DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV
In accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court
may create a Chamber for consideration of a particular case, and there is
no doubt that this is a discretionary right of the Court. In the course of
discussion of the matter in theCourt 1supportedthe viewthat, taking the
circumstances into account, it was reasonable that the whole matter be
considered by the Court as newly composed in February 1982.1did not
object to the positive decision of the Court in principle to establish the
Chamber, subject to the reservation that theelection of the members of the
Chamber should be postponed until 6 February 1982. 1 maintain that
reservation.
After rejection of my suggestion relating to the postponement of the
election, 1did not participate in that election. In the course of the general
discussion 1noted that, in substance, the Special Agreement between the
United States of America and Canada clearly took as point of departure
theerroneouspresumption that, contrary toArticle 26,paragraph 2,of the
Statute, the Parties who present a request to create a Chamber for con-
sideration of a particular case may not merely choose what should be the
number of the members of the Chamber, but also formally decide and
propose the names ofthejudges who shouldbe electedby secretballot, and
even present these proposals to the Court in the form of some kind of
"ultimatum". 1 was and remain unconvinced by the answers given to the
Court by theAmbassadors of the United States ofAmerica and Canadain
theirletter to the Acting President of the Court of 6 January 1982,which
moreover only repeats and confirms the above-mentioned incorrect pre-
sumption of the Parties that they may dictate to the Court who should be
elected.
In this situation, the sovereignright of the Court tocarry out the election
independently of the wishes of the Parties, by secret ballot in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court, becomes in sub-
stance meaningless.
1 have therefore voted against the Order as a whole. 1continue to thnk
that the matter could have been successfullv settled bv the Court in
February 1982 in its new composition, which would not have been in
contradiction with Article II of the Treaty of 29 March 1979between the
United States of America and Canada, since that Article provides that the
Parties are ready to wait six full calendar months for settlement of the
question (that is to Say,until 19 May 1982).
(Signed) P. D. Mo~ozov.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV
In accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court
may create a Chamber for consideration of a particular case, and there is
no doubt that this is a discretionary right of the Court. In the course of
discussion of the matter in theCourt 1supportedthe viewthat, taking the
circumstances into account, it was reasonable that the whole matter be
considered by the Court as newly composed in February 1982.1did not
object to the positive decision of the Court in principle to establish the
Chamber, subject to the reservation that theelection of the members of the
Chamber should be postponed until 6 February 1982. 1 maintain that
reservation.
After rejection of my suggestion relating to the postponement of the
election, 1did not participate in that election. In the course of the general
discussion 1noted that, in substance, the Special Agreement between the
United States of America and Canada clearly took as point of departure
theerroneouspresumption that, contrary toArticle 26,paragraph 2,of the
Statute, the Parties who present a request to create a Chamber for con-
sideration of a particular case may not merely choose what should be the
number of the members of the Chamber, but also formally decide and
propose the names ofthejudges who shouldbe electedby secretballot, and
even present these proposals to the Court in the form of some kind of
"ultimatum". 1 was and remain unconvinced by the answers given to the
Court by theAmbassadors of the United States ofAmerica and Canadain
theirletter to the Acting President of the Court of 6 January 1982,which
moreover only repeats and confirms the above-mentioned incorrect pre-
sumption of the Parties that they may dictate to the Court who should be
elected.
In this situation, the sovereignright of the Court tocarry out the election
independently of the wishes of the Parties, by secret ballot in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court, becomes in sub-
stance meaningless.
1 have therefore voted against the Order as a whole. 1continue to thnk
that the matter could have been successfullv settled bv the Court in
February 1982 in its new composition, which would not have been in
contradiction with Article II of the Treaty of 29 March 1979between the
United States of America and Canada, since that Article provides that the
Parties are ready to wait six full calendar months for settlement of the
question (that is to Say,until 19 May 1982).
(Signed) P. D. Mo~ozov. OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. MOROZOV
[Traduction]
Conformément àl'article26,paragraphe 2,du Statut, la Cour peut créer
une chambrepour connaître d'une affaire déterminée, etil ne fait pas de
doute qu'il s'agità d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire. Lors de l'examen de la
question par la Cour, j'ai fait valoir quevu les circonstances, il serait
raisonnable que l'ensemblede la question fût examinépar la Cour dans sa
nouvelle composition, en février 1982. Je ne me suis pas opposé à la
décision positivede la Cour d'établir enprincipelachambre, àune réserve
près :que l'électiondes membres de la chambre fût renvoyéeau 6 février
1982.Je maintiens cette réserve.
Masuggestionrelative au renvoidel'électionayant été rejetéej,e n'aipas
participé à cette élection.Pendant le débatgénéral, j'aifait remarquer
qu'en substance le compromis entre les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueet le
Canada partait manifestement de l'idéeerronéeque, malgré les disposi-
tions de l'article 26,paragraphe 2, du Statut, les Parties qui demandent la
constitution d'une chambre chargéede connaître d'une affairedéterminée
~ouvaient non seulement déciderdu nombre des membres de la chambre.
mais encore choisir et indiquer formellement les noms desjuges àélire au
scrutin secret. et mêmefaire ce. ~rA~ositionsa la Cour en leur donnant la
forme d'unesorte cl'u<ltimatum D.Jen'aipas trouvéconvaincantes - etje
continue à ne pas trouver convaincantes - lesréponsesdonnées àla Cour
par les ambassadeurs des Etats-Unis d'Amériqueet du Canada dans leur
lettre au Président en exerciceen date du 6 janvier 1982, qui ne fait
d'ailleurs que réitéreret confirmer le postulat erroné susmentionnédes
Parties selonlequelcelles-cipourraient dicteàlaCour lesnoms desjuges a
élire.
Dans cesconditions, ledroit souverainde laCour de procéder àune telle
électionde façon indépendante par rapport à la volonté desParties, au
scrutin secret, conformément aux dispositions de son Statut et de son
Règlement, perd toute signification véritable.
J'ai donc votécontre l'ensemble de l'ordonnance. Je persiste à penser
que la question aurait pu êtrerégléede manièresatisfaisante par la Cour
dans sa nouvelle composition, en février 1982, ce qui n'aurait pas été
contradictoire avec l'article II du traité du29 mars 1979entre les Etats-
Unis d'Amériqueet leCanada, puisque aux termes de cettedisposition les
Parties étaient prêtesà attendre six mois pleins (c'est-à-dire, jusqu'au
19mai 1982)pour le règlementde la question.
(Signé P. D. Mo~ozov.
Dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov