Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma

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126-20060203-JUD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
126-20060203-JUD-01-00-EN
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55

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies not only to disputes as to the
interpretation or application of the Convention but also to disputes as to the ful-
filment of the Convention — Article IX envisions that disputes relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide be submitted to the Court — Reservations
to a clause concerning dispute settlement are contrary to the object and purpose

of the treaty if the provision is the raison d’être of the treaty — The object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention is the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide, and this encompasses holding a State responsible for vio-
lating its obligations under the Convention — The DRC’s failure to object to
Rwanda’s reservation is not sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the
issue of Rwanda’s reservation — Human rights treaties like the Genocide Con-
vention are based not on reciprocity between States but instead serve to protect
individuals and the international community at large — Principle of good faith
and Rwanda’s prior statements in support of human rights — Principle of good
faith and Rwanda’s prior efforts to establish International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda — Forum prorogatum — Court should have seized opportunity
to examine thoroughly whether reservation violated object and purpose of
Convention.

1. Among the bases of jurisdiction invoked by the Democratic Repub-

lic of the Congo (DRC) in instituting legal proceedings against Rwanda
before the Court is Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, to which both States are
parties, the DRC having acceded on 31 May 1962 and Rwanda on
16 April 1975. Article IX of the Convention stipulates that:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)

2. Article VIII provides that:
“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the

United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide . . .” (Emphasis added.)

3. According to Article III:
“The following acts shall be punishable:

5356 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP.KOROMA )

(a) Genocide;

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.”

4. Thus, Article IX envisions that disputes between Contracting
Parties relating to a violation of the Convention and disputes relating to

the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III , shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute.

5. As stated earlier, both the DRC and Rwanda are parties to the
Genocide Convention. In its accession instrument Rwanda entered a
reservation that: “The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as
bound by Article IX of the Convention.” Thus, Rwanda argued, the juris-
diction of the Court under the Genocide Convention was excluded by the

reservation entered by it to Article IX.
6. However, Rwanda’s reservation, in my view, has to be considered in
light of the object and purpose of the Convention. Under Article I of the
Convention,

“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under internatio-
nal law which they undertake to prevent and to punish .” (Emphasis

added.)
Article I thus imposes an obligation on States to prevent and punish the

crime of genocide.
7. In its Application, the DRC contends that Rwanda has violated
Articles II and III of the Convention.
8. Article II defines genocide to be:

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as

such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the

group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Article III has been quoted earlier.
9. Specifically, the DRC claims that Rwandan forces, directly or

through their Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD/Goma)
agents, committed acts of genocide against 3,500,000 Congolese, by

5457 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

carrying out large-scale massacres, assassinations and other murders

targeting well-identified groups (Warega, Bemba, Bashi, Bahemba . . .)
in Rwandan-occupied territories of the DRC.

10. It is in the light of these tragic events that the DRC decided to
exercise its right under Article IX of the Convention, alleging that Rwanda

had violated its obligations under the Convention and bears responsi-
bility for those violations. Rwanda, for its part, denied the Court’s juris-
diction on the grounds that: it was not bound by the Article as it had
entered a reservation to it; and the Court therefore lacked competence to
adjudicate on the matter.

11. While a reservation to a treaty clause concerning dispute settle-
ment or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty is not, in
itself, incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, it is incom-
patible if the provision to which the reservation relates constitutes the

raison d’être of the treaty (“Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties”,
International Law Commission, Fifty-seventh Session, A/CN.4/558/
Add.2, Ann., p. 31, para. 3.1.13 (14 June 2005)).
12. The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is the preven-
tion and punishment of the crime of genocide, and this encompasses

holding a State responsible whenever it is found to be in breach of its
obligations under the Convention. As explained below, Article IX is the
only provision of the Convention addressing the question of State respon-
sibility and it provides:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)

The Article thus contemplates that disputes concerning acts of genocide,
or the responsibility of a State or Government for such acts, will be
referred to the Court for judicial scrutiny, and that a State accused of
breaching its obligations under the Convention should account to the

Court for its conduct.
13. An analysis of the structure of the Genocide Convention reinforces
this conclusion. The title itself of the Convention — Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide — clearly frames
it in terms of both prevention and punishment of genocide (see, for

example, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 24 (deducing the object and purpose of a Convention
from its title)). Having conclusively established that the acts listed in
Article III are punishable, the Genocide Convention then sets up two types
of punishment mechanisms: the first is aimed at persons and the second

at State actors. In keeping with this dichotomy, Articles IV, V, VI
and VII treat the punishment of persons responsible for genocide or any

5558 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

of the other acts listed in Article III. Unlike Articles IV, V, VI and VII,

however, Article IX focuses on disputes at the level of State actors.
Indeed, given the nature of the crime, it is difficult to imagine how geno-
cide could be committed without some form of State complicity or
involvement. Article IX is thus crucial to fulfilling the object and purpose
of the Convention since it is the only avenue for adjudicating the respon-

sibilities of States. Denying the Court this function, as Rwanda purports
to do by its reservation, not only prevents the Court from interpreting or
applying the Convention but also — and this in my view is the critical
point in the present case before the Court — from enquiring into disputes
between Contracting Parties relating to the responsibility of a State for

genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, and is
thus not conducive to the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the
Convention, namely, the prevention and punishment of genocide. As the
Court stated in the Legality of Use of Force cases:

“Article IX of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the
extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention, including dis-
putes ‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III’ of the said Convention”
(Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (I), p. 137, para. 37; emphasis added).

14. In considering Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Geno-
cide Convention, the Court observed that the Convention does not pro-
hibit reservations and that the DRC had put forward no objection to

Rwanda’s reservation when it was made. This finding notwithstanding,
the fact that a State does not object to such a reservation at the time it is
made is not, in my view, of dispositive significance, given that States
are often remiss in fulfilling their duties of objecting to reservations
which they consider invalid. Moreover, the failure of a State to object

should not be regarded as determinative in the context of human rights
treaties like the Genocide Convention that are not based on reciprocity
between States but instead serve to protect individuals and the inter-
national community at large .

15. As the Human Rights Committee stated in its General Com-
ment 24, human rights treaties

“are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They
concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of
inter-State reciprocity has no place, save perhaps in the limited con-
text of reservations to declarations on the Committee’s competence

under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on
reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not

5659 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP.KOROMA )

seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. The

absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either
compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant.” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6), 4 November 1994, para. 17.)

The Committee concluded that the pattern of objections to reservations
is so unclear that it is unsafe to assume that a non-objecting State “thinks

that a particular reservation is acceptable” (ibid., para. 17). Although
the Human Rights Committee was speaking about the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the same holds true for the Geno-
cide Convention. Because, as the Court itself has stated, the Genocide

Convention, like other human rights treaties, is not based on reciprocity
between States, the fact that the DRC did not object to Rwanda’s reser-
vation at the time it was made has no bearing on the Court’s ability to
consider it. Hence, the DRC’s failure to object should not have been
deemed sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the issue of

Rwanda’s reservation on this occasion.

16. While the question of reservations to Article IX of the Genocide
Convention came up in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force —
(Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999,

I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 772, para. 32) and (Yugoslavia v. United
States of America) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999 (II),
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 924, para. 24) — the Court in those cases did not
examine the issue whether the reservations to Article IX by Spain and the
United States prevented the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the

Convention, because that precise issue was not raised by Yugoslavia.
Since Yugoslavia neither explicitly raised the issue nor alluded to it in
its arguments, the Court concisely concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
under Article IX. Be that as it may, the Court did however confirm that
disputes relating to “the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the

Convention included disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State
for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III”,
even though in those cases the acts complained of by Yugoslavia
were incapable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention. In the present case, the fact that the issue of the reservation

was addressed by both Parties entitled the Court to examine Rwanda’s
reservation in the light of the purpose and object of the Convention.

17. Moreover, in considering this issue the Court should have taken
due account of the principle of good faith as it relates to the effect of the

Statement made by Rwanda, in the person of its Minister of Justice,
before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

“Rwanda is one of the countries that has ratified the greatest
number of international human rights instruments. In 2004 alone,

5760 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

our Government ratified ten of them, including those concerning the

rights of women, the prevention and repression of corruption, the
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and the environment.
The few instruments not yet ratified will shortly be ratified and past
reservations not yet withdrawn will shortly be withdrawn.” (Sixty-
first Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.)

Among the few instruments to which Rwanda had entered reservations,

reservations that were “shortly [to] be withdrawn”, was the Genocide
Convention.
18. The Court made clear in the Nuclear Tests cases that:

“Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties
is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an inter-

national obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus
interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and
place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obliga-
tion thus created be respected.” (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 268, para. 46; Nuclear Tests

(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 473,
para. 49.)

It would not be appropriate to regard Rwanda’s declaration concerning
its reservation to the “most important” human rights and humanitarian
treaty as nothing more than political posturing devoid of legal effect.

19. This is all the more so given the principles underlying the Con-

vention, as well as the gravity of the present case, in which 3,500,000
Congolese citizens are alleged to have been massacred on grounds of
ethnicity.
20. As the Court stated in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case:

“By [its] very nature [the outlawing of genocide, aggression,
slavery and racial discrimination is] the concern of all States. In

view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.” (Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970 ,p .;
emphasis added.)

21. Thirty years later, the Court confirmed its understanding of the
object and purpose of the Convention and concluded:

“It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Con-
vention are rights and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that

the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime
of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention .” (Applica-

5861 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 616,
para. 31; emphasis added.)

Hence, in my judgment, a State which denies the Court’s jurisdiction to
enquire into allegations alleging violation of the Convention would not
be lending the co-operation required to “liberate mankind from [the] . . .

odious scourge” of genocide or to fulfil the object and purpose of the
Convention. Denying recourse to the Court essentially precludes judicial
scrutiny into the responsibility of a State in a dispute relating to the vio-
lation of the Convention.
22. This point is of particular cogency in this case concerning Rwanda ,

a State where genocide took place and which justifiably called on the
United Nations Security Council to set up an international criminal tri-
bunal to try those who committed the crime against a section of its popu-
lation. It will thus not be in keeping with the spirit and objective of the

Convention to refuse to allow judicial consideration of the allegation of
genocide perpetrated in another country because Rwanda itself or its
agents are alleged to be responsible. While this is not to claim that the
seriousness of an obligation, the jus cogens status of a norm or the erga
omnes nature of an obligation per se confers jurisdiction on the Court, as

was recognized in the Judgment, it is nevertheless my opinion that it is
incumbent on Rwanda in this case, as a State party to the Genocide Con-
vention — and which itself was a victim of genocide and rightly referred
the matter to the competent organ of the United Nations — to allow
scrutiny of the allegation that it had breached its obligations under the

Genocide Convention.

23. In its letter to the Secretary-General of 28 December 1994 regard-
ing this issue, Rwanda rightly stressed the gravity of the genocide which
had been committed on its territory and requested the “[s]etting up as

soon as possible [of] an international tribunal to try the criminals”. In the
request, Rwanda stated as follows:

“There is evident reluctance by the international community . . .
to expose and punish the criminals . . . still at large. This is tanta-
mount to diluting the question of genocide that was committed in
Rwanda.” (Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent

Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, United Nations doc. S/1994/1115
(29 September 1994).)

Parallel reasoning would suggest that Rwanda’s unwillingness to allow
the Court to scrutinize its alleged genocidal conduct in this case not only
has the same effect of diluting the question of genocide, a result which

Rwanda rightly criticized and sought to prevent, but in fact has an even
more drastic effect: denial of the question of genocide. In this connec-

5962 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

tion, it is worth stressing that all human lives — be they Rwandan, Con-

golese, or of any other nationality — are precious; offering redress to
some while denying it to others is neither in conformity with the Conven-
tion nor with justice; nor does it further the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter in respect of the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. The spirit of the Convention as well as the letter of the Convention

must be respected at all times.
24. The allegation involving the commission of genocide is far too
serious a matter to be allowed to escape judicial scrutiny by means of a
procedural device. The nature of the Convention and gravity of the
allegation dictate that, wherever possible, it must be subject to judicial

scrutiny. Inasmuch as Rwanda was able to call on the international com-
munity to hold to account those alleged to have committed genocide in
Rwanda itself, it cannot justifiably shield itself from enquiry in respect
of the very kinds of acts for which it succeeded in obtaining scrutiny by a

competent organ. In other words, it is neither morally right nor just
for a State to shield itself from judicial scrutiny under Article IX of the
Convention in respect of acts alleged to have taken place in the territory
of a neighbouring State when those acts constitute the very same
conduct as that in response to which the State successfully urged the

establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.

25. It is indeed a principle of law that the jurisdictional basis of the

Court is consensual. In paragraph 21 of the Judgment the Court recalls
that such consent may take various forms. Among these is forum proro-
gatum, which was explained not long ago by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in
his separate opinion in the Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-

govina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) case as follows:

“the possibility that if State A commences proceedings against State B
on a non-existent or defective jurisdictional basis, State B can
remedy the situation by conduct amounting to an acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court” (Provisional Measures, Order of
13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 416, para. 24, separate

opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).

While I do not accept the substance of the DRC’s argument on this issue,
I do believe that the gravity of the matter and the nature of the allegation
before the Court are such that the Court should have been allowed to
adjudicate the case. There is no impediment in law preventing Rwanda
from expressing its consent and thereby entitling the Court to examine

the alleged breaches of Rwanda’s obligations under the Genocide Con-
vention.

6063 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

26. As can be seen from the foregoing, this opinion has, to a great

extent, drawn on the jurisprudence of the Court on the subject of the
Genocide Convention to show why the Court should have been able to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court has over the years taken cognizance of
the importance of the Genocide Convention, has acknowledged the denial
of humanity that genocide — described as the “crime of all crimes” —

represents, and has responded appropriately, declaring “the principles
underlying the Convention” to be “principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 616,
para. 31). In reaching such profound conclusions, the Court, in my view,
was reflecting the gravity of the crime of genocide and the seriousness
with which it, the international community and mankind as a whole take

the Convention. While not denying the right of the States parties to the
Convention to enter reservations to Article IX, the Court, through its
jurisprudence, has stressed the unique nature of the Convention and the
necessity for States to respect their obligations under it. The Court’s pro-
nouncements fostered high hopes and expectations that the object and

purpose of the Convention would be fulfilled. This case presented an
opportunity for the Court to apply the Convention and its principles.
27. It is thus this profound respect for the Court’s earlier affirmations
of the principle underlying the Convention, its object and purpose,
together with the seriousness of the matter before it, which leads me to

regret the Court’s conclusion that it is not entitled to take on the present
case. In my view, had the Court also, besides the Genocide Convention,
taken a different, but no less valid, view of the other instruments relied
upon including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women and the Montreal Convention for the Sup-

pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, it could
have reached a different conclusion with respect to its jurisdiction. My
regret that the Court was not able to do so explains my vote.

28. I have read with considerable interest the joint separate opinion

of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma. They have
succinctly reflected the essence of the judicial concern underlying this
opinion, namely, that it is a very grave matter for a State to shield itself
from international judicial scrutiny for

“any claim that might be made against it concerning genocide. A
State so doing shows the world scant confidence that it would never,
ever, commit genocide, one of the greatest crimes known” (para. 25).

That concern could not have been more aptly stated. I also agree with the
joint opinion to the effect that in matters relating to the compatibility of

6164 ARMED ACTIVITIES DISS. OP. KOROMA )

a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty, the reserving State

or States do not have the final word.
29. On the other hand, while not disagreeing with the view of the
authors of the joint opinion that Article IX of the Genocide Convention
creates no monitoring function involving the review of periodic reports

by human rights treaty bodies on States’ behaviour, I wish to reiterate
that Article IX does provide for the Court to adjudicate:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the inter-
pretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,

including those relating to the responsibility of a State ” (emphasis
added).

The Article, in my view, therefore provides a basis for the Court, inter
alia, to enquire into State responsibility for genocide.

(Signed) Abdul G. K OROMA .

62

Bilingual Content

55

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies not only to disputes as to the
interpretation or application of the Convention but also to disputes as to the ful-
filment of the Convention — Article IX envisions that disputes relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide be submitted to the Court — Reservations
to a clause concerning dispute settlement are contrary to the object and purpose

of the treaty if the provision is the raison d’être of the treaty — The object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention is the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide, and this encompasses holding a State responsible for vio-
lating its obligations under the Convention — The DRC’s failure to object to
Rwanda’s reservation is not sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the
issue of Rwanda’s reservation — Human rights treaties like the Genocide Con-
vention are based not on reciprocity between States but instead serve to protect
individuals and the international community at large — Principle of good faith
and Rwanda’s prior statements in support of human rights — Principle of good
faith and Rwanda’s prior efforts to establish International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda — Forum prorogatum — Court should have seized opportunity
to examine thoroughly whether reservation violated object and purpose of
Convention.

1. Among the bases of jurisdiction invoked by the Democratic Repub-

lic of the Congo (DRC) in instituting legal proceedings against Rwanda
before the Court is Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, to which both States are
parties, the DRC having acceded on 31 May 1962 and Rwanda on
16 April 1975. Article IX of the Convention stipulates that:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)

2. Article VIII provides that:
“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the

United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide . . .” (Emphasis added.)

3. According to Article III:
“The following acts shall be punishable:

53 55

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE KOROMA

[Traduction]

L’article IX de la convention sur le génocide s’applique non seulement aux
différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’application de la convention, mais
aussi aux différends relatifs à son exécution — L’article IX prévoit que les dif-
férends relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat pour génocide sont soumis à la
Cour — Les réserves à une disposition concernant le règlement des différends

sont contraires à l’objet et au but du traité si cette disposition constitue la raison
d’être du traité — L’objet et le but de la convention sur le génocide sont la pré-
vention et la répression du crime de génocide, qui supposent que les Etats
doivent répondre de la violation des obligations découlant pour eux de la conven-
tion — Le fait que la RDC n’a pas émis d’objection à la réserve du Rwanda ne
suffit pas à empêcher la Cour d’examiner la question de cette réserve — Les
instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme comme la convention sur le
génocide ne sont pas fondés sur la réciprocité entre Etats, mais ont pour but
de protéger les individus et la communauté internationale tout entière — Prin-
cipe de la bonne foi et déclarations antérieures du Rwanda en faveur des
droits de l’homme — Principe de la bonne foi et efforts antérieurs du Rwanda
pour faire établir un Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda — Forum
prorogatum — La Cour aurait dû saisir cette occasion d’examiner de
manière détaillée si la réserve violait l’objet et le but de la convention.

1. L’une des bases de compétence invoquées par la République démo-

cratique du Congo (RDC) pour introduire une instance contre le Rwanda
devant la Cour est l’article IX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide de 1948, à laquelle les deux Etats sont
parties, la RDC y ayant adhéré le 31 mai 1962 et le Rwanda, le 16 avril
1975. L’article IX de la convention est ainsi conçu:

«Les différends entre les parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpré-
tation, l’application ou l’exécution de la présente convention, y com-
pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide

ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’une partie
au différend. » (Les italiques sont de moi.)

2. L’article VIII dispose que:
«Toute partie contractante peut saisir les organes compétents de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies afin que ceux-ci prennent, confor-

mément à la Charte des Nations Unies, les mesures qu’ils jugent
appropriées pour la prévention et la répression des actes de
génocide...» (Les italiques sont de moi.)

3. Aux termes de l’article III:
«Seront punis les actes suivants:

5356 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP.KOROMA )

(a) Genocide;

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.”

4. Thus, Article IX envisions that disputes between Contracting
Parties relating to a violation of the Convention and disputes relating to

the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III , shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute.

5. As stated earlier, both the DRC and Rwanda are parties to the
Genocide Convention. In its accession instrument Rwanda entered a
reservation that: “The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as
bound by Article IX of the Convention.” Thus, Rwanda argued, the juris-
diction of the Court under the Genocide Convention was excluded by the

reservation entered by it to Article IX.
6. However, Rwanda’s reservation, in my view, has to be considered in
light of the object and purpose of the Convention. Under Article I of the
Convention,

“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under internatio-
nal law which they undertake to prevent and to punish .” (Emphasis

added.)
Article I thus imposes an obligation on States to prevent and punish the

crime of genocide.
7. In its Application, the DRC contends that Rwanda has violated
Articles II and III of the Convention.
8. Article II defines genocide to be:

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as

such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the

group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Article III has been quoted earlier.
9. Specifically, the DRC claims that Rwandan forces, directly or

through their Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD/Goma)
agents, committed acts of genocide against 3,500,000 Congolese, by

54 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES OP .DISS. KOROMA ) 56

a) le génocide;

b) l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide;
c) l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide;
d) la tentative de génocide;
e) la complicité dans le génocide.»

4. Ainsi, l’article IX prévoit que les différends entre parties contrac-
tantes relatifs aux violations de la convention et les différends relatifs à

son interprétation, son application ou son exécution, y compris ceux rela-
tifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide ou de l’un quel-
conque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III , seront soumis à la Cour
internationale de Justice à la requête de l’une ou l’autre des parties au
différend.

5. Comme je l’ai dit plus haut, la RDC et le Rwanda sont tous deux
parties à la convention sur le génocide. Dans son instrument d’adhésion,
le Rwanda a formulé une réserve selon laquelle «la République rwan-
daise ne se considère pas comme liée par l’article IX de ladite conven-
tion.» Le Rwanda soutient en conséquence que, par cette réserve, il a

exclu la compétence de la Cour en vertu de l’article IX.
6. Cependant, la réserve du Rwanda doit, à mon avis, être examinée
au regard de l’objet et du but de la convention. Aux termes de l’article
premier de celle-ci,

«[l]es parties contractantes confirment que le génocide, qu’il soit
commis en temps de paix ou en temps de guerre, est un crime du
droit des gens, qu’elles s’engagent à prévenir et à punir » (les italiques

sont de moi).
L’article premier impose donc aux Etats l’obligation de prévenir et de

réprimer le crime de génocide.
7. Dans sa requête, la RDC soutient que le Rwanda a violé les ar-
ticles II et III de la convention.
8. L’article II définit comme suit le génocide:

«[L]’un quelconque des actes ci-après, commis dans l’intention de
détruire, [en] tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial

ou religieux, comme tel:
a) meurtre de membres du groupe;
b) atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de membres du

groupe;
c) soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’existence
devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;
d) mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;
e) transfert forcé d’enfants du groupe à un autre groupe.»

J’ai déjà cité l’article III.
9. Concrètement, la RDC affirme que les forces rwandaises, directe-

ment ou par l’intermédiaire de leurs agents du Rassemblement congolais
pour la démocratie (RCD/Goma), se sont rendus coupables d’actes de

5457 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

carrying out large-scale massacres, assassinations and other murders

targeting well-identified groups (Warega, Bemba, Bashi, Bahemba . . .)
in Rwandan-occupied territories of the DRC.

10. It is in the light of these tragic events that the DRC decided to
exercise its right under Article IX of the Convention, alleging that Rwanda

had violated its obligations under the Convention and bears responsi-
bility for those violations. Rwanda, for its part, denied the Court’s juris-
diction on the grounds that: it was not bound by the Article as it had
entered a reservation to it; and the Court therefore lacked competence to
adjudicate on the matter.

11. While a reservation to a treaty clause concerning dispute settle-
ment or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty is not, in
itself, incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, it is incom-
patible if the provision to which the reservation relates constitutes the

raison d’être of the treaty (“Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties”,
International Law Commission, Fifty-seventh Session, A/CN.4/558/
Add.2, Ann., p. 31, para. 3.1.13 (14 June 2005)).
12. The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is the preven-
tion and punishment of the crime of genocide, and this encompasses

holding a State responsible whenever it is found to be in breach of its
obligations under the Convention. As explained below, Article IX is the
only provision of the Convention addressing the question of State respon-
sibility and it provides:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)

The Article thus contemplates that disputes concerning acts of genocide,
or the responsibility of a State or Government for such acts, will be
referred to the Court for judicial scrutiny, and that a State accused of
breaching its obligations under the Convention should account to the

Court for its conduct.
13. An analysis of the structure of the Genocide Convention reinforces
this conclusion. The title itself of the Convention — Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide — clearly frames
it in terms of both prevention and punishment of genocide (see, for

example, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 24 (deducing the object and purpose of a Convention
from its title)). Having conclusively established that the acts listed in
Article III are punishable, the Genocide Convention then sets up two types
of punishment mechanisms: the first is aimed at persons and the second

at State actors. In keeping with this dichotomy, Articles IV, V, VI
and VII treat the punishment of persons responsible for genocide or any

55 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 57

génocide contre trois millions cinq cent mille Congolais, en commettant

à grande échelle massacres, assassinats et autres meurtres visant des
groupes bien définis (Warega, Bemba, Bashi, Bahemba...) dans les terri-
toires de la RDC occupés par le Rwanda.
10. C’est compte tenu de ces événements tragiques que la RDC a
décidé d’exercer le droit qu’elle tient de l’article IX de la convention, en

soutenant que le Rwanda a violé les obligations que lui impose la conven-
tion et qu’il doit répondre de ces violations. Le Rwanda, pour sa part, a
contesté la compétence de la Cour au motif qu’il n’était pas lié par l’ar-
ticle IX, puisqu’il avait fait une réserve à cet article, et que la Cour n’avait
donc pas compétence pour statuer.

11. S’il est vrai qu’une réserve à une disposition conventionnelle rela-
tive au règlement des différends ou au contrôle de la mise en Œuvre du
traité n’est pas, en soi, incompatible avec l’objet et le but de celui-ci, il en
va différemment si la disposition sur laquelle porte la réserve constitue la

raison d’être du traité («Dixième rapport sur les réserves aux traités»,
Commission du droit international, cinquante-septième session, A/CN.4/
558/Add. 2, annexe, p. 31, par. 3.1.13 (14 juin 2005)).
12. L’objet et le but de la convention sur le génocide sont la prévention
et la répression du crime de génocide, ce qui implique aussi qu’un Etat

doit être tenu pour responsable dès lors qu’il est constaté que cet Etat a
violé les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la convention. Comme
je l’expliquerai plus loin, l’article IX est la seule disposition de la conven-
tion mentionnant la responsabilité des Etats; il est ainsi conçu:

«Les différends entre les parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpré-
tation, l’application ou l’exécution de la présente convention, y com-
pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide

ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’une partie
au différend.» (Les italiques sont de moi.)

Cet article prévoit donc que les différends relatifs aux actes de génocide
ou à la responsabilité d’un Etat ou gouvernement pour de tels actes seront
soumis au contrôle judiciaire de la Cour, et qu’un Etat accusé d’avoir
violé les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de la convention devra

répondre devant la Cour de son comportement.
13. L’économie même de la convention sur le génocide confirme cette
conclusion. Son titre — convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide — indique déjà clairement qu’elle vise à la fois la pré-
vention et la répression du génocide (voir, par exemple, l’affaire relative

à Certains emprunts norvégiens (France c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Re-
cueil 1957, p. 24 (dans laquelle l’objet et le but d’une convention sont dé-
duits de son titre)). Ayant prévu expressément que les actes énumérés à l’ar-
ticle III sont punissables, la convention sur le génocide établit deux types
de mécanismes de répression: le premier vise les individus, le second les

acteurs étatiques. En conséquence de cette dichotomie, les articles IV, V,
VI et VII prévoient les sanctions frappant les personnes physiques res-

5558 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

of the other acts listed in Article III. Unlike Articles IV, V, VI and VII,

however, Article IX focuses on disputes at the level of State actors.
Indeed, given the nature of the crime, it is difficult to imagine how geno-
cide could be committed without some form of State complicity or
involvement. Article IX is thus crucial to fulfilling the object and purpose
of the Convention since it is the only avenue for adjudicating the respon-

sibilities of States. Denying the Court this function, as Rwanda purports
to do by its reservation, not only prevents the Court from interpreting or
applying the Convention but also — and this in my view is the critical
point in the present case before the Court — from enquiring into disputes
between Contracting Parties relating to the responsibility of a State for

genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, and is
thus not conducive to the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the
Convention, namely, the prevention and punishment of genocide. As the
Court stated in the Legality of Use of Force cases:

“Article IX of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the
extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention, including dis-
putes ‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any

of the other acts enumerated in article III’ of the said Convention”
(Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (I), p. 137, para. 37; emphasis added).

14. In considering Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Geno-
cide Convention, the Court observed that the Convention does not pro-
hibit reservations and that the DRC had put forward no objection to

Rwanda’s reservation when it was made. This finding notwithstanding,
the fact that a State does not object to such a reservation at the time it is
made is not, in my view, of dispositive significance, given that States
are often remiss in fulfilling their duties of objecting to reservations
which they consider invalid. Moreover, the failure of a State to object

should not be regarded as determinative in the context of human rights
treaties like the Genocide Convention that are not based on reciprocity
between States but instead serve to protect individuals and the inter-
national community at large .

15. As the Human Rights Committee stated in its General Com-
ment 24, human rights treaties

“are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They
concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of
inter-State reciprocity has no place, save perhaps in the limited con-
text of reservations to declarations on the Committee’s competence

under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on
reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not

56 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 58

ponsables de génocide ou des autres actes énumérés à l’article III, alors
que l’article IX traite des différends au niveau des acteurs étatiques.
D’ailleurs, eu égard à la nature du crime, il est difficile d’imaginer com-
ment le génocide pourrait être commis sans une certaine complicité ou

participation de l’Etat. L’article IX est donc essentiel à la réalisation de
l’objet et du but de la convention, puisqu’il est le seul moyen de faire
reconnaître en justice la responsabilité des Etats. En privant la Cour de
cette fonction, comme le Rwanda prétend le faire par sa réserve, non seu-
lement on empêche la Cour d’interpréter ou d’appliquer la convention,

mais on l’empêche aussi — et c’est là, à mes yeux, l’élément crucial de la
présente affaire — d’examiner les différends entre parties contractantes
sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour génocide ou pour les autres actes énu-
mérés à l’article III, ce qui n’est pas de nature à favoriser l’exécution de
l’objet et du but de la convention, à savoir la prévention et la répression

du génocide. Comme la Cour l’a déclaré dans les affaires relatives à la
Licéité de l’emploi de la force :

«[L’a]rticle IX de la convention semble ainsi constituer une base
sur laquelle la compétence de la Cour pourrait être fondée, pour
autant que l’objet du différend ait trait à «l’interprétation, l’applica-

tion ou l’exécution» de la convention, y compris les différends «rela-
tifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide ou de l’un
quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III» de ladite conven-
tion.» (Mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999 , C.I.J.
Recueil 1999 (I), p. 137, par. 37; les italiques sont de moi.)

14. En examinant la réserve émise par le Rwanda à l’article IX de la

convention sur le génocide, la Cour a relevé que la convention n’interdit
pas les réserves et que la RDC n’avait pas fait d’objection à la réserve du
Rwanda au moment où ce dernier l’avait formulée. Cependant, le fait
qu’un Etat n’émet pas d’objection à une réserve au moment où elle est

formulée n’est pas, à mon avis, d’une importance déterminante, car les
Etats négligent souvent leur obligation d’émettre une objection à une
réserve s’ils considèrent que celle-ci n’est pas valide. De plus, l’absence
d’objection d’un Etat ne doit pas être considérée comme déterminante
dans le cadre d’instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme comme la

convention sur le génocide, qui ne sont pas fondés sur la réciprocité entre
Etats, mais ont pour but de protéger les individus et la communauté inter-
nationale tout entière.
15. Comme le Comité des droits de l’homme l’a déclaré dans son
observation générale n 24, les instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme

«ne constituent pas un réseau d’échanges d’obligations interé-
tatiques. Ils visent à reconnaître des droits aux individus. Le principe
de la réciprocité interétatique ne s’applique pas, sauf peut-être dans le
contexte limité des réserves aux déclarations touchant la compétence
du Comité faites au titre de l’article 41. Etant donné que les règles

classiques sur les réserves sont tout à fait inadaptées, souvent les

5659 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP.KOROMA )

seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. The

absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either
compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant.” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6), 4 November 1994, para. 17.)

The Committee concluded that the pattern of objections to reservations
is so unclear that it is unsafe to assume that a non-objecting State “thinks

that a particular reservation is acceptable” (ibid., para. 17). Although
the Human Rights Committee was speaking about the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the same holds true for the Geno-
cide Convention. Because, as the Court itself has stated, the Genocide

Convention, like other human rights treaties, is not based on reciprocity
between States, the fact that the DRC did not object to Rwanda’s reser-
vation at the time it was made has no bearing on the Court’s ability to
consider it. Hence, the DRC’s failure to object should not have been
deemed sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the issue of

Rwanda’s reservation on this occasion.

16. While the question of reservations to Article IX of the Genocide
Convention came up in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force —
(Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999,

I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 772, para. 32) and (Yugoslavia v. United
States of America) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999 (II),
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 924, para. 24) — the Court in those cases did not
examine the issue whether the reservations to Article IX by Spain and the
United States prevented the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the

Convention, because that precise issue was not raised by Yugoslavia.
Since Yugoslavia neither explicitly raised the issue nor alluded to it in
its arguments, the Court concisely concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
under Article IX. Be that as it may, the Court did however confirm that
disputes relating to “the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the

Convention included disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State
for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III”,
even though in those cases the acts complained of by Yugoslavia
were incapable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention. In the present case, the fact that the issue of the reservation

was addressed by both Parties entitled the Court to examine Rwanda’s
reservation in the light of the purpose and object of the Convention.

17. Moreover, in considering this issue the Court should have taken
due account of the principle of good faith as it relates to the effect of the

Statement made by Rwanda, in the person of its Minister of Justice,
before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

“Rwanda is one of the countries that has ratified the greatest
number of international human rights instruments. In 2004 alone,

57 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 59

Etats n’ont pas vu l’intérêt juridique s’agissant du Pacte, ni la néces-
sité d’élever une objection aux réserves. L’absence de protestation de
la part d’un Etat ne peut pas laisser supposer qu’une réserve est com-
patible ou incompatible avec l’objet et le but du Pacte.» (Comité des
o
droits de l’homme, observation générale n 24, CCPR/C/21/rev.I/
Add.6, 4 novembre 1994, par. 17.)

Le Comité a conclu que le profil des objections aux réserves est si peu
clair que l’on peut difficilement déduire de l’absence d’objection de la
part d’un Etat qu’il «juge une réserve particulière acceptable» (ibid.,
par. 17). Le Comité des droits de l’homme parlait du Pacte international
relatif aux droits civils et politiques, mais ce qu’il dit vaut aussi pour la

convention sur le génocide. En effet, comme la Cour l’a dit elle-même, la
convention sur le génocide, comme les autres traités relatifs aux droits de
l’homme, n’est pas fondée sur la réciprocité entre Etats et le fait que la
RDC n’a pas formulé d’objection à la réserve du Rwanda au moment où

celle-ci a été faite est sans incidence sur le pouvoir de la Cour de l’exa-
miner. L’absence d’objection de la part de la RDC n’aurait donc pas dû
être jugée suffisante pour empêcher la Cour d’examiner la question de la
réserve du Rwanda en l’espèce.
16. Même si la question des réserves à l’article IX de la convention sur

le génocide a été abordée dans les affaires relatives à laLicéité de l’emploi
de la force — (Yougoslavie c. Espagne) (mesures conservatoires, ordon-
nance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 772, par. 32) et (You-
goslavie c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) (mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 924, par. 24) —, la Cour, dans

ces affaires, n’a pas examiné la question de savoir si les réserves faites par
l’Espagne et les Etats-Unis à l’article IX faisaient obstacle à la réalisation
de l’objet et du but de la convention, parce que la Yougoslavie n’avait pas
soulevé cette question. Comme la Yougoslavie n’avait pas soulevé expres-

sément la question et qu’elle ne l’avait pas non plus évoquée dans ses plai-
doiries, la Cour a conclu succinctement qu’elle n’avait pas compétence en
vertu de l’article IX. Quoi qu’il en soit, la Cour a confirmé que les diffé-
rends relatifs à «l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution» de la
convention comprenaient bien les différends «relatifs à la responsabilité

d’un Etat en matière de génocide ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes
énumérés à l’article III» même si, dans les affaires considérées, les actes
dont se plaignait la Yougoslavie ne relevaient pas des dispositions de la
convention sur le génocide. Dans la présente espèce, le fait que les deux
Parties avaient soulevé la question autorisait la Cour à examiner la réserve

du Rwanda au regard de l’objet et du but de la convention.
17. En outre, en examinant cette question, la Cour aurait dû tenir
dûment compte du principe de la bonne foi pour apprécier l’effet de la
déclaration faite par le Rwanda, en la personne de son ministre de la jus-

tice, devant la Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies:
«Le Rwanda est l’un des pays qui ont ratifié le plus grand nombre

d’instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme. Pen-

5760 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

our Government ratified ten of them, including those concerning the

rights of women, the prevention and repression of corruption, the
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and the environment.
The few instruments not yet ratified will shortly be ratified and past
reservations not yet withdrawn will shortly be withdrawn.” (Sixty-
first Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.)

Among the few instruments to which Rwanda had entered reservations,

reservations that were “shortly [to] be withdrawn”, was the Genocide
Convention.
18. The Court made clear in the Nuclear Tests cases that:

“Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties
is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an inter-

national obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus
interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and
place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obliga-
tion thus created be respected.” (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 268, para. 46; Nuclear Tests

(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 473,
para. 49.)

It would not be appropriate to regard Rwanda’s declaration concerning
its reservation to the “most important” human rights and humanitarian
treaty as nothing more than political posturing devoid of legal effect.

19. This is all the more so given the principles underlying the Con-

vention, as well as the gravity of the present case, in which 3,500,000
Congolese citizens are alleged to have been massacred on grounds of
ethnicity.
20. As the Court stated in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case:

“By [its] very nature [the outlawing of genocide, aggression,
slavery and racial discrimination is] the concern of all States. In

view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.” (Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970 ,p .;
emphasis added.)

21. Thirty years later, the Court confirmed its understanding of the
object and purpose of the Convention and concluded:

“It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Con-
vention are rights and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that

the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime
of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention .” (Applica-

58 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 60

dant la seule année 2004, notre gouvernement a ratifié dix d’entre

eux, y compris ceux qui concernent les droits de la femme, la préven-
tion et la répression de la corruption, l’interdiction des armes de des-
truction massive et l’environnement. Les quelques instruments qui
n’ont pas encore été ratifiés le seront sous peu, et les réserves passées
qui n’ont pas encore été retirées seront retirées sous peu.» (Soixante

et unième session de la Commission des droits de l’homme.)
Parmi ces quelques instruments auxquels le Rwanda avait formulé des

réserves qui devaient être «retirées sous peu» figurait la convention sur le
génocide.
18. La Cour a déclaré clairement dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires
que:

«Tout comme la règle du droit des traités pacta sunt servanda elle-
même, le caractère obligatoire d’un engagement international assumé

par déclaration unilatérale repose sur la bonne foi. Les Etats inté-
ressés peuvent donc tenir compte des déclarations unilatérales et
tabler sur elles; ils sont fondés à exiger que l’obligation ainsi créée
soit respectée.» (Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1974, p. 268, par. 46; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande

c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 473, par. 49.)

Il ne serait pas approprié de considérer la déclaration du Rwanda concer-
nant sa réserve au «plus important» des instruments relatifs aux droits de
l’homme et au droit humanitaire comme un simple geste politique
dépourvu d’effet juridique.
19. Ce qui précède est particulièrement vrai si l’on tient compte des

principes de base de la convention et de la gravité de la présente affaire,
dans laquelle trois millions cinq cent mille citoyens congolais auraient été
massacrés en raison de leur origine ethnique.
20. Comme la Cour l’a déclaré dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne) :

«Par [sa] nature même, [la mise hors la loi du génocide, de l’agres-
sion, de l’esclavage et de la discrimination raciale concerne] tous les

Etats. Vu l’importance des droits en cause, tous les Etats peuvent
être considérés comme ayant un intérêt juridique à ce que ces droits
soient protégés; les obligations dont il s’agit sont des obligations
erga omnes.» ( Deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970 ,p .,
par. 33; les italiques sont de moi.)

21. Trente ans plus tard, la Cour a confirmé son interprétation de
l’objet et du but de la convention, en concluant:

«Il en résulte que les droits et obligations consacrés par la conven-
tion sont des droits et obligations erga omnes. La Cour constate que

l’obligation qu’a ainsi chaque Etat de prévenir et de réprimer le
crime de génocide n’est pas limitée territorialement par la conven-

5861 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 616,
para. 31; emphasis added.)

Hence, in my judgment, a State which denies the Court’s jurisdiction to
enquire into allegations alleging violation of the Convention would not
be lending the co-operation required to “liberate mankind from [the] . . .

odious scourge” of genocide or to fulfil the object and purpose of the
Convention. Denying recourse to the Court essentially precludes judicial
scrutiny into the responsibility of a State in a dispute relating to the vio-
lation of the Convention.
22. This point is of particular cogency in this case concerning Rwanda ,

a State where genocide took place and which justifiably called on the
United Nations Security Council to set up an international criminal tri-
bunal to try those who committed the crime against a section of its popu-
lation. It will thus not be in keeping with the spirit and objective of the

Convention to refuse to allow judicial consideration of the allegation of
genocide perpetrated in another country because Rwanda itself or its
agents are alleged to be responsible. While this is not to claim that the
seriousness of an obligation, the jus cogens status of a norm or the erga
omnes nature of an obligation per se confers jurisdiction on the Court, as

was recognized in the Judgment, it is nevertheless my opinion that it is
incumbent on Rwanda in this case, as a State party to the Genocide Con-
vention — and which itself was a victim of genocide and rightly referred
the matter to the competent organ of the United Nations — to allow
scrutiny of the allegation that it had breached its obligations under the

Genocide Convention.

23. In its letter to the Secretary-General of 28 December 1994 regard-
ing this issue, Rwanda rightly stressed the gravity of the genocide which
had been committed on its territory and requested the “[s]etting up as

soon as possible [of] an international tribunal to try the criminals”. In the
request, Rwanda stated as follows:

“There is evident reluctance by the international community . . .
to expose and punish the criminals . . . still at large. This is tanta-
mount to diluting the question of genocide that was committed in
Rwanda.” (Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent

Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, United Nations doc. S/1994/1115
(29 September 1994).)

Parallel reasoning would suggest that Rwanda’s unwillingness to allow
the Court to scrutinize its alleged genocidal conduct in this case not only
has the same effect of diluting the question of genocide, a result which

Rwanda rightly criticized and sought to prevent, but in fact has an even
more drastic effect: denial of the question of genocide. In this connec-

59 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 61

tion.» ( Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répres-

sion du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II) , p. 616,
par. 31; les italiques sont de moi.)

Aussi, selon moi, un Etat qui nie que la Cour a compétence pour exami-
ner les allégations de violations de la convention ne fait pas preuve de
l’esprit de coopération requis pour «libérer l’humanité [du]

fléau ... odieux» qu’est le génocide ou pour réaliser le but et l’objet de la
convention. Refuser l’accès à la Cour, c’est en fait interdire le contrôle
judiciaire de la responsabilité d’un Etat dans un différend relatif à la vio-
lation de la convention.
22. Ce point est d’une importance particulière dans cette affaire qui

concerne le Rwanda, Etat dans lequel un génocide a eu lieu et qui, à bon
droit, a demandé au Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies d’établir un tribunal pénal international chargé de juger
ceux qui avaient commis ce crime à l’égard d’une partie de sa population.

De la part du Rwanda, il n’est donc pas conforme à l’esprit et à l’objectif
de la convention de refuser que la Cour examine l’allégation d’un géno-
cide perpétré dans un autre pays parce qu’il est allégué que la responsa-
bilité en revient au Rwanda lui-même ou à ses agents. Sans vouloir
contester le fait que, comme le dit l’arrêt, le sérieux d’une obligation, le

caractère impératif d’une norme ou le caractère erga omnes d’une obliga-
tion ne saurait en lui-même fonder la compétence de la Cour, j’estime
néanmoins qu’il incombe au Rwanda dans cette affaire, en tant qu’Etat
partie à la convention sur le génocide, qui a été lui-même victime du
génocide et qui a, à bon droit, porté la question devant l’organe compé-

tent des Nations Unies, de laisser examiner l’allégation selon laquelle il a
violé les obligations que lui impose la convention sur le génocide.
23. Dans sa lettre du 28 décembre 1994 au Secrétaire général sur cette
question, le Rwanda a, à juste titre, souligné la gravité du génocide com-
mis sur son territoire, en demandant que soit «[créé] au plus tôt un tri-

bunal international chargé de juger les criminels». Dans cette lettre, il
déclarait ce qui suit:

«La communauté internationale répugne manifestement à ... juger
et punir les criminels encore en liberté. Cela revient à gommer le pro-
blème du génocide qui a été commis au Rwanda.» (Lettre datée du
28 septembre 1994 adressée au président du Conseil de sécurité par

le représentant permanent du Rwanda auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies, doc. S/1994/1115 (29 septembre 1994).)

En appliquant le même type de raisonnement, on pourrait penser que la
répugnance du Rwanda à laisser la Cour examiner le comportement
génocide dont il est accusé dans cette affaire a elle aussi, pour effet non

seulement de gommer le problème du génocide, effet que le Rwanda avait
à juste titre critiqué et essayé de prévenir, mais de l’escamoter complète-

5962 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

tion, it is worth stressing that all human lives — be they Rwandan, Con-

golese, or of any other nationality — are precious; offering redress to
some while denying it to others is neither in conformity with the Conven-
tion nor with justice; nor does it further the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter in respect of the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. The spirit of the Convention as well as the letter of the Convention

must be respected at all times.
24. The allegation involving the commission of genocide is far too
serious a matter to be allowed to escape judicial scrutiny by means of a
procedural device. The nature of the Convention and gravity of the
allegation dictate that, wherever possible, it must be subject to judicial

scrutiny. Inasmuch as Rwanda was able to call on the international com-
munity to hold to account those alleged to have committed genocide in
Rwanda itself, it cannot justifiably shield itself from enquiry in respect
of the very kinds of acts for which it succeeded in obtaining scrutiny by a

competent organ. In other words, it is neither morally right nor just
for a State to shield itself from judicial scrutiny under Article IX of the
Convention in respect of acts alleged to have taken place in the territory
of a neighbouring State when those acts constitute the very same
conduct as that in response to which the State successfully urged the

establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.

25. It is indeed a principle of law that the jurisdictional basis of the

Court is consensual. In paragraph 21 of the Judgment the Court recalls
that such consent may take various forms. Among these is forum proro-
gatum, which was explained not long ago by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in
his separate opinion in the Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-

govina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) case as follows:

“the possibility that if State A commences proceedings against State B
on a non-existent or defective jurisdictional basis, State B can
remedy the situation by conduct amounting to an acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court” (Provisional Measures, Order of
13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 416, para. 24, separate

opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).

While I do not accept the substance of the DRC’s argument on this issue,
I do believe that the gravity of the matter and the nature of the allegation
before the Court are such that the Court should have been allowed to
adjudicate the case. There is no impediment in law preventing Rwanda
from expressing its consent and thereby entitling the Court to examine

the alleged breaches of Rwanda’s obligations under the Genocide Con-
vention.

60 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES OP .DISS. KOROMA ) 62

ment. A cet égard, il importe de souligner que toutes les vies humaines

— qu’elles soient rwandaises, congolaises ou autres — sont précieuses,
qu’accorder une réparation aux uns et la refuser aux autres n’est conforme
ni à la convention ni à la justice et ne sert pas non plus les buts et les
principes de la Charte des Nations Unies concernant le règlement paci-
fique des différends. L’esprit de la convention et sa lettre doivent être

toujours respectés.
24. L’allégation de crime de génocide est beaucoup trop grave pour
qu’on la laisse échapper au contrôle judiciaire par une astuce de procé-
dure. La nature de la convention et la gravité de l’allégation imposent
que, chaque fois que possible, elle soit soumise au contrôle juridictionnel.

Dans la mesure où le Rwanda a eu la possibilité de s’adresser à la com-
munauté internationale pour faire traduire en justice ceux qui étaient
accusés d’avoir commis le génocide sur son territoire, il n’a pas d’excuse
pour se soustraire à un examen concernant précisément des actes iden-

tiques par nature à ceux qu’il a réussi à faire examiner par un organe
compétent. En d’autres termes, il n’est ni moral ni juste de la part d’un
Etat de se soustraire au contrôle judiciaire prévu à l’article IX de la
convention pour des actes prétendument commis sur le territoire d’un
Etat voisin, alors que ces actes constituent précisément le comportement

pour lequel il a instamment demandé et obtenu la constitution d’un tri-
bunal international chargé de poursuivre les personnes responsables de
génocide et d’autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire
commis chez lui.
25. Certes, un principe de droit veut que la base de la compétence de la

Cour soit le consentement des parties. Au paragraphe 21 de son arrêt, la
Cour rappelle que l’expression de ce consentement peut prendre diverses
formes. L’une d’entre elles est le forum prorogatum, que M. le juge ad hoc
Lauterpacht a exposé naguère, dans son opinion individuelle en l’affaire
de l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du

crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie (Serbie et Mon-
ténégro)), dans les termes suivants:

«si un Etat, l’Etat A, introduit une instance contre un autre Etat,
l’Etat B, sur une base de compétence d’inexistence ou défectueuse, le
forum prorogatum consiste en la possibilité pour l’Etat B d’y remé-
dier en adoptant un comportement valant acceptation de la compé-
tence de la Cour» (mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 13 sep-

tembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993 , opinion individuelle du juge
Lauterpacht, p. 416, par. 24).

Bien que je n’accepte pas sur le fond l’argument de la RDC sur ce point,
je n’en considère pas moins que la gravité de la question et la nature de
l’allégation portée devant la Cour sont telles que celle-ci aurait dû être
autorisée à statuer. Rien en droit n’empêchait le Rwanda d’exprimer son
consentement et de permettre ainsi à la Cour d’examiner les allégations

selon lesquelles le Rwanda avait violé les obligations découlant pour lui
de la convention sur le génocide.

6063 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS.OP .KOROMA )

26. As can be seen from the foregoing, this opinion has, to a great

extent, drawn on the jurisprudence of the Court on the subject of the
Genocide Convention to show why the Court should have been able to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court has over the years taken cognizance of
the importance of the Genocide Convention, has acknowledged the denial
of humanity that genocide — described as the “crime of all crimes” —

represents, and has responded appropriately, declaring “the principles
underlying the Convention” to be “principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 616,
para. 31). In reaching such profound conclusions, the Court, in my view,
was reflecting the gravity of the crime of genocide and the seriousness
with which it, the international community and mankind as a whole take

the Convention. While not denying the right of the States parties to the
Convention to enter reservations to Article IX, the Court, through its
jurisprudence, has stressed the unique nature of the Convention and the
necessity for States to respect their obligations under it. The Court’s pro-
nouncements fostered high hopes and expectations that the object and

purpose of the Convention would be fulfilled. This case presented an
opportunity for the Court to apply the Convention and its principles.
27. It is thus this profound respect for the Court’s earlier affirmations
of the principle underlying the Convention, its object and purpose,
together with the seriousness of the matter before it, which leads me to

regret the Court’s conclusion that it is not entitled to take on the present
case. In my view, had the Court also, besides the Genocide Convention,
taken a different, but no less valid, view of the other instruments relied
upon including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women and the Montreal Convention for the Sup-

pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, it could
have reached a different conclusion with respect to its jurisdiction. My
regret that the Court was not able to do so explains my vote.

28. I have read with considerable interest the joint separate opinion

of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma. They have
succinctly reflected the essence of the judicial concern underlying this
opinion, namely, that it is a very grave matter for a State to shield itself
from international judicial scrutiny for

“any claim that might be made against it concerning genocide. A
State so doing shows the world scant confidence that it would never,
ever, commit genocide, one of the greatest crimes known” (para. 25).

That concern could not have been more aptly stated. I also agree with the
joint opinion to the effect that in matters relating to the compatibility of

61 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES OP .DISS. KOROMA ) 63

26. Les paragraphes qui précèdent montrent que la présente opinion,
dans une grande mesure, s’inspire de la jurisprudence de la Cour relative
à la convention sur le génocide pour montrer pourquoi la Cour aurait dû
pouvoir exercer sa juridiction. Au fil du temps, la Cour a confirmé

l’importance de la convention sur le génocide, elle a reconnu la négation
de l’humanité que représente le génocide — le «crime absolu» — et elle y
a répondu comme il convenait en déclarant que «les principes qui sont à
la base de la convention» sont des «principes reconnus par les nations
civilisées comme obligeant les Etats même en dehors de tout lien conven-

tionnel» (Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression
du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II) , p. 616, par. 31)). En tirant
des conclusions aussi profondes, la Cour, selon moi, exprimait la gravité
du crime de génocide et le sérieux avec lequel elle-même, la communauté

internationale et l’humanité tout entière considèrent la convention. Sans
nier le droit des Etats parties de formuler des réserves à l’article IX, la
Cour par sa jurisprudence a souligné le caractère exceptionnel de la
convention et la nécessité pour les Etats de respecter les obligations

qu’elle leur impose. Ces prononcés de la Cour avaient fait naître de
grands espoirs de voir réaliser l’objet et le but de la convention, et la pré-
sente affaire était l’occasion pour la Cour d’appliquer la convention et ses
principes.
27. C’est ce profond respect pour les déclarations antérieures de la

Cour affirmant le principe qui fonde la convention, son objet et son but,
ainsi que la gravité de la question dont la Cour était saisie, qui font que
je regrette la décision par laquelle la Cour a conclu qu’elle ne pouvait pas
connaître de cette affaire. A mon avis, si la Cour avait adopté un point de
vue différent, mais tout aussi valide, sur les autres instruments invoqués

en même temps que la convention sur le génocide, notamment la conven-
tion sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des
femmes et la convention de Montréal pour la répression d’actes illicites
dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile, elle aurait pu parvenir à une

conclusion différente sur sa compétence. Je regrette que la Cour n’ait pas
été en mesure de le faire et c’est ce qui explique mon vote.
28. J’ai lu avec un très grand intérêt l’opinion individuelle commune
de M me le juge Higgins et MM. les juges Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada et
Simma. Ils ont succinctement exprimé l’essence de la préoccupation qui,

en tant que juge, m’a amené à émettre cette opinion, à savoir qu’il est très
grave pour un Etat de soustraire à l’examen judiciaire international

«une requête le mettant en cause pour génocide. Un Etat qui agit

ainsi se montre aux yeux du monde bien peu assuré de ne jamais, au
grand jamais, commettre de génocide, l’un des plus grands crimes
que l’on connaisse.» (Par. 25.)

On ne saurait mieux dire. Je pense aussi comme les auteurs de l’opinion

commune que, dans les questions relatives à la compatibilité d’une réserve

6164 ARMED ACTIVITIES DISS. OP. KOROMA )

a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty, the reserving State

or States do not have the final word.
29. On the other hand, while not disagreeing with the view of the
authors of the joint opinion that Article IX of the Genocide Convention
creates no monitoring function involving the review of periodic reports

by human rights treaty bodies on States’ behaviour, I wish to reiterate
that Article IX does provide for the Court to adjudicate:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the inter-
pretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,

including those relating to the responsibility of a State ” (emphasis
added).

The Article, in my view, therefore provides a basis for the Court, inter
alia, to enquire into State responsibility for genocide.

(Signed) Abdul G. K OROMA .

62 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. DISS.KOROMA ) 64

avec l’objet et le but d’un traité, ce n’est pas à l’Etat ou aux Etats auteurs

de la réserve qu’appartient le dernier mot.
29. D’un autre côté, sans être en désaccord avec les auteurs de l’opi-
nion commune lorsqu’ils disent que l’article IX de la convention sur le
génocide n’institue pas une fonction de surveillance comprenant l’examen

des rapports périodiques sur le comportement des Etats par les organes
conventionnels chargés de l’application des instruments relatifs aux droits
de l’homme, je tiens à répéter que l’article IX prévoit bel et bien que la
Cour statue sur les:

«[d]ifférends entre les parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpréta-
tion, l’application ou l’exécution de la présente convention, y com-

pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat» (les italiques sont de
moi).

Cet article, à mes yeux, fournit donc à la Cour la base qui lui permet,
notamment, d’examiner la responsabilité des Etats pour génocide.

(Signé) Abdul G. K OROMA .

62

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Document Long Title

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma

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