des mandats de la Société deN s ations,
pourront maintenant êtreplacéssous la surveillance du Conseil de
tutelle.»
Fraser est le dernier à parler sur le rapport. Après son intervention, le NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 193
text (the English text has "construe"), paragraph 2 of Article 80 States
that paragraph 1should not be "interpreted" as giving grounds for delay
or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of trusteeship agree-
ments.
There are also other reasons for considering that the interpretation
given by the 1950Advisory Opinion was correct.
Interpreted as a mere "saving clause", Article 80 is really reduced to
nothing, to total pointlessness. If the view is taken that the liquidation of
the League of Nations put an end to the mandates or to the obligations
of the mandatories, the Article is deprived of al1practical meaning. In
this sense Judge MacNair was right in saying "that it is difficultto seethe
relevance of this Article"(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 160).But can a method
of interpretation be a good one if it leads to the absurd conclusion that
an Article of the Charter is totally pointless?
3. The history of Article 80has been thoroughly studied, as is apparent
in the Court's publications in the South West Africa cases. To examine it
afresh would be unnecessarily to burden this opinion; but it may be of use
to reproduce a few texts with which the Court was already acquainted
in 1950.
On 14 May 1945at San Francisco, in Committee 1114,the delegate of
South Africa said that "the terms of existing mandates could not be
altered without the consent of the mandatory Power". It was his concern
to protect the rights of States in the period preceding the conclusion of
trusteeship agreements, whereas the delegate of Egypt expressed concern
forthe preservation of the rights of peoples administered under mandate.
This led to the proposition ofthe United States delegate, to the effectthat:
"al1rights, whatever they may be, remain exactly the same as they exist-
that they are neither increased nor diminished..." (UNCIO docs., Vol. X,
pp. 439 and 486, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, InternationalStatus of South
West Africa, p. 98). In the same sense, Mr. Stassen said that the purpose
was "to preserve the rights during that in-between period fromthe time
this Charter isadoptedand thetime that the new agreements are negotiated
and completed" (8 June 1945: running numbers 24, 25. UN Archives,
Vol. 70, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings, ibid.,p. 217).
In Commission II of the San Francisco Conference, Mr. Fraser (Prime
Minister of New Zealand), the president of the Trusteeship Committee,
said with regard to the report of that Committee: "The Mandate does
not belong to my country or any other country. It is held intrust for the
world." He also stated that:
"The work immediately ahead is how those mandates that were
previously supervised by the Mandate Commission of the League of
Nations can now be supervised by the Tru'steehipCouncil."
Mr. Fraser was the last speaker on the report, and when he had finished, i94 NAMIBIE (S.-0. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. DE CASTRO)
maréchal Smuts, président dela Commission II, déclarele rapport accepté
intégralement (UNCIO, doc. 1144, séancedu 21 juin 1945; doc. 1208,
séancedu 27juin 1945 ; citations dans C.I.J. Mémoires,Statut international
du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 108).
Le maréchal Smuts, premier ministre de l'Union sud-africaine, inter-
rogésur la signification de l'article 80,paragraphe 2,réponden cestermes:
((Ceciétaitdestiné à prévenir une situation dans laquelle le man-
dataire dirait: ((Je ne tiens à conclure aucun accord ))II adopte cette
manière de voir que, la Société desNations ayant disparu, nous
sommes maintenant libres, nous pouvons faire ce que nous voulons. »
(Union of South Africa House of Assembly, 13 mars 1946,citation
dans l'exposéde M.Ingles(Philippines), C.I.J. Mémoires,ibid.,p. 242.)
4.. L'article 80 est aussi la base de référence oul'appui de la résolution
de la Société desNations en date du 18avril 1946 l. La Société desNa-
tions peut mourir tranquille, parce que les principes de la Charte sont
les mêmesque ceux de l'article 22 du Pacte et que subsiste le principe du
bien-être etdu développement des peuples non encore capables de se
diriger eux-mêmes.Ayant fait leur, en signant la Charte, l'article 80,les
mandataires manifestent leur volonté de continuer à administrer les
territoires en conformité avec l'article 22 du Pacte et les instruments de
mandat.
La conclusion selon laquelle l'Afrique du Sud est restée soumiseaux
obligations internationales énoncées S.l'article 22 du Pacte et selon la-
quelle iesfonctions de contrôlesur leur accompiissement doivent êtreexer-
céespar les Nations Unies, a donc comme fondement: l'acceptation par
le mandataire de l'article 80 (du fait qu'il a signéla Charte), la résolution
du 18avril 1946(qui déclarela fin des fonctions de la Société des Nations
et son agrément aux dispositions de la Charte) et les déclarations par
lesquelles les mandataires ont annoncéleur intention de continuer à ad-
ministrer les territoires sous mandat conformément aux obligations con-
tenues dans les divers mandats.
5. Ces conclusions ont été durementcritiquées et l'autorité de l'avis
de 1950 a étémise en doute sur la base de ce qu'on appelle ((les faits
nouveaux ))-- faits qui, prétend-on, n'auraient pas été connusde la Cour
en i950. Mais l'étude decesprécédents,vus sans parti pris, semble mener
au résultatcontraire ?.La préoccupation fondamentale de la plupart des
rédacteurs de la Charte et des liquidateurs de la Société desNations a
l Sur la conscience de ce que les Nations Unies allaient continuer l'Œuvre de
en date du 18avril 1946; voir aussi les observations de Bourquin et Bailey (citations
dans C.I.J. Mémoires. Statut international du Sud-Ouest africaiD. 209 et note 1.
p. 210). ,.
Voir sur ce point un excellent exposé dans l'opinion dissidente de M. Jessup,
C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 339-351. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 194
Field Marshal Smuts, presiding, declared it adopted in full (UNCIO
docs.,. 1144(21 June 1945) and 1208 (27 June 1945), quoted in I.C.J.
Pleadings,ibid., p. 108).
Field Marshal Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa,
replied to a question put to him on the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
80 by saying:
"That was to prevent a situation where the mandatory says: 'I do
not want to make an agreement ai all'. He takes this position, that
the League of Nations having disappeared we are now free, that we
can do what we like" (Union of South Africa, Debates of the House
of Assembly, 13March 1946,quoted in the statement by Mr. Ingles
(Philippines),Z.C.J. Pleadings, ibid.,p. 242).
4. Article 80 is also the basis of reference or support for the League of
Nations resolution of 18April 1946 '.The dying League of Nations could
be easy in its mind because the principles of the Charter werethe same as
those of Article 22 of the Covenant, the principle of the well-being and
development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves being
preserved. Having by their signature of the Charter endorsed Article 80,
the mandatories manifested their intention to continue to administer the
territories in accordance with Article 22of the Covenant and the mandate
instruments.
The conclusion that South Africa remained subject to the international
obligations contained in Article 22 of the Covenant and that the super-
visory functions with regard to their performance were to be carried out
by the United Nations is thus based on the acceptance by the mandatory
of Article 80 (because it signed the Charter), the resolution of 18 April
1946(whichdeclaredthe f~nctions ofthe Leagueof Nations to be at an end
and stated its agreement with the provisions of the Charter) and the
statements whereby the mandatories announced their intention of con-
tinuing. to administer the mandated territories in accordance with the
"
obligations set out in the various mandates.
5. These conclusions have been severelycriticized and doubt has been
cast on the authority of the 1950Opinion on the basis of what has been
called the "new facts2'-facts which it is claimed were unknown to the
Court in 1950.But the study of the background, looked at with an open
mind, would seemto lead to a contrary result2.The basic concern of most
of the frarners of the Charter and of the liquidators of the League of
On the subject of the understanding that the United Natiwas to continue
the work of the League, see the preamble to the League Assembly's resolution of
Committee (cited in I.C.J. Pleadings, International Status of South West Africa, pp.
209 f.).
See the excellent account of the matter given by Judge Jessup in a dissenting
opinion:Z.C.J Reports 1966, pp. 339-351.été depréserver lesdroits des peuples et leur garantie, et c'est seulement
en second lieu qu'ils ont eu le souci de maintenir les droits des Etats
(question de la porte ouverte).
Des renseignements mêmesfournis par l'Afrique du Sud à l'audience
du 15mars 1971sur lesantécédentsconcernantla rédaction del'article 80,
il ressort que, dans le texte proposépar le comitétechnique, il est prévu
que les droits des Etats et des peuples ou ((lestermes d'un mandat quel-
conque ))ne seront modifiésni directement ni indirectement, et 1'Egypte
fait référence aussiaux ((termes d'un mandat quelconque )).Les Etats-
Unis parlent d'une clause((conservatoireou de sauvegarde »,par laquelle
tous les droits restent les mêmeset ne sont (ni augmentés ni diminués )).
Dans la proposition de la Syrie, on mentionne aussi les termes d'un
Mandat quelconque n.Le groupe consultatif propose de ne pas modifier
les droits quels qu'ils soient ...((ou les termes des actes internationaux
existants ».Les Etats-Unis demandent que, dans les actes officiels, on
consigne que, parmi ((lesdroits quels qu'ils soient)),sont compris tous
les droits stipulés à l'article 22, paragraphe 4, du Pacte. Le comité de
coordination signale que l'intention du comité4 de la Commission II est
de ((respecterle statu quo ».
Dans ces discussions, l'Union soviétique déclare craindre que le main-
tien sans changement de l'ancien régime desmandats ne soit l'occasion
de retarder la conclusion des accords de tutelle et de perpétuer indéfini-
ment les mandats.
Une foisla Charte signée ',laSociétédeN s ations sepréoccuped'assurer
la poursuite de son Œuvre concernant la protection des peuples sous
mandat. M. Liang propose à la Première Commission, qui discute la
transmission des fonctions de la Société desNations, une recomman-
dation tendant à ce que les Etats administrant des mandats soumettent
des rapports annuels aux Nations Unies, jusqu'à la constitution du
comitéde tutelle. Ce projet n'est pas acceptécar il se situe hors de la
compétencede la commission. Plus tard, le moment venu de traiter des
mandats, M. Liang présente un autre projet dans lequel on ne mentionne
pas les rapports annuels et qui sera la base de la résolution du 18 avril
1946.On a considéréle retrait du premier projet et la nouvelle rédaction
du projet de M. Liang comme une raison de ne pas accepter l'opinion
émisedans l'avisde 1950selon laquelle les fonctions de la Société seraient
passéesaux Nations Unies (opinion individuelle de M. van Wyk, citant
l'opinion dissidente de sir Percy Spender et de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
C.I.J. Recuei 1l966,p. 112).Mais si le projet Liang a été abandonné,ce
n'est pas parce qu'il prévoyait latransmission des fonctions; c'est parce
qu'il manquait de réalismeen ce sens que des rapports ne pouvaient pas
êtreenvoyéssimplement à l'Assemblée généralq e, 'un organismebureau-
II est à noter qu'aux neuvièmeet dixième séancesdu comité4 dela Commission
II,l'Argentine, 1'Ethiopieet le Guatemala ont fait des réservesà l'article 80, mais
non l'Afrique du Sud. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 195
Nations was to preserve the rights of peoples and the safeguards for
those rights, and only secondarily the rights of States (the open-door
question).
From the information provided by South Africa itself at the hearing of
15March 1971concerning the background to the drafting of Article 80,
it appears that, in the text proposed by the Technical Committee, it was
provided that nothing should in and of itself alter the rights of any States
or any peoples "or the terms of any mandate". An Egyptian proposal
also referred to "the terms of any mandate". The United States spoke of
"a conservatory or safeguarding clause", whereby al1 rights would
remain the same and be "neither increased nor diminished". The Syrian
proposa1 also referred to "the terms of any mandate". The Consultative
Group proposed that what should be specified as not being altered were
the rights whatsoever ... "or the terms of existing international instru-
ments". The United States asked that it should be placed on record that
among "rights whatsoever" were included any rights provided by Article
22,paragraph 4, ofthe Covenant. The Coordination Committee indicated
that the intention of Committee 1114was "to freezethe present position".
In these discussions the SovietUnion said itfeared that the preservation
of the former mandate régime unchanged might be usedas a pretext to
delay the conclusion of trusteeship agreements and indefinitelyperpetuate
the mandates.
Once the Charter had been signed l,the League of Nations concerned
itself with ensuring the continuation of jts work with a view to the
protection of the peoples under mandate. Dr. Liang proposed in the
First Committee, which was discussing the transmission of the League of
Nations' functions, a draft recommending that the mandatory Powers
should submit annual reports to the United Nations until the Trusteeship
Council had been constituted. This draft was not accepted, as it was
outside the Committee's terms of reference. Later, when the time came to
discuss the mandates, Dr. Liang submitted another draft in which no
reference was made to annual reports, and which was to provide the basis
for the resolution of 18 April 1946.The withdrawal of Dr. Liang's first
draft, and the wording of the new draft, have been regarded as providing
a reason for rejecting the view of the 1950 Advisory Opinion that the
League's functions passed to the United Nations (separate opinion of
Judge van Wyk, citing the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy
Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 112).But if
the Liang draft was abandoned, it was not because it provided for the
transmission of functions; it was because it was unrealistic in the sense
that reports could not simply be sent to the General Assembly. Some
It is noteworthy that during the ten meetings heId by Committee 1114Argentina,
Ethiopia and Guatemala expressed reservations in respect of Articleut South
Africa did not. 196 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. DE CASTRO)
cratique spécialiséétaitnécessaire,ce qui, selon l'Union soviétique,était
anticonstitutionnel et pourrait être un prétexte pour retarder la mise en
train du régimede tutelle.
Aux Nations Unies, on a aussi la préoccupation de disposer d'un
organisme bureaucratique chargé desurveiller l'administration des man-
dataires, d'où l'idéed'un comitétemporaire de tutelle, proposé par les
Etats-Unis. Si elle n'a pas réussi, c'estause de l'opposition de l'Union
soviétiquequi voit dans toutes cespropositions une manière deprolonger
le système desmandats et d'éviterle régimede tutelle.
Aucune référence n'estfaite ni à la non-transmission des fonctions
aux Nations Unies ni à l'extinction des obligations des mandataires.
Au contraire, les Etats se déclarentdisposés à s'acquitter de leurs obli-
gations comme mandataires, dans l'esprit des mandats. L'intérêt général
semble êtrede chercher à assurer le transfert aux Nations Unies des
fonctions et responsabilités du système des mandats (exposéécritsud-
africain, chap. VIII,par. 13).
La Belgique pour sa part affirme qu'elle est ((pleinement consciente
de toutes les obligations qu'imposent aux Membres des Nations Unies
les dispositions de l'article 80 dela Charte))(11avril 1946).
L'Afrique du Sud affirme qu'elle est disposée à appliquer les principes
de la Charte (23décembre 1945),qu'elle est consciente deses obligations
et responsabilitéscomme signataire de la Charte (17janvier 1946),et que,
(1en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'article 80, aucun droit ne sera modifié
jusqu'au moment où les différents accords de tutelle seront conclus))
(22janvier 1946). L'Afrique du Sud reconnaît aussi la transmission aux
Nations Unies des pouvoirs concernant lesmandats puisqu'elle demande
à l'Assembléegénérale de consentir à l'annexion du Sud-Ouest africain.
Enfindanslalettre du 23juillet 1947elleenvisage de continuer àprésenter
des rapports.
La résolution del'Assembléeen date du 18avril 1946est d'une grande
importance. Elle est baséesur le projet de M. Liang. Celui-ci indique
dans la présentation de son texte que les fonctions de la Société des
Nations ne sont pas transmises automatiquement à l'Organisation des
Nations Unies. Il manque l'organe administratif adéquat. La Société
des Nations doit s'assurer Ide la continuité d'application des principes
du système desmandats ».Il cite lesmots du professeur Bailey,«la Société
des Nations désireêtreassurée del'avenir desterritoires sous Mandat ».
En appuyant la proposition de M. Liang, la France dit qu'on ne regarde
pas la dissolution de la Sociétécomme affaiblissant les obligations des
Etats mandataires.
6. La résolution du 18 avril 1946rappelle le principe fondamental du
régime desmandats, qui est d'assurer le bien-êtreet la protection des
peuples sous mandat (art. 22du Pacte). Elle reconnaît la fin des fonctions
de la SdN tout en admettant son remplacement par les Nations Unies
(dont la Charte contient des dispositions qui pourraient s'appliquer dès NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 196
specialized machinery was necessary and that, in the view of the Soviet
Union, could be a pretext for delaying the institution of the Trusteeship
system.
There was also concern in the United Nations with regard to the need
for some organized machinery to supervise the administration of the
mandatories, hence the idea of a ternporary trusteeship committee as
proposed by the United States. If this met with no success it wasbecause
of the opposition of the Soviet Union, which regarded al1these proposals
as a way of prolonging the mandates system and staving off the trustee-
ship system.
There is no reference to non-transmission of functions to the United
Nations, or to the extinction of the rnandatories' obligations.
On the contrary, States affirmed their readiness to discharge their
obligations as mandatories in accordance with the spirit of the mandates.
The general interest appeared to be toseek to ensure the transfer to the
United Nations of the functions and responsibilities of the mandates
systern (South African written statement, Chap. VIII, para. 13).
For its part,Belgiurnstated (11 April 1946)that it was "Sully alive to
al1the obligations devolving on Members of the United Nations under
Article 80of the Charter".
South Africa stated that it was prepared to apply the principles laid
down in the Charter (23 December 1945),that it was conscious of its
obligations and responsibilities as a signatory of the Charter (17 January
1946),and that "according to paragraph 1of Article 80, no rights would
be altered until individual trusteeship agreements were concluded"
(22 January 1946).South Africa also recognized the transmission to the
United Nations of the powers concerning the mandates, sinceit requested
the General Assembly to agree to the annexation of South West Africa.
Finally, in the letter of 23July 1947,there was a reference to the continua-
tion of the submission of reports.
The Assembly's resolution of 18 April 1946 is of great importance.
It is based on Dr. Liang's draft. In proposing the new draft, Dr. Liang
indicated that the functions ofthe League of Nations were not transferred
automatically to the United Nations. The appropriate administrative
organ was lacking. The League of Nations should take steps to secure
"the continued application of the principles of the mandates system".
He quoted Professor Baileyto the effectthat "the League would wishto be
assured as to the future of mandated territories". In supporting Dr.
Liang'sproposal, France stated that the dissolution of the League was not
to be regarded as weakening the obligations of the mandatory States.
6. The resolution of 18April 1946recalled the basic principle of the
mandates system, which was to ensure the well-being and the protection
of the peoplesunder mandate (Art. 22 of the Covenant). It recognized the
ending of the functions of the League of Nations while accepting its
replacement by the United Nations (the Charter containing provisions 197 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND.DE CASTRO)
la dissolution de la Société desNations), et en notant que les principes
de l'article 22 ont été incorporédans les chapitres XI, XII et XII1 de la
Charte. On remarquera la concordance avec l'article 80. La Société des
Nations est satisfaite de ce que la protection des peuples sous mandat
sera assuréepar les Nations Unies, comme elle l'étaiten vertu de l'article
22 du Pacte.
Pour plus de certitude, la résolution fait solennellement état des dé-
clarations par lesquelleslesMembres mandataires dela Société ont annon-
cé leurintention de continuer à administrer les territoires, conformément
aux obligations contenues dans les divers mandats.
Une fois la Société desNations dissoute, la préoccupation de tous -
exceptéde l'Afrique du Sud - est la conclusion rapide d'accords de
tutelle. L'absence d'organismes auxquels présenter des rapports résulte
de la crainte derctarder la conclusion des accords de tutelle. Rien néan-
moins ne laissepenser qu'on a desdoutessurla transmission àl'organisa-
tion des Nations Unies des pouvoirs concernant les mandats. Au con-
traire, on attend d'elle (mêmel'Afrique du Sud)sa décisionpour pouvoir
déclarerque les mandats ont pris fin.
7. Pour dissiper des équivoques,il semble utile de préciser la significa-
tion du chapitre XI de la Charte et de son article 73.
C'est obscurcir le sens de la déclaration relative aux territoires non
autonomes que de la considérer commelimitéeaux territoires qui ne sont
soumis ni au-régimede tutelle ni au régime desmandats. La lettre et les
antécédents de l'article73 montrent qu'elle a une application générale.
Dans les preniièresétapes dela rédaction dela Charte, les dispositions
du chapitre XI se trouvaient dans le mêmechapitre que les articles de
l'actuel chapitre XII. Si la section A est devenue un chapitre indépendant
(aujourd'hui chapitre XI), c'estparce que l'on a cru inappropriéd'insérer
une déclaration généraledans le chapitre régissantle régimede tutelle.
Mais cela n'a rienôtéde son caractère général àl'article 73.
En présentant le rapport du comité4 à la Commission II, lemaréchal
Smuts a expliquéla portée de la section A (devenue le chapitre XI) en
disant qu'elle applique le principe de la mission (destrustees)à tous les
territoires non autonomes, qu'ils soient territoires sous mandat, qu'ils
soient territoires pris aux pays vaincus ou qu'ils soient colonies despuis-
sances. Toute la matière des territoires non autonomes est à présent
couverte. (UNCIO, vol. VIII, p. 160et suiv.) M. van der Plas a fait obser-
ver que la déclaration de l'article 73s'appliqueà tous les territoires non
autonomes, qu'elle revêt uncaractère d'adhésion volontaireen ce qui
concerne les territoires coloniaux et, pour ce qui est des territoires sous
tutelle, un caractère contractuel qui entre dans le cadre des obligations
contractées à leur égard. (Comité decoordination, 37' séance,citation
dans C.I.J. Mémoires,Statut international du Sud-Ouestafricain, p. 39).
Le texte de l'article 73montre que la déclaration sur les territoires
non autonomes s'applique aux ((territoires dont les populations ne s'ad-which could be implemented on the dissolution ofthe League of Nations),
and notingthat the principles ofArticle 22had been ernbodied in Chapters
XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter. The concordance with Article 80will be
noted. The League of Nations was satisfied that the protection of the
peoples under mandate would be ensured by the United Nations, as it had
been under Article 22 of the Covenant.
To make doubly sure, the resolution solemnly placed on record the
staternents whereby the Mernbers of the League administering territories
under mandate expressed their intention of continuing to adrninister them
in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates.
Once the League of Nations had been dissolved, the concern of al1
States except South Africa was the rapid conclusion of trusteeship
agreements. The lack of any body to which reports could be submitted
is attributable to th.e fear of delaying the conclusion of trusteeship
agreements. However there is no evidence that there was any doubt as
to thetransmission to the United Nations ofthepowers regardingmandates.
On the contrary, the decision of the Organization was awaited (even by
South Africa) before declaring that the mandates had come to an end.
7. To dispel misunderstanding, it would be as well to clarify the
significance of Chapter XI of the Charter and of Article 73, which forms
part of it.
To consider the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories as
applying only to territories under neither mandate nor trusteeship is to
obscure the sense of it. Both the wording and the history of Article 73
show that it is of general application.
In the course of the first stages of drafting the Charter, the provisions
of Chapter XI were in the same chapter as the articles of what is now
Chapter XII. If Section A becarne a separate chapter (now Chap. XI), it
was because it was thought inappropriate to include a general declara-
tion in the chapter governing the trusteeship systern. But this has not
diminished the general nature of Article 73.
When presenting the report of Cornmittee 1114to Commission II,
Field Marshal Smuts explained the scope of Section A (which became
Chap. XI) by saying that Section A applied the trustee principle to al1
dependent territories, whether they were mandated, territories taken from
defeated countries, or existing colonies of Powers. That covered the
whole field of non-self-governing territories. (UNCIO docs., Vol. VIII,
p. 127.) Mr. van der Plas pointed out that the declaration in Article 73
applied to al1non-self-governing territories, to those of colonial status on
a voluntary basis and to those of a trust status, among the obligations
assumed for them, on a contractual basis (Coordination Committee,
surnmary record of 37th Meeting, quoted in I.C.J. Pleadings,International
Status of South West Africa, p. 39).
The text of Article 73 shows that the declaration regarding non-self-
governing territories applies to "territories whose peoples have not yetministrent pas encore complètement elles-mêmes », sans mentionner
aucune exception. 11ne semble pas que l'interprète ait le droit d'excepter
des territoires non autonomes comme les territoires sous mandat et sous
tutelle.
Certes les obligations imposées aux Etats administrant des territoires
sous mandat ou sous tutelle ont une ampleur que n'ont pas celles qui
sont prévuespour les autres territoires non autonomes, mais la déclara-
tion de l'article 73, étantgénéraleet complémentaire, s'applique à tous
les territoires non autonomes.
L'article73 a recueilli de l'article 22 du Pacte le principe de la(mission
sacrée))et du caractère temporaire de l'administration des territoires
(((territoires dont les populations ne s'administrent pas encore complète-
ment elles-mêmes »).Ce quiexplique bienla référence faitepar larésolution
du 18avril 1946de la Société de5 Nations au chapitre XI de la Charte.
L'Afrique du Sud a soumis pendant les premièresannéesdes rapports
aux Nations Unies. Elle a dit parfois qu'il s'agissait de renseignements.
fournis conformément à l'article73. Mais de ce que l'Afrique du Sud
a donné des interprétations à posteriori et s'est référée expressémen àt
l'article73, ilne résulte pas qu'elleait dénoncésa condition et ses obliga-
tions de mandataire; elle s'acquittait des devoirs imposés généralement
aux mandataires.
8. On a cru trouver une autre preuve contre la transmission des pou-
voirs dans larésolution XIVdu 12février1946sur le (transfert decertaines
fonctions et activités ».Elle ne contient pas de référence auxmandats,
et de cette omission on tire la conséquence qu'iln'y a pas eu de trans-
mission. Raimnnement sans explicatign; le sous-comitédu Comitéexé-
cutif qui s'est occupédu transfert éventuel desfonctions et activitésde la
SdN déclare expressémentque la question des mandats est hors de sa
compétence. Cela est naturel car la question a déjà ététranchée par
l'article80 de la Charte, du côtédes Nations Unies, et par la résolution
du 18avril 1946,du côtéde la Société desNations l.
9. L'avis de 1950 trouve aussi un appui puissant dans les principes
de droit interne.
Lauterpacht rappelle que l'essencedu régime desmandats est l'admi-
nistration du territoire dans l'intérêt des peuples indigènes; concevoir
qu'il puisse êtreassuré sans la surveillance serait réduire à des mots la
décisionde la Cour. Il existera rarement, ajoute-t-il, une plus forte raison
d'appliquer - comme l'a fait la Cour - la doctrine de ((cy-près »(The
l On ne doit pas oublier que la césure entre la SdN et l'ONU est politique et
non pas fonctionnelle;voir les observations de Bailey et Bourquin et le préambule
de la résolution de laSdN en date du 18 avril 1946 dans C.I.J. Mémoires, Statut
international du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 209 et 1.te attained a full measure of self-government", without mention of any
exception. It does not appear that anyone interpreting the text is entitled
to exclude non-self-governing territories such as mandated or trusteeship
territories.
Of course the obligations imposed upon the States administering man-
daced or trusteeship territories are wider than those provided in the case
of other non-self-governing territories, but the declaration in Article 73,
being general and supplementary, is applicable to al1non-self-governing
territories.
Article 73 took over from Article 22 of the Covenant the principle
of the "sacred trust" and of the temporary nature of the administration
of the territories ("territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government"). This explains the reference made by the
League of Nations resolution of 18 April 1946 to Chapter XI of the
Charter.
During the first few years South Africa submitted reports to the
United Nations. It stated at times that it was a matter of supplying in-
formation in accordance with Article 73. But the fact that South Africa
1 ouchsafed certain interpretations a posteriori and referred expressly to
Article 73 does not imply that it had thereby cast off its position and
obligations as a mandatory; it was carrying out the duties generally laid
upon mandatories.
8. An additional argument against the transmission of powers has
been sought in resolution XIV of 12February 1946concerning thetransfer
of certain functions and activities. It contains no reference to the man-
dates, and the conclusion has been drawn from this omission that there
was no transmission. This is an inexplicable argument, as the Sub-Com-
mittee of the Execut've Committee which dealt with the possible transfer
of League of Nations functions and activities expressly stated that the
question of the mandates was outside its terms of reference. This is
natural, for the question had already been settled by Article 80 of the
Charter on the United Nations' part and by the resolution of 18 April
1946on the League of Nations' part l.
9. There is alsc powerful support for the 1950 Advisory Opinion in
the principles of municipal law.
Lauterpacht recalls that the essence of the mandates system was the
administration of the territory in the interests of the indigenous peoples;
to hold that this could be secured without supervision would have been to
reduce to a form of words the decision of the Court. He adds that seldom
was there a more compelling occasion for applying-as the Court did in
Nations is political, not functional; see the observations of Bailey and Bourquin
and the preamble of the League resolutionof 18 April 1946, inZ.C.JP.leadings,
Internationalrarus of South West Africa, p. 209 and note 1.Development of International Law by the International Court, p. 279).
Selon cette doctrine, on doit décider (cy-prèsque possible )),spéciale-
ment dans le cas descharitabletrust, enchangeant le trusteeoulaméthode
d'administration, dans l'intérêd tu bénéficiaireq,uand cela est nécessaire,
étant donnéles circonstances. (Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts,
1952,p. 568; Keeton, Law of Trusts, 1939,p. 148-149;Hanbury, Modern
Equity, 1946,p. 227; Keeton, Social Change in the Law of Trusts, 1958,
p. 96.)
Dans lesautres droits, iln'ya pas de doute que sil'onsupprime l'organe
existant de tutelle et sil'on enétablit un autre (sion remplace par exemple
le conseil de famille par le contrôle judiciaire), le tuteur aura à rendre
compte au nouvel organe.
10. En vérité,l'interprétation de l'article 80 faite par la Cour en 1950
a le mérited'empêcherqu'on utilise .lemandat pour créerun titre d'an-
nexion; elle a le mérited'éviterune fraude à la loi.
B. La règle de l'unanimité dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations
1. Une manière indirecte mais effective de nier la transmission de
pouvoirs aux Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les mandats consiste à
signaler son impossibilitépratique, du fait que la règle de l'unanimité
jouait dans les votes intervenant au Conseil de la Sociétée ,t que le man-
dataire assistait aux séancessoit comme Membre soit comme invitéau
Conseil parce que la question l'intéressait(art. 5, par. 1et art. 4, par. 5,
du Pacte). Un droit de veto étaitdonc attribué au mandataire, qui vidait
de toute substance les droits et devoirs de surveillance et de contrôle
de la Société, laquelle n'adonc pu lestransmettre; aucun pouvoir, aucune
facultépratique n'aura pu passer aux Nations Unies.
2. Il importe donc d'étudierla règle de l'unanimité et la possibilité
de son application à un mandataire Membre de la Société desNations.
A l'occasion de l'avis demandé à la Cour sur le Statut internationaldu
Sud-Ouest africain, l'Afrique du Sud a soutenu énergiquement et avec
force argdments que le mandat étaitéteint, maiselle n'a pas fait mention
de la règlede l'unanimité.Ce n'est qu'aprèsl'avisde 1950et la constitu-
tion du Comité du Sud-Ouest africain, dans les discussions du comité
et de l'Assemblée consacrées àla mise en Œuvrede l'avis, que le Gouver-
nement de l'Union sud-africaine s'estopposé auxpropositions du comité
en alléguantqu'elles cne permettraient pas notamment de sauvegarder
la règlede l'unanimitéconsacréepar le Pacte de la Société des Nations )l.
l Lettre adresséeau présidentdu Comitédu Sud-Ouest africain, le 25 mars 1954,
187 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 199
fact-the cy-prèsdoctrine (The Development ofInternatiolzalLaw by the
International Court, p. 279).
Under that doctrine, which applies specificallyin the case of charitable
trusts, a court must decide "as near as possible", by changing the trustee
or the method of administration in the interests of the beneficiary when
this is necessary in view of the circumstances (Bogert, Handbook of the
Law of Trusts, 1952, p. 568; Keeton, Law of Trusts, 1939, pp. 148 f.;
Hanbury, Modern Equity, 1946, p. 227; Keeton, Social Change in the
Law of Trusrs, 1958,p. 96).
In other systems of law there isno doubtthat if the existing supervisory
organ in a tutelage situation is abolished and another is established (if for
example a conseil defamille is replaced byjudicial supervision) the guard-
ian becomes accountable to the new organ.
10. In reality the interpretation of Article 80 by the Court in 1950has
the virtue of preventing the mandate being used to create a title for
annexation; it has the virtue of preventing fraus legis.
B. The Unanimity Rule in the Covenant ofthe League of Nations
1. An indirect but effectiveway of arguing against anytransmission of
powers to the United Nations in respect of the mandates is to point to
its practical impossibility,ecause the unanimity rule operated in respect
of decisions by the League Council, and because the mandatory was
present at the meetings of the Council either as a member or on the in-
vitation of the Council owing to its interests being specially affected
(Covenant, Art. 5, para. 1, and Art. 4, para. 5). A right of veto was thus
conferred on the mandatory, emptying the League's supervisory rights
and duties of any substance and making it impossible for the League to
transmit them; no power or practical function could have passed to the
United Nations.
2. It is therefore necessary to study the unanimity rule and the possi-
bility of itsapplication to a Member of the League of Nations which was a
mandatory.
At the time of the Opinion requested of the Court on the International
Status of South West Africa, South Africa argued energetically and
forcibly that the Mandate had lapsed, but did not mention the unanimity
rule. It was only after the 1950Opinion and the setting up of the Com-
mittee on South West Africa, in the discussions of the Committee and of
the Assembly devoted to the implementation of the Opinion, that the
Government of the Union of South Africa opposed the proposals of the
Committee, claiming that they "would not, inter alia, safeguard the
rule of unanimity which was provided for in the Covenant of the League
of Nations l".
l Letter of 25 March 1954 from Permanent Representative of South Africa to
187 L'argument a impressionnéle Comitédont les membres se sont divisés.
L'Assemblée générale s'ets rtouvée devantdeux propositions. Selonl'une,
les résolutions devaient êtreprises «sous réserve de l'approbation de
l'Union sud-africaine »; elle n'obtint pas la majorit6 nécessaire.L'a~tre
a abouti à la résolution 844 (IX) du 11 octobre 1954,par laquelle on a
demandé àla Cour un avis sur la procédure de vote applicable aux ques-
tions relatives au Sud-Ouest africain, notamment sur le point de savoir
si l'application de l'article 18,paragraphe 2, de la Charte est conformeà
l'avis de 1950 et, dans l'affirmative, sur la procédure de vote que l'As-
semblée générald eevrait suivre. (Voir dossier transmis par le Secrétaire
généralde l'ONU, C.I.J. Mémoires,Procédure devote applicable aux
questions touchant les rapportset pétitionsrelatifs au Territoire du Sud-
Ouest africain,p. 21 et suiv.) Le Gouvernement de l'Union n'a pas parti-
cipé à la procédure; mais dans les notes complémentaires du dossier
transmis par le Secrétaire général (ibid., p. 38-48) et dans l'exposéécrit
des Etats-Unis (ibid.,p. 57-60),la question de la règlede l'unanimité a été
étudiée.
Dans l'avis de 1955,la Cour considère que, malgré lesarguments sur
la règlede l'unanimitéproduits devant l'Assemblée généraleet les com-
missionsdes Nations Unies, iln'estpas nécessairede ((traiterlesproblèmes
poséspar ces arguments ou d'examiner l'étendueet la portée de I'appli-
cation de la règlede l'unanimité sousle régimedu Pacte de la Société
des Nations D,parce que la question du degréde surveillance ne s'étend
pas ou ne se rapporte pas au système devote (C.I.J. Recueil 19.55,p.74).
L'avis déclare:
(Le systèmede voteest lié àla composition et aux fonctions de cet
organe. Il est Yunedes caractéristiquesdela constitution de l'organe.
Prendre des décisions à la majoritédes deux tiers ou à la majorité
simple est I'un des traits distinctifs de l'Assemblée générale t,ndis
que la règlede l'unanimité était I'un des traits distinctifs du Conseil
de la Société desNations. » (Ibid., p. 75.)
En conséquencela Cour écartela thèsede l'Afrique du Sud selon laquelle
il existe une incompatibilité entre le systèmede vote envisagépar l'As-
sembléegénéraleet la règlede l'unanimité.
L'avis de 1950 reconnaît à l'Assemblée généralle e droit d'exercer les
fonctions de contrôle. L'avis de 1955lui reconnaît la faculté deprendre
des décisionsrelatives au mandat à la majoritédes deux tiers des Mem-
bres présents et votants. M. Lauterpacht aurait souhaité que la Cour
examine le problème de la règle de l'unanimité sous tous ses aspects
par le représentant permanentde l'Union sud-africaine, annexe 1 au rapport du
Comité du Sud-Ouest africainDocuments officiels de I'Assembléegénérale,neuvième
session, supplément no 14 (A/2666), p. 7). This argument impressed the Committee, whose members were divided
in their views. The General Assembly found itself faced with two pro-
posals. Under one of them, resolutions were to be ta~en "subject to the
concurring vote of the Union of South Africa"; this proposal did not
obtain the necessary majority. The other culminated in resolution 844
(IX) of 11 October 1954,by which the Court was asked to givean opinion
on the voting procedure on questions relating to South West Africa, in
particular on the question whether the application cf Article 18, para-
graph 2, of the Charter was in conformity with the 1950 Opinion, and
in the affirmative, aso the voting procedure which the General Assembly
should follow. (See the Dossier transmittea by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions
relating to Reports and Petitions concerningthe Territory of South West
Africu, pp. 21ff. The Government of South Africa did not take part in
the proceedings, but in the Additional Notes in the Dossier transmitted
by the Secretary-General (ibid.,pp. 38-48)and in the written statement of
the United States (ibid.,pp. 57-60),the question of unanimity was studied.
In the 1955Opinion, the Court considered that despite the arguments
on the unanimity rule advanced before the General Assembly and the
United Nations Committees, it was unnecessary "to deal with the issues
raised by these contentions or to examine the extent and scope of the
operation of the rule of unanimity under the Covenant of the League of
Nations", because the question of the degree of supervision did not in-
clude or relate to the system of voting (I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 74). The
Opinion States that:
"The voting system is related to the composition and functions
of the organ. It forms one of the characteristics of the constitution
of the organ.Taking decisions by a two-thirds majority vote or by a
simple majority vote is one of the distinguishing features of the
General Assembly, while the unanimity rule was one of the distin-
guishing features of the Council of the League of Nations." (I.C.J.
Reports 1955, p. 75.)
Consequently, the Court rejected the contention of South Africa that
there was incompatibility between the voting procedure conternplated
by the General Assembly and the unanimity rule.
The 1950Opinion had recognized that the General Assembly had the
right to exercise the supervisory functions. The1955Opinion recognized
that it had the power to take decisions regarding the Mandate by a two-
thirds majority of Members present and voting. Judge Lauterpacbt would
have wished the Court to examine the problem of the unanimity rule in
Chairman of Committee on South West Africa, Annex 1to Report to the Committee
on South West Africa,GA, OR, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 14, A/2666.
188(ibid., p. 98). La Cour ne l'a pas fait et la question de l'application aux
mandats de la règlede l'unanimité, prévuepar le Pacte, reste ouverte.
La Cour n'en a pas moins considérédans deux arrêtssuccessifsque,
selon le Pacte et dans le cadre de la Société desNations, la règle de
l'unanimitéétaitapplicable aux mandats, sans avoir soumis la question
à une étudespéciale.
L'arrêtde 1962 s'efforcede prouver que la protection judiciaire de la
mission sacréecontenuedanschaque mandat constitue un aspect essentiel
du système desmandats; il souligne la raison d'êtreet la nécessitéde
cette garantie évidente, endisant que sans elle la surveillance de la So-
ciété des Nations, les mesures àprendre par le Conseil, ne pouvaient être
efficaces,«en tout cas, l'approbation exigeait l'unanimité detous les re-
présentants y compris celuidu Mandataire »(C.I.J. Recueil1962,p. 336).
Plus tard la Cour tire argument de la règlede l'unanimité, maispour
contredire l'argument de la nécessité. Le fonctionnement du système des
mandats était autre, étant donné la règlede l'unanimité(C.I.J. Recueil
1966, p. 44-47); ale Conseil n'avait aucun moyen d'imposer son point
de vue au mandataire )),cl'intention n'a jamais été quele Conseil puisse
imposer son point de vue aux mandataires au sujet des dispositions des
mandats relatives à la gestion ». Le risque que les mandataires agissent
d'une manière contraire non seulement à l'opinion des autres membres
du Conseil mais encore aux dispositions mêmes desmandats a, de toute
évidence, été consciemment accepté ))(taken withopen eyes) (ibid., p. 46).
L'autoritédes arrêtsde 1962 et 1966 paraît assez faible. Ils sont en
évidentecontradiction l'un avec l'autre et les références à la règle de
l'unanimité sont des obiter dicta, qui visent àrenforcer l'argumentation
mais neprocèdentpas d'uneétudespécialeetapprofondie dela question l.
On ne peut pas pour autant les négliger.L'arrêtde 1966revient à dire
que la règlede l'unanimité énoncéd eans le Pacte n'est pas seulement une
règlede procédurede vote, mais qu'elletouche aussi à l'essencedes man-
dats. Il amène à se demander si les mandats ne seraient pas des cessions
déguisées.Les mandataires n'ont-ils pas d'obligationsjuridiques et n'ont-
ils que des obligations morales? Le Conseil de la Société des Nations ne
pouvait-il rien faire contre l'annexion d'un territoire sous mandat?
11semble donc que l'on doive suivre le conseil de sir Hersch Lauter-
pacht et examiner sous tous ses aspectsla question dela règlede l'unani-
mité.
Ne sont pas pris en considération les arguments et faits tirés de la pratique
indiqués dansC.I.J. Mémoires,Procédure devote applicable aux questions touchant
les rapports etpétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain,. 57-60;
C.Z.J. Recueil 1955, p. 98-106, et par les auteurF.Williams, aThe League of
Nations and Unanimity»,AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw, vol. 19,p. 475et suiv.;
C. A. Riches, The Unanimity Rule and the League of Nations, Baltimore, 1933. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 20 1
ail its aspects (I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 98). The Court did not do so and
the question of the application to mandates of the unanimity rule, pro-
vided for in the Covenant, remains open.
The Court has nonetheless held, in two successive Judgrnents that,
according to the Covenant and within the framework of the League of
Nations, the unanimity rule was applicable to mandates, without having
subjected the question to special study.
The 1962 Judgment endeavours to show that the system of judicial
protection of the sacred trust contained in each mandate was an essential
feature of the mandates system; itstressed the raison d'êtreand the
necessity of this evident security, because wikout it the supervision by
the League, and the steps to be taken by the Council, could not be
effective,"in either case the approval meant the unanimous agreement of
al1the representatives including that of the mandatory" (I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 336).
Later the Court based an argument on the unanimity ruie, but in order
to contradict the necessity argument. The functioning of the mandates
systenl was otherwise, given the unanimity rule (I.C.J. Reports 1966, pp.
44-47); "the Council had no means of imposing its views on the man-
datory", "in relation to the 'conduct' provisions of the mandates, it was
never the intention that the Council should be able to impose its views
on the various rnandatories". "As regards the possibility that a manda-
tory might be acting contrary not only to the views of the rest of the
Council but to the mandate itself, the risk of this was evidently taken
with open eyes" (ibid., p. 46).
Theauthority of the 1962and 1966Judgments seemsrather weak. They
are in clear contradiction with each other and the references to the una-
nimity rule are obiter dicta ntended to reinforce the argument, but
which are not the outcome of a special and thorough study of the ques-
tion '.
Nonetheless one cannot ignore them. The 1966Judgment amounts to
saying that the unanimity rule laid down inthe Covenant isnot merelya
rule of voting procedure, but it also touches the very essence of the
mandates. As a result one must question whether mandates are not thus
disguised cessions. Do mandatories have no legal obligations, but only
moral obligations? Could the Council of the League of Nations do
nothing to check the annexation of a mandated territory?
It therefore seerns that the counsel of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht should
be followed, and that the question of the unanimity rule should be
examined in al1its aspects.
l There were not taken into consideration thearguments and facts based on
practice indicatein I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions relating to
Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, pp. 38-48 and
57-60: I.C.J. Reports 1955, pp. 98-106, and by legal writerg, J. F. Williams, "The
League of Nations and Unanimity",American Journal of Internafional Law, Vol. 19,
1925:p. 475; C. A. Riches, The Unanimity Rule and the Leagweof Nations, Baltimore,
1933. 3. Si des difficultés naissent de la règle de l'unanimitépour qui veut
comprendre le système des mandats, cela tient en premier lieu à une
erreur de perspective. Doit-on voir la question sous l'anglede l'article 22?
C'est cet article que l'on essaie d'interpréter. Selon ses dispositions, le
but du mandat est la mission sacrée enversles indigènes; lemandataire
est l'instrument par lequel la Sociétédes Nations accomplit sa tâche
civilisatrice, la conséquencereconnue étantl'exclusionde toute possibilité
d'annexion ouverte ou déguiséed , e la part du mandataire.
Pour apprécier la signification de l'article 22, on doit rapp-l er son
origine. Les mandats ont leur basedans letraitéde Versailles. L'Allemagne
cèdeses colonies d'Afrique à condition qu'elles deviennent desterritoires
sous mandat. Les Puissances alliéeset la Société desNations acceptent
les territoires,à charge de veiller à ce que les mandataires auxquels on
confie les territoires accomplissent dûment leur mission sacréede civili-
sation.
L'Allemagne, comme partie au traité de Versaiiles, a un intérêjturi-
dique à ce que la Société desNations observe l'article 22. L' Allemagne
n'a pas le droit de surveiller l'administration des territoires ', mais elle
peut se plaindre si le système des mandats est transformé en un autre
régime,si un territoire sous mandat devient une colonie ou est annexé.
L'article 22 joue un rôle tout à fait particulier dans le Pacte. Il crée
une situation ou institution indépendante de la volontédes Membres de
la Société.On peut changer les dispositions du Pacte par un vote ma-
joritaire (art. 26); on peut modifier le mandatpour le Sud-Ouest africain
avec le consentement du Conseil (art. 7 du mandat). Mais on ne peut pas
abroger ou modifier l'article 22. Le régime estétablien faveur des peuples
desterritoires et cesterritoiressont cédésà charge derespecter l'article 22.
Ce statut s~écialde l'article 22 est visible si l'on envisuge la structure
du Pacte. L'article est un corps normatif indépendant, étranger mêmeau
reste des règlesdu Pacte. Ses rédacteurs avaient d'ailleurs penséque les
conventions sur les mandats seraient inséréesdans le traitéde paix (rap-
port Hymans, citédans l'opinion individuelle de M. Jessup, C.I.J.Recueil
1962.,L. 391).
4. La relation entre un mandataire et le Conseil n'est pas la mêmeque
celle d'un Membre de la Société par rapport au Conseil. Selon l'instru-
ment de mandat pour le sud-ouest africain, le mandataire exerce I'ad-
ministration au nom de la Société desNations (préambuledu mandat);
il est autoriséà appliquer sa législation(art. 2); il prend à sa charge une
séried'obligations (art. 2-5); il doit envoyer au Conseil un rapport annuel
satisfaisant le Conseil avec toute information intéressant le territoire et
C'est pour cette raison que la protestation de l'Allemagne contre la Belgique
à propos du Ruanda-Urundi fut rejetée. 3. If the unanimity rule gives rise to difficultiesfor anyone who seeks
to understand the mandates system, this results in the first place from an
error of perspective. Should the question be seen from the point of view
of Article 22? It is that Article which we are attempting to interpret.
According to its provisions, the purpose of the mandate is the sacred
trust towards the natives; the mandatory is the instrument by which the
League of Nations effects its civilising task, the admitted consequence
being the exclusion of any possibility of open or disguised annexation on
the part of the mandatory.
To appreciate the significanceof Article 22, its originInust be recalled.
Mandates were founded on the Treaty of Versailles. Germany ceded its
African colonies on condition that they became mandated territories.
The Allied Powers and the League of Nations accepted the territories
subject to the duty to ensure that the mandatories to which the territories
were entrusted duly accomplished their sacred trust of civilization.
Germany, as a party to the Treaty of Versailles, had a legal interest
in the observance by the League of Nations of Article 22. Germany had
no right to supervise the administration of the territories ',but it could
complain if the mandates system were transformed into another régime,
if a mandated territory became a colony or were annexed.
Article22plays averyspecialpart in the Covenant. It created a situation
or institution which was independent of the will of the Members of the
League. The provisions of the Covenant could be altered by majority
vote (Art. 26); the Mandate for South West Africa could be modified
with the consent of the Council (Art. 7 of the Mandate). But Article 22
could not be abrogated or modified. The regime was set up for the benefit
of the peoples of the territories, andhese territories were assigned subject
to the obligation to respect Article 22.
This special status of Article 22 is apparent if one considers the
structure of the Covenant. This Article is an independent normative
entity, foreign even to the remainder of the provisions of the Covenant.
Those who drafted it had in fact contemplated that agreements for man-
dates could be inserted into the Peace Treaty (Hymans Report, quoted in
the separate opinion of Judge Jessup, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 391).
4. The relation between a mandatory and the Council is not the srime
as that between a Member of the League and the Council. According to
the mandate instrument for South West Africa, the Mandatory exercises
administration on behalf of the League of Nations (Preamble to the
Mandate); it may apply its own legislation to the Territory (Art. 2);
it undertakes a series of obligations (Arts. 2-5); it is to make to the
Council an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council with full
Ruanda-Urundi twas rejected.Germany's protest against Belgium with regard toindiquant les mesures prises pour assurer les engagementspris suivant les
articles2, 3, 4 et 5 (art. 6).
Le mandataire descend donc du ((podium »de la souveraineté. L'ad-
ministration d'un territoire sous mandat n'est pas une affaire qui relève
essentiellement ou accidentellement de la compétencenationale propre
des Etats. La relation entre mandant (Société desNations) et mandataire
(Afrique du Sud) ou, si l'on préfère,entre le tuteur et l'autorité chargée
de veillerà sa gestion n'estpas une relation d'égalitéi,nter aequales,mais
de subordination dans le domaine des mandats. Le mandataire n'a ni à
administrer ni à présenter des rapports à la satisfaction du Conseil en
qualité de Membre,avec lesconditions et prérogatives quecela comporte;
il le fait comme mandataire ayant à rendre compte de son mandat.
Le mandataire ne peut pas jouer deux rôles différents etcontraires.
II ne peut jouir des avantages liés à l'administration du territoire dans la
robe de mandataire puis, après s'en être dépouillé eatvoir revêtula robe
de Membre de la SdN, user du droit de veto et se soustraire à ses obli-
gations de mandataire.
5. L'article 5, paragraphe 1, du Pacte établit la règle de l'unanimité
d'une manière générale ((sauf disposition expressément contraire du
présentPacte 1)Règletranchante et qui semble exclure la possibilitéd'une
dérogation implicite ou par analogie s'il n'existe pas une disposition ex-
pressémentcontraire à la règle.
Mais l'interprétation ne mérite passon non1si elle s'entient à l'écorce
de; mots, en sacrifiant superstitieusement les autres règlesdu droit - en
l'occurrence, en négligeant l'article22 du Pacte et les principes qui
l'inspirent.
a) Pour connaître la signification des articles 4 et 5 du Pacte, il faut
d'abord examiner leur but propre.
Lors de la rédaction du Pacte, la règle de l'unanimité était fon-
damentale comme expression et garantie de la souveraineté et de
l'indépendancedes Etats. A la naissance de la Société desNations,
on a éprouvéle besoin derassurer lesgouvernements. Onadit ((aucune
nation, grande ou petite, n'a à craindre l'oppression des organes de
la Sociétédes Nations J(lord Cecil, citépar Riches, /oc. cil., p. 22);
et l'on a dit aussi que serait écartétout projet par lequ((notre propre
pays [le Royaume-Uni] serait exposé à ce qu'une recommandation
soit adoptée contre lui par le vote d'une majorité,dans une matière
qui affecte vitalement son intérêt national ))(rapport intérimaire du
Comitépour la Société desNations présidépar sir Walter Phillimore,
1918, Riches, loc. cit., p3).
Tel étant le but, et le but unique de la règle, il est logique que la
Première Commission de la Deuxième Assembléeait accepté leinformation with regard to the Territory and indicating the measures
taken to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5
(Art. 6).
The mandatory therefore comes down from the "platform" of sover-
eignty. The administration of a mandated territory is not something
which falls, either essentially or fortuitously, within the national com-
petence proper to States. The relationship between the Mandator
(League of Nations) and Mandatory (South Africa) or, if preferred,
between theguardian (tuteur)and the authority called upon to supervise
its management, is not a relation of equality inter aequales, but one of
subordination in the field of mandates. A mandatory does not have to
administer nor present reports to the satisfaction of the Council as a
Member, with the conditions and prerogatives involved in that relation-
ship; it does so as a mandatory which has to give an account of its
mandate.
The mandatory cannot play two different and inconsistent parts. It
cannot enjoy the advantages connected with the administration of the
territory in the robe of a mandatory, and then, after having doffed that,
put on-the robe of Member of the League of Nations, make use of its
right of veto, and evade its obligations as mandatory.
5. Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant lays down the unanimity
rule as general "except where otherwise expressly provided in this
Covenant". A decisiveprovision, which appears to exclude the possibility
of any implied derogation, or derogation by analogy, if there is no
provision expressly contrary to the rule.
But interpretation does not deserve to be so called if it sticks in the
bark of the words, superstitiously sacrificing the otherrules of law, in the
present case, by neglecting Article 22 of the Covenant and the principles
inspiring it.
(a) To ascertain the significance of Articles 4 and 5 of the Covenant, it
is necessary first of al1to study their particular purpose.
At the time of the drafting of the Covenant, the unanimity rule
was fundamental as an expression and a safeguard of the sovereignty
and independence of States. On the birth of the League of Nations,
the need was felt to reassure governments. It was said that "no
nation, whether small or great, need fear oppression from the organs
of the League" (Lord Cecil, quoted by Riches, /oc. cit.p. 22); and
it was alsosaid that any scheme would be avoided "under which our
own country [the United Kingdom] should be rendered liable to have
a recommendation passed against it by a majority vote in a matter
vitally affecting the national interests". (Interim Report of the
Phillimore Committee, 1918, Riches, foc. cit.p. 3.)
Since such was the purpose, and the sole purpose, of the rule, it
was logical for the First Committee of the Second Assembly to 204 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN ()P. IND. DE CASTRO)
rapport du comité de Londres, lequel après avoir préciséque la
règle de l'unanimité est unegarantie de la souveraineté des Etats,
en déduit que l'unanimitén'est pas nécessaire,exception faite des cas
où la souverainetéest en péril(Riches, loc. cit., p. 98). La Deuxième
Assemblée((explique à nouveau que l'adoption de la règlede I'una-
nimité est en premier lieu un moyen de protéger ((les droits de
souverainetédes Etats ))et établit aussi qu'elledoit êtregardéeseule-
ment là où elle sert à cette fin))(Riches, loc. cit., p. 117).
Cette règlede l'unanimitéprotègenon seulement lesMembres de la
Sociétém , ais tous les Etats. Dans lapratique du Conseil, il est d'usage
de considérerque ledroit de (siégerenqualitéde membre )impliquant
un droit de vote, doit s'appliquer aussi par analogie aux pays qui ne
sont pas membres de la Société.
On connaît, à côtéde cela, la raison du décalageentre la forme
absolue de la règleet le caractère limité de son objetet de son but.
En 1930,au moment où l'on envisageaitd'apporter un amendement
à l'article 13, deux des auteurs du Pacte, lord Cecil of Chelwood et
M. Scialoja exprimèrent l'avis que c'étaituniquement par inadver-
tance qu'une disposition relative à l'unanimité ((relative 1)avait été
inséréedans certains articles visant les différendset omise dans d'au-
tres l.
b) La Cour permanente a dit:
((11en résulte que, d'aprèsle Pacte lui-même,dans certains cas
et spécialementlorsqu'il s'agit du règlement d'un différendl,a
règle de l'uaanimité S'applique avec cette limitation, que les
votes donnéspar les représentants des Parties intéresséesn'ont
pas l'effet d'exclurel'unanimitérequise.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Il s'agit toujours de la iègle bien connue d'après laquelle nul ne
peut êtrejuge dans sa propre cause.
A un point de vue pratique, exiger que les représentants aes
Parties acce~tent la décision du Conseil éauivaudrait à leur
donner un droit de veto pouvant empêchertoute décision ...»
(C.P.J.I. sérieB no12, p. 31-32.)
Lord Cecil: «a toujours étéd'avis que c'est probablement par accident que la
règle du Pacte de laSdN suivant laquelle l'unanimité ne doit pas comprendre les
parties au différendn'a étéspécifiéeque dans certains cas. Evidemment, si c'est une
règle juste, elle doit s'appliquerous les différend».
n'a pas dit que les voix des parties intéresséesne figuraient pas dans le calcul de
l'unanimité.a(Dossier transmis par le Secrétaire génél e l'ONU, C.Z.J. Mémoires,
Procédure de vote applicable aux questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifs
au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain, 41.) accept the report of the London Committee, which after having
explained that the unanimity rule served to safeguard the sovereignty
of States, deduced therefrom that unanimity could not be necessary
except in cases in which the sovereignty of States was in jeopardy
(Riches, loc. cit., p. 98).The Second Assembly "again explained the
adoption of the unanimity rule in the first place as a means of
protecting 'the rights of State sovereignty', and they further stated
that it only needed to be maintained where it served that end
(Riches, !oc. cit., p. 117).
Thisunanimity rule protected not only the Members of the League,
but al1 States. In the practice of the Council, it was customary to
consider that the right to sitas a member, implying the right to vote,
must be applicable also by analogy to countries which were not
mernbers of the League.
In addition to this. the reason is well known whv there was a
divergence between the absolute form of the rule and the limited
nature of its objecî and purpose.
Two of the draftsmen of the Covenant, Lord Cecil of Chelwood
and Mr. Scialoja, suggested in 1930,when amendment to Article 13
of the Covenant was under consideration, that it was only by
inadvertence that a provision on qualified unanimity had been
inserted in some of the articles concerning disputes and omitted
from others l.
(b) The Pei,manent Court has stated that:
"It follows from the foregoing that, according to the Covenant
itself, in certain cases and more particularly in the case of the
settlernent of a dispute, the rule of unanimity is applicable,
subject to the limitation that the votes cast by representatives
of the interestedParties do not affect the required unanimity.
......................
The well-known rule that no-one can be judge in his own suit
holds good.
From a practical standpoint, to require that the representa-
tives of the Parties should accept the Council's decision would
be tantamount to giving them the right of veto enabling them
to prevent any decision being reached . . .(P.C.I.J., Series B,
NO. 12, pp. 31-32).
Lord Cecil: "had always held that it must have been by some accident that the
rule in the Covenant providing that unanimity should not comprise the parties to the
dispute had only been enacted in certaincases. Obviously if it were the rightle
itMr.ouScialoja: "There was no doubt thatt. .it had been simply by an oversight
that it had not beensaid that the votes of the interested parties should not figure in
oalculating unanimity." (Dossier transmittby the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, I.C.J. Pleadings, Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and
Petitions concerning the Territory of South Westrica, p. 41.) En conséquence,on a pu dire que:
«La condition d'unanimité, si exprèsque soient les termes qui
la posent, est implicitement limitéepar ce dernier principe [une
partie ne peut êtrejuge dans sa propre cause] et il ne faudrait
rien de moins que son exclusion expresse pour autoriser un Etat
à prétendre qu'en agissant comme juge dans sa propre cause il
possède le droit de priver de tout effet une obligation internatio-
nale solennelle à laquelle il a souscrit. 1(Opinion individuelle de
M. Lauterpacht, C.I.J. Recueil 1955,p. 104.)
c) Dans une étude sur la règlede l'unanimité,on a dit que ((ledroit est
l'expression de la volonté d'un organisme vivant I),et que ala con-
tinuitéde l'organisme exigequ'il soit adaptéaux conditions de sa vie I)
(Williams, loc. cit., p. 475, 485). C'est ce qu'a fait la Société desNa-
tions.
Déjàen 1921on recommande dans une résolution que ((enatten-
dant la ratification de l'amendement [sur I'article 161,-lesvotes des
parties soient exclus pour déterminer s'il y a eu unanimité ))(Riches,
loc. cit., p. 141).
De la mêmemanière, et pour éviter aussile résultatabsurde que la
règle de l'unanimité empêchel'application de l'article 26 du Pacte,
on considère que, pour proposer des modifications au Pacte, I'una-
nimitén'estpas nécessaireet la majoritérequise pour lesmodifications
est suffisante (Riches, loc. cit., p. 109, 115).
On peut citer aussi quatre différendsdans lesquels le Conseil con-
sidèreses résolutions comme obligatoires, malgréle vote contraire de
l'une des parties (opinion individuelle de M. Lauterpacht, C.I.J.
Recueil 1955, p. 101 ; Riches, loc. cit., p. 145) l. On peut citer enfin
toutes les résolutionssur des questions dans lesquelles la Société avait
à remplir des fonctions administratives (Riches, loc. cit., p. 161, 166).
d) Après une étudeconsciencieuse de la pratique de la Sociétéon a pu
conclure ((qu'ellemontre une disposition décidéede la part des Mem-
bres à ne pas permettre que la règlede l'unanimité rende impuissante
la Sociétée ,t celamalgréles règles explicitesde l'instrument juridique
qui est sa loi fondamentale » (Riches, loc. cit., p. 117).
e) La contradiction apparente entre l'article 22 et les articles 4 et 5 du
Pacte doit êtresurmontée compte tenu de la valeur relative de ces
dispositions.
Les articles 4 et 5 sont des règlesd'une nature abstraite et générale;
leur but est étranger à la relation du mandataire avec le mandant au
Naturellement pour des raisons politiques, le Conseil pouvait considérer comine
non obligatoires des résolutions auxquelles une partie s'est opposée- cas de la
Lituanie et du Japon (Riches,loc. cit.p. 148-152). Consequently, it has been possible to observe that:
"The requirement of unanimity, however expressly stated,
is implicitly qualified by the latter principle [the principle that
a party may not bejudge in its own suit]; and .. .nothing short
ofits express exclusion is sufficientto justify a State in insisting
that it should, by acting as judge in its own case, possess the
right to render inoperative a solemn international obligation
to which it has subscribed." (Separate opinion of Judge Lauter-
pacht, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 104.)
(c) In a study of the unanimity rule, it has been said that "law is the
expression of the will of a living organism", and that "the perma-
nency of the organism requires that its constitution should be
subject to readjustment to the conditions of its life" (Williams, loc.
cit., pp. 475, 485). This is what the League of Nations did.
As early as 1921it was recommended in a resolution that "pending
the ratification of the amendment [of Article 161,the votes of the
parties be excluded in determining whether unanimity had in fact
been achieved" (Riches, loc. cit., p. 141).
In the same way, and also to avoid the absurd result whereby un-
animity rule might prevent the application of Article 26 of the
Covenant, it was considered that for the proposal of amendments to
the Covenant, unanimity was not necessary and the majority required
for amendments was sufficient (Riches, loc. cit., pp. 109, 115).
For disputes might also be cited in which the Council considered
its resolutions to be binding despite the contrary vote of one of the
parties (see separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports
1955, p. 101 ;Riches, loc. cit., p. 145)'.Finally one might quote al1
the resolutions on questions in which the League had to carry out
administrative functions (Riches, loc. cit., pp. 161, 166).
(d) After a thorough examination of the practice of the League, it has
been possible to conclude that "it shows a decided disposition on
the part of the Members not to allow the unanimity rule to make
the League impotent, and this in spite of the explicit provisions
of the legal instrument which forms its fundamental law" (Riches,
loc. cit., p. 117).
(e) The apparent contradiction between Article 22 and Articles 4 and 5
of the Covenant is to be overcome by taking into account the
relative value of those provisions.
Articles 4 and 5 are rules of an abstract and general nature;
their purpose lies outside the relationshrp of the mandatory with
Naturally, for political reasthe Council could regardas not binding reso-
lutions opposed by one of the parties-caseof Lithuania and Japan (Riches, loc.
cit.pp. 148-152). nom (on behalfl duquel il exerce l'administration. Donc, la non-ap-
plication de la règle de l'unanimité aux fonctions du Conseil con-
cernant le mandat ne contredit pas l'objet et la fin des articleset 5,
à savoir le respect de la compétenceexclusive des Etats. Au contraire,
l'article2 donne naissance à une institution dont la nature est in-
compatible avec la possibilité del'exerciced'un vetopar le mandataire.
Il est si contrairàla notion de mandat, de tutelle et àla bonne foi
d'établiret de réglementer la surveillance sur le mandataire tout en
rendant ((cette surveillance nominale et inopérante)),tout en laissant
à la seule bonne volonté du mandataire l'accomplissement de ses
obligations, que cela((nepeut êtredéduitde façon concluantedu seul
fait que la constitution prévoitla règlede l'unanimité »(voir opinion
individuelle deM. Lauterpacht, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 99).
D'un autre côté,le principe nemojudex in re sua interdit que l'ad-
ministrateur, le tuteur ou le mandataire soit celui qui décideou juge
s'ila lui-même rempliou non ses obligations comme tel - ((iln'existe
pas de motif valable permettant de distinguer entre les organes ju-
diciaires et les organes de surveillance, du point de vue deI'applica-
bilité du principe selon lequel nul ne peut êtrejuge en sa propre
cause »(opinion individuelle de M. Lauterpacht, ibid., p. 100).
La question soulevéepar la règle de l'unanimitéest la mêmeque
celle qui se présentedans la pratique du droit interne, et laquelle on
répond en faisant appel à la notion de fraude à la loi. Celle-ci se
caractérise par le fait qu'on demande la protection d'une règle ab-
straite et générale,pour éviterl'application d'une autre règle visant
régler unfait concret. Dans les cas où la règleabstraite n'a pas pour
but de réglerle fait concret, on applique la règlequi vise directement
ce fait.
La demande de l'Afrique du Sud tendant à ce qu'on applique la
règlede I'unanimitépeut donc êtrequalifiée d'agereinfraudem legis.
Une interprétation des articles 22, 4 et 5 du Pacte justifiant le refus du
mandataire d'accomplir les obligations qu'il a acceptéespar l'ins-
trument de mandat, et par la signature du Pacte, pourrait être
qualifiéed'interpretatio infraudem legis.
On doit ajouter dans le même sensque l'idéede l'application de la
règlede l'unanimitéaux mandats ne fut pas généralement admisepar la
doctrine contemporaine à la Société.Wright la rejette d'une manière
décidéesur la base de l'avisrendu dans l'affaireditede Mossoul, et des ar-
ticles 15et 16du Pacte (Mandates UndertheLeague ofNations,p. 132,522).
A l'Institut de droit international (session de Cambridge, 1931, sur les
mandats internationaux), à propos de la révocation des mandats, Borel
soulève laquestion de la règlede I'unanimité;Seferiades oppose que bien
que le Conseil décide iil'unanimité, on ne tient pas compte du vote du
mandataire. Rolin affirme que l'unanimitén'est pas nécessaire maisque the mandator on behalf of which it exercises its administration.
Thus, the non-application of the unanimity rule to the Council's
functions regarding the mandate does not contradict the object and
purpose of Articles 4 and 5, namely respect for the exclusive juris-
diction of States. Article 22 on the other hand, gave birth to an
institution the nature of which is incompatible with the possibility
of the exercise of a veto by the mandatory.
It is so contrary to the concepts of mandate and of tutelage, and
to good faith, to set up and regulate supervision of the mandatory
while rendering "that supervision nominal and ineffeciive", while
leavingit to the good will of the mandatory to fulfil his obligations,
that this "cannot be conclusively inferred from the mere fact that
the basic instrument provides forthe rule of unanimity" (seeseparate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 99).
Furthermore, the principle nerno-judex in re sua prohibits an
administrator, guardian (tuteur) or mandatory from being the
person who decides or judges whether or not he has fulfilled his
obligations as such-"there is no valid reason for distinguishing, in
connection with the applicability of the principle that no-one isjudge
in his own cause, between the judicial and the supervisory organs"
(separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ibid., p. 100).
The question raised by the unanimity rule is the same as that
which arises in practice in municipal law, where it is answered by an
appeal to the concept of fraus legis. The mark of this concept is
the fact that the protection of an abstract generaI rule is sought
in order to avoid the application of another rule intended to settle
a concrete point. In cases where the purpose of the abstract rule is
not to settle the concrete point, therule which directly contemplates
that point is to be applied.
south Africa's claim for the application of the unanimity rule can
therefore be classified as agere in,fraudemIegis.An interpretation of
Articles 22, 4 and 5 of the Covenant which would justify the refusal
of the mandatory to fulfil the obligations which it has accepted by
the mandate instrument and by the signature of the Covenant, could
be classified asinterpretatio in$raudem legis.
To the same effect it should be added that the idea of the application
'the unanimity rule to mandates was not generally accepted by writers
'the time of the League. Wright rejected it decisively on the basis of
e Opinion given in tk so-called Mosul case, and of Articles 15and 16
the Covenant (Mandates Under the League of Nations, pp. 132 and
2). At the 1931 session of the Institut de Droit International held at
imbridge, which discussed international mandates, Borel raised the
iestion of the unanimity rule in connection with the revocation of
andates. Seferiades then argued that although the Council's decisions
:re taken unanimously, the mandatory's vote was disregarded. Rolin ce n'est pas le moment de traiter de la question. La discussion ne fut pas
poursuivie mais le vote favorable à la révocation implique le rejet de
l'application dela règlede l'unanimité auxmandats (Annuairedel'Institut
de droit international,vol. II, p. 58). Lesnombreux auteurs qui affirment
le droit pour la Société de révoquerles mandats paraissent implicitement
partager le même avis. Récemment encore,Dugard soutient la non-
application de la règlede l'unanimitéaux mandats (((The Revocation of
the Mandate for South West Africa)), The American Journalof Inter-
nationalLaw, 1968,p. 89 et suiv.).
Il convient de rappeler les caractéristiques du régime des mandats,
car ce n'est qu'entenant compte de sa nature que l'on pourra répondre
à la question relative aux pouvoirs que possédaitla Société desNations,
puis,à sa place, l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Les mandats ne sont pas une simple concession des Principales Puis-
sances alliéeset associéesaux Etats mandataires. Le mandat est une
institution très complexe.
Elle est basée surla cession faite par l'Allemagne de ses colonies en
Afrique (art. 118, 119du traitéde paix). Cette cession n'est pas pure et
simple, elle est faite sub nzodo.Ces territoires ne passent pas sous la
souveraineté desEtats mandataires. Dans le traité, 1'Etat mandataire
est désigné comme ((le gouvernement qui exercera l'autorité sur ces
territoires» (art. 127); le transfert des territoires est lié((àla Puissance
mandataire prise en cette qualité »; et les territoires sont administrés
par mandataire d'après l'article22 de la partie 1 (la Société desNations)
du présent traité » (art. 257); on parle aussi des puissances (administrant
d'anciens territoires allemands en tant que mandataires, en vertu de
l'article 22 de la partie 1 (la Société desNations) » (art. 312). C'est cet
article 22 qui fixe les principes de la nouvelle institution.
La Société desNations assume la responsabilitéd'une (mission sacrée
de civilisation )l, cdans l'intérêd te la population indigène »,jusqu'au
moment où les peuples en question seront ((capables de se diriger eux-
mêmes ».Dans le Pacte on relèveainsi la nature temporaire du mandat;
il doit finir quand la population indigène sera apte à se gouverner par
elle-même.Le généralSmuts s'est efforcéde faire supprimer cette réfé-
rence au caractère limité dans le temps des mandats, et a proposé à
rapportsà la Commission II:e(1Le mandat n'appartient,pas à mon pays ou à unson
autre pays. On le tient entrust pour le monde.11(UNCIO, vol. VIII, doc. 1144,
séance du 21 juin 1945, p. 154; citation dans C.I.J. Mémoires, Statut international
du Sud-Ouest africain,. 222.) stated that unanimity was not necessary but that discussion of the ques-
tion was untimely. The discussion was not pursued, but the vote in
favour of revocation impliedrejection of the application of the unanimity
rule to mandates (Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. II,
p. 58). The many writers who assert that the League was entitled to
revoke the mandates appear by implication to share the same view.
Quite recently Dugard has maintained that the unanimity rule was not
applicable to mandates ("The Revocation of the Mandate for South
West Africa", A.J.Z.L., 1968,pp. 89 ff.).
V. POSSIBILIT OF FORFEITUR BEY THE MANDATORY-
THE NATURE OF THE MANDATE
Itis necessary to reîall the characteristics of the mandate régime,for
only in the light ofits nature will it be possible to say what powers were
possessed by the League of Nations and are now possessed by the United
Nations in its place.
The mandates are not a simple concession granted by the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers to the mandatory States. The mandate is a
very complex institution.
It was based on the cession by Germany of its colonies in Africa (Arts.
Il8 and 119 of the Treaty of Peace). This cession was not pure and
simple, but szcbmodo. The territories concerned did not pass under the
sovereignty of the mandatory States. In the Treaty, the mandatory States
were designated as the "governments exercising authority over those
territories" (Art. 127); the territories were transferred "to the Mandatory
Power in its capacity as such" ;the territories were to be "administered
by a Mandatory under Article 22 of Part 1 (League of Nations) of the
present Treaty" (Art. 257); reference was also made to any Power "ad-
ministering former German territory as a mandatory under Article 22,
Part 1 (League of Nations)" (Art. 312). It was this Article 22 which
laid down the principles of the new institution.
The League of Nations assumed the responsibility for a "sacred trust
of ci~ilization"~, "in the interests of the indigenous population", until
such time as the peoples in question should be "able to stand by them-
selves". It was in this way that the Covenant pointed to the temporary
nature of mandates; they were to come to an end when the indigenous
populations were capable of governing themselves. General Smuts tried
to get this reference to the chronologically finite nature of mandates
l Mr. Fraser (NewZealand), tthen chairrnan of Cornmittee 1114,concluded his
report to the Secondrnmittee with the following words: "The manddoes not
belong to my country or any other country. It isheld in trust for the world." (21June
1945, UNCIO doc. 1144, Vol. VIII, p. 154; cineZ.C.J. Pleadings, International
Status of South West Africa, p. 222.cette fin de biffer le mot ((encore » (yet en anglais) dans l'expression
(non encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes a; mais cette proposition
fut rejetée.
La Société desNations confie cla tutelle de ces peuples aux nations
développées », qui ccexerceraientcette tutelle en qualité de mandataires
et au nom de la Société » '.La Société confieles pouvoirs d'administra-
tion au mandataire «sous réserve desgaranties prévues plus haut dans
l'intérêtde la population indigène)). Plus spécialement on établit une
commission permanente chargée de recevoir et d'examiner les rapports
des mandataires et de donner au Conseil son avis sur toutes questions
relatives à l'exécution desmandats. Dans le mandat pour le Sud-Ouest
africain, à côtéde la référence à l'article 22 du Pacte, il est prévu que
le mandataire devra envoyer au Conseil des rapports satisfaisant celui-ci
et contenant toute information intéressant le territoire et indiquant les
mesures prises pour s'acquitter decertains engagements spécifiques(art. 6).
La surveillance par l'organe de la communauté internationale est une
caractéristiquedistinctive du :ilandat (Wright, Mandates under the League
of Nations, 1930, p. 64), conforme à sa nature même(C.I.J. Recueil
1950, p. 133, 136). ((En fait, exclure les obligations liéesau Mandat
reviendrait à exclure l'essence mêmedu Mandat » (C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
p. 334) 2. C'étaitune responsabilité grave de la Société desNations, à
présent desNations Unies, que la n mission sacrée » envers les peuples
indigènes, et qui ne peut êtreassuréequ'au moyen du contrôle et des
possibilités qu'iloffre 3.
La tâche que les Etats mandataires doivent remplir ([au nom » (on
behalfl de la Société est qualifiéd ee fonction de ((mandataire » (manda-
tory) et consiste à exercer une 1tutelle ))(tutelage). Elle est marquée,
comme ces termes mêmesl'indiquent en droit interne, par le désintéres-
sement. Celui-ci a été solennellement proclamé par les Puissances alliées
lLe gouverneur de la Nouvelle-Zélande a dit en 1926: 1Le Samoa occidental
ne fait pas partie intégrante de l'Empire britannique: c'est un enfant dont nous
avons accepté la tutelle )(Commission permanente des mandats, procès-verbaux
de la dixième session, 1926, p. 24, citation dansI.J. Mémoires, Statut international
du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 203).
11La surveillance internationalprévue par les paragraphes 7 et 9 de l'article 22
du Pacte est la pierre angulaire de tout le système des mandats1);des décisions du
Conseil il résulte<que c'est un contrôle effectif et sérieux qui est viséet non pas
un contrôlepurement théorique ou fictif.(Le système des mandats: Origine, principes
et application, citations dans C.I.J. Mémoires, Admissibilité de l'audition de pétition-
naires par le Comitédu Sud-Ouest africain, p. 28.)
11En ce qui concerne le devoir qui incombe à la Société d'assurer l'observation
des termes des mandats, le Conseil envisage ses attributions en l'espècedans le sens
le plus large (rapport présentépar le Conseil a l'Assemblée le 6 décembre 1920,
document de l'Assemblée de la SdN, 20148, 161, citation dans C.I.J. Ménzoires,
ibid., p. 29).
196 NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP. DE CASTRO) 208
deleted, and for this purpose proposed the removal of the word "yet" in
the phrase "not yet able to stand by themselves"; but this amendment
was rejected.
The League of Nations entrusted "the tutelage of such peoples . ..to
advanced nations" the method being that "this tutelage should be
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League"'. Powers of
administration were entrusted to the mandatories by the League "subject
to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous
population". More particularly, there was constituted a Permanent
Commission to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandato-
ries andto advise the Council on al1matters relating to the observance of
the mandates. In the Mandate for South West Africa, in addition to the
reference to Article 22 of the Covenant, it was provided that the Manda-
tory should make to the Council of the League of Nations annual reports
to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information with regard
to the Territory, and indicating the measures taken to carry out certain
specified obligations (Art. 6).
Supervision by the organ of the international community is a dis-
tinctive feature of the mandate (Wright, Mandates under the League of
Nations, 1930, p. 64) and is in conformity with its very nature (I.C.J.
Reports 1950, pp. 133 and 136). "Tndeed, to exclude the obligations
connected with the Mandate would be to exclude the very essence of the
Mandate" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 334)'. The "sacred trust" in respect of
the indigenous peoples was a grave responsibility for the League of
Nations and now for the United Nations, and one which can only be
discharged through the modality of supervision and the possibilities
which it provides 3.
The task which the mandatory States have to perform "on behalf" of
the League is qualified as a "mandatory" function and consists in the
exercise of "tutelage". It is characterized, as the same terms imply in
municipal law, by absence of self-interest. This was solemnly proclaimed
by the Allied Powers (16 June 1919)in reply to a protest by the German
'The New Zealand Government said in 1926: "Western Samoa is not an integral
part of the British Empire, but a child of which we have assumed the guardianship"
(Minutes of the Tenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1926,
p. 24: cited in I.C.J. Pleadings, International Sfatus oj" South-West Africa, p. 203).
"The international supervision provided for in paragraphs7 and 9 of Article
22 of the Covenant is the cornerstoneof the whole mandaies system"; "It clearly
emerges . ..from ... the decisions of the Council that what is intended is an effective
and genuine, not a purely theoretical ormal, supervision." (The Mandates System.
Hearings of Petitioners by the Cornrnirree on South-West Afrip. 28.)missibiliof
"With regard to the responsibility of the League for securing the observance of
the terrns of the mandates, the Counciinterprets its duties in this connection in the
widest manner." (Op. cit., p. 34, quoting a report presented by the Council to the
Assembly on 6 December 3920, League Assembly Doc. 20/48/161 ; cited in I.C.J.
Pleadings, ihid., p. 29.)209 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND. DE CASTRO)
(16juin 1919)en réponse à une protestation du Gouvernement allemand
à la conférencede la ~aix: ((Les Puissances mandataires aui. étantcons-
. ,
tituées fidéicommissairespar la Société desNations, ne tireront aucun
bénéficede ce fidéicommis ))Cette conception se traduit à l'article 257
du traitéde paix, où il n'estpas tenu compte de la valeur des possessions
allemandes cédées pour le calcul des indemnités à payer par l'Allemagne
(van Rees, Les mandats internationaux, 1927,p. 18, 19). Ce mêmeargu-
mentdu désintéressemenftut utilisépar lesPrincipales Puissances alliéeset
associées en facede l'Italie qui réclamaitdes compensations territoriales
surla base despromesses faites par la France et par la Grande-Bretagne :
((les territoires aui furent confiés à leur Mandat ne constituent
aucun agrandissement de leurs possessions coloniales; les terri-
toires en question ne devant appartenir, en vertu du système des
Mandats, qu'aux peuples qui leç habitent ))(Stoyanovski, La théorie
générale dem s andats internationaux, 1925,p. 18).
Les droits du mandataire, en conséquence,((nesont pour ainsi dire que
de simples instruments lui permettant de remplir ses obligations ))(C.I.J.
Recueil 1962, p. 329).
Cette conception a d'importantes conséquencespratiques. Le man-
dataire n'a pas le pouvoir de transmettre, céder ou louer une partie
quelconque du territoire sous mandat (rapport de Sjoberg, cité par
Wright, loc. cit., p. 122). La Commission permanente des mandats a
protesté contre le fait que, dans l'accord sur les frontières entre l'Afrique
du Sud et le Portugal (1926),l'Afrique du Sud ait indiquéqu'elle possède
la souveraineté(possessessoilereignty)dans le territoire sous sonmandat
(Wright, loc. cit., p. 121, 201-202, 446) l; la mêmecommission insiste
là-dessus en soutenant aue ((comme corollaire direct de l'absence de
souveraineté, le mandataire ne peut tirer aucun profit direct du terri-
toire ))(ibid., p. 214), et que, ((mêmedans les territoires sous Mandat
((C »,il y a lieu d'examiner si la discrimination économique n'est pas
contraire aux intérêts des habitants du territoire ))(ibid., p. 215).
Selon van Rees, les territoires sous mandat ont une individualité
marquée; lespuissances mandataires sont des gérantsobligésde respecter
rigoureusement l'intégritédes territoires; les terres vacantes ou sans
maître font partie du domaine du territoire (Les mandats internationaux,
p. 22). La Commission permanente des mandats a dit aussi, en 1925,
que des contributions ou donations des territoires sous mandat en faveur
de 1'Etat mandataire ne sont admissibles que si elles concernent des
institutions et des Œuvres dont le territoire sous mandat peut tirer un
A cette occasion, M. Smit, représentant de l'Afrique du Sud, a dit: «l'Union
sud-africaine exercera et possédera cette souveraineté [sur le territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain] au nom d'une tierce partie non définie. Telle est sa manière de voir; il ne
peut êtrequestion d'annexion. » (Commission permanente des mandats, procès-
international du Sud-Ouest africain,197.)2, citation dans C.I.J. Mémoires, StatutGovernment at the Peace Conference: "The Mandatory Powers which, in
so far as they may be appointed Trustees by the League of Nations, will
derive no benefit from such Trusteeship ..." This conception is reflected
in Article 257 of the Treaty of Peace, the effect of which is that the
value of the German possessions thus transferred was not taken into
account in calculating the reparations to be paid by Germany (van Rees,
Les mandats internationaux, 1927, pp. 18 f.). The same argument of
absence of interest was used by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
when Italy claimed territorial compensation on the basis of promises
made by France and Great Britain :
"The territoriesentrusted to them under mandate do not represent
any increase in their colonial possessions; the territories in question
can only belong, under the mandates system, to the peoples inha-
biting them" (Stoyanovski, La théorie générale de msandats inter-
nationaux, 1925,p. 18).
Cansequently the rights of the mandatory "are, so to speak, mere tools
given to enable it to fulfil its obligations" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 329).
This conception has important practical consequences. The mandatory
has no power to cede or lease any part of themandated territory (Sjoberg
report, quoted by Wright, op. cit., p. 122). The Permanent Mandates
Commission protested against the statement by South Africa in the 1926
boundary agreement between South Africa and Portugal that South
Africa "possesses sovereignty" in the mandated area (Wright, op. cit.,
pp. 121,201f., 446)'. The Commission insisted that "as a direct corollary
to the lack of sovereignty . . the mandatory make no direct profit from
the territory" (ibid., p. 214), and that "even in C territories economic
discriminations are scrutinized to see that they are not against the in-
terests of the inhabitants of the area" (ibid., p. 215).
Van Rees finds that the mandated territories have a distinct indivi-
duality; the mandatory Powers are managers under an obligation of
strict respect for the integrity of the territories; unoccupied or ownerless
land is part of the property of the territory (Les mandats internationaux,
p. 22). The Permanent Mandates Commission also stated in 1925 that
contributions or gifts made by the mandated territories to the mandatory
Power were only admissible if they concerned institutions or works which
could be said to benefit the mandated territory materially or morally
' On that occasion the representative of South Africa, Mr. Smit, said "the
Government of the Union of South Africa exercised and possessed that sovereignty
was his position: therecould be no question of annexation."ir(Minutes of theed. That
Eleventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1927, p. 92; cited in
I.C.J.Pleadings, International Status of South- West Ap.i197.) 21O NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN ()P. IND.DE CASTRO)
avantage matériel ou moral (Bentwich, The Mandates System, p. 106,
107); en 1927,elle a dit que les chemins de fer et ports construits par les
Allemands dans le Sud-Ouest africain ne pouvaient pas êtreconsidérés
comme relevant du dominium de l'Afrique du Sud et elle a exigéqu'on
proclame leur appartenance au territoire administré par l'Union; en
1929, l'Afrique du Sud a donné des explications conformément à la
demande qui lui était faiteibid p.,6).
L'instrument de mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain allemand en date
du 17décembre1920 a la forme d'une déclaration adoptéepar le Conseil
de la Société desNations. Sa nature a été discutéepar la doctrine qui
n'a pu le faire entrer dans aucune des notions juridiques connues. Sa
gestation, comme celle des autres mandats, aéla suivante: l'Allemagne
a cédé.auxPrincipales Puissances alliéeset associéesle Sud-Ouest africain
allemand, pour qu'il soit administré par le mandataire conformément
à l'article 22 du Pacte. Les Principales Puissances conviennent qu'un
mandat soit conféré à Sa Majestébritannique pour êtreexercéen son
nom par l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud, conformément à l'article 22 du
Pacte. Sa Majestébritannique, agissant pour l'Afrique du Sud, s'engage
à accepter le mandat et à l'exercer au nom de la Société desNations.
Le Conseil de ladN, considérant l'article22, paragraphe 8, a statué sur
les points mentionnésdans cette disposition, et confirmé le mandat.
Elaboration compliquée, marquée d'interventionsaux significations
diverses. Cellede l'Afrique du Sud esta plus passive: Sa Majestébritan-
nique s'est engagéeàaccepter pour ellele mandat. Dc cette manière prend
naissance une institution internationale dont l'essenceest dans l'article 22
du Pacte - ce qui ressort d'ailleurs de la continuelle référenceàacet
article dans le traité de Versailles et dans l'instrument de mandat. C'est
en véritéaux principes fondamentaux de l'article 22 que se réfère aussi la
résolution testamentaire de la Sociétédes Nations du 18 avril 1946; ce
sont ces principes qui donnent sa signification au régimedes mandats.
La mission sacréeenvers les peuples indigènes des territoires sous
mandat est une responsabilité directe de la communauté internationale
organisée.La Société desNations et, depuis le 18avril 1946,rgznisation
des Nations Unies, a le devoir de garantàrces peuples que cette mission
ne sera pas trahie par la canduite des mandataires agissant précisément
en son nom. C'est de ces principes que naissent des obligations bien
définiesà la charge des Nations Unies et des mandataires.
VI. POSSIBILIT DE RETRAIT DU MANDAT
A. La révocabilitédes mandats
La question préalableclé,compte tenu des antécédents,pour répondre
à la demande d'avis, est celle de savoir si l'Assembléegénéralea pris une (Bentwich, The Mandates System, pp. 106 f.). In 1927 the Commission
stated that therailways and harbours built by the Germans in South West
Africa could not be regarded as having passed to the dominium of South
Africa; it urged that they should be declared to belong to the territory
administered by the Union; in 1929 South Africa gave explanations in
accordance with the request made to it (ibid., p. 96).
The instrument embodying the Mandate for German South West
Africa, dated 17December 1920,took the form of a declaration made by
the Council of the League of Nations. Its nature has been discussed by
jurists, who have been unable to classify it as belonging to any one of the
known legalcategories. It was brought into being, like theothermandates,
asfollows. Germany ceded German South West Africa to the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, to be administered by the mandatory in
accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant. The Principal Powers agreed
that a mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty to be
exercised on his behalf by the Union of South Africa, in accordance with
Article 22 of the Covenant. His Britannic Majesty, acting for South
Africa, undertook to accept the Mandate and exercise iton behalf of the
League of Nations. The Council of the League of Nations, having regard
to Article 22, paragraph 8, took a decision on the points referred to in
that provision, and confirmed the Mandate.
This was a complicated process, in which the contributions of the dif-
ferent participants varied in significance. South Africa's was the most
passive: His Britannic Majesty made the undertaking to accept the
Mandate on its behalf. In this way was born an international institution
the essence of which is in Article 22 of the Covenant-as is moreover
apparent from the continuous references to this Article in the Versailles
Treaty and in the mandate instrument. Tt was reaily also to the basic
principles of Article 22 that the resolution of 18April 1946constituting
the final will and testament of the League of Nations referred back;
it is those principles which give meaning to the mandates system.
The sacred trust in respect of the indigenous people of the mandated
territories is a direct responsibility of the organized internationalmu-
nity. The League of Nations and, since 18April 1946,the United Nations,
is in duty bound to guarantee those peoples that this trust will not be
betrayed by the conduct of the mandatories acting, as they do, on its
behalf. It is those principles which give rise to well-defined obligations for
the United Nations and the mandatories.
A. Revocabilo iftyandates
Taking into account what has gone before, the key prior question for
the response to be given to the request for opinion is whether the General211 NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN)(OP. IND. DE CASTRO)
décisionultra vires,en déclarant((terminé » le mandat confié à l'Afrique
du Sud. Mêmeen admettant que les Nations Unies ont succédé à la
Société des Nations dans sespouvoirs de surveillance, il est clair que si la
Sociétédes Nations ne pouvait pas retirer le mandat à l'Afrique du
Sud, les Nations Unies n'ont pas pu recevoir despouvoirs que la Société
n'avait pas. Il faut donc considérer si la Société desNations avait le
pouvoir de mettre fin aux mandats.
La lutte entre les colonialistes et les progressistes n'a pas fini avec la
signature du Pacte.11est normal que lescolonialistes pensent et disent que
le système desmandats est une forme voiléed'annexion, que la souve-
raineté surles territoires sous mandat appartient aux mandataires et que
la concession d'un mandat est définitiveet irrévocable.Les défenseurs des
intérêts coloniauxont à surmonter l'obstacle que constitue l'expression
des buts du régime desmandats dans l'article 22 du Pacte. Pour y par-
venir, ilsfont valoir les argumentssuivants: l'article ne mentionne pas
le droit de révocation; or si l'on avait voulu le conféràrla Société des
Nations, on l'aurait stipulé expressément dans le Pacte. Les Etats
mandataires, ou la plupart d'entre eux, ont manifestéfranchement le
désird'obtenir l'annexion pure et simple, dans les discussions antérieures
à la rédaction del'article 22. Les mandats ont été attribués aux Etatspar
les Principales Puissances alliéeset associéeset non par la Société des
Nations et comme les Principales Puissances avaient acquis ces territoires
par conquête,seules elles auraient pu garder la faculté de révoquerle
mandat, à l'exclusionde la Société.
Ces arguments semblent assez faibles. La règle inclusiounius exclusio
alterius est sans application quand le but d'une norme montre qu'une
interprétation conforme à la ratio juris est nécessairesi l'on veut lui
donner effet.11n'y a pas lieu de prendre en considérationles désirset les
espoirs de certainesparties au Pacte, pas plus quetoute reservatiomentalis,
dès lors que les autres parties n'en ont pas tenu compte lors de la
signature, mêmesi l'Afrique du Sud les invoque. Les Principales Puis-
sances n'ont pas acquis lesterritoires par voie de conquête(il n'ya pas eu
debellatio),et sil'Allemagnecèdedesterritoires dans letraitéde Versailles,
c'est pour qu'ils soient placéssous mandat, conformément à l'article 22
du Pacte.
Vu la faiblesse de l'argumentation ci-dessus commentée, c'est la
position contraire, favorable au droit de la Société dNations de mettre
fin au mandat, qui doit l'emporter. Mais lestenants de cette opinion sont
eux-mêmes diviséssur le fondement de ce droit.
Il est évident quel'idéeoriginaire du systèmedes mandats englobait la
possibilité d'une révocation. Pour le généralSmuts qui la formule,
l'attribution du mandat constitue une preuve de grande confiance et un
honneur, et le mandat ne doit pas êtreune source de profits ou d'avan-
tages personnels pour les nationaux du mandataire (The League ofAssembly took a decision ultra vireswhen it declared that the Mandate
entrusted to South Africa was terminated. Even if it is admitted that the
United Nations succeeded to the supervisory powers of the League of
Nations, it is clear that if the League of Nations could not withdraw the
mandate from South Africa, the United Nations could not have received
powers which the League did not have. It is necessary therefore to con-
sider whether the League of Nations had the power to put an end to
mandates.
The struggle between the colonialists and progressives did not end with
the signature of the Covenant. It is understandable that colonialists
consider and averthat the mandates system is a veiled form of annexation,
that sovereignty over the mandated territories belongs to themandatories,
and that the grant of a mandate is definitive and irrevocable. In order to
defend the colonial interest, its partisans have to overcome the obstacle
of the expression of the purposes of the mandates system to be found in
Article 22 of the Covenant. In order to achieve this, they put forward the
following arguments: Article 22 does not mention any right of revoca-
tion; but if it had been intended to confer such a right on the League of
Nations, it would have been expressly provided for in the Covenant. The
mandatory States, or the majority of them, frankly revealed, in the course
of the discussions preceding the drawing-up of Article 22, their desire to
obtain annexation pure and simple. Mandates were granted to States by
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and not by the League of
Nations; and since the Principal Powers had acquired those territories
by conquest, they alone, and not the League, could have retained the
power to revoke a mandate.
These arguments seem somewhat weak. The rule inclusiouniusexclusio
alteriusmay not be applied when the purpose of a norm shows that an
interPretadion in haimony with the ratio iuriis necessary if effectis to be
given to it. There is no ground for taking into account the desires and
hopes of certain parties-to the Covenant, any more than any mental
reservation, if they were disregarded by the other parties at the time of
signature, even if South Africa now relies on them. The Principal Powers
did not acquire the territories by way of conquest (there wasnodebellatio),
and if Germany ceded those territories in the Treaty of Versailles, it
was so that they might be placed under mandate, in accordance with
Article 22 of the Covenant.
In view of the weakness of the arguments just discussed, it is the con-
trary position, favouring the right of the League of Nations to put an end
to a mandate, which must prevail. But those who hold this view are
themselves divided as to the basis of the right.
It is clear that the original idea of the mandates system involved the
possibility of revocation. For General Smuts, who put it into words, the
allocation of a mandate was a mark of great trust and an honour, and
a mandate should not be a source of profit or private advantage for the
nationals of the mandatory (The League of Nations: A Practical Sugges- Nations:A PracticalSuggestion, 1918,p. 21-22) ;il ajouteque la Sociétse
réservera((ledroit absolu d'exercer endernier ressort son contrôle ou sa
surveillance, de même qu'elle réserveraau territoire ou au peuple intéressé
le droit d'en appelerà la Sociétécontre toute violation flagrante de son
mandat par 1'Etatmandataire » (ibid., p. 23). Mais c'eàtdes territoires
européensquelegénéraS l mutspense commeéventuelsmandats, etc'est lui
qui plus tard demandera l'annexionpour lesterritoires del'Afrique. C'est
Wilson qui fera étendre l'applicationdu système desmandats aux terri-
toires africains, en conservant lesprincipes formuléspar le général muts.
On peut expliquer le silence de l'article 22 sur la révocation par les
circonstancesde sa rédaction.Contrairementaux autres articles du Pacte,
il ne fut pas rédigépar des experts connaissant les finessesdel'interpréta-
tion juridique; on sait qu'il fut mis au point par des hommes politiques,
sans êtrerevisépar les experts. La sociétéinternationale de la belle
époquen'aimait pas mentionner les choses désagréableset préféraitles
laisser sous-entendues. 11aurait été demauvais goût de parler de la
possibilitéqu'une des Principales Puissances trahisse la mission sacrée
qu'on lui aurait confiée. Ce risquelointain était cependant couvert grâce
aux termes employés.
Que telle ait étéla situationà ce moment-là semble confirmépar ce
qu'on connaît des discussions préalables à la rédactiondu Pacte et ce que
l'on sait de l'opinion des membres de la Commission permanente des
mandats.
Dans les réunions préalables àla rédactiondu Pacte, certains gouverne-
ments se montrèrent soucieux desconditions applicables aux mandats; un
mandat pouvait ne pas présenter d'intérêst'ilétaitrévocabledu jour au
lendemain. On les a tranquillisésen leur disant qu'une telle révocation
était pratiquement impossible. On n'a pas niéla possibilitéjuridique
d'une révocation,mais on a essayéde dissiper leurs craintes en précisant
qu'une telle possibilitén'était pas à prévoir,étant donnéles puissances
auxquelles il avait étéconvenu d'accorder des mandats, et celles qui
composaient le Conseil de la Société des Nations.
Les membres de la Commission permanente des mandats ont eu à
discuter la question de la révocabilité.Le devoir s'imposait à eux de
favoriser le développement économiquedes territoires sous mandat. Or
d'aucuns avaient émis la crainte que l'éventualitéd'une révocation
n'effraie les investisseurs. Quoi faire pour les tranquilliser? Des rapports
des discussions on retire l'impression que I'on n'a pas voulu donner une
réponse négativetranchante, mais que I'on n'a pas ménagéles efforts
pour fortifier l'assurance qu'une révocationest inconcevable en pratique.
Seul van Rees croit avoir trouvé un appui juridique dans l'opinion de
Rolin; mais on peut lui opposer que ce! auteur considère la révocation
possible en cas de grave abus du mandat l.L'opinion des hommes con-
' Après avoir dit que le mandat est une aliénation irrévocable, il ajoute: «elle
ne serait sujette à révocation à charge de ce dernier [le mandataire] qun pour
200 tion,1918, pp. 21 f.); he goes on to Saythat the League should reserve to
itself "complete power to ultimate control and supervision, as well as
the right of appeal toit from the territory or people affected against any
gross breach of the mandate by the mandatory State" (ibid., p. 23).
But it was European territories which General Smuts was thinking of as
possible mandates, and it was he who later was to cal1for annexation for
the African territories. It was Wilson who was to have the mandates
system extended to the African territories, while retaining the principles
formulated by General Smuts.
The silenceof Article 22 on the question of revocation can be explained
by the circumstances under which it was drawn up. Unlike the other
Articles of the Covenant, it was not drawn up by experts acquainted with
the finer points of legal interpretation: it is well known that it was
worked out by politicians, without being revised by experts. International
society of the belleépoque did not like to mention disagreeable matters
and preferrec!to leave them to be understood. It would have been in bad
tasle to refer to the possibility that one of the Principal Powers might
betray the sacred trust conferred upon it. This remote risk was, however,
covered, thanks to the terms used.
That such was the situation at that time seems to be confirmed by what
is known of the preliminary discussions preceding the drafting of the
Covenant, and what is known of the opinion of the members of the
Permanent Mandates Commission.
In the preliminary meetings prior to the drafting of the Covenant,
certain governments showed concern as to the conditions which were to
be applicable to mandates; there might be no interest in having a man-
date if it were revocable at any moment. These doubts were put at
rest by the statement that such a revocation was practically impossible.
The legal possibility of revocation was not denied, but an attempt was
made to calm their fears by explaining that such a possibility wasnot to be
foreseen, taking into account whichPowersit had beenagreedto grantman-
dates to, and which Powers made up the Council of the League of Nations.
The inembers of the Permanent Mandates Commission had to discuss
\ the question of revocability. They were under a duty to favour the
economic development of the mandated territories. But some of them had
expressed fears that the possibility of revocation might scare off investors.
What could be done to assuage these fears? From the reports of the
discussions one gets the impression that it was desired not to give a
definite negative answer, but that no effort was spared to strengthen the
assurance that a revocation was inconceivable in practice. Only van Rees
considers that he has found legal support for his view in that of Rolin;
but it may be said in reply that the latter author considers revocation to be
possible in the case ofserious abuse of a mandate l.The opinion of those
After having said that a mandate is an irrevocable alienatiogoes on: "It
would not be subject to revocation as against the latter [themandatory] except for a
200213 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN (O) P.IND.DE CASTRO)
naissant le mieux les territoires sous mandat et des administrateurs des
colonies paraît assez défavorable à l'irrévocabilité. Van Reesq ,ui tient
tant à donner des assurances aux entrepreneurs, énumère parmi les
questions que l'article laissesans réponse: le mandat est-il révocableet
dans l'affirmative quelleautorité est compétentepour prendre une telle
décision? Il laisse lui-mêmela question sans réponse(Les mandats inter-
nationaux, 1927, p. 14). Sir Frederick Lugard, qui avait souligné à la
Commission le caractère inconcevable de l'hypothèse dela révocation,
admet la révocabilité sansle moindre doute dans son livre fondamental.
Il le fait en considérantla situation juridique des personnes sous mandat:
«la personne ((protégée en vertu d'un mandat » partage avec celui qui
possède leterritoire (the ownerof theestate) untitre précaire,sous réserve
de l'éventualitéque le mandat soit révoquéou abandonné » (The Dual
MandateinBritishTropicalAfrica,2' éd.,1923,p. 56; 5' éd.,1965,p. 56) '.
Les auteurs qui soutiennent la thèse de la révocabilitéla défendent
avec des arguments divers concernant: le caractère foncièrement tempo-
raire des mandats, la nécessitéde la cessation dans le cas d'un peuple
mûr pour l'indépendance,la souveraineté dela Société desNations, la
sanction résultant d'un manquement aux devoirs, les principes généraux
régissant mandats, tutelle et trust, la manifestation des pouvoirs de
surveillanceet de contrôle, l'impossibilitéde coopérationet la nécessitéde
protégerles peuples. Cette abondance de motifs n'est pas la preuve de
la faiblesse de la thèse,c'est la conséquencede la variétédes aspects de
l'institution du mandat et de la possibilité d'envisager des causes diverses
de terminaison.
Il n'est pasjuridiquement tout à faitjuste de dire que lespouvoirs de la
Société des Nations correspondent àl'exercicede l'exceptiononadimpleti.
C'est une des caractéristiques des contrats synallagmatiques mais c'est
aussi la manifestation d'un principe généralD . ans les contrats, celui qui
remplit les obligations contractuelles fondamentales a la possibilité, en
cas de défaillancedu cocontractant, non seulement de déclarerla résolu-
tion du contrat, mais aussi de demander l'indemnisation des préjudiceset
la restitutio de ce qui est reçu par le contrat (c'estle cas par exemple des
cessions de bases militaires: si le traitéprend fin en raison de violations
commises par le cessionnaire, celui-cidoit restituer). Mais il y a d'autres
manquement tellement grave aux conditions de la cession qu'il témoignerait de
l'inaptitude foncière du mandataire administrer le territoire conformément au
Pacte.. (Le système des mandats coloniaux»,Revue de droit international et de
législation comparée,1920, p. 352-353.)
l Rappard, à la Commission permanente des mandats, après avoir dit que la
révocabilité desmandats est conforme aux principes générauxajoute:
((Ce serait, en effet, affaiblir dans l'opinion ce qui fait la valeur propre de
l'institution dont nous sommes les défenseurs attitrés que de déclarer que,
quelle que puisse être en théoriel'indignité d'une Puissance mandataire, elle
ne pourrait jamais, dans aucunehypothèse, donner lieuà la révocation du
Mandat. u (Procès-verbaux de la sixième session, 1925, p. 157, citation dans
C.Z.J. Mémoires,Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain, p. 230, note 3.) best acquainted with the mandated territories, and of the colonial ad-
ministrators, seems somewhat unfavourable to irrevocability. Van Rees,
who is so much concerned to reassure investors, mentions among the
questions which the article leaves unanswered: are mandates revocable,
and if so what is the authority competent to take such a decision? He
gives no reply to the question (Les mandats internationaux,1927,p. 14).
Sir Frederick Lugard, who before the Commission had stressed the
inconceivability of the hypothesis of revocation, admits the possibility
of revocation without any doubt whatsoever in his fundamental book.
He does so when he is dealing with the legal situation of persons under
mandate: "the person 'protected under mandate' shares with the owner
of an estate 'un titre précaire' subjectto the contingencies of revocation,
rendition, or resignation of the mandate" (The Dual Mandate in British
Tropical Africa, 2nd ed., 1923,p. 56; 5th ed., 1965,p. 56) l.
Those writers who uphold revocability support their viewwith various
arguments adducing: the basically temporary nature of the Mandates;
the need for them to come to an end in the case of a people ripe for
independence; the sovereignty of the League of Nations; sanctions
following from a breach of duty; general principles governing mandates,
trusts and tutelage; manifestation of powers of supervision and control;
impossibility of CO-operation,and the need to protect the peoples. This
abundance of grounds does not prove the weakness of the argument, but
is the consequence of the variety of aspects of the mandate as an institu-
tion, and the possibility of envisaging various causes for termination.
It is not, legally speaking, entirely correct to Saythat the powers of the
League of Nations corresponded to the exerciseof exceptio nonadimpleti.
That is one of the characteristics of bilateral contracts. but it is also the
manifestation of a general principle. In the case of contracts, if oneparty
defaults it is open to the other, who ishonouring his own basic contractual
obligations, not only to declare the contract terminated but to claim
damages and the restitution of the thing received under the contract (an
example lies in the grant of military bases: if the treaty is terminated for
breach onthe part of the grantee State, that Statemust make restitution).
But there are other relationships which feature an especially stringent
breach of the conditions of the grant so serious as to show the basic unfitness of the
système des mandatsstecoloniaux",tRevue de droit international et de législation
comparée,1920,pp. 352 f.)
Rappard, having observed before the Permanent Mandates Commission that
the revocability of mandates was in conformity with general principles, added: "To
state that, however unworthy in theory a mandatory Power might be, its misdeed
could never in any conceivable circumstances lead to revocation, would be to
weaken, before public opinion, that sentiment which gives its special value to the
institution of which we are the recognized defenders" (Minutes ofixth Session,
1925, p.157;cited in Z.C.J. Pleadings, International Status of South-West Africa,
p. 230, note 3). 214 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN ()P.IND. DE CASTRO)
relations dans lesauelles la facultéde mettre fin la relation contractuelle
et de demander la restilutio est spécialement énergique.Dans le mandat,
dans la tutelle et dans les trusts, il est accordéà une partie ou à une
autorité un pouvoir particulier de mettre fin à la situation. Celui qui
confère le pouvoir d'administrer en son nom et pour lui peut retirer ce
pouvoir (et quand il charge autrui de remplir ses propres devoirs envers
un tiers il doit le retirer), si celui auquela confié nes'acquitte pas des
obligations assumées,dit ne pas vouloir s'en acquitter ou nie avoir des
obligations. La nature juridique propre des mandats internationaux fait
qu'on doit tenir compte de ces considérations.
Il semble bien qu'on a rédigé l'article22 en s'efforçant de mettre en
vedette les buts fondamentaux du mandat. Lestermes employés,mandat,
tutelle,trust, montrent chacun à sa manière le caractère commun d'une
mission de confiance (jîdesfacta), desfonctionsprotectrices exercéespour
I'organisation internationale et en son nom par le mandataire. Celui-ci
est liépar le mandat, et comme I'organisation, avec pouvoir d'oficiurn.
C'est pour cette raison, semble-t-il, qu'on a choisi le terme ((tutelle ».
L'une des expressionsfigurant au paragraphe 1de I'article22est pratique-
ment la mêmeque la définition d'école concernant la tutelle (quipropter
aetatern suarn sponte se defendere nequit, Digeste 26, 1, 1, pr.). Cela
convient aussi àla nature de trust attribuée aux mandats. Le tuteur dans
lacornrnonlaw a la position de trustee (The relationof guardianand ward
is strictly thof trustee and cestui que trust). Comme ces notions juridi-
ques visent essentiellement laprotection despersonnes qui ne peuvent pas
se gouverner elles-mêmes(ici les peuples), la conséquence nécessaire est
l'exerciced'une surveilllance sur celui qui est chargé dela tutelle (super-
visionof the guardian), et en cas d'infractions gravesà ses devoirs (fides
fracta), la perte ou déchéancede la tutelle (forfeiture of guardianship).
On voit qu'étant donné la rédaction de l'article 22 et les termes em-
ployés,il n'était pasnécessairede parler de la révocation des mandats.
L'essence de cette notion implique d'une manière claire et évidente la
possibilitéde mettre fin au mandat, et mêmele devoir qui incombe à
l'organisation de lefaire, en cas de manquements graves à des obligations
de la part du mandataire. Un mandat qu'on ne pourrait pas révoquer
dans un tel cas ne seraitDasun mandat mais une cession de territoire ou
une annexion déguisée.
Il est difficilede croire que, d'une part, on a organisélefonctionnement
du mandat, avecune commission permanente pour contrôler I'administra-
lion du mandataire et que, d'autre part, on laisse le mandataire libre de
faire ce que bon lui semble, à l'encontre de la nature mêmedu mandat,
qu'on le mette en possession du territoire sans aucune obligation de sa
part. (Sub hac conditione:si volarn,~lullajt obligatio, Digeste44, 7, 8.) 11
serait vraiment excessif qu'il soit permis au mandataire de faire ce qu'il
veut, de commettre au nom de I'organisation des actes contraires aux
fins de l'article 22. Une interprétation qui nierait la possibilitéde mettrepower to putan end tothe contractual bond and claim restitution. In the
case of mandates, tutelage and trusts, a particular power to put an end
to the situation is vested in one party or in an authority. The party
granting powers to administer in his name or on his behalf may withdraw
them (and must withdraw them if conferred for the discharge of his own
duties to a third party) inthe eventthat their recipientils to discharge the
obligations assumed, expresses unwillingness to discharge them or denies
their existence. The particular legal nature of international mandates is
such that these considerations must be taken into account.
It does seem that in the drafting of Article 22 an effort was made to
lay stress on the fundamental purposes of the mandate. The terms
employed-mandate, trust, tutelage-evidence each in their own way
the common character of the committal of a trust (fidesfacta) protective
functions exercisedfor the international organizationand on its behalf by
the mandatory. The latter is bound by the mandate, like the organization,
with power of of3ciurn.It is for this reason, it would seem, that the term
"tute1age" was chosen. One of the expressions to be found in paragraph 1
of Article 22 is practically the same as the standard definition of tutelage
(quipropter aetatem suam sponte se defendere nequit; Digest, 26, 1,1,pr.).
This accords also with the nature of a trust, which mandates are also
regarded as having. A guardian under the Common-Law system is inthe
position of a trustee ("the relation of guardian and ward is strictly that
of trustee and cestui que trust"). As these legal concepts essentially
contemplate the protection of persons (in this case, who cannot
govern themselves,the necessaryconsequence isthe exerciseof supervision
over the penon entrusted with guardianship, "supervision of the guard-
ian", and in case of serious breaches of his duties($desfracta) the loss or
forfeiture of guardianship.
It willthus be observed that in view of the wording of Article 22 and
the terms used therein there was no need to mention revocation of the
mandates. The essential nature of this concept implies, clearly and
evidently, the possibility of putting an end to the mandate, and even the
duty laid upon the organization to do so in the case of serious breaches of
obligations on the part of the mandatory. A mandate which could not be
revoked in such a case would not be a mandate, but a cession of territory
or a disguised annexation.
It is difficultto believe that, on the one hand, the working of the man-
dates system was organized to include a Permanent Commission to
control the mandatory's administration and that, on the other hand, the
mandatory was left free to do what he thought fit, even if it were to run
counter to the very nature of the mandate, that one should put him in
possession of the territory without any obligation on his part (sub hac
corzditione:si volanz,nulla,fit obligatio; Digest,44, 7, 8). It would really
be too much if the mandatory were permitted to do what he wished, to
commit, on behalf of the organization, acts contrary to the purposes of215 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN (O) PIND. DE CASTRO)
fin au mandat en cas de violation flagrante de ses obligations par le
mandataire réduiraitl'article 22 à unjlatus vocis,ou plutôt à une ((blague
sanglante »,endonnant une couleur de légalité àl'annexion des territoires
sous mandat.
Ces considérations expliquentque la communisopiniosoit favorable à
la facultéde révocation. Ala session de Cambridge de l'Institut de droit
international (juillet1931),on a adoptéune résolution sur«les Mandats
internationaux ».L'article VI1 dit: (Les fonctions de 1'Etatmandataire
prennent fin par démission ou révocation du mandataire ..». La
révocationde 1'Etatmandataire et l'abrogation du mandat sont décidées
par le Conseil de la Société des Nations; l'abrogation peut résulter aussi
de l'admission de la collectivitésous mandat comme Membre de la
Société des Nations. Le mot ((révocation 1)fut acceptépar 27 voix contre
15(Annuairede l'Institut, vol. II, p. 60; pour letexte de la résolution, voir
vol. II, p. 233-234).Les objections formuléescontre cette expression sont
de différentes catégories. Wehberg pensq eue la Société des Nations peut
retirer le mandat unilatéralement,mêmesans faute grave du mandataire
car elle a la souverainetésur le territoire. Verdross souligne que la fin du
mandat doit êtrebaséesur lesprincipes de droit qui permettent l'abroga-
tion pour inobservation desobligations. Gide1citel'exceptiononadimpleti
contractus. Mais Rolin, rapporteur, défend leterme crévocation » en
disant qu'il est de l'essence du contrôle de comporter les sanctions
adéquates: «en acceptant de gérerun territoire sous le contrôle de la
Société des Nations, 1'Etatmandataire a accepté implicitementla sanction
de la révocationde sa charge x(pour la discussion,voir vol. II, p. 5à 59).
On a observéque la fonction de l'Institut est de lege ferenda, et qu'en
conséquenceon ne peut pas l'invoquer pour l'interprétation del'article
22 du Pacte. Mais on semble oublier que, dans le vote final, plusieurs
membres se sont abstenus et ont expliqué leurabstention en disant que
la résolution touchait à l'interprétation du Pacte (ainsi Brown Scott,
Huber, Fischer Williams; probablement Diéna,p. 66-67) l.
Plus récemment, aprèsla dissolution de la Société desNations, des
auteurs indépendantsont soutenu le caractère temporaire des mandats et
la possibilitéde leur révocation(Crawford, (South WestAfrica:Mandate
Termination in Historical Perspective »,The ColumbiaJournal of Znter-
nationalLaw, vol. VI, no 1, 1967,p. 95, 100, 107,109,119; Dugard, (The
Revocation of the Mandate for West Africa a,The American Journal of
International Law, in toto, spécialement p.85et suiv.).
On a soutenu que le silencede la Charte sur la possibilitéde révoquer
l Il y a eu 18 abstentions, 38 votes en faveur de la résolutionet aucun vote con-
traire. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP. DE CASTRO) 215
Article22. Any interpretation which denied the possibility of putting an
end to the mandate in the case of flagrant violation by a mandatory of its
obligations would reduce Article 22 to a j7atus vocis, or rather to a
"damnable mockery", by giving somecolour of legality to the annexation
of mandated territories.
These considerations explain why the communis opinio is favourable
to the power of revocation. At the Cambridge session of the Institut de
droitinternational (July 1931),aresolution was adopted on "International
Mandates". Article VI1 reads: "The functions of the mandatory State
come to an end on the resignation or removal (révocation) of the man-
datory ..." The removal of the mandatory State and the abrogation of
themandate are to be decided on by the Council of the League of Nations;
such abrogation may also result from admission of the entity under
mandate as a Member of the League of Nations. The word révocation
was included by a vote of 27 to 15 (Annuaire de l'Institut, 1931,Vol. II,
p. 60: for the text of the resolution see ibid., pp. 233 f.). The objections
raised against this expression fa11into different categories. Wehberg
thought that the League could unilaterally withdraw a niandate, even in
the absence of serious fault by the mandatory, since the League had
sovereignty over the territory. Verdross stressed that termination of the
mandate should be based on the principles of law which permit of
forfeiture for non-observation of obligations. Gide1quoted the exceptio
non adimpleti contractus. But the Rapporteur, Rolin, defended the term
révocationby saying that it was of the essence of control to involve
adequate sanctions: "by agreeing to administer a territory under the
control of the League of Nations, the mandatory State had implicitly
accepted the sanction of revocation of its trust" (for the discussion see
ibid.,pp. 54-59).
It has been pointed out that the function of the Institut is only de Iege
ferenda, and that consequently one cannot seek support from this
quarter for interpretationof Article 22 of the Covenant. This argument
seemsto overlook that, onthe finalvote on this occasion, severalmembers
abstained and explained their abstention by saying that the resolution
related to the interpretation of the Covenant (thus James Brown Scott,
Huber, Fischer Williams, and probably Diéna:ibid., pp. 66 f.).
More recently, since the dissolution of the League of Nations, inde-
pendent writers have argued for the temporary nature of mandates and
the possibility of their revocation (Crawford, "South West Africa:
Mandate Termination in Historical Perspective", The Columbia Journal
of International Law, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1967, pp. 95, 100, 107, 109, 119;
Dugard, "The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa",
American Journal of International Law, in toto and particularly pp. 85 ff.).
It has been argued that the silence of the Charter on the possibility
lThere were 18 abstentions, 38 votes for and none against the resolution.
203 216 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND.DE CASTRO)
les tutelles est concluant en ce sens qu'il établit leurirrévocabilité.Donc,
ajoute-t-on, c'està un autre argument en faveur de l'irrévocabilitédes
mandats, étant donné l'analogie entre les deux notions. Mais la non-
réglementation dela révocationde la tutelle ne signifiepas son exclusion;
le but de l'institution semble au contraire exiger la possibilitéde la révo-
cation.Il aurait fallu une déclaration expresse pour entraîner I'irrévo-
cabilité. La Charte ne semble pas avoir voulu laisser la gestion des ter-
ritoires sous tutelle la libre volonté des administrateurs, de sorte que
I'organisation serait privéedetouteautoritépour sanctionner la violation
de leurs obligations. L'Afrique du Sud ne paraît pas avoir pensé différem-
ment lorsqu'elle a écartétouteslesdemandes des Nations Unies relativesà
la signature d'un accord de tutelle.
Dans une étudeconsacree à la question des tutelles, il est signaléqu'en
vertu de l'article 85,paragraphe1,et conformément à la procédureétablie
par l'article 18,paragraphe 2, on peut mettre finàune tutelle pour viola-
tion substantielle (Marston, «Termination of Trusteeship »,International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, XVIII, 1969,p. 18).
B. Lesfaits ayant entraîné leretrait du mandat
Se rattachant aux nombreux renseignements présentésdans les exposés
écritset oraux de l'Afrique du Sud, se trouve l'offre du Gouvernement
sud-africain de produire des preuves pour réfuterles accusations dirigées
contre lui en raison de ses manquements à ses devoirs de mandataire.
Mais il y a tout de mêmeun fait sur lequel l'Afrique du Sud ne sollicite
pas l'ouverture de la preuve, un fait dont elle reconnaît et proclame
l'existence. C'estson refus de remplir ses obligations comme mandataire
envers l'organisation au nom de laquelle elledoitadministreret de laquelle
dépend son titre juridique à l'occupation et à l'administration de la
Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain).
Cette infraction commise contre le mandat est la plus grave de toutes
du point de vuejuridique formel. Dans ses conclusions l'Afrique du Sud
nie lemaintien du mandat qu'elle considère comme caduc ou bien, à titre
subsidiaire, soutientla disparition des obligations essentielles du mandat.
De cette manière, l'Afriquedu Sud empêche lesNations Unies de remplir
leur ((missionsacréc 1envers le peuple de la Namibie.
L'Afriaue du Sud a manaué à ses devoirs comme mandataire et elle
a déclaré defaçon solennelle et insistante sa décisionde ne pas les rem-
plir; ellea niéleur existence. La Cour,lle:a déclarque l'Afrique du Sud
est soumise aux obligations internationales qui découlent de son mandat
pour le Sud-Ouest africain et que les fonctions qui incombaient à la
Société desNations sont exercéespar les Nations Unies, dans les avis de
1950, 1955et 1956et dans l'arrêt de1962.L'Afrique du Sud ne peut pas of revoking trusteeships is conclusive in the sense that it establishes the
irrevocability thereof. This therefore, the argument continues, is an
additional argument in favour of the irrevocability of mandates, in view
of the analogy between the two concepts. But the lack of any provision
for revocation of trusteeshipsdoes not mean that such is excluded; on the
contrary, the purpose of the institution would appear to require the
possibility of revocation. An express declaration would have been neces-
sary to bring about irrevocability. The Charter does not seem to have
intended to leave the administration of territoriesunder trusteeship to the
unfettered will of the administrators, insuch a way that the Organization
would be deprived of any authority to impose sanctions for violation
of their05liga.tions. South Africa does not appear to have differed from
this view when it brushed aside al1requests by the United Nations con-
cerning the signature of a trusteeship agreement.
In a study of the question of trusteeships, it has been mentioned that by
virtue of Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and in accordance with
the procedure laid down by Article 18, paragraph 2, thereof, a trustee-
ship may be terminated for substantial violation thereof (Marston,
"Termination of Trusteeship", International and Conzparatii-e Law
Quarterly, XVIII, 1969,p. 18).
B. TheFacts Which Led to the Withdrawal of the Mandate
With reference to the considerable amount of information presented
in the written and oral statements of South Africa, an offer has been made
by the South African Government to produce evidence to refute the
accusations made against it of breaches of its duties as Mandatory. But
there is nonetheless one fact as to which South Africa does not seek to
adduce evidence, a fact which it concedes, the existence of which it
proclaims. This is its refusa1to fulfilits obligations as Mandatory towards
the organization on behalf of which it hasto carry on its administration,
and upon which depends its legal title to occupy and administer Narnibia
(South West Africa).
This contravention of the Mandate is the most serious of al1from the
formal legal point of view. In its submissions, South Africa denies the
continued existence ofthe Mandate, which it considers to have lapsed, or,
in the alternative, it claims that the essential obligations of the Mandate
have disappeared. ln this way, South Africa is preventing the United
Nations from fulfilling its "sacred trust" towards the people of Namibia.
South Africa has failed in its duties as Mandatory and it has solemnly
and repeatedly declared its decision not to fulfil thern; it has denied their
existence. The Court, for its part, has declared, in its Opinions of 1950,
1955and 1956,and in the 1962Judgment, that South Africa is subject to
the international obligations resulting from its Mandate for South West
Africa, and that the functions of the League of Nations are now exercised
by the United Nations. South Africa cannot allege that it is unaware ofalléguer qu'elleignore l'existencede sesdevoirs. Lesarguties de plaidoirie
ne peuvent pas réduire ànéant l'autoritéde la Cour.
En véritéon est devant un cas de violation d'obligations, et l'on peut
dire, comme l'a fait Rolin dans son étude de jeunesse sur les mandats, à
propos des conditions de révocation,que ce manquement témoignede
((l'inaptitude foncièredu mandataire à administrer le territoire confor-
mémentau Pacte )(Revue de droit international et de législation comparée,
1920,p. 353).
D'autre part, l'Afrique du Sud, en appliquant les lois surl'apartheid
dans le Sud-Ouest africain (Namibie), viole ses devoirs de mandataire;
on ne peut pas administrer le territoire confié à l'encontre des buts et
principes de la Charte (art. 1, par. 3; aussi art. 76 c)).
VIT.RÉPONS E LA DEMANDE D'AVIS
A. Les conséquencesjuridiques
Avant tout, il semble qu'on doit bien délimiterla portée dela requête.
A cet effet, il faut en considérerles termes. On a demandéquelles sont
«les conséquencesjuridiques ))On doit donc laisser de côtétout ce qui
tient aux conséquences économiques, socialesp ,ratiques et politiques.
Pour cette raison, il semble que la Cour ne doit pas s'occuper de ce que
les Etats ont à faire dans le cadre des organes des Nations Unies pour
mettre finà la situation anormale de la Namibie et permettre ainsà l'Or-
ganisation des Nations Unies de s'acquitter de ses devoirs envers le
peuple namibien, selonla ((missionsacrée 1)qui lui estconfiée.Lamention
des conséquences«pour les Etats ))implique que la Cour n'aura pas à
étudierlesconséquencesdela résolution276(1970)pour lesorganisations
internationales, et mêmepour les Nations Unies, en relation avec leur
responsabilitéenvers lepeuplenamibien. Enfin,lefait quecette résolution
276(1970)est plus particulièrement citéedonne à penser que la Cour n'a
pas à considérer les conséquencesjuridiques des autres résolutionsdu
Conseil de sécurité.
La réponsedela Cour doitêtrerédigée, semble-t-ile,n termesgénéraux,
pour l'orientation desNations Unies, et ne doitpasentrer dans des détails
qui prêteraient àconfusion.
B. Conséquences pour l'Afrique du Sud
La conséquenceimmédiateet fondamentale est la perte du titre juri-
dique, qui avaitjusqu'à présentpu justifier la possession du territoire du
Sud-Ouest africain par l'Afrique du Sud. Certes, depuis qu'ellea déclaré
ne pas êtreliéepar les obligations découlant du mandat, on peut con-
sidérer qu'elleest déchue de sacondition de mandataire. Mais, jusqu'àthe existence of its duties, nor can litigious cavils bring to nought the
authority of the Court.
In fact, we are dealing with a case of violation of obligations, and it
can be said, as was said by Rolin in his early study of mandates, with
reference to the conditions foï revocation, that this breach indicates the
"basic unfitness of the mandatory to administer the territory in accor-
dance with the Covenant" ("Le Système desmandats coloniaux", Revue
de droit internationalet de législation comparée,20,p. 353).
Furthermore, in applying the Iaws of apartheid in South West Africa
(Namibia), South Africa is in breach of its duties as the mandatory
Power; it is not permissible to administer an entrusted territory in a
manner contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter (Art. 1,
para. 3; Art. 76(c)).
VII. REPLY TO THE REQUES FOR ADVISORO YPINION
A. Legal Consequences
It would seem that, before anything else, the scope of the question
should be clearly defined. For this purpose the terms thereof must be
considered. It has been asked what are "the legal consequences": there-
fore everything relating to economic, social, practical and political con-
sequences should be left aside. For this reason, it would seem that the
Court should not concern itself with what States are to do within the
framework of the United Nations organs in order to put an end to the
abnormal situation in Namibia and thus enable the United Nations to
discharge its duties towards the people of Namibia in accordance with
the "sacred trust" confided to it. The mention of consequences "for
States" implies that the Court will not have to examine the consequences
of resolution 276 (1970)for international organizations, not even for the
United Nations, so far as responsibility to the Namibian people is
concerned. Finally, the fact that resolution 276 (1970)is specificallycited
prompts the supposition that the Courtdoes not have to consider the legal
consequences of the other resolutions of the Security Council.
The Court's reply should, it seems, be drawn up in general terms for
the guidance of the United Nations, and should not go into details which
might give rise to confusion.
B. Consequences,forSouth Africa
The immediate and fundamental consequence is the loss of the legal
title which might, up to the present, have justified the possession of the
Territory of South West Africa by South Africa. Of course it may be
considered that, eversinceit declared that it was not bound by the obliga-
tions deriving from the Mandate, it has forfeited its position as Manda- la résolution 2145 (XXI), la déclaration solennelle visant la cessation du
mandat n'a pas étéfaite, et l'on a pu croire au maintien du titre de man-
dataire.
La déclaration d'aprèslaquelle le mandat confié à Sa Majestébritan-
nique et en son nom pour l'Afrique du Sud est(terminé » (résolution2145
(XXI))entraine comme conséquence que,dès cemoment-là ,l'occupation
du territoire de la Namibie s'esttrouvée dépourvue detoute justification
juridique. Cette résolutiondispose que le Sud-Ouest africain relèvedirec-
tement des Nations Unies, de sorte que la présencede l'Afrique du Sud a
quelque chose d'une usurpation et d'une occupation mala Jides. Ces
conséquencesont acquis force exécutoireen vertu de la résolution 276
(1970)du Conseil de sécurité.
Conséquence immédiatepour l'Afrique du Sud: elle a l'obligation de
retirer son administration du territoiremibien et de prendre toutes les
mesures nécessaires pour mettre en possession l'administration des
Nations Unies.
Le Gouvernement sud-africain est responsable, comme possesseur de
mauvaise foi, de la restitution des biens et des fruits'égarddu peuple
namibien.
On ne doit pas oublier que, comme l'avait déclaréla Commission
permanente des mandats, les biens cédés parl'Allemagne (chemins de fer,
tramways, ports, etc.) et les biens publics de toutes catégories (mines,
biens sans maîtres, eaux non privées, etc.) sont restés la propriété
exclusive du peuple namibien et, en tant que biens du domaine public,
imprescriptibles.
Cela étant, le Gouvernement sud-africain est obligéd'indemniser le
peuple namibien des dommages subis. L'administration du mandataire
doit faire l'objet d'un règlement de comptes dans lequel on doit prendre
en considération les investissements effectuésau profit du peuple nami-
bien par l'Afrique du Sud.
C. Conséquences pour les Etats MemSres des Nations Unies
En donnant son appui à la résolution 2145 (XXI) dans sa résolution
276 (1970),le Conseil de sécuritéimpose aux Membres de l'organisation
l'obligation d'accepter et d'appliquer cequi est stipulédans cesrésolutions
et de coopérer à leur mise en Œuvrela plus complète.
En l'espèce, les actes des autorités occupantes ne peuvent pas être
considéréscomme ceux d'un gouvernement légitime,mais doivent être
assimilésà ceux d'un gouvernement defacto et usurpateur.
Il faut distinguer le côté public du côtéprivé. Il semble qu'on doit
considérer comme valides les actes des aotorités de fait, qui touchent les
actes et droits des particuliers (validité desactes d'état civil, du registre
foncier, des mariages, des sentences des tribunaux civils, etc.). Au
contraire, les Etats ne doivent pas considérercomme valides les actes et
dispositions des autorités en Namibie visant des biens publics, destory. But until resolution 2145 (XXI), no solemn declaration of the cessa-
tion of the Mandate had been made, and it was conceivable to hold that
the Mandatory still had a title.
The declaration to the effect that the Mandate conferred upon His
Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by South Africa was
"terminated" (resolution 2145 (XXI)) involved the consequence that,
from that time on,the occupation of the Territory of Namibia was devoid
of any legal justification. The same resolution provides for South West
Africa to come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, so
that the presence of South Africa is somewhat in the nature of usurpation
and an occupation mala jde. These consequences have acquired execu-
tory force by virtue of Security Council resolution 276 (1970).
The immediate consequence for South Africa is that it is under obliga-
tion to withdraw its administration from the Territory of Namibia and
take al1 necessary steps to put the United Nations administration into
possession.
The Government of South Africa, as a possessor in bad faith, is
responsible to the people of Namibia forthe restitution of property, assets
and the fruits thereof.
It should not be forgotten that, as the Permanent Mandates Commis-
sion had declared, the assets transferred by Germany (railways, tram-
ways, ports, etc.) and public assets of al1 kinds (mines, bona vacantia,
non-private waterways, etc.) have remained the exclusiveproperty of the
Namibian people and, since these are assets in the public domain, there
can be no bar of limitation to their restitution.
This being the case, the South African Government is under an obliga-
tion to indemnify the people of Namibia for damage suffered.An account
should be struck in respect of the administration of the Mandatory, in
which investments made for the benefit of the Namibian people by
South Africa should be taken into consideration.
C. The Consequences,for Member States of the United Nations
The Security Council, by giving its support to resolution 2145 (XXI)
in its resolution 276 (1970),lays upon the Members of the Organization
the obligation to accept and apply what is laid down in those resolutions,
and to CO-operateto ensure the fullest possible implementation thereof.
In the present case, the acts of thz occupying authorities cannot be
considered as those of a legitimate government, but must be likened to
those of a defacto and usurping government.
A distinction must be made between the private and the public sector.
It would seem that the acts of the defacto authorities relating to the acts
and rights of private persons should be regarded as valid (validity of
entries in the civilregisters and in the Land Registry, validity of marriages,
validity of judgments of the civil courts, etc.). On the other hand, other
States should not regard as valid any acts and transactions of the autho-concessions, etc. Les Etats ne pourront donc pas exercer la protection
de leurs nationaux àl'égard desacquisitions de cette nature.
Dans le domaine des relations internationales, le devoir de coopération
des Etats implique qu'ilsontà s'abstenir detoutes relations diplomatiques,
consulaires ou autres avec l'Afrique du Sud, qui indiqueraient qu'ils
reconnaissent l'autorité du Gouvernement sud-africain sur le territoire
de la Namibie - plus spécialementils ne doivent pas avoir de consuls,
d'agents, etc., enNamibie, exceptéde la nature adéquate dans les ter-
ritoires occupésdefacto (au sens de la résolution283 (1970)).
Les Etats doivent tenir pour inefficaces les clauses de tout traité ad-
mettant l'autorité de l'Afriquedu Sud dans le territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain. Les nouveaux traitésconclus avec l'Afrique du Sud ne peuvent
pas contenir de clauses semblables.
Dans lestraités surla double imposition, on pourra ne pas tenir compte
des impôts payésen Namibie. Les traités d'extradition ne pourront pas
avoir d'effets envers les Namibiens, parce qu'on ne saurait les remettre
entre lesmains d'autoritésillégales,etc.
D. Conséquencep sour les Etats non membresdes Nations Unies
Ces Etats n'ont pas d'obligations selon la Charte. Ilsdoivent néanmoins
respecter une déclarationsur la déchéance du titre juridique de possession,
prononcéepar une autorité légitime à l'encontre de 1'Etatqui avait reçu
le territoirà administrer au nom de l'organisation internationale. Cette
déclaration doit êtrerespectée, semble-t-il,comme celle du propriétaire
qui retire son mandat àl'administrateur de ses biens.
(Signé)F. DE CASTRO.rities in Namibia relating to public property, concessions, etc. States will
thus not be able to exercise protection of their nationals with regard to
any acquisitions of this kind.
In the field of international relations, the duty of CO-operation of
States implies that they must refrain from al1 diplomatic, consular and
cther relations with South Africa whichmight indicate that they recognize
the authority of the South African Government over the Territory of
Namibia-and more particularly they must not have consuls, agents, etc.,
in Namibia, except for such as are of a nature appropriate to territories
whichare under defacto occupation (in the senseofresolution 283(1970)).
States should regard as ineffectiveclausesin any treaty which recognize
the authority of South Africa in the Territory of South West Africa. New
treaties with South Africa may not contain such clauses.
In treaties for avoidance of double taxation, no account may be taken
of taxes paid in Namibia. Extradition treaties may not have effect with
regard to Namibians, because they cannot be handed over to illegal
authorities, etc.
D. Consequencesfor States not Members of the UnitedNations
These States have no obligaiions under the Charter Nonetheless they
should respect a declaration of the forfeiture of the legal ti~leto possess
the Territory, pronounced by a legitimate authority, against a State which
received the territory inorder to administer it in the name of the inter-
national 0rgan;zation. Such declaration should, it appears, be respected
in the same way as that of an owner of property who withdraws the
mandate given by him to administer his property.
(Signed) F. DE CASTRO.
Separate opinion of Judge De Castro