SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT AMMOUN
[Translationj
1. The Security Council having requested from the International Court
of Justice, within the framework of the latter's advisory jurisdiction, an
authoritative opinion concerning the legal consequences of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) not-
withstanding the termination in 1966 of the tutelary Mandate which the
League of Nations had conferred upon that Power in 1920, the Court
has been called upon to pronounce, for the first time in regard to certain
fundamental principles of international law, on a number of problems
raised by the request for an opinion. These are, in particular, the sover-
eignty of dependent peoples, the mandate institution, its nature and its
objects, the right of peoples to self-determination and decolonization,
equality between nations and between individuals, racial discrimination
as expressed in the doctrine ofapartheidin South Africa and in Namibia
and, in sum, the whole body of human rights and their imperative uni-
versa1character.
Al1these notions are the outward expression of a new body of inter-
national law, the consequence of an irreversible social and political evo-
lution of the modern world. The Court, in its Advisory Opinion, has
not overlooked them. In my view, however, it has not always gone far
enough in spelling out the legal conclusions to which they point.
Furthermore, 1 find that neither the reasons given for the operative
part nor the wording of those paragraphs are sufficiently explicit and
decisive in regard to the legal qualification of the presence of South
Africa in Namibia and the obligations for States that flow therefrom.
1have therefore felt it my duty to compose this separate opinion with
a view to contributing to the Advisory Opinion of the Court, whose
views 1share, some further support, however modest it may be.
2. The Republic of South Africa, having, like certain other States,
availed itself of Article 66 of the Statute of the Court in order to furnish
information in connection with the request for an advisory opinion,
presented itself as a party to a dispute between it and the majority of
States which had taken part in voting the United Nations General As-
sembly and Security Council resolutions relating to Namibia. On that
ground; it requested permission to choose a judge ad hoc to participate,
with the Members of the Court, in the giving of the opinion.
Having rejected South Africa's application by a majority decision in
an Order made on 29 January 1971, the Court has explained that oneof its reasons lay in the absence of a dispute between parties. To justify
the appointment of a judge ad hoc, not only would a dispute have had
to be present but there would have had to be on the Bench no judge of
the nationality of one of the parties while the Bench did include a judge
of the nationality of the opposing party. But what, in the present pro-
ceedings, would have been the identity of that opposing party? The
States which voted against South Africa? But in that case those which
voted for South Africa are in the same interest as it, within the meaning
of Article 31 of the Statute, and as such are already represented. To have
ignored this and allowed South Africa a judge ad hoc would in such
circumstances have contravened the rule of that very equality which the
Statute seeks to safeguard through the institution of judges ad hoc.
A fortiorithis rules out any discretionary power that some might wish
to deduce from Article 68 of the Statute, for the Court may not, on the
pretext of interpretation, contravene the fundamental rule and raison
d'être of that institution. In any case, if the opinion of the minority had
been accepted, the Court ought, in my view, to have permitted the choice
of a judge ad hoc both for South Africa and for Namibia. The legal
personality of Namibia would thus have been judicially recognized
and Namibia would have appeared for the first time in international
proceedings .
Namibia, even at the periods when it had been reduced to the status of
a German colony or was subject to the South African Mandate, possessed
a legal personality which was denied to it only by the law now obsolete.
It was considered by the Powers of the day as a merely geographical
concept taking its name from its location in the South-West of the African
Continent. It nevertheless constituted a subject of law that was distinct
from the German State, possessing national sovereignty but lacking the
exercise thereof. The institution of the Mandate, afortiori,did not connote
the annexation of the country which was subject to it, as the Court has
made clear by its reference to its earlier Advisory Opinion of 18July 1950.
Sovereignty, which is inherent in every people, just as liberty is inherent in
every human being, therefore did not cease to belong to the people sub-
ject to mandate. It had simply, for a time, been rendered inarticulate
and deprived of freedom of expression. General Smuts, the Prime Minis-
ter of the Union of South Africa, already recognized this in his study on
what was to be the mandate institution 2. As the beneficiaries on whose
behalf the mandate agreements were to be concluded, it was right that
some of the peoples who were to be subjected to them should be consulted
on the selection of the mandatory. That is what was stipulated in para-
graph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, for the peoples severed from the
Ottoman Empire. In fact the commission of inquiry, reduced to its
l It was only as an observer that Namibia was admitted to the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa.
The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion. American members, King and Crane, conducted such consultations
in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq; the United Kingdom and
France having declined the American President Woodrow Wilson's
invitation to take partbecause they had come to an agreement as to the
allocation of the mandates and were already in position on the spot. The
majority of the populations consulted demanded immediate indepen-
dence, but the right of peoples to self-determination had not yet come to
maturity and it was only in the wake of the Second World War that the
four countries mentioned were to obtain their independence.
The opinion expressed by Paul Fauchille, writing in 1922, deserves
attention solely as a historical illustration, since today it has lost al1
relevance. "It seems clear," he averred, "that, whereas in the case of
mandates of the second and third categories full sovereignty is attributed
to the Mandatory, there is in the case of mandates of the first category,
as in a protectorate properly so called, a sharing of sovereignty between
the independent communities or nations and the Mandatory l."Fauchille
thus assimilated "B" and "C" Mandates to the colonies of his period.
He conceived of a sharing of sovereignty in the case of "A" Mandates,
whereas it must surely be agreed that sovereignty is indivisible, as is
liberty, and that al1that is conceivable is a distinction between the pos-
session of sovereignty and its exercise. Stoyanovsky, writing three years
later, took a more accurate view when he upheld the notion of virtual
sovereignty residing ina people deprived of its exerciseby domination or
tutelage 2.Those were also the views of Paul Pic 3.
It is true that the Namibians' status of a people, which was recognized
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 2372
(XXII) of 12June 1968,has been disputed by the South African Govern-
ment so as to justify dividing-and ruling-the country under the euphe-
mism of separate development, known in Afrikaans as apartheid. But
the Namibian people, whose existence and unity the Court has, in its
turn, recognized in the present Advisory Opinion, has itself asserted its
international personality by taking up the struggle for freedom. Since
South Africa has opposed the achievement of the objects of the Mandate
and blocked Namibia's path to independence and the enjoyment of its
full sovereignty, Namibia has decided to fight. The legitimacy of the
Namibian national struggle has been recognized in four resolutions of
the General Assembly and in Security Council resolution 269 (1969).
This struggle, by analogy, continues the line of those waged by other
members of the international community, during the First World War,
before they were recognized as States, such as the Polish, Czech and
Traité de droit internationalpub1922, Vol. 1, p. 298.
La théoriegénéraledes mandats internat ion au.^,1925, ff. 83
international public, 1923, 2nd Series, IV, No. 5, p. 334., Revue généralede droit
Resolutions 2372 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498 (XXIV) and 2517 (XXIV).Slovak peoples; or of the French national movement ' at the time when
France was under the domination of Nazi Germany.
In law, the legitimacy of the peoples' strugglecannot be in any doubt,
for it follows from the right of self-defence, inherent in human nature,
which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is
also an accepted principle that self-defence may be collective; thus we
see the other peoples of Africa, members of the Organization of African
Unity, associated with the Namibians in their fight for freedom. The
rightness of this isalso confirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which stresses in its preamble that "it is essential, if man is not
to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
rule of law".
The struggle of the Namibian people thus takes its place within the
framework of international law, not least because the struggle of peoples
in general has been one, if not indeed the primary factor in the formation
of the customary rule whereby the right of peoples to self-determination
is recognized. 1 could therefore have wished that the Court, like the
General Assembly and the Security Council, had mentioned in its Opin-
ion the legitimate struggle of the Narnibian people. But its silence on
this subject does not exclude its agreement, since it has referred to the
relevant resolutions of the other two organs of the United Nations.
The Court has not mentioned the General Assembly's decision to the
effect that "henceforth South West Africa Lames under the direct res-
ponsibility of the United Nations" (para. 4 of General Assembly reso-
lution 2145 (XXI)). That should have been said in order to make clear
the nature of the relationships between the Organization, on the one hand,
and Namibia and the Republic of South Africa on the other. Nor has
the Court referred to the setting-up of a United Nations Council for
South West Africa (para. 6 of the same resolution), the name of which
was changed by resolution 2372 (XXII) to United Nations Council for
Namibia and which resolution 2248 (S-V) had vested with powers of
statehood. These are the powers which it was for the Mandatory to
exercise until the expiry of the Mandate, and they entitle the Council,
acting on behalf of the United Nations, to exercise legislative competence
and administrative authority in Namibia as well as to represent it diplo-
matically and exercise diplomatic protection of its nationals. It is to
this body that it would in other circumstances have fallen to choose a
judge ad hoc for Namibiu, and it might also have presented the Court
with a written statement and an oral statement as did the Government
of South Africa. However it did not receive the communication referred
to in Article 66 which would have authorized it to do so.
These are the terms used by L. Cavaré,Droit internationa1p~:blicpositif, Vol. II,
2nd ed.,pp. 334 f. 3. The revocation of South Africa's Mandate for Namibia which was
decided upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations is based
on three grounds which are mentioned in the fifth paragraph of the pre-
amble to resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, reading as follows:
"Coni,inced that the administration of the mandated Territory
by So~ith Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary to the
Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."
The General Assenibly had reached this decision after finding, in the
eighth paragraph of the preanible to the same resolution,
". .. that al1 the efforts of the United Nations to induce the Govern-
ment of South Africa to fulfil its obligations in respect of the ad-
ministration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the well-being
and security of the indigenous inhabitants have been of no avail".
The revocation of the Mandate was thus explicitly based on three
grounds relating to international instruments of the first importance.
In refusing, quite rightly, to question the forma1 or intrinsic validity of
the resol~itionsconcerned, the Court nevertheless felt it necessary to refute
the arguments advanced in this connection by certain States. In doing
this it had in addition to direct its consideration to each of the three
grounds stated in resolution 2145 (XXI) as justifying the termination of
the Mandate and entailing the illegality of the presence in Namibia of
the South African authorities thus bereft of title.
The Court considered the first ground, naniely that of the violation
of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of Article 2
of the mandate agreement, according to which:
"The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory subject to the present Mandate.''
The Court could not content itself with finding that the Mandatory
had violated this obligation, for it was called upon to deduce the legal
consequences of the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia, and
these consequences differ in nature and in number according to whether
there was a violation of the relatively limited texts constituting the man-
date instruments, or a violation of the obligations flowing from the con-
stitutional Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Furthermore, the principles and purposes of the United Nations must
be observed by al1its organs: by the General Assembly and the Security
Council and, no less, by the International Court of Justice, as also by
each of the member States.
Now, we are toid that these principles have been violated, these pur-poses gravely neglected. And when the political organs have fulfilled
their obligations, by denouncing and condemning these violations and
this grave neglect, the International Court of Justice owed it to itself
to discharge its own obligations by not closing its eyes to c~nduct
infringing the principles and rights which it is its duty to defend.
Again, the Court could not remain an unmoved witness in face of
the evolution of modern international law which is taking place in the
United Nations through the implementation and the extension to the
whole world of the principles of equality, liberty and peace in justice
which are embodied in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
The Court is not a law-making body. It declares the law. But it is a
law discernible from the progress of humanity, not an obsolete law, a
vestige of the inequalities between men, the domination and colonialism
which were rife in international relationships up to the beginning of
this century but are now disappearing, thanks to the struggle being
waged by (the peoples and to the extension to the ends of the world of
the universal community of mankind.
Thus, in addition to the violation of the stipulations of the Mandate,
the Court did not omit consideration of the other two grounds for its
termination. By referring, like resolution 2145 (XXI), to the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Court has asserted the imperative character of the right of peoples
to self-determination and also of the human rights whose violation by
the South African authorities it has denounced. It appears to me, how-
evcr, that its reasoning and conclusions, to which, as 1 have said, 1
subscribe, leave room for explanations which, expressed in the separate
opinions, may serve to strengthen those conclusions.
4. With regard to the survival of the Mandate after the dissolution
of the League and the taking-over by the United Nations of supervision
of the Mandatory's administration, which the Court has justified by
legal arguments drawn from consideration of the purposes and objects
of the Mandate in the light of the texts and travaux préparatoiresand
from an analysis of the pertinent Charter articles, referring also herein
to certain of its earlier decisions (the Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955
and 1956, and the Judgment of 1962), 1 would like to add one general
observation which seems to me to be essential; it relates to the very
nature of the tutelary-mandate institution and its place in the evolution
of humanity.
Historians ' have outlined the upward march of mankind from the
time when homo sapiens appeared on the face of the globe, first of al1
in the Near East in what was the land of Canaan, up to the age of the
greatest thinkers and, more particularly, throughout the whole history
See in particularH. G. WellOutlinof History. NAMIBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 73
of social progress, from the slavery of Antiquity to man's inevitable,
irreversible drive towards equality and freedom. This march is like time
itself. Itever stops. Nothing can stand in its way for long. The texts,
whether they be laws, constitutions, declarations, covenants or charters,
do but define it and mark its successive phases. They are a mere record
of it. In other words, the progressive rights which men and peoples enjoy
are the result much less of those texts than of the human progress to
which they bear witness.
The institution of tutelage, succeeding colonialization and preceding
and preparing the way for sovereign independence, has its place in this
upward march, at one stage of which this concept of guardianship was
born, in 1920; at the following stage, it was due to end. The provisions
of Article 22 of the Covenant and the terms of the mandate agreements,
whether they define the purposes of tutelage or specify the assistance to
be given to backward peoples to enable them to catch up the vanguard
of more developed peoples, give expression to this kinetic reality.Wood-
row Wilson, and even the South African General Smuts, and the French
Minister Simon, were imbued with this truth when they admitted that
mandates must have an end, or are revocable. And so, to revert to the
arguments set forth in the Advisory Opinion, 1 could have wished that
the revocability of the Mandate, which has been so strongly contested,
had been more fully justified by reference to the nature of tutelage and
in consideration of the universal context in which it finds its place.
Considering its nature and purposes, the duration of the tutelary Mandate
could not be determined at will by the party charged or entrusted with it.
When the General Assembly, representing the international community
once the League had ceased to do so, decided the revocation of that
Mandate, with effect erga omnes in view of the Mandate's objective
institutionalcharacter, that revocation was also binding on the extremely
small number of States which had opposed it or, by expressing doubts and
reservations, withheld their approval. For how could South Africa's
Mandate, with its organs and structures, having lapsed for the quasi-
unanimity of States, survive in the eyes of some others? An institution
is a creature of reason which either exists or does not: it cannot at one
and the same time be and not be. That would be no less curious than if a
State admitted by majority vote to the United Nations should be a
Member for some but not for others.
5. Recognition of the right of peoples to self-determinationsexpressed
by the Court in paragraph 52 of the Advisory Opinion. It is there stated,
interaliat,hat :
"Furthermore, the sllbsequent development of international law,
in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-deter-
mination applicable to al1 of them.. ..A further important stage
in this development was the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assemblj
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces al
peoples and territories which 'have not yet attained independence'."
Theopinion is not lacking in persuasive force; it would have possessec
still more if it had retraced the path whereby this right of peoples ha:
made its entry into positive international law and had determined exactl)
what were the factors which have gone into its making. 1refer in parti.
cular to the fight of the peoples for freedom and independence, whicl-
has been going on ever since there have been conquering and dominating
peoples and subject but unsubjugated peoples. To confine ourselves tc
modern times, we may mention the historic declarations proclaimed ai
the end of the eighteenth century, the provisions of present-day charter:
and covenants from the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter
to the Pact of Bogota and the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, the repeated declaiations of Bandung and of the non-aligned
countries meeting in Belgrade and Cairo, the declaration contained in
resolution 1514(XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and,
finally thetwo solemn Declarations which marked the close of the work of
the United Nations during the first 25 years of its existence: resolution
2625(XXV), adopted unanimously on 24October 1970,onthe principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and CO-operation between
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and resolu-
tion 2627 (XXV), adopted on the same day on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of the United Nations. Would these international or universal
instruments have seen the light of day if it had not been for the heroic
fight of peoples aspiring with al1 their hearts after freedom and inde-
pendence? If there is any "general practice" which might be held, beyond
dispute, to constitute law within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph
1 (b),of the Statute of the Court, it must surely be that which is made
up of the conscious action of the peoples themselves, engaged in a
determined struggle. This struggle continues for the purpose of asserting,
yet once more, the right of self-determination, more particularly in
southern Africa and, specifically, Namibia. Indeed one is bound to
Yecognize that the right of peoples to self-determination, before being
written into charters that were not granted but won in bitter struggle,
had first been written painfully, with the blood of the peoples, in the
finally awakened conscience of humanity. And without those same
-eop-es, mainly of Asia and Africa, who since the Second World War
have streamed into the new international Organization, the first of a
universalist character, would it have been possible to achieve thatimpres-
sive number of declarations and resolutions whereby the great principles
they had helped consecrate have been translated into law and applied
to the reshaping of international relations?
As for the "general practice" of States to which one traditionally
refers when seeking to ascertain the emergency of customary law, it NAMlBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 75
has, in the case of the right of peoples to self-determination, become
so widespread as to be not merely "general" but universal, since it has
been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (Art. 1,para. 2,
and Art. 55) and confirmed by the texts that have just been mentioned:
pacts, declarations and resolutions, which, taken as a whole, epitomize
the unanimity of States in favour of the imperative right of peoples to
self-determination. There is not one State,it should be emphasized, which
has not, at least once, appended its signature to one or other of these
texts, or which has not supported it by its vote. The confirmed rightness
of this practice is moreover evinced by the great number of States-
no less than 55-which, since the consecration by the Charter of the
right of self-deterinination, have benefited from it, after having ensured,
by the struggles and the strivings of their peoples, its definitivembodi-
ment in both the theory and the practice of the new law. If any doubts
had remained on this matter in the mind of the States Members of
the United Nations, they would not have resolved to proclaim the
legitimacy of the struggle of peoples-and more specificallythe Namibian
people-to make good their right of self-determination. If this right is
still not recognized as a juridical norm in the practice of a few rare
States or the writings of certain even rarer theoreticians,the attitudethe
former is explained by their concern for their traditional interests, and
that of the latter by a kind of extreme respect for certain long-entrenched
postulates of classic international law. Law is a living deed, not a brilliant
honours-list of past writers whose work of course compels respect but who
cannot, except for a few great minds, be thought to have had such a
vision of the future that they could always see beyond their own times.
Everything goes to show how difficult it is to free ourselves from the
servitudes of a past through which we have ourselves lived and from
traditions we have always respected. It is, then, a page of history which
needs turningthat must be seer.in attachment to an outdated law which
denies the resolutions of the United Nations the authority with which
the Charter has invested them, which authority has been reinforced by
the almost unanimous will of the peoples of the world. That will is
incomparably more decisive than that of the five or six Powers which
have asserted opposite conceptions while relying on a claim to repre-
sentativity whose lack of legal basis they must confess. Facts, lherefore,
have got the better of their last-ditch resistance, and in the last two senten-
ces of paragraph 52 of the Advisory Opinion one may see an allusion tc>
this struggle: one perhaps over-discreet, but at al1events the Opinion has
writtenfinis to the matter.
6. The violation of human rights has not come to an end in any part
of the world; to realize that fact one need only consult the archives of
the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Commission
of the United Nations or the International Commission of Jurists, or
simply read the world press. Violations of persona1 freedom and human
dignity, the racial, social or religious discrimination which constitutesthe most serious of violations of human rights since it annihilates the
two-fold basis provided by equality and liberty, al1still resist the currents
of liberation in each of the five continents. That is certainly no reason
why we should close our eyes to the conduct of the South African
authorities. The facts mentioned before the Court in relation to the
request for an advisory opinion cannot be ignored, seeing that considera-
tion of them is importantfor the determination of the legal consequences
of the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia.
The Advisory Opinion takes judicial notice of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. In the case of certain of the Declaration's pro-
visions, attracted by the conduct of South Africa, it would have been
an improvement to have dealt in terms with their comminatory nature,
which is implied in paragraphs 130 and 131 of the Opinion by the
references to their violation.
In its written statement the French Government, alluding to the
obligations which South Africa accepted under the Mandate and assumed
on becoming a Member of the ~nited Nations, and to the norms laid
down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stated that there
was no doubt that the Government of South Africa had, in a very real
sense, systematically infringed those rules and those obligations. Never-
theless, referring to the mention by resolution 2145(XXI) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it objected that it was plainly impossible
for non-com~liance with the norms it enshrined to be sanctioned with
the revocation of the Mandate, inasmuch as that Declaration was not
in the nature of a treaty binding upon States.
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua
international convention within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1
(a), of the Statute of the Court, they can bind States on the basis of
custom within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b) of the same Article,
whether because they constituted a codification of customary law as
was said in respect of Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, or because they have acquired the force of custom through
a general practice accepted as law, in the words of Article8,paragraph 1
(b), of the Statute. One right which must certainly be considered a pre-
existing binding customary norm which the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights codified is the right to equality, which by common
consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed inherent in
human nature.
The equality demanded by the Namibians and by other peoples of
every colour, the right to which is the outcome of prolonged struggles to
make it a reality, is something of vitalterest to us here, on the one hand
because it is the foundation of other human rights which are no more
than its corollaries and, on the other, because it naturally rules out racial
discrimination and apartheid, which are the gravest of the facts with
which South Africa, as also other States, stands charged. The attention1 am devoting to it in these observations can therefore by no means be
regarded as exaggerated or out of proportion.
It is not by mere chance that in Article 1of the Universal Declaration
of the Rights of Man there stands, so worded, this primordial principle
or axiom: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights."
From this first principle flow most rights and freedoms.
Of al1 human rights, the right to equality is far and away the most
important. It is also the one which has been longest recognized as a
natural right: it may even be said that the doctrine of natural law was
born in ancient times with the concept of human equality as its first ele-
ment. It has been part of natural law ever since Zeno of Sidon ' and his
earliest disciples. It is in countriesoutside Europe that the provenance of
the concept itself, as also of its most ardent present-day defenders, must
be sought. Like the Christianity which later espoused the same premises,
the philosophy of Zeno reflected the revolt ofthe humble and the oppres-
sed. "Stoic liberty," Hegel teaches us in his Phenomenology of the Mind,
"arose in a time of fear and slavery." Equality was not to the liking of
the Greeks up to and including the time of Plato and Aristotle, who both
found words to justify inequality and slavery 2,whereas for the Stoics:
"man is a slave neither by nature nor by conquest." When Zeno died,
his work was completed, and the notion of equality definitively received
and propagated throughout the world of that era by his disciples 3,the
distant forerunners of the eighteenth-century philosophers. Two streams
of thought had become established on the two opposite shores of the
Mediterranean,a Graeco-Roman stream represented by Epictetus, Lucan,
Cicero and Marcus Aurelius; and an Asian and African stream, comprising
the monks of Sinai and Saint John Climac, Alexandria with Plotinus and
Philo the Jew, Carthage to which Saint Augustine gave new lustre; the
two streams flowed together in Spain with Seneca. The stoic philosophy,
'According to Diogenes Laertes, a statue was erected to hirn in that city, as
also in Athens, where he had gone to teach and where he founded the school which
first bore hisarne but was later called the Stoic school.
For Aristotle, reason was a privilege of which certain people, for instance
slaves, are deprived. Hisdvice to his pupil Alexander, who was not yet called the
Great, was "to treat Greeks as members of the farnily, the Barbariansas anirnals
Yet had not the Barbarians already probed space. predicted eclipses and given
names to the signs of the Zodiac; divided time into rnonths, into weeks; invented
losophy: narnely, that founded upon equality?the world the first really hurnane phi-
G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie grecque, 1969, p.31.
The disciples of Zeno were, many of thern, his fellow countryrnen: Zeno, the
second of that name, and Boëthus, both also of Sidon; Antipater. of Tyre; Apol-
lonios, also of Tyre; Chrysippos, of Phoenician Cyprus; Herillos, of Carthage;
Cato, of Utica; Perseus, friend of Zeno; Posidonios, of Hama in Syria, a Phoeni-
cian halting-place on the road to Babylon; Diogenes, of Babylon; Panetios, a pupil
of Antipater of Tyre, who was born in Rhodes, a Phoenicio-Greek meeting-place
as also was Cyprus, where Cicero and Pompey came to follow his teaching.
65sowing for the first time in mankind's history the seeds of equality be-
tween men and between nations, influenced the greatest of the Roman
jurisconsults who were of Phoenician origin, Papinius and Ulpian, and
then the doctors of Christianity ' through whom it was eventually trans-
mitted to the Age of Reason 2. The ground was thus prepared for the
legislative and constitutional process which began with the first declara-
tions or bills of rights in America and Europe, continued with the consti-
tutions of the nineteenth century, and culminated inpositive international
law in the San Francisco, Bogotà and Addis Ababa charters, and in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which has been confirmed by
numerous resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the above-
mentioned declarations adopted by the General ~ssembl~ in resolutions
1514(XV), 2625 (XXV) and 2627 (XXV). The Court in its turn has now
confirmed it.
7. The Charter has consecrated the principle of equality in even more
categorical terms than it uses for the right of peoples to self-determination
by reaffirming in its preamble the faith of the United Nations in the equal
rights of nations large and small, and by declaring in Article 2, paragraph
1, that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of al1its Members". The General Assembly has many times had
occasion to affirm the right to equality and the fundamental rights which
derive therefrom. This has been the case every time that the General
Assembly has decided that it had competence notwithstanding the claim
by Statez that such rights did not enjoy theprotection ofinternational law
and therefore fell within their own national jurisdiction. Thus South
Africa has regularly sought to rely on its domestic jurisdiction, denying
the competence of the United Nations whenever since 1946, at session
after session, it has been accused ofpractising apartheid in violation of the
right to equality. The successive resolutions of the General Assembly
rejecting this contention by South Africa have given it to be understood
that the equality and fundamental rights violated by apartheid constitute
obligations which are in fact placed under the protection of international
law and as such fall within the competence of the United Nations.
Only recently, on 26 May 1971,the Special Committee on Apartheid
decided to oppose any dialogue with South Africa unless based on prior
recognition of the equality of the Black population.
Bertrand Russell, in his Histovy of Wesrern Philosophy, pp. 275 f., writes: "By
nature, the stoics held, al1human beings are eq... Christianity took this part of
the stoic teachings."
For this flowering of the concept of equality in the ancient land of Phoenicia,
through the vicissitudes ofirne, the following works rnay be consulted: Bertrand
Russell,op. cit.; Ernile Bréhier, Histoire de la philosophie, Vol. 2, pp. 228 and 234;
Rodis-Lewis, La morale stoïcienne, pp. II and 74; G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie
grecque, pp. 219, 220 and 231; Fritz Schulz, HistofyRoman Legal Science, p. 67;
Ernest Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme. For the rest, how is it possible not to recognize the binding force of
principles and rights which the international comrnunity has agreed that
it is legitimate to defend by force of arms? That is what the General
Assembly and the Security Council have been affirming ever since 1966in
proclaiming the legitimacy of the Namibian people's struggle, and that
of a11other dependent peoples, to defend their rights. What is more, in
its resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 2 December 1968,the General Assembly,
making specific reference to human rights and the struggle for their
implementation, reaffirmed-
". ..its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples
of South Africa for al1human rights."
This resolution, adopted unanimously but for the two votes of South
Africa and Portugal, demonstrates that the international community as a
whole deems it legitimate to defend human rights by force of arms; it thus
considers them to be peremptory rights endowed with effective sanction,
or in other words that they are part .and parcel of positive international
law. The opposition of two States, Portugal and South Africa, does not
diminish the legal authority of that resolution,because they could not be
expected to go to the heroic length of condemning themselves. The
SecurityCouncil in its turn, in resolution 282 (1970)ordering an embargo
on the shipment of arms to South Africa, recognized-
". ..the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South
Africa in pursuance of their human and political rights as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations and [in]the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights".
This concordance of view between the General Assembly and the
Security Council offersfinal confirmation of the binding nature of human
rights.
It will also be noted that the General Assembly equated acts which
result from the policy of apartheidand thus violate the fundamental laws
ofequalityandliberty, andnearlyall other human rights, to warcrimesand
crimes against humanity when, in the Tnternational Convention of 26
November 1968,it declared them liable to prosecution without statutory
limitation. Thus, in the eyes of the international community, violations
of human rights by the practice of apartheid,itself a violation of equality
and of the rights which are its corollaries, are no lesspunishablethan the
crimes against humanity and war crimes upon which the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal visited sanctions. General Assembly resolution
2074 (XX) even condernned apartheid as constituting "a crime against
humanity". For how can States-other than Portugal and South Africa,
so often denounced by the United Nations-cast doubt on a tenet to which they have al1subscribed, namely that human rights are binding in
character? How true is what the Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain
once wrote :
". ..underlying the stealthy, perpetual urge to transform societies
is the fact that man possesses inalienable rights while the pos~ibi~ity
of claiming actually to exercise now this one, now that, is yet denied
him by those vestiges of inhumanity which remain embedded in the
social structures of every era l".
The particular human rights whose violation by the practice of apart-
heid is punishable for the same reason and on the same terms as war
crimes, and such crimes against humanity as genocide, will be indentified
when, at the end of section 8,1 come in the course of the argument to deal
with the various acts which go to make up apartheid.
8. The Court could not refrain from ascertaining the real nature of the
practice of apartheid, which is not merely contrary to the Mandatory's
obligation to ensure the moral and material well-being and socialprogress
of the population under Mandate, but also contravenes the principles of
equality and liberty, and the other rights deriving therefrom for indivi-
duals and peoples alike. The condemnation of apartheid, if it were only
taken into account asa violation of the Mandate, would not be radical, as
it should be. For it is not onlypractised by the former mandatory State of
South Africa, nor only in the former mandated territory of Namibia. It is
more widespread. It is applied in countries which are not under tutelage.
It should be delineated and punished as any other attempt upon human
equality and individual or national liberty would be. It should be appre-
hended, in the General Assernbly's words, as a crime against humanity,
committed in this case against the Namibian people. The breach of the
obligation to submit a report to the satisfaction of the Council of the
League, or to transmit the petitions of the inhabitants, both of which are
obligations bound up with the safeguards for the due performance of
the principal obligations assumed by the trustee-.Mandatory as such, is
not laden with the same degree of gravity as the violation of the latter
themselves. It is therefore inadmissible to choose the easy way out and
justify the revocation of the Mandate by reference to the refusa1to report
to the General Assembly or transmit petitions, or even the refusa1 to
collaborate with the committees set up by the United Nations, while at
the same time overlooking the gravest violations by failing to make the
effort toadduce the proofs thereof, on the hollow pretext that a Statehas
not been given an opportunity of producing factual evidence, when both
the written and the oral proceedings contain superabundantproof. This
point was grasped by the General Assembly when, with the exception of
'Autour de la Déclarationuniverselle des droits de l'homme, Unesco, 1948, p. 16.
6 8 NAMlBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP.AMMOUN) 81
South Africa and Portugal, it unanimously took account of the breach
not only of the Mandate, but also of the Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. As is plain from the texts of its many
resolutions, what decided the United Nations to penalize South Africa's
conduct was much less the non-compliance over reports and petitions
than the flagrant violation of the most essential principles of humanity,
principles protected by the sanction of international law: equality, of
which apartheid is the negation; freedom, which finds expression in the
right of peoples to self-determination; and the dignity of the human
person, which has been profoundly injured by the measures applied to
non-White human beings.
That point having been made clear, a reply must nevertheless be given
to two objections raised in connection with the practice of apartheid and
the necessity of denouncing it with a view to determining the legal con-
sequences.
When, in the first place, its maintained that the request for advisory
opinion formulated by the Security Council is not concerned with apart-
heid, it is surely forgotten that the application of that doctrine has been
the underlying cause of the United Nations' action ever since the earliest
days, from the raising of the question by India in 1946to resolution 2145
(XXI) of 1966, which revoked the Mandate, and those adopted since.
Resolution 2145 (XXI), which was reaffirmed by the Security Council
resolution, 276 (1970), to which resolution 284 (1970) requesting the
opinion of the Court refers, contains the following paragraph:
"Reafirming its resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965,
in particular paragraph 4 thereof which condemned the policies of
apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the Government of
South Africa in South West Africa as constituting a crime against
humanity."
In view of this,can it still be said that the request forthe Court's opinion
does not entitle it to deal with the subject oapartheid?
Nor is it any excuse for evading examination of the practice of apart-
heid in Namibia to plead the absence of material proof of the application
of that policy to the detriment of the Namibian people; for such proof,
quite apart from ministerial admissions on the part of South Africa, is to
be found in abundance in the documentation of the proceedings. After
reproducing some of these admissions, 1 will cite the official texts of the
South African Government which demonstrate the facts of the matter and
reveal the explanation, which is that the policy of apartheid has been
applied not, as South Africa claims, in the interest of the population
formerly under Mandate, but to the prejudice of that population and in
the interest of the mandatory State and its own nationals.
In the matter of admissions, four successivePrimeMinisters from 1948
to the present day, Dr. Malan, Mr. Strijdom,Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Vor-ster,have defined their concept of the apartheid policy, as applicable in
both South Africa and Namibia, in declarations which offer proof con-
clusive. In a speech made in April 1948, Dr. Malan asked:
"Will the European race in the future be able to maintain its rule,
its purity and its civilization, or will it float along until it vanishes
for ever, without honour, in the Black sea of South Africa's Non-
European population?. .. As a result of foreign influences the
demandfor the removal of al1colour bar and segregation measures is
being pressed more and more continuously and vehernently; and al1
this rneans nothing less that that the White race will lose its ruling
position . .."
In April 1955Mr. Strijdom, describing his policy in Parliament, stated:
"1am being as blunt as 1can. 1 am making no excuses. Either the
White man dominates or the Black man takes over ... The only way
the Europeans can rnaintain suprernacy is by domination. .."
Dr. Verwoerd likewise stated to Parliament in 1958:
"Dr. Malan said it, and Mr. Strijdom said it, and 1 have said it
repeatedly and 1want to say it again: The policy of apartheid moves
consistently in the direction of more and more separate development
with the ideal of total separation in al1spheres."
Later Dr. Verwoerd went into greater detail in a speech on 25 January
1963:
"Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than
this: We want to keep South Africa White .. .Keeping it White can
only mean one thing, namely White domination, not leadership, not
guidance, but control, supremacy. If we are agreed that it is the
desire of the people that the White man should be able to continue
to protect hirnself by White domination. .. we say that it can be
achieved by separate development."
Finally, in May 1965, the present Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, then
Minister of Justice, declared :
"In this Parliament, whose business it is to decide the destiny of
the Republic of South Africa, Whites, and Whites only, will have
the right to sit."
Such declarations would afford ample proof of what the practice of
apartheid means and what the motives of those who devised it were. But
the Ministers whose declarations are here reproduced have not appeared before the Court to certify their full authenticity orto explain and com-
ment upon them. 1 therefore turn to the official texts which have been
promulgated and published, and which constitute at one and the same
time material proof and an admission; their mere enumeration, even
though not exhaustive, demonstrates the various forms in which the
unlawfulness of apartheid is manifested and the corresponding human
rights which have been violated.
The chief texts possessing this probative effect are the following:
1. The Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936, concerning reserves for
hfricans which constitute permanent territorial segregation; it thus
encroached upon personal liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of
residence and the right to own property (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Arts. 1, 13and 17).
2. The Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951,amended in 1954,
under which Black persons may not, with a few exceptions, reside in
urban areas; this Proclamation infringes the same rights as the Bantu
Trust and Land Act.
3. The Native Reserve Regulations of 1924and 1938,which forbade
Africans in the reserves to leave them or return to them without special
authorization; this also violates the human rights mentioned above.
4. The Native Administration Proclamation of 1922, which forbids
Africans to circulate without a pass; this violates the right to freedom
of movement (Art. 13).
5. The Native Building Workers Act of 1951,which encroaches upon
the principles of equality and liberty (Art. 1).
6. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968, which, in
violation of democratic freedoms, prohibits parties of racially mixed
membership (Art. 21).
7. The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, which
flouted the political rights of the Africans (Art. 21).
8. The Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920, which makes the
contract of employment a punishable offence; this constitutes
breach of a
an infringement of the right to work and an affront to human dignity,
and virtually reintroduces forced labour (Arts. 1 and 23).
9. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance of 1953, which
regards marriages between Blacks and Whites as void; this is another
affront to human dignity and violates the principles of equality as well
as the rights of the family (Arts.1and 16).
10. The Terrorism Act of 1967,intended to enforce apartheid through
severe repression, which violates the most sacred principles of criminal
law, namely the rule nullum crimen sine lege, the rules relating to the
definition of principal and accessory,the non-retroactivity of penal laws
and of penalties, the presumption of innocence,andthe rule of resjudicata. NAMlBIA (s.w.AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 84
11. The Suppression of Cornmunism Act of 1950,extended to Namibia,
which has thesame unlawful characteristics as the Terrorism Act.
It is, in surn, not without interest to recall that the Commission on
Human Rights, in its resolution 3 (XXIV) of 1968,denounced the laws
and practices of apartheid and condemned-
". ..the Governrnent of South Africa for its perpetuation and
intensification of thenhuman policy of apartheid, in complete and
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights".
In the light of the foregoing it isjustifiable toider that the General
Assernbly was not rnistaken when, in resolution 395 (V) of 2 December
1950,it emphasized that any system of racial segregation, such as apart-
heid, is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination. The
Assembly was no less categorical in its Declaration on the Elimination
of Al1 Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by resolution 1904
(XVIII). This Declaration condemns racial discrimination and apartheid
as violating human rights. It was adopted unanimously. Giventhisgen-
eral agreement of States, some of which have the fullest possible means
of investigation at their disposal, it is difficult to understand how the
material existence of the illegalities they denounce can be doubted.
Furthermore, the condemnation of apartheid has passed the stage of
declarations and entered the phase of binding conventions. The Inter-
national Convention on the Elirnination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination-naturally including apartheid-adopted by the General
Assembly on 21 Decernber 1965,came into force on 4 January 1969.
9.South Africa has not only contested the material existence of the
facts but also the interpretation placed upon them by the General As-
sembly and the Security Council. Its point of view-rejected by al1States,
even those which question the validity of the measures taken against
South Africa-is that its administration has been designed with the
precise aim of realising the objectives of the Mandate, these being to
promote the well-being and social progress of the inhabitants; that ac-
cordingly apartheid, or the separate development of these populations
was, given their stage of social evolution, instituted in their own interest:
that the rneasures which have been deemed contrary to the provisions
of the Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
particular by resolution 2145 (XXI) revoking the Mandate, werejustified
by the socio-anthropological circumstances and are directed solely to
the accornplishment of the mission entrusted to South Africa.
The Court, in paragraph 131of the Advisory Opinion, has veryjustly NAMIBIA (S.W.AFRICA) (SEP.OP. AMMOUN) 85
adduced the textual proof which exists of the unlawfulness of the
practice of apartheid. Concrete proof could likewise be drawn from the
facts already in the Court's possession. When it is possible to refer to
such proofs, it is even better to present them in order to reinforce, if
need be, the decisiveness of the Court's findings. In this connection 1
propose to deal with two questions which the Court has not touched
upon but which afford opportunities for further clarification: in order,
first, to meet the assertion that the Namibian people is not a people and,
secondly, to refute the claimthat apartheidcorresponds to theandator~'~
obligation of promoting the well-being and social progress of the people
under Mandate.
10. The argument to which South Africa clings most tenaciously is that
of the disparity ofthearious ethnicgroups in Namibia. ln order tojustify
the policy of apartheid applied not only in the Republic of South Africa
but also in Namibia, successive Pretoria governments have put forward
the a"gument that the natives in theouth-west of Africa have never form-
ed a people, and that, because of the ethnic and sociological differences
which divide them and set them against each other, only the policy of
separate development based upon their tribal institutions could ensure
their social well-being and progress. This assertion has been used to
buttress denials by the South African Government that it pursued a po-
licy of racial discrimination and has also permitted it to reject any accu-
sation that it violated the provisions of the Mandate and the Charter or
contravened the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1 therefore
propose to show that the premise upon which South Africa bases this
justification of its methods of administration in Namibia is a false one;
that the Namibian people, ultimate heir of an ancient civilization which
in its heyday rivalled anything in Europe, had, before the days of the
colonial régime, taken part in the making of great empires, notwith-
standing the multiplicity of the elements of which it, like so many other
peoples, is composed.
How many of the peoples that have come into being, throughout his-
tory and in our times, have not in fact been made up of a variety of
human elements? Multiplicity of ethnic entities has been no obstacle
to the formation of peoples and States in Africa. Not to mention the
ancient States of Ghana, Mali, Bornu, Axum, Kivu, Benin and that of
the Bantus, or the Congo State of the Berlin Conference, it cannot be
denied that a large number of the 30 or so States liberated since 1960
are multiracial. India, China and Pakistan offer similar examples in Asia.
Many States of Europe also preserve what is sometimes no faded memory
of a now complete process of union: for example, Switzerland, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, or the United Kingdom from the Norse invasions
down to the reigns of Henry VI11(incorporation of Wales in England)
and Queen Anne (union with Scotland). Moreover, is not even the South
Africa of today governed by a White minority formed by the union of
immigrants of different national origins-Germans, English, Dutch andseveral others? Whereas the people of Namibia, which always used to
be the master of the country, is nowadays united by common aspirations,
the legal foundation of nationhood, towards a life of independence and
freedom, whatever inay be the political régime which it will select after
obtaining independence.
If we take a look at the historical facts, we shall see, in the first place,
what legality used to be taken to mean ir?Africa and what it was which
used to be called "African law" as opposed to "the public law of Europe";
an African law illustrated-if one can apply the term---in themonstrous
blunder committed bv the authors of the Act of Berlin. the results of
which have not yet disappeared from the African political scene. It was
a monstrous blunder and a flagrant injustice to consider Africa south of
the Sahara as terrae nullius, to be shared out among the Powers for oc-
cupation and colonization, when even in the sixteenth century Vitoria
had written that Europeans could not obtain sovereignty over the Indies
by occupation, for they were not terra nullius.
By one of fate's iroqies, the declaration of the 1885 Berlin Congress
which held the dark continent to be terrae nullius related to regions
which had seen the rise and development offlourishingstatesand empires.
One should be mindful of what Africa was before there fell upon it the
two greatest plagiies in the recorded history of rnankind: the slave-trade,
which ravaged Africa for centuries on an unprecedented scaie; and colo-
nialisni, which exploited humaiiity and natural wealth to a relentless
extreme. Before these terrible plagues overran their continent, the African
peoples had founded States and even empires of a high level of civili-
zation. Only Abyssinia, by its savage resistance, escaped the slave-trade
and repelled colonialism, preserving its venerable institutions of State.
States less ancient but structurally no less developed than the country
of the Negus have nothing to show today but ruins enshrining faint im-
pressions of the past. Itisjust and pertinent that they be recalled here one
by one, beginning, in the first centuries of the Christian era, with the
empire of Ghana, the power and wealth of which was unequalled in
Western Europe after the fa11of the Roman Empire. The empire of Mali,
which covered territories more vast than Europe at a time when a con-
siderable part of the latter was a feudal and often feuding patchwork;
at the centre of this empire shone a university more ancient than any of
Europe, the University of Timbuktii, of which it was said, in illustration
of its splendour, that the profit there obtained from the sale of manu-
scriptsexceeded that derived from any economic activity. The State of
Bornu, the prosperity of which was still such in the nineteenth century,
when visited by an English traveller shortly before its conquest, that the
situation of the niost humble citizen appeared to him happy and com-
fortable. The Great Lake civilizations. where traces can be found of
roads, irrigation canals, dykes and aqued,ucts, of a remarkable level of
technical skill. Passing on, without paiising to consider the civilizations
of Axum, Kivu and Benin, we come to that of Southern Africa. On the NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 87
banks of the Zambezi, in the same areas as are now dominated by the
Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese found, to quote Barboza,
"richer trade than in any other part of the world". This is a flattering
comparison, for it was made when the Italian republics were at their
splendid apogee. ln Zimbabwe, the present Rhodesia, gigantic ruins,
which cal1 to mind the bastions at Nuragus or Mycenae, bear witness
to its ancient grandeur. Its empire extended,into what isnow the Repub-
lic of South Africa, on both banks of the Limpopo, includingthe present
Transvaal and the sites of Pretoria and Johannesburg. To sum up, let us
recall what Rairnondo Luraghi has wrilten:
"Tl-ius, at the time of the arriva1 of the Portuguese, a chequered
history had unrolled for centuries and millennia between the Sahara
desert and South Africa-a history of civilized peoples, comparable
to that of the great empires of Latin Ainerica or of Europe in the
most brilliant days of Antiquity and the Middle Ages."
Furthermore, African civilization was not merely material. To give
some idea of the high intellectual level of these discredited, unknown or
ignored peoples 1would quote the work written by Father Placide Tem-
pels, a Belgian Franciscan, on the Bantu people, who still live in Namibia
in large numbers. Father Tempels called his book Philisophie bantoue,
because he had observed the ontological nature of their thinking, based
upon awareness of self-on the "know thyself", may 1 add, of Thales,
the Phoenician philosopher who was adopted by the Greeks and ranked
among the Seven Sages of their land. "To that intense spiritual doctrine
which quickens and nourishes souls within the Catholic church," writes
Placide Tempels, "a striking analogy ma) be found in the ontological
thinking of the Bantus." The latter are in fact one of those same great
ethnic groups which inhabit the immense territories to which colonialism
still desperately clings, that is to say from Mozambique and Angola to
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. And it is these very populations
which the South African Government claims are made up of tribes of
diverse origins which are incapable of uniting, and which do not deserve
the title of a people which the United Nations has attributed to them.
11. Having done justice to the contention that separate development
or apartheid is a necessity on account of the diversity of ethnic compo-
sition precluding on the part of the inhabitants a potentiality foration-
hood, 1 shall now turn to the argument that the measures of discrimi-
nation adopted by the South African authorities can be justifiedin terms
of the stage of social evolution reached by the Namibians.
The second paragraph of Article 2 of the mandate agreement provides
that :
"The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of inhabitants of the ter-
ritory subject to the present Mandate."
75 NAMIBIA (s.w.AFRICA) (SEP.OP. AMMOUN) 88
Here then is an obligation which the Mandatory has to carry out "to
the utmost" [par tous les moyens en son pouvoir]. To that end the first
paragraph of the same Article confers upon him "full power of admini-
strationand legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate".
This means that, rightly or wrongly, the Council of the League of
Nations deliberately conferred a power of discretion on the Mandatory.
It was however a power of discretion in the legal sense of the term, thus
evidently not an arbitrary power but one necessarilysubordillate to certain
limitations which flow from the overriding principles and rules of law,
more particularly the rights of peoples and individuals.
South Africa contends that bad faith would be the only ground upon
which criticism could be levelled against its use of that power. This im-
plies that South Africa could be pardoned for irresponiible inaction or
neglect, whether serious or slight; for the misuse of law; or for a wilful
misinterpretation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, the
Mandate and the United Nations Charter which is alleged to justify
racial discrimination and apartheid,defacto annexation of the Territory
of Namibia, and legislative, administrative or judicial measures contrary
to thetenets of both national and international law, the principles of the
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
But in fact there is no escaping the dialectical necessity of comparing
the responsibility of an authority administering a country placed under
its guardianship with that of other authorities entrusted with the ad-
ministration of their own countries or the interests of their nationals.
The latter are expected in public law to provide good government and,
inthe area of personal rights, to mode1their conduct on that of the bonus
paterfunzilius; they are for that reason the more to be blamed for any
abuse of law or misuse of power. Tnshort, the international judge cannot
be denied the right of determining in al1circumstances whether proper
use has been made of the discretionary power; whether, in the opinion of
the international tribunal, it has been exercised with a view to the pro-
motion of the well-beingand social progress of the population, or whether
the mandatory State has done its utmost to fulfil its obligations. This
implies ascertaining whether racial discrimination, apartheid and related
measures, blameworthy in themselves, can be justified on account of
local or temporary circumstances, usually of a social nature, and the
interests of the population in question. To pass ail opinion in these
various situations, a judge cannot rely on his personal judgment, which
is bound to be subjective and Vary according to the mentality of each
judge, his legal, philosophical and ethical outlook, his views on natural
law and his cultural and social background. An objective criterion or
standard is clearly necessary.Such a criterion is afforded by the general
conduct of States and international organizations as a whole. Should
the judge further decide to derive criteria from mlinicipal precedents,
which abound in such examples as the notion of the bonw paterfamilias
already rnentioned, or from powerful moral trends in a given country, NAMIBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 89
they must still be acceptable to other countries in general or be already
enshrined in the universal conscience of mankind. And in fact it can
be said that the many resolutions, adopted over nearly a quarter of a
century, which condemn racial discrimination and apartheid in South
Africa and, as later extended, in Namibia, disclose an objective standard
which the South African Government is required to apply. The same can
be said with reference to the other human rights. To this the firm attitude
of the international community has borne witness whenever it has taken
a stand against their infringement. Indeed, the mere perusal of the texts
1 have mentioned is edifying in this regard.
12. 1 now come to the legal consequences of the presence of South
Africa in Namibia. In order to determine what these are, that presence
must first of al1be legally classified. 1sit a matter of mere peacef~ilinter-
vention? Or of a military occupation degenerating into aggression? Or a
colonial war? For the legal consequences differ in international law ac-
cording to whether it falls within one or another of these classifications.
The representatives of a certain number of States who have had
occasion to speak in the Security Council have stated that the occupation
of Namibia by the Republic of South Africa is an aggression. The
representatives who so argued were those of Algeria, Colombia, Hungary,
Nepal, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, and
Zambia l.Similarly the other African States stated at A.ddis Ababa in
1966 that it was a military occupation, which is the mark of aggression
according to al1 the definitions which have been given of that term.
And the representative of the United States of America, in the written
statement submitted to the Court, expressed the following view:
"The territory is occupied by force against the will of the inter-
national authority entitled to adininister it. Such occupation is as
much belligerent occupation as the hostile occupation of the ter-
ritory of another State."
An armed force which violates the frontiers of a country indisputably
commits an aggression. What then is the position as to belligerent
occupation of a whole territory, to which the representative of the
United States refers?
The General Assembly has made matters clear: in resolution 2131
(XX) it said that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression".
The representative of Pakistan was more emphatic in his oral state-
ment of 15 Februarq last. He rightly viewed the act of using force with
the object of frustrating the right of self-determination as an act of
aggression, which is al1 the more grave in that the right of self-deter-
See S/PV. 1387-1395. mination is a norrn of the nature of jus cogens, derogation frorn which
is not permissible under any circumstances.
1 hasten to recall that the Security Council has used terms no less
forceful. Tt described the occupation of Namibia as illegal. In its resolu-
tion 269 (1969), following the General Assernbly, it recognized "the
legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Narnibia against the illegal
presence of the South African authorities in the territory"; a legitimate
struggle against what, if not against an aggressionYhis is a logical
interpretation, no refutation of which is possible. Tt follows not only
from the logic of things but also from the actual text of the Charter.
For Article51 only authorizes self-defence [légitimedéfense] or legitimate
struggle in cases of response to armed attack [agression armée]. Thus
once the Security Council proclairns the legitirnacy of a defence or of a
struggle against a foreign occupier, it is an armed attack iagression
armée! which is in question, and the occupier's act cannot consequently
be anything other than an aggression [agression ;. It isin this context
that one must understand the Council's expression, mentioned by the
Court in paragraph 109 of the Opinion, "that the continued occupation
of the territory of Namibia by the South African authorities constitutes
an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations".
The aggression committed by South Africa with regard to Narnibia is
the more serious in that, de facto and notwithstanding the South African
Government's denials, it has turned into a veritable annexation. This can
be indisputablq proved by facts which cannot be denied. 1 will quote
the more important of these, the meaning and significance of which it is
easy to discern :
il) The South West Africa Affairs Amendrnent Act of 1949 deleted
al1 references to the Mandate from the Constitution of the Territory.
(2) The South African Government contends that it occupies the Ter-
ritory of South West Africa by conquest or by acquisitive prescription.
(3)In the 16following piecesof legislation, the "Union", or the "State",
or the "Republic" of South Africa is defined as including South West
Africa :
(a) the Terrorism Act of 1967;
(h) the Border Control Act of 1967;
(c) the War Pensions Act of 1967;
(d) the Wool Act of 1967;
(e) the Armaments Developrnent and Production Act of 1968:
(f) the Human Sciences Research Act of 1968;
(g) the Professional Engineers' Act of 1968;
(12) the Companies Amendment Act of 1969;
(i) the Land Bank Amendment Act of 1969;
(j) the National Monuments Act of 1969;
(k) the Births, Ma~riages and Deaths Registration Act of 1970:
(1) the Land Survey Act of 1970; (m)the Land Surveyors' Registration Act of 1970:
(n) the Maintenance Act of 1970;
(O) the National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970;
(p) the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Oïders Act of 1970.
(4) The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of 1949 effects
annexation at constitutional level, by providing for representation of the
Namibians in the Pretoria Parliament.
The annexation of Namibia by South Africa is definitely an act of
aggression. A menlorable example of that kind of aggression is recorded
iiithe historic Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 in which the
Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and China quali-
fied the occupation and annexation of Austria by Hitlerite Germany as
aggression and solemnly declared their refusal to recognize it. The fact
that the annexation of a territory by the mere movement of troops or by
the presence of foreign troops is ranked as an act of aggression by that
Declaration means that the word aggression covers a wider range than
the notion of armed attack strictosensu. This is easily understand-
able, inasmuch as occupation and annexation achieve the ultimate aims
of aggression, bringing about the destruction of the entity which was the
latter's target. As amatter of definition, can the occupation of Austiia
with a view to its annexation be classified as aggression, and the occu-
pation and subsequent annexation of Namibia not be so regarded? This
was what the Court has sought to exclude, when in paragraph 109of the
Opinion it recalled that in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 269 (1969)
the Security Council decided "that the continued occupation of the ter-
ritory of Namibia by the South African authorities constitutes an ag-
gressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations". The
General Assembly had stated earlier in resolution 2074 (XX) that "any
attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West
Africa constitutes an act of aggression". For while the law of former
times, as in the 1885Act of Berlin and the Treaties of Bardo and Algéci-
ras and numerous other treaties, tolerated conquest and annexation, of
which South Africa's conduct appears to be one of the last examples,
modern law, that of the United Nations Charter,the Pact of Bogota and
the Charter of Addis Ababa, condemns them beyond reprieve. Annexa-
tion is nothing lesshan the negation of the new law of self-determination.
Thus the United Nations has rziterated that acquisition of a territory
may not be effected by the use or the threat of force. In its recent reso-
Iution 2628 (XXV), of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly "re-
affirms that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible", and
that consequently the occupied territories must be restored. None the
less, South Africa has throughout, and even before the Court, sought to
justify its continued occupation of Namibia by claiming to be there by
right of conquest or by the effect of acquisitive prescription. The Court
has dismissed this claim in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Opinion. The rriost categorical argument on the point would have been that conquest
and acquisitive p~escription have totally disappeared from the new law
which hascondemned warand proclaimed the inalienability of sovereignty.
13. The presence of South Africa in Namibia having thus been defined
as illegal and warlike, and, in short, regarded as aggression, what are
the legal consequences of this?
The recognition by the United Nations of the legitimacy of the Na-
mibian people's struggle against the South African aggression is nothing
lessthan a recognition of belligerency. For the recognizing States, namely
the States Members of the United Nations, it transforms the hostilities
between a State and another subject of law, which the Namibian people
is, into an international war.Consequently, when there is aggression by
a State against a people for the purpose of subjugating it by force, then
whatever itsmanifestations, it cannot be denied that it has the character
of a war, or at least of a state of belligerency', with al1the legal effects
attarhing thereto, including in particular the status of neutrality imposed
on third-party States.
If the provisions of the Charter concerning collective security could
have been implemented according to the letter and in the spirit of
the San Francisco Conference, there would have been no place for
neutrality, at least among States Men~bersof the United Nations. The
Charter provided on the one hand for an international army (Arts. 43
to 47) and disarmament (Art. 11, para. 1; Art. 26, and Art. 47, para. 1).
But military preparations have been neglected since 1948, and in place
of disarmament, which is in the doldrums, there has from the beginning
beenan intensiveprocess of nuclearand conventional armament spreading
into the wars bein"carried on more or lessal1overthe world. On the other
hand, there were the provisions concerning collective security (Arts. 39
et seq.), the executive counterpart of which was to be the international
army: The fate of the new institution intended to put an end to wars was
no better than that described above. The Security Council's action has
been paralysed by the veto, or by the fear of a veto as in the Namibia
question. Consequently, neutrality persists so long as wars are tolerated,
whether deliberûtely or through weakness. This applies particularly in
the case of the States Members which, evading the obligations deriving
from the United Nations resolutions, for some reason or another, are
at leastunder an obligation not to hinder the activities of or the mea-
sures adopted by the Organization of which they are Members.
The obligations of States not participating in hostilities, which con-
stitute the status of neutrality, are applicable in the case of mere belli-
' L. Cavaré wrote as follows concerning coloniprotectorates:"If the protected
country retains its personality, then there is a war in the international meaning of
3rd ed., p. 551). Afortiori, this is the case for Namibia even before it was recognized
by the United Nations by resolution 2372 (XXII). See also above section 2. gerency just as in the case of war. This would be relevant if it were con-
sidered that the relations between South Africa and Namibia are only a
state of belligerency between communities, one of which is not yet a
State. The classic exaniple of this is the War of Secession in the United
States. Therefore, whether the Namibians are regarded as being in a
state of war or in a state of insurrection against South Africa, recognized
by the international community, the obligations of third States are clear:
those States are bound by the status of neutrality as it derives from the
1871 Washington Rules, and Conventions V and XII[ adopted by the
1907 Hague Peace Conference-which have becoine binding rules of
customary law-and from the relevant provisons of the laws and customs
of war. This means: abstention and impartiality.
In order to define the concept of impartiality, a distinction must be
made between the aggressor and the victim of aggression'. A noteworthy
1 exarnple is that of the polic) adopted by the United States of Amelica,
which led to the promulgation of the Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease
Acts. These Acts were exceptions to the general rules of neutrality,
founded on a desire to assist the victims of aggression2. With regard to
certain Western States which continue to supply South Africa with arms,
ammunition and war rnaterial, their attitude contravenes the status of
neutrality,from which they have previously benefited 3,for instead of the
obligation of impartiality being interpreted by them in favour of the
victim, it is violated for the benefit of the aggressor. They should abstain
from such deliveries. Security Council resolution 282 (1970), pronouncing
the arms embargo against South Africa alone, is in line with international
pract ice.
14. The obligation of abstention entailed by the status of neutrality
--
' G. Schwarzenberger explains the distinction in these words in connection with
the implementation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact:
"Parties to the Kellogg Pact which rernain at peace with the aggressor are
entitled, by way of reprisal, to depart frorn the observance of strict neutrality
between the Pact-breaker and his victim and to discriminate against taggres-
sor."
As examples in support of this rule he cites the Destroyer Deal between the United
States and Great Britain, and the"Aid Britain" Act of 1941. He adds in a relevant
comparison :
"As with Members of the United Nations (Art. 2 (5) of the Charter), parties
to treaties may even beunder a legal duty to discriminate against an aggressor
State." (A Manlral of International Law, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 185.)
See E. Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 1954, pp. 451 and 477,
who mentions that:
"The purpose may be to assist the victim of aggression ... in which case
American writers have used the expression 'supporting State'" (p. 451).
R. Sherwood, in his book of memoirs entitled Roosevelt and Hopkins, writes
on p. 221, of Churchill's overjoyed gratitude: ". .and frorn this came the vast
concept which Churchill later described as 'a new Magna Charta ... the most un-
selfish and unsordid financial act of any coiintry in al1hist"ry'.
81rnust be defined having regard to the development of modern arrnaments
and the variety of means of assistance which rnay be supplied to the
belligerents. The different prohibitions imposed by international law
rnay rnoreover duplicate and reinforce or may supplement those laid
down in the relevant Security Council resolutions, on account of viola-
tion of the Charter and of international law. States rnay thus be under
various obligations by virtue of more than one source of obligation.
Exarnples of such prohibitions are:
(1) The prohibition of al1 military assistance, not only de.facto, but
also in irnplementation of a treaty of alliance or of bilateral orltilateral
defence. The obligations contained in those treaties cannot prevail over
the obligation not to assist an aggressor State. A treaty which enabled
assistance to be given to an aggressor would be immoral and contrary
to international order, and could not therefore be tolerated by the inter-
nctional comrnunity. Further, treaties of alliance generally provide that
they do not operate unless it is the other signatory which was attacked.
(2) The prohibition of the supply of nuclear or conventional arrns
and of al1ammunition; of the supply of ships, aircraft or other military
machines, and of arrned or transport helicopters; of rockets, missiles
and electronic equipment which can be put to military uses; of al1arms
capable of being used against guerillas, including napalm, chemical and
bacteriological weapons, and gases of al1sorts. As in the case of treaties
of alliance or defence, agreements for the supply of any of the foregoing
may not be irnplemented in favour of the aggressor, for any reason what-
soever, whether of joint defence or of economic necessity.
(3) The prohibition of the supply of spare parts and an) equiprnent
capable of being used for the production or maintenance of arrns or
anmunition or nuclear devices, and patents oi licences relating thereto.
(4) The prohibition of the emigration or despatch of technicians for
work in the armainents industry, or for the training of rnilitary personnel;
on the transmission of military or technical information, including in-
formation relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on account of
the possibility of its being adapted to military purposes.
(5) The prohibition of the supply of oil and petroleum products and
of ilatural gas on account of their vital importance for war. If this pro-
hibition is such as to harm South African industry, that can only be a
more effective way of bringing South A.fricato put an end to its.aggres-
sion '.
(6) The prohibition of the supply of al1facilities for the transport of
the above-mentioned arms; machinery, munitions and other products.
(7) The prohibition of al1economic, industrial or financial assistance,
' On the subject of oil supplies see Professor Erik Castrén, The PLawenof
War andNeutrnlity. 1954, p. 474.
82 in the form of gifts, loans, credit, advances or guarantees, or in any other
form l.This prohibition is not confined to States. Ttnaturallyextends to
institutions in which States have voting rights, such as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Develop-
ment Association and the International Finance Corporation; as is well
known, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has
deliberately disregarded the resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council, by continuing to grant South Africa aid amounting
to hundreds of millions of dollars, which is in fact aid to the illegal ac-
tivity of the South African authorities in Namibia, contrary to the objects
and DurDosesof the United Nations 2.
AI\ tge above prohibitions apply to States and to associations of
States and to public and private international organizations.
Furthermore, governments must show due diligence in preventing îny
individual or collective act contrary to neutrality. This obligation relates
to nationals and subjects, and to foreign residents. Showing due dili-
gence means that adequate measures must be taken, including legislative
measures providing for penalties. For a State which undertakes an obli-
gation commits its own subjects and those who live under its law. and
must employ every kind of means, legislative, administrative and judicial,
by which it governs. It is not therefore suficient to refuse diplomatic
protection to those who transgress; as has been suggested by the Govern-
ment of the United States.
It is by taking these rneasures, which are dictated bythe status of neutra-
lity, that States, and in particular those which are, politically and finan-
cially speaking, the Great Powers, will bring South Africa to abandon
its present policy, in the interests of justice, peace and international co-
operation.
15. It was to be desired that the Court should deduce al1 the legal
consequences from the aggression observed by the Security ~ouncil.
The request made of it was not confined to the effect of resolution 276
(1970), referred to in resolution 284 (1970) requesting the opinion. The
legal consequences upon which it had to pronounce are al1those resulting
from the very presence of South Africa in Namibia, which is the first
' See in connection with prohibitions of a financial nature, Professor PaulReuter,
op. cir.p. 321.
The specialized agencies in which the voting is based on the democratrule of
one State, one vote, have al1 decided to refrain from any support to South Africa:
for example, Unesco, ILO, FA0 and WHO. The recalcitrant attitude of the IBRD
and the IMF is to be explained by the multiple voting system on a capitalist basis
which operates therein, by which the financial Great Powers have a number of votes
calculated according to thsize of their share in the capital of these two institutions.
These Powers are primarily the States which the General Assembly has described as
commercial partners of South Africa. In future, Statesougto take it as a matter of
course that they should bring their attitude in these institutions into line with deci-
sions of the United Nations.point rnentioned in resolution 284 (1970), and which is conditioned by
resolution 276 (1970).That presence was the justification for resolutions
282(1970)and 283 (1970),which the Court could not leaveouï of account
as not falling within the request for advisory opinion. For resolution 283
(1970)re-affirrns,first resolution 276 (1970)and secondly resolution 282
(1970), in the following terrns:
"Re-afirming its resolution 282 (1970) on the arrns embargo
against the Governrnent of South Africa and the significance of that
resolution with regard to the territory and people of Narnibia, ..."
These two resolutions, 282(1970)and 283 (1970),concerning the illegal
presence of South Africa in Namibia were, what is more, adopted before
the request for opinion; resolution 283 (1970)was adopted solely because
of that illegalpresence, which isthe principal subject-rnatter of the request
for opinion, and resolution 282 (1970) had in view apartheid beyond the
frontiers of South Africa, as well as the policies of that Governrnent in
southern Africa, including Narnibia. Resolution 282 (1970) reads as fol-
lows :
"Reiterating its condernnation of the evil and abhorrent policies
of apartheid and the rneasures being taken by the Governrnent of
South Africa to enforce and extend those policies beyond its borders,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . .
"Gra~elyconcerned by the persistent refusal of the Governrnent of
South Africa to abandon its racist policies and to abide by the reso-
lutions of the Security Council and of the General Assernbly on this
question and others relating to southern Africa. .."
This latter paragraph of resolution 282 (1970), by rnaking reference to
"the resolutions of the Security Council", contemplated resolution 276
(1970)in particular.
16. Although the Court has made no mention of resolutions 282(1970)
and 283 (1970),it has nonetheless reached conclusions which do not differ
in substance from those which follow from those two resolutions and
from the status of neutrality.
1 will begin with economic consequences, namely those enurnerated
in resolution 283 (1970) and the more cornplete set, resulting frorn the
status of neutrality, which are rnentioned in section 14, paragraph 7,
of the present separate opinion. The Advisory Opinion has not failed to
express the view,inthe operative clause, that mernber States of the United
Nations are under obligation "to refrain from any acts and in particular
any dealings with the Government of South Africa ... lending support
or assistance to" South Africa. The prohibition of economic assistance
provided for in resolution 283 (1970) and by the status of neutrality has
thus been substantially adopted by the Opinion of the Court.
Itisclear from a reading of the whole of the Opinion that the operativeclause is integrally connected with the reasoning, and is explained by the
reasoning. But even in the light of the reasoning, there are missing
details which it might have been useful to clear up. The question arose
whether the legal consequences which the Court was called upon to
deduce should be summed up in a few major rules, or whether they should
be laid down in terms as detailed as possible. The Court has chosen the
first solution, leaving it to the political organs to effect the application
thereof. This does not seem to me to be quite what the Security Council
wanted. Of course any analytical formulation carried to extremes would
have failed to be exhaustive, and might sometimes have overlooked
circumstances which were necessarily unforeseeable. Nonetheless, a more
complete enumeration, but one which did not lose itself in detail, might
have been more satisfying, and would have been more surely effective in
stopping at the source those interpretations which are sometimes made
to suit national tendencies or interests.
The possible clarifications to supplement the Opinion may, in conse-
quence of what has been said above, be deduced from what is laid down
by the status of neutrality, and by resolution 283 (1970). Although not
mentioned in the Advisory Opinion, this resolution is covered by the
rule which has there been laid down erga omnes, namely thatthe decisions
of the Security Council are imperatively binding by virtue of Article 25
of the Charter. The following is a not exhaustive list of the prohibitions
of an economic kind which result therefrom:
(1) States should debar themselves and should forbid their nationals,
subjects and foreign residents, under penalties, from having any part in
South African companies or undertakings registered or established in
Namibian territory, or having in that territory branches, representatives
or agencies, either by way of technical participation or on the financial
level by the acquisition of stocks, shares or bonds.
(2) States should not authorize the shares and bonds of such compa-
nies to be quoted on the Stock Exchange, or any dealings therein to be
effected. Otherwise, they would be facilitating the disposa1 of assets
acquired by misappropriation or spoliation, taking into account the civil
or commercial responsibilities attaching thereto.
(3) The exploitation of the petroleum, diamond, gold and other resources
of the soi1and sub-soi1of Namibia, its territorial waters or its continental
shelf, carried out by South Africa or its nationals, or with its authori-
zation, is equivalent to the seizure of Namibian assets by, or with the
CO-operation of, the occupying authority, and the Republic of South
Africa must therefore render an account to the future State of Namibia of
the income and taxes which it has derived or collected from such sources.
Any States which have obtained profit from these exploitations, either in
the form of concessions or in the form of participation in the invested
capital, may be held jointly responsible with South Africa towards
Namibia. These States and their subjects must refrain from acquiring any
of the production of these exploitations, in order not to incur civil respon-
85 sibility by being involved either as receivers or as purchasers, with notice,
of assets not belonging to the vendor.
17. Turning to rnilitary matters, it should be observed that the passage
in the operative clause of the Opinion forbidding any support or assis-
tance to South Africa is drawn in very general terms. By rnentioning
"any acts" and "any dealings with the Governrnent of South Africa",
itclearly includes rnilitary support, and such support, being indisputably
the rnostserious and the rnost heavy with consequences, must therefore be
forbidden before any other forrn of support. Any supply of arms, rnuni-
tions or war material, and any technical or scientific rnilitary assistance,
are hereafter prohibited. Thisrule applies to al1States, and none of thern
can evade it on any ground whatsoever, e.g., econornic or strategic
interests.
As in the case of econornic consequences, the details of the rnilitary
support which is prohibited rernain to be deterrnined. Like resolution 283
(1970),resolution 282 (1970)is a binding decision by virtue of Article 25,
already referred to; the more soin that resolution 282(1970)is related, as
has been stated, to resolution 276 (1970) through resolution 283 (1970).
In any event, the acts of rnilitary support or assistance from which States
rnust refrain are those the prohibition of which is dictated by resolution
282 (1970)and by the status of neutrality rnentioned in Section 14, para-
graphs 1 to 6, of this separate opinion. Under each of the three documents
in question-the Court's Opinion, resolution 282 (1970)and the status of
neutrality-what rnatters isthat no assistance shall be given to an aggres-
sor: consequently, the rneasures to be applied rnust be the sarne, in
order to meet the sarne need.
Certain governments, in order to sorne extent to evade the embargo
on arrns and rnaterial for land, sea and aerial warfare, have drawn a
distinction between arrns and war rnaterial destined for interna1 use, in
other words for repression-to whichthey admit the prohibition would
apply-and arms and material allocated to external defence, which they
contend would be excluded frorn the embargo.
This distinction is condemned by the facts of the case. In the various
wars waged by the colonial Powers and mandatory States, heavy arma-
ments and rnilitary aircraft were widelyused. According to Mr. McBride,
the Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists, "heavy
weapons were often ernployed to rnaintain a colonial régime,and they
could bevery usefulto a régimelikethat in South Africa '".And armoured
cars were in fact deployed at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, when the
South African police opened fire and according to the United Nations
report, killed a large nurnber of peaceful and unarrned Black dernonstra-
Ad Hoc Sub-Cornrnittee of the Security Council, S/AC. 17/SR. 14, meeting of
24 June 1970.
86tors while fighter aircraft flew overhead. The anniversary of that day was
proclaimed by the General Assembly as the International Day for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Of course, as a diplomat observed,
"it is not possible to transform submarines into amphibious vehicles in
order to use them for land operations". However, no one can be unaware
that in the course of colonial wars there have been bombardments by
naval units or aircraft ofports, towns, villagesor concentrations ofpeople.
That is why the supply of any arms capable of reinforcing South Africa's
military potential must be forbidden, particularly since it is this material
strength which enables it to nlaintain its presence in Namibia notwith-
standing resolution 276 (1970).
18. Furthermore, the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia opens
up possibilities of wide application of Article 103 of the Charter. The
obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter, con-
templated by that Article, clearly include obligations resulting from the
provisions of the Charter and from its purposes, and also those laid down
by the binding decisions of the organs of the United Nations. Among such
decisions are those of the Security Council, namely resolutions 282 (1970)
and 283 (1970). SinceArticle 103applies both to past and future commit-
ments, the following, whatever their date ', can no longer be relied on
against member States in their relationship with South Africa: military
alliances, naval agreements or agreements relating to joint naval ma-
nŒuvres, agreements to supply arms, war material and munitions,
agreements for CO-operationin the nuclear field for whatever purpose, as
well as al1 treaties involving any assistance whatsoever calculated to
facilitate the maintenance of South Africa's presence in Namibia, as is
stated in paragraphs 119et seq. of the Court's Opinion.
19. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that since 1967the United
Nations has been convinced that any assistance given to South Africa,
even without being earmarked for any particular application, would
nevertheless further the designs of South Africa both in South African
territory and in Namibia. For the South African Government has been
administering Namibia as an integral part of its territory since even
before it was annexed thereto, applying to it its racial policy and its
policy of colonial exploitation. Any financial, economic or military
assistance is likely to promote the general development of that policy
and consequently to tighten South Africa's hold over the Territory of
Namibia. Thus it is that the General Assembly has adopted resolution
upon resolution in order to dissuademember States of the United Nations
from giving any assistance whatsoever to South Africa, even such as is
not expressly intended to consolidate its presence in Namibia, for so long
as it continues its policy of racial discrimination and apartheid in the
See hereon L. Cavaré, op. cit.p,p. 653f. NAMIBlA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP.AMMOUN) 100
geographical, political, economic and military ensemble of South and
South West Africa. This was the purpose of resolutions 2307 (XXII),
2396 (XXIII), 2426 (XXIII) and 2506 (XXIV). In thesame way, the two
resolutions 282 (1970) and 283 (1970) of the Security Council concern
South Africa no less than Namibia. It is in this sense that the Court's
Opinion is to be understood; to do otherwise would be to run counter
to reality.
(SignedF )ouad AMMOUN.
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. AMMOUN,
VICE-PRÉSIDENT
1.Le Conseil de sécuritéayant demandé à la Cour internationale de
Justice, dans le cadre de la compétence consultative de celle-ci, un avis
autoriséau sujet des conséquencesjuridiques du maintien de la présence
de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (ancien Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant
la révocation en 1966 du mandat-tutelle que la Société desNations
avait confié à cette puissance en 1920, la cour a été appeléeà se pro-
noncer, pour la première fois en ce qui concerne certains principes
fondamentaux du droit des gens, sur un certain nombre de problèmes
que soulève la demande d'avis. Ce sont, en particulier, la souveraineté
des peuples dépendants, l'institution du mandat, sa nature et ses fins,
le droitdes à disposer d'eux-mêmeset la décolonisation,l'égalité
entre les nations et entre les individus, la discrimination raciale traduite
dans la doctrine de l'apartheid en Afrique du Sud et en Namibie, enfin
l'ensemble desdroits de l'homme et leur caractère universel impératif.
Toutes ces notions sont la manifestation d'un droit international
nouveau, conséquencede l'évolution socialeet politique irréversible du
monde moderne. La Cour, dans son avis, ne les a pas éludées.Elle ne
leur a pas toujours donné, cependant, à mon avis, les développements
de droit qu'elles exigent.
D'autre part, les motifs et l'énoncédu dispositif ne me semblent pas
suffisamment explicites et concluants quantà la définition juridique de
la présencesud-africaine en Namibie et aux obligations qui en découlent
pour les Etats.
C'est pourquoi j'ai cru devoir émettre la présente opinion individuelle
en vue d'apporter à l'avis, dont je partage les vues, un appui supplé-
mentaire, quelque modeste qu'il soit.
2. La République d'Afrique du Sud, qui s'étaitprévalue,entre autres
Etats, de l'article 66 du Statut de la Cour, pour fournir des renseigne-
ments à l'occasion de la demande d'avis, s'était présentée comme une
partie à un différend l'opposant à la majorité des Etats qui avaient
participé au vote des résolutions de l'Assemblée générale deN sations
Unies et du Conseil de sécurité relativesà la Namibie. A ce titre, elle
avait sollicitél'autorisation de désignerunjuge adc appelé àparticiper
avec les membres de la Cour au prononcé de l'avis.
Après avoir rejetéla requête de l'Afrique du Sud par une ordonnance
rendue le 29 janvier 1971à la majorité des voix, la Cour l'a expliqué SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT AMMOUN
[Translationj
1. The Security Council having requested from the International Court
of Justice, within the framework of the latter's advisory jurisdiction, an
authoritative opinion concerning the legal consequences of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) not-
withstanding the termination in 1966 of the tutelary Mandate which the
League of Nations had conferred upon that Power in 1920, the Court
has been called upon to pronounce, for the first time in regard to certain
fundamental principles of international law, on a number of problems
raised by the request for an opinion. These are, in particular, the sover-
eignty of dependent peoples, the mandate institution, its nature and its
objects, the right of peoples to self-determination and decolonization,
equality between nations and between individuals, racial discrimination
as expressed in the doctrine ofapartheidin South Africa and in Namibia
and, in sum, the whole body of human rights and their imperative uni-
versa1character.
Al1these notions are the outward expression of a new body of inter-
national law, the consequence of an irreversible social and political evo-
lution of the modern world. The Court, in its Advisory Opinion, has
not overlooked them. In my view, however, it has not always gone far
enough in spelling out the legal conclusions to which they point.
Furthermore, 1 find that neither the reasons given for the operative
part nor the wording of those paragraphs are sufficiently explicit and
decisive in regard to the legal qualification of the presence of South
Africa in Namibia and the obligations for States that flow therefrom.
1have therefore felt it my duty to compose this separate opinion with
a view to contributing to the Advisory Opinion of the Court, whose
views 1share, some further support, however modest it may be.
2. The Republic of South Africa, having, like certain other States,
availed itself of Article 66 of the Statute of the Court in order to furnish
information in connection with the request for an advisory opinion,
presented itself as a party to a dispute between it and the majority of
States which had taken part in voting the United Nations General As-
sembly and Security Council resolutions relating to Namibia. On that
ground; it requested permission to choose a judge ad hoc to participate,
with the Members of the Court, in the giving of the opinion.
Having rejected South Africa's application by a majority decision in
an Order made on 29 January 1971, the Court has explained that one68 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND.AMMOUN)
notamment par l'absence d'un différend entre parties. Pour que soit
désigné unjuge ad hoc,il aurait fallu non seulement qu'ilyait un différend,
mais que l'unedesparties àce différend n'aitpas unjuge de sa nationalité
sur le siège,alors que l'autre en avait un. Quelle serait en l'espècecette
autre partie? Les Etats qui ont votécontre l'Afrique du Sud? Mais alors
ceux qui se sont prononcés en sa faveur font avec elle cause commune
aux termes de l'article 31 du Statut de la Cour et, comme tels, ils sont
déjà représentésD . ans ces conditions, passer outre et autoriser l'Afrique
du Sud à désigner un juge ad hoc aurait étéà l'encontre de la'règlede
l'égalitéque le Statut de la Cour a voulu justement sauvegarder par
l'institution du juged hoc. Cela exclut,à plus forte raison, tout pouvoir
discrétionnaire que l'on voudrait déduire de l'article 68 du Statut de
la Cour; car celle-cine peut, sous couvert d'interprétation, violer la règle
de base et la raison d'être de cetteinstitution. De toute façon, si l'opinion
de la minoritéavait étéacceptée, laCour aurait dû, à mon avis, autoriser
la désignation d'un juge ad hoc tant pour l'Afrique du Sud que pour la
Namibie. La personnalitéjuridique de la Namibie aurait étéainsi judi-
ciairement reconnue, et la Namibie aurait figurépour la première fois
dans une instance internationale l.
La Namibie, mêmedu temps où elle étaitréduite à l'état de colonie
allemande ou qu'elle était soumise au mandat sud-africain, possédait
une personnalitéjuridique que seul le droit ancien lui déniait.Elle n'était
considéréepar les puissants du jour que comme une expression géo-
graphique empruntant son nom à la position la localisant dans le sud-
ouest du continent africain. Elle n'en constituait pas moins un sujet de
droit distinct de 1'Etat allemand, possédant la souveraineté nationale
mais n'en ayant pas l'exercice. L'institution du mandat, à plus forte
raison, n'entraînait pas l'annexion du pays qui y fut soumis, ainsi que
la Cour l'a préciséen se reportant à son avis précédentdu 18 juillet
1950.La souveraineté, qui est inhérente à tout peuple, comme la liberté
est inhérente à tout être humain, n'avait donc pas cesséd'appartenir
au peuple sous mandat. Elle était simplement dépouilléepour un temps
de ses moyens et de sa libertéd'expression. Legénéral Smuts, premier
ministre de l'Union sud-africaine, le reconnaissait déjà dans son étude
sur la future institution du mandat 2. Parties bénéficiairesaux accords
de mandat par voie de représentation, certains des peuples qui allaient
y êtresoumis devaient en conséquenceêtreconsultés sur le choix du
mandataire. C'est ce que stipulait le paragraphe 4 de I'article 22 du
Pacte pour les peuples détachésde l'Empire ottoman. Il est vrai que la
commission d'enquête, réduite à ses seuls membres américains, King et
l Ce n'est qu'à titre d'observateur que la Namibie a été admiseà la Commission
économique des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique.
The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion.of its reasons lay in the absence of a dispute between parties. To justify
the appointment of a judge ad hoc, not only would a dispute have had
to be present but there would have had to be on the Bench no judge of
the nationality of one of the parties while the Bench did include a judge
of the nationality of the opposing party. But what, in the present pro-
ceedings, would have been the identity of that opposing party? The
States which voted against South Africa? But in that case those which
voted for South Africa are in the same interest as it, within the meaning
of Article 31 of the Statute, and as such are already represented. To have
ignored this and allowed South Africa a judge ad hoc would in such
circumstances have contravened the rule of that very equality which the
Statute seeks to safeguard through the institution of judges ad hoc.
A fortiorithis rules out any discretionary power that some might wish
to deduce from Article 68 of the Statute, for the Court may not, on the
pretext of interpretation, contravene the fundamental rule and raison
d'être of that institution. In any case, if the opinion of the minority had
been accepted, the Court ought, in my view, to have permitted the choice
of a judge ad hoc both for South Africa and for Namibia. The legal
personality of Namibia would thus have been judicially recognized
and Namibia would have appeared for the first time in international
proceedings .
Namibia, even at the periods when it had been reduced to the status of
a German colony or was subject to the South African Mandate, possessed
a legal personality which was denied to it only by the law now obsolete.
It was considered by the Powers of the day as a merely geographical
concept taking its name from its location in the South-West of the African
Continent. It nevertheless constituted a subject of law that was distinct
from the German State, possessing national sovereignty but lacking the
exercise thereof. The institution of the Mandate, afortiori,did not connote
the annexation of the country which was subject to it, as the Court has
made clear by its reference to its earlier Advisory Opinion of 18July 1950.
Sovereignty, which is inherent in every people, just as liberty is inherent in
every human being, therefore did not cease to belong to the people sub-
ject to mandate. It had simply, for a time, been rendered inarticulate
and deprived of freedom of expression. General Smuts, the Prime Minis-
ter of the Union of South Africa, already recognized this in his study on
what was to be the mandate institution 2. As the beneficiaries on whose
behalf the mandate agreements were to be concluded, it was right that
some of the peoples who were to be subjected to them should be consulted
on the selection of the mandatory. That is what was stipulated in para-
graph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, for the peoples severed from the
Ottoman Empire. In fact the commission of inquiry, reduced to its
l It was only as an observer that Namibia was admitted to the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa.
The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion.Crane, procéda à une consultation au Liban, en Syrie, en Palestine et en
Irak, la Grande-Bretagne et la France ayant déclinél'invitation d'y
participer du président américain Woodrow Wilson parce qu'elles
s',étaientntendues pour l'attribution des mandats et qu'ellessetrouvaient
déjàsur place. La majoritédes populations consultéesréclama I'indépen-
dance immédiate.Le droit des peuples àdisposer d'eux-mêmesn'étaitpas
encore mûr. Les quatre pays mentionnés ne devaient obtenir leur in-
dépendancequ'à la suite de la deuxièmeguerre mondiale.
L'opinion de Paul Fauchille, écrivant en 1922,n'est à retenir qu'à titre
historique, dépourvue qu'elle est aujourd'hui de toute pertinence. ((Il
paraît bien [avançait-il] que tandis que dans les mandats de la deuxième
et de la troisième catégorie, la pleine souveraineté est attribuée au
Mandataire, il ya dans lesmandats de la première catégorie,commedans
un protectorat proprement dit, partage de la souveraineté entre les
communautés ou nations indépendantes et le Mandataire '.))Fauchille
assimilait donc les mandats Bet C aux colonies de son temps. Il concevait
un partage de souverainetépour les mandats A, alors qu'il faut convenir
que la souverainetéest indivisible, comme la liberté,et que ne peut être
conçue qu'une distinction entre la possession de la souverainetéet son
exercice.~~to~anovsk~,écrivanttrois ans plus tard, voyait plus juste en
soutenantla thèsede la souverainetévirtuelle qui résidedans lepeuple que
la domination ou la tutelle a dépossédé de son exercice 2.Telles étaient
aussi les vues de Paul Pic 3.
Il est vrai que la qualitéde peuple, reconnue par l'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies dans sa résolution 2372 (XXII) du 12juin 1968 au
peuple namibien, a été contestéepar le Gouvernement sud-africain dans le
butde justifi~r, pour régner,la division au sein du pays, sous le vocable
afrikaans de l'apartheid, ou développement séparé.Mais le peuple
namibien. dont la Cour a admis à son tour l'existence et l'unitédans le
présentavis, a affirmé lui-même sa personnalité internationale en entre-
prenant la lutte pour la liberté. L'Afrique du Sud s'étant opposée à la
réalisation des buts du mandat et à l'acheminement de la Namibie vers
l'indépendanceet la jouissance de sa pleine souveraineté,celle-cireprend
le combat. La légitimitéde la lutte nationale namibienne a été reconnue
dans quatre résolutions de l'Assembléegénérale et dans la résolution
269 (1969)du Conseil de sécurité.Cette lutte s'aligne,par analogie, avec
cellesentreprises par d'autres membres de la communauté internationale,
au cours de la première guene mondiale, avant qu'ils ne fussentreconnus
comme Etats, tels que lespeuples polonais, tchèque et slovaque; ou avec
Traitéde droit international public, 1922, tome 1, p. 298.
La théoriegénéraledes mandats internationaux, 1925, p. 83 et suiv.
Le régimedes mandats d'après le traité de Versail»Revue généralede droit
internationalpublic, 1923,2esérie, IV,no5, p. 334.
Résoiutions 2372 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498 (XXIV) et 2517 (XXIV). American members, King and Crane, conducted such consultations
in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iraq; the United Kingdom and
France having declined the American President Woodrow Wilson's
invitation to take partbecause they had come to an agreement as to the
allocation of the mandates and were already in position on the spot. The
majority of the populations consulted demanded immediate indepen-
dence, but the right of peoples to self-determination had not yet come to
maturity and it was only in the wake of the Second World War that the
four countries mentioned were to obtain their independence.
The opinion expressed by Paul Fauchille, writing in 1922, deserves
attention solely as a historical illustration, since today it has lost al1
relevance. "It seems clear," he averred, "that, whereas in the case of
mandates of the second and third categories full sovereignty is attributed
to the Mandatory, there is in the case of mandates of the first category,
as in a protectorate properly so called, a sharing of sovereignty between
the independent communities or nations and the Mandatory l."Fauchille
thus assimilated "B" and "C" Mandates to the colonies of his period.
He conceived of a sharing of sovereignty in the case of "A" Mandates,
whereas it must surely be agreed that sovereignty is indivisible, as is
liberty, and that al1that is conceivable is a distinction between the pos-
session of sovereignty and its exercise. Stoyanovsky, writing three years
later, took a more accurate view when he upheld the notion of virtual
sovereignty residing ina people deprived of its exerciseby domination or
tutelage 2.Those were also the views of Paul Pic 3.
It is true that the Namibians' status of a people, which was recognized
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 2372
(XXII) of 12June 1968,has been disputed by the South African Govern-
ment so as to justify dividing-and ruling-the country under the euphe-
mism of separate development, known in Afrikaans as apartheid. But
the Namibian people, whose existence and unity the Court has, in its
turn, recognized in the present Advisory Opinion, has itself asserted its
international personality by taking up the struggle for freedom. Since
South Africa has opposed the achievement of the objects of the Mandate
and blocked Namibia's path to independence and the enjoyment of its
full sovereignty, Namibia has decided to fight. The legitimacy of the
Namibian national struggle has been recognized in four resolutions of
the General Assembly and in Security Council resolution 269 (1969).
This struggle, by analogy, continues the line of those waged by other
members of the international community, during the First World War,
before they were recognized as States, such as the Polish, Czech and
Traité de droit internationalpub1922, Vol. 1, p. 298.
La théoriegénéraledes mandats internat ion au.^,1925, ff. 83
international public, 1923, 2nd Series, IV, No. 5, p. 334., Revue généralede droit
Resolutions 2372 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498 (XXIV) and 2517 (XXIV).70 NAMIBIE (%-O. AFRICAIN ()P.IND.AMMOUN)
le mouvement national français ltandis que la France étaitdominée par
l'Allemagne hitlérienne.
En droit, la légitimité de lalutte des peuples ne doit pas faire de doute,
car elle découledu droit de légitime défenseinnédans la nature humaine
et consacrépar l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Et l'on sait
que la Iégitime défensepeut êtrecollective, associant, ainsi qu'il en est,
les autres peuples de l'Afrique, membres de l'organisation de l'unité
africaine, au combat pour la libertédu peuple namibien. La Déclaration
universelle des droits de l'homme l'a également admis en soulignant, dès
lepréambule, (qu'il est essentielque lesdroits de l'homme soient protégés
par un régime de droit pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en
suprêmerecours, à la révoltecontre la tyrannie et l'oppression ».
La lutte du .eu~.e namibien se situe ainsi dans le cadre du droit des
gens, d'autant plus que la lutte des peuples en générala étéun des
éléments,sinon l'élémentprimordial, dans la formation de la règle
coutumière qui a conduit à la reconnaissance du droit de libre déter-
mination des peuples. Aussi aurais-je souhaité que la Cour eût fait
mention dans son avis de la lutte Iégitime du peuple namibien, à l'instar
de l'Assembléegénéraleet du Conseil de sécurité.Mais son silence à ce
sujet n'exclut pas son assentiment, du moment qu'elle s'est référé aux
résolutions pertinentes des deux autres organes des Nations Unies.
La Cour n'a pas fait mention de la décisionde I'Assenibléegénérale
portant ((que desormais le Sud-Ouest africain relèvedirectement de la
responsabilitédel'organisation desNations Unies 1(par. 4dela résolution
de l'Assemblée général2 e145 (XXI)). Cela était à dire pour préciserla
nature des rapports entre l'organisation internationale d'une part, la
Namibie et la République sud-africainede l'autre. Elle n'a pasmentionné
non plus la création du Conseil des Nations Unies pour le Sud-Ouest
africain (par.6 de ladite résolution), dénommépar la suite Conseil des
Nations Unies pour la Namibie par la résolution2372 (XXII) et doté,par
la résolution2248 (S-V), de compétencesétatiques. Ces compétences, qui
devaient êtreassurées par 1'Etat mandataire jusqu'à la déchéancedu
mandat, habilitent le Conseil à exercer, au nom des Nations Unies, le
pouvoir législatifet l'autorité administrative en Namibie, ainsi que sa
représentation diplomatique et la protection diplomatique de ses ressor-
tissants. C'est cet organisme qui aurait étéappelé, le cas échéant, à
désigner un juge ad hoc pour la Namibie, comme ilaurait pu aussi
présenter à la Cour l'exposéécritet l'exposéoral à l'instar du Gouverne-
ment sud-africain. Il n'a pas reçu toutefois la communication de l'article
66 l'y autorisant.
2eéd.,p. 334-335.ermes de L. Cavaré, Droit international public positif, tome II,Slovak peoples; or of the French national movement ' at the time when
France was under the domination of Nazi Germany.
In law, the legitimacy of the peoples' strugglecannot be in any doubt,
for it follows from the right of self-defence, inherent in human nature,
which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is
also an accepted principle that self-defence may be collective; thus we
see the other peoples of Africa, members of the Organization of African
Unity, associated with the Namibians in their fight for freedom. The
rightness of this isalso confirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which stresses in its preamble that "it is essential, if man is not
to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
rule of law".
The struggle of the Namibian people thus takes its place within the
framework of international law, not least because the struggle of peoples
in general has been one, if not indeed the primary factor in the formation
of the customary rule whereby the right of peoples to self-determination
is recognized. 1 could therefore have wished that the Court, like the
General Assembly and the Security Council, had mentioned in its Opin-
ion the legitimate struggle of the Narnibian people. But its silence on
this subject does not exclude its agreement, since it has referred to the
relevant resolutions of the other two organs of the United Nations.
The Court has not mentioned the General Assembly's decision to the
effect that "henceforth South West Africa Lames under the direct res-
ponsibility of the United Nations" (para. 4 of General Assembly reso-
lution 2145 (XXI)). That should have been said in order to make clear
the nature of the relationships between the Organization, on the one hand,
and Namibia and the Republic of South Africa on the other. Nor has
the Court referred to the setting-up of a United Nations Council for
South West Africa (para. 6 of the same resolution), the name of which
was changed by resolution 2372 (XXII) to United Nations Council for
Namibia and which resolution 2248 (S-V) had vested with powers of
statehood. These are the powers which it was for the Mandatory to
exercise until the expiry of the Mandate, and they entitle the Council,
acting on behalf of the United Nations, to exercise legislative competence
and administrative authority in Namibia as well as to represent it diplo-
matically and exercise diplomatic protection of its nationals. It is to
this body that it would in other circumstances have fallen to choose a
judge ad hoc for Namibiu, and it might also have presented the Court
with a written statement and an oral statement as did the Government
of South Africa. However it did not receive the communication referred
to in Article 66 which would have authorized it to do so.
These are the terms used by L. Cavaré,Droit internationa1p~:blicpositif, Vol. II,
2nd ed.,pp. 334 f.71 NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
3. La révocation du mandat de l'Afrique du Sud sur la Namibie
décidéepar l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies se fonde sur trois
motifs qui figurent au paragraphe 5 du préambule de la rtsolution 2145
(XXI) du 27 octobre 1966,ainsi conçu:
1Coni~ainc~re que I'administration du Territoire sous mandat par
l'Afrique du Sud a étéassuréed'une manièrecontraire au Mandat, à
la Charte des Nations Unies et à la Déclaration universelle des droits
de I'homme ..11
12'Assemblée généraleen était arrivéeà cette décisionaprès qu'elle eut
constaté, au paragraphe 8 du préambule de ladite résolution,
1que tous les efforts faits par l'organisation des Nations Unies pour
amener le Gouvernement sud-africain à respecter ses obligations en
ce qui concerne I'administration du Territoire sous mandat et à
assurer le bien-êtreet la sécurité desautochtones du pays ont été
inutiles1).
La révocation du mandat a étéainsi expressément fondée sur trois
motifs touchant trois instruments internationaux de prime importance.
La Cour, en refiisant, à juste titre, de discuter la validité formelle ou
intrinsèque des résolutions en cause, n'en a pas moins jugé nécessairede
réfuter les arguments avancés à ce sujet par certains Etats. En le faisant,
elle devait porter en outre son examen sur chacun des trois motifs
énoncéspar la résolution 2145 (XXI) justifiant la révocation du mandat
et entraînant l'illégalitéde la présence en Namibie des autorités sud-
africaines devenue sans titre.
La Cour a examiné le preniier motif consistant en la violation de
l'article 22 du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations et de l'article 2 de l'acte de
mandat aux termes duquel
1,Le Mandataire accroîtra, par tous les moyens en son po~ivoir,le
bien-êtrematériel et moral ainsi que le progrès social des habitants
du territoire soumis au présent mandat. 11
La Cour ne pouvait se contenter de constater la violation de cette
obligation par le mandataire. Elle est en effet conviée à dégagerles consé-
quencesjuridiques de la présenceillégalede l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie,
et ces conséquences diffèrent en nature et en nombre suivant qu'il y a eu
violation des textes relativement limités que sont les instruments du
mandat, ou violation des obligations découlantde la Charte constitution-
nelle des Nations Unies et de la Déclaration ~iniverselledes droits de
l'homme.
D'autre part, les principes et les buts des Nations Unies s'imposent à
tous les organes de celles-ci: à l'Assemblée générale,au Conseil de
sécuritéet, tout autant, à la Cour internationale de Justice, comme aussi
à chacun des Etats Membres.
Or l'on nous dit que ces principes ont étéviolés,que ces buts ont été 3. The revocation of South Africa's Mandate for Namibia which was
decided upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations is based
on three grounds which are mentioned in the fifth paragraph of the pre-
amble to resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, reading as follows:
"Coni,inced that the administration of the mandated Territory
by So~ith Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary to the
Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."
The General Assenibly had reached this decision after finding, in the
eighth paragraph of the preanible to the same resolution,
". .. that al1 the efforts of the United Nations to induce the Govern-
ment of South Africa to fulfil its obligations in respect of the ad-
ministration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the well-being
and security of the indigenous inhabitants have been of no avail".
The revocation of the Mandate was thus explicitly based on three
grounds relating to international instruments of the first importance.
In refusing, quite rightly, to question the forma1 or intrinsic validity of
the resol~itionsconcerned, the Court nevertheless felt it necessary to refute
the arguments advanced in this connection by certain States. In doing
this it had in addition to direct its consideration to each of the three
grounds stated in resolution 2145 (XXI) as justifying the termination of
the Mandate and entailing the illegality of the presence in Namibia of
the South African authorities thus bereft of title.
The Court considered the first ground, naniely that of the violation
of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of Article 2
of the mandate agreement, according to which:
"The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory subject to the present Mandate.''
The Court could not content itself with finding that the Mandatory
had violated this obligation, for it was called upon to deduce the legal
consequences of the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia, and
these consequences differ in nature and in number according to whether
there was a violation of the relatively limited texts constituting the man-
date instruments, or a violation of the obligations flowing from the con-
stitutional Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Furthermore, the principles and purposes of the United Nations must
be observed by al1its organs: by the General Assembly and the Security
Council and, no less, by the International Court of Justice, as also by
each of the member States.
Now, we are toid that these principles have been violated, these pur-gravement négligés.Et, tandis que les organes politiques ont rempli
leurs obligations en dénonçant et condamnant ces violations et cette
grave négligence,la Cour internationale de Justice se devait de remplir
les siennes en ne fermant pas les yeux sur des agissements affectant les
principes et lesdroits dont la défenselui incombe.
Enfin, la Cour ne pouvait pas rester témoinimpassible face l'évolution
du droit des gens moderne qui se poursuit aux Nations Unies par la mise
en Œuvre et l'extension à l'ensemble du monde des principes d'égalité,
de liberté et de paix dans la justice, inscrits dans la Charte et la Décla-
ration universelle des droits de I'homme.
La Cour ne légifèrepas. Elle dit le droit. Mais un droit qui se dégage
duprogrès humain, et non un droit révolu, vestigedes inégalités humaines
de la domination et du colonialisr=,equi ont sévidans les rapports inter-
nationaux jusqu'au débutdu siècle,et qui disparaissent, grâce à la lutte
des peuples et à l'extension, jusqu'aux confins du globe, de la commu-
nautéhumaine universelle.
Aussi la Cour n'a-t-elle pas omis d'aborder, outre la violation des
stipulations du mandat, les deux autres motifs de sa révocation. En se
référant,comme la résolution2145 (XXI), à la Charte des Nations Unies
et à la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, la Cour a affirmé
le caractère impératif du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes,
ainsi que des droits de l'homme dont elle a dénoncéla violation par les
autorités sud-africaines. Son raisonnement et ses conclusions, auxquels
j'ai dit que j'adhère, me paraissent cependant compatibles avec des
explications complémentaires qui, exprimées dans les opinions indivi-
duelles. sont de nature à renforcer lesdites conclusions.
4.En ce qui concerne la survivance du mandat après la dissolution de
la Société desNations et la prise en charge du contrôle de I'administra-
tion du mandataire par l'organisation des Nations Unies que la Cour a
justifiéespar des arguments juridiques tirés de la considération des buts
et objets du mandat à la lumière des textes et des travaux préparatoires,
ainsi que de l'analyse desarticles pertinents de la Charte, renvoyant aux
avis età l'arrêtantérieurs(avis de 1950, 1955et 1956et arrêtde 1962),je
voudrais ajouter une considération générale quime paraît indispensable,
se rattachant à la nature mêmede l'institution du mandat-tutelle et à sa
place dans l'évolutionde l'humanité.
Des historiens' ont esquissé1ctableau de la marche ascensionnelle de
l'homme, depuis l'homo sapien aspparu sur la face du globe en premier
lieu au Proche-Orient dans ce qui a été laTerre de Chanaan, jusqu'aux
plus grands penseurs et, plus spécialement,tout au long de l'histoire du
l Voir en particulH.rG. Wells, Outline ofHistory.
60poses gravely neglected. And when the political organs have fulfilled
their obligations, by denouncing and condemning these violations and
this grave neglect, the International Court of Justice owed it to itself
to discharge its own obligations by not closing its eyes to c~nduct
infringing the principles and rights which it is its duty to defend.
Again, the Court could not remain an unmoved witness in face of
the evolution of modern international law which is taking place in the
United Nations through the implementation and the extension to the
whole world of the principles of equality, liberty and peace in justice
which are embodied in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
The Court is not a law-making body. It declares the law. But it is a
law discernible from the progress of humanity, not an obsolete law, a
vestige of the inequalities between men, the domination and colonialism
which were rife in international relationships up to the beginning of
this century but are now disappearing, thanks to the struggle being
waged by (the peoples and to the extension to the ends of the world of
the universal community of mankind.
Thus, in addition to the violation of the stipulations of the Mandate,
the Court did not omit consideration of the other two grounds for its
termination. By referring, like resolution 2145 (XXI), to the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Court has asserted the imperative character of the right of peoples
to self-determination and also of the human rights whose violation by
the South African authorities it has denounced. It appears to me, how-
evcr, that its reasoning and conclusions, to which, as 1 have said, 1
subscribe, leave room for explanations which, expressed in the separate
opinions, may serve to strengthen those conclusions.
4. With regard to the survival of the Mandate after the dissolution
of the League and the taking-over by the United Nations of supervision
of the Mandatory's administration, which the Court has justified by
legal arguments drawn from consideration of the purposes and objects
of the Mandate in the light of the texts and travaux préparatoiresand
from an analysis of the pertinent Charter articles, referring also herein
to certain of its earlier decisions (the Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955
and 1956, and the Judgment of 1962), 1 would like to add one general
observation which seems to me to be essential; it relates to the very
nature of the tutelary-mandate institution and its place in the evolution
of humanity.
Historians ' have outlined the upward march of mankind from the
time when homo sapiens appeared on the face of the globe, first of al1
in the Near East in what was the land of Canaan, up to the age of the
greatest thinkers and, more particularly, throughout the whole history
See in particularH. G. WellOutlinof History.progrès social, depuis l'antique esclavage jusqu'à la propension humaine
inéluctable et irréversible vers l'égalitéet la liberté. Cette marche est
comme le temps. Elle ne s'arrête pas.Nul ne saurait s'yopposer longtemps.
Les textes, que ce soient les lois, les constitutions, les déclarations, les
pactes ou les chartes. ne font que la définir et en marquer les étapes
successives. Ils en sont la simple constatation. C'est dire que les droits
dont jouissent progressivement les hommes et les peuples sont bien moins
le résultat de ces textes que du progrès humain qu'ils attestent.
L'institution de la tutelle, succédant à la colonisation, et précédant
et préparant l'indépendance souveraine, s'inscrit dans cette marche
ascensionnelle. La conception de la tutelle a pris naissance à l'une de ces
étapes,en 1920;elle devait prendre fin à l'étape suivante. Les dispositions
de l'article 22 du Pacte, les termes des actes de mandat, qu'ils définissent
les buts de latiitelle ou déterminent l'aide aux peuples attardés afin qu'ils
rejoignent l'avant-garde constituée par les peuples plus évolués,traduisent
cette mouvante réalité.Woodrow Wilson. et mêmele généralsud-africain
Smuts et le ministre français Simon, étaient imprégnésde cette vérité
quand ils avouaient que le mandat a une fin OLI est révocable. Aussi.
revenant aux arguments développésdans l'avis, j'aurais souhaité que la
révocabilitédu mandat, qui a étési fortement contestée, ait été plus
aniplement justifiée par la nature de la tutelle. et en considération du
contexte universel dans lequel elle s'inscrit. De par sa nature et en vue
de ses fins, le mandat-tutelle ne pourrait en conséquence durer au gré
de celui qui n'en avait que la charge ou la garde. Sa révocation, décidée
erga omnes, en raison de son caractère i~stitutionnel objectif, par l'As-
sembléegénérale représentantla communauté internationale depuis que
ne la représente plus la Sociétédes Nations, s'impose à l'extrêmepetit
nombre d'Etats qui s'y sont opposés ou se sont abstenus de l'approuvzr
en exprimant des doutes ou des réserves. Comment le mandat sud-
africain, avec ses organes et ses structures, devenu caducpour la majorité
quasi unanime des Etats, subsisterait-il pour quelques autres? Une
institution est un êtrede raison qui existe ou n'existe pas, mais ne peut
tout à la fois êtreet ne pas être.Cela serait non moins étrange qu'un
Etat admis à la majorité Membre des Nations Unies qui le deviendrait
pour les uns et non pour les autres.
5. Le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes a étéenfin reconnu
par la Cour au paragraphe 52 de l'avis.IIy est notamment dit:
1~En outre, l'évolution ultérieure du droit international à l'égard
des territoires non autonomes, tel qu'il est consacrépar Ir_Charte des
Nations Unies, a fait de l'autodétermination un principe applicable
à tous ces territoire...Une autreétape importante de cetteévolution
a étéla déclaration sur l'octroi de I'indépendance aux pays et aux
6 1 NAMIBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 73
of social progress, from the slavery of Antiquity to man's inevitable,
irreversible drive towards equality and freedom. This march is like time
itself. Itever stops. Nothing can stand in its way for long. The texts,
whether they be laws, constitutions, declarations, covenants or charters,
do but define it and mark its successive phases. They are a mere record
of it. In other words, the progressive rights which men and peoples enjoy
are the result much less of those texts than of the human progress to
which they bear witness.
The institution of tutelage, succeeding colonialization and preceding
and preparing the way for sovereign independence, has its place in this
upward march, at one stage of which this concept of guardianship was
born, in 1920; at the following stage, it was due to end. The provisions
of Article 22 of the Covenant and the terms of the mandate agreements,
whether they define the purposes of tutelage or specify the assistance to
be given to backward peoples to enable them to catch up the vanguard
of more developed peoples, give expression to this kinetic reality.Wood-
row Wilson, and even the South African General Smuts, and the French
Minister Simon, were imbued with this truth when they admitted that
mandates must have an end, or are revocable. And so, to revert to the
arguments set forth in the Advisory Opinion, 1 could have wished that
the revocability of the Mandate, which has been so strongly contested,
had been more fully justified by reference to the nature of tutelage and
in consideration of the universal context in which it finds its place.
Considering its nature and purposes, the duration of the tutelary Mandate
could not be determined at will by the party charged or entrusted with it.
When the General Assembly, representing the international community
once the League had ceased to do so, decided the revocation of that
Mandate, with effect erga omnes in view of the Mandate's objective
institutionalcharacter, that revocation was also binding on the extremely
small number of States which had opposed it or, by expressing doubts and
reservations, withheld their approval. For how could South Africa's
Mandate, with its organs and structures, having lapsed for the quasi-
unanimity of States, survive in the eyes of some others? An institution
is a creature of reason which either exists or does not: it cannot at one
and the same time be and not be. That would be no less curious than if a
State admitted by majority vote to the United Nations should be a
Member for some but not for others.
5. Recognition of the right of peoples to self-determinationsexpressed
by the Court in paragraph 52 of the Advisory Opinion. It is there stated,
interaliat,hat :
"Furthermore, the sllbsequent development of international law,
in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-deter-
mination applicable to al1 of them.. ..A further important stage
in this development was the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- peuples coloniaux (résolution 1514(XV) de l'Assembléegénéraleen
date du 14décembre1960)applicable à tous lespeuples età tous les
territoires(qui n'ont pas encore accédé à I'indépendance ».
L'avis ne manque pas de force persuasive. Ilen eût eu encore davantage
s'il avait remontéla voie qui a conduit ce droit des peuplesà faire ainsi
son entréedans le droit des gens positif, et déterminéquels en ont étéles
élémentsconstitutifs dans leur intégralité.Je fais allusion en particulier
la lutte des peuples pour la libertéet I'indépendance quisedéroule depuis
qu'il y a des peuples conquérants et dominateurs, et des peuples soumis,
mais insoumis. Pour nous limiter aux temps modernes, citons les déclara-
tions historiques proclamées dès la fin duXVIIIe siècle,les dispositions
des chartes et des pactes modernes, depuis la charte del'Atlantique et la
Charte des Nations Unies, jusqu'au pacte de Bogota et àcelui de l'Orga-
nisation de l'unité africaine, les déclarations renouveléesde Bandoung
et des pays non alignésde Belgrade et du Caire, la déclaration 1514(XV)
de l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies, enfin les deux déclarations
solennelles qui ont clôturé l'Œuvre des Nations Unies au cours des
vingt-cinq premières années de son existence: la déclaration 2625 (XXV)
adoptée à l'unanimitéle 24octobre 1970,relative aux principes du droit
international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les
Etats conformément à la Charte, et la déclaration 2627 (XXV) adoptée
le mêmejour à l'occasion du 24' anniversaire de l'organisation des
Nations Unies. Ces actes internationaux ou universels auraient-ils vu
le jour sans la lutte héroïque des peuples aspirant du plus profond
d'eux-mêmes à la liberté età I'indépendance? S'il est une «pratique
générale»pouvant, de façon incontestable, créer le droit aux termes
de l'article 38, paragraphe 1 b), du Statut de la Cour, c'est bien celle
que constitue l'action consciente des peuples eux-mêmesluttant avec
détermination. Cette lutte se poursuit pour affirmer, une fois de plus,
le droit de libre disposition, notamment en Afrique australe, et plus
spécialementen Namibie. En sorte qu'on doive reconnaître que le droit
de libre disposition des peuples, avant d'êtreinscrit dans les chartes
non octroyées mais enlevées de haute lutte, avait d'abord été écrit
douloureusement, avec le sang des peuples, dans la conscience enfin
réveilléede l'humanité.Et sans ces mêmespeuples, principalement d'Asie
et d'Afrique, qui ont afflué,depuis la deuxièmeguerre mondiale, dans la
nouvelle organisation internationale, première organisation de caractère
universaliste, aurait-on enregistré ce nombre imposant de déclarations
et de résolutions qui ont traduit dans le droit et imposéaux rapports
internationaux rénovés lesgrands principes qu'ils avaient contribué à
consacrer?
Quant à la ((pratique généralIIdes Etats,à laquelle on a traditionnel-
lement recours pour constater l'éclosiondu droit coutumier, ellea acquis,
62 pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assemblj
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces al
peoples and territories which 'have not yet attained independence'."
Theopinion is not lacking in persuasive force; it would have possessec
still more if it had retraced the path whereby this right of peoples ha:
made its entry into positive international law and had determined exactl)
what were the factors which have gone into its making. 1refer in parti.
cular to the fight of the peoples for freedom and independence, whicl-
has been going on ever since there have been conquering and dominating
peoples and subject but unsubjugated peoples. To confine ourselves tc
modern times, we may mention the historic declarations proclaimed ai
the end of the eighteenth century, the provisions of present-day charter:
and covenants from the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter
to the Pact of Bogota and the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, the repeated declaiations of Bandung and of the non-aligned
countries meeting in Belgrade and Cairo, the declaration contained in
resolution 1514(XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and,
finally thetwo solemn Declarations which marked the close of the work of
the United Nations during the first 25 years of its existence: resolution
2625(XXV), adopted unanimously on 24October 1970,onthe principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and CO-operation between
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and resolu-
tion 2627 (XXV), adopted on the same day on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of the United Nations. Would these international or universal
instruments have seen the light of day if it had not been for the heroic
fight of peoples aspiring with al1 their hearts after freedom and inde-
pendence? If there is any "general practice" which might be held, beyond
dispute, to constitute law within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph
1 (b),of the Statute of the Court, it must surely be that which is made
up of the conscious action of the peoples themselves, engaged in a
determined struggle. This struggle continues for the purpose of asserting,
yet once more, the right of self-determination, more particularly in
southern Africa and, specifically, Namibia. Indeed one is bound to
Yecognize that the right of peoples to self-determination, before being
written into charters that were not granted but won in bitter struggle,
had first been written painfully, with the blood of the peoples, in the
finally awakened conscience of humanity. And without those same
-eop-es, mainly of Asia and Africa, who since the Second World War
have streamed into the new international Organization, the first of a
universalist character, would it have been possible to achieve thatimpres-
sive number of declarations and resolutions whereby the great principles
they had helped consecrate have been translated into law and applied
to the reshaping of international relations?
As for the "general practice" of States to which one traditionally
refers when seeking to ascertain the emergency of customary law, it7 5 NAMIBIE(S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
quant au droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, une extension plus
que (générale »,une extension universelle, depuis qu'elle a étéconsacrée
par la Charte des Nations Unies (art. le', par. 2, et art. 55)et confirmée
par les textes dont il vient d'être fait mention,pactes, déclarations,
résolutions, qui ont réuni,dans leur ensemble, l'unanimitédes Etats sur
le droit impératif de libre disposition des peuples. Il n'est pas un Etat,
faut-il le souligner, qui n'ait, au moins une fois, apposésa signature sur
l'un ou l'autre de ces textes, ou ne l'ait appuyé de son suffrage. La
rectitude et la fermetéde cette pratique sont prouvées, de surcroît, par
le grand nombre des Etats - non moins de cinquante-cinq - qui,
depuis la consécration par la Charte du droit à l'autodétermination, en
ont bénéficié a,près avoir déterminépar la lutte et les revendications de
leurs peuples, son établissement définitifdans la théorie comme dans la
pratique du droit nouveau. Si des doutes avaient subsisté à cet égard
dans l'esprit des Etats Membres des Nations Unies, ils ne se seraient pas
déterminés à proclamer la légitimitéde la lutte des peuples - en l'espèce
le peuple namibien - en vue de la réalisationdu droit à l'autodétermina
tion. Si la reconnaissance de ce droit en tant que norme juridique n'est
pas encore admise dans la pratique de certains Etats, rares il est vrai,
pas plus que dans lesécritsde certainsjuristes encore plus rares, l'attitude
des premiers s'expliquepar le souci de leurs intérêts traditionnels,et celle
des seconds par une sorte de respect extrêmepour des postulats implantés
de longue date dans le droit international classique. Le droit est un acte
vivant, non un palmarès glorieux des auteurs du passé, dont l'Œuvre
impose certes le respect, mais auxquels on ne peut supposer, de grands
esprits exceptés, une visionde l'avenir telle qu'il leur soit possible de voir
toujours au-delà de leur temps. Tout montre combien il est difficilede se
libérer des servitudesd'un passéqu'on a vécusoi-mêmeet des traditions
pour lesquelles on n'avait que des égards. II faut donc voir une page
d'histoire à tourner dans l'attachement à un droit révolu qui dénieaux
résolutions des Nations Unies l'autoritédont la Charte les a revêtues et
qu'a renforcée lavolonté quasi unanime des peuples du monde; volonté
autrement plus décisiveque celle des cinq ou six puissances qui affir-
maient des conceptions contraires enseprévalantd'un droit dereprésenta-
tion dont elles doivent avouer l'absence de fondement juridique. Aussi
les faits ont-ils eu raison des ultimes résistances et l'onpeut voir dans les
deux dernières phrases du paragraphe 52 de l'avis une allusion, peut-être
trop discrète, à cette lutte, avis qui met en tout cas le point final à la
question.
6. La violation des droits de l'homme n'a pas pris fin sous quelque ciel
que ce soit;il suffitpour s'enrendre compte de consulter lesarchivesdela
Cour européenne desdroits de l'homme, de la Commission des droits de
l'homme des Nations Unies, de la Commission internationale dejuristes,
voire de lire la presse mondiale. Les violations de la libertéindividuelle
et de la dignité humaine, la discrimination raciale, sociale ou religieuse
63 NAMlBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 75
has, in the case of the right of peoples to self-determination, become
so widespread as to be not merely "general" but universal, since it has
been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (Art. 1,para. 2,
and Art. 55) and confirmed by the texts that have just been mentioned:
pacts, declarations and resolutions, which, taken as a whole, epitomize
the unanimity of States in favour of the imperative right of peoples to
self-determination. There is not one State,it should be emphasized, which
has not, at least once, appended its signature to one or other of these
texts, or which has not supported it by its vote. The confirmed rightness
of this practice is moreover evinced by the great number of States-
no less than 55-which, since the consecration by the Charter of the
right of self-deterinination, have benefited from it, after having ensured,
by the struggles and the strivings of their peoples, its definitivembodi-
ment in both the theory and the practice of the new law. If any doubts
had remained on this matter in the mind of the States Members of
the United Nations, they would not have resolved to proclaim the
legitimacy of the struggle of peoples-and more specificallythe Namibian
people-to make good their right of self-determination. If this right is
still not recognized as a juridical norm in the practice of a few rare
States or the writings of certain even rarer theoreticians,the attitudethe
former is explained by their concern for their traditional interests, and
that of the latter by a kind of extreme respect for certain long-entrenched
postulates of classic international law. Law is a living deed, not a brilliant
honours-list of past writers whose work of course compels respect but who
cannot, except for a few great minds, be thought to have had such a
vision of the future that they could always see beyond their own times.
Everything goes to show how difficult it is to free ourselves from the
servitudes of a past through which we have ourselves lived and from
traditions we have always respected. It is, then, a page of history which
needs turningthat must be seer.in attachment to an outdated law which
denies the resolutions of the United Nations the authority with which
the Charter has invested them, which authority has been reinforced by
the almost unanimous will of the peoples of the world. That will is
incomparably more decisive than that of the five or six Powers which
have asserted opposite conceptions while relying on a claim to repre-
sentativity whose lack of legal basis they must confess. Facts, lherefore,
have got the better of their last-ditch resistance, and in the last two senten-
ces of paragraph 52 of the Advisory Opinion one may see an allusion tc>
this struggle: one perhaps over-discreet, but at al1events the Opinion has
writtenfinis to the matter.
6. The violation of human rights has not come to an end in any part
of the world; to realize that fact one need only consult the archives of
the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Commission
of the United Nations or the International Commission of Jurists, or
simply read the world press. Violations of persona1 freedom and human
dignity, the racial, social or religious discrimination which constitutes 76 NAMIBIE(S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
qui constitue la plus grave des violations des droits humains puisqu'elle
en annihile la double base que sont l'égalitet la liberté, résistenttoutes
encore aux courants de libération dans chacun des cinq continents. Ce
n'est certes pas une raison pour clore les yeux sur le comportement des
autorités sud-africaines. Les faits évoquésdevant la Cour en rapport
avec la demande d'avis consultatif ne peuvent êtreignorésdu moment
que leur examen importe à la détermination des conséquencesjuridiques
de la présence illégalde l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie.
L'avis fait formellement état de la Déclaration universelle des droits
de I'homme. Il aurait gagné à traiter expressément du caractère com-
minatoire de certains de ces droits mis en cause par les agissements de
l'Afrique du Sud, et dont ila admis ce caractèreen en retenant la violation
aux paragraphes 130et 131.
Dans son exposéécrit,le Gouvernement français, faisant allusion aux
obligations du mandat acceptépar l'Afrique du Sud, à celles qu'elle a
assuméesen devenant Membre des Nations Unies, et aux normes énon-
céesdans la Déclaration unive~selledes droits de l'homme, a déclaré
qu'il nefait pas de doute que le Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud a très
réellementet systématiquement contrevenu à cesrèglesetà cesobligations.
Mais il a objectà propos de la mention faite par la résolution2145(XXI)
de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, que le manquement
aux normes qui y sont inscrites ne peut, de toute évidence, déclencherla
sanction de la révocationdu mandat, le texte de cette déclaration n'ayant
pas un caractèreconventionnel liant les Etats.
Quoique les énonciations de la Déclaration ne soient pas obligatoires
en tant que convention internationale selon l'article8, paragraphe 1a),
du Statut de la Cour. elles eu ventlier les Etats en vertu de la coutume
aux termes du paragraphe' 1 b) du mêmearticle, soit qu'elles aient
constitué une codification di1droit coutumier, ainsi qu'il a étédit dans
l'avis pour l'article de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités,
soit qu'elles aient acquis force de coutume par une pratique générale
acceptée comme étant le droit, selon les termes de l'article 38, para-
graphe 1 b). Un droit qui est certes à considérer comme une norme
coutumière obligatoire antérieure à la Déclaration universelle des droits
de I'homme etque celle-ci a codifiée, est le droit'égalité,roit que l'on
s'accorde à considérer, depuisles temps les plus anciens, comme inhérent
à la nature humaine.
L'égalitéque réclament les Namibiens et d'autres peuples de toutes
teintes, résultatde longues luttes tendanà latraduire dans lesfaits, nous
intéresseau plus haut point parce quelle est, d'une part, le fondement
d'autres droits de I'homme qui n'en sont que les corollaires et, d'autre
part, parce qu'elle exclut naturellement la discrimination raciale et
l'apartheid, qui sont lesplus graves des faits reprochésAfrique du Sud,
comme aussi à d'autres Etats. Les explications que je lui consacre nethe most serious of violations of human rights since it annihilates the
two-fold basis provided by equality and liberty, al1still resist the currents
of liberation in each of the five continents. That is certainly no reason
why we should close our eyes to the conduct of the South African
authorities. The facts mentioned before the Court in relation to the
request for an advisory opinion cannot be ignored, seeing that considera-
tion of them is importantfor the determination of the legal consequences
of the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia.
The Advisory Opinion takes judicial notice of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. In the case of certain of the Declaration's pro-
visions, attracted by the conduct of South Africa, it would have been
an improvement to have dealt in terms with their comminatory nature,
which is implied in paragraphs 130 and 131 of the Opinion by the
references to their violation.
In its written statement the French Government, alluding to the
obligations which South Africa accepted under the Mandate and assumed
on becoming a Member of the ~nited Nations, and to the norms laid
down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stated that there
was no doubt that the Government of South Africa had, in a very real
sense, systematically infringed those rules and those obligations. Never-
theless, referring to the mention by resolution 2145(XXI) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it objected that it was plainly impossible
for non-com~liance with the norms it enshrined to be sanctioned with
the revocation of the Mandate, inasmuch as that Declaration was not
in the nature of a treaty binding upon States.
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua
international convention within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1
(a), of the Statute of the Court, they can bind States on the basis of
custom within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b) of the same Article,
whether because they constituted a codification of customary law as
was said in respect of Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, or because they have acquired the force of custom through
a general practice accepted as law, in the words of Article8,paragraph 1
(b), of the Statute. One right which must certainly be considered a pre-
existing binding customary norm which the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights codified is the right to equality, which by common
consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed inherent in
human nature.
The equality demanded by the Namibians and by other peoples of
every colour, the right to which is the outcome of prolonged struggles to
make it a reality, is something of vitalterest to us here, on the one hand
because it is the foundation of other human rights which are no more
than its corollaries and, on the other, because it naturally rules out racial
discrimination and apartheid, which are the gravest of the facts with
which South Africa, as also other States, stands charged. The attention NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
77
sauraient donc nullement être considéréescomme exagéréesou dis-
proportionnées.
Ce n'est pas par pure coïncidence que figure dans l'article premier de la
Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme le principe primordial,
ou véritépremière, ainsi libellé: clTous les hommes naissent libres et
égauxen dignitéet en droits. 11
De ce principe premier découlentla plupart des droits et libertés.
De tous les droits de I'honime, le droit à I'égalitéest. de loin, le plus
important. IIest aussi le plus anciennement reconnu comme un droit
nat~irel; on peut mêmedire que la doctrine du droit naturel a vu lejour
dans l'antiquité avec la conception de I'égalitéhumaine con-imepremier
élément.Elle estde droit naturel depuis Zénon de Sidon ' et ses premiers
disciples. Lcs origines du concept de I'égalitéhumaine se rattachent à
des pays hors d'Europe, comme s'y rattachent aujourd'hui ses plus
ardents défenseurs. Comme le christianisme qui en a repris les données,
la philosophiezénonienne reflétaitla révolte des humbleset des opprimés.
(La liberté stoïque 11,nous enseigne Hegel dans la Plît;nonzt;17ologie de
I'esprir, a surgi dans Lintemps de peur et d'esclavage 11L'égalité n'étap itas
du goût des Grecs jusques et y compris le temps de Platon et d'Aristote,
qui trouvaient des mots pour justifier l'inégalitéet l'esclavage '. Alors
que pour les stoïciens, 11on n'est esclave ni par nature, ni par conquête 11.
Quand Zénon mourut, son Œuvre était achevée et lanotion d'égalité
définitivement accueillie et répandue dans le monde de ce temps par ses
disciples ', lointains précurseurs des philosophes du XVIIIe siècle. Deux
courants s'étaient établissur les deux bords opposésde la Méditerranée:
un courant gréco-romain illustré par Epictète, Lucain. Cicéron, Marc-
Aurèle; et un courant asiatique et africain, passant par les moines du
Sinaï et saint Jean Climaque, Alexandrie avec Plotin et Philon le Juif,
Carthage qu'illustra à nouveau saint Augustin: les deux courants se
rejoignant en Espagne avec Sénèque. La philosophie stoïcienne, semant
' Selon Diogène Laërce, une statue lui f~itélevéedans cette ville. de mêmequ'à
Athènes oii iétait allé enseigner et y fonda l'écolequi porta d'abordson nom, puis
celui d'école stoïcienne.
? Polir Aristote, la raison constitue un privilège dont certains. par exemple les
esclaves, sont privés. Ses conseils à son élèveAlexandre q~ii n'était pas encore le
Grand, 1étaient de traiter les Grecsen familiers, les Barbares comme des animaux II...
Et pourtant les Barbares n'avaient-ils pas déjà sondé l'espace, prédit les éclipseset
baptisé les signes du Zodiaque; divisé le temps en mois, en semaines; inventé
['alphabet; et n'allaient-ils pas bientôtdonner au monde la première philosophie
vraiment humaine, celle fondée sur I'égalité?
G. Rodier, Oudes de philosopl~ie gi.ecque, 1969, p. 231.
Les disciples de Zénon furent, en grand nombre, ses conlpatriotes: Zénon.
second du nom, et BŒthus, tous deux également de Sidon; Antipater, de Tyr;
Apollonios, également de Tyr; Chrysippe, de la Chypre phénicienne; Herillos, de
Carthage; Caton, d'Utique; Persée, con1patrio:e et ami de Zénon; Posidonios, de
Haniah de Syrie, étape phénicienne vers Babylone; Diogène, de Babylone; Panetios,
élèved'Antipater de Tyr, né à Rhodes, lieu de rencontre phénico-grec comme Chypre,
oii Cicéron et Pompée vinrent suivre son enseignement.
651 am devoting to it in these observations can therefore by no means be
regarded as exaggerated or out of proportion.
It is not by mere chance that in Article 1of the Universal Declaration
of the Rights of Man there stands, so worded, this primordial principle
or axiom: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights."
From this first principle flow most rights and freedoms.
Of al1 human rights, the right to equality is far and away the most
important. It is also the one which has been longest recognized as a
natural right: it may even be said that the doctrine of natural law was
born in ancient times with the concept of human equality as its first ele-
ment. It has been part of natural law ever since Zeno of Sidon ' and his
earliest disciples. It is in countriesoutside Europe that the provenance of
the concept itself, as also of its most ardent present-day defenders, must
be sought. Like the Christianity which later espoused the same premises,
the philosophy of Zeno reflected the revolt ofthe humble and the oppres-
sed. "Stoic liberty," Hegel teaches us in his Phenomenology of the Mind,
"arose in a time of fear and slavery." Equality was not to the liking of
the Greeks up to and including the time of Plato and Aristotle, who both
found words to justify inequality and slavery 2,whereas for the Stoics:
"man is a slave neither by nature nor by conquest." When Zeno died,
his work was completed, and the notion of equality definitively received
and propagated throughout the world of that era by his disciples 3,the
distant forerunners of the eighteenth-century philosophers. Two streams
of thought had become established on the two opposite shores of the
Mediterranean,a Graeco-Roman stream represented by Epictetus, Lucan,
Cicero and Marcus Aurelius; and an Asian and African stream, comprising
the monks of Sinai and Saint John Climac, Alexandria with Plotinus and
Philo the Jew, Carthage to which Saint Augustine gave new lustre; the
two streams flowed together in Spain with Seneca. The stoic philosophy,
'According to Diogenes Laertes, a statue was erected to hirn in that city, as
also in Athens, where he had gone to teach and where he founded the school which
first bore hisarne but was later called the Stoic school.
For Aristotle, reason was a privilege of which certain people, for instance
slaves, are deprived. Hisdvice to his pupil Alexander, who was not yet called the
Great, was "to treat Greeks as members of the farnily, the Barbariansas anirnals
Yet had not the Barbarians already probed space. predicted eclipses and given
names to the signs of the Zodiac; divided time into rnonths, into weeks; invented
losophy: narnely, that founded upon equality?the world the first really hurnane phi-
G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie grecque, 1969, p.31.
The disciples of Zeno were, many of thern, his fellow countryrnen: Zeno, the
second of that name, and Boëthus, both also of Sidon; Antipater. of Tyre; Apol-
lonios, also of Tyre; Chrysippos, of Phoenician Cyprus; Herillos, of Carthage;
Cato, of Utica; Perseus, friend of Zeno; Posidonios, of Hama in Syria, a Phoeni-
cian halting-place on the road to Babylon; Diogenes, of Babylon; Panetios, a pupil
of Antipater of Tyre, who was born in Rhodes, a Phoenicio-Greek meeting-place
as also was Cyprus, where Cicero and Pompey came to follow his teaching.
65pour la première fois dans l'histoire de l'humanitéles germes de I'égalité
entre leshommes et entre lesnations, influença lesplus grands jurisconsul-
tes romains, d'origine phénicienne,Papinien et Ulpien, puis les docteurs
du christianisme ',à travers lesquels elle se perpétuajusqu'au siècle des
philosophes 2. Le terrain était préparépour l'Œuvre législative et constitu-
tionnelle qui débutaaveclespremières déclarationsde droits en Amérique
et en Europe, se continua avec les constitutions du XIXe siècle,pour
aboutir finalement, dans le droit des gens positif, aux chartes de San
Francisco, de Bogota et d'Addis-Abéba,ainsi qu'à la Déclarationuniver-
selle des droits de l'homme, que sont venues confirmer les multiples
résolutionsdes Nations Unies et, en particulier, les déclarationssolennel-
les précitéesde l'Assembléegénérale1514 (XV), 2625 (XXV) et 2627
(XXV). La Cour vient de l'affirmer àson tour.
7. La Charte a consacré l'égalité en termes encore plus formels que
ceux relatifs au droit de libre disposition des peuples, en proclamant dans
le préambulela foi des Nations Unies dans I'égalité den sations, grandes
et petites, et en déclarant à l'article 2, alinéa1, que ((L'Organisation est
fondée sur I'égalitésouveraine de tous ses Membres)). L'Assemblée
généraleeut maintes fois l'occasion d'affirmer le droit à I'égalitéet les
droits fondamentaux qui en dérivent. Il en a étéainsi chaque fois que
l'Assembléegénérale,retenant sa compétencenonobstant la prétention
des Etats que cesdroits,n'étant pas sanctionnéspar le droit international,
relevaient de leur compétence nationale. L'Afrique du Sud s'est ainsi
régulièrement prévalue de sa compétence interne, déniant celle des
Nations unies, lorsqu'elle a étéaccuséedepuis 1946,sessionaprèssession,
de pratiquer l'apartheid en violation du droit à I'égalitéL. es résolutions
successives de l'Assemblée géuéralereietant la thèse sud-africaine
impliquaient que I'égalité et les droits fondamentaux violéspar l'apartheid
constituent des obligations placées sous la protection de la loi inter-
nationale et rentrent comme telles dans 1; compétence des Nations
Unies.
Tout dernièrement, le 26 mai 1971, le Comité spécialsur l'apartheid
décidait de s'opposer à tout dialogue avec l'Afrique du Sud qui ne com-
porterait pas la reconnaissance préalablede I'égalité àlapopulation noire.
Bertrand Russell écrit dans son ouvrage History of Western Philosophy, p. 275-
276: ((By nature, the stoics held, al1 human beings are equ..Christianity took
this part of the stoic teachings.
par le monde gréco-romain et le christianisme, son développementnà travers lesion
tribulations detemps, on peut consulter notamment, outre Bertrand Russell déjà
cité, Emile Bréhier,istoire de la philosophie, tome 2, p. 228 et 234; Rodis-Lewis,
La morale stoïcienne, p. 11 et 74; G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie grecque, p. 219,
220 et 231; Fritz Schulz,History of Roman Legal Science, p. 67; Ernest Renan,
Histoire des origines du christianisme.sowing for the first time in mankind's history the seeds of equality be-
tween men and between nations, influenced the greatest of the Roman
jurisconsults who were of Phoenician origin, Papinius and Ulpian, and
then the doctors of Christianity ' through whom it was eventually trans-
mitted to the Age of Reason 2. The ground was thus prepared for the
legislative and constitutional process which began with the first declara-
tions or bills of rights in America and Europe, continued with the consti-
tutions of the nineteenth century, and culminated inpositive international
law in the San Francisco, Bogotà and Addis Ababa charters, and in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which has been confirmed by
numerous resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the above-
mentioned declarations adopted by the General ~ssembl~ in resolutions
1514(XV), 2625 (XXV) and 2627 (XXV). The Court in its turn has now
confirmed it.
7. The Charter has consecrated the principle of equality in even more
categorical terms than it uses for the right of peoples to self-determination
by reaffirming in its preamble the faith of the United Nations in the equal
rights of nations large and small, and by declaring in Article 2, paragraph
1, that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of al1its Members". The General Assembly has many times had
occasion to affirm the right to equality and the fundamental rights which
derive therefrom. This has been the case every time that the General
Assembly has decided that it had competence notwithstanding the claim
by Statez that such rights did not enjoy theprotection ofinternational law
and therefore fell within their own national jurisdiction. Thus South
Africa has regularly sought to rely on its domestic jurisdiction, denying
the competence of the United Nations whenever since 1946, at session
after session, it has been accused ofpractising apartheid in violation of the
right to equality. The successive resolutions of the General Assembly
rejecting this contention by South Africa have given it to be understood
that the equality and fundamental rights violated by apartheid constitute
obligations which are in fact placed under the protection of international
law and as such fall within the competence of the United Nations.
Only recently, on 26 May 1971,the Special Committee on Apartheid
decided to oppose any dialogue with South Africa unless based on prior
recognition of the equality of the Black population.
Bertrand Russell, in his Histovy of Wesrern Philosophy, pp. 275 f., writes: "By
nature, the stoics held, al1human beings are eq... Christianity took this part of
the stoic teachings."
For this flowering of the concept of equality in the ancient land of Phoenicia,
through the vicissitudes ofirne, the following works rnay be consulted: Bertrand
Russell,op. cit.; Ernile Bréhier, Histoire de la philosophie, Vol. 2, pp. 228 and 234;
Rodis-Lewis, La morale stoïcienne, pp. II and 74; G. Rodier, Etudes de philosophie
grecque, pp. 219, 220 and 231; Fritz Schulz, HistofyRoman Legal Science, p. 67;
Ernest Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme. 79 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND.AMMOUN)
Au surplus, comment ne pas admettre comme obligatoires des principes
et des droits qu'il est légitimede défendreles armesla main, ainsi qu'en
a convenu la communautéinternationale? C'estce que n'ont cesséd'affir-
mer l'Assembléegénéraleet le Conseil de sécurité depuis 1966,en pro-
clamant la légitimité dela lutte du peuple namibien et de tous autres
peuples dépendants pour la défensede leurs droits. De plus, dans sa
résolution 2396 (XXIII) du 2 décembre 1968, l'Assemblée générale s,e
référantexpressémentaux droits de l'homme et à la lutte pour leur mise
en Œuvre,
IIRéafirmesa reconnaissance de la légitimitédu combat que mène
la population de l'Afrique du Sud pour assurer la jouissance des
droits de l'hommesans exception. »
Cette dernière résolution,adoptée à l'unanimité,moins les deux voix
de l'Afrique du Sud et du Portugal, montre que la communauté inter-
nationale dans son ensemble juge les droits de l'homme susceptibles
d'êtredéfenduspar la force des armes, les considérant par conséquent
comme des droits impératifspourvus d'une sanction effective,c'est-à-dire
faisant corps avec le droit international positif. L'opposition des deux
Etats du Portugal et de l'Afrique du Sud ne diminue pas I'autoriti
juridique de cette résolution, car on ne pouvait leur demander de faire
acte d'héroïsmeen se condamnant eux-mêmes. Le Conseid lesécuritéà son
tour, dans sa résolution 282 (1970)ordonnant l'embargo sur les armes à
destination de l'Afrique du Sud a reconnu
(la légitimité dcombat que mènelepeuple oppriméde l'Afrique du
Sud pour assurer les droits de l'homme et les droits politiques
énoncésdans la Charte des Nations Unies et dans la Déclaration
universelle desdroits de l'homme ».
Cet accord de l'Assembléegénéraleet du Conseil de sécurité est de
nature à mettre le point final au caractère obligatoire des droits de
l'homme.
On remarquera, de surcroît, que l'Assembléegénéralea assimilé les
actes rentrant dans le cadre de l'apartheid, actes violant les normes
fondamentales de l'égalitéet de la libertéet presque tous les autres droits
de l'homme, aux crimes de guerre et aux crimes contre l'humanité en en
proclamant l'imprescriptibilité dans la convention internationale du
26 novembre 1968.Les violations des droits de l'homme par la pratique
de l'apartheid, elle-mêmeviolation de l'égalité et dedsroits qui en sont
les corollaires, sont donc punissables, au sens de la communauté inter-
nationale, tout autant que les crimes contre l'humanité et les crimes de
guerre, sanctionnéspar le statut du tribunal de Nuremberg. La résolution
2074 (XX) de l'Assembléegénéralea mêmecondamnél'apartheid (com-
me constituant un crime contre l'humanité ».Comment des Etats -
autres que le Portugal et l'Afrique du Sud tant de fois dénoncéspar les For the rest, how is it possible not to recognize the binding force of
principles and rights which the international comrnunity has agreed that
it is legitimate to defend by force of arms? That is what the General
Assembly and the Security Council have been affirming ever since 1966in
proclaiming the legitimacy of the Namibian people's struggle, and that
of a11other dependent peoples, to defend their rights. What is more, in
its resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 2 December 1968,the General Assembly,
making specific reference to human rights and the struggle for their
implementation, reaffirmed-
". ..its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples
of South Africa for al1human rights."
This resolution, adopted unanimously but for the two votes of South
Africa and Portugal, demonstrates that the international community as a
whole deems it legitimate to defend human rights by force of arms; it thus
considers them to be peremptory rights endowed with effective sanction,
or in other words that they are part .and parcel of positive international
law. The opposition of two States, Portugal and South Africa, does not
diminish the legal authority of that resolution,because they could not be
expected to go to the heroic length of condemning themselves. The
SecurityCouncil in its turn, in resolution 282 (1970)ordering an embargo
on the shipment of arms to South Africa, recognized-
". ..the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South
Africa in pursuance of their human and political rights as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations and [in]the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights".
This concordance of view between the General Assembly and the
Security Council offersfinal confirmation of the binding nature of human
rights.
It will also be noted that the General Assembly equated acts which
result from the policy of apartheidand thus violate the fundamental laws
ofequalityandliberty, andnearlyall other human rights, to warcrimesand
crimes against humanity when, in the Tnternational Convention of 26
November 1968,it declared them liable to prosecution without statutory
limitation. Thus, in the eyes of the international community, violations
of human rights by the practice of apartheid,itself a violation of equality
and of the rights which are its corollaries, are no lesspunishablethan the
crimes against humanity and war crimes upon which the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal visited sanctions. General Assembly resolution
2074 (XX) even condernned apartheid as constituting "a crime against
humanity". For how can States-other than Portugal and South Africa,
so often denounced by the United Nations-cast doubt on a tenet toNations Unies - peuvent-ils mettre en doute, après en avoir convenu,
que les droits de l'homme revêtentun caractère obligatoire? Tant est vrai
le mot du philosophe catholique Jacques Maritain:
(...à l'origine de l'incitation secrète qui pousse sans cesse à la
transformation des sociétés,il y a le fait que l'homme possèdedes
droits inaliénables,et que cependant la possibilité de revendiquer
justement l'exercicede tels ou tels d'entre eux lui est ôtéepar ce qui
subsiste d'inhumain à chaque époquedans les structures sociales »'.
Les droits humains dont la violation par la pratique de l'apartheid est
punissable au mêmetitre et dans les mêmesconditions que les crimes de
guerre et les crimes contre l'humanité,tel le génocide,sont à déterminer
en relevant par la suite et au courantde l'argumentation, les actes consti-
tutifs de l'apartheid. Je le fais au paragraphe infine.
8. La Cour ne pouvait s'abstenir de vérifierla réalitéde la pratique de
l'apartheid qui, non seulement est contraire à l'obligation du mandataire
d'assurer lebien-êtrematériee lt moral et leprogrèssocial despopulations
sous mandat, mais contrevient aussi aux principes d'égalité et de liberté,
et aux autres droits qui en dérivent pour les individus et les peuples.
Si l'apartheid n'était retenu que comme uneviolation du mandat, sa
condamnation ne serait pas, comme il se doit, radicale. Il n'est pas, en
effet,pratiquéuniquement par l'Afrique duSud, ancien Etat mandataire,
et rien qu'en Namibie,anciennement sous mandat. II est d'une extension
plus large. Il est pratiqué dans des pays qui ne sont pas sous tutelle. Il
doit êtredéfiniet réprimé commele serait tout attentat contre l'égalité
humaine et la libertéindividuelle ou nationale. IIdoitêtresaisi,commeil a
étédit par l'Assemblée générale c,omme un crime contre l'humanité,
commis en l'espèceau préjudice du peuple namibien. La violation de
l'obligation de présenter un rapport à la satisfaction du Conseil de la
Société desNations, ou celle de transmettre les pétitions des habitants,
toutes deux obligations connexes relatives aux garanties de bonne
exécution des obligations principales propres au mandat-tutelle, ne
revêtentpas la mêmegravitéque la violation de ces dernières. On ne
saurait donc opter pour la solution de facilitéconsistant à justifier la
révocationdu mandat par le refus de faire rapport à l'Assemblée générale
et de transmettre les pétitions, voire par le refus de collaborer avec les
comitéscrééspar les Nations Unies, et négliger en mêmteemps les vio-
lations lesplus graves en ne faisant pas l'effort d'en relever les preuves,
sous le vain prétexte que la possibilité n'apas été donnée à un Etat
d'exposer les faits, preuves que la procédure écriteet orale contient en
surabondance. L'Assembléegénérale l'a bien compris qui a relevé à
l'unanimité,l'Afrique du Sud et lePortugal exceptés,outre la violation du
- -
l Autourde la Déclarationuniverselledes droits de l'homUnesco, 1948, p.16.
68 which they have al1subscribed, namely that human rights are binding in
character? How true is what the Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain
once wrote :
". ..underlying the stealthy, perpetual urge to transform societies
is the fact that man possesses inalienable rights while the pos~ibi~ity
of claiming actually to exercise now this one, now that, is yet denied
him by those vestiges of inhumanity which remain embedded in the
social structures of every era l".
The particular human rights whose violation by the practice of apart-
heid is punishable for the same reason and on the same terms as war
crimes, and such crimes against humanity as genocide, will be indentified
when, at the end of section 8,1 come in the course of the argument to deal
with the various acts which go to make up apartheid.
8. The Court could not refrain from ascertaining the real nature of the
practice of apartheid, which is not merely contrary to the Mandatory's
obligation to ensure the moral and material well-being and socialprogress
of the population under Mandate, but also contravenes the principles of
equality and liberty, and the other rights deriving therefrom for indivi-
duals and peoples alike. The condemnation of apartheid, if it were only
taken into account asa violation of the Mandate, would not be radical, as
it should be. For it is not onlypractised by the former mandatory State of
South Africa, nor only in the former mandated territory of Namibia. It is
more widespread. It is applied in countries which are not under tutelage.
It should be delineated and punished as any other attempt upon human
equality and individual or national liberty would be. It should be appre-
hended, in the General Assernbly's words, as a crime against humanity,
committed in this case against the Namibian people. The breach of the
obligation to submit a report to the satisfaction of the Council of the
League, or to transmit the petitions of the inhabitants, both of which are
obligations bound up with the safeguards for the due performance of
the principal obligations assumed by the trustee-.Mandatory as such, is
not laden with the same degree of gravity as the violation of the latter
themselves. It is therefore inadmissible to choose the easy way out and
justify the revocation of the Mandate by reference to the refusa1to report
to the General Assembly or transmit petitions, or even the refusa1 to
collaborate with the committees set up by the United Nations, while at
the same time overlooking the gravest violations by failing to make the
effort toadduce the proofs thereof, on the hollow pretext that a Statehas
not been given an opportunity of producing factual evidence, when both
the written and the oral proceedings contain superabundantproof. This
point was grasped by the General Assembly when, with the exception of
'Autour de la Déclarationuniverselle des droits de l'homme, Unesco, 1948, p. 16.
6 8 mandat, celle de la Charte et de la Déclaration universelle des droits de
l'homme. Cequi a déterminél'organisation des Nations Unies à sanction-
ner le comportement de l'Afrique du Sud, ainsi que cela se lit dans ses
nombreuses résolutions, c'est bien moins l'abstention touchant rapports
et pétitions,que la violation flagrante des principes lesplus essentielspour
l'homme, que consacre le droit international: l'égalité,dont l'apartheid
est la négation,la liberté quis'exprimepar le droit de libre disposition des
peuples, et le respect de la dignité humaine qu'ont affectéprofondément
des mesures appliquées auxhommes de couleur.
Cela dit, il importait de répondreà deux objections soulevées à propos
de la pratique de I'apartheid et de la nécessité dela dénoncer pour en
tirer lesconséquencesde droit.
Quand on soutient tout d'abord que la demande d'avis consultatif
formuléepar le Conseil de sécuriténeporte pas sur I'apartheid,ne semble-
t-il pas que l'on oublie que l'application de cette doctrine a étéla cause
fondamentale de l'action des Nations Unies tout au long de son histoire.
depuis que l'Inde l'a soulevéeen 1946, passant par la résolution 2145
(XXI) de 1966révoquant le mandat et celles adoptéesdepuis cette date?
Ladite résolutionde 1966,qui a étéréaffirmée par la résolution276 (1970)
du Conseil de sécurité à laquelle se réfèresa résolution284 (1970)deman-
dant l'avisde la Cour, s'exprimeen cestermes:
RéaBrmant sa résolution 2074 (XX) du 17 décembre 1965,
notamment le paragraphe 4 par lequel elle a condamnéla politique
d'apartheid et de discrimination raciale pratiquée par le Gouverne-
ment sud-africain au Sud-Ouest africain comme constituant un
crime contre l'humanité. ))
Peut-on après cela dire que l'avis demandé a la Cour ne l'autorise pas
à traiter de I'apartheid?
Ce n'est pas non plus une excuse pour éluderl'examen de la pratique
de l'apartheid en Namibie que de se retrancher derrière l'absence de
preuves matériellesattestant l'application de cette politique au détriment
du peuple namibien. Car ces preuves, outre les aveux des responsables
sud-africains, se trouvent en abondance dans les dossiers de l'instance.
Après avoir reproduit certains de cesaveux,je citerai lestextes officielsdu
Gouvernement sud-africain qui démontrent le fait et en donnent I'expli-
cation, à savoir que la politique d'apartheid n'a pas étéappliquée dans
l'intérêt dela population autrefois sous mandat comme le prétend
l'Afrique du Sud, mais au préjudicedecette population etdans l'intérêd te
1'Etatmandataire et de sespropres ressortissants.
Dans le cadre des aveux, il faut citer les déclarations probantes des
quatre premiers ministres qui se sont succédédepuis 1948 à ce jour, NAMlBIA (s.w. AFRICA SEP. OP.AMMOUN) 81
South Africa and Portugal, it unanimously took account of the breach
not only of the Mandate, but also of the Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. As is plain from the texts of its many
resolutions, what decided the United Nations to penalize South Africa's
conduct was much less the non-compliance over reports and petitions
than the flagrant violation of the most essential principles of humanity,
principles protected by the sanction of international law: equality, of
which apartheid is the negation; freedom, which finds expression in the
right of peoples to self-determination; and the dignity of the human
person, which has been profoundly injured by the measures applied to
non-White human beings.
That point having been made clear, a reply must nevertheless be given
to two objections raised in connection with the practice of apartheid and
the necessity of denouncing it with a view to determining the legal con-
sequences.
When, in the first place, its maintained that the request for advisory
opinion formulated by the Security Council is not concerned with apart-
heid, it is surely forgotten that the application of that doctrine has been
the underlying cause of the United Nations' action ever since the earliest
days, from the raising of the question by India in 1946to resolution 2145
(XXI) of 1966, which revoked the Mandate, and those adopted since.
Resolution 2145 (XXI), which was reaffirmed by the Security Council
resolution, 276 (1970), to which resolution 284 (1970) requesting the
opinion of the Court refers, contains the following paragraph:
"Reafirming its resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965,
in particular paragraph 4 thereof which condemned the policies of
apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the Government of
South Africa in South West Africa as constituting a crime against
humanity."
In view of this,can it still be said that the request forthe Court's opinion
does not entitle it to deal with the subject oapartheid?
Nor is it any excuse for evading examination of the practice of apart-
heid in Namibia to plead the absence of material proof of the application
of that policy to the detriment of the Namibian people; for such proof,
quite apart from ministerial admissions on the part of South Africa, is to
be found in abundance in the documentation of the proceedings. After
reproducing some of these admissions, 1 will cite the official texts of the
South African Government which demonstrate the facts of the matter and
reveal the explanation, which is that the policy of apartheid has been
applied not, as South Africa claims, in the interest of the population
formerly under Mandate, but to the prejudice of that population and in
the interest of the mandatory State and its own nationals.
In the matter of admissions, four successivePrimeMinisters from 1948
to the present day, Dr. Malan, Mr. Strijdom,Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Vor-MM. Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd et Vorster, quant à la définition qu'ils
donnent de la politique d'apartheid applicable tant en Afrique du Sud
qu'en Namibie. Le Dr Malan, dans un discours prononcé en avril 1948,
s'exprimait en cestermes:
(La race européenne del'avenir sera-t-ellecapable de maintenir sa
maîtrise, sa pureté et sa civilisation, ou se laissera-t-elle aller à la
dérivejusqu'à ce qu'ellesoit submergéepour toujours, sans honneur,
dans la mer noire de la population non européenne del'Afrique du
Sud? Des influencesétrangèresfont que l'ondemande de plus en plus
souvent, avec une véhémence grandissante, que toutes les colourbars
et lesmesuresdeségrégationsoientsuppriméesl;erésultatnepourrait
êtreque celui-ci: la race blanche perdrait sasuprématie ..1)
M. Strijdom, décrivant en avril 1955 sa politique devant le parlement,
disait :
((Jeparle net, je ne m'excusepas. Ou bien l'homme blanc domine,
ou bien c'est lenoir qui prend le dessus ...La seule façon dont les
Européens puissent maintenir leur suprématie,c'est par la domina-
tion ..))
Le Dr Verwoerd, parlant égalementau parlement en 1958,déclarait:
((Le Dr Malan l'a dit, M. Strijdom l'a dit, je l'ai dit à maintes
reprises etje le répète ici:la politique d'apartheid s'oriente constam-
ment dans la direction d'un développement deplus en plus séparé,
l'idéalétantune séparation totale dans tous les domaines. ))
Dans un autre discours plus circonstancié prononcé le 25 janvier 1963,
il devait dire:
((Réduit à ses termes fondamentaux, la problème est très simple:
nousentendonsgarder blanche l'Afriquedu Sud ...La garder blanche
ne peut vouloir dire qu'une chose, la domination des Blancs. II ne
suffitpas que les Blancsdirigent ou guident, il faut qu'ils dominent,
qu'ils aient la suprématie.Si nous admettons que le désirdu peuple
est que les Blancs puissent continuer à se défendreen maintenant
leur domination ...nous disons que ce résultat peutêtre atteintpar le
développement séparé. ))
Enfin, en mai 1965,M. Vorster, l'actuel premier ministre, déclaraitalors
qu'il étaitministre de la Justice:
((A ce parlement auquel il incombe de déciderdu destin de la
République sud-africaine,c'est leBlanc, et le Blanc seul, qui aura
ledroit de siéger. 1)
Ces déclarations établiraient à suffisancela pratique de l'apartheid et les
mobiles de ses auteurs. Mais les responsables dont les déclarations ont
été reproduitesn'ont pas étéentendus par la Cour pour qu'ils en recon-
70ster,have defined their concept of the apartheid policy, as applicable in
both South Africa and Namibia, in declarations which offer proof con-
clusive. In a speech made in April 1948, Dr. Malan asked:
"Will the European race in the future be able to maintain its rule,
its purity and its civilization, or will it float along until it vanishes
for ever, without honour, in the Black sea of South Africa's Non-
European population?. .. As a result of foreign influences the
demandfor the removal of al1colour bar and segregation measures is
being pressed more and more continuously and vehernently; and al1
this rneans nothing less that that the White race will lose its ruling
position . .."
In April 1955Mr. Strijdom, describing his policy in Parliament, stated:
"1am being as blunt as 1can. 1 am making no excuses. Either the
White man dominates or the Black man takes over ... The only way
the Europeans can rnaintain suprernacy is by domination. .."
Dr. Verwoerd likewise stated to Parliament in 1958:
"Dr. Malan said it, and Mr. Strijdom said it, and 1 have said it
repeatedly and 1want to say it again: The policy of apartheid moves
consistently in the direction of more and more separate development
with the ideal of total separation in al1spheres."
Later Dr. Verwoerd went into greater detail in a speech on 25 January
1963:
"Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than
this: We want to keep South Africa White .. .Keeping it White can
only mean one thing, namely White domination, not leadership, not
guidance, but control, supremacy. If we are agreed that it is the
desire of the people that the White man should be able to continue
to protect hirnself by White domination. .. we say that it can be
achieved by separate development."
Finally, in May 1965, the present Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, then
Minister of Justice, declared :
"In this Parliament, whose business it is to decide the destiny of
the Republic of South Africa, Whites, and Whites only, will have
the right to sit."
Such declarations would afford ample proof of what the practice of
apartheid means and what the motives of those who devised it were. But
the Ministers whose declarations are here reproduced have not appearednaissent la pleine authenticité ou qu'ils les expliquent et les commentent.
Aussije passe aux textes officielspromulguéset publiésqui constituent à
la fois une preuve matérielleet un aveu, et dont l'énumération, quoique
non exhaustive, rapporte la preuve des diverses manifestations illicites de
l'apartheidainsi que des droits humains correspondants qui ont été violés.
Les principaux textes qui ont cet effetprobatoire sont les suivants:
1) Le Bantu Trust and Land Act de 1936,relatif aux réservespour les
Africains, constituant une ségrégation territorialedéfinitive, etqui porte
atteinte à la liberté individuelle, au droit de libre déplacement et de
libre résidenceet au droit de propriété(Déclaration universelle des droits
de l'homme, art. 1, 13et 17).
2) Le Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation de 1951, modifiéen 1954,
aux termes duquel les noirs ne peuvent résiderdans les zones urbaines,
sauf quelques exceptions; proclamation qui viole les mêmesdroits que
le Bantu Trust and Land Act.
3) Les Native Reserve Regulations de 1924et de 1938,qui interdisent
aux Africains dans les réserves deles quitter ou d'y retourner sans une
autorisation spéciale, violantles droits humains précités.
4) Le Native Administration Proclamation de 1922, qui interdit aux
Africains de se déplacer sans un laissez-passer, violant le droit de libre
déplacement (art. 13).
5) Le Native Building Workers Act de 1951, qui porte atteinte aux
principes d'égalité edte liberté(art. 1).
6) Le Prohibition of Political Interference Acde 1968,qui interdit, en
violation des libertés démocratiques, les partis à composition mixte
(art. 21).
7) Le South West Africa Aflâirs Amendment Act de 1949,qui méconnaît
les droits politiques des Africains (art. 21).
8) Le Master and Servants Proclamation de 1920, qui constitue en
délit la rupture d'un contrat d'emploi, portant atteinte au droit du
travail età la dignité humaine, et rétablit, en quelque sorte, le travail
forcé(art. 1et 23).
9) Le Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance de 1953,qui considère
nuls les mariages entre noirs et blancs, violant le principe d'égalet les
droits de la famille et la dignité humaine (art. 1 et 16).
10) Le Terrorism Act de 1967,destiné à donner plein effetà la pratique
de l'apartheid par une répression sévère qui viole les principes les plus
sacrésdu droit criminel, à savoir la légalité des délits, les règles relatives
à la définition de l'action principale et de la complicité, la non-rétro-
activitédes délitset des peines, la présomption d'innocence, la règlede
la chose jugée. before the Court to certify their full authenticity orto explain and com-
ment upon them. 1 therefore turn to the official texts which have been
promulgated and published, and which constitute at one and the same
time material proof and an admission; their mere enumeration, even
though not exhaustive, demonstrates the various forms in which the
unlawfulness of apartheid is manifested and the corresponding human
rights which have been violated.
The chief texts possessing this probative effect are the following:
1. The Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936, concerning reserves for
hfricans which constitute permanent territorial segregation; it thus
encroached upon personal liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of
residence and the right to own property (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Arts. 1, 13and 17).
2. The Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951,amended in 1954,
under which Black persons may not, with a few exceptions, reside in
urban areas; this Proclamation infringes the same rights as the Bantu
Trust and Land Act.
3. The Native Reserve Regulations of 1924and 1938,which forbade
Africans in the reserves to leave them or return to them without special
authorization; this also violates the human rights mentioned above.
4. The Native Administration Proclamation of 1922, which forbids
Africans to circulate without a pass; this violates the right to freedom
of movement (Art. 13).
5. The Native Building Workers Act of 1951,which encroaches upon
the principles of equality and liberty (Art. 1).
6. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968, which, in
violation of democratic freedoms, prohibits parties of racially mixed
membership (Art. 21).
7. The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, which
flouted the political rights of the Africans (Art. 21).
8. The Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920, which makes the
contract of employment a punishable offence; this constitutes
breach of a
an infringement of the right to work and an affront to human dignity,
and virtually reintroduces forced labour (Arts. 1 and 23).
9. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance of 1953, which
regards marriages between Blacks and Whites as void; this is another
affront to human dignity and violates the principles of equality as well
as the rights of the family (Arts.1and 16).
10. The Terrorism Act of 1967,intended to enforce apartheid through
severe repression, which violates the most sacred principles of criminal
law, namely the rule nullum crimen sine lege, the rules relating to the
definition of principal and accessory,the non-retroactivity of penal laws
and of penalties, the presumption of innocence,andthe rule of resjudicata.84 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN ()P.IND. AMMOUN)
11) Le Suppression of CommunismAct de 1950,étendu à la Namibie,
qui présente les mêmescaractéristiques illicites que la loi contre le
terrorisme.
11n'est pas sans intérêt,en définitive,de rappeler que la Commission
des droits de I'homme dénoncedans sa résolution 3 (XXIV) de 1968les
lois etles pratiques de l'apartheid et
[(Condamne les agissements du Gouvernement de l'Afrique du
Sud qui poursuit et intensifie sa politique inhumaine d'apartheid en
violation totale et flagrante de la Charte des Nations Unies et de la
Déclaration universelle des droits de I'homme. 11
En conclusion de ce qui précède,ilest permis de croire que l'Assemblée
généralen'errait pas lorsqu'elle soulignait, dans la résolution 395 (V) du
2 décembre 1950,que tout systèmede ségrégation raciale, tel I'apartheid,
est automatiquement fondé sur des doctrines de discrimination raciale.
Elle n'a pas etémoins catégorique dans sa déclaration sur l'élimination
de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale adoptée par sa résolution
1904 (XVIII). Cette déclaration condamne la discrimination raciale et
I'apartheidcomme une violation des droits de I'homme. Ellea étéadoptée
à l'unanimité. On comprend difficilement après cet accord général des
Etats, dont certains disposent des moyens d'investigation les plus
complets, qu'on puisse douter de la réalitédu fait illicite qu'ils dé-
noncent.
La condamnation de l'apartheid a, au surplus, dépasséle stade des
déclarations pour passer dans celui des conventions obligatoires. La
convention internationale sur l'élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale, comprenant naturellement I'apartheid, adoptée
par l'Assembléegénéralele 21 décembre 1965, est entréeen vigueur le
4janvier 1969.
9. L'Afrique du Sud n'a pas contesté uniquement la matérialitédes
faits, mais aussi l'interprétation qui en a été donnéeprr l'Assemblée
généraleet le Conseil de sécurité. Lepoint de vue qu'elle soutient, et
que tous les Etats lui dénient, mêmeceux qui discutent la validité des
mesures prises à son égard,est que son administration a étéprécisément
conçue en vue de réaliser les objectifsdu mandat consistant à accroître
le bien-êtreet le progrès social des populations; que I'apartheid, ou
développement séparé deces populations, aurait été instauréen consé-
quence dans leur intkêt, étant donné leur état d'évolution sociale;
que les mesures prises, jugéescontraires aux dispositions de la Charte et
à la Déclaration universelle des droits de I'homme, notamment par la
résolution 2145 (XXI) révoquant le mandat, étaientégalement justifiées
par les circonstances inhérentes au milieu humain et ne tendent qu'à la
réalisationde la mission dont l'Afrique du Sud a étéinvestie.
La Cour a fort justement rapporté, au paragraphe 131 de l'avis, la NAMlBIA (s.w.AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 84
11. The Suppression of Cornmunism Act of 1950,extended to Namibia,
which has thesame unlawful characteristics as the Terrorism Act.
It is, in surn, not without interest to recall that the Commission on
Human Rights, in its resolution 3 (XXIV) of 1968,denounced the laws
and practices of apartheid and condemned-
". ..the Governrnent of South Africa for its perpetuation and
intensification of thenhuman policy of apartheid, in complete and
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights".
In the light of the foregoing it isjustifiable toider that the General
Assernbly was not rnistaken when, in resolution 395 (V) of 2 December
1950,it emphasized that any system of racial segregation, such as apart-
heid, is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination. The
Assembly was no less categorical in its Declaration on the Elimination
of Al1 Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by resolution 1904
(XVIII). This Declaration condemns racial discrimination and apartheid
as violating human rights. It was adopted unanimously. Giventhisgen-
eral agreement of States, some of which have the fullest possible means
of investigation at their disposal, it is difficult to understand how the
material existence of the illegalities they denounce can be doubted.
Furthermore, the condemnation of apartheid has passed the stage of
declarations and entered the phase of binding conventions. The Inter-
national Convention on the Elirnination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination-naturally including apartheid-adopted by the General
Assembly on 21 Decernber 1965,came into force on 4 January 1969.
9.South Africa has not only contested the material existence of the
facts but also the interpretation placed upon them by the General As-
sembly and the Security Council. Its point of view-rejected by al1States,
even those which question the validity of the measures taken against
South Africa-is that its administration has been designed with the
precise aim of realising the objectives of the Mandate, these being to
promote the well-being and social progress of the inhabitants; that ac-
cordingly apartheid, or the separate development of these populations
was, given their stage of social evolution, instituted in their own interest:
that the rneasures which have been deemed contrary to the provisions
of the Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
particular by resolution 2145 (XXI) revoking the Mandate, werejustified
by the socio-anthropological circumstances and are directed solely to
the accornplishment of the mission entrusted to South Africa.
The Court, in paragraph 131of the Advisory Opinion, has veryjustly85 NAMIBIE(S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
preuve textuelle de l'illégalide la pratique de l'apartheid. Des preuves
concrètes peuvent égalementêtretiréesdes faits sans plus ample informé.
Quand de pareilles preuves sont susceptibles d'êtrerapportées,il convient
de les présenter pour rendre encore plus décisives,si besoin est, les
conclusions de la Cour. Je traiterai, ce propos, de deux questions que
la Cour n'a pas abordéeset qui sont utilesà la clartédu sujet: l'une pour
répondre àla prétention que le peuple namibien n'en estpas un; l'autre
afin de réfuter l'affirmation que l'apartheid répond à l'obligation du
mandataire de promouvoir le bien-êtredu peuple sous mandat et son
progrès social.
10. L'argument auquel l'Afrique du Sud s'attache avec le plus de
véhémence estla disparité des ethnies en Namibie. Pour justifier la
politique d'apartheid qu'ils appliquent tant en République sud-africaine
qu'en Namibie, les gouvernements successifs de Pretoria ont avancéla
thèse selon laquelle lesautochtones dans le sud-ouest de l'Afrique n'ont
jamais constitué un peuple, et qu'en raison des oppositions ethniques
et sociologiques qui les divisent et les dressent les uns contre les autres,
seule la politique de développement séparé fondée surles institutions
tribales pouvait leur assurer le bien-êtreet le progrès social. Cette
assertion permettait au Gouvernement sud-africain, non seulement de se
défendrede faire une politique de discrimination raciale, mais aussi de
rejeter toute accusation de violer les dispositions du mandat et de la
Charte et de contrevenir à .ia Déclaration universelle des droits de
l'homme. Je me propose de montrer, en conséquence,que la prémissesur
laquelle l'Afrique du Sud se fonde pour justifier ses méthodes d'ad-
ministration de la Namibie est fausse; que le peuple namibien, lointain
héritier d'unevieille civilisation qui n'avait riennvier en son temps à
l'Europe, avait, avant le régimecolonial, participé à la constitution de
grands empires, nonobstant la multiplicité desélémend tsont il se compose
comme tant d'autres peuples.
Que de peuples se sont en effet constituésd'élémentshumains divers
et variés,de nos jours et tout au long de l'histoire. La multiplicité des
ethnies n'a pas fait obstacleà la formation des peuples et des Etats en
Afrique. Sans parler des Etats anciens du Ghana, du Mali, de Bournou,
d'Axoum, de Kivu, du Béninet des Bantous, ainsi que de 1'Etat du
Congo créé par le congrèsde Berlin, on ne peut nier qu'un grand nombre
des quelque trente Etats libérésdepuis 1960sont multiraciaux. D'autres
exemples analogues se rencontrent en Asie avec l'Inde, la Chine, le
Pakistan. En Europe, plus d'un Etat conserve le souvenir, parfois vivace,
de l'union aujourd'hui parachevée;telle cellede la Suisse, de la Tchéco-
slovaquie ou de la Yougoslavie; ou celle du Royaume-Uni depuis les
invasionsnordiques etjusque sous lesrègnesde Henri VI11(incorporation
du pays de Galles) etd'Anne Stuart (union de l'Angleterre et de'Ecosse).
Et pour revenir à l'Afrique du Sud, ne la voit-on pas gouvernéepar la
minorité blanchequi est forméede l'union d'immigrants de nationalités NAMIBIA (S.W.AFRICA) (SEP.OP. AMMOUN) 85
adduced the textual proof which exists of the unlawfulness of the
practice of apartheid. Concrete proof could likewise be drawn from the
facts already in the Court's possession. When it is possible to refer to
such proofs, it is even better to present them in order to reinforce, if
need be, the decisiveness of the Court's findings. In this connection 1
propose to deal with two questions which the Court has not touched
upon but which afford opportunities for further clarification: in order,
first, to meet the assertion that the Namibian people is not a people and,
secondly, to refute the claimthat apartheidcorresponds to theandator~'~
obligation of promoting the well-being and social progress of the people
under Mandate.
10. The argument to which South Africa clings most tenaciously is that
of the disparity ofthearious ethnicgroups in Namibia. ln order tojustify
the policy of apartheid applied not only in the Republic of South Africa
but also in Namibia, successive Pretoria governments have put forward
the a"gument that the natives in theouth-west of Africa have never form-
ed a people, and that, because of the ethnic and sociological differences
which divide them and set them against each other, only the policy of
separate development based upon their tribal institutions could ensure
their social well-being and progress. This assertion has been used to
buttress denials by the South African Government that it pursued a po-
licy of racial discrimination and has also permitted it to reject any accu-
sation that it violated the provisions of the Mandate and the Charter or
contravened the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1 therefore
propose to show that the premise upon which South Africa bases this
justification of its methods of administration in Namibia is a false one;
that the Namibian people, ultimate heir of an ancient civilization which
in its heyday rivalled anything in Europe, had, before the days of the
colonial régime, taken part in the making of great empires, notwith-
standing the multiplicity of the elements of which it, like so many other
peoples, is composed.
How many of the peoples that have come into being, throughout his-
tory and in our times, have not in fact been made up of a variety of
human elements? Multiplicity of ethnic entities has been no obstacle
to the formation of peoples and States in Africa. Not to mention the
ancient States of Ghana, Mali, Bornu, Axum, Kivu, Benin and that of
the Bantus, or the Congo State of the Berlin Conference, it cannot be
denied that a large number of the 30 or so States liberated since 1960
are multiracial. India, China and Pakistan offer similar examples in Asia.
Many States of Europe also preserve what is sometimes no faded memory
of a now complete process of union: for example, Switzerland, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, or the United Kingdom from the Norse invasions
down to the reigns of Henry VI11(incorporation of Wales in England)
and Queen Anne (union with Scotland). Moreover, is not even the South
Africa of today governed by a White minority formed by the union of
immigrants of different national origins-Germans, English, Dutch and d'originesdifférentes:Allemands,Anglais, Hollandaiset quelques autres,
alors que le peuple de Namibie, de tout temps maître du pays, est au-
jourd'hui uni par des aspirations communes, fondement juridique de la
nation, àune vie indépendanteet libre, quel que soit le régimepolitique
qu'il se choisira après'indépendance.
Une incursion dans les faits montrera, tout d'abord, ce qu'était la
viejuridique en Afrique, et ce qu'on appelait alors le droit africain, par
opposition au ((droit public de l'Europe »; un droit africain illustré, si
I'on peut dire, par la monstrueuse erreur que les auteurs de l'acte de
Berlin ont commise et dont les séquellesn'ont pas encore disparu de la
scènepolitique africaine. Monstrueuse erreur et flagrante injustice que
celles de considérerl'Afrique sub-saharienne ((territoires sans maîtr» à
partager entre les puissances pour êtreoccupéeet colonisée.Alors que
déjà Vitoriaécrivaitau XVIesiècleque les Européens ne peuventacquérir
la souverainetésur les Indes par le procédé de l'occupation,car elles ne
sont pas territoires sans maître.
Par une ironie du sort, la déclaration issue du congrès de Berlin en
1885 tenant le continent noir pour ((territoires sans maître»,visait des
régions qui ont vu naître et se développer des Etats et des empires
florissants. On ne devrait pas, en effet,ignorerqu'était l'Afriqueavant
que ne s'y soient abattus les deux plus grands fléauxque l'histoire de
l'humanitéait jamais rapportés: la traite des noirs, qui a sévipendant
des siècles,à une échellejamais connue, et le colonialisme, exploitant
àoutrance hommes et biens. Avant que ces terribles fléauxn'aient déferlé
sur le continent noir, les peuples africains avaient constitué des Etats,
voire des empires de grande civilisation. Seule l'Abyssinie, par sa résis-
tance farouche, échappa à la traite et re-jetalecolonialisme, sauvegardant
ses vénérablesinstitutionsétatiques. Des Etats moins anciens, mais aussi
fortement structurés que lepays des négus, n'offrentaujourd'hui à la vue
que des ruines rappelant d'évanescents souvenirs. II est aussi juste
qu'utile de les évoquerun à un.
Dès les premiers sièclesde l'èrechrétienne,l'empire du Ghana, dont
la puissance et la richesse n'avaient pas d'égalesen Europe occidentale
après la chute de l'empire romain. L'empire du Mali, qui s'étendaitsur
des territoires plus vastes que l'Europe, alors qu'une notable partie de
celle-ci était diviséeen fiefs souvent en lutte les uns contre les autres;
au centre de cet empire brillait une universitéplus ancienne que toutes
celles de l'Europe: l'universitéde Tombouctou, à propos de laquelle on
disait, pour en marquer la splendeur, que le profit qui y était tiréde la
vente des manuscrits dépassait celui de toute activité économique.
L'Etat de Bournou, dont la prospéritéétait encore telle qu'au XIXe
siècle,à la veille de la conquête, lorsqu'unvoyageur anglais s'y rendit,
la condition des plus humbleslui parut douceet heureuse. Lescivilisations
des Grands Lacs, où I'on retrouve des vestiges de routes, de canaux
d'irrigation, de digues, des aqueducs d'une technique admirable. Passant
sans nous y arrêterpar les civilisations d'Axoum, de Kivu, de Bénin,
74several others? Whereas the people of Namibia, which always used to
be the master of the country, is nowadays united by common aspirations,
the legal foundation of nationhood, towards a life of independence and
freedom, whatever inay be the political régime which it will select after
obtaining independence.
If we take a look at the historical facts, we shall see, in the first place,
what legality used to be taken to mean ir?Africa and what it was which
used to be called "African law" as opposed to "the public law of Europe";
an African law illustrated-if one can apply the term---in themonstrous
blunder committed bv the authors of the Act of Berlin. the results of
which have not yet disappeared from the African political scene. It was
a monstrous blunder and a flagrant injustice to consider Africa south of
the Sahara as terrae nullius, to be shared out among the Powers for oc-
cupation and colonization, when even in the sixteenth century Vitoria
had written that Europeans could not obtain sovereignty over the Indies
by occupation, for they were not terra nullius.
By one of fate's iroqies, the declaration of the 1885 Berlin Congress
which held the dark continent to be terrae nullius related to regions
which had seen the rise and development offlourishingstatesand empires.
One should be mindful of what Africa was before there fell upon it the
two greatest plagiies in the recorded history of rnankind: the slave-trade,
which ravaged Africa for centuries on an unprecedented scaie; and colo-
nialisni, which exploited humaiiity and natural wealth to a relentless
extreme. Before these terrible plagues overran their continent, the African
peoples had founded States and even empires of a high level of civili-
zation. Only Abyssinia, by its savage resistance, escaped the slave-trade
and repelled colonialism, preserving its venerable institutions of State.
States less ancient but structurally no less developed than the country
of the Negus have nothing to show today but ruins enshrining faint im-
pressions of the past. Itisjust and pertinent that they be recalled here one
by one, beginning, in the first centuries of the Christian era, with the
empire of Ghana, the power and wealth of which was unequalled in
Western Europe after the fa11of the Roman Empire. The empire of Mali,
which covered territories more vast than Europe at a time when a con-
siderable part of the latter was a feudal and often feuding patchwork;
at the centre of this empire shone a university more ancient than any of
Europe, the University of Timbuktii, of which it was said, in illustration
of its splendour, that the profit there obtained from the sale of manu-
scriptsexceeded that derived from any economic activity. The State of
Bornu, the prosperity of which was still such in the nineteenth century,
when visited by an English traveller shortly before its conquest, that the
situation of the niost humble citizen appeared to him happy and com-
fortable. The Great Lake civilizations. where traces can be found of
roads, irrigation canals, dykes and aqued,ucts, of a remarkable level of
technical skill. Passing on, without paiising to consider the civilizations
of Axum, Kivu and Benin, we come to that of Southern Africa. On thenous arrivons à celle de l'Afrique australe. Sur les rives du Zambèze,
sur ces mêmes lieux que domine la Républiquesud-africaine, lesPortugais
trouvèrent, au dire de Barboza, ccun commerce plus riche qu'en toute
autre partie du monde ». La comparaison est flatteuse, car c'était au
temps de la splendeur des républiquesitaliennes. Au Zimbabwé, l'actuelle
Rhodésie,des ruines gigantesques rappelant les bastions nouragiques ou
mycéniens,en attestent l'ancienne grandeur. Son empire s'étendaitdans
l'actuelle République sud-africaine, sur les deux rives du Limpopo,
englobant I'actual Transvaal et les sites de Pretoria et Johannesburg.
Pour résumer,rappelons ce qu'en disait Raimondo Luraghi:
((Ainsi au moment de l'arrivée desPortugais, une histoire variée
se déroulaitdepuis des siècleset des millénaires,du désertdu Sahara
à l'Afrique du Sud; histoire de peuples civilisés,comparable à celle
des grands empires de l'Amériquelatine, ou d'Europe aux jours les
plus brillants de l'Antiquité et du Moyen-Age. ))
Au surplus, la civilisation africaine n'était pasuniquement matérielle.
Pour saisir la haute penséede ces peuples discréditésou ignorés,citons
l'étudeque le père Placide Tempels, franciscain belge, a consacréeaux
Bantous, qui vivent encore en grand nombre en Namibie. Le père
Tempels intitule son livre Philosophie bantoue parce qu'il avait remarqué
le caractère ontologique de leur pensée,fondée sur la conscience de soi,
sur le (Connais-toi toi-même », ajouterais-je, du philosophe phénicien
Thalès, adopté par les Grecs et rangéparmi les sept sages de la Grèce.
((Cette doctrine spirituelle intense qui anime et alimente les âmes au
sein de I'Eglisecatholique )I,écritPlacide Tempels, ((trouve une analogie
saisissante dans la penséeontologique des Bantous 1).Et ces derniers sont
justement une des grandes ethnies habitant les immenses territoires
auxquels le colonialisme s'accroche encore désespérément, soid tepuis
le Mozambique et l'Angola, jusqu'au Zimbabwe, à l'Afrique du Sud et
à la Namibie. Et ce sont ces populations mêmesque le Gouvernement
sud-africain prétendêtre formées de tribus d'origines diverses incapables
de s'unir et ne méritant pas le titre de peuple que leur ont reconnu les
Nations Unies.
11. Aprèsavoir fait justice de la thèse selon laquellele développement
séparéou apartheid s'impose en raison de la diversité des éléments
ethniques des populations qui les rend inaptes à constituer un peuple,
.e .asse à l'argument suivant lequel les mesures discriminatoires adoptées
par lesautoritéssud-africaines sejustifient par l'état social desNamibiens.
L'article2, alinéa2, de l'acte de mandat dispose que
((le Mandataire accroîtra, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le
bien-être matériel et moral ainsq iue le progrès social des habitants
du territoire soumis au présentmandat )I. NAMIBIA (s.w. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 87
banks of the Zambezi, in the same areas as are now dominated by the
Republic of South Africa, the Portuguese found, to quote Barboza,
"richer trade than in any other part of the world". This is a flattering
comparison, for it was made when the Italian republics were at their
splendid apogee. ln Zimbabwe, the present Rhodesia, gigantic ruins,
which cal1 to mind the bastions at Nuragus or Mycenae, bear witness
to its ancient grandeur. Its empire extended,into what isnow the Repub-
lic of South Africa, on both banks of the Limpopo, includingthe present
Transvaal and the sites of Pretoria and Johannesburg. To sum up, let us
recall what Rairnondo Luraghi has wrilten:
"Tl-ius, at the time of the arriva1 of the Portuguese, a chequered
history had unrolled for centuries and millennia between the Sahara
desert and South Africa-a history of civilized peoples, comparable
to that of the great empires of Latin Ainerica or of Europe in the
most brilliant days of Antiquity and the Middle Ages."
Furthermore, African civilization was not merely material. To give
some idea of the high intellectual level of these discredited, unknown or
ignored peoples 1would quote the work written by Father Placide Tem-
pels, a Belgian Franciscan, on the Bantu people, who still live in Namibia
in large numbers. Father Tempels called his book Philisophie bantoue,
because he had observed the ontological nature of their thinking, based
upon awareness of self-on the "know thyself", may 1 add, of Thales,
the Phoenician philosopher who was adopted by the Greeks and ranked
among the Seven Sages of their land. "To that intense spiritual doctrine
which quickens and nourishes souls within the Catholic church," writes
Placide Tempels, "a striking analogy ma) be found in the ontological
thinking of the Bantus." The latter are in fact one of those same great
ethnic groups which inhabit the immense territories to which colonialism
still desperately clings, that is to say from Mozambique and Angola to
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. And it is these very populations
which the South African Government claims are made up of tribes of
diverse origins which are incapable of uniting, and which do not deserve
the title of a people which the United Nations has attributed to them.
11. Having done justice to the contention that separate development
or apartheid is a necessity on account of the diversity of ethnic compo-
sition precluding on the part of the inhabitants a potentiality foration-
hood, 1 shall now turn to the argument that the measures of discrimi-
nation adopted by the South African authorities can be justifiedin terms
of the stage of social evolution reached by the Namibians.
The second paragraph of Article 2 of the mandate agreement provides
that :
"The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of inhabitants of the ter-
ritory subject to the present Mandate."
75 C'est, comme il est dit, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir que 1'Etat
mandataire doit s'acquitter de son obligation. II a, à cet effet, aux termes
de l'alinéa I dudit article, 11pleins pouvoirs d'administration et de
législation sur le territoire faisant l'objet du mandat11.
C'est donc un pouvoir discrétionnaire que le Conseil de la Société
des Nations lui a,à tort ou à raison, sciemment concédé.Mais un pouvoir
discrétionnaire au sens juridique du terme, qui ne veut évidemment pas
dire un pouvoir arbitraire, et qui est nécessairement subordonné à
certaines limitations qui découlent des principes et des règlesdu droit en
vigueur, et notamment des droits des peuples et des individus.
Selon la thèse de l'Afrique du Sud, seule sa mauvaise foi pourrait lui
êtrereprochée dans l'usage de ce pouvoir. Ainsi lui seraient pardonnés
la carence ou la négligence, qu'elles soient graves ou légères, l'abus de
droit, la fausse interprétation des dispositions de l'article 22 du Pacte
de la Société desNations, de l'acte de mandat ou de la Charte des Nations
Unies, interprétation qui a précisémentconduit à la justification de la
discrimination raciale et de I'aoartheid. à l'annexion effectivedu territoire
de la Namibie, aux mesures d'ordre législatif,administratif et judiciaire
contraires au droit commun national et international, aux principes de la
Charte et à la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme.
On ne peut cependant échapper à la nécessitédialectique de comparer
la responsabilité de l'autorité administrant un pays placésous sa tutelle,
à celle des autres autorités investies de l'administration de leur propre
pays ou des intérêts deleurs nationaux. A ces dernières, ilest demandé,
en droit public, d'assurer un bon gouvernement et, dans les institutions
de droit personnel, de se comporter en bon père de famille; l'abus de
droit et le détournement de pouvoir leur sont à plus forte raison re-
prochables. En bref, on ne peut refuser au juge international, comme
au juge national, le droit d'apprécier, en toutes circonstances, s'il a été
fait bon usage du pouvoir discrétionnaire; si, au jugement du tribunal
international, le pouvoir discrétionnaire a été exercéen vue de promouvoir
le bien-être des populations et leur progrès social; ou si I'Etat investi
du mandat a épuisétoutes les possibilités pour s'acquitter de ses obliga-
tions. Cela revient à se demander si la discrimination raciale et l'apartheid,
ainsi que les mesures connexes, condamnables en eux-mêmes,sejustifient
par des circonstances locales ou temporaires, généralement d'ordre
social, et par l'intérêt despopulations en cause. Pour se prononcer
dans ces diverses situations, le juge ne peut se fier à son jugement per-
sonnel, jugement subjectif variable selon la mentalité de chaque juge,
ses conceptions juridiques, philosophiques et morales, ses vues sur le
droit naturel, sa formation culturelle, ses origines sociales. C'est à un
critère ou standard objectif qu'il semble qu'il doive se référer.Ce critère
lui est proposé par le comportement de la généralité desEtats ainsi que
des organisations internationales. S'il sedécideen outre à s'inspirer des
précédents judiciaires nationaux, riches en exemples comme la notion
du bon père de famille déjà mentionnée, ou des puissants courants NAMIBIA (s.w.AFRICA) (SEP.OP. AMMOUN) 88
Here then is an obligation which the Mandatory has to carry out "to
the utmost" [par tous les moyens en son pouvoir]. To that end the first
paragraph of the same Article confers upon him "full power of admini-
strationand legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate".
This means that, rightly or wrongly, the Council of the League of
Nations deliberately conferred a power of discretion on the Mandatory.
It was however a power of discretion in the legal sense of the term, thus
evidently not an arbitrary power but one necessarilysubordillate to certain
limitations which flow from the overriding principles and rules of law,
more particularly the rights of peoples and individuals.
South Africa contends that bad faith would be the only ground upon
which criticism could be levelled against its use of that power. This im-
plies that South Africa could be pardoned for irresponiible inaction or
neglect, whether serious or slight; for the misuse of law; or for a wilful
misinterpretation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, the
Mandate and the United Nations Charter which is alleged to justify
racial discrimination and apartheid,defacto annexation of the Territory
of Namibia, and legislative, administrative or judicial measures contrary
to thetenets of both national and international law, the principles of the
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
But in fact there is no escaping the dialectical necessity of comparing
the responsibility of an authority administering a country placed under
its guardianship with that of other authorities entrusted with the ad-
ministration of their own countries or the interests of their nationals.
The latter are expected in public law to provide good government and,
inthe area of personal rights, to mode1their conduct on that of the bonus
paterfunzilius; they are for that reason the more to be blamed for any
abuse of law or misuse of power. Tnshort, the international judge cannot
be denied the right of determining in al1circumstances whether proper
use has been made of the discretionary power; whether, in the opinion of
the international tribunal, it has been exercised with a view to the pro-
motion of the well-beingand social progress of the population, or whether
the mandatory State has done its utmost to fulfil its obligations. This
implies ascertaining whether racial discrimination, apartheid and related
measures, blameworthy in themselves, can be justified on account of
local or temporary circumstances, usually of a social nature, and the
interests of the population in question. To pass ail opinion in these
various situations, a judge cannot rely on his personal judgment, which
is bound to be subjective and Vary according to the mentality of each
judge, his legal, philosophical and ethical outlook, his views on natural
law and his cultural and social background. An objective criterion or
standard is clearly necessary.Such a criterion is afforded by the general
conduct of States and international organizations as a whole. Should
the judge further decide to derive criteria from mlinicipal precedents,
which abound in such examples as the notion of the bonw paterfamilias
already rnentioned, or from powerful moral trends in a given country,moraux dans un pays déterminé, encorefaut-il qu'ils soient acceptéspar
la généralité dea sutres pays, ou qu'ils soient déjàinscrits dans la cons-
cience universelle. Aussi peut-on dire que les nombreuses résolutions
adoptées depuisprès d'unquart de siècle,condamnant la discrimination
raciale et l'apartheid pratiqués en Afrique du Sud puis étendus à la
Namibie, décèlentun standard objectif que le Gouvernement sud-africain
est tenu d'appliquer. On peut el1dirc autant des autresdroits de l'homme.
La ferme attitude de la communauté internationale l'atteste par ses prises
de position vis-à-vis des manifestations contraires a ces droits. La seule
lecture des textes dont il a étéfait mention est au surplus à elle seule
édifiante.
12. J'en arriveaux conséquencesjuridiques de la présencede l'Afrique
du Sud en Namibie. Pour les déterminer, ily a lieu tout d'abord de
qualifier juridiquement cette présence. S'agit-ild'une simpl: intervention
pacifique? Ou d'une occupation militaire qui dégénère en agression?
Ou d'une guerre coloniale? Les conséquences jui idiques diffèrenten effet
en droit international selon qu'il s'agit de l'uneou l'autre de ces quali-
fications.
Les représentants d'un certain nombre d'Etats qui ont eu à s'exprimer
au Conseil de sécuritéy ont dit que I'occupation de la Namibie par la
République sud-africaine constitue une agression. Ce sont les représen-
tants de l'Algérie,de la Colombie, de la Hongrie, du Népal,du Nigéria,
de la Républiquearabe unie, de l'Union soviétique,de la Zambie l. Les
autres Etats africains ont dit de même à Addis-Abéba en 1966 qu'il
s'agit d'uneoccupation militaire, ce qui est le propre de l'agression selon
toutes les définitions quiont été données de celle-ci. Et le représentant
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, dans son exposéécrit soumis à la Cour,
s'exprime ainsi :
rLe territoire est occupépar la force contre la volontéde l'autorité
internationale habilitée à l'administrer. Cette occupation a un carac-
tère tout aussi belliqueux que s'il s'agissait de I'occupation militaire
du territoire d'un autre Etat. 1)
Une force armée qui viole les frontières d'un pays commet incontes-
tablement une agression. Que serait-ce de I'occupation belliqueuse du
territoire tout entier dont parle lereprésentantdes Etats-Unis d'Amérique?
L'Assembléegénérale l'a précisé:dans sa résolution 2131 (XX) elle a
dit que ((l'intervention arméeest synonyme d'agression 11.
Le représentantdu Pakistan a été plus expressif dans son exposéoral du
15févrierdernier. IIa vu, a bon escient, dans l'acteconsistant Bemployer
la force afin de neutraliser le droit l'autodétermination, un acte d'agres-
sion d'une gravitéd'autant plus grande que le droit à l'autodétermination NAMIBlA (S.W. AFRICA) (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 89
they must still be acceptable to other countries in general or be already
enshrined in the universal conscience of mankind. And in fact it can
be said that the many resolutions, adopted over nearly a quarter of a
century, which condemn racial discrimination and apartheid in South
Africa and, as later extended, in Namibia, disclose an objective standard
which the South African Government is required to apply. The same can
be said with reference to the other human rights. To this the firm attitude
of the international community has borne witness whenever it has taken
a stand against their infringement. Indeed, the mere perusal of the texts
1 have mentioned is edifying in this regard.
12. 1 now come to the legal consequences of the presence of South
Africa in Namibia. In order to determine what these are, that presence
must first of al1be legally classified. 1sit a matter of mere peacef~ilinter-
vention? Or of a military occupation degenerating into aggression? Or a
colonial war? For the legal consequences differ in international law ac-
cording to whether it falls within one or another of these classifications.
The representatives of a certain number of States who have had
occasion to speak in the Security Council have stated that the occupation
of Namibia by the Republic of South Africa is an aggression. The
representatives who so argued were those of Algeria, Colombia, Hungary,
Nepal, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, and
Zambia l.Similarly the other African States stated at A.ddis Ababa in
1966 that it was a military occupation, which is the mark of aggression
according to al1 the definitions which have been given of that term.
And the representative of the United States of America, in the written
statement submitted to the Court, expressed the following view:
"The territory is occupied by force against the will of the inter-
national authority entitled to adininister it. Such occupation is as
much belligerent occupation as the hostile occupation of the ter-
ritory of another State."
An armed force which violates the frontiers of a country indisputably
commits an aggression. What then is the position as to belligerent
occupation of a whole territory, to which the representative of the
United States refers?
The General Assembly has made matters clear: in resolution 2131
(XX) it said that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression".
The representative of Pakistan was more emphatic in his oral state-
ment of 15 Februarq last. He rightly viewed the act of using force with
the object of frustrating the right of self-determination as an act of
aggression, which is al1 the more grave in that the right of self-deter-
See S/PV. 1387-1395. est une norme relevant du jus cogensà laquelle il n'est permis de déroger
en aucune circonstance.
Je me hâte de rappeler que le Conseil de sécuritén'a pas étéen deçà de
toutes ces affirmations. 11 a qualifiél'occupation de la Namibie d'illégale.
II a reconnu, après l'Assemblée généraled , ans sa résolution 269 (1969)
((la Iégitimitéde la lutte du peuple de la Namibie contre la présence
illégale des autorités sud-africaines dans le territoire 11;lutte légitime
contre quoi, sinon contre une agression? C'est une interprétation logique
à laquelle il n'y a pas de réponse possible. Cela résulte d'ailleurs non
seulement de la logique des choses, mais du texte mêmede la Charte.
L'article 51, en effet, n'autorise la défense ou la lutte légitimeque dans le
cas où l'on réagitcontre une agression armée. C'est donc d'une agression
armée qu'il s'agit du moment que le Conseil de sécuritéproclame la
Iégitimitéde la défense ou de la lutte contre l'occupant étranger, dont
l'acte ne peut être, en conséquence, qu'une agression. C'est dans ce
contexte qu'il faut comprendre l'expression du Conseil, rappelée par la
Cour au paragraphe 109 de l'avis, ((que l'occupation continue du terri-
toire de la Namibie par les autorités sud-africaines constitue une atteinte
agressive à l'autoritédes Nations Unies 11.
L'agression commise par l'Afrique du Sud à l'endroit de la Namibie
est d'autant plus grave qu'elle s'est traduite, en fait et nonobstant les
dénégationsdu Gouvernement sud-africain, en une véritable annexion.
Celle-ci est établie sans conteste par des faits qu'il n'est pas possible de
récuser. J'en citeles principaux dont il est facile de dégagerle sens et la
portée :
1) Le Soutl~ West Afiica Affairs Amendment Act de 1949 supprime
de la constitution du territoire toute référenceau mandat.
2) Le Gouvernement sud-africain soutient qu'il occupe le territoire
du Sud-Ouest africain en vertu de la conquête et de la prescription
acquisitive.
3) Dans les seize actes législatifs suivants, l'Union, ou I'Etat, ou la
République sont définiscomme englobant le Sud-Ouest africain:
a) le Terrorisnl Act de 1967;
b) le Border Control Act de 1967;
le War PensionsAct de 1967 ;
c)
d) le Wool Act de 1967;
e) le Armaments Dei~elopme~a itndProductionAct de 1968;
.f) le Human SciencesResearclzAct de 1968;
g) leProfessional Engineers' Act de 1968 ;
le CompaniesAmendtnent Act de 1969;
h)
i) leLand Bank Amendment Act de 1969 ;
j) le National Monuments Act de 1969;
k) le Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act de 1970;
1) leLand Surrey Act de 1970; mination is a norrn of the nature of jus cogens, derogation frorn which
is not permissible under any circumstances.
1 hasten to recall that the Security Council has used terms no less
forceful. Tt described the occupation of Namibia as illegal. In its resolu-
tion 269 (1969), following the General Assernbly, it recognized "the
legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Narnibia against the illegal
presence of the South African authorities in the territory"; a legitimate
struggle against what, if not against an aggressionYhis is a logical
interpretation, no refutation of which is possible. Tt follows not only
from the logic of things but also from the actual text of the Charter.
For Article51 only authorizes self-defence [légitimedéfense] or legitimate
struggle in cases of response to armed attack [agression armée]. Thus
once the Security Council proclairns the legitirnacy of a defence or of a
struggle against a foreign occupier, it is an armed attack iagression
armée! which is in question, and the occupier's act cannot consequently
be anything other than an aggression [agression ;. It isin this context
that one must understand the Council's expression, mentioned by the
Court in paragraph 109 of the Opinion, "that the continued occupation
of the territory of Namibia by the South African authorities constitutes
an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations".
The aggression committed by South Africa with regard to Narnibia is
the more serious in that, de facto and notwithstanding the South African
Government's denials, it has turned into a veritable annexation. This can
be indisputablq proved by facts which cannot be denied. 1 will quote
the more important of these, the meaning and significance of which it is
easy to discern :
il) The South West Africa Affairs Amendrnent Act of 1949 deleted
al1 references to the Mandate from the Constitution of the Territory.
(2) The South African Government contends that it occupies the Ter-
ritory of South West Africa by conquest or by acquisitive prescription.
(3)In the 16following piecesof legislation, the "Union", or the "State",
or the "Republic" of South Africa is defined as including South West
Africa :
(a) the Terrorism Act of 1967;
(h) the Border Control Act of 1967;
(c) the War Pensions Act of 1967;
(d) the Wool Act of 1967;
(e) the Armaments Developrnent and Production Act of 1968:
(f) the Human Sciences Research Act of 1968;
(g) the Professional Engineers' Act of 1968;
(12) the Companies Amendment Act of 1969;
(i) the Land Bank Amendment Act of 1969;
(j) the National Monuments Act of 1969;
(k) the Births, Ma~riages and Deaths Registration Act of 1970:
(1) the Land Survey Act of 1970;91 NAMIBIE(S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
m) leLand Surveyors' Registration Registration Actde 1970;
n) leMaintenanceActde1970;
O) leNational SuppliesProcurement Act de 1970;
p) le Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act de 1970.
4) Le South West A.fricaAffairs Amendment Act de 1949, qui réalise
I'annexion au niveau de la constitution en représentant les Namibiens
au parlement de Pretoria.
L'annexion de la Namibie ainsi réaliséepar l'Afrique du Sud est un acte
d'agression qualifié.Un exemple mémorable de cette sorte d'agression
est donné par l'historique déclaration de Moscou du 30 octobre 1943,
formuléepar l'Union soviétique,les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et
la Chine, qualifiant d'agression l'occupation et l'annexion de l'Autriche
par l'Allemagne hitlérienne et affirmant solennellement qu'ils ne la
reconnaîtraient pas. Que I'annexion d'un territoire par un simple déplace-
ment de forces ou par la présence de forces étrangèressoit rangéepar
cette déclaration parmi les actes d'agression, cela signifiequel'on donne
à l'agression uneportéeplus étendueque celle de la notion stricto sensu
d'attaque armée. Cela se conçoit d'ailleurs sans difficulté,car l'occupa-
tion et I'annexion réalisentles buts ultimes de l'agression, entraînant la
destruction de l'entité objet de celle-ci. En définition l'occupation de
l'Autriche en vue de son annexion serait qualifiéed'agression, et I'occu-
pation de la Namibie suivie de son annexion ne le serait pas? C'est ce
que la Cour n'apas voulu en rappelant, au paragraphe 109de l'avis,qu'au
paragraphe 3 du dispositif de la résolution269 (1969),le Conseil décidait
que ((l'occupation continue du territoire de la Namibie par les autorités
sud-africaines constitue une atteinte agressive à l'organisation des
Nations Unies 1).L'Assemblée généralaevait déjà déclaré dans sa résolu-
tion 2074 (XX) que ((toute intervention visant à annexer une partie ou
l'ensemble du Sud-Ouest africain constitue un acte d'agression 1).En
effet, si le droit ancien, celui de l'acte de Berlin de 1885et des traités du
Bardo et d'Algésiras, et de nombre d'autres, tolérait la conquête et
I'annexion - dont le comportement de l'Afrique du Sud semble êtreune
des dernières manifestations - le droit moderne, celui de la Charte des
Nations Unies, des pactes de Bogota et d'Addis-Abéba,les condamnent
sans recours. a annexio n'est rien de moins que la négation du droit
nouveau d'autodétermination. Aussi les Nations Unies ont rappeléplus
d'une fois que I'acquisition d'unterritoire nepeut sefaire par l'usageou la
menace de la force. Dans sadernièrerésolution2628(XXV)du4 novembre
1970,l'Assemblée général(e(réaffirmeque l'acquisition de territoires par
la force est inadmissible » et qu'en conséquence lesterritoires occupés
doivent êtrerendus. L'Afrique du Sud n'en a pas moins tentédejustifier
son occupation continue de la Namibie, jusque devant laCour, en soute-
nant qu'elle s'ytrouve par droit de conquêteou par l'effetde la prescrip-
tion acquisitive. La Cour a rejetécette prétention aux paragraphes 85 et
86 de l'avis. L'argument le plus catégorique aurait étéque la conquête (m)the Land Surveyors' Registration Act of 1970:
(n) the Maintenance Act of 1970;
(O) the National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970;
(p) the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Oïders Act of 1970.
(4) The South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act of 1949 effects
annexation at constitutional level, by providing for representation of the
Namibians in the Pretoria Parliament.
The annexation of Namibia by South Africa is definitely an act of
aggression. A menlorable example of that kind of aggression is recorded
iiithe historic Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 in which the
Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and China quali-
fied the occupation and annexation of Austria by Hitlerite Germany as
aggression and solemnly declared their refusal to recognize it. The fact
that the annexation of a territory by the mere movement of troops or by
the presence of foreign troops is ranked as an act of aggression by that
Declaration means that the word aggression covers a wider range than
the notion of armed attack strictosensu. This is easily understand-
able, inasmuch as occupation and annexation achieve the ultimate aims
of aggression, bringing about the destruction of the entity which was the
latter's target. As amatter of definition, can the occupation of Austiia
with a view to its annexation be classified as aggression, and the occu-
pation and subsequent annexation of Namibia not be so regarded? This
was what the Court has sought to exclude, when in paragraph 109of the
Opinion it recalled that in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 269 (1969)
the Security Council decided "that the continued occupation of the ter-
ritory of Namibia by the South African authorities constitutes an ag-
gressive encroachment on the authority of the United Nations". The
General Assembly had stated earlier in resolution 2074 (XX) that "any
attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West
Africa constitutes an act of aggression". For while the law of former
times, as in the 1885Act of Berlin and the Treaties of Bardo and Algéci-
ras and numerous other treaties, tolerated conquest and annexation, of
which South Africa's conduct appears to be one of the last examples,
modern law, that of the United Nations Charter,the Pact of Bogota and
the Charter of Addis Ababa, condemns them beyond reprieve. Annexa-
tion is nothing lesshan the negation of the new law of self-determination.
Thus the United Nations has rziterated that acquisition of a territory
may not be effected by the use or the threat of force. In its recent reso-
Iution 2628 (XXV), of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly "re-
affirms that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible", and
that consequently the occupied territories must be restored. None the
less, South Africa has throughout, and even before the Court, sought to
justify its continued occupation of Namibia by claiming to be there by
right of conquest or by the effect of acquisitive prescription. The Court
has dismissed this claim in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Opinion. The 92 NAMIRIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN OP. IND. AMMOUN)
et la piescription acquisitive ont disparu complètement du droit nouveau
qui a condamné la guerre et proclamé la souveraineté inaliénable.
!3. La présence de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie étant ainsi qualifiée
d'illégale et de belliqueuse et, en définitive, considéréecomme une
agression, quelles en sont les conséquencesjuridiques?
La reconnaissance par les Nations Unies de la légitimitéde la lutte du
peuple namibien contre l'agression sud-africaine n'est rien de moins
qu'une reconnaissance de belligérance. Elle transforme les hostilités
entre un Etat et un autre sujet de droit, ainsi que l'est le peuple namibien,
en guerre internationale, au regard des auteurs de la reconnaissance, à
savoir tous les Etats Membres des Nations Unies. En conséquence,
quand l'agression est le fait, comme en J'espèce, d'un Etat contre un
peuple dans le but de le subjuguer par la force, quelles que soient les
manifestations de celle-ci, on ne peut lui dénierle caractère d'une guerre
ou, pour le moins, d'un état de belligérance l,avec tous les effets juri-
diques qui s'y rattachent, dont en particulier le statut de neutralité
s'imposant aux Etats tiers.
Si les dispositions de la Charte concernant la sécurité collectiveavaient
pu êtremises en Œuvre selon la lettre et dans l'esprit de la conférence de
San Fransisco, il n'y aurait pas eu de place pour la neutralité, du moins
entre Etats Membres des Nations Unies. La Charte avait en effet prévu,
d'une part, une armée internationale (art. 43 à 47), et le désarmement
(art.1 1, par. 1;art. 26 et art. 47, par. 1). Mais la préparation militaire a
étédélaisséedepuis 1948, et le désarmement, qui languit, a fait place,
dès le début, à un intense armement nucléaire et classique couvrant
actuellement lesguerres qui se poursuivent un peu partout dans le monde.
Ceci d'une part. II y eut, d'autre part, les dispositions concernant la
sécuritécollective (art. 39 et suiv.), dont l'armée internationale devait
êtrele bras séculier. Le sort de la nouvelle institution destinée à mettre
fin aux guerres ne fut pas plus heureux. L'action du Conseil de sécuritéa
étéparalyséepar le veto, ou par la craintedu veto comme dans la question
de la Namibie. En conséquence, la neutralité subsiste, tant que des guerres
sont toléréesdélibérémentou par impuissance. Cela spécialement pour
les Etats Membres qui, se soustrayant aux obligations découlant des
résolutions des Nations Unies pour quelque motif que ce soit, doivent
pour le moins ne pas contrecarrer l'action ou les mesures adoptées par
l'organisation dont ilsfont partie.
Les obligations des Etats ne participant pas aux hostilités, qui cons-
tituent le statut de neutralité, s'imposent aussi bien en cas de guerre
' L. Cavaré écrivait au sujet du protectorat colonia<Si le protégé conservesa
personnalité, il y a guerre au sens international de l'expression et les lois de la guerre
doivent êtreappliquéesa(Droitinternationalpublicposittome 1,3eéd.,p. 551).Aplus
forte raison en est-il ainsi pour la Namibie, mêmeavant qu'elle ne fût reconnue par
les Nations Unies par la résolution 2372 (XXII). Voir aussi le no2 de cette opinion.
80 rriost categorical argument on the point would have been that conquest
and acquisitive p~escription have totally disappeared from the new law
which hascondemned warand proclaimed the inalienability of sovereignty.
13. The presence of South Africa in Namibia having thus been defined
as illegal and warlike, and, in short, regarded as aggression, what are
the legal consequences of this?
The recognition by the United Nations of the legitimacy of the Na-
mibian people's struggle against the South African aggression is nothing
lessthan a recognition of belligerency. For the recognizing States, namely
the States Members of the United Nations, it transforms the hostilities
between a State and another subject of law, which the Namibian people
is, into an international war.Consequently, when there is aggression by
a State against a people for the purpose of subjugating it by force, then
whatever itsmanifestations, it cannot be denied that it has the character
of a war, or at least of a state of belligerency', with al1the legal effects
attarhing thereto, including in particular the status of neutrality imposed
on third-party States.
If the provisions of the Charter concerning collective security could
have been implemented according to the letter and in the spirit of
the San Francisco Conference, there would have been no place for
neutrality, at least among States Men~bersof the United Nations. The
Charter provided on the one hand for an international army (Arts. 43
to 47) and disarmament (Art. 11, para. 1; Art. 26, and Art. 47, para. 1).
But military preparations have been neglected since 1948, and in place
of disarmament, which is in the doldrums, there has from the beginning
beenan intensiveprocess of nuclearand conventional armament spreading
into the wars bein"carried on more or lessal1overthe world. On the other
hand, there were the provisions concerning collective security (Arts. 39
et seq.), the executive counterpart of which was to be the international
army: The fate of the new institution intended to put an end to wars was
no better than that described above. The Security Council's action has
been paralysed by the veto, or by the fear of a veto as in the Namibia
question. Consequently, neutrality persists so long as wars are tolerated,
whether deliberûtely or through weakness. This applies particularly in
the case of the States Members which, evading the obligations deriving
from the United Nations resolutions, for some reason or another, are
at leastunder an obligation not to hinder the activities of or the mea-
sures adopted by the Organization of which they are Members.
The obligations of States not participating in hostilities, which con-
stitute the status of neutrality, are applicable in the case of mere belli-
' L. Cavaré wrote as follows concerning coloniprotectorates:"If the protected
country retains its personality, then there is a war in the international meaning of
3rd ed., p. 551). Afortiori, this is the case for Namibia even before it was recognized
by the United Nations by resolution 2372 (XXII). See also above section 2. qu'en cas de simple belligérance.II en serait ainsi si I'on considérait que
les rapports entre l'Afrique du Sud et la Namibie ne sont que ceux d'un
état de belligéranceentre collectivitésdont l'une ne constitue pas encore
un Etat. L'exemple classique est celuide la Guerre de sécessiondesEtats-
Unis d'Amérique. Que I'on considère donc les Namibiens en état de
guerre ou en un étatd'insurrection contre l'Afrique du Sud reconnu par
la communauté internationale, les obligations des Etats tiers sont claires:
ces Etats sont soumis au statut de neutralitétel qu'il résulte desrèglesde
Washington de 1871,des Veet XIIIeconventions adoptées àla conférence
de la paix de La Haye de 1907et devenues règlescoutumières, ainsi que
des dispositions pertinentes des lois et coutumes de la guerre. Ce qui veut
direabstentionet impartialité.
Pour déterminer la notion d'impartialité, il faut faire la distinction
entre l'agresseur et la victime '. Un exemple notable à retenir est celui de
la politique adoptée par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui a conduit à la
promulgation des actes dit Cash and Carry et Lend-Lease Act. Ces actes
furent des exceptions aux règlesde la neutralité fondéessur l'intention
de donner assistance aux victimes de l'agression '. Pour ce qui concerne
certains Etats occidentaux qui continuent à fournir à l'Afrique du Sud
armes, munitions et matérielde guerre, leur attitude contrevient au statut
de neutralité dont ils avaient jadis profité 3, car le devoir d'impartialité,
au lieu d'être interprété par eux en faveur de la victime, est violéau
bénéfice de l'agresseur. Ilsdoivent s'abstenir deprocéder à cesfournitures.
La résolution 282 (1970) du Conseil de sécuritéprononçant l'embargo
sur les armes uniquement contre l'Afrique du Sud est dans la ligne de la
pratique internationale.
14. Le devoir d'abstention que comporte le statut de neutralité doit
' G. Schwarzenberger explique cette distinction à propos de la mise en Œuvre du
pacte Briand-Kellogg en ces termes:
cParties to the Kellogg Pact which remain at peace with the aggressor are
entitled, by way of reprisal, toepart from the observance of strict neutrality
between the Pact-breaker and his victim, and to discriminate against theggres-
SOT.
II donne en exemple celui du destroyer deal entre les Etats-Unis et la Grande-
Bretagne et I'Aid Britain Act de 1941. Il ajoute par une comparaison pertinente:
As with Members of the United Nations (Art. 2 (5) of the Charter), parties
to treaties may even beunder a legal duty to discriminate against an aggressor
State.1(A Manual of International Law, vol. 1, 4e éd.,p. 185.)
Voir E. Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 1954, p. 451 et 477, qui
rappelle:
ilThe purpose may be to assist the victim of aggression ... in which case
American writers have used the expression (supporting State 11.
R. Sherwood, dans ses mémoires intitulés Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 221,
évoquant l'élande reconnaissance de Churchill, écrit: [...and from this came the
vast concept which Churchill later described as1a new Magna Charta ...the most
unselfish and unsordid financial actof any country in al1History». gerency just as in the case of war. This would be relevant if it were con-
sidered that the relations between South Africa and Namibia are only a
state of belligerency between communities, one of which is not yet a
State. The classic exaniple of this is the War of Secession in the United
States. Therefore, whether the Namibians are regarded as being in a
state of war or in a state of insurrection against South Africa, recognized
by the international community, the obligations of third States are clear:
those States are bound by the status of neutrality as it derives from the
1871 Washington Rules, and Conventions V and XII[ adopted by the
1907 Hague Peace Conference-which have becoine binding rules of
customary law-and from the relevant provisons of the laws and customs
of war. This means: abstention and impartiality.
In order to define the concept of impartiality, a distinction must be
made between the aggressor and the victim of aggression'. A noteworthy
1 exarnple is that of the polic) adopted by the United States of Amelica,
which led to the promulgation of the Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease
Acts. These Acts were exceptions to the general rules of neutrality,
founded on a desire to assist the victims of aggression2. With regard to
certain Western States which continue to supply South Africa with arms,
ammunition and war rnaterial, their attitude contravenes the status of
neutrality,from which they have previously benefited 3,for instead of the
obligation of impartiality being interpreted by them in favour of the
victim, it is violated for the benefit of the aggressor. They should abstain
from such deliveries. Security Council resolution 282 (1970), pronouncing
the arms embargo against South Africa alone, is in line with international
pract ice.
14. The obligation of abstention entailed by the status of neutrality
--
' G. Schwarzenberger explains the distinction in these words in connection with
the implementation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact:
"Parties to the Kellogg Pact which rernain at peace with the aggressor are
entitled, by way of reprisal, to depart frorn the observance of strict neutrality
between the Pact-breaker and his victim and to discriminate against taggres-
sor."
As examples in support of this rule he cites the Destroyer Deal between the United
States and Great Britain, and the"Aid Britain" Act of 1941. He adds in a relevant
comparison :
"As with Members of the United Nations (Art. 2 (5) of the Charter), parties
to treaties may even beunder a legal duty to discriminate against an aggressor
State." (A Manlral of International Law, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 185.)
See E. Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 1954, pp. 451 and 477,
who mentions that:
"The purpose may be to assist the victim of aggression ... in which case
American writers have used the expression 'supporting State'" (p. 451).
R. Sherwood, in his book of memoirs entitled Roosevelt and Hopkins, writes
on p. 221, of Churchill's overjoyed gratitude: ". .and frorn this came the vast
concept which Churchill later described as 'a new Magna Charta ... the most un-
selfish and unsordid financial act of any coiintry in al1hist"ry'.
81êtredéterminéen prenant en con si dé ratiol^ e développement de l'arme-
ment moderne et la diversité des moyensd'assistance qui peuvent être
fournis aux belligérants. Les différentesinterdictions qu'impose ledroit
des gens peuvent d'ailleurs doubler et renforcer, ou complétsr, celles qui
ont étéénoncéesdans les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité
en raison de la violation de la Charte et du droit international. Les Etats
peuvent ainsi êtretenus à diverses obligations en vertu de plus d'une
sourced'obligation. Telles sont lesinterdictions:
1) De toute assistance militaire, non seulement de fait, mais aussi en
exécutiond'un traité d'alliance ou de défense bilatéralou multilatéral.
Les obligations stipulées par ces traités ne peuvent en effet prévaloir
contre celle ne pas assister un Etat agresseur. Un traitéqui permettrait
l'aideà l'agression serait immoral et contraireà l'ordre international et
ne saurait par conséquentêtretolérépar la communauté internationale.
Les traités d'alliance prévoient d'ailleurs généralementqu'ils ne jouent
pas si cen'estpas lecocontractant quia étéattaqué.
2) De toutes fournitures d'armes nucléaires ou classiqueset de toutes
munitions; de navires, aéronefs ou autres engins de guerre, ainsi que
d'hélicoptèresarmés ou de transport; de fusées,de missiles, d'équipe-
ments électroniques d'utilité militaire; de toutes armesutilisables contre
lesguérillas,ycompris lenapalm, lesarmes chimiques et bactériologiques,
les gaz de toutes sortes. De mêmeque les traitésd'alliance ou de défense,
les accords de fourniture de tout ce qui précède nesauraient recevoir
exécution en faveur de l'agresseur, pour quelque motif que ce soit,
défensecommune ou nécessitéséconomiques.
3) De toutes fournitures de pièces détachéeset de tout matériel
susceptibles de servirà la production ou à l'entretien d'armes de guerre
ou de munitions, ou d'engins nucléaires, ainsi que de tous brevets ou
licencesyrelatifs.
4) De l'émigration ou de l'envoi de techniciens appelés à travailler
pour l'industrie d'armement, ou pour la formation de personnel militaire;
de la transmission de connaissances militaires ou techniques, y compris
les connaissances relatives à l'usage pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire en
raison de son adaptation possible aux usages de guerre.
5) De toutes fournitures de pétrole et de produits pétroliers et de gaz
naturel en raison de leur importance capitale pour la guerre. Si cette
interdiction est de natureà nuire à l'industrie sud-africaine, elle ne peut
que servir plus efficacement à déterminer l'Afrique du Sud à mettre fin
à son agression '.
6) De la fourniture de toutes facilitésde transport des armes, engins,
munitions et autresproduits susmentionnés.
7) De toute assistance économique, industrielle ou financière, sous
Voir au sujet de la fourniture du pétrole, M. Erik Castrén, ThePresent Law of
War and Neutrality, 1954, p. 474.rnust be defined having regard to the development of modern arrnaments
and the variety of means of assistance which rnay be supplied to the
belligerents. The different prohibitions imposed by international law
rnay rnoreover duplicate and reinforce or may supplement those laid
down in the relevant Security Council resolutions, on account of viola-
tion of the Charter and of international law. States rnay thus be under
various obligations by virtue of more than one source of obligation.
Exarnples of such prohibitions are:
(1) The prohibition of al1 military assistance, not only de.facto, but
also in irnplementation of a treaty of alliance or of bilateral orltilateral
defence. The obligations contained in those treaties cannot prevail over
the obligation not to assist an aggressor State. A treaty which enabled
assistance to be given to an aggressor would be immoral and contrary
to international order, and could not therefore be tolerated by the inter-
nctional comrnunity. Further, treaties of alliance generally provide that
they do not operate unless it is the other signatory which was attacked.
(2) The prohibition of the supply of nuclear or conventional arrns
and of al1ammunition; of the supply of ships, aircraft or other military
machines, and of arrned or transport helicopters; of rockets, missiles
and electronic equipment which can be put to military uses; of al1arms
capable of being used against guerillas, including napalm, chemical and
bacteriological weapons, and gases of al1sorts. As in the case of treaties
of alliance or defence, agreements for the supply of any of the foregoing
may not be irnplemented in favour of the aggressor, for any reason what-
soever, whether of joint defence or of economic necessity.
(3) The prohibition of the supply of spare parts and an) equiprnent
capable of being used for the production or maintenance of arrns or
anmunition or nuclear devices, and patents oi licences relating thereto.
(4) The prohibition of the emigration or despatch of technicians for
work in the armainents industry, or for the training of rnilitary personnel;
on the transmission of military or technical information, including in-
formation relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on account of
the possibility of its being adapted to military purposes.
(5) The prohibition of the supply of oil and petroleum products and
of ilatural gas on account of their vital importance for war. If this pro-
hibition is such as to harm South African industry, that can only be a
more effective way of bringing South A.fricato put an end to its.aggres-
sion '.
(6) The prohibition of the supply of al1facilities for the transport of
the above-mentioned arms; machinery, munitions and other products.
(7) The prohibition of al1economic, industrial or financial assistance,
' On the subject of oil supplies see Professor Erik Castrén, The PLawenof
War andNeutrnlity. 1954, p. 474.
82 forme de don, de prêt,de crédit, d'avanceou de garantie, ou sous toute
autre forme l.Cette interdiction ne se limite pas aux Etats. Elle s'étend
naturellement aux institutions dans lesquelles les Etats ont un droit de
vote, telles que la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le
le développement (BIRD) et ses filiales: l'Association internationale de
développementet la Société financièrienternationale; la BIRD a, comme
on sait, méconnu délibérémenltes résolutions de l'Assembléegénérale
et du Conseil de sécurité,continuant à accorder à l'Afrique du Sud une
aide se chiffrant par centaines de millions de dollars qui constitue en fait
une aide à l'action illicite des autorités sud-africaines en Namibie con-
trairement aux butset objectifs des Nations Unies 2.
Toutes les interdictions qui précèdent s'appliquent aux Etats comme
aux associations d'Etats et aux organisations internationales publiques
et privées.
En outre, les gouvernements doivent faire duediligencepour empêcher
tous actes individuels ou collectifs contrairesà la neutralité.Cette obliga-
tion viselesnationaux et lesressortissants, ainsi que lesrésidentsétrangers.
Faire duediligencesignifieque les mesures adéquates doiventêtreprises,
y compris des mesures législativescomportant des sanctions. Car 1'Etat
qui s'oblige engage ses propres ressortissants et ceux qui vivent sous sa
loi, et doit recourir aux mesures de tous ordres, législatives,adminis-
tratives ou judiciaires, par lesquellesil gouverne. II ne suffit donc pas de
refuser aux contrevenants, comme le propose le Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis d'Amérique,la protection diplomatique.
C'est en adoptant ces mesures dictéespar le statut de neutralité que
les Etats, et notamment les grandes puissances, politiquement et finan-
cièrementparlant, amèneront l'Afrique du Sud à abandonner sa politique
actuelle, dans l'intérêtde la justice, de la paix et de la coopération
internationales.
15. Il était souhaitable que la Cour eût dégagétoutes les conséquences
juridiques de l'agression que le Conseil de sécuritéa constatée. Ce qui
lui était demandén'était pas limité à l'effetde la résolution 276 (1970) à
laquelle la résolution 284 (1970) requérant l'avis se réfère.Les consé-
quences juridiques sur lesquelles elle avait à se prononcer sont toutes
celles résultant de la présencemêmede l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie,
Voir au sujet des interdictions d'ordre financier, M. Paul Reuter, . 321.t.p,
l'unité de suffrage ont toutes décidéde s'abstenir de toutà l'Afrique du Sud.ue de
Telles sont l'Unesco, l'OIT, la FAO, l'OMS. L'attitude récalcitrante de la BIRD et
du FMI s'explique par le procédédes votes multiples à base capitalistyrègne,
accordant aux grandes puissances financières un nombre de votes calculé suivant
l'importance de leur participation au capital de ces deux institutioCe sont
principalement les Etâts que l'Assembléegénérale aqualifiésde partenaires commer-
ciaux de ['Afrique du Sud. Aussi faut-il que les Etats tiennent désormais pour acquis
qu'ils sont tenus de conformer leur attitude dans ces institutions aux décisions des
Nations Unies. in the form of gifts, loans, credit, advances or guarantees, or in any other
form l.This prohibition is not confined to States. Ttnaturallyextends to
institutions in which States have voting rights, such as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Develop-
ment Association and the International Finance Corporation; as is well
known, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has
deliberately disregarded the resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Security Council, by continuing to grant South Africa aid amounting
to hundreds of millions of dollars, which is in fact aid to the illegal ac-
tivity of the South African authorities in Namibia, contrary to the objects
and DurDosesof the United Nations 2.
AI\ tge above prohibitions apply to States and to associations of
States and to public and private international organizations.
Furthermore, governments must show due diligence in preventing îny
individual or collective act contrary to neutrality. This obligation relates
to nationals and subjects, and to foreign residents. Showing due dili-
gence means that adequate measures must be taken, including legislative
measures providing for penalties. For a State which undertakes an obli-
gation commits its own subjects and those who live under its law. and
must employ every kind of means, legislative, administrative and judicial,
by which it governs. It is not therefore suficient to refuse diplomatic
protection to those who transgress; as has been suggested by the Govern-
ment of the United States.
It is by taking these rneasures, which are dictated bythe status of neutra-
lity, that States, and in particular those which are, politically and finan-
cially speaking, the Great Powers, will bring South Africa to abandon
its present policy, in the interests of justice, peace and international co-
operation.
15. It was to be desired that the Court should deduce al1 the legal
consequences from the aggression observed by the Security ~ouncil.
The request made of it was not confined to the effect of resolution 276
(1970), referred to in resolution 284 (1970) requesting the opinion. The
legal consequences upon which it had to pronounce are al1those resulting
from the very presence of South Africa in Namibia, which is the first
' See in connection with prohibitions of a financial nature, Professor PaulReuter,
op. cir.p. 321.
The specialized agencies in which the voting is based on the democratrule of
one State, one vote, have al1 decided to refrain from any support to South Africa:
for example, Unesco, ILO, FA0 and WHO. The recalcitrant attitude of the IBRD
and the IMF is to be explained by the multiple voting system on a capitalist basis
which operates therein, by which the financial Great Powers have a number of votes
calculated according to thsize of their share in the capital of these two institutions.
These Powers are primarily the States which the General Assembly has described as
commercial partners of South Africa. In future, Statesougto take it as a matter of
course that they should bring their attitude in these institutions into line with deci-
sions of the United Nations. 96 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN () P.IND.AMMOUN)
laquelle constitue la mention première de larésolution284 (1970)et dont
la résolution 276 (1970) est la condition. Cette présence a justifié les
résolutions 282 (1970) et 283 (1970), que la Cour ne pouvait négliger
comme ne rentrant pas dans le cadre de la demande d'avis. Car en effet
la résolution283 (1970)réaffirme,d'une part, la résolution276 (1970)et,
d'autre part, la résolution 282 (1970) dans les termes suivants:
((Réaffirmantsa résolution 282 (1970) concernant l'embargo sur
les armes contre le Gouvernement sud-africain et l'importance de
cette résolution pour le territoire et le peuple de Namibie ..))
Ces deux résolutions, 282 (1970) et 283 (1970) touchant la présence
illégalede l'Afrique du Suden Namibie, ont d'ailleurs étéadoptéesavant
la demande d'avis, larésolution283 (1970)uniquement en raison de cette
présence illégale,principal objetde la demande d'avis, et la résolution282
(1970) visant l'apartheid au-delà des frontières de l'Afrique du Sud,
ainsi que la politique raciste de cette dernière en Afrique australe,
comprenant la Namibie. La résolution 282 (1970) s'exprime ainsi:
((Réitérantsa condamnation de la politique malfaisante et odieuse
d'apartheid et des mesures prises par le Gouvernement sud-africain
pour appliquer et étendre cette politique au-delà de ses frontières,
..............................
Profondémentinqzrietdu refus persistant du Gouvernement sud-
africain de renoncer à sa politique raciste et de se conformer aux
résolutions zdoptéespar le Conseil de sécuritéet l'Assemblée géné-
rale sur cette question et d'autres questions relatives à l'Afrique
australe.»
Ce dernier paragraphe de la résolution 282 (1970), en se référant
((auxrésolutions adoptéespar leConseil de sécurité »,visait, en particulier,
la résolution 276 (1970).
16. Quoique la Cour n'ait pasfait mention des résolutions 282 (1970)
et 283 (1970), elle n'en est pas moins arrivée à des conclusions qui ne
diffèrent pas substantiellement de celles qui découlent de ces deux
résolutions et du statut de neutralité.
Je commence par les conséquencesd'ordre économique, àsavoir celles
énuméréep sar la résolution283 (1970)et celles, plus complètes,résultant
du statut de neutralité citées au paragraphe 14, no 7, de la présente
opinion individuelle. L'avis n'a pas manqué d'opiner, au dispositif, dans
le sens que les Etats Membres des Nations Unies ont l'obligation «de
s'abstenir de tous actes et en particulier de toutes relations avec le
Gouvernement sud-africain ...qui constitueraient une aide ou une
assistance)) à l'Afrique du Sud. La prohibition de l'aide économique
prévuepar la résolution 283 (1970) et par le statut de neutralité a ainsi
étéreprise en substance par l'avis de la Cour.
Le dispositif, ainsi qu'ilressort de la lecture de l'ensemble de l'avis,faitpoint rnentioned in resolution 284 (1970), and which is conditioned by
resolution 276 (1970).That presence was the justification for resolutions
282(1970)and 283 (1970),which the Court could not leaveouï of account
as not falling within the request for advisory opinion. For resolution 283
(1970)re-affirrns,first resolution 276 (1970)and secondly resolution 282
(1970), in the following terrns:
"Re-afirming its resolution 282 (1970) on the arrns embargo
against the Governrnent of South Africa and the significance of that
resolution with regard to the territory and people of Narnibia, ..."
These two resolutions, 282(1970)and 283 (1970),concerning the illegal
presence of South Africa in Namibia were, what is more, adopted before
the request for opinion; resolution 283 (1970)was adopted solely because
of that illegalpresence, which isthe principal subject-rnatter of the request
for opinion, and resolution 282 (1970) had in view apartheid beyond the
frontiers of South Africa, as well as the policies of that Governrnent in
southern Africa, including Narnibia. Resolution 282 (1970) reads as fol-
lows :
"Reiterating its condernnation of the evil and abhorrent policies
of apartheid and the rneasures being taken by the Governrnent of
South Africa to enforce and extend those policies beyond its borders,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . .
"Gra~elyconcerned by the persistent refusal of the Governrnent of
South Africa to abandon its racist policies and to abide by the reso-
lutions of the Security Council and of the General Assernbly on this
question and others relating to southern Africa. .."
This latter paragraph of resolution 282 (1970), by rnaking reference to
"the resolutions of the Security Council", contemplated resolution 276
(1970)in particular.
16. Although the Court has made no mention of resolutions 282(1970)
and 283 (1970),it has nonetheless reached conclusions which do not differ
in substance from those which follow from those two resolutions and
from the status of neutrality.
1 will begin with economic consequences, namely those enurnerated
in resolution 283 (1970) and the more cornplete set, resulting frorn the
status of neutrality, which are rnentioned in section 14, paragraph 7,
of the present separate opinion. The Advisory Opinion has not failed to
express the view,inthe operative clause, that mernber States of the United
Nations are under obligation "to refrain from any acts and in particular
any dealings with the Government of South Africa ... lending support
or assistance to" South Africa. The prohibition of economic assistance
provided for in resolution 283 (1970) and by the status of neutrality has
thus been substantially adopted by the Opinion of the Court.
Itisclear from a reading of the whole of the Opinion that the operative97 NAMIBIE (S.-O. AFRICAIN) (OP. IND. AMMOUN)
partie intégrante avec les motifs et s'explique par eux. Mais mêmeà la
lumière des motifs, des détails manquent qu'il eût été utile de préciser.
La question se posait de savoir s'il fallait que les conséquencesjuridiques
que la Cour a étéappeléeà dégagersoient condenséesen quelques règles
principales, ou s'il y avait lieu de les énonceren termes aussi détaillésque
possible. La Cour a opté pour la première solution, laissant aux organes
politiques le soin d'en faire l'application. Cela ne me paraît pas avoir été
tout à fait le désir du Conseil de sécurité.Sans doute une formulation
analytique poussée à l'extrême n'eût pas été exhaustive eetût méconnu
parfois des circonstances forcément imprévisibles. Néanmoins, une
énumération plus complète mais qui ne se serait pas perdue dans les
détails aurait pu êtreplus satisfaisante et aurait plus sûrement tari les
sources d'interprétations faites parfois au gré des tendances ou des
intérêtsnationaux.
Les précisions suceptibles de compléter l'avis peuvent, en conséquence
de ce qui a étédit plus haut, se déduire des énonciations du statut de
neutralité et de la résolution283 (1970). Quoique non retenue par l'avis,
cette résolution bénéficiede la règle qui y a été énoncé erga omnes, à
savoir que les décisions du Conseil de sécurités'imposent impérativement
en vertu de l'articl25 de la Charte. Telles seraient, à titre énumératifnon
limité,les interdictions d'ordre économique qui en découlent:
1) Les Etats doivent s'interdire et interdire à leurs nationaux ou
ressortissants et aux résidents étrangers, sous peine de sanctions, de
participer aux sociétés ouentreprises sud-africaines ayant leur siègesocial
ou étantenregistréesen territoire namibien, ou y ayant des établissements,
représentations ou agences, soit à titre technique, soit sur le plan financier
par acquisition d'actions, d'obligations ou de parts sociales.
2) Les Etats ne doivent pas autoriser que les actions et obligations de
ces sociétés soient cotéesen bourse ou qu'elles y fassent l'objet de trans-
actions. Autrement ils faciliteraient l'écoulement de biens détournésou
spoliés, compte tenu des responsabilités civiles ou commerciales qui s'y
rattachent.
3) Les exploitations pétrolières, diamantifères, aurifères et autres
exploitations des richesses du sol et du sous-sol de la Namibie, de ses
eaux territoriales ou de son plateau continental, effectuéespar l'Afrique
du Sud ou ses ressortissants, ou avec son autorisation, constituant une
extorsion de biens namibiens par l'autorité occupante ou avec son con-
cours, la République sud-africaine devra rendre compte au futur Etat
namibien des revenus et taxes qu'elle en a retirésou perçus. Les Etats qui
auraient retiré des bénéficesde ces exploitations, soit sous forme de
concessions ou de participation au capital investi, pourraient être
responsables vis-à-vis de la Namibie solidairement avec 1'Etat sud-
africain. Ces Etats, leurs ressortissants compris, doivent s'abstenir
d'acquérir les produits de ces exploitations afin de ne pas encourir laclause is integrally connected with the reasoning, and is explained by the
reasoning. But even in the light of the reasoning, there are missing
details which it might have been useful to clear up. The question arose
whether the legal consequences which the Court was called upon to
deduce should be summed up in a few major rules, or whether they should
be laid down in terms as detailed as possible. The Court has chosen the
first solution, leaving it to the political organs to effect the application
thereof. This does not seem to me to be quite what the Security Council
wanted. Of course any analytical formulation carried to extremes would
have failed to be exhaustive, and might sometimes have overlooked
circumstances which were necessarily unforeseeable. Nonetheless, a more
complete enumeration, but one which did not lose itself in detail, might
have been more satisfying, and would have been more surely effective in
stopping at the source those interpretations which are sometimes made
to suit national tendencies or interests.
The possible clarifications to supplement the Opinion may, in conse-
quence of what has been said above, be deduced from what is laid down
by the status of neutrality, and by resolution 283 (1970). Although not
mentioned in the Advisory Opinion, this resolution is covered by the
rule which has there been laid down erga omnes, namely thatthe decisions
of the Security Council are imperatively binding by virtue of Article 25
of the Charter. The following is a not exhaustive list of the prohibitions
of an economic kind which result therefrom:
(1) States should debar themselves and should forbid their nationals,
subjects and foreign residents, under penalties, from having any part in
South African companies or undertakings registered or established in
Namibian territory, or having in that territory branches, representatives
or agencies, either by way of technical participation or on the financial
level by the acquisition of stocks, shares or bonds.
(2) States should not authorize the shares and bonds of such compa-
nies to be quoted on the Stock Exchange, or any dealings therein to be
effected. Otherwise, they would be facilitating the disposa1 of assets
acquired by misappropriation or spoliation, taking into account the civil
or commercial responsibilities attaching thereto.
(3) The exploitation of the petroleum, diamond, gold and other resources
of the soi1and sub-soi1of Namibia, its territorial waters or its continental
shelf, carried out by South Africa or its nationals, or with its authori-
zation, is equivalent to the seizure of Namibian assets by, or with the
CO-operation of, the occupying authority, and the Republic of South
Africa must therefore render an account to the future State of Namibia of
the income and taxes which it has derived or collected from such sources.
Any States which have obtained profit from these exploitations, either in
the form of concessions or in the form of participation in the invested
capital, may be held jointly responsible with South Africa towards
Namibia. These States and their subjects must refrain from acquiring any
of the production of these exploitations, in order not to incur civil respon-
85responsabilitécivile d'une complicitépar recel ou achat en connaissance
de cause de biens n'appartenant pas au cédant.
17. Venant au domaine militaire, ilfaut remarquer que le dispositif de
I'avis interdisant toute aide et toute assistance à l'Afrique du Sud est
conçu en des termes très généraux.Mentionnant ((tousactes ))et Itoutes
relations avec le Gouvernement sud-africain », il inclut manifestement
l'aide militaire, cette aide étant sans conteste la plus grave et la plus
grosse de conséquences et, partant, devant être interdite avant toute
autre. Toute fourniture d'armes, de munitions et de matérielde guerre et
toute assistance militaire technique ou scientifique sont désormais
prohibées.Cette règles'applique à tous les Etats, et aucun d'eux nepeut
s'y soustraire pour quelque motif que ce soit: intérêts économiqueo su
stratégiques.
Ainsi qu'il ena été pourles conséquencesd'ordre économique, il reste
à déterminerle détail del'aide militaire prohibée. Commela résolution
283 (1970),la résolution282 (1970)constitue une décisionobligatoire en
vertu de l'article 25 précité;et cela d'autant plus que la résolution 282
(1970)relève, ainsiqu'il a été dit,e la résolution276(1970)par la voiede
la résolution 283 (1970). De toute façon, les faits d'aide ou d'assistance
militaire dont les Etats doivent s'abstenir sont ceux dont l'interdiction
est énoncéepar la résolution 282 (1970) et par le statut de neutralité
mentionnésau paragraphe 14, no" à 6 de cette opinion individuelle.
Dans lecas de chacun des trois documents en cause - l'avis,la résolution
282 (1970) et le statut de neutralité -- il importe de ne pas aider un
agresseur: en conséquenceles mesures à appliquer ne peuvent qu'êtreles
mêmespour répondre à un mêmebesoin.
Certains gouvernements, pour se soustraire dans une certaine mesure à
I'embargosur les armes et le matérielde guerre terrestre, naval et aérien,
ont fait une distinction entre lesarmes et le matériel destinéàêtreutilisés
à l'intérieur,autrement dit à la répression,sur lesquels porterait l'inter-
diction, et les armes et le matériel affectés à la défense extérieure, qui
seraient exclus de I'embargo.
Cette distinction est condamnéepar les faits. Dans les guerres menées
par les puissances coloniales et les Etats mandataires, le matériellourd,
les avions de combat ont été largementutilisés. D'après M. McBride,
secrétaire généra dle la Commission internationale dejuristes, (les armes
lourdes sont souvent employéespour maintenir un régimecolonial, et
elles peuvent êtretrès utiles à un régimecomme celui de l'Afrique du
Sud l))Des blindésfurent effectivementdéployé s Sharpeville, le21mars
1960,lorsque, dans une fusillade, les forces sud-africaines ont tué,selon
un rapport des Nations Unies, un grand nombre de manifestants noirs,
l Sous-comitédu Conseil de sécurit,/AC.17/SR.14, séancedu 24juin 1970. sibility by being involved either as receivers or as purchasers, with notice,
of assets not belonging to the vendor.
17. Turning to rnilitary matters, it should be observed that the passage
in the operative clause of the Opinion forbidding any support or assis-
tance to South Africa is drawn in very general terms. By rnentioning
"any acts" and "any dealings with the Governrnent of South Africa",
itclearly includes rnilitary support, and such support, being indisputably
the rnostserious and the rnost heavy with consequences, must therefore be
forbidden before any other forrn of support. Any supply of arms, rnuni-
tions or war material, and any technical or scientific rnilitary assistance,
are hereafter prohibited. Thisrule applies to al1States, and none of thern
can evade it on any ground whatsoever, e.g., econornic or strategic
interests.
As in the case of econornic consequences, the details of the rnilitary
support which is prohibited rernain to be deterrnined. Like resolution 283
(1970),resolution 282 (1970)is a binding decision by virtue of Article 25,
already referred to; the more soin that resolution 282(1970)is related, as
has been stated, to resolution 276 (1970) through resolution 283 (1970).
In any event, the acts of rnilitary support or assistance from which States
rnust refrain are those the prohibition of which is dictated by resolution
282 (1970)and by the status of neutrality rnentioned in Section 14, para-
graphs 1 to 6, of this separate opinion. Under each of the three documents
in question-the Court's Opinion, resolution 282 (1970)and the status of
neutrality-what rnatters isthat no assistance shall be given to an aggres-
sor: consequently, the rneasures to be applied rnust be the sarne, in
order to meet the sarne need.
Certain governments, in order to sorne extent to evade the embargo
on arrns and rnaterial for land, sea and aerial warfare, have drawn a
distinction between arrns and war rnaterial destined for interna1 use, in
other words for repression-to whichthey admit the prohibition would
apply-and arms and material allocated to external defence, which they
contend would be excluded frorn the embargo.
This distinction is condemned by the facts of the case. In the various
wars waged by the colonial Powers and mandatory States, heavy arma-
ments and rnilitary aircraft were widelyused. According to Mr. McBride,
the Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists, "heavy
weapons were often ernployed to rnaintain a colonial régime,and they
could bevery usefulto a régimelikethat in South Africa '".And armoured
cars were in fact deployed at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, when the
South African police opened fire and according to the United Nations
report, killed a large nurnber of peaceful and unarrned Black dernonstra-
Ad Hoc Sub-Cornrnittee of the Security Council, S/AC. 17/SR. 14, meeting of
24 June 1970.
86paisibles et sans armes, pendant que des avions de chasse survolaient
la foule. L'anniversaire de ce jour a été proclamépar l'Assemblée
généraleJournée internationale pour l'élimination de la discrimination
raciale. Certes, comme le disait un diplomate, c(il n'est pas possible
de transformer des sous-marins en véhiculesamphibies pour les utiliser
dans des opérations terrestres)). Il n'échappe cependant à personne
que des bombardements par des unités navales ou des aéronefs, de
ports, de villes, de villages ou de concentrations d'hommes, ont eu
lieu au cours des guerres coloniales. C'est pourquoi la fourniture de
toutes armes susceptibles de renforcer le potentiel militaire de'Afrique
du Sud est à interdire. Cela particulièrement parce que c'est cette force
matérielle qui luipermet de se maintenir en Namibie nonobstant la
résolution276 (1970).
18. D'autre part, la présence illégalde l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie
donne à l'article 103de la Charte des possibilitésd'application étendues.
Les obligations des Membres des Nations Unies en vertu de la Charte
que vise cet article englobent manifestement les obligations qui découlent
des dispositions de la Charte et de ses buts, ainsi que cellesénoncéespar
les décisions obligatoires des organes des Nations Unies. Parmi ces
décisions figurentcellesdu Conseil de sécurité, savoir lesrésolutions282
(1970) et 283 (1970). L'article 103s'appliquant aux engagements passés
etfuturs, deviennentinopposables aux Etats Membres dans leursrelations
avec l'Afriquedu Sud, quelle qu'en soit la date': les alliances militaires,
les accords navals ou relatifs à des manŒuvres navalescommunes, les
accords de fournitures d'armes, de matérielde guerre et de munitions, les
accords de coopération dans le domaine nucléaire à quelque fin que ce
soit, ainsi que toutes conventions comportant une assistance quelconque
de nature à faciliter le maintien de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie ainsi
qu'il estdit aux paragraphes 119et suivants de l'avis de laCour.
19. Il est nécessairede souligner, pour terminer, que les Nations Unies
s'étaientpersuadées, dès1967,que toute aide accordée à l'Afrique du Sud
sans que soit attribuéeà cette aide une destination déterminée, servirait
quand même ses desseinstant en territoire sud-africain qu'en Namibie.
Le Gouvernement sud-africain administre en effet la Namibie comme
partie intégrante de son territoire, mêmeavant qu'elle n'yfût annexée,y
appliquant sa politique raciale et d'exploitation coloniale. Toute assistan-
ce financière, économiqueou militaire est de nature à développer cette
politique dans son ensemble et à renforcer en conséquence l'emprisede
l'Afrique du Sud sur le territoire namibien. Aussi l'Assemblée générale
a-t-elleadoptérésolutionsur résolutionpour dissuader lesEtats Membres
des Nations Unies d'accorder une aide quelconque à l'Afrique du Sud,
mêmenon expressément destinée à consolider sa présenceen Namibie
tant qu'elle poursuit sa politique de discrimination raciale et d'apartheid
dans l'ensemble géographique, politique, économiqueet militaire du
l Voir àce sujeL. Cavaré,op. cit., p. et654.
87tors while fighter aircraft flew overhead. The anniversary of that day was
proclaimed by the General Assembly as the International Day for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Of course, as a diplomat observed,
"it is not possible to transform submarines into amphibious vehicles in
order to use them for land operations". However, no one can be unaware
that in the course of colonial wars there have been bombardments by
naval units or aircraft ofports, towns, villagesor concentrations ofpeople.
That is why the supply of any arms capable of reinforcing South Africa's
military potential must be forbidden, particularly since it is this material
strength which enables it to nlaintain its presence in Namibia notwith-
standing resolution 276 (1970).
18. Furthermore, the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia opens
up possibilities of wide application of Article 103 of the Charter. The
obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter, con-
templated by that Article, clearly include obligations resulting from the
provisions of the Charter and from its purposes, and also those laid down
by the binding decisions of the organs of the United Nations. Among such
decisions are those of the Security Council, namely resolutions 282 (1970)
and 283 (1970). SinceArticle 103applies both to past and future commit-
ments, the following, whatever their date ', can no longer be relied on
against member States in their relationship with South Africa: military
alliances, naval agreements or agreements relating to joint naval ma-
nŒuvres, agreements to supply arms, war material and munitions,
agreements for CO-operationin the nuclear field for whatever purpose, as
well as al1 treaties involving any assistance whatsoever calculated to
facilitate the maintenance of South Africa's presence in Namibia, as is
stated in paragraphs 119et seq. of the Court's Opinion.
19. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that since 1967the United
Nations has been convinced that any assistance given to South Africa,
even without being earmarked for any particular application, would
nevertheless further the designs of South Africa both in South African
territory and in Namibia. For the South African Government has been
administering Namibia as an integral part of its territory since even
before it was annexed thereto, applying to it its racial policy and its
policy of colonial exploitation. Any financial, economic or military
assistance is likely to promote the general development of that policy
and consequently to tighten South Africa's hold over the Territory of
Namibia. Thus it is that the General Assembly has adopted resolution
upon resolution in order to dissuademember States of the United Nations
from giving any assistance whatsoever to South Africa, even such as is
not expressly intended to consolidate its presence in Namibia, for so long
as it continues its policy of racial discrimination and apartheid in the
See hereon L. Cavaré, op. cit.p,p. 653f.100 NAMIBIE (S.-O.AFRICAIN() P.IND.AMMOUN)
territoire sud et sud-ouest africain. Ce fut l'objet des résolutions 2307
(XXII), 2396 (XXIII), 2426 (XXIII) et 2506 (XXIV). De mêmes lesdeux
résolutions 282 (1970) et 283 (1970) du Conseil de sécuritévisent tout
autantl'Afrique du Sud que la Namibie. Ce n'est que dans ce sens qu'on
peut comprendre l'avis; sinon on iraitncontre de la réalité des choses.
(Signé Fouad AMMOUN. NAMIBlA (s.w. AFRICA()SEP.OP.AMMOUN) 100
geographical, political, economic and military ensemble of South and
South West Africa. This was the purpose of resolutions 2307 (XXII),
2396 (XXIII), 2426 (XXIII) and 2506 (XXIV). In thesame way, the two
resolutions 282 (1970) and 283 (1970) of the Security Council concern
South Africa no less than Namibia. It is in this sense that the Court's
Opinion is to be understood; to do otherwise would be to run counter
to reality.
(SignedF )ouad AMMOUN.
Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun (translation)