JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BEDJAOUI,
RANJEVA AND KOROMA
(Translation]
Long-standing dispute - Recurrence - Purticular difJiculties of case -
Appeal to Parties to transcend theirfrustrations through co-operation - Hope
that judicial settlement ivill be capable offully perfbrming its calming, peace-
rnakingfuncrion - Jitdicial settlen~ent and public opinion - Conditions for
social acceptahilitj, of'judicial decisiotls - Grounds relied on by Parties -
Court's choice of single ground- Questionable and hazardous.
British decision of II July 1939 -- Of questionable legal value - Court's
exanzination offormal validity of British decision to exclusion of substantive
validity - Risk ofruling infra petita - Court's exanlination offorma1 vulidit).
incomplete - Vitiation of consent - British decision vitiated byfraud - His-
torical context and circumstances of 1939 decision - Role of local British rep-
resentatives - Rushfor oil und advent ofojfshore e'rploration - "Provisional"
decision of 1936 - Finaldecision of 1939 - Political decisionnot huving status
of arbitral aivard and thus lacking,force of resjudicata - Decision no/ binding
- ~Veedfor consent to 1939 proceedings - Consent must be expressed,
inforrnedandfreely given, as ivith any territorial issue - Consent to proceed-
ingsand consent to substantive decision -- Qatar'sconsent not express, inforrned
andfreely given - Elements estahlishingfraud - 1939 decision could no/ prop-
erly serve as valid title for airard of the Hawars to Bahrain.
Consequencesof Court'sfailure to examine substantive validity of 1939 deci-
sion - Court's failure to proceed to logical conclusion: a minima solution
involving sharing of Hawar Islands on basis of Bahrain's effectivités - A
minima solution the logical consequence of Court's chosen approach, yet not
adopted - "Bahrainiformula" - Meaning and interpretution in light of inter-
na1coherence - Incompatibility betiveen Balzrainiformula and application to
dispute of uti possidetis juris - Reintroduction of effectivitésissue, avoided by
Judgment, but inevitably resurfacing a5 result of sole reliance on 1939 decision
- Weightmarzreport underlying British decision - Ausard oj'Jazirat Habvar
justijïed by Weightman by reference to Bahrain's effectivités - Absence of
effectivités in other Ifait9ar Islands -- Aivard of those islands just$ed by
Weightman on hasis of "presumption" of effectivité - Weightman report's
interna1contradictions - Double standard in application ofproximity principle
- Judgment ultra petita because effectivitéslimited to main Haivar island and
rorally absent in other islands and islets.
United Kingdom's subsequent doubts - Acceptance in 1960s of re-examina-
tion of 1939 decision !>y"neurral" authority - Qatar'spersistent protests andrefusal to acquiesce in 1939 decision and successive acts of occupation -
Qatar's attitude of non-renunciation preventingformation of Bahraini title over
Haivars - Issue of evidence ofexercise of sovereign authority over Islands -
Flimsiness of effectivités - Failure to respect territorial status quo during
period 1936-1939iohenBritish decision was inpreparation - Failure to respect
status quo during Sau~Iimediationfronl 1983 and since institution of proceed-
ings hefore International Court of Justice in 1991.
Search for historical title to the Hawars - Role of historical events in
dynarnics of legal disputes over territory - Interplay hetiveen lzistory and lait.
- Court'sduty - Purely descriptive arzdfactual nature of Judgment's account
ofhistorical context: failure to applj legal rules and principlesframing histori-
cal events - Judgn7entSfailure to dru11n 1ecessary legal con.~equencefsrom his-
toricalfacts - Legal criteriafor asses.singhistorical events - Court's investi-
gation of lzi.~toricaltitle to Zubarah, butfailure to do so,for Haivar Islands,for
which requirement iras greater.
British presence in Gulf' and its legal consequences during nineteenth and
tçi.entiethcenturies - Characteristics -- Creation of two distinct entities. Bah-
vainand Qatar, in last third of nineteenth century - Progressi~le formation and
consolidation of Al-Thanis' historical title to Qatar peninsula.
Ottoman presence in Qatarfrom 1871 and its legal consequencesuntil Turk-
ish i.vithdraiva1in 1914 - Attitude of United Kingdom - Bahrain's conduct:
silence reyecting acquiescence - Conduct of Sheiks of Qatar; extension of
authority over entire p<?ninsulu - Legai consequencesof Anglo-Ottoman agree-
ments of 1913 and 1914 - Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915 and 1927 - Legal
con.requenr.esof Anglo-Qatari agreement of 1916.
Interplay of geogruphy and law - Court's duty - Geographicalproximity
- Strong legalpresumption of appurterzunceto coastal State of al1islandssitu-
ated ivithin its territorial waters - Legal concept of "distance" - Issue of
State's territorial integrity.
Map evidence - Ei~identiaryvalue -- Maps as reflection of general public
opinion and repufe - British War Office maps: their purticular credibility -
Qatar's title to Haiijar.~conjirmed hy &vide geographical and temporal spread qf
nlaps produced - Judqment's silence onmap evidence.
Historical documents on territorial composition of Bahrain and Qatar -
Respective territorial ca.ytentsin light of historicul documents - Appurtenance
of the Haiz?arsto Qatar.
Maritime delimitation - Decision infra petita - "Bahrainiformula" and
single maritime boundary - SigniJïcanceof enumeration of maritime areas to
be delimited - Failure to apply coherence test to course of line - Multifunc-
tional line and exercise of rights - Method of construction of provisional
median line - Baselines und hase points - Duality offunctions and develop-
ment of laiv - Rejection hy case laiv~fduulity offunctions - Equitahle points
and lines - Delin?itationof territorial sea and equitahle identiJïcationof base
points - Distorting eff~~c.to sn coursr uf provi.sionu1line - Enclai~ementof DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 147
Haii,ar Islands - Right of innocent pussage through Bahrain's territorial sea -
Régimeof international eusement - Court's lack of competence to dejne that
régime - Obligation of Parties to conclude agreement for international ease-
rnent - Legul characterizution of Qit'at Jaradah - Islands: dejnition and cri-
teria - Historical developrnent - "Natural" area of land: terra ferma -
Single line of'deliniitatio- Eicistence cft~c'osectors- Point of separation -
Adjustment qf rzortliern.secio- E-~cessiverffect accorded to Qit'at Jaradah.
Suggested solution -- Prrcedents - Saudi-Bahraini territorial agrc1en7ent:
dii~isibilitg:sovereignty and resources -- i2lgeria-Morocco agreenzents.
Ceneru1 conclusion -- iittaclzment of'Court's African judges to principle of
uti possidetis juris - ,'VuSrate .succession - British decision of 1939: legal
art$ce - "Oil donlinutes Iund and seau - Judicial ethics- British decision of
1939 to he mc~asuredhj~yardstick of'n7odern nzethods of interpretation and irz
ligllt of conten7porary nornzs of'internationul lait,.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
1. INTRODUCTION 1-15
II. THEBRITISH DECISIO NF 11JULY1939 16-47
65-85
IV. EFFECTIVITE AS D REFUSA LO ACQUIESCE
V. THEHISTORICA TITLE 86-136
(a) The arriva1 of the Ottomans in the Gulf in 1871 113-123
(i) First, the conduct of Great Britain 114-117
(ii) The conduct of Bahrain during the period ofOttoman
establishment in Qatar: Bahrain's tacit acquiescence 118-120
(iii) The conduct of the Sheikhs of Qatar and the spread
of their authority to the entire peninsula
(h) The Convention of 29 July 1913 respecting the Persian
Gulf and Adjacent Territories
(i) First, Article11
(ii) Article 13 of the Convention
(c) The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914
(d) The Anglo-Saudi Treaties of 1915and 1927
(e) The Anglo-Qatari agreement of 1916
(i) The respective capacities of the contracting parties
(ii) The nature and extent of the protection
(iii) The territorial area involved
VI. PROXIMIT AND TIZRRITORIIA NLTEGRITY 137-143
VII. THEMAPEVIDENCE 144-148VIII. HISTORICADLOCUMENT CONCERNING THE TERRITORIA EXTENT
OF BAHRAI NND QATAR
(a) The territorial extent of Bahrain
(i) Lorimer's description
(ii) J. T. Bent's description
(iii) Three confidential British memoranda
(iv) Three British military reports
(v)Numerous other official British documents
(b) The territorial extent of Qatar: its gradua1 identity with
the territorial area of the peninsula, including the adjacent
islands
IX. THEMARITIM DELIMITATION
(a) The Judgment rules infra petita in terms of the Bahraini
formula as applied to the course of the single median
line
(h) The method adopted in order to draw the provisional
median line
(c) Legal characterization of Qit'at Jaradah
(d) The course of the final delimitation line
XI. FINALCONCLUSION DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 149
1. This case has divided Qatar and Bahrain for too long. For over 60
years now Qatar has ceaselesslyprotested at the British decision of 1939
attributing the Hawar Islands to Bahrain. We can look back on fruitless
attempts at arbitration over more than 30 years. The Saudi mediation
between the two countries, which was to end in disappointing failure,
began more than 20 years ago. For countless decades there have been
phases of direct, invariably abortive negotiations between the two States.
And finally, for ten long years, punctuated with a whole variety of inci-
dents, the case has officially been before this Court.
2. We would accordingly be more tlian justified in hoping that, with
the Judgment delivered by the Court today, this case will be satisfactorily
settled once and for all. Yet has this Judgment carefully identified and
met al1the requisite criteria for success? In this respect, Ourhope becomes
clouded when we consider the treatment accorded to the question of the
Hawar Islands and to that of the drawing of the singlemaritime delimita-
tion line, which has, in our view, been arrived at by a somewhat novel
method that breaks with the most soundly established practices. Thus,
the provisional course of the equidistance line was determined by taking
prior account of certain special circumstances, some of which are in fact
insignificant,such as Umm Jalid, a maritime feature a few dozen metres
long, projecting 30 centimetres out of the water. The fundamental rule
that "the land douriinntesthe sea" was not respected in drawing the pro-
visional line, the Judgment having opted not to apply the mainland-to-
mainland method. It is al1 of this that has prompted us to write this
opinion.
3. The parties involved in a lawsuit must have the good sense to assess,
calmly and realistically, their respective gains and losses - which are
sometimes unavoidable in a judicial settlement. Today's Judgment is
what it is. But it stands. It is our hope that the Parties will manage to
draw from this situation - but above al1 from the infinite resources
offered by their common genius - the will to set off again with confi-
dence along the road of co-operation and to restore mutually beneficial
relations through a dialogue that will transcend their difficulties or frus-
trations.
4. The question of the Hawar Islands is a highly sensitive one for both
Bahrain and Qatar. It is a subject that carries an exceptional emotional
charge for the people of the two States and one about which they feel
exceptionally strongly.
5. For Bahrain, losing the Hawar Islands would be a truly alienating-
cupitis diminutio - indeed alienating in the extreme, because a largepart
of a smafl country would be amputated. It would also involve the loss of DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.)
150
a vestige of bygone splendour, a remnant of the now-distant era when
Bahrain held sway over virtually the entire Gulf, and indeed over the
Qatar peninsula itself. For Bahrain, Hawar represents a fundamental
political myth, like those existing in many countries. In the age-old con-
flict between France and Germany, now fortunately laid to rest, the ques-
tion of Alsace-Lorraine, among other highly flammable flashpoints, was
like the flint that invariably sparked off a war. To some c.rtcnt, Hu~vuri.7
Buhuain's "Alsuce-Lorrrririe".
6. For Qutür, the loss of, or failure to recover, the Hawars through the
jOrcc of 1u)13b, efore a court for whose jurisdiction Qatar vigorously
fought, would give rise to a sense of disappointment as intense as its con-
fidence in international justice was great. At the end of every day for 61
years now, each and every Qatari sees his lost illusions swept away on the
waves of the daily ebb. Each day, when the tide goes out, every Qatari
can walk, without getting his feet wet, those few hundred metres - even
less in some places -- separating him from the Hawars . . .
7. Why then should anyone be surprised that the taste in the mouths
of the crowd, both in Bahrain and in Qatar, is a Sour one? It is more
essential than ever that judicial settlement fulfil to the utmost its calming,
peace-making function in a case such as this, where each Party fears
being unjustly despoiled by a Judgment depriving it of the Hawars.
8. Thus, for the Court to satisfy both Parties under the circumstances
is an arduous and well-nigh impossible task, and yet the decision must be
rendered strictly under the law and rigorous care must be taken to avoid
handing down any form of judgment cs aequo et bono! However, it is
clear that the fact that this bitter dispute has persisted for so long in any
case imposed an extra duty on the Court. What we mean by this is that in
ruling, in deciding solely in accordance with international law, the Court
was nevertheless duty-bound to seek out, from among the possible solu-
tions, that which appeared to be the most pacifying and likely to cause
the least dissatisfaction on either side.
9. The American judge Philip Jessup, in his dissenting opinion in the
South West Afiicu case, wrote that international law must not be regarded
as an antiquated compendium of dead letters, dating back to a long-gone
period in the history of the world: "the standard to be applied by the
Court rnust hc ono ii+iic.litukcs uccount of'the vieivs rrnduttitud~~sof the
contcnlporurj) intcrn~rtiotiuic.ot?lmunity" .
'I.C.J. Ri~port1966.p. 441: emphasis acided. Two authors, Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, have further stated
that :
"The case in question demoiistrated [that] law is not something
that is apart from reality, apart from politics . . . The case highlights
the delicate line the Court must tread. It generally attempts in its
judgment to include somestatements that make the decisions at least
purtly at.ceptuble to the losers; it is never highly critical or abusive.
The trick indeed, is to try to make the decision carry as little painfor
the /oser as possible, to tr),to uvoid muking the Court itselj'unpopu-
I(rrwith any part of the international Community."'
10. It would be wrrong to think for a single moment that al1 this is
peculiar to international fora. The same problem of rejection of judicial
decisions by public opinion exists within States and sometimes takes on
alarming proportions, ranging from displays of popular emotion to acts
of violence. Whether national or international, justice is therefore bound
to be concerned with ensuring that it is accepted, through decisions
which, while articulating the state of the law, must not completely ignore
the stute of'puhlic.opinion. One author has remarked that "Judges do not
live in isolation. Their opinions are subject to criticism, and they are, and
should be, influenced by popular reaction. The process often works in
subtle ways . . ."'
11. The Soutlz We.rtAjricu case provides confirmation of the view held
by Chaïm Perelman, who wrote: "It is indeed rare for legal reasoning to
be able to lead, like . . . the proof of a mathematical theorem, to a com-
pelling conclusion." Courts, whether domestic or international, are also
îaced, in a particularly acute manner, with the problem of the "sociul
ut~c~eptabilit~o ~f"their decisions? '711 fact", as Stéphane Rials added, "in
spite of the majesty which attaches to their decisions, courts cannot dis-
pense with techniques which will make their judgments more persuasive
and enhance their lepitirna~y"~.
12. This is true LI fortiori of the International Court, which is so
dependent, for the referral of cases to it and for its jurisdiction, on the
consent of States. In the So~rth Clfest Africrr case, the Court had in
advance robbed the technical solution put forward by it of any substance,
so that it could only appear to the public as a derisory expedient once the
Court had accepted jurisdiction and agreed that the Application was
Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, Jullgirig flic Worltl Cou-! Lirii tint1Politi<,sin tlrc
Fl.orltl's Lcutlir~g cour1988. Chap. 7. "The Courts in Collision", p. 213; emphasis
added.
'Norman Redlich, "J~~dgesas Instruments of Democracy". in TliczRolc of fliCourts
in So<,ic,ied. Shimon Slietreet. 1988,Chap. II. pp. 149-156.
Chüïm Perelman. Lo,qiclirt,jlrridicti.our.c,llc,rl~i.io.976,pp. 7 and 9.
'Lrs ('ollrs tic,tlro1050.pp. 429 and 451. quoted by StéphaneRials. "Les standards.
notions critiques du droit". in Chaïnl Perelman and Raymond Vander Elst, Lr.5notioii.(i
c~~rrr<~rtrritrhlrJriiroittravaux du Centre national de recherches de logiquc. Brussels.
1984.pp. 39-53, at p. 46. DELIMITATION AND QLIESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 152
admissible. The opinion and expectations of the "public" are an impor-
tant factor, constituting what is referred to by some authors as "inj'ru-
clroit"'.
13. Whc~tIlus tlie Court done in the present case? In order to convince
the Court, the Parties have argued at length on the following grounds of
law put forward by each of them on the question of the Hawars:
((1) the existence of an original title;
(hi the presence of gffi>ctivitPs;
(c) the legal principle of proximity and the matter of territorial integ-
rity;
(ri) the map evidence;
(ci the principle of utipossicletisjuris; and lastly,
(,O the British decision of II July 1939 awarding the Hawars to
Bahrain.
Far from examining al1 of these grounds and according them such full
value as they deserved to be given as support for the position of one or
other of the Parties, the Court deliberately ignored the first five, in order
to base its solution on the British decision of 11 July 1939 ulone.
14. A choice that is both questionable and hazardous. Questionable
because, particularl!i where territorial disputes are concerned, the first
intellectual step norrnally undertaken is rather to seek an original histori-
cal legal title, irrespective of whether or not it is currently still effective.
Questionable also because, by not responding as it should to the numer-
ous other legal grounds argued by the Parties, the Court leaves them (and
anyone reading the Judgment) with the regrettable impression that it has
only given the Parties a very incomplete hearing on matters which they
however considered to be crucial. In other words, the Court has thus
taken the risk not only of rendering an incorrect judgment but also of
failing to give a complete ruling. The Court thus exposes itself to the
danger of charges of having ruled "infiupetitcr". A hazardous choice, more-
over, as the nature of the present case is not such as to enable various
grounds to be so easily dispensed with simply because the examination of
" André-Jean Arnaud, Criticlire(1Itrr.oi.~onj~rridiqOir i8lu .\o<.iol»gilttiroi>.
LGDJ, 1981. in parti<:ular his arguments entitled "Repères pour une exploration
méthodiquede l'infra-droit". pp.5tJtsiJc/".L'urtrt~t-dirr-droif ".to use the term employed
by the author, is made iip of a number of factors. objective and subjective. which. in the
popular imagination, re.,ishtipea court decision beiore it is delivered, and fuel public
expectation:levels of consciousness and legal culture. i.e., conformist or revolutionary
tetidencies on the part the public- together with more subjective Factors made up of
attitudes. opinions. types of behaviour. heliefs. images, and so on. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 153
one ground would definitely and indisputably - so it is believed- pro-
duce the solution, thereby relieving the Court of the need to examine any
other grounds. In this case, as indeed in many others, the solution
derived from one ground could be strongly contradicted - effectively
undermined and set at naught - by others. The science of international
law does not have thle rigour and logical certainty of the mathematical
sciences, in which one line of reasoning must inevitably completely exclude
or render superfluous any other. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in
international law, one does not halt at the first result in a territorial
award, but then goes on to see whether a "better title" exists.
15. Let us begin by considering the British decision of 11July 1939,by
which the United Kirigdom awarded the Hawars to Bahrain and which is
the legal ground on which the Court has based its entire Judgment. In
Our view, that decisicincannot constitute the requisite "better title". And
that is what we must first show. We regret that, in so doing, we are
obliged to attack at the very heart of the Judgment.
II.THEBRITISH DECISION OF 11 JULY1939
16. The Court ruled on the question of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands solely on the basis of the British Government's decision of 11 July
1939.According to the Court, that decision was binding on Bahrain and
Qatar at the time it was adopted and was opposable to them notwith-
standing the subsequent protests of the Sheikh of Qatar. The Court states
that its "conclusion .. . on the basis of the British decision of 1939makes
it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the arguments of the Parties based
on the existence of an original title, c~f2ctivités,and the applicability of
the principle of uti po.rsidetis juris to the present case" (Judgment,
para. 148).
17. The Court thus made the deliberate, hazardous choice, analysed
above, of deciding a territorial dispute on the basis of a decision of ques-
tionable legal value and to dispense with careful consideration of the
other grounds advaiiced by the Parties in support of their arguments,
namely whether or riot the principle of uti possideiis ,jura insd the prin-
ciples of geographical proximity and territorial unity applied to the case
and whether there kvasan original title or c:ffic.ti~~iti..sT.he Court thus
chose not to apply the relevant principles of law and avoided drawing the
inescapable conclusiconsthat followed from consideration of the interna-
tional treaties, of applicable customary law relating to islands, of mari-
time law and of the substantial map evidence.
18. The Court's treatment of the subject of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands might have been convincing had the Court carried through with
its task and performed in full the judicial mission incumbent upon DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 154
it. However, not only did the Court decline to examine the substan-
tive validity of the British decision of 11 July 1939, even though it had
been invited to do so by the Parties - which in itself exposed it to
the risk of ruling "i~!frupetitu" -- but ils consideration of the formal
validity of that decision was, further. both incomplete and lacking in
credibility.
19. With respect to the specific question of the Hawars. which entails
important consequences for the maritime delimitation, the entire legal
edifice constructed b:y the Court thus rests on a single foundation, the
British decision of 1939, and that foundation is itself particularly flimsy,
in that it led the Court toconclude that the consent given by both Parties
in 1938to Great Britain to take that decision was free of any defect. Yet,
as we shall show, the Sheikh of Qatar's consent was clearly vitiated by
the existence of frautl
20. But before undertaking an examination of the questionable cir-
cumstances under which the decision was taken, it is worth quoting
at this point a comrnent made in 1964 by Christopher Long, a senior
Foreign Office official, who, in summarizing the events of 1938-1939,
admitted the followirig:
"Neiflier qf tlie tii30RuIers ivus usked beforrhund to promise his
consent to the aizlurd, nor ufterii,urd.s to givrit. H.M.G. simply
'made' the awarti. Although it followed the form of an arbitration to
some extent, it was imposedfrorn crhove,and no question of its valid-
ity or otherwise was raised. It was quite simply a decision which was
taken for practical purposes in order to clear the ground for oil
concessions." '
21. In other words, the Foreign Office itselfacknowledged in 1964that
the 1939 decision hatl been "imposed from above" and that the Ruler of
Qatar had not promised in advance to accept the content of that decision.
This clearly means tlnat, however it might have been characterized, that
decision could not be regarded as binding.
22. But statements like that of Christopher Long are not only to be
found ufier the decision was taken. Critical views were also expressed
within those same British diplomatic circles hqfor' the 1939decision was
adopted. The Minute drawn up on 30 December 1937 by Rendel, one
such British senior official, States: "As regards the Hawar Islands at
No. 17, 1cannot help regretting that the India Office went so far as they
seem to have done in allotting these islands to BahrahWx
More generally, the filesubmitted to the Court shows that the fact that
' Reply of Bahrain, Vol. 2. Ann. 2. p. 4; emphasis added.
Replyof Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann111.56p. 349.the Hawars belongetl to Qatar was not disputed prior to the "provi-
sional" decision of 1036.
23. It is important to recall the facts and circumstances which led to
the British decision of 11 July 1939.This is particularly necessary because
the Judgment, far from describing the exact historical context of that
decision, confined it:;elf, in paragraphs 118 to 135, to citing the most
immediate of the eveintsoccurring between 10 May 1938 and 25 Septem-
ber 1939.More cruci;il facts capable of shedding light on the British deci-
sion of 1939are to be found in the "quulités",at the very beginning of the
Judgment, far removed from the discussion devoted to consideration of
the 1939 decision, and thus separated from that discussion and inter-
mingled with other points.
24. As we shall shiow below in considering the question of historical
title, it was acknowledged, at least until 1936,that Hawar appertained to
Qatar, as a result of historical consolidation and the recognition of
Qatar's title. The challenge raised to Qatar's title may be explained by the
conjunction of the local policy of certain British representatives and the
rush for oil with the advent of off-shore exploration. A confidential letter
of 30 July 1933 from Gastrell, British Political Agent in Bahrain, to the
British Political Resident in the Gulf, referred to the reluctance on the
part of the Ruler of Bahrain and his son to designate by name the islands
to be included in the area of the oil concession granted by Bahrain. In a
telegram dated the next day, 31 July 1933, to the Government of India,
the Political Resident in the Gulf accepted this suggestion but did how-
ever state that "Hawar Island is clearly not one of the Bahrain group"'.
25. On 28 April 1936, following the Ruler of Bahrain's discovery that
the "unallotted area of Bahrain" for which he could grant a new oil con-
cession comprised less than half of the land territory of the main Bahrain
Island, Muharraq, Sitrah, Nabi Salih and Umm Na'asan, Charles Bel-
grave, the Political Adviser to the Ruler, presented to his superior, the
British Political Agent, a formal claim of title to the Hawar Islands on
behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain. The elements of the claim were set out in
a document the text of which began as follows: "In connection ~viththe
present nc)gotiurion.s fi~r rrnoil r.onr.rssionover the territory of Bahruin
fishichisnot ir~cludedin thc~1925 oil conccs.riotz." 'OThey related to islands
the majority of which lie within the 3-mile belt of Qatar's territorial sea.
This fact of geography is not disputed.
26. Here is the account given in the confidential Foreign Office minute
dated 10June 1964,entitled "Sovereignty over Hawar Island" and signed
" Mernorial of Qatar, 'Vol.6, Ann. 111p.8451.
"'Mernorial of Qatar, Vol. 7. Ann. 111.p.317 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 156
by Christopher Long. of the events following Bahrain's claim:
"3. The first stage was from April to July, 1936. In a letter
dated April 28, 1936, (E3439) the Political Agent, Bahrain, reported
that Bahrain, .stimuluteclhyprospective oil concessionaires, liud put
filrivcwd a c.lui/n to Hu,i~ur.He oh.scri.1r.tshut 'if tnigl.t. suit u.r
politicull~~to lzui'eus large un urea us possible includod under Buh-
ruin.' T11eP01itic:ulResiUIL'n~tupport~dtllis attitude and the mutter
\ras di.~cussetl,togctlicr with reluted oil questions, ut u meeting in
Whitehull. As a result, in a letter to Mr. Skliros of Petroleum Con-
cessions Liinited.,dated July 14, 1936,it was stated that 'on the basis
of the evidence at present before H.M.G. it appears that Hawar
belongs to the Skiaikhof Bahrain, and that the burden of disproving
his claim would lie on any other potential claimant.' (E 4490.)"
27. This decision of 9 July 1936 by the British Government was noti-
fied to Charles Belgrave, who conveyed it to the Ruler of Bahrain and to
Skliros of Petroleurri Concessions Limited, but not to the Sheikh of
Qatar. The Sheikh was informed neither of Bahrain's forma1 claim of
28 April 1936 to the Hawars nor of the British decision of 9 July 1936
and was not made a participant, either directly or indirectly, in the vari-
ous steps in the process, even though the British Government must have
been aware that most of the islands in question lay within three miles of
the Coast of the Qatari peninsula and that Qatar regarded them as
belonging to it. Thus, at'terflying over them in 1934,the Royal Air Force
had stated that they were part of Qatar's territory. Moreover, between
1933 and 1934. early in the negotiations over the granting of an oil con-
cession, British officiialsin the Gulf and in London had had no doubt
that the islands appertained not to Bahrain but to Qatar. Although the
British Government stated that the 1936 decision was based on the evi-
dence before them, it clearly had not escaped them that neither the
Annual Reports of the Government of Bahrain nor Belgrave's "Diary"
contained any mention whatsoever of the Hawar Islands or of any
administration of those islands by or on behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain;
at most, ail we find is a reference to Weightman's visit to Hawar on
15 April 1938.
28. The foregoing thus demonstrates that the 1936 decision was not
taken on the basis of the available evidence, but rather in spite of and
against that evidence, and, even though it was characterized as "provi-
sional", its significance and practical effect could hardly have been under-
estimated. It was a definitive statement of the principles guiding British
policy with respect to offshore concessions in the area concerned.
''Reply of Bahrain, Vol. 2, Ann. 2, p. 2: emphasis added.
120 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 157
29. Nevertheless, in order to soften the foreseeable reaction by the
Ruler of Qatar, the British authorities stated that the decision was pro-
visional and that a final decision would not be taken until any claims
which the Ruler of Qatar might have had to those islands had been con-
sidered. These precautions came to nothing, for Belgrave was at pains to
indicate that the Ruler of Bahrain would include the Hawars on the list
of his possessions. Consequently. subsequent negotiations for oil conces-
sions in Bahrain's "unallotted area" were conducted on the basis that the
Hawars were part of Bahrain and that the Ruler of Bahrain alone was
entitled to grant a concession covering those islands. The competent
British authorities, in the Gulf and in London, also acted on the basis
that the Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain.
30. The British authorities allowed oil companies to continue to nego-
tiate with the Ruler of Bahrain alone for a concession covering the whole
of the unallotted arecdor just the Hawar Islands, as if they had already
made a final decision that those islands belonged to Bahrain. Moreover,
the inevitable conseqiuence of the "provisional decision" of 1936was that
the burden of disproving Bahrain's claim to the islands was placed on
Qatar, even though the proposa1 later sent to the Ruler of Qatar did not
include the evidence on which Bahrain based its claim. Thus, the Ruler of
Qatar was not given an opportunity to rebut Bahrain's arguments.
31. It was against this background that, on 10May 1938,the Ruler of
Qatar told Weightman, the then Political Agent of Great Britain, that
Hawar "is, by its natiural position, a part of Qatar" and "belongs to it" 12.
It was on this basis tlnat he protested against Bahrain's initial occupation
of the north of Jazir,at Hawar. Referring to the relations between Qatar
and Great Britain, he requested the latter to "do what is necessary in the
matter so as to avoid any trouble which may cause a breach of peace" 13.
In his reply of 28 May, Weightman referred to Bahrain's claim to the
Hawar Islands and stated the following:
"It is indeed a fact that by their formal occupation of the Islands
for some time past the Bahrain Government possess a prima facie
claim to them, but 1 am authorised by the Honourable the Political
Resident to say that even so His Majesty's Government will be pre-
pared to give the fullest consideration to any formal claim put for-
ward by you to the Hawar Islands, provided that your claim is sup-
ported by a full and complete statement of the evidence on which
you rely in asserting that you, as Shaikh of Qatar, possess sover-
eignty over thern." l4
" Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 7, Ann. 111.p.255
''Ihirl.. 256.
'* IhirlAnn. 111.156pp. 281 and 282. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 158
32. Weightman added that meanwhile the British Government "will
not be prepared to prohibit or restrict"I5 Bahrain's occupation of the
islands. In his reply of27 May to the Political Agent. the Sheikh of Qatar
agreed in the followirig terms to having the proceedings for settlement of
the problem conducted by the British: "1 am very grateful to you for the
good expressions coritained in your letter and 1am also thankful to His
Majesty's Government who will, us you said, decide the matter in the
light of truth and justice." l"On 30 May Weightman and the Sheikh met
in Doha. Then, on 15 June, the Sheikh wrote to Weightman reminding
him that during his visit, "1 thanked you for informing me that you were
going to investigate the matter very thoroughly so that the facts may
become clear, and His Majesty's Government may be able to decide the
matter in the light of justice and equity" 17.
33. This was the specific context, further complicated by competing
British and American oil interests, in which Great Britain took its deci-
sion on 11 July 1939,which it notified by means of two identical letters to
the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar and by which it attributed the Hawars
to BahrainIX.
34. We agree with the majority of the Court that the British decision
of 1939 is not an arbitral award and therefore does not have the force of
rrs judicatu. We support the Court's reasoning and agree with it that the
characteristic features of an arbitral award are lacking here. The British
decision is a politicailor administrative decision and, as such, constitutes
a simple historical fa~ct.
35. However, according to the Judgment, that decision is still legally
binding today on the two Parties, as a result of the consent given by each
of them in 1938to tlnelocal representatives of the United Kingdom. We
wish to state Our total disagreement on this point.
36. As the Judgment pointed out, correctly noting in passing the simi-
larity between the present case and the DuhuilSharj(r11case, the consent
of the Rulers was of course required. We accept that, in the circum-
stances of this case and taking due account of the nature of the relation-
ship between Bahrain and Qatar and the United Kingdom, such consent
was necessary. But, in the Judgment now handed down by the Court,
that consent is artificially examined, detached from its temporal context
and, in sum. analysed in a totally abstract manner.
37. In order to reach the conclusion that the British decision was and
remains binding on the Parties, the Judgment deemed the consent of the
" Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 7, Ann. 111.156,p. 282.
'"Ihitl.. Ann. 111.157.p. 287; emphasis added.
l7Ibitl.. Ann. 111.160,p. 307.
" Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. p. 1176. DELIMITATION AND QLESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 159
Ruler of Qatar to be indivisible. Since consent to the procedure implied
consent to the substantive decision, the protests of the Sheikh of Qatar
were accordingly heltl to be without legal force: made "after the event",
they simply expressed the disappointment of their author.
38. In the present case, the indivisibility of the consent has not been
established; it is simply presumed. In political terms, the nature of the
relationship between the protecting Power and the protected State did
not permit the use of any language other than the deferential terms in
which the local rulers expressed themselves; thus to interpret that lan-
guage as evidence of consent to the renunciation of territorial jurisdiction
is in reality to give the opposite sense to the natural meaning of the words
and conduct in 1939. In legal terms, when the Judgment invokes against
Qatar its consent to i.he substance of the 1939decision - a consent that
was in reality hypothetical - , it reproaclies Qatar with its failure
to abide by a decision with which it had already been threatened in
veiled terms since 1037. Independently of the fraudulent nature of the
manŒuvres of the British representatives, the question is whether
Qatar was legally bound to abide by the decision. The answer must be
a negative one. in tize mrlttrr of' territorj>. consent to u rcnunciution of
sovereigrzty ctrnnot hc prrsutned; the renunciatiorz must hr expressrd urzd
'stuhlished in unequii~ocal tcrn7.r. This is an absolute rule in international
law. Agreement to a power on the part of the United Kingdom to
dispose of sovereignly over the Hawar Islands has not been established.
Consent to the procr:edings, even supposing that it was validly given -
yuod non - did not signify automatic consent to the final decision. There
is iiothing in the evidence submitted to the Court, and in particular in
the letters of Qatar cited in the Judgment, to show that Qatar gave its
consent to be legally bound by the future decision.
39. We repeat that, in a case such as this, consent had to be express,
iqformcd and Jieely giwn. This was not the case. Paragraph 141 of the
Judgment, which deals with the question of the forma1 validity of Qatar's
consent, is determinative in that it demonstrates, with a certain surreal-
ism, the construction. unfounded in reality. which the Judgment places
upon that consent. This paragraph is worth quoting:
"while it is true that the competent British officiaisproceeded on the
premise that Bahrain possessed prima facie title to the islands and
that the burden of proving the opposite lay on the Ruler of Qatar,
Qatar cannot maintain that it was contrary to justice to proceed on
the basis of this premise iixhrn Qtrtur hud hertz irgbrr?zcldbcjbrr ugrer-
ir~gto the procédure thut tl2i.sivould occur und Izud con~er~t~dto tlie
procceding.~ heirzg c~~t~ductcd oil tlrut husis"''.
'" Emphasis added DELIMIT,$TION AND QLIESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 160
In effect, already iri this one paragraph, the Court's Judgment stands
at the threshold of the issue of fraud, only then to shy away from it.
40. What exactly happened in fact? We have to restore the entire con-
text and not content ourselves with abstract reasoning. Under the Anglo-
Qatari Treaty of 1916, and pursuant to the assurances given in the 1930s,
which were linked to the agreement by Qatar in 1935to grant an oil con-
cession, the British Giovernment had guaranteed the territorial integrity
of Qatar. Despite this. in 1936 it took the decision falsely described as
"provisional". whereby it breached this undertaking to respect territorial
integrity. What is more, it saw to it that Qatar was not informed of this.
Already. and by this fact alone, it may be said that Qarur's con.sc.ntIO tlze
procredings iiws not an informrd consent. The British decision of 1936
was not only concealled from the Ruler of Qatar, but, further, did not
retain the "provisiona~l"status with which it had been characterized, since
from 1937 Bahrain had begun to occupy the north of Jazirat Hawar with
the support of the British representatives. That rendered the decision irre-
versible. The fraudulent intent is thus clearly established. How, in these
circumstances, could the United Kingdom commence in May 1938a pro-
cedure under which it acted as if it had never taken any prior decision?
At the time of Weighitman'sexchange of letters on the procedure with the
Ruler of Qatar in May 1938,the decision had in fact already been taken
since 1936 and implemented since 1937. If one had to draw a parallel.
albeit white remaining within the parameters specific to each particular
case, one might compare this situation with that described in Article 17
of the Statute of the Court, which prohibits any Member of the Court
froin hearing a case if he had already dealt with it in the past in any
capacity.
41. But there is triore to it than this. When the Ruler of Qatar dis-
covered the first signs of occupation by Bahrain of the northern part of
Jazirat Hawar, he ccsmplained about this "interference" to the British
Government, meeting its representative, Weightman, in February 1938.The
British Government failed to disclose to him, either at that time, or in the
course of the exchange of letters in May 1938, the existence of the deci-
sion taken by it in 11936,which effectively authorized these first mani-
festations of Bahrairii occupation. This justifies a reading of the situa-
tion which prevailecl at the time of the correspondence of May 1938
altogether different from that given by paragraph 141 of the Judgment
quoted above. Thus everything happened as if the United Kingdom
wanted to demonstrate to the Ruler of Oatar that this Bahraini ocCuDa-
.
tion was an occurrence independent of Britain's wishes, that it was
entirelv unconnected with the 1936 decision (which Britain continued to
conceal), that it was bound to regard the occupation as a fact tending
rather to encourage iitin the belief that prima facie the Hawars belonged
to Bahrain and, finally, that it would not seek to put an end to that occu-
pation without first hearing any arguments from Qatar showing that the
occupation was contrary to law. From this we can see that the exchange
of letters of May 1938,with its true context and full significance restored, DELIMIT4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 161
disclosed a situation which prevented Qatar's consent from being fully
informed. This ivas un operution in four stages: jîrst, non-disclosure of
the esistcnce of the 1936 decision; then alloir,ingcrc.dencc to the notion
tliat the result~lnt B(~1zrainioccupution ivus totully independent of that
decision; then, hoi~ev~eru.sing thut occupution us CLprete.ut to support the
vieil. thtrt "at first sig,htWthe Huirurs helongcd to B~lhrain:and, ,final!,'.
doing rîothing to intrrrupt thtrt oc<.uputionun1c.s.sund until clrgunzcntsto
thclcorîtrurj, iivrr provitked h.Qatar.
42. In such a context and in these circumstances, it is surreal to con-
tend that the Ruler of Oa.ar. thus "informed" of the British mima facie
belief, was in a position to refuse to "participate in the proceedings on
that basis". Moreover, in complaining to the United Kingdom about
Bahrain's illegal occupation, the Ruler of Qatar was in no way throwing
open to debate or submittingfor decision his sovereignty overthe Hawars.
And on 27 May 1938he confirmed this view of the situation: "1 now sub-
mit my forma1 complaint against the steps taken by the Bahrain Govern-
ment in islandsbelonging to others . . ."20It is here that the equivocation,
manifestation of fraiid, becomes apparent. Qatar was not seeking any
decision from the United Kingdom on the matter of its sovereignty over
the Hawars at a time when, unknown to it, those islands had already
been awarded to Bahrain under the secret British decision of 1936.
43. To complete the picture, it should be noted that it was not only the
1936decision that was not communicated to Qatar. The official claim to
the Hawars made by Bahrain in April 1936 was not conveyed to Qatar
either. Moreover, Qatar was kept in ignorance of al1 the documents
exchanged before thie final decision of 1939. Belgrave's "Preliminary
Statement" of 1939 Iiad never been conveyed to Qatar, although it had
already been analysed in the Weightman Report of 22 April 1939, "0ii.n-
ership of'the Huivur I.slr~ntls",on which the British decision of 1939 was
founded.
44. It is thus a semblance of "consent". coloured bv Dretedc1 and
equivocation. that theJudgment seeks to rely on, in relation both to pro-
cedure and to substance. whereas that consent. which was in anv event
confined to the procedure, was tainted by fraud. A consent whch -
neither express, nor fully informed, nor freely given - has, moreover,
been stripped of its entire vitiating context, and in particular of the whole
illuminating sequence of events prior to the exchange of letters of May
1938. How could it be said that this consent to the proceedings, tainted
and invalid as it was, could create an obligation to be bound by the
British decision of 1939, which was in any case merely the prior
decision of 1936?
45. As we have already pointed out earlier, high officials of the For-
eign Office and the lndia Office moreover recognized subsequently that
Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. 5, Ann. 260. p. 1103the 1939 decision hadl been imposed on the Ruler of Qatar, whose "con-
sent" possessed neither thecharacter nor the scope to render it equivalent
in law to an express, informed and freely given consent.
46. The conclusiori that the Court should have reached was that this
consent was nul1 and void. In consequrncr, the British decision q/ 1939
couid not propcrly sc,.i1c LZStitle,fbr. an alrurd oj'the Huicur.~to Buhrairz.
47. So far, we have confined ourselves to an analysis of the formal
validity of the British decision of 1939. We must now examine its sub-
stantive validity, despite the fact that its formal invalidity would have
obviated the need to consider the issue of its substantive validity. How-
ever, we must now explain why we go on to deal with this second ques-
tion, even though it is superfluous, for, if the Court had considered it,
then it would at least have been able, in the terms of its own logic, to
reach an u n~inirnasolution, that is to say a solution that shared the
Hawars, taking account in so doing of Bahrain's eJfi.c.tivités.
48. Let us now undertake an alternative reading of the Court's Judg-
ment on the Hawars. that Judgment having confined itself to examining
th^purelj~ji>r.rîirrvluliditj3of the British decision of 1939, stopping short
of the issue of vitiation of consent which, tliough manifest, it refused to
acknowledge. But, in addition, the Judgment avoided examining thc sub-
.sturztivevulidity of the decision. This aspect is touched upon in a some-
what superficial manner in paragraph 140 of the Judgment, which does,
however, rightly point out that the British Government had undertaken
to give itsdecision "in the light of truth and justice". although no conclu-
sion is drawn from this albeit significant point. It is clear that, in so
doing. the majority of the Court sought to avoid evaluating the strength
of the cyfi.ctivitl:.srelied upon by Bahrain. These, in the general view, are
too weak to justify the award of the Hawars to that State. It is thus not
through recourse to this matter of c/fi.ctivitl:s that a better title in favour
of Bahrain may be found.
49. But let us linger a little longer over this question to see if the Court
could not have fountl some solution other than the award of the Hawars
in toto to one Party alone, taking as Our starting point the very logic
which inspired the Court.
50. The famous " Bahraini formula" unreservedly accords us the power
to rule on the Sate of the 1939 decision, and thus, where necessary. to
confirm it, annul it, amend it. adjust it, or quite simply to interpret it insuch a way as would irestore its interna1 coherence. The formula reads as
follows: "The Parties request the Courtto decide any matter of territorial
right or other title or interest which may be a matter of difference
between them . . ."
51. Let us digress for a moment. 1sit not clear that this "Bahraini for-
mula" (which, as its riame suggests, had been proposed by Bahrain) can
and must be regarded as an invitation to the Court not to take any
account of the principle of u/ipo.ssidptisjuris and thus to submit the Brit-
ish decision of 1939 to whatever examination, criticism, or even sanction
that it might merit? Thus it seems to us that, whereas the principle of uti
possidetis juris could tie our hands and oblige us purely and simply to
confirm the 1939 decision, the Bahraini formula on the contrary fully
relieved us of that obligation and invited us freely to examine that deci-
sion. It will also be noted in passing that to argue that the Hawars
belonged to Bahrain by virtue of uti possidctis juris exposed Bahrain,
which had sought to do so, both to a difficulty and to a risk. It would
have been difficult tcl show that there was a Bahraini Dresence on the
Hawars at the date of independence - a presence based on cflectivités
that are sparse, not to Say insignificant, and hence incapable of substan-
tiating that presence. And, above all, Bahrain risks undermining from
within its legal strate,gy founded on the principle of uti po.ssidetisjuris.
Bahrain has claimed both Hawar and Zubarah: the former was under
Bahraini authority at the date of independence, the latter under the
authority of Qatar ori the same date. The legal strategy chosen by Bah-
rain would thus have enabled it to gain Hawar only by losing Zubarah, if
uti possideti.~juri.s - which Bahrain could not invoke in the former case
without doing so in the latter - were applied consistently. We now
return to the matter at hand.
53. It should be noted that the 1939 decision on which the Judgment
has opted to found itself leads us back, whether we like it or not, as far as
its content is concerned, to the question of the "cff~c/ivitc;s" that the
Judgment has sought to avoid examining. Weightman's report, in which
he proposed to his Giovernment that the Hawars be attributed to Bah-
rain, in fact relies solely on the cJfiic.tii1itisccomplished in 1937-1938fol-
lowing the secret decision of 1936. In this regard let us once again recall
that it was the duty of the Court to decide on the competing historical
titles invoked by the Parties; but, after taking the trouble faithfully to
reproduce the arguments of each of them on this question of title. it curi-
ously did not rule at ;a11 on the validity of those arguments, any more -
incidentally -- than it ruled on the Parties' right to invoke that ground".
''As will bc observed below. the Parties argued thisground at length. All that the
Court has done in thih Judgment isto refer to it in a number of paragrabut,trt rio ~iriir
riirikin!:uilj urtc,tiiprro .sc,/tlctlli., quc,srion(fritlc,. See, for exanip100 andagraphs
101. in which Bahrain invoked a historical title dating back two centuries. and para-
graphs 99 and 107. in which Qatar invoked "the primacy of its originatitle" "over the
qffc~tii.ic(;.cr.elicd byoBahrain". 53. It would be understandable that the Court sought to avoid embark-
ing on the relatively difficult task of examining the historical title. How-
ever, this was to faIl from Charybdis to Scylla, for it then exposed itself to
having to tackle the ejjCctivités issue raised by the Weightman report,
which, inevitably. it had to fudge. At least, having given the appearance
of basing itself solely on the 1939 British decision, while carefully stop-
ping short of the <//&.tivitc;sissue involved in that decision, the Court, for
the sake of consistericy. could have opted for a compromise solution:
going beyond an examination of the purely formal validity of the 1939
decision, while at the:same time stopping short of a full examination of
the substantive validlity of that decision. Acting u rninimu, the Court
could in effect have avoided seeking to cal1into question the underlying
reasoning of the Wei,ghtman report (which was based not only on exces-
sively flimsy cfictivirks but also on mere presumptions of </T~ctivitc;s);it
could instead simply have sought to draw al1the conclusions necessarily
flowing therefrom, ra~therthan only certain of them, as the British Gov-
ernment had already done.
Let us explain more fully what would be involved in this compromise
solution. which must logically follow, whether one likes it or not, from
the Court's choice of starting point.
54. Let us start then from the assumption, inevitably implied by the
Court's reasoning, that the 1939 British decision, on which it based itself,
was reasoned, the grounds having been clearly set out in the Weightman
report, in the light of which the British Government decided the matter in
the way we know it did. We are then bound to recognize that the Court's
Judgment was only able to ignore the ejfectivités issue, on which the
grounds put forward by Weightman are based, by confining itself, as we
have indicated, to examining the formal aspect of the British decision to
the exclusion of its niaterial content. In so doing, the Court was uncon-
cerned about :
(a) thus halting halfway, despite the fact that the grounds for the deci-
sion set out in the Weightman report are not without relevance for
resolving the issue of the award of the Hawars;
(h) ruling "infra petita": falling short of what the Parties expected of it
when they empowered it to make a full and complete examination of
the substance of the dispute under the "Bahraini formula".
55. The basic document, analysis of which should have been of pri-
mary concern to the Court, is thus the Weightman report, which appears
on the face of it
(a) to have provided only a partial foundation for the decision, in jus-
tifying the awar'dof the main Hawar Island on the basis of ejjkctiv-
itc;~;but
(h) to have committed an error of fact and law in simply "presuming"
that <i/iic.tivitésalso existed for the remainder of the Hawar Islands,
whereas DELIMITATION AND Q~JESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 165
c) Bahrain, in its viritten pleadings, and in particular in map No. 4 in
Annex 7 to its Pvlemorial(see p. 215 below), locates the ~f~ectivitPs
EXCLUSIVEL1t' on the main Hawar Island: and. moreover.
(d) makes frequent reference in its written $eadings to "Hawar" or to
"Hawar Island" (in the singular). Indeed, the nomenclature speaks
for itself, since only the main island is called "Jazirat Hawar"
("Hawar Island"), and has given its name of "Hawar" to the entire
group of islandii, even though each one of the islands other than
"Jazirat Hawar" has its own name.
56. If the Court had undertaken an examination of the Weight-
man report, on which the 1939 decision was based, it would thus imme-
diately have appreciated the element of interrzcrl contrudictionii~hic.1it
contuins.
57. It is that inter:nal contradiction which has up to the present time
affected the full irnpi'c~rnentutioof the 1939 decision, since on the one
hand Bahrain has been able to occupy only the largest of those islands,
whilst on the other hand Qatar has refused for 61 years to acquiesce in
that decision. Thc Court couldful~~ acc~ornpli.shthe mandute caonjerred
uporl if hl, tlic Buhru~ni,firrnirluorziy hj. hrirzging t1li.ssituution to un end
und renciering it po.ssihlcfor the Purtie.~to irnplclment the decision under a
sol~ition ii~liicli it 11itic.urnhrnt upon the Court to devise. in order to
rlin~ir~rrtc~the iriternul' contru~lictioti ii,hich ive huve noted in the. W~ight-
rnu~ireport rrncl ii.hie.h ii,u.srqflrctc~rl in the British tIc>ci.sion.
58. It can readily be appreciated that the British decision of 1939 was
inspired by politic.rrl consi(/c~ru/ioand by oil interests. But the Weight-
man report also gave it tr lcgul rl?otii,utioor veneer, by invoking Bah-
rain's c~ffc~ctii~its.ithout having to return to the weakness of those
cg'bc-tiitité,~e will confine ourselves to noting that the British decision of
1939 could not on tlhat basis justify the award of the Hawars in their
totality. but only the largest Hawar Island, and even then the physical
possession implied by those gflCctii~itcwas - particularly when Weight-
man was writing - both very weak and very recent.
59. But the Court could have observed that, in paragraph 13 of his
report. Mr. Weightrrian ventured to formulate u hypothc.ri.~, ii~hicli ii3u.s
firl.~~an(/ ii.lii(.li rc~rnrrirlsso to thiintk"u.s.sur~iingthat the islets and
rocks other than "Jazirat Hawar" ("Hawar Island") must "pr'sur~~ublj,"
fall to the authority of the ruler establishing himself on the main island.
Thus Weightman clearly recognized that Bahrain had no c$i~c.tii,itover
the other islands.
60. We cannot thuefore see ii-htrt Ic~gulhusicould be relied upon to
justify irz its tottrlithe 1939 decision and the award to Bahrain of the
entirety of the Hawar Islands. This is al1 the more so in that. for the
islaiids other than the main one, Qatar has in its favour not only the lack
of physical possession of those islands by Bahrain, but also geographical
proximity and the presumption of international law concerniiig the sov- DELIMIT/\TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 166
ereignty of islands which are situated wholly or in part in the territorial
sea of Qatar.
61. By using the expression "the small harren and uninhuhited islun~ls
und rocky islrts which jorm the c~mplete Haiilar group", Weightman
clearly implies in his report that the islands other than the main one
should follow the fate of the latter. This could be interpreted as an invita-
tion to apply in international law the adage "the accessory folloii~.sthe
principul".
62. But:
(u) no principle of tlhiskind exists in international law;
(h) this would be to apply to the main island of "Jazirat Hawar" a
"gruvitationul po11,er"over the others, whereas the eJ'ctii~itC..s push-
ing it towards Bahrain were already very weak in themselves, par-
ticularly in 1937-1938 ;and
(r.) above all, it would be to apply in favour of "Jazirat Hawar" "a
gravitational force" denied to the mainland mass of Qatar, which
has in its favour the legal presumption that islands situated within
the territorial sea of the coastal State appertain to that State; and
finally:
(d) in this regard, wi:would recall the observation already quoted above
by Max Huber in the Islantl c!f'Pulmuscase, to the effect that (i) the
"act of first takirig possession . . .can hardly extend to every portion
of the territory", and (ii) the display of sovereignty, which is "a con-
tinuous and prollonged manifestation. must make itself felt through
the whole of the territory"".
63. Nothing could therefore justify awarding the entirety of the Hawar
Islands to Bahrain simply because it was entitled to the main Hawar
Island. The 1939deciçion ought at the very least to have been interpreted
sub.ject to the limits of interna1 consistency of the Weightman report
which underlay it. It i~~oirltlker<firr have bec~nconsistcwt ,i,ith tlle logic
of'that report, puragruplj 4 of ii.11icstute~ltl~ntthe principle qf'pro.uimity
fkvoured the c.ocrsta[Stute(!), to envi.sage LIconlpromi.sr so/utiorr to the
issue of'tllc)HUIIYIYSI.n not doing so the Judgment has further weakened
itself, for the Court has implicitly ruled "ultra pctitu" on the basis of
pffictii~itP.slimited tci the main Hawar island and totally absent in the
other islands and islets.
64. Thus, to resunie and conclude:
rrfirst upprou(.h,s.tarting from an analysis of the conterlt of the British
decision of 1939,ought to have consisted in leaving Bahrain with sov-
ereignty over the main island of "Ju-irut HLI\IYI~" and recognizing
Qatar's sovereignty over the other small islands, where there was no
-- United Nations. R~,port.ofI~it<~rnrrrioulrhitrul Aivur.(l.\(RIAAVol. II, p. 855.
and French translation in R<,I,~~~S~~II>/~droit int<,~.~~ulprblic. op(.if.1935.
130 DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 167
evidence of any Bahraini rffectivités; that would have been a "vrrti-
cul" division of the Hawar coastal archipelago;
- LIsccond rrpprouch,also based on analysis of the content of the 1939
decision, could have been a "horiiontul" division of Jazirat Hawar, or
even of the whole of the Hawars. What we mean by this is that this
second approach would have been based essentially on the notion
that Bahraini ejfectiiiités are not only weak in some areas and non-
existent in others, but also and above al1that they are specifically dis-
tinguished by having been too lutc as regards certain of them, which
disqualifies them from serving as a basis for a claim to sovereignty.
The rjj'c~ir istkslished in 1937-1939 in the northern part of the
main Hawar island would have formed the basis for this "horizontal"
division.
IV. EFFECTI~.IT AESD REFUSA TLO ACQUIESCE
65. In any event, the absence of consent by Qatar to the 1939decision,
and the subsequent doubts expressed by the United Kingdom, continued
to weaken that decision from the legal standpoint. It would seem that,
even to its own author, the decision was not Sullyjustified. It was more
than likely that it was inspired rather by oil interests than by considera-
tions based on materials in the case file. But what is particularly signifi-
cant in the British conduct is the fact that :
- the United Kingclom began by taking in 1936 a purely "proi~isionnl"
decision, which it did not disclose to Qatar, as if it was not altogether
certain of its legal correctne-- conduct, it should be noted, which
should in princip!lehave disqualified the United Kingdom from deal-
ing with this case again in 1938-1939: as we have already pointed out.
there was here a blatant "conflict of interests":
- the United Kingdom, when pressed by Qatar, which had protested
against the finalecision of 1939, had cited inter ulitrthe World War
situation as justification for its refusal to reopen the question;
- in the 1960s the IJnited Kingdom accepted the idea of a re-examina-
tion of the 1939 decision by a "neutral" authority, within the frame-
work of an international arbitration.
66. Note should be taken, moreover, of the absence of any acquies-
cence by Qatar and of its persistent protests against the 1939 decision.
That decision has not been accepted by Qatar and has from that time
~intilthe present day been the subject of repeated protests on its part. We
shall return later to the legal consequences of Qatar's protests over a
period of 61 years against the occupation of the Hawar Islands by Bah- I>ELIMI'TATlON AND QlJESTlONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 168
rain subsequent upon notification of the 1939 decision. At this point we
shall confine ourseIves to analysing the purported acceptance of that
decision by Qatar.
67. Reference has been made to a letter of August 1939from the Ruler
of Qatar to the British Political Resident, a passage from which, dictated
by considerations of courtesy and deference, has been interpreted as
acquiescence by the Ruler in the British decision. What should really be
noted is the letter of 18 November 1939 from the Ruler to Prior, British
Political Agent in Bahrain, the terms of which are crystal clear:
"1 therefore beg to inform Your Honour that 1 neithcr r<~cogni:e
tlor suhrîiit tl~trttlir Bahruirz Gollcrnnîcnt liuvr tllr least Iuiiful (.on-
noction ii,it/i t/~ Huiixr Iskrntls, and that 1view that whatever meas-
ure which have been lately taken by the Bahrain Government as a
challenge and an encroachment upon my rights rrguinstiihich 1rliost
strongb. protest, and therefore, us 1 lluve inforr~lr~ij'ou hc:fi)rc],
1 rc.rcriJe171)riglzts to the Huii~~r1.vlund.>327.llilerzot rccognizing un)'
r~ic~tr.nri~1lic.hu)) hr tukrn in tl~enz. . .
68. In these circumstances we may ask ourselves if and why Qatar's
protests should be inoperative and whether Bahrain has succeeded in
conducting for 61 years an effective, continuous and peaceful occupation
of the Hawar Islancls. It is to this that we must now turn.
69. International jurisprudential practice sets great store by the con-
duct of States. A state's silence, its consent, its acquiescence, any waiver
of its rights, any protest, any effect of estoppel upon its actions, al1rep-
resent important elements in the creation or extinction of a title over a
territory. In the present case, Qatar has always protested, and never
ceased to do so. on the onehand against the British decision of 1939and
on the other againsi. the activities of Bahrain in the Hawar Islands. This
consistent course of conduct by Qatar is such as to prevent any title
arising in favour of Bahrain.
70. Qatar's refusal to acquiesce in Bahrain's potential [email protected]é.~over
the Hawar Islands is manifest. It cannot be disputed that since 1938
Qatar has never ceased to protest against the "illegal occupation" of the
Hawars. In 1939,when the British decision was notified to him, the Ruler
of Qatar protested. Given the unequal relationship between his country
and the United Kingdom, and looking beyond the language of courtesy
and deference, Qatar's position could not be interpreted otherwise than
as a refusal to acquiesce and as a request for a re-examination of the deci-
sion, al1of which pi-evented Bahrain's </jbc.tivitc;s - assuming that there
was any substance 1.0them - from producing any effects in law.
71. Since then, a number of clear manifestations of lack of acquies-
'l Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 8. Ann. 111.2p.59: emphasis added. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 169
cence can be noted. They have taken various forms, such as proposais for
mediation, arbitraticln or judicial settlement.
72. Thus in the 1960s Qatar put forward the idea of an arbitration,
which in itself could only have been with a view on the one hand to re-
examining, indeed ca.llinginto question, both the British decision of 1939
and the line of 1947and, on the other, to expressing a refusal to acquiesce
in these two decisioris. Thus it was envisaged that the proposed arbitra-
tion would settle the questions of the maritime delimitation, of the status
of Fasht ad Dibal arid Qit'at Jaradah and of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands. This refusal to acquiesce in the acts of occupation by Bahrain in
the Hawars was particularly noteworthy in that it must be regarded as
having been recognized by the United Kingdom itself, author of the two
decisions, inasmuch as the proposal for arbitration by Qatar had been
approved by the Brii.ish,who still exercised protective authority over the
two countries.
73. We are bound to recognize that Qatar demonstrated perseverance
in its refusa1to acquiesce in the award of the Hawars, for, when the pro-
posa1 for arbitration failed, it replaced it with another, equally unsuccess-
ful, for mediation. This task was entrusted to Saudi Arabia, despite the
latter's being traditionally regarded as closer to Bahrain than to Qatar,
with which it had a territorial dispute. That mediation, conducted in
principle since 1976, in fact from 1983 to 1990, and still regarded as not
extinguished by the seisin of the Court in 1991,has up to the present day,
after 24 years, failed to achieve a result. It has still not been terminated,
for it continues in pi-incipleto this day, as an adjunct to the work of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, which is also seised of the matter.
74. Finally, the refusal to acquiesce in the decisions of 1939 and 1947
is clearly implied by Qatar's wish to bring Bahrain before the Court on
the basis of the 1987and 1990agreements, which are in themselves mani-
festations and evidence of this refusal to acquiesce, and which served as
the basis for our juirisdiction. The Court is well placed to attest to the
perseverance with which Qatar succeeded in overcoming the objection to
jurisdiction raised bli Bahrain and in having the Court declare itself com-
petent. The difficult episode of the jurisdiction phase (199 1-1995) is
indeed particularly significant in this regard. Nor should we lose sight of
the fact that notwithstanding, or looking beyond, the procedural arrange-
ments before the Court, Qatar clearly remains the applicant Party in this
case, a fact which patently demonstrates that Qatar has never accepted
the relevance of Bahrain's "c;ffi)ctiilitc;s"on the Hawar Islands. By
the very fact of its seisin, the Court is thus itself placed in a position to
recognize Qatar's persistent refusal to acquiesce in the two British
decisions of 1939 and 1947.
75. In sum. Qatar's protests, in al1their forms, with regard to al1kinds
of actions undertaken by Bahrain in the Hawar Islands, areboth numer-
ous, varied and persistent. They show that Qatar did not allow Bahraini
<f;fi~catiilt.s be acquired by remaining silent. Moreover, ever since the
case was brought before the Court, Qatar has consistently protested DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 170
against the non-0bsi:rvance of the status quo by Bahrain. Between the
filing of its Mernorizil and that of its Counter-Memorial, that is to Say
over a period of a mere two years (1996-1997), we note no less than
13 protests in the foirm of Notes Verbales concerning:
(i) Bahraini legislatjon whenever it affects the Hawar Islands;
(ii) violations of airspace inhose islands:
(iii) advertisements published by Bahrain in the press relating to its
activities in the islands and its claims to sovereignty over the gr~up~~.
76. International jurisprudence refers to acts capable of constituting
manifestations of the peaceful and continuous exercise of State authority
over a territory. The acts of occupation of the Hawars by Bahrain took
place immediately after the "provisional" British decision of 1936. It is
necessary to assess the nature of those acts and to ascertain whether they
represent qfji.ctivitcapable of establishing a title by Bahrain over those
islands. We must also examine the conduct of Qatar throughout that
period in order to determine whether or not that conduct could effec-
tively prevent Bahrain from establishing such title. However, the circum-
stances in which Bahrain undertook its acts of occupation between the
date of the provisional decision of 1936 and that of the final decision in
1939are such that a distinction must be drawn between the acts of occu-
pation for the period 1936 to 1939 and the other manifestations of
authority after 1939.
77. First, the period 1936 to 1939. The United Kingdom had provi-
sionally ruled in July 1936in favour of awarding the Hawars to Bahrain.
The British authorities failed to inform the Ruler of Qatar of this. This
was a period marked by rivalry over oil interests. The Ruler of Bahrain
was preparing to grz~ntan additional oil concession in respect of a sector
that was still unallotted, in which, according to his declaration of April
1936, he included the Hawar Islands. For his part, the Ruler of Qatar
had in 1932granted exploration rights over the entire peninsula, while in
1933 he had authorized geological surveys over the whole territory of
Qatar, expressly including the Hawar Islands and ultimately, in 1935,
granting a full conclcssion over the whole of the peninsula and its adja-
cent islands.
78. Bahrain admits that it established various military facilities on the
main island of Hawar during this period. That is a form of occupation,
but it was unlawful in so far as it was carried out in a somewhat clan-
destine manner. Thus these activities were not conducted peacef~~llyand
cannot therefore be numbered among those constituting the manifesta-
tion of an exercise of sovereign authority. On the other hand. however, at
'JSce Couilter-Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. Appen1ands2 DELIMKATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 171
the period in question the Sheikh of Qatar was supposed to be exercising
exclusive authority over the entire peninsula, including the Hawars, and
his lack of vigilance in remaining unaware of the existence of foreign
activities on his territory might at first sight seem somewhat puzzling. It
is true, though, that the Hawars were an inhospitable desert region. The
rulers of Qatar knevvthat they remained open to seasonal fishing prac-
tised by individuals of any origin, who were traditionally free of any con-
trols. In modern terrns, the régime ofthe Hawar Islands could be assimi-
lated to that of a free zone.
79. The lack of vigilance was not, however, total. The Ruler of Qatar,
Sheikh Abdullah bin Qasim al-Thani, as soon as he became aware of the
acts of Bahraini occupation, protested orally in February 1938, then in
writing on 10 May 1938 to the British Political Agent in bah rai^^^^.
80. Note should a.lso be taken of the difficulty in which Bahrain finds
itself in, on the one hand, arguing in favour of the legal nature of the
1939 decision while, on the other, recognizing the existence of the mili-
tary facilities installed by it in 1937-1938. 1s this not in a sense an
acknowledgment of the fact that it failed to respect the status quo
during the preparatory phase of what it voluntarily characterizes as the
arbitral award of 1939'?At a time when the case was, from Bahrain's
standpoint, suh judicc, it carried out acts of occupation.
81. In view of al1of these circumstances and above al1of, on the one
hand, the failure by -theUnited Kingdom to inform the Ruler of Qatar of
the "provisional" decision of 1936to award the Hawars to Bahrain, and,
on the other, of the necessarily non-pacific nature of those clandestine
operations, we would be justified in taking the view that tlie ucts carried
out hy Brrhrriitzovcr the period 1936-1939 do not constitute effectivités
oppoxuhlr to Q~rturor cupahhleof'grnerating u rifle infuvour qf BuIlruin.
82. Bahrain has provided the Court with a table setting out 80 types of
activity which it hatl undertaken on the Hawar Islands since the eight-
eenth century. If we confine Our attention to the period since the 1939
decision, it will be noted that according to this table the activities in ques-
tion number 20. But, in gener-al terms, to quote the Arbitration Tribunal
in the Eritrrul Ye~îencase,they are "voluminous in quantity but sparse in
useful content" (para. 239). We must therefore not be deluded by the
number of ~fjectivités,even assuming that they merit being described as
such. One by one, i.he "~~fj>cti~~itbisn"voked evaporate upon examina-
tion, the quantity fa.ilingto make up for the lack of quality. Three cen-
turies before Christ, Euclid said: "a pile of wheat remains a pile of wheat
if you take away one grain, then another grain and so on. And yet there
comes a time when, by removing one grain, there is no longer any pile."
25Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 7. Ann. 111.150,p. 253, and Agent's reply in Memorial of
Qatar, Vol. 7. Ann. 111.156,p. 279.The lesson for lawyerijto reflect upon is that degrees of quantity must not
conceal variations in quality. As one court put it, "a vast mass of evi-
dence will not suffice to constitute proof, any more than a hundred hares
will make a horse".
83. Furthermore, a number of those activities were undertaken after
the acceptance of the status quo to which both Parties had committed
themselves on commencement of the Saudi mediation in 1983,or indeed
after acceptance of )the status quo subsequent upon the Court being
seised of the case in July 1991. But any act capable of modifying the
status quo must be considered as null, and devoid of effect in law.
84. While there arc:military facilities on the main Hawar Island which
date back to the 1930s, the civiliun works, by contrast, date back only a
few years, in particular since the institution of proceedings before this
Court (roads, port, hotel, bungalows, palace and associated buildings).
These facilities. necessarily unproductive on an island without any fresh
water, which has to be iinported at great expense Srom Bahrain, are in al1
likelihood intended to give the impression of effective occupation.
85. In conclusion, al1of the above analysis leads to the conclusion that
Bahrain has not succeeded in demonstrating the existence in its favour of
a better title than that formed and consolidated by Qatar over the Hawar
Islands. These shoulcl therefore be awarded to Qatar, or alternatively, in
a peacemaking solution which would moreover not be without basis in
law - assuming that we abide by the logic of the choice made by the
Court, which confined the ground for its ruling to the British decision of
11 July 1939 - they should be shared between the two States. But that
would nonetheless br: to lose sight of the existence of another îar more
decisive ground: the fact that Qatar possesses a historical title to the
Hawars that has beeinestablished progressively, consolidated and recog-
nized. That is what kvemust examine now.
86. We believe that the flaws noted in the British decision of 1939,
together with the overall structure of the Court's Judgment, founded as it
is solely on that deirision, already could not justify the award of the
Hawars to Bahrain. But, in addition, Qatar holds a better title, consisting
of its original title to the Hawars. That is what must now be shown.
87. What first strikes the man in the street when glancing at a map of
the region is the indisputable fact that, physically, the Hawar "Islands"
belong to the same continental mass as Qatar. When the tide goes out
each day, Qatar's whioleland mass resembles a hand, whose thumb is the
Hawars. As shown by British Admiralty Chart No. 2886 of 1994(see p. 215below), entitled "Jazîreh-Ye Lavan and Jazîrat Dâs to Ra's Tannürah"'6,
there is no break between the thumband the rest of the hand. The Hawar
"Islands" are not actually islands but an indivisible part of the land mass
of Qatar, cut off by the sea when the tide comes in and joined to the land
again when the tide goes out. This elementary lesson in macrogeography
seems to have escaped the Court. In reality, and with a certainty beyond
the power of even the most rigorous Thomist to dispute, the Hawar
Islands are simply a peninsula which, in geographical terms, forms an
integral part of the rest of the mainland.
88. It would even be superfluous in this connection, not to Say inap-
propriate, to invoke the principle based on the strong legal presumption
that islands situated in a coastal State's territorial sea belong to that
State. because the Hawars cannot be said to be "islands" in the true
sense, but rather a peninsula - firmly attached to the mainland -
emerging daily when the tide goes out.
89. No legal reasoning, however ingenious - and certainly no reason-
ing in this Judgment - can overcome this inescapable fact. Long before
the Court, macrogeography determined, and for al1time, that the penin-
sula of the Hawars blrlongs to theQatari mainland, of which it is an inte-
gral part. Such a decree of nature cannot be abrogated. The enormous
map file submitted to the Court by Qatar, containing maps from a wide
variety of sources arid eras, confirms this geomorphological reality and
clearly shows, as will be seen below, that the Hawars were and are
recognized to belong to Qatar.
90. And yet the extent of the effort devoted by the Court's Judgment
to seek to justify the contrary conclusion must be admired. However, let
us first recall that theJudgment has, very damagingly, avoided examining
the absolutely crucial issue of historical title. We ourselves shall examine
that question, for, 1ik.ea number of other issues, it totally contradicts the
solution adopted by the Court, particularly since in Our view the Court
examined the ground based exclusively on the British decision of 1939
from one standpoint only - and a superficial and purely formal one at
that - to the exclusiionof other more decisive aspects, notably substan-
tive ones. In these cii-cumstances, Our concern to consider al1of the legal
grounds advanced by the Parties, including in particular the urgurnent
hn.sed on historical ritlc, can readily be understood. It is to this latter
argument that we shall now turn.
91. Did Bahrain hold, and does it still hold, a historical title to the
Hawars? Both more and less can and should be said on this subject. Even
'('The chart bears the. imprint: "Published at Taunton 29th April 1994 under the
Superintendence of Rear Admiral N. R. Essenhigh. Hydrographer of the Navy."
137 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 174
the most superficial historical review shows that, when the Al-Khalifa
dynasty was thriving, Bahrain had dominion over a large part of the Gulf
region, and in any event and for many years, over Qatar. But Bahrain
also long ago (we shall set out the significant dates below) lost al1histori-
cal title to any part of the Qatari peninsula, including the Hawar Islands.
The branch of the Utubi tribe from Arabia which gave birth to the Al-
Khalifa dynasty in IIahrain first settled in the south-west of the Qatar
peninsula, certainly iinthe vicinity of Zakhnuniyah and perhaps on the
Hawar Islands as well, at least in winter, but in any event definitely in the
north-west in the Zubarah area.
92. These semi-sedentary "Arahiun" tribes who settled on the west
coast of Qatar were not "Bahrainis" occupying Qatar. They had not yet
entered Bahrain. They were to become "Br/hr.uini"when they left Qatar
in order to establish themselves in turn in Bahrain, where other tribes,
also from central Arabia, had already settled. The Al-Khalifa branch,
natives of Arabia and settled in Zubarah, thecradle of the future dynasty,
became Bahraini ii.hrn thcy left Z~rharuhto settlc in Bahrain ,fi.on~ 1783
onii~ru',~.t can therefore be said in this respect that the Arabian tribes
which were the forebears of the Bahrainis and of today's ruling dynasty
in Bahrain were first Qataris, by virtue of their settlement in Zubarah,
before becoming Bahrainis as a result of spreading out to Bahrain and
through the Gulf region.
93. Before investigating any further Bahrain's or Qatar's historical
title to the Hawars and what was to become of it, we wish to express Our
deep regret that the Judgment avoids giving due consideration to this
question. The Judginent has timidly shied away from undertaking the
essential research wliich was, ultimately. determinative for the award of
the Hawars. Admittedly, the Court is not a learned assembly of histori-
ansand is not technically equipped to embark on historical research con-
cerning the past of two litigant States. Yet u court is ohligeu'to meet flic
challenges ivith ivhic-hhistory confronts it in a particular case. It must
take account of the interplay between historical events and territorial dis-
putes, notwithstanding al1 the various difficulties which the juridical
approach may face. In the course of its up-and-down, indecisive relation-
ship with history, a right will in effect arise on the basis, inter aliu, of the
various possible stages in the establishment of a title, such as its forma-
tion and subsequent consolidation or disappearance. The jurist has thus
had to learn to idenitify the criteria and conditions for the creation of a
title, to choose "the better" of two competing titles, to distinguish an
"original title" frorn a "derivative title", an "absolute title" from an
"inchoate title", and so on.
94. International fora have found themselves faced with the issue of
historical titles far more often than is thought, and the law has thus been DELIMITATION AND QUEST~ONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 175
obliged to deal with the matter. It follows that, however limited their
qualifications in the discipline of history and however poor the tools at
their disposal, judges are under a duty to decide the territorial disputes
submitted to them. There are many instances of international arbitral
awards where the arbitrators have had to deal with historical titles2'. Nor
have the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice, for their part, been able to avoid ruling on historical
titles, for example in the following cases: Legal Stutus qf'Eustern Green-
/und (1 933). Fisherics ( United Kingdot??v. Norizuy) (195 1), Minquiers
urîd Ecrchos (1953), 5;over~~ignto yver Certain Frontier Lund (1959), Righr
of'Pussugc oiler ItldicrnTerritory ( 1960), Temple of Prrah Viheur (1962),
Fronticr Dispute (Burkitln FusolRopuhlic. of Mali) (1986), Territoriul
Dispute (Libj~un Aruh J~zmuhiri~~uICl~ud()1994) and KrlsikililSedudu
I.vlund(1999); and by way of advisory opinion, in the Western Suhura
(1975) case. Furthermore, the Central American Court of Justice also
dealt with historical issues in the Gulf'of Fonsccu case (1917).
95. We have made a point of citing these various cases in a virtually
exhaustive manner iii order to show how numerous they have been and
to counter the erronieous notion that our relative lack of the scientific
ability to form accurate historical judgments should incline us to exercise
caution by confirming the status quo in the present case. We do not share
that point of view.
96. It is thus regrettable that the Judgment has confined itself to a reci-
tation of historical data without ever - or hardly ever - drawing legal
conclusions from them, despite the fact that this is the Court's role. The
historical narrative in the Judgment is a linear succession of events, pre-
sented in a way that raises questions as to its usefulness in terms of the
general reasoning. Tlhusthe Judgment presents us with a blurred X-ray, a
one-dimensional scan, of the history of the two countries, from which a
determination of the historical title to the Hawars and the identification
of the holder of thai title is iiiissing, and remains still to be undertaken.
97. And yet international law today possesses principles and rules
whereby it can crea1.ea "/ram~it~ork"for historical facts - bring them
under control, interpret them, give them a legal rneuning and draw from
them al1 of the conclusions that they entail in law. This is clearly an
essential role of a court, a role which it has a duty to fulfil and one which
it cannot shirk on the convenient nround that it is not a master of the
u
discipline of history. In reality it is not a question of historical know-
ledge, but rather of the applicution of thc legrrlrulcs and principlcs ii.hicl1
'' See the Altiskun Boirwtit~. isput(1903).Anglo-BrurilicnrBoutidur:iDi.s/?li(1904).
I.sl(rnofBultrrrrirArhirrtrri(1870). Bc,IugouB(iy Arhirrurior(1875). Grishudurnu Arhi-
rrcition(1909). Cl~uri~izlrhirrtrtion (11).I.~lutiojPu1111uA.srhirrritiorr(1928). Co1ori1-
hiri-Vc~nc,:ircuoun(ltrr.Arhitrution (1922). Guatrn~ulu-Hondurus Bouwdcirj.Arhitrutiorr
(1933). K11fi.sl1Bcg. Arhitrtlriotl 1).,VorrliAtluntit~Fishcrics Arhitrtrtion (1910) and
Eritrt~tilYc~ri~cc~a(1998).,/rurnc rlrr1risroricuIJa.rt.s.n this respect the court's approach should not
be thought of as a hazardous venture into what for it may be "terra
incognitu"; quite to thlecontrary, it is a purrlj,juridic~ul oprrutiorzapper-
taining to a court's function and jurisdiction.
98. As part of this juridical operation, the court has to weigh up the
manifestations of authority which a State power has imposed in the past
on a given territory. It is in the warp and weft of history that it discerns
these "effectivités in ~iction" and ascertains the degree of consolidation
which they impart to the State's historical title to that territory. This
operation, juridical by nature. is often difficult when applied to historical
material, but that has never dissuaded or discouraged
"the international adjudicator, who has often had to tackle it in
dealing with situations rendered obscure by distant historical origins
which defied any precise chronological determination. What experi-
ence has shown ilthe necessity to assess the <ff.ctiilitc;in the overall
light of its historical development."'x
It is interesting to observe that in carrying out this juridical operation
the International Couirt of Justice in many cases has not shrunk from a
penetrating analysis of historical detail where that was necessary. In the
Minyuicrs atrd Ecrehos case, for example, "the Court comprehensively
and in great detail weighed up the probative force of numerous manifes-
tations of governmental activity"'".
99. Over and above this juridical operation regarding the formation,
consolidation or extiriction of a "historicul title" to a territory, the court
may find that a "legul titlc~"exists as well, created in most cases by a
treaty relating to the. territory in question. Here too it undertakes an
operation of a fundarnentally juridical nature by employing legal criteria
in order to assess the weight to be given respectively to the qfTectii.itc;.s,
the historical titles and the legal titles invoked by the parties in their con-
flicting claims. Certain of these legal criteria of assessment have been
identified by the Court. For example, the Chamber in the case concerning
the Frontier Dispute (Burki~ru Fu,solRrpuhlic of' Muli) established a
scheme of the dialectical relationships which may exist between ~fecti-
i.itc;.istorical titles and legal titles. In this respect four situations can be
identified that rnay enable the court to settle a territorial dispute:
(u) the titlr und the ieffectivitéc.orrespond:this situation will simply con-
firm "the exercise of the right derived from a legal titleW3OT .his iden-
tity of effictii.iti.s and title eases the court's task, and it will have no
difficulty in making a determination;
(h) 1/1ctiflc trtzdtlie effectivitédo ilot corrcspontt: "preference should be
Charles De Visscher, Lïs <:(fi~c./<h;.srlroirinfc~r.r~tr/ionprlrrlhlic,.1967. p. 107.
"'Charles De Visschcr,op. (,il.. p. 105.
"'1.C:J. Rr~porr1986. p. 587. para. 63.
140 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 177
given to the holder of the title"". This too is a situation presenting
little difficultfia- the court, which will normally have to give
priority to the legal title over the rj'bctivité;
(c) tlre titlr i.sunclear as evidence of sovereignty: in this case the rffbc-
tiviti's play an important role in interpreting the title; when com-
bined with it, they give the title its true aspect and help the court to
reach a decision;
(d) tlzc.titlc is non-c~si.ste171i:n this case, which requires more active
intervention by the court, the effrctivité.rplay a role of absolutely
prime importance; they constitute a kind of rrsiduul title.
100. International arbitral and judicial jurisprudence has developed
yet other rules and pririciples for attributing legal consequences to his-
torical facts and actions. Effective possession, the objective element of a
"corpore posscssio", should be accompanied by a subjective element con-
sisting of the "wimu.r possidrndi" :
"it may be well to state that a claim to sovereignty based not upon
some particular ;act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely
upon continued display of authority. involves two elements each of
which must be shown to exist . ..: the corpus and the unimuspos,si-
drndi or occupundi" (Legul Stutus of Eustrrn Grernlund, 1933,
P.C.I. J., Serics .4/B,No. 53, Counter-Memorial of the Norwegian
Government, Ann. No. 38; and dissenting opinionofJudge Anzilotti,
p. 78).
101. Wr ,féuvin this resprcr thut toduy 'sJudgtncnt Iras net,ftrijîlled the
jilnction which could have been expected of it, that of a juridical review
and inter~retation of the seauence of historical events. with a view to
determinkg whether (4histori'caltitle to the Hawars existed and identify-
ing its holder. The Court's only effort at historical enquiry and analysis
concerned Zubarah, though it is regrettable that the Court in fact failed
to draw al1the conclusions from the result which it reached, namely that
Qatar held a liistorictrl title to its own peninsula! The Court thus recog-
nized the territorial iritegrity of the peninsula as far as Zubarah was con-
cerned, only to dismantle it when itcame to the Hawars. Moreover, as
for the methodology employed, why, it may be asked, did the Court
determine the historical title to Zubarah, the first issue addressed in the
Judgment, and not do the same for the Hawars, in the next part of the
Judgment? We believe that we are fully justified in beginning, as is
proper, by placing the matter of the Hawars in its historical context.
102. The British pi:esence in the Gulf had the legal effect, inter alia, of
creating two separate political entities, Bahrain and Qatar, in the late
''1C.J.R<.por.t1986,p. 587, para. 63.
141 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 178
nineteenth century. The British had established themselves in the Gulf in
order to protect their maritime trade and safeguard the route to India.
From 1797 to 1819 they rebuffed tribal attacks and piracy and in 1820
imposed a "General Treaty" establishing perpetual maritime peace
between Great Britain and the sheikhs, tribes and individuals of what
was now the "Trucial Coast". The salient characteristics of the British
presence may be sumlnarized as follows:
u) They established neither sovereignty nor suzerainty over the sheikh-
doms or territories of the Trucial Coast. as we shall see later.
(b) Within the limits dictated by the needs of maritime peace and the
protection of their interests, the British did indeed find themselves
intervening in trilbalconflicts or supporting one tribe against another,
but they did not interfere to any greater extent in their aftàirs. This
will be clear fronl the evolution in the respective statuses of Bahrain
and Qatar. a subject we shall consider later in detail as we move
from one treaty to another.
(c) On the one hancl the British maintained the Al-Khalifa in power in
Bahrain, protecting them against Muscat in 1820, the Wahhabis in
1835 and 1859, and the Persians in 1843 and 1869. On the other
hand, however. they refused to back Bahrain's intermittent claims to
the Westcoast of'Qatar. or to the Hasa coast in 1861.They imposed
a treaty on Bahrain in 1861 by which the Al-Khalifa renewed their
commitment to refrain from any maritime aggression.
(dl The British policy was above al1 pragmatic and took account of
shifting balances in the region. Throughout the first half of the nine-
teenth century and up to the 1860s, the legal impact of this policy.
formalized in tvvo treaties with Bahrain in 1867 and 1868 (after
others in 1820, 1847, 1856 and 1861) and a treaty with Qatar in
1868.was to c~t~iblislztlzeesistcncc in the 1860sof'tii~)quite distinct
politicul entities, Btrhruin uncl Qutur, neither of ~i,liichii.us in un},
ii.ujsuhorclinutc~to tl~cotlîcv..
103. Thus, througlhout the nineteenth century Qatar benefited from
the relative weakness; of Bahrain, which allowed the Qatari sheikhs to
fimn unti consalidtitr their ritle to their peninsula, secure from Bahraini
claims to the Westcoast of Qatar. The Ottoman presence on the penin-
sula for 44 years was to have very much the same result.
104. The,ji)rrnc~tiona,nd then tlle pr.ogres.sircc~onsoli~lution,f'tlir Al-
Tl~trr~isti'tle was greatly facilitated by two things: not only did the British
impose treaties on B~ihrain(to be discussed later) forbidding it to carry
out any form of aggression - and thus, in the context of the time, to
undertake any territorial conquests, in particular on the West coast of
Qatar and its adjacent islands - but they also physically prevented or
resolutely punished any intervention by Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula. DELIMITfiTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 179
In Qutar, therefire, thleuuthority oj'the Al-Thuni gruduullg spreud, ~rhile
thut of the Al-Khulijü progressively shrank.
105. The two years 1867 and 1868 are significant in this regard. Each
marked a decisive turning point. The geur 1867 witnessed the collapse of
Bahraini authority in Qatar following the arrest of a Qatari Bedouin in
the peninsula and his transfer to Bahrain for trial. The geur 1868 then
demonstrated even more forcefully the emergence of a Qatari political
entity which was comlpletelyseparate from Bahrain, following a punitive
Bahraini expedition to Qatar which was met by a Qatari attack on Bah-
rain. All this was reflected in the agreements concluded between Great
Britain and Bahrain and Qatar respectively with a view to stopping the
"II.L~~"- this was the word used in the official British documents - deal-
ing with its consequen~cesand establishing conclusively that two separate
political entities existed. Bahrain and Qatar, each independent of the
other and each governed by an "independent Ruler", the expression
thenceforth customar!~in al1the treaties concluded by Great Britain with
each of the two countries.
These two years ari: therefore crucial. Briefly, what took place was as
follows.
106. ((1) In 1867 Bahrain arrested a Qatari Bedouin in the peninsula
and transferred him to Bahrain for trial: the subsequent violent reactions
marked the cnd cfone title and thcjbrnlrrtion oj'anotlzcr. In response to
the arrest, the Qatari authorities, led by the Naim, a tribe that was how-
ever supposedly faithful to the Ruler of Bahrain, revolted, defeated Bah-
rain's representative il?Qatar at the head of his troops and expelled him
from Wakrah. In legal terms, this historical episode, which put an end to
the Bahraini presence in Qatar, reflected the cesser of Bahrain's title to
the Qatari peninsula ;and the commencement of the formation of a title
by Qatar to that entire area.
107. (h) The war between Qatar and Bahrain in 1867-1868was settled
by the 1868 treaties between Great Britain and each of the two now
mutually independent political entities. In October 1867 Sheikh Moham-
med of Bahrain had despatched his brother Ali to punish Qatar. With the
help of 2,000 men mobilized by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Zeid bin Kha-
lifa, Ali destroyed a large number of Qatari vessels and sacked the towns
of Biddah (Doha) andWakrah 32.Qatar launched a counter-attack against
Bahrain. The naval ;action by Qatar resulted in the destruction of a
number of Bahraini vessels and in Bahraini dead. But Bahrain resisted.
?'Cf.. in addition to the pertinent references in the Court's case file. Gholam-Reza
Tadjbakhche, Lu (/lrr.stionrilcs Buhrc,iop.ci/.. pp. 171..Y(,(/.a.nd the following offi-
cial British sourc:sDist~rrhtrr~cincc,r.sitrnGulf: Ac~coorfthc Violtrtior~of'the,.Wtrri-
tiriic,Trui~~! th<,C11igf.iof Btrhr(rin(in(/ Ahurhuh~ (Ahu Dhrrhi]. publication of the
Forcign Department of the Govcrnmrnt of India, No. 19.Faced with this war between two now clearly distinguished political enti-
ties and convinced that the sheikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi had been
the first to disturb the Maritime Truce, the British Resident, Lieutenant-
Colonel Pelly. acting on instructions from his Government, then sent an
ultimatum to Sheikh Mohammed of Bahrain on 2 September 1868'3,
accusing him of haviing violrrtc~l 11i.s~tt~dc~rtukirzgtslîrough Izis uct.suguinst
Qutur and demanding reparation from him.
108. Pursuant to am undertaking signed on 6 September 1868, Sheikh
Ali declared that Sheikh Mohammed, having repeatedly committed
irregularities at sea, and having now fled, had "forfeited al1claims to his
title as principal Shaikh and Chief of bah rai^^"^^ .heikh Ali became the
"Independent Ruler" of Bahrain in the place of his brother Sheikh
Mohammed.
109. By this Anglo-Bahraini Agreement of 1868, which took note of
the change in ruler, Bcrlzrain cldmittrcI thut it lirl(/ no rights of soverrignty
over tlzc Qatar petîiti.sula.In legal terms, this Agreement of 6 September
1868 imposing various British penalties, both financial and otherwise,
supplemented the Anglo-Bahraini Convention of 18 May 1861, which
already tied the hantls of the Sheikhs of Bahrain and required them to
abstain from al1maritime aggression~'~.The legal undertaking of 18May
1861 thus received specific application in the Agreement of 6 September
1868 and its c.lr(ir 1r;yuI c~onsecluenicas to prrivnt Bahruin fioni r~iuin-
tuirzing or c>'ctrnding ifs u~ltlzoritj~ oivr Qatar. Cleurlj~ tl~rrefifore, tlirouglz
tlic.vc fii.o instt~irnierzt~:t,lie 1860s c1c.tnon.thut Bahruitz ii~rslosing its
title to the prtzin.sulcc?fQutar. S~/c./ziixere tlîc legul rffects of the British
prrsencc.
110. But those effirctsdid not stop there. Having received the surren-
der of Sheikh Ali of'Bahrain on board ship on 6 September 1868, the
British Resident Pelly, in a letter dated 11 September 1868,invited Sheikh
Mohammed bin Tha.ni of Qatar to join him in turn on board. In itself
this political initiative was significant of the existence of two separate
entities to which Great Britain addressed itself. The British Government
dc~c.larpclifsrIf' rrn "cïrhitrrrtoof' the Truce" hcticren fii20.sI~rikh~/oni.s
ii'Iiir.11irerc noic in&prnc/enof cac.11othrr. Its rzeii.c~ipucity drseri1c.sto he
hornc in mind in our suhsccluent unci1~~si.s.
11 1. The Agreement of 12 September 1868 which capped this ship-
board visit obviously contained the customary warning not to attack
Bahrain or disturb the maritime peace. It also contained an undertaking
by Sheikh Mohammlcd bin Thani of Qatar to "maintain towards Shaikh
Ali bin Khalifeh" the peaceful relations which had previously existed
'' Cf. Foreign Office 2481252.Pellv to Mohammed bin Khalifa and, in his absence. to
Ali bin~halic.
'Tf. Foreign Office 2481252.op[,ilPelly to C. Gonne, and Aitchison. A Colli~i~rioti
of'Treuties. Engtr~rrncnlsund SirnRel<rfitroInttiuund NciglihouringCozrr1trie.c1..933.
Vol. XI.PL 236-237.
" ~emirial of Qatar. Vol. 5, Ann. 11.20.p. 47between Bahrain and Guttur (Qatar) and to refer any difference of
opinion arising between them to the British Political Resident 76.From
the I~grrlpersprctivc., tl1i.sAgreement thus rstuhlished clrur rquulity
hrt~i,ern Qatar utld ~%lzruin,neitlier qf'~r/lic/z11.ucntitled tu tukc uni-
latrrul uction to resolitc in its o,iln,fivour uny conflic,tbet~i-eenthem.
112. The period after the significant events of 1867 and 1868 saw the
gradua1 consolidatioi~ and the recognition of the title of the Al-Thani to
the territory of the entire peninsula and adjacent islands (1868-1916).The
two Agreements of 1868, one with Bahrain and the other with Qatar,
which followed the British intervention of 1867-1868,bear witness to the
c.ondut.t of the Briti:sh Government. This conduct, which expressed a
recognition of the tiltle of the Sheikh of Qatar, manifested itself in the
same way in connection with:
(a) the arriva1 of the Ottomans in the Gulf in 1871 ;
(b) the Anglo-Ottoman agreements of 1913 and 1914 and the Anglo-
Saudi agreements of 191 5.
(a) The At,rirul of the 0ttorî1un.sin the. Gulf'in 1871
113. After the death of the King of Arabia, Wahhabi Amir Faisal bin
Turki, his two sons Abdullah and Saud disputed the throne, a situation
which created unresl.; this justified an Ottoman military expedition to
Hasa and Nejd in 1871, the Ottoman Empire being the suzerain of Ara-
bia. On this occasion the Turks offered their protection to the Sheikh of
Qatar, Mohammed bin Thani, and his son Jassim, both of whom accepted
it. As a result, a Turkish garrison was established at Biddah (Doha)
in January 1872. Thus hegun the 44-j~ur-long Ottotnun prrscnce in
Qutur. fioni 1871 to 191.5. This nir~deit itnpossiblr for Buhrui11to tnuin-
tuirzuny prc.srr1c.etIztlre,the British hu~~itzuirrudj. ijoiced tlzrir sutisfrlc-
riorithut flic Ottorl~trnsIicrci ot P.\-prcsscdunj3designs un Buhrr~initsrlf.'
The Ottoman administration gradually established itself tliroughout the
pc~ninsuluof'Qtrtur. Qatar became a "kaza", in other words a province, of
the Ottoman Empire.. and was administered accordingly; the Sheikh of
Qatar was appointed "kaimakam", head of the administrative province.
The Ottoman "kaza" constituted the entire peninsula of Qatar. It is
therefore interesting itoexamine thc conduct hoth ~f'Buhruin unrio/'Grcuf
Britclin.
'('Meniorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. Ann. 11.28.p. 85. "Sealed in our presence by Mahomed
biii Snnee of Guttur aiid signed by Lewis Pelly, the British Political Resident. and R. A.
Broun. Captain ofH.M.'s Ship "Vigilaiit'". DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 182
(i) First, the conduct of Great Brituin
114. As soon as the Ottomans began to penetrate Qatar, Great Britain
attempted to ascertain their intentions. It made it known to Constanti-
nople that it would not remain indifferent to any Ottoman penetration of
Balzruinund Omrn?, but it suid nothing ubout Qutur. Great Britain's atti-
tude in this respect was perfectly logical, in so far as its main concern was
to ensure maritime Deacein the Gulf. and at that time it was not bound
by any obligations of protection other than against conquest or attack by
sea. Bahrain, being an insular entity, could therefore count on such pro-
tection. That was not so for Qatar, which could be invaded by land.
What is more, in the case of Qatar, there had been no attack by "seu",
nor even any "~ittuck" by the Ottomans, who had established themselves
there at the invitation of the Sheikh of Qatar. Also. at the time of the
Turkish penetration in 1871, Great Britain was not bound by the same
kind of agreement with Qatar as with Bahrain. The former did not sign
any "exclusive agreeinent" with Great Britain at any time during the
Ottoman period.
115. Great Britain quickly obtained assurances from the Ottoman
Empire that its ambitions were confined to Qatar: "The Ottoman Porte
explicitly denies al1 intention of extending supremacy over BuIlruin,
Mu.skut, or the independent tribes of'Soutlzern Arubia, and contenîp1ate.r
no uttück against tlzern." 37The vali (Ottoman governor) of Baghdad, for
his part, informed the British "thut Qatar it'usnot covered hy u previous
Turkislz assurunce that there ,shouldbe no interference ~ixithBul~ruin"~~.
116. Thus Great Britain's conduct was to refrain from opposing Otto-
man policy in Qatar. An understanding between the two Powers meant
that this policy woulcl be implemented in the area occupied by the Qatar
peninsula as such, silice the Ottoman assurances referred to "Bahrain"
but not to any part of Qatar by name, such asZubarah, Hawar or Janan.
This conduct on tlze part of the British unquestionubly consolidutrd
Qntur's title to tlze ~i'fzoof'thc pcwin.ruluund its cidjucrnt isluncls,t11u.s
supplernenting the co,ilduct,chich Grcut Britairî lzud &rnonstruted in the
cruc.iulyears 1867-1868 in such u ivuy us to perfect Qatar's title.
117. The conduct of the British was an acknowledgment of the Otto-
mans' defucto control of the peninsula and its adjacent islands from 1871
to 1915, something vvhich the British never seriously challenged during
that period as long as Bahrain's security and the maritime peace were not
involved. This conduct was exemplified by the rejection by Britain of the
offer made to it in 1891 by Sheikh Jassim of Qatar to conclude a treaty
witli it on the same terms as it had done with the Trucial Chiefs. Britciin
p ~
" Memorial of Qatar, 'Vol.4. An11.7.p. 48.
'Vorimer. in Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.5.p. 210.sought tn uvoid upsetting the Ottomuns unnrc~ssurily by ending its
recognition of'their c(9ntrolover the peninsulu 3".
(ii) The condu'uc .f Bahruin during the period of Ottnt~iunestablishr~lent
in Qutar: Bahrain's tucit (rcquiescence
118. A perusal of the evidence before the Court reveals no protest on
tl~eptrrt cf Brrhrain,either directly or through Great Britain, against the
authority exercised t)y the Ottomans and the Qatari sheikhs over the
whole of the Qatar peninsula.
119. Bahrain's silcncc during the Ottoman period from 187 1to 1915
will be discussed in detail later, and expanded to cover the period 1915-
1937. Even in the 0i.toman period, however, this conclucf on Buhruin's
part jkll hcloii the sttrnd(rr~/.rsrcquirediinternational lu111if Bahrain had
wished to retain or ri:cover its authority over the Hawar Islands, that is
to Say, over islands which there was rrstrorlg Iegal prcsumption (we shall
revert to this later) to place in Qatar's sphere of sovereignty by reason of
their proximity (territorial sea) to the peninsula.
120. By this conduct, Bahrain failed to halt the (~on.solillutionof Qatar's
title to Hawar (and L!ubarah and Janan) and recognition of that title by
other Powers. Like his predecessors, Major Prideaux was anxious to limit
the Ottoman presenct: to the Qatar peninsula. In 1909he visited Zakhnu-
niyah to meet the Dowasir - whose allegiance was being solicited by the
Ottomans - and then proceeded to Hawar. On his return to Bahrain he
acquainted its Sheikh with his visit, out of concern that the Sheikh might
lay claim to both these places. The Sheikh of Bahrain's response, in a
letter of 30 March 1909. was a claim to Zakhnuniyah, />utnone to
Htr1i.ur4"!
(iii) Tlie con~f~[ct11j"tllc' S1zeikli.oj' Quttrr und tlic. spread of' thcir
uutliorit~~to the cntirr peni~isukr
121. The Al-Thanii gained in authority by the Ottoman presence.
Under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, Sheikh Jassim gradually
strengthened his title to Hawar. The Turks having appointed him "kai-
makam" of the "ka;!aWor province of Qatar, he had jurisdiction over
Odeid as well. Shielded by the Ottomans, he succeeded in imposing him-
self on al1 the various tribes in the peninsula. By controlling Qatar
through the sheikh. the Turks lost nothing themselves while being of
maximum benefit to him. The Ottoman protection was both sufficiently
effective to enable him to command the obedience of the tribes and suf-
ficiently light-handecl to leave him master of the peninsula and its adja-
'')Mernorial of Qatar. Vo5. Ann.11.8.p. 121.
"' Mernorial of Qatar. par5.40. andVol.6.Aiin. 111.52p.241. DELIMllrATlON AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 184
cent islands. Lorimer, such an astute political observer, wrote that "little
or no change was produced by the presence of a Turkish post at Dohah
. . . the Al Thani Shaikhs of Dohah were still the principal factor in
politics"41.
122. Bahrain4' has, however, observed that the power seemingly exer-
cised by Sheikh Jassim of Qatar was no more than illusory. Great Britain
had once warned hini about having failed to maintain order in the penin-
sula and prevent or isuppress piracy throughout the Westcoast of Qatar.
It should be noted from this that:
- by thus attributing responsibility to Sheikh Jassim, Great Britain
again rc.c,ognizedhis authority over and title to Qatar;
- in international law, a State is not subject to objec.tii,rrespon.sibilit~~
for everything which may occur in its territory; there are circum-
stances in which it can be relieved of its responsibility;
- finally and above all, what is more important is that Great Britain
held Qatar responsible for the disturbances on the Westcoast, but not
Bahrain, thus ceasing to recognize any Bahraini authority over the
Hawar Islands or Zubarah on that same coast.
123. The Anglo-Ottoman agreements of 1913 and 1914, the Anglo-
Saudi agreement of 1915and theAnglo-Qatari agreement of 1916marked
the completion of the consolidation of the Al-Thanis' title and its recog-
nition by treaty.
(b) The Coni~ention oJ '9 Jul~' 1913 Respecfing the Persiun Gulf und
Adjucvnt Territorics
124. This Converition, because of its Articles 11 and 13, is of great
importance for our purpose.
(i) Fir.rt, Article II
125. This Article is worded as follows:
"The Ottoman sanjak of Nejd, the northern boundary of which is
marked by a line of demarcation defined in article 7 of this Conven-
tion, ends on the south at the gulf opposite the island of Zakhnuni-
yah, which belongs to the said sanjak. A line starting from the
extreme end of the said gulf shall run due south to Ruba-al-Khali,
and shall separate Nejd from the El-Katr peninsula. The boundaries
4' Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.5.p. 210
Meniorinl of Bahrain. para. 133. of Nejd are marked by a blue line on the map annexed to this Con-
vention (annex Va). The Imperia1 Ottoman Government having
renounced al1their claims with regard to the El Katr peninsula, it i.s
cr~rerdhctii7ern ,111tic30Goverrzmentsthut the suid peninsula shuli hc~
gover.net/,US her~t(?fi)re,bj?Slleikli Jussini-bin-Sun~i [hin Thani] und
his successor.s. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that
they will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrein to interfere in the interna1
affairs of El-Katr, to infringe the autonomy of the country, or to
annex it."43
126. What is the import of this Article?
1. In the first place the two major Powers in the region, Great Britain
and the Ottoman Empire, recognize the territorial integrity of Qatar.
Article 1I above talks of the "peninsula" of Qatar as a political and
geographical entiiy.
2. The two great Powers also recognize, and consolidate, the title of the
Al-Thcini r&nustj,, who are mentioned by name. By speaking of the
"hcret(?fiwp"of their title, Article 11 gives it a temporal foundation
and authenticates it.
3. The Ottoman Empire records Great Britain's renewed undertaking to
opposc unj interf>r.cnt.cby Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula, thus
acknowledging the end of the Bahraini presence in the Hawars (and in
Zubarah and Janan) as set forth in the 1868 Agreements.
4 These three e1emc:ntsconfirm the end of the Bahraini title and its
replacement by the title of the Al-Thani - events which had been
recorded and proclaimed 45 years earlier in the 1868 Agreements
between Great Briitain and Bahrain and Qatar respectively.
5. Another importantpoint: tllc n1upattcichcd to Aniles V (a) qf'tl~eCon-
ilcntionconfirrn.~the provision.^of'Artick Il und shoit'.~thut tlle Hairur
Islurlds bhrlongto Q~rtur.
6. It would be impossible for the denomination "El-Katr peninsula" to
exclude any portion of that peninsula unless the Convention expressly
said so - which it does not - especially where the question is one of
excluding the Haluar Islands, sit~iatedas they are in the territorial sea
of that peninsula and, better still, physically being an integral part
of it.
(ii) Artic.1~13 (!/'the Conivntiotz
127. As we have just said, Article 11 and the map annexed to the Con-
vention show that the Hawars are not part of Bahrain but definitely part
of the peninsula of Qatar. Article 13 demonstrates this just as clearly:
"The Imperikil Ottoman Government renounce al1 their claims
with regard to tllc Brrl~rrini.slunds. including the two islets of
" Emphasis iidded DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 186
Lubainat-el-Aliya and Lubainat-es-Safliya, and recognise the inde-
pendence of that country. His Britannic Majesty's Government on
their part declare that they have no intention of annexing the Buh-
vc.inislunds to their territ~ry."~~
The reason why the Convention took care to mention by name, so asto
include them in "the Bahrein islands", islands such as the two Lubainat,
north and south, clo,seas they are to the main island of Bahrain, is that
it did not seem natural and self-evident that they should be included in
Bahrain unless they were expressly named. A Jovtiovi, then, the Hawar
Islands, situated further away and therefore not mentioned by name,
could not be regarcled as forming part of Bahrain, not having been
expressly mentioned in the Convention.
128. The Convention of 29 July 1913was signed, but never ratified. It
should be noted, ho,wever, that its Article Il, which we have discussed
above, was referred to expressly in the Anglo-Turkish Convention respect-
ing the Boundaries of Aden of 9 March 1914, an instrument which was
duly ratified. This Article11 of the Convention of 29 July 1913was also
referred to in Article III of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914,which
was also ratified.
(c) Tilt Anglo- Turkisll Convention of'1Y14
129. Just as important as the preceding Convention of 1913, this
instrument makes several references to "El-Katr" as an entity ("penin-
sula"). The fact that it does not exclude the Hawar Islands by name from
that peninsular entity implies that the two contracting Powers recognized
and placed on record the fact that Bahrain had lost any title to the
Hawars. These belong to the peninsular entity of Qatar as adjacent
islands.
130. In conclusiori, the two Conventions of 1913and 1914represented
a further element to be added to al1the others which, since the 1860s,had
come together to create and consolidate the title of the Al-Thani to the
Hawar Islands.
(d) The Anglo-Suudi Trcuties of'1915 und 1927
131. Finally, after the British and the Ottomans, it was Arabia's turn
to recognize the Al-Thanis' title. This recognition was particularly impor-
tant in that Ibn Saud of Arabia had long expressed an uninzuspossidendi
to the whole of Qatar. Having conquered Hasa, he claimed the peninsula
again in 1913. He finally renounced his claim as a result of British
pressure and conclu.ded a treaty to that effect with Great Britain on
Emphasis added.
15026 December 191545.This treaty was followed by a further treaty con-
cluded at Jeddah on, 20 May 1927, likewise renouncing any territorial
ambitions to Qatar.
(e) The Anglo-Qatari Agrecwent of' 1916
132. This agreement is important for several reasons:
(i) The respectiile capacities of thc contracting parties
133. Qatar was represented by Sheikh Abdullah Al-Thani as "lnde-
pendent Ruler" of tEiewhole of Qatar and ull his subjects. Great Britain
was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, the initial signa-
tory, pending subsequent signature of the Agreement by the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India. Great Britain appears in a new capacity: it
undertakes to offer ils "good otfices" in the event of aggression (by land).
Good ojficrs trpp!,, .s~olc~ljs~betircen tiilo entities irliich arc uutonornous
and indclpendetit of eucli other: Qatar thus achieved recognition of that
status vis-ri-vis Bahrain. What is more, Great Britain could not have
offered "good offices" to those two countries if they had been its colonies
or protectorates.
(ii) The nature and c:Ixtent of'the protectiori
134. Until that time Great Britain's treaty undertakings had been
limited to protectiori in the event of aggression "by seu", which in the
context of the time meant protection against actions by Bahrain.
The new agreement, in addition to providing for that protection, con-
tained an obligation by Great Britain in Article XI to grant its "good
offices" in the event of an aggression hy /und, and "within the territories
of Qatar".
(iii) The territoviul uea involved
135. Article XI refers to aggression "within the territories [in the plu-
ral] of Qatar". The 1Treatycovers the entire peninsula. This is confirmed
in various ways:
- by an article entitled "El Katr, 1908-1916" in Persian Gulf'Historicul
Surnrnuric~s,1907-1928 ;
- by a British military publication, the Handbook of Arubiu, which
clearly shows that "Qatar" means the entire peninsula;
- Bahrain nevertheless cited a report dated 12 March 1934 by the Brit-
ish Resident on the subject of his interview with the Sheikh of Qatar.
The latter indicated to the Residcnt that the 1916 Treaty related to
I5Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. An11.46p. 179.
15 1 the "coustline" biit not the"interior."This interpretation on the part
of the Sheikh was inspired by special considerations, in particular a
desire not to have the choice of a British oil Company dictated to him.
But it was not consistent with Article XI of the 1916 Treaty, which
speaksof the "territories"of Qatar. Furthermore, if the Treaty envis-
aged the "cocutline" it was thus necessarily referring to the Hawar
Islands. Finally, this same 1934 report by the Resident records the
appropriate reply he gave to the Sheikh: "And you are the Ruler of
ALL Qatar and the Treaty extends to the WHOLE of Qatar."4h
Tlius. it i.s legally e.stublislzcd thut the territor-). rcfbto in Ar-
ticSIeX und XI of the Anglo-Quturi Treuty of'1916 izas tlie entire
Qutur peninsula. This interpretation is also consistent with Article11
and 13respectively of the Convention of 1913and the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of 1914.
136. In conclusiori to this analysis of the convergence of historj, und
Iutv,we believe it apparent that, ussurning tliut Buhruin had in tlze pust
hrld u lzistoricul title tothe Haivurs, the Anglo-Bahraini and Anglo-
Qatari treaties of 1868 established that it had lost sovereignty over the
Qatar peninsula. These agreements marked the end of one title and the
birth of another, belonging to Qatar, a new entity separate from Bahrain.
Qatar's title was progressively strengthened, to such a degree that the
1916 treaty between (GreatBritain and Qatar recorded the definitive con-
solidation of that title.t is striking, und lisehelieve ur?f0rtunute, tliar the
present Judgtnent h~1.suvoided nd~fre.s.singand rrsolving the question of'
thc historicul legul titlan analysis of which was particularly vital since
this constitutes the traditional key to deciding territorial attribution.
We do not think that undertaking the historical research was beyond
the capability of the Court, especially since each historical juncture was
marked out by international treaties and the Court has extensive
experience in interpreting instruments of that kind. Moreover, if the
Court had taken the trouble to analyse the issue of the historical legal
title, that is theconvergence cd 'istory and lutt~,it would have found
confirmation of the results of that analysis in considering the conver-
gence of geogruphy irnd luiz.,that is, in:
1. the legal concept of geographical proximity in relation to the question
of a coastal State's territorial integrity;
2. the universal agreement, according to the map evidence, on the appur-
tenance of the Hiiwars; and
3. the identificatiori and determination of the territorial extent of
Bahrain and Qatar, respectively.
4hCounter-Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. 2, Ann.p.412; emphasis added It is these points which should now be examined, as a form of
countercheck to confirm the conclusion drawn from consideration of
the historical legal title.
VI. PR.OXIMIT AND TERRITORIAIL NTEGRITY
137. The Court's Judgment has almost as little to Say on the issues of
pro'ciinity, cotztiguitj8und territorirrlintegrity as it does on the question of
historical title.
There exists, however, a strong legal presuinption under international
law that islands lying within the territorial waters of a State belong to
that State.
"There is a strong presumption that islands within the twelve-mile
coastal belt will belong to the coastal State, unless there is a fully-
established case to the contrary (as, for example, in the case of the
Channel Islands). But there is no like presumption outside the
coastal belt, where the ownership of the islands is plainly at issue."
So states the Award of 9 October 1998 made by the Arbitration Tri-
bunal in the EritrecilYernen case under the presidency of Sir Robert
Jennings (para. 474). This Award applied the principle of international
law that un i.slundsifuated in the icrritoriul 1i.atrrof (1Stt~te is decmed
tojOrn7ptrrt of'the tiirritorjl of'thut Stute.
138. This is a "strong presumption" in law - one which admittedly is
not irrebuttable but which cannot be overcome except:
in tcrms of'procedure, by reversing the burden of proof; and
- suhstuntil~el~,by invoking a superior title.
139. Thc presunlption concerns islunds situuted ivithin territoriul
bruters.Today the breadth of the territorial sea is 12 miles. The Eritreul
Yenien Award of course took this into account. If we go by this figure, ull
the Hawar Islands belong to Qatar. And if we go by the 3-mile breadth
which applied at thr: time of the Anglo-Qatari Treaty of 3 November
1916, the mujority of the islands and islets of the Hawars lie totally or
partially within Qatar's territorial sea. The claim made by Bahrain on
29 May 1938 concerned 17 islands and islets, II of which are within the
3-mile limit.
140. Bahrain denied the existence of this principle in positive law and
cited no fewer than 11 instances worldwide in which the principle has not
prevailed. But Bahi-ain's argument is irrelevant, since the situations
mentioned al1 derivir from special circumstances and were crcuted hj*
treuty. Anything - almost anything - can be done by treaty, since the DELIMII'ATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 190
contractual freedom of sovereign States is a fundamental principle. The
Eritr.eulYenzen Award took good care to say "unless there is a fully-
established case to the contrary".
141. What is more, proximity ulone does not constitute a title. It sup-
plements or combines with other elements to constitute a title. This is
clearly the case here.
It will also be noted that the concept of proximity is not as alien to the
law as might at first be thought. The notion of "distance" is clearly
present in the law of the sea. That of "proximity" derives from it. After
all, the title of a coastal State to its territorial sea stems exclusively from
proximity. What is more, an "urclzipelugic" State, which is what Bahrain
claims to be, is nothing more than a collection of islands having in com-
mon "prosimity "alone.
142. In the presenitcase we are simply recalling the strong presumption
that an island belongs to a coastal State if it is situated within the limits
of its territorial sea. This presumption exists, and calling it the "principle
of proximity" or by any other name cannot detract from its existence
merely because the principle comes cloaked in a new guise, such as "con-
tiguity", or because a section of the doctrine - in truth. a rather small
one - on occasion challenges it.
143. Bahrain appears to be putting forward the Islund oJ'Pulmusjuris-
prudence as being opposed to the concept of proximity. That decision is
not relevant to the present case. The arbitrator Max Huber discounted
the matter of proxiniity simply because the islands concerned were situ-
ated beyond the limit of territorial waters, which is not the case here.
VII. THEMAPEVIDENCE
144. We shall now turn to the mup evidence. Since the Court's juris-
prudence has deterrriined quite clearly the relative importance of carto-
graphie material as evidence, we shall not revert to this point. Even quite
recently, the Arbitration Tribunal established in the EritreulYemcn case
spelled out the importance of maps, which are, as it were, a reflection of
general opinion and repute: "Although the Tribunal must be wary of this
evidence in the sense that it cannot be used as indicative of legal title, it is
norzethrless 'importu,~rc~irlc~ncoc.j'gcnertrl opiniorl or uc.pzrte'in the sense
advanced by Yemen."47
145. While the cairtographic material submitted by Bahrain was insig-
nificant, Qatar took great trouble to present a substantial collection of
map evidence confirming its position in regard to ownership of the
Hawar Islands. A large number of maps from Turkey, the United King-
47Paragraph 381 of the Award; emphasis added DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS. OP.) 191
dom, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Russia, the United States, Aus-
tralia and Iran show that, according to general opinion in various parts
of the world at widely differing periods, the Hawar Islands belonged to
Qatar.
146. In particular. the maps subsequent to 1868 (the Bahrain-Qatar
war and Great Britain's treaties with Qatar and Bahrain respectively)
demonstrate the existence of two by-then separate political entities: Bah-
raiii, a compact set of five islands, and Qatar, made up of a peninsula
with its adjacentislaindsand islets. including the Hawar Islands.
147. The map evidence produced by Qatar therefore seems to us far
the more persuasive. We take particular note of the maps prepared by the
British War Office in 1901, 1908and 19 11, and the sketch-map prepared
by that Office in 1934,al1of which show that the entire peninsula, includ-
ing the Hawar Islands, was under Qatar's sovereignty.
148. The existence of a collection of map evidence as extensive as that
presented to the Court by Qatar, drawn from such varied sources and
covering both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, cannot fail to
be significant. Where this evidence gives a virtually uniform description
of the political and geographical situation of Qatar and Bahrain over
such a long period, it is irnpo.s~inot to uc(.ord it suhstantiul itvight in
confirming tlze e.uistcwceof'u title which Qutur possesses to the Ha~i,rrr
I.sltrnds(and to Zubarah as well). It is in uny event irnpossihle to ignore
thut evideizcc(~ot~~ple~elS~,e Court 'SJudgnzent dors, irithout providing
cri?e.up/unution.
VIII. HISTORICAL DOCUMEN TONCERNING THE TERRITORIAEL XTENT
OF BAHRAIN AND QATAR
149. We have a final countercheck confirming that the Hawars belong
to Qatar. This consists of the territorial description of Bahrain and Qatar
respectively in various documents and works.
(a) The Territorial Extent of'Bahruin
(i) Lorimer's clescription
150. Lorimer's de:icription is extremely important. Among otherworks
he published a study entitled "Bahrain Principality" which, over and
above its scholarly character, had been approved by the British officials
serving in the Persian Gulf, including the influential Captain Prideaux, I>ELIMIT4TION ANI) QIJESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 192
the Political Agent in Bahrain, who revised various drafts", a point
which undoubtedly enhances its importance. According to Lorimer, the
"Bahrain Islands" coristitute a compact group of islands consisting of five
islands, and does not include the Hawar Islands.
15 1. Lorimer was vvriting in 1905and thus took into account the politi-
cal situation in the region after the major turning point of 1867-1868.
(ii) J. T. BcII~'.d~c>scription
152. In the Procretlings of'the Royul Geogrtrphic.uISociety und Motztlzly
Rrcwrd «f'Gengruph~~~~ T,heodore Bent published a study entitled "The
Bahrein Islands, in the Persian Gulf', accompanied by a mapx'. Both the
study and the accompanying map indicate clearly that Bahrain consists
of a "group of islands . . . in a bay of the same name about 20 miles off
the Coast of El Hasa. in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf'".
153. The first confidential memorandum was drawn up on 25 March
1874 by the British Foreign Service. Two other confidential memoranda
were prepared by the India Office, one on 27 August 1928 and the other
on 14July 1934, bot11signed by J. G. Laithwaite.
The first memorandum, that of 1874, concerns the Ottoman and Per-
sian claims to Bahrain or the "Bahrain Islands". It does not include the
Hawar Islands in that term.
Laithwaite's 1928 IIndiaOffice memorandum is of great interest, deal-
ing as it does with the:"Status of Certain Groups of Islands in the Persian
Gulf'52. It States that the "[Bahrain] archipelago consists of the islands of
Bahrein, Muharraq, Umm Na'assan, Sitrah and Nabi Salih, and a number
of lesser islets and rocks forming part of the same compact geographical
group". The second of Laithwaite's two confidential memoranda, that of
193453,gives the samledescription.
Thus there was no change in the 60 years from 1874 to 1934.
(iv) Thrcr British rniliturj~rcJports
154. The first is the Hundhook of Aruhiu, 1916 54, which offers exactly
the same description of Bahrain as a compact group of five islands.
4X Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.3,Lorimer. p. 87
"'Vol. XII. No. 1.Januarv 1890.o. 1.
"'Ihitl.. p. 56.
'' Reulv of Qatar. Vol4,Ann. IV.35. P. 211
" RI~~I;of Qatar. Vol. 4. Ann. IV.2. p: 5.
;' Reply of Qatar. Vol. 2, Ann. 11.61,p. 359.
'j"General. Admiralty War Staff. Intelligence Division. For Official Use only. Atten-
tion is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Act", in
Reply of Qatar. Vol. 4, A.nn. IV.1. p. 3. 155. The second document is the Militury Report on the Arubiun
Shorcs of the Persian Gulf: Kuwait, Bahruin, Hasu, Qatar, Trucial Onzan
und Oman, 1933j5. This too offers the same description of Bahrain as a
"compact group" forming an archipelago of five islands, whose names
are givens6.
156. The third document is the Militury Report and Route Book - tlze
Aruhiun States of thc Per.riun G~lf'lY39~' with the same description -
23 years after the first document.
(v) Nzimerous other c?fficiulBritish documents
157. It is impossible to examine al1 of these. Picking a few almost at
random, we shall confine ourselves to citing:
- the 1933 letter from Laithwaite of the India Office;
- the letter of 1933 from the Officiating Political Resident to the Sec-
retary of State for India, which contains the following simple, forth-
right assertion: ":Hawar is clearly not one of the Bahrain group";
- a further letter of 1933 from the incumbent Political Resident to the
Secretary of State for India expressing a decision to the same effect;
- the Minute drawri up by Mr. Rendel dated 30 December 1937,"Ara-
bian Boundary Disputes :Bahrain-Qatar, 1818-199 1 ", which contains
the following statement: "As regards the Hawar Islands .. .I cannot
hplp rpgretting that the India Office went so far as they seem to have
done in allotting these islands to Bahrein. They are obviously, from
the geographical point of view, a part of Qatar .. ."58;
- the well-known and highly critical point of view expressed by Prior,
Political Agent (1929-1932) and Political Resident (1939-1945), to the
effect that the Ha~warIslands "belong to Qatar, a view supported by
Lorimer" '9.
(b) The Territorial l?.~tent of Qatar: Its Grudual Identity ivith the Ter-
ritorial Area ($the Peninsulu, Including the Adjucent Islands
158. This aspect nieed not detain us long, since the exclusion of the
Hawar Islands €rom t.heQatar peninsula as a whole cannot be either sup-
posed or presumed. On the contrary, the presumption must be in favour
of their inclusion, by virtue of geography and the unity of the peninsula,
as well as by virtue of law, of the principle of proximity and of the
presence of these islands in the territorial waters.
159. Moreover, by reason of history too, their inclusion is something
more than a presumption: it is an established fact. The history we have
55 "For Official Use only. This document is the property of the Government of India."
rh Memorial of Bahrairi, Vol. 6, Ann. 330, document submitted by Bahrain
'' Reply of Qatar. Vol. 4, Ann. IV.3, p. 11.
Reply of Qatar, Vol. 3, Ann. 111.56.p. 349; emphasis added.
5'Memorial of Qatar, Vol. 8, Ann. 111.229,p. 129.traced throughout this opinion shows that the State of Qatar gradually
came into being within the limits of the peninsula.
160. The Stateof Bahrain is certainly an older edifice than the Stateof
Qatar, but in its territorial extent the State of Bahrain, which in earlier
centuries controlled almost the entire Arabian shore of the Gulf as far
as Muscat, has shrunk. And from the end of the nineteenth century
the State of Qatar has seen its territorial area gradually expand so as to
coincide with the terr.itory of the peninsula.
161. The evidence furnished by a well-connected specialist who com-
maiided great authority in his time, Lorirner, confirms the territorial
extent of Qatar in the study which he devoted to that Principality. In par-
ticular, in this erudite and well-researched work, he gives a precise, docu-
mented list of the islands and islets making up Qatar; it is not surprising
to find that the list contains the Hawar Islands (and Janan as well).
162. We conclude that :
the ruling dynast:y of Qatar crruted u title fbr itsclf in 1868 over the
entire peninsula and the adjacent islands, including the Hawar Islands;
- this title repluced the title which Bahrain undoubtedly possessed and
which it lost through its silence and juilurc IO cluini after 1868;
- this title was gradually consolitlrrtc~df,rom 1868 to 1916;
- this title was recognizrtl by treaty in 1913, 1914, 191 5 and 1916by the
British, the Ottornans and the Saudis, the regional Powers;
- this title has bee:n coqfinlied by the map evidence and, as far as
Hawar is concernied, by, inter ciliu,the legal principle of proximity.
163. As regards the section of the Judgment dealing with delimitation
by a single maritime boundary, we disagree with this on four points:
(u) the Judgment rules infiu petitu in terms of the Bahraini formula as
applied to the clourse of the single median line:
(h) the method adopted in order to draw the provisional median line;
(c) the legal characiterization of Qit'at Jaradah;
(d) the course of the final line of delimitation. DELIMIT4TION AND QIJESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 195
(a) The Judgment Rules infra petita in Terms of the Buhruini Forrnulu
us Applied to the Course oj'the Single Mediun lin^
164. The Bahraini formula represents the cornerstone of the maritime
delimitation which the Court must carry out at the express request of the
Parties. As paragraph 67 of the Judgment recalls: "The Parties request
the Court to . .. draw a single maritime boundary between their respec-
tive maritime areas, sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters."
An analysis of th(: section dealing with the maritime delimitation
enables us to identify three distinct elements:
(LI) a definition of the Court's task: to draw a maritime boundary;
(hl the nature of that boundary: a single maritime boundary;
(c) a statement of the maritime areas to be delimited: the sea-bed, the
subsoil and the superjacent waters.
165. We would mcireover recall the following three facts:
(u) The Bahraini foi-mula was accepted by Qatar in December 1990 at
the Doha meetirig (see paragraph 69);
(hj Qatar, in 1991, and Bahrain, in 1993,have extended the breadth of
their respective territorial seas to 12 miles (see paragraph 174);
(c) Finally, Qatar's Application was filed on a date, 8 July 1981. prior
to the decisions extending the breadth of the territorial sea; at that
particular date, the limits were then three miles, so that no problem
of delimitation of territorial waters arose.
166. The present Judgment has, indisputably, satisfied two of the
stipulations set out iil the Bahraini formula. By contrast, as far as the
third element is concerned, and more precisely the relationship between it
and the two preceding ones, the statement in the Judgment that this is to
be "a single maritime boundary that serves other purposes as well" (see
paragraph 174)falls clearly irzfiupetitu having regard to the terms of the
formula. Thus the question is whether identification of the course of the
single maritime boundary has the effect of restricting its scope to a purely
delimitational function. The answer will depend on the impact, in terms
of the definition of the Court's task, to be attributed to the fact that the
maritime areas for delimitation have been expressly enumerated.
167. On examination, it is apparent that the course of the single mari-
time boundary, whilst constructed within the terms of the formula, does
not entirely satisfy the structural balance established in that compromis-
sory clause. Recourse to the technique of enumerating the areas to be
delimited has a dual aim: ,first, to specify individually the areas for
delimitation and, sc~cc~~dltjo. emphasize the distinct nature of each type
of area in relation to the others, since each possesses its own coherent
character in law. The Judgment is correct in speaking of a "single mari-
time boundary that serves other purposes as well". The single maritime
boundary is not a composite line but a multifunctional one; that is to DELIMITATION AND QLIESTIONS(JOINT DISS. OP.) 196
Say, it serves simultaneously as a line of demarcation for each specific
category of area to be delimited throughout its length. It follows that
the single boundary line must not have the effect of changing the nature
of the areas divided by it, or of affecting their legal status. It must cumula-
tively and simultaneously delimit each area, independently of the régime
governing the maritirne zone through which it passes, without any special
preference or diminuition in favour of a particular régimeor zone. This is
a condition based not simply on considerations of theory or expediency.
Maximalist tendencie.~can only be counter-productive, given the require-
ments which governed the general conditions of equilibrium of the Mon-
tego Bay Conventiori: a line resulting in the application to that zone of
the sole régimesof the territorial sea and the contiguous zone would have
no chance of being generally accepted by States. Conversely, a "free-for-
all" in regard to the régimesgoverning these maritime areas would run
counter to the security considerations which, inter (llia, underpinned the
projection of territorial jurisdiction into the sea adjacent to coastlines.
Thus, and by analogy with the test of equity which the Court applies in
al1maritime delimitations, the specific enumeration of areas in the Bah-
raini formula required the Court to ensure that the result it achieved was
coherent over the enitire maritime area delimited.
168. Maritime delimitation by means of a single multifunctional line
implies, moreover, that the enjoyment and exercise of rights, facilities and
privileges recognized and accorded by law, in particular to neighbouring
or riparian States of the area to be delimited, be guaranteed and secured.
This is an element inherent in the act of maritime delimitation, the pur-
pose of which is to determine the imaginary line separating the maritime
areas over which eairh State exercises the respective powers held by it
under the law. and constituting the external boundary of each such area.
Delimitation implies neither a discretionary power nor a power of dis-
posa1over the rights attaching to those areas. In failing to investigate the
impact upon the legal status and régime ofthe various areas delimited by
the single maritime boundary, the Judgment does not fully meet the
requirements of the IBahraini formula and rules infiupetitcl.
169. In the present case, the Court was bound to investigate whether
the various maritime régimesremained valid in light of the course of the
single maritime bouridary, given that it had awarded the Hawar Islands
to Bahrain and that i.hesea between the Hawars and the Qatar peninsula
is not deep enough for navigation. As a result, it is impossible in practice
for Qatar to commuriicate between the northern and southern parts of its
land territory along its western seaboard. To this objection, it was replied
that coastal traffic along Qatar's western seaboard was insignificant or of
no importance. But that argument is unacceptable. Factual considera-
tions cannot. in themselves, suffice to defeat firmly established positive
law rights; navigation, along with fishing, represents one of the primary
uses of the sea. The Judgment kas sought to respond to this problem, butunfortunately in a reductionist manner in terms of the litigant Parties'
rights. The passage of Qatari vessels, it is said, is protected under the
rules governing the right of innocent passage through Bahrain's territo-
rial sea. The narrowness of the relevant area for delimitation poses the
problem of passage through the superjacent waters of the continental
shelf and beyond the external boundariesof each territorial sea. The Bah-
raini formula implie:; a test of validity: it was for the Court to assure
itself that the course of the ~rovisional line had no adverse effect ub inirio
upon the nature of these areas. A simple factual observation demon-
strates that. even at that stage, coastal shipping rights were jeopardized.
170. In strict law, there can be no criticism of the enshrinement of
Qatar's right of innocent passage - like that indeed of any other State -
through Bahrain's territorial sea between the Hawars and the other Bah-
raini islands. The resiatement, in the second subparagraph of point (2) of
the operative part of'the Judgment, of this right of innocent passage in
terms of the relations. inter prrr.tchsas to be assessed at its true worth: on
the one hand, the deihnitive and perpetual nature of these rights, and on
the other their autoriomy and inviolability against any attempt to pro-
claim these areas interna1 Bahraini waters. However, this solution, which
could have benefited from a bolder approach, ignores an element of fact
and law.
171. The relations between the Parties are not affected by any prob-
lems other than those of maritime delimitation. The peaceful and harmo-
nious use of this area, and the cohabitation of the inhabitants of these
two States, must not suffer undesirable effects as a result of the imple-
mentation of the riglit, that is to say the lawful and legitimate introduc-
tion of the régimeof innocent passage. Without losing sight of the ques-
tion whether a régimeof acquired rights of Qatari fishermen and users is
conceivable or possible, it was necessary to make specific provision to
deal with the effects of the delimitation.
172. In the present case, the Court could have envisaged a legal solu-
tion involving the est.ablishment of a régimefor the enjoyinent and exer-
cise of rights of user in respect of the sea, the most sensitive outstanding
question being passage between the northern and southern parts of the
Qatar peninsula alon~gthe western seaboard. The Court could have con-
sidered securing such enjoyment of rights and communication by apply-
ing withiri the delimited area a régimeanalogous to that of an "interna-
tional easement". This would have meant according a foreign State rights
and powers exercisable over a maritime area falling within the jurisdic-
tion of a riparian State0". The result of such an easement régimewould
have been to enclave the Hawar Islands and to determine how this was to
affect Bahrain's rights in regard to the need for a passage between its
"" See the dcfiiiition gi\cnH.qLauterpacht in "Règles gt.nér;ileadu drdela paix".
RLY II<,(/<,.Y 1 orir./'A(~tr~/~;il<i/r(~iiiit<~rr~trtii/1Lli Hrg,<,. Vol. 62.1937.
pp. 377.328. DELIMIT,1TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 198
main island and Hawar. These auestions merited being examineL in
depth prior to identifying any consequences which they might have for
the present proceedings.
173. The creation of a legal enclave, which serves to guarantee the
enjoyment and exercise of a right of passage following a maritime delimi-
tation, is no novelty in international jurisprudence.
In the case concerriing Dclir?litutionof the Continentul Sheif'hetiiven
tllc United Kingdon) of' Greut Brituin und Northern Irrlrrnd, und the
Frenclz Rclpublic, Decision of 30 June 1977, the Court of Arbitration
stated :
"the substantial lsoint at issue is whether the presence of the British
archipelago of the Channel Islands close to the French coast is a
'special circumstance' or a circumstance creative of inequity that
calls for a departure from or variation of the equidistance method of
delimitation which the Parties agree to be in principle the applicable
method" ('2.
The solution adopted by the Court was a "twofold" one:
"throughout the whole length of the Channel comprised within the
arbitration area the primary boundary of the continental shelf
will be a mid-Channel median line. In delimiting its course in the
Channel Islands region . . .,the Channel Islands themselves are to
be disregarded, since their continental shelf must be the subject
of a second and separate delimitation.
202. The secoi~dpart of the solution is to delimit a second bound-
ary establishing, vis-à-vis the Channel Islands, the southern limit of
the continental shelf held by the Court to be appurtenant to the
French Republic in this region to the south of the mid-Channel
median line. This second boundary must not, in the opinion of the
Court, be so draiwn as to allow the continental shelf of the French
Republic to enciroach upon the established 12-mile fishery zone of
the Channel Isla~nds.The Court therefore further decides that this
boundary shall be drawn at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
established baselines of the territorial sea of the Channel Islands.
The effect will be to accord to the French Republic a substantial
band of continental shelf in mid-Channel which is continuous with
its continental shelf to the east and west of the Channel Islands
region; and at the same time to leave to the Channel Islands, to their
north and to thieir west, a zone of seabed and subsoil extending
12nautical miles from the baselines of the two Bailiwicks. The result,
so far as the Channel Islands are concerned, is to enclose them
in an enclave formed, to their north and west, by the boundary
"'See United Nations, RIAA, Vol. XVIII, pp. 3 ff.
"'Ihi( p/..76-77. para148. DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 199
of the 12-mile zone just described by the Court and, to their east,
south and south-,west by the boundary between them and coasts of
Normandy and Brittany, the exact course of which it is outside the
competence of the Court to ~pecify."~~
It should be recalled that in that case the issues of the creation of
enclaves or semi-enclaves were discussed by the litigant Parties in their
arguments before the Court.
174. In international practice, enclaves on the high seas are to be
found "in the North Atlantic, around Jan Mayen Island and in the
Barents Sea" and also in
"the Sea of Okhotsk . .. off the eastern Coast of the Russian Federa-
tion, bordered by the Kamchatka peninsula and the island of Sakha-
line . ..,an enclave is subject to the régimeof the high seas, whilst
being entirely surrounded by one or more EEZs under national juris-
diction" ("'.
It should also be noted that a decision to create a "maritime corridor"
is not unprecedentecl either: see Cusr concerning tlîr Delimitation of'
Muritinw Arras bettt~rrn Canadu und Fruncc, arbitration presided over
by Judge Jiménezde Aréchaga, former President of this C~urt"~.
175. In the present case, the circumstances are such that the basic issue
is not that the course of the median line is creative of inequity, but rather
that this is an inequity which prevents one of the Parties from enjoying
and exercising rights enshrined in international law. A legal adjustment is
required, involving the creation of an "international easement" constitut-
ing a "navigation corridor" in the navigable part of the sea between the
main island of Bahrain and the Hawar Islands. The waters of this area
would then remain Bahraini, whilst the enclaved corridor would be sub-
ject to "easements" relating to the traditional uses of the sea.
176. It of course goes without saying that the creation of this corridor
must not, however, be a cause of prejudice or source of inequity for Bah-
rain in regard to the enjoyment and exercise of its rights of navigation
and overflight when it has to communicate between the two parts of its
land territory and cross the navigation corridor. Bahrain's rights to con-
tinuity between the component parts of its territory and to security are of
equal rank with those accorded by positive law to Qatar. It follows that
the régimefor the said navigation corridor traversing Bahrain's territorial
sea between its main island and the Hawars also needs to be subject to
some form of legal provision more specifically adapted to the circum-
stances.
(''United Nations. RIAA. pp. 94-95. paras. 201-202.
E. Nemoz, "Les mers enclavées:l'exemplede la Mer d'Okhotsk: multilatéralismet
~i"'lUnited Nations. RI.4A. Vol. XXI. p. 267.in~c~N.so.. 9. 1995.p. 197. 177. Having established the sui generis nature of this area produced by
the legal enclavement of the Hawar Islands, we now have to outline the
general scheme of it:; régime.This legal régimecould be represented in
vectorial terms as lying between that of innocent passage and the tradi-
tional régimeof the high seas. Thus. in the zone currently delimited, a
tradition of usage has arisen which the passage of time has consolidated;
both Bahraini and Qatari nationals using this area have been the direct
joint beneficiaries of this situation. The problem thus concerns the effect.
in terms of right creation, of the delimitation established by the present
decision: the breach of legal continuity, that is to say the break with the
previous situation, n~ust not in itself be a source of tension in the rela-
tions between the Parties to the dispute or of disturbances in use for the
nationals concerned. In the case concerning KrrsikililSe(1udu 111und(Bot-
sit.nnc~lNumibi<ri,the Court made an award of sovereignty in respect of
the disputed island. tietermined the course of the frontier and established
the usage régime governing navigation on the River Chobe. Delimita-
tion cannot, in our view, be reduced to an abstract exercise confined to a
theoretical definition of the line marking the meeting point of the
external boundaries of the area over which each Party exercises its juris-
diction. When it so aicts,the Court is not seeking to make considerations
of expediency prevail, but to encourage the establishment of peaceful
relations, both in bilateral relations between the States party to the dis-
pute and in the day-to-day activities of the populations concerned.
178. The Court's power to state the conditions which it considers
indispensable for the restoration and consolidation of peaceful relations
between the Parties is a matter requiring examination. Thus it is not for
the Court to substitirte itself for States with a view to defining the terms
of a legal régime diirectly opposable to them; moreover, the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations has no specific competence to exer-
cise judicially powers pertaining to preventive diplomacy. On examina-
tion, however, it is clear that the scope of these remarks requires qualifi-
cation. The powers conferred upon the Court require it to adopt an
approach that is nclt exclusively a juridical one, but also encompasses
considerations of expediency, of the factual circumstances. Articles 41
of the Court's Statute and 37-38 of its Rules, concerning provisional
nieasures, place particular emphasis, uhoic crllrl.s~on the importance
of the factual circurnstances. The Court does not base itself exclusively
on reasons of pure law in order to indicate such measures; the above-
mentioned provisions accord it a special power: a discretional power to
determine whether the circumstances require the indication of such
measures and what the most appropriate measures are. It would be
something of a paradox if a jurisdictional decision founded on urgency
were to be deprived of the desired effect because of constraints relating
to the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction. In order to act, the
Court first assesses the risks to the Parties' rights in the case and then
indicates the measur.esrequired in order to protect those rights, for which
the Court is responsible by reason of its seisin of the case. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 201
179. Sec-orzdly.in the case concerning KusikililSedudu Island (Bot-
sii~analNatnihiu), the Court enriched the case law on the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. Previously, it had espoused the traditional doctrine.
Thus in the case concerning Pussuge through the Greut Belt (Finlatzd
v. Denmark). the Court stated that it would welcome an agreement
between Finland and Denmark for the friendly settlement of the dis-
puteoo. It forcefully i-estated this wish in the case concerning the Acriul
It~citlentof 10 August 1999 (Pukistun v. in di^)^'.
The contribution of the decision in the KusikililSedudu I.slund (Bot-
.~1t~nnalNrit~7ibiucase lies in the fact that, proprio moru. the Court
regarded as an element in the settlement of the merits of the dispute the
arrangements for navigation on the Chobe. In the present case, there has
been a development which is worth underlining: the second subparagraph
of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Judgment. However, given the
particular circumstarices, and with a view to securing appropriate enjoy-
ment and exercise of user rights within the delimited area, it would have
been preferable to recall a further obligation incumbent upon Bahrain
and Qatar: the conclusion of an agreement, the terms of which it would
be for the Parties themselves to prescribe.
180. It follows from the foregoing that, by reminding the Parties to
these proceedings of the obligation to respect both the legal régimesgov-
erning the areas delimited and their own rights, the Court would have
carried out in full the:task required of it by the Bahraini formula if it had
applied the validity test and identified its consequences. However, the
Court was not invited in this case to prescribe detailed terms and condi-
tions guaranteeing the enjoyment and exercise by the Parties of their
respective rights. The Court is accordingly not competent to do this.
Responsibility for the conception, formulation and implementation of
this dual guarantee régime,through the creation of a maritime navigation
corridor and the establishment of rules for the crossing of that corridor,
are a matter for the two Parties. In accordance with its established case
law, it was incumbent upon the Court to instruct the Parties to endeav-
our to reach an eqiiitable solution through negotiations carried on in
good faith and to rectify by treaty or agreement the inequitable result
noted.
(b) The Metliod Adopted in Order to Dru111 the Provisionul
Metliun Line
181. The two principles upon which the law governing the delimita-
tion of the territorial sea hinges must, in Our view, be interpreted as
follows:
h"See I.C.J. R<~porIYYl, p. 20. para. 35.
("Judgmcnt ci27 Junr 2000. I.C.J. Rc'1î~000. pp. 33-34. paras. 51-55 186. Examination of the respective travaux prépuratoires for the
Geneva instruments and for the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea discloses a change in approach. The International Law
Commission seems t,o have demonstrated a preference for having base-
lines serve both to firthe boundary with the high seas and also to fixthe
equidistance line. But this stance by the Commission was not confirmed
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Within
negotiating Group VII, which dealt with the question of the delimitation
of the continental shelf and the exclusiveeconomic zone, the problem of
basepoints was a matter on which the delegations were unable to agree:
some favoured adoption of the equidistance line, others an equitable
solution. The former wished not only purely and simply to extend appli-
cation of the normal baseline to al1areas, but also to accord it this dual
function; the merit of this solution lay in its mathematical simplicity. For
the latter group, on the other hand, the search for an equitable solution
did not reauire from the outset the ado~tion of criteria that were a source
of inequity, or the automatic application of one principle or method in
particular. In some c,asesthis approach would have such distorting effects
that there could be rio question of raising it to the status of an absolute
rule. To do so would be to create an obstacle to the conclusion of delimi-
tation agreements between neighbouring States. The disagreement on this
point, both within negotiating Group VI1 and within the Conference
itself, calls into question the proposals and interpretations espoused by
the International Law Commission in 1953and 1956.
In conclusion, itil;not established that in law baselines serveboth for
purposes of delimitation and for the fixing of the external boundaries of
maritime areas.
187. As far as cascelaw is concerned, the Court has had to rule on this
question on a numbe:rof occasions; it hasnot however endorsed the prin-
ciple that the normal baseline be accorded a dual function. During the
period immediately following the adoption of the Montego Bay Conven-
tion, the Court, aware of the results of the work of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and in particular of the work
of negotiating Group VII, did not follow the proposals and conclusions
of the International Law Commission.
188. Already in 1984, in the case concerning the Delimitation of tlîe
Maritime Boundary in the Guif of'Maine Area, the Chamber excluded :
"any method wlhichtakes tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low-tide
elevations, sometimes lying at a considerable distance from terra
firma, as basepoint for the drawing of a line intended to effect an
equal division of a given areaWbX.
The decision in the case concerning the Continental Slîelf' (Lihyrrn
I.C.J. Rq~ort1984,pp. 329-330. para. 201Arab JumahiriyalMuita) made the position even clearer when it excluded
the island of Filfla as basepoint for thedrawing of the provisional median
line, even though it was used by Malta to measure the breadth of its
territorial sea. Thus, for the Court:
"the baselines as determined by coastal States are not per se identical
with the points chosen on a coast to make it possible to calculate the
area of continental shelf appertaining to that State. In this case, the
equitableness of an equidistance line depends on whether the precau-
tion is taken of eliminating the disproportionate effect of certain
'islets, rocks andl minor coastal projections', to use the language of
the Court in its 1969 Judgment. quoted ab~ve."~~
The term equituble characterizes both the result to be achieved and the
means to be applied to reach that result '".
189. Admittedly, it might be asked whether the case concerning Muri-
time Delimitution in tlze Areu hetiivcn Greerzluntland Jun Muyen (Den-
murk v.Norivuy) does not represent a break with the previous jurispru-
dence, when the Court States:
"The area of overlapping claims in this case is defined by the
median line and the 200-mile line from Greenland, and those lines
are both geometi-icalconstructs; there might be differences of opinion
over basepoints, but given defined basepoints, the two lines follow
automatically. The median line provisionally drawn as first stage in
the delimitation process has accordingly been defined by reference to
the basepoints indicated by the Parties on the coasts of Greenland
and Jan Mayen.""
Here, the use of the subjunctive "might" instead of the present indica-
tive denotes the absence of disagreement between the Parties over the
identification of the 'basepoints, their disagreement being confined to the
issue of the breadth of the maritime areas. It should, moreover, be noted
that in "macrogeographic" terms the areas in question are vast, having
nothing in common with thearea between Qatarand Bahrain. Should we
then accord general scope to the statement that, "given defined base-
points, the two lines follow automatically"? The use of the adverb auto-
nzaticully would justify an affirmative reply, which would find support in
the work of the International Law Commission. However, on examina-
tion this conclusion cannot be upheld: in the first place both Denmark
and Norway are pal-ties to the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and 1960,
and participants in a network of regional agreements which have favoured
the development of a law and practice shared by the States of the region.
In the second place, in the absence of disagreement between the Parties,
""I.C.J. Rc~port.985.p. 48. para. 64.
See I. J. Reports1982. p. 59, para. 70.
71I.C.J. ReporrslYY3,p. 78, para. 89. DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 205
the Court did not consider it necessary to deal with the question of a "dif-
ference of opinion", since this was in any case a hypothetical issue here.
The Court was conteint to place on record the respective basepoints and
lines proposed by each Party, satisfying itself that no challenge to those
proposals had been made. In these circumstances, the Court's conclusion
is to be contrasted with the test of inequity ah initio applied in the cases
ContinclntalSheij" ( Tzrni.siuILihyunA rub Jum~ihirij~a)of 1982 and Conti-
nrntul Sf~elf(Lihycrn Aruh Jatnahirij~trlM~ilt~of 1985. In effect iri 1993,
in its decision in the case concerning Maritirnc. Delitnitution in the Areu
hrtii,cen Greenlcruzdund Jrriî Mcr~" ,lrDzenn7urk v. Norii,ulti. the Court
proceeded in the sanie manner, relying on the lack of challenge to the
basepoints and lines designated by each Party. Thus the Court proceeds
on a case-by-case basis and reserves the right to decide on the equitable-
ness of basepoints and lines, irrespective of whether or not these are pro-
posed by the parties to a dispute.
190. Contrary to what the Judgment appears to suggest, the syste-
matic use of basepoints and lines to calculate the extent of the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and to fix the external boundaries
of those areas, is not prescribed by law, or by the Court's case law. The
final solution is based on a specific appreciation of the factual circum-
stances, which courtij assess at their discretion with the assistance of a
minimum of mathematical apparatus and of a sense of equity.
191. In a delimitation of the territorialsea. this sense of equity is also
a requirement of law. We can only criticize, and most particularly so in
the present case, the interpretation which the Judgment gives to the
"equidistancelspecial circumstances" rule, which is the norm applicable
here. Contrary to tht: solution reached in the Judgment, the relationship
between the two notions of equidistance and special circumstances is one
between equal and opposite forces, to borrow a term from mathematics.
In 1958,a Yugoslav proposal hostile to the reference to "special circum-
stances" was rejectedlnot on conceptual grounds, but because of the dif-
ficulties involved in interpreting this notion, which was regarded as too
vague and too subjective. However, we would recall the masterly presen-
tation of the theory of special circumstancesby the United Kingdom dele-
gate, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, subsequently judge of this Court. In Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice's view, special circumstances comprised considera-
tions of equity and the particular configuration of a Coast; to these two
initial circumstances was added a reference to historical titles, which had
been the subject of an amendment proposed by the Federal Republic of
Germany. By contrilst, there was no mention of islands, either in the
speeches or in the firial version of Article5. From 1958, and the truvuu.~
prc;parutoirrs confirrn this, equidistance could be applied as the standard
criterion, as long as this did not produce a result contrary to the require-
ments of an equitable solution, for, in general: DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS. OP.) 206
"while international law requires that a delimitation be rooted in
title, it also imposes the requirement of an equitable result. Both
conditions . .. are necessary; neither is enough on its ~wn."~~
192. As far as equidistance is concerned, the real question concerns the
identification of the basepoints. No systematic answer can readily be
given on this point. In the case concerning Muritirne Drlirnitution in the
Arecl hrtiiren Grernlunci und Jun Muyen (Dennzurk v. Norivuy). the
Court was not faced with any problem, since the points utilized by each
of the Parties were not disputed, and the choice appeared acceptable to
them, because it was regarded as equitable. In the absence of agreement
between the States concerned, it is difficult to speak of a general solution
or applicable principle in circumstances where island features are situated
close to a Coast; in :;orne cases islands are disregarded, in others taken
into account. for purposes of drawing the median provisional line. In
1973, certain Africari States had proposed that the attribution of mari-
time areas to islands in general, and in particular to small islands, must
be made in accordance with equitable principles; al1factors and circum-
stances should be taken into account, including surface area, population,
distance from the principal territory, geological configuration and par-
ticular interests of island and archipelagic States (Seabed Committee,
doc. AIAC. 138189arid Rev.1).The objections in the Gulf'of Muine case
to the equidistance line proposed by Canada on the basis of points which
it had itself chosen demonstrate the limits encountered in practice where
there is confusion between the points utilized in order to calculate the
breadth of maritime areas and those adopted to determine the external
boundaries of those areas7'. Thus equity must also govern the choice of
the basepoints utilized for purposes of maritime delimitation. The search
for an equitable solution implies that considerations deriving from the
requirements of equity be consistently taken into account at every stage
of the actand operation of delimitation. It was necessary for the Court to
recall that the choice of basepoints must also be equitable, as must be the
method used and the result sought. "[Tlhe equitableness of an equidis-
tance line depends on whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the
disproportionate effiict of certain islets, rocks and niinor coastal pro-
jection~."~~This reqluirement also reflects the provisional character of
the equidistance line, since allowance for special circumstances merely
implies a simple adjustment of the line thus drawn on a provisional basis.
Inequitable basepoints will affect the course of the true median line,
and hence the equitaible nature of the solution adopted.
7' P. Weil. Prrspccrii.cchr droit (ILl,u (Ii.lirnitutionnzuritime. 1088. p. 90.
7z See1.C.J. Rr~port1984,pp. 329-330. para. 210.
7-'1C.J. Reports 1985. p. 48. para. 64. 193. Following the award of the Hawar Islands, and above al1 of
Qit'at Jaradah, to Bahrain and, to a lesser degree, of Janan to Qatar, the
Court, given the narrowness of the delimited area was bound to ask itself
whether the choice of the traditional basepoints was an equitable one.
Grounds of law are in this case opposed by equity. Thus, in giving effect
to islets or features located at a greater distance from the main island of
Bahrain than the Ha,war Islands are from Qatar, the Judgment failed to
take account of any e:lementother than those relating to title. The test of
equitableness used tc~adjust the single line was applied by reference to
basepoints which hacl not first been examined to ensure that their choice
was equitable. In the event, the final choice of basepoints resulted in
the equidistance line being located too far to the west, because of the
exaggerated effects accorded to tiny, unimportant features. The drawing
of the provisional equidistance line on the basis of the points chosen
here, namely what are called "maritime features" or "le,sjOrmations tnuri-
times". had the effeci:of distorting the general direction of the coastline.
It is surely curious thut the sea sl~ouldbe dominatecl not hj, terru jrrna
but hy minor mariti,we jkutures, precisely lucking jirm ,joundutions. If
the principle of the pre-eminence of terra firma over the sea had been
respected, the direct result would have been a baseline which faithfully
followed the coastliine, and an equidistance line which respected the
topography of the land and its coastlines.
The provisional equidistance line should, in the circumstances of the
case, have been constructed by reference to equitably chosen baselines,
which would have required its being moved to the west of the line pro-
posed by the Judgment. In the circumstances of the case it was incumbent
upon the Judgment to satisfy this requirement if the method for drawing
the provisional line was to be an equitable one, based on points which
were also equitable.
(c) Legal Characterizution of'Qit'at Jaradah
194. The conclusion, in paragraph 195 of the Judgment, that
"the maritime feature of Qit'at Jaradah satisfies the above-
mentioned critelria [in Article 10, paragraph 1,of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Article 121,
paragraph 1,of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea] and
that it is an islaild which should as such be taken into consideration
for the drawing of the equidistance line"
is disputable given tlnegeophysical characteristics of this feature.
195. There are a number of factors which cast doubt upon the view
that Qit'at Jaradah is geographically an island: the inconsistency of the DELIMIT/iTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 208
experts' opinions; the fact that it is not indicated as an island on British
Admiralty charts (see attached map, p. 215, below) (see paragraph 193of
the Judgment); the removal of the upper surface of the feature in 1986
(paragraph 192 of the Judgment); and, finally, the sedimentation which
has taken place since then. In the absence of precise information, it would
appear that there is currently a tiny maritime feature of very small size
appearing above the svaterline at the location known as Qit'at Jaradah.
196. It is not for the Court to settle a dispute involving theoretical dis-
cussions of physical geography. But, irrespective of the legal and political
dimension of the question whether or not Qit'at Jaradah is an island in
law, we must not los<:sight of a consideration of basic common sense:
one cannot have contradictory answers to one and the same question.
According to the Dic,tionnuirc Robert: "An island is an area of terra
firma which emerges permanently from the water"; the Cumbridge Inter-
r~ationulDictiotlary of E~zglislzspeaks of "a piece of land completely sur-
rounded by water". For its part, the first paragraph of Article 121of the
Montego Bay Conveiition defines an island as "a naturally formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide". Over
and above editorial differences inherent in the aims of the respective dis-
ciplines, it will be noted that the problem turns on considerations of
hydrography (high tide) and geomorphology (a naturally formed area of
land).
197. First, the hydrographie element: "high tide" is an important
factor in the definition of an island under the 1982 Convention; this
criterion is more precise than that used in everyday language. Here,
appearance above the waterline at high tide is the essential condition
in order for a naturally formed area of land to be characterized as an
"island" rather than as a low-tide elevation.
198. Next, geomorphological considerations, which entail examination
of the question of the composition of the "land" comprising an island:
"natural area of land". "area of terra firma". The "naturalness" of an
insular feature has been the subject of fierce debate, both in doctrine and
in the work of codification. 1sthe land - a product of nature - the con-
sequence of geological action or of sedimentation? A proposal by H.
Lauterpacht to inseri. the adjective "natural" before "area of land" was
rejected by the International Law Commission in 195475.It was on a pro-
posai by the United States, who were hostile to any artificial, abusive
extension of the territorial sea and to aily encroachment on the freedom
of the high seas, that an amendment was adopted providing for the inser-
tion of the word "natural" in the paragraph dealing with the definition of
an i~land'~.The sense of the term has itself changed. Since the Anna case,
it would seem that it had been accepted that the geomorphological com-
75 Yi~urhookoJ'thr Ii~fcriiutiLuit.(oii~inissio1954.Vol. 1.pp. 92 and 94.
7hSee the final Article 10of the Law of the Sea Convention, doc. A/Conf.13/CllL.I 12.
O/bc.iiDoc.r~nicrrt.ol. III: First Cornmittee. pp. 180and 265. DELIMIT/\TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 209
position of a feature was irrelevant: sediment, mud, coral, madrepore,
or terra firma properly so-called7'. But contrary to the judgment of Sir
William Scott in that case, the Montego Bay Convention departed quite
significantly from those principles.
The fact that the land lies above the high-water line is not enough in
itself for a feature to be characterized as an island; only areas of terra
firma can be accorded the status of island under Article 121of the Law of
the Sea Convention. In the first place, Article 121introduces a distinction
between islands and "rocks", whose legal régimeis dealt with in the third
paragraph. The treatinents of rocks and islands are not identical, even
though both are featilres permanently above the high-water line and of
stable geomorphological composition.
Secondly, areas of land lying above the high-water line are not con-
fined to islands. The 1982Convention expressly refers to atolls. but pro-
vides no legal definition of these; in geographical terms, they are "ring-
shaped coral reefs in warm seas, enclosing a lagoon communicating with
the high sea" (Dictioiqnuire Robert). In terms of their geomorphological
composition, atolls are not terra firma, and therefore cannot be accorded
the status of islands. In short, atolls are features or elevations consisting
of a mixture of sedimient, mud, coral and madrepore.
Cays are also areas of land lying permanently above sea level. "A cay
is an islet or elevation composed of sand compacted to a greater or lesser
degree" (Grund Lar.oussr universel). This is a category of maritime
feature which remains above the waterline at high tide but which is not
terra firma in the ordinary, traditional sense of the term. Unlike islands,
atolls, or even artific:ial islands, the Montego Bay Convention does not
refer to cays as a geographical category recognized by law.
199. As regards Qit'at Jaradah, the various changes which this feature
has undergone can be explained on the one hand by the absence of terra
firma and on the other by the fact that it has been formed by accretion,
that is to say, "a process of agglomeration of inorganic elements, solid or
liquid" (Dictionnaire Robert). Thus the question is whether it can be
assimilated to an island within the meaning of Article 121 of the 1982
Convention. The answer must be a negative one, for its geomorphologi-
cal characteristics place it in a category not provided for in the Montego
Bay Convention.
200. The assimilation of islands to land territory is moreover expli-
cable purely in terms of geomorphological considerations: in both cases,
by contrast with atolls and cays, the stable underlying element is terra
firma; thus they have a physically durable base which ensures their per-
'' Reports of Cu.sesurgurtl utid dt~fctlthe High Court of'Adrnirulty cornrnencing
icirlthe JudgnrcrrO/'Slr Williu~nScort. Michurlmus TL'T?798, ed. Chr. Robinson,
1799-1808, VolV. 1806. pp. 337-385.
173manence. In the case of Qit'at Jaradah, how otherwise to explain the
ease with which the upper surface could be removed and subsequently
restored? In law, thiç assimilation must be understood in cor~junction
with the notion of effectiveness of sovereignty; sovereignty, in interna-
tional law, implies a minimum stable terrestrial base, which is not to be
found in maritime feaitures above the waterline which are not islands.
In support of this difference in treatment as between an island and
other maritime features which appear above the waterline at high tide, we
may cite official marine charts. These documents, because of the need to
meet the safety requirements of marine navigation, offer the best descrip-
tions and evidence of the location and status of features situated within
maritime waters.
201. Finally, what makes the Court's solution for Qit'at Jaradah even
more debatable is the fact that not only did it treat it as an island, but it
then awarded it to Bahrain, whereas the precise calculations of distance
carried out by the Court-appointed hydrographer indicate that it is closer
to Qatar than to Bahrain.
(d) Tlzc Course of the Final Dclimitatinn LNZC
202. It is regrettable that a single vote was taken on the course of the
delimitation line. There was no need for such a restriction, either legally
or technically.
203. In terms of law, the Parties indicated, with arguments in support
of their positions, thait the area for delimitation consisted of two sectors:
a northern sector and a southern sector. The similarity in their positions
did not imply that they were in agreement on the CO-ordinates of the
point of separation csf the two sectors. This lack of agreement should
have led the Court to determine those co-ordinates in light of the circum-
stances of the case. and in particular of the technical data.
204. Technically. .the point of separation of the delimitation line is
simple to determine. First, the geometrical reference figure is the provi-
sional equidistance line (Sketch-map No. 2). The Court's uncertainty as
to whether Fasht al Azm was part of the Bahraini island of Sitrah
resulted in the construction of two theoretical median lines, whose ends
run northward from the point where Fasht al Azm ceases to have effect.
In the southern sector, the junction point is located in the area of Qit'at
el Erge. Src.ond this southern junction of the two theoretical lines is the
most northerly point where Rabad al Gharbiyah has effects upon the
equidistance line. Hence, technically, this latter point represents the point
of separation between the two sectors of the delimitation lines.
205. In terms of the delimitation, if the northern sector had been
defined in this way we would have voted in favour. Overall, the delimita- DELIMITPLTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 211
tion line laid down in the Judgment mitigates the inequity of the final
solution, in particular by the lack of effect accorded to Qit'at Jaradah.
Some adjustments coiild, however, have slightly improved the solution.
In effect- and this is very much a subsidiary point - the geographi-
cal location of Qit'at Jaradah in relation to the Parties' respective main-
lands is instructive. PLswe have just pointed out above, this feature is
situated, according to the hydrographie calculations, 17.1 13 km from the
Qatar peninsula and 21.698 km from the main island of Bahrain. If Fasht
al Azm were attachecl to the island of Sitrah, the distance would have
been 11.605 km, but on this point the Court refrained from making any
judicial ruling that would have enabled this fact to be taken into account.
Thus the maritime delimitation was affected by the excessive influence
accorded to Qit'at Jaradah by the ruling on the maritime delimitation,
which was thus distorted in an inequitable manner.
This anomaly is aggravated by the fact that Qit'at Jaradah is accorded
an effect of 500 m, eviin though the Court had decided not to give it any
effect at al1and to draw the delimitation line at a strict tangent to Qit'at
Jaradah. This has distorting consequences for the northern part of the
line.
The position is further aggravated by the fact that the Court has estab-
lished a single maritime boundary on the basis of two contradictory
maps, an American one for the southern sector and a British one for
the northern sector. This duality in the Court's approach is somewhat
puzzling, since it would have been more normal for it to rely on a single
map for the entire colurse of the line and to choose the most recent one,
providing the most up-to-date data. This was the British map, prepared
in 1994 by the Admii-alty of the country that had for many years been
the protecting power in the region and was thus quite well informed of
the true situation. This British bathymetric chart clearly demonstrates
the geographical continuity between the Hawars and Qatar, which form
a single entity and together constitute the Qatari peninsula. But in
choosing to rely rather on the American map for this southern sector
of the single boundary, the Court was able to represent the low-water
line in that southern sector in an arbitrary manner only, thus raising
fears as to the legibility of the decision and above al1creating ~ireul risk
of trn~pututiorzof the territor}' od'Qutur.proper.. Thus the choice of the
less suitable map for the southern sector leaves serious doubts, not only
as to the fairness, but also as to the simple accuracy. of the line
obtained. Havine Lailed to choose the British man it would have been
better if the Judgment had not assumed responsibility for errors in
the course of the lin12and had instead invited the Parties to nezotiatL
that course on the basis of indications [rom the Court.
For al1of the reasons set out above. we regret that we cannot accept
responsibility for any amputation of Qatar's territory. I>ELIMIT.4TION AND QI'ESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 212
206. In this particularly sensitive case, where public opinion is easily
roused, it would have been open to the Court to render its Judgment
more readily acceptable if it had taken the initiative of more or less
directly encouraging the two Parties to envisage the possibilitj~of'n~utuul
Jinunciul c.ompensutic.~nT . he Court's judicial function is not basically
incompatible with a certain capacity to make suggestions, or even indi-
cate guidelines, to the parties. Juridical technique has more resources in
this regard than might be imagined. On the opening day of the hearings,
Professor Salmon made it clear that the return of the Hawars to Qatar
would necessarily be accompanied by the compensation of any interests
affected by such decision. We are thinking rather of an additional possi-
bility, which would lhave been open to the Court thanks to a certain
effort of the imagination from which it should not have debarred itself,
particularly in a case so sensitive for both Parties.
207. We were prornpted in this direction by two factors: the first was
Bahrain's reference to its relative poverty; the second is the precedent
constituted by a delimitation agreement between Saudi Arabia and,
precisely, Bahrain. While the former is of no legal relevance whatever,
as the entire body of international jurisprudence has consistently demon-
strated, the latter, by contrast, may be taken as a good example to
be recommended by the Court and followed by the Parties. If the pre-
cedent of the Saudi-Bahraini agreement, provided by two Gulf States,
one of which is party to the present proceedings, had been so suggested.
it would have allovied the Court to take account indirectly of the
otherwise inadmissible arguments concerning the relative poverty of
Bahrain.
208. What happened was the following. In the course of negotiations
with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain invoked its economic difficulties; whereupon
the Saudis proposed ithat Bahrain should recognize their sovereignty over
a disputed island, in return for which the two parties would share the
area's resources.
209. The delimitation agreement of 22 February 1958 (which entered
into force four days later following the exchange of instruments of rati-
fication on 26 Febriiary 1958) includes an interesting Article 2. which
reads as follows:
"ln view of the desire of His Highness the Ruler of Bahrain and
the consent of His Majesty the King of Saoudi Arabia, the oil
resources in the: area mentioned and delimited above in the part
belonging to the Kingdom of Saoudi Arabia shall be developed in
the manner which His Majesty may choose, on condition that licl
giixcs tlzc'Governnicwt of'Bulirui~zIzulf'qf'tliut ulhic/ipert~iins to tlie
S~iurliArrrhicrnC;oi.~~rnnlcotj'tlic.net inconle ~lc>rifon1 tlzisdevel-
opmrtzt. It is understood that this sliull not impair [lie right qf'.soi,- I>ELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 213
ereignty and ud/?iinistrution of the Saudi Arabia Government in the
above mentionecl area." 7x
210. We would point out in passing that this agreement was not nego-
tiated by the United Icingdom, the protecting State, in the name of Bah-
rain, its protected State, but by Bahrain itself, which on this occasion
exercised, in 1958, its own,jus tr.acta~uun~.
It should be noted in the second place that the lir-iedrawn apparently
refrained from taking any account of the attribution of the Hawars to
Bahrain. It did not resolve the issue. Point No. 1 of the median line
drawn is the equidistance point between a point A (corresponding to
the southernmost point of the island of Bahrain at Ra's-al-Barr) and a
point B on the Saucli Coast at Ra's-abu-Maharrah. Thus Bahrain did
not have the Hawars brought into the equation.
Thirdly and lastly, it should be noted that certain islands and low-tide
elevations were not taken into account at al1in the delimitation.
211. To return to our suggestion, we feel that this 61-year-old dispute
would be finally given its quietus if the legal position were restored, with
the Hawars being retilrned to Qatar, subject to an obligation to share not
only "oil resources" (as in the 1958 agreement with Saudi Arabia), but
also al1 other resources (natural gas, tourism and fisheries) which those
territories might provide. For, if the latter do not contain oil, as would
appear to be the case, the agreement embodying Our suggestion would
lose its entire point if it were restricted to"oilresources".
212. Finally, it shc~uldbe emphasized that the Saudi-Bahraini example
of 1958does not represent an isolated case. Such arrangements are more
frequent than one might think. We would point out in particular that, at
the Summit of the Oirganization for African Unity (OAU) held in Rabat
(Morocco) in June 1972, Algeria and Morocco signed two agreements,
one drawing the froritier between the two countries, keeping the region
known as Ghara-Djebilet under Algerian sovereignty, and the other
granting to Morocco one half of the region's mineral resources (in par-
ticular. high-content iron ore). The African Heads of State present at this
Rabat Suinmit were witnesses to that agreement.
XI. FINALCONCLUSION
213. To conclude this opinion, a dissenting one to Our regret, we
believe that the Court was correct in refusing to apply the principle of uti
7hEmphiisis added. See United Stateof Americ;~.Department of State. Bure;iii of
Intelligence and ResearcIritc~rtr(rrirolrnt/rrrySrlrl/j., Srrivs A. Lit~iitsiil rli<,Sï(rs.
Cotltit~~~trtrIli<~lf'Botr~t.rhr.t~itrlAtrliuhNo. 12, Miirch 1970.possidetis juris to the present case. We are in full agreement with the
Court's analysis in this regard. And yet, as representatives of the various
legal systems of the continent of Africa, we are committed to that prin-
ciple and have never lost sight of its importance for the post-colonial
phase of State development in Africa under conditions of stability and
peace.
214. However, Our agreement with the Court's analysis ruling against
the application of the principle to the present case is inspired by a variety
of reasons. First, the "special relationship of protection" between the
United Kingdom and the two States parties to the present dispute gave
rise to a flexible division, evolving over time, of responsibilities between
the protecting Power and the protected State, as a result of which the
State retained its personality; this wasnot the case for most countries in
Africa. There could be no question of applying the principle of uti pos-
sidetis juris, since no new subject of international 1awhad been created;
that is to say, there was no State succession in the present case.
215. Second in our view, simple reasons of legal ethics required the
rejection of uti possidetis jlrris as a relevant title. No one can be unaware
of the real motives underlying the legal contrivance which was the British
decision of 1939, directly inspired as it was by rival oil interests. The
authors of that decisicsntroubled themselves so little with legal coherence
that the only "principle" applied was: "oil dominates the land and the
scu". We could not tt-iereforefind a legal pretext for ratifyirig such a deci-
sion without making Our own contribution to this kind of contrived,
deceptive legal edificr:which poorly conceals the interests clearly under-
lying it and is damaging to the rights of the peoples concerned.
216. Finally, the principle of uti yossidefis juris is generally applied in
a "global" manner, in that it confines itself to "photographing" the
boundary situation between two newly independent States and conferring
on that situation the status of inviolability. There is not necessarily any
requirement to undertake a detailed examination of the various colonial
texts which contribut~~d,individually, to the creation of that boundary. In
the present case, by icontrast, it is the detail of a single text that we are
directly invited to examine.
217. It follows that, in the particular case of a decision like that of
1939, we were bouncl to undertake a critical examination of the validity
of that text, measured by the yardstick of modern methods of interpreta-
tion and on the basiij of the rules and principles of contemporary inter-
national law, in which colonial or protectorate law have no place.
(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.
(Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signed) Abdul G. KOROMA.Reproduit àpartir de la carte 2886 di: l'Amiraut0 Britirh Cron'nCopyright 1994. Reproduit avec l'autorisation du
Controllrr of.lier Maji~stySrationeiy Oflre et du bureuu h.vdrogruphiqurdu Royaume-Uni. (Cane mentionnée au
paragraphe 87 de l'opinion dissidente commune.)
Rrproducrdfrom Admiralty chart 2H.Y(Oi British CroivnCopyright 1994.Reproduced bypermis~ion ofthe Controllerof
Her Majeswi Stafione- Oflice and the UKHydrogruphicOflice. (Mup referred IO inparagraph 87 of thejoint
dissenfing opinion.)
OPINION DISSIDENTE COMMUNE DE MM. BEDJAOUI,
RANJEVA ET KOROMA
Ancienneté du différend - Sa récurrence - Dificu1ti.s particulières de
I'r~ffaire- Appel au'<P - arties pour transcender leursfrustrations par leur coo-
pération - Espoir que le règlement judiciaire pourra pleinement exercer sa
,fonction apaisante et pac13catrice - Règlement judiciaire et opinion publique
- Conditions de l'acceptabilitésociale des décisions judiciaires - Moyens de
droit ailancéspar les Parties - Choix d'un seul moyen de droit par la Cour -
Choix douteus et périlleus.
La décisionbritannique du Il juillet 1939 - Sa i~aleurjuridique douteuse -
E.uarnenpar la Cour de lu validitéformelle de la décisionbritannique &l'exclu-
sion de sa validitésubstantielle - Risque d'unprononcéinfra petita - Examen
lacunaire par la Cour de lu validitéformelle - Vice du consentement - Déci-
sion britannique viciée parl'existence d'un ci01 - Conte.ute historique et cir-
constances de la décision de1939 - Role des agents britanniques locaux -
Aventure du pétroleet lancement de l'e.~plorationoJf shore - La décision«pro-
visoire)) de 1936 - La décisiondéJnitive de 1939 - Une décision politique
n'ayant pas la q~lalitéd'unesentence arbitrale et doiorld cépourvue del'autoritéde
la chose jugée - Une décision sans caractére obligatoire - Nécessité du
consentement à laprocédure de1939 - Nécessitéd'un consentenlent e.uplicite,
éclairéet libre, comme dans toute question territoriale - Consentenlent à la
procédure et consentement à la décisionau fond - Absence de consentenlent
e'cplicite.éclairéet libre de Qatar - Elémentscon.rtitutifs d'un do1 - La déci-
sion de 1939 impropre a servir de titre juridique valide pour une dévolution des
îlesHawar à Bahrein.
Conséquencesde l'abstention de la Cour d'examiner la validitésubstantielle
de la décision de 1939 - Abstention de la Cour d'aller au bout de sa logique et
de débouchersur une solution a minima de partage des îles Haii'arpar la prise
en compte des effectivités de Bahreïn - La solution a minima imposéepar la
logique du choix de la Cour, mais non retenue par celle-ci - La ((formule
buhreïniteo - Sa signijication et son interprétation eu égard à sa cohérence
inferne - Incompatibilité entre laformule buhreïnite et l'application de I'uti
possidetis juris au dfférend - Réintroduction de l'e-camende la question des
effectivités, évitépar I'arrst, mais inévitabletnent resurgidufait mêmedu choi'c
du moyen de droit tiré de l'existence de la décision de 1939 - Le rapport
Weightman à la base de la décisionbritannique - JustiJication par Weightman
de la dévolution de Jazirat Ha~varpar les efjèctivités de Bahrein - Absence
d'effectivités dans les autres îles de Hu,t,ar - Justijcation par Weightman de
l'attribution de ces îles sur la base d'une ((présomption»d'effectivité - Contra-
diction interne du rapport Weightman - Existence d'un ((double standard))
dans l'application du principe deproximité - Jugement ultra petita sur la base
d'effectivités limitées à la grande île des Ha~varet totalement absentes dans les
autres îles et îlots.
Hésitationspostérieuresdu Royaume-Uni - Acceptation dans les annéesmil
neuf cent soivante d'un rée.uamende la décision de 1939 par une autorité JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BEDJAOUI,
RANJEVA AND KOROMA
(Translation]
Long-standing dispute - Recurrence - Purticular difJiculties of case -
Appeal to Parties to transcend theirfrustrations through co-operation - Hope
that judicial settlement ivill be capable offully perfbrming its calming, peace-
rnakingfuncrion - Jitdicial settlen~ent and public opinion - Conditions for
social acceptahilitj, of'judicial decisiotls - Grounds relied on by Parties -
Court's choice of single ground- Questionable and hazardous.
British decision of II July 1939 -- Of questionable legal value - Court's
exanzination offormal validity of British decision to exclusion of substantive
validity - Risk ofruling infra petita - Court's exanlination offorma1 vulidit).
incomplete - Vitiation of consent - British decision vitiated byfraud - His-
torical context and circumstances of 1939 decision - Role of local British rep-
resentatives - Rushfor oil und advent ofojfshore e'rploration - "Provisional"
decision of 1936 - Finaldecision of 1939 - Political decisionnot huving status
of arbitral aivard and thus lacking,force of resjudicata - Decision no/ binding
- ~Veedfor consent to 1939 proceedings - Consent must be expressed,
inforrnedandfreely given, as ivith any territorial issue - Consent to proceed-
ingsand consent to substantive decision -- Qatar'sconsent not express, inforrned
andfreely given - Elements estahlishingfraud - 1939 decision could no/ prop-
erly serve as valid title for airard of the Hawars to Bahrain.
Consequencesof Court'sfailure to examine substantive validity of 1939 deci-
sion - Court's failure to proceed to logical conclusion: a minima solution
involving sharing of Hawar Islands on basis of Bahrain's effectivités - A
minima solution the logical consequence of Court's chosen approach, yet not
adopted - "Bahrainiformula" - Meaning and interpretution in light of inter-
na1coherence - Incompatibility betiveen Balzrainiformula and application to
dispute of uti possidetis juris - Reintroduction of effectivitésissue, avoided by
Judgment, but inevitably resurfacing a5 result of sole reliance on 1939 decision
- Weightmarzreport underlying British decision - Ausard oj'Jazirat Habvar
justijïed by Weightman by reference to Bahrain's effectivités - Absence of
effectivités in other Ifait9ar Islands -- Aivard of those islands just$ed by
Weightman on hasis of "presumption" of effectivité - Weightman report's
interna1contradictions - Double standard in application ofproximity principle
- Judgment ultra petita because effectivitéslimited to main Haivar island and
rorally absent in other islands and islets.
United Kingdom's subsequent doubts - Acceptance in 1960s of re-examina-
tion of 1939 decision !>y"neurral" authority - Qatar'spersistent protests and 146 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
«neutre» - Protestations persistantes et refus d'acquiescement de Qatar à la
décision de1939 et aux actes d'occupation con.sécutifs - La conduite de non-
renonciation de Qatar comme susceptible d'empêcherlaformation d'un titre au
projît de Bahreïn sur les Hawar - Question de lu manfistation d'un exercice
d'autoritésouveraine sur les îles - Fragilitédes effectivités - Non-respect du
statu quo territorial pendant lapériode de1936-1939 de préparationde la déci-
sion britannique - Non-respect du statu quo au cours de la médiation saou-
dienne ù compter de 1983 et depuis l'introduction de l'affaire devant la Cour
internationale de Justice en 1991.
Recherche du titre historique sur les Hawar - Place des faits hist0rique.s
dans la dynamique des controverses juridiques territoriales - La rencontre
entre l'histoire et le droit - Le devoir dujuge - Caractèrepurement descriptif
et factuel de 1'e.xposédu contexte historiquejigurant dans l'arrêt sansapplica-
tion des principes et règles juridiques qui encadrent les faits historiques -
Absence dans l'arrêtdes conséquences juridiques susceptiblesd'êtretirées des
faits hi.storique.s - Critèresjuridiques d'appréciatioildesfaits historiques -
Recherche par la Cour du titre historique pour Zubarah, mais abstention de le
faire pour les îles Hawar pour lesquelles cette recherche s'imposait davantage.
La présence britannique dans le Colfi. et ses conséquences juridiques aux
XIXe et XX" sikcles - Ses caract4ristique.s - La création dedeux entitésdis-
tinctes l'une de l'autre, Bahreïn et Qatur, dans le dernier tiers du XIXe siècle -
Formation progre.ssive et consolidation du titre historique des Al-Thani sur la
presqu'île de Qatar.
La présenceottomane à Qatar apartir de 1871 et ses conséquencesjuridiques
jusqu'au retrait turc en 1914 - Le comportement du Royaume-Uni - La
conduite de Bahreïn et son silence d'acquiescement - La conduite des cheikhs
de Qatar et le développement de leur autorité sur toute lu presqu'île - Les
conséquencesjuridiques des conventions anglo-ottomanes de 1913 et 1914 -
Les traités anglo-saoudiensde 1915 et de 1927 - Les conséquences juridiques
de l'accord anglo-qatari de 1916.
La rencontre entre la géographieet le droit - Le devoir dujuge - La proxi-
mitégéographique - L'établissement d'uneforte présomptionjuridique d'appar-
tenance à I'Etat côtier de toutes les îles situées dansses eaux territoriales - La
notion juridique de («distance» - Lu question de l'intégrité territorialede
I'Etat.
Le dossier cartographique - Placc,relative du matériau cartographique dans
l'administration de la preuve - Les cartes comme reflet de l'étatde l'opinion
publique généraleet de la réputation - Les cartes britanniques du Wur Ofjce
et leur crédibilitétoute particulière - Lu conjîrmation du titre de Qatar sur les
Hawar par l'universalité dans l'espace etla diversitédans le temps des cartes
produites - Le silence de l'arrêtsur le dossier cartographique.
Documents historiques sur la consistance territoriale de Bahreïn et de Qatur
- Les assiettes territoriales respectives u la lumière des documents historiques
- Appartenunce des Habvar à Qatar.
Délimitation maritime - Décisioninfra petita - cFormule bahreïnite)) et
ligne maritime unique - Portéede l'énumération des zonesmaritimes à délimi-
ter - Absence de test de cohérencedu résultat dutracé - Ligne multifonction-
nelle et exercice des droits - Méthode de construction de la ligne médiane
provisoire - Lignes de base et points de buse - Dédoublement fonctionnel et
évolution dudroit - Rejet par lajurisprudence du dédoublement,fonct -ionnel
Points et lignes équitables - Délimitationde la mer territorialeet identijcation
équitable des points de base - EJfets pervers sur le tracé dela ligne provisoirerefusal to acquiesce in 1939 decision and successive acts of occupation -
Qatar's attitude of non-renunciation preventingformation of Bahraini title over
Haivars - Issue of evidence ofexercise of sovereign authority over Islands -
Flimsiness of effectivités - Failure to respect territorial status quo during
period 1936-1939iohenBritish decision was inpreparation - Failure to respect
status quo during Sau~Iimediationfronl 1983 and since institution of proceed-
ings hefore International Court of Justice in 1991.
Search for historical title to the Hawars - Role of historical events in
dynarnics of legal disputes over territory - Interplay hetiveen lzistory and lait.
- Court'sduty - Purely descriptive arzdfactual nature of Judgment's account
ofhistorical context: failure to applj legal rules and principlesframing histori-
cal events - Judgn7entSfailure to dru11n 1ecessary legal con.~equencefsrom his-
toricalfacts - Legal criteriafor asses.singhistorical events - Court's investi-
gation of lzi.~toricaltitle to Zubarah, butfailure to do so,for Haivar Islands,for
which requirement iras greater.
British presence in Gulf' and its legal consequences during nineteenth and
tçi.entiethcenturies - Characteristics -- Creation of two distinct entities. Bah-
vainand Qatar, in last third of nineteenth century - Progressi~le formation and
consolidation of Al-Thanis' historical title to Qatar peninsula.
Ottoman presence in Qatarfrom 1871 and its legal consequencesuntil Turk-
ish i.vithdraiva1in 1914 - Attitude of United Kingdom - Bahrain's conduct:
silence reyecting acquiescence - Conduct of Sheiks of Qatar; extension of
authority over entire p<?ninsulu - Legai consequencesof Anglo-Ottoman agree-
ments of 1913 and 1914 - Anglo-Saudi treaties of 1915 and 1927 - Legal
con.requenr.esof Anglo-Qatari agreement of 1916.
Interplay of geogruphy and law - Court's duty - Geographicalproximity
- Strong legalpresumption of appurterzunceto coastal State of al1islandssitu-
ated ivithin its territorial waters - Legal concept of "distance" - Issue of
State's territorial integrity.
Map evidence - Ei~identiaryvalue -- Maps as reflection of general public
opinion and repufe - British War Office maps: their purticular credibility -
Qatar's title to Haiijar.~conjirmed hy &vide geographical and temporal spread qf
nlaps produced - Judqment's silence onmap evidence.
Historical documents on territorial composition of Bahrain and Qatar -
Respective territorial ca.ytentsin light of historicul documents - Appurtenance
of the Haiz?arsto Qatar.
Maritime delimitation - Decision infra petita - "Bahrainiformula" and
single maritime boundary - SigniJïcanceof enumeration of maritime areas to
be delimited - Failure to apply coherence test to course of line - Multifunc-
tional line and exercise of rights - Method of construction of provisional
median line - Baselines und hase points - Duality offunctions and develop-
ment of laiv - Rejection hy case laiv~fduulity offunctions - Equitahle points
and lines - Delin?itationof territorial sea and equitahle identiJïcationof base
points - Distorting eff~~c.to sn coursr uf provi.sionu1line - Enclai~ementof147 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
- Enclavement des îles Ha~lar - Droit de passage inoffensif dans la mer ter-
ritoriale de Bahreïn - Régimede servitude internationale - Incompétencede
la Cour pour définirce régimede servitude internationale - Obligation des
Parties de conclureun accord deservitude internationale - Qualijîcationjuri-
dique de Qit'at Jaradah - Notion et critéred'uneîle - Evolution historique -
Etendue «naturelle» de terre: terreferme - Ligne unique de délimitation -
Existence de deux secteurs - Point de séparation - Aménagementdu secteur
nord - Effet escessif donné à Qit'utJuradah.
Une suggestion corzclusive - Précédents - Accord trrritoriul saoudo-
bahreïnite: divisibilité,souveraineté etressources - Accords algéro-marocains.
Conclusion générale - Attachement des juges africains de la Cour au prin-
cipe de l'uti possidetisjuris - Absence de successiond'Etats - Artijïces juri-
diques de la décisionbritannique de 1939 - «Le pétroledomine la terre et la
mer» - Ethiquejudiciaire - La décisionbritannique de 1939 vue à travers les
méthodesmodernes d'interprétationet mesurée ù l'aune de nornles contempo-
raines du droit international.
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Paragraphes
1. INTRODUCTION 1-15
II. LA DÉCISION BRITANNIQUE DU 11 JUILLET 1939 16-47
III. UNE SOLUTION (<A M1,VIMA)) 48-64
IV. EFFECTIVIT ETSREFUS D'ACQUIESCEMENT 65-85
a) L'arrivéedes Ottomans dans le Golfe en 1871
i) La conduite de la Grande-Bretagne d'abord
ii) La conduite de Bahreïn durant la période d'installation
ottomane a Qatar: le silence d'acquiescement de
Bahreïn
iii) La conduite des cheikhs de Qatar et le développement
de leur autorité sur toute la presqu'île
b) La convention du 29 juillet 1913 relative au Golfe et aux
territoires adjacents
i) L'article II tout d'abord
ii) L'article 13de la convention
c) La convention anglo-ottomane de 1914
d) Les traitésanglo-saoudiens de 1915et 1927
e) L'accord anglo-qatari de 1916
i) Par les qualitésrespectives des cocontractants
ii) Par la nature et l'étenduede la ~rotection
iii) Par l'assiette territoriale concerke
VI. PROXIMIT ET INTÉGRITE TERRITORIALE 137-143
VII. LE DOSSIER CARTOGRAPHIQUE 144-148 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 147
Haii,ar Islands - Right of innocent pussage through Bahrain's territorial sea -
Régimeof international eusement - Court's lack of competence to dejne that
régime - Obligation of Parties to conclude agreement for international ease-
rnent - Legul characterizution of Qit'at Jaradah - Islands: dejnition and cri-
teria - Historical developrnent - "Natural" area of land: terra ferma -
Single line of'deliniitatio- Eicistence cft~c'osectors- Point of separation -
Adjustment qf rzortliern.secio- E-~cessiverffect accorded to Qit'at Jaradah.
Suggested solution -- Prrcedents - Saudi-Bahraini territorial agrc1en7ent:
dii~isibilitg:sovereignty and resources -- i2lgeria-Morocco agreenzents.
Ceneru1 conclusion -- iittaclzment of'Court's African judges to principle of
uti possidetis juris - ,'VuSrate .succession - British decision of 1939: legal
art$ce - "Oil donlinutes Iund and seau - Judicial ethics- British decision of
1939 to he mc~asuredhj~yardstick of'n7odern nzethods of interpretation and irz
ligllt of conten7porary nornzs of'internationul lait,.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs
1. INTRODUCTION 1-15
II. THEBRITISH DECISIO NF 11JULY1939 16-47
65-85
IV. EFFECTIVITE AS D REFUSA LO ACQUIESCE
V. THEHISTORICA TITLE 86-136
(a) The arriva1 of the Ottomans in the Gulf in 1871 113-123
(i) First, the conduct of Great Britain 114-117
(ii) The conduct of Bahrain during the period ofOttoman
establishment in Qatar: Bahrain's tacit acquiescence 118-120
(iii) The conduct of the Sheikhs of Qatar and the spread
of their authority to the entire peninsula
(h) The Convention of 29 July 1913 respecting the Persian
Gulf and Adjacent Territories
(i) First, Article11
(ii) Article 13 of the Convention
(c) The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914
(d) The Anglo-Saudi Treaties of 1915and 1927
(e) The Anglo-Qatari agreement of 1916
(i) The respective capacities of the contracting parties
(ii) The nature and extent of the protection
(iii) The territorial area involved
VI. PROXIMIT AND TIZRRITORIIA NLTEGRITY 137-143
VII. THEMAPEVIDENCE 144-148148 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP..DISS.COMMUNE)
VIII. DOCUMENT HISTORIQUES SUR LA CONSISTANCE TERRITORIALE
BAHRE~ NT DEQATAR
a) L'assiette territoriale de Bahreïn
i) La description de Lorimer
ii) La description de J. T. Bent
iii) Trois mémorandums confidentiels britanniques
iv) Trois rapports militaires britanniques
v) Nombreux autres documents officielsanglais
h) L'assiette territoriale de Qatar: coïncidence progressive
avec l'assise territoriale de la péninsule, îles adjacentes
comprises 158-161
IX. LA DÉLIMITATION MARITIME 163-205
a) L'arrêt statueinfr aetitaeu égardà la formule bahreïnite
appliquéeau tracéde la ligne maritime unique 164-180
b) La méthode de construction de la ligne médiane provisoire81-193
c) La qualificationjuridique de Qit'at Jaradah
d) Le tracéde la ligne finale de délimitation
XI. CONCLUSIO FNALE 213-217VIII. HISTORICADLOCUMENT CONCERNING THE TERRITORIA EXTENT
OF BAHRAI NND QATAR
(a) The territorial extent of Bahrain
(i) Lorimer's description
(ii) J. T. Bent's description
(iii) Three confidential British memoranda
(iv) Three British military reports
(v)Numerous other official British documents
(b) The territorial extent of Qatar: its gradua1 identity with
the territorial area of the peninsula, including the adjacent
islands
IX. THEMARITIM DELIMITATION
(a) The Judgment rules infra petita in terms of the Bahraini
formula as applied to the course of the single median
line
(h) The method adopted in order to draw the provisional
median line
(c) Legal characterization of Qit'at Jaradah
(d) The course of the final delimitation line
XI. FINALCONCLUSION 1. Cette affaire divise depuis trop longtemps Qatar et Bahreïn. Voici
plus de soixante ans que Qatar proteste sans relâche contre la décision
britannique de 1939 attribuant les îles Hawar à Bahreïn. Voici plus de
trente ans que des tentatives d'arbitrage infructueuses se rappellent à
notre souvenir. Voici plus d'une vingtaine d'années que la médiation
saoudienne avait commencéentre lesdeux pays avant de s'acheversur un
désolant échec. Les décenniesne se comptent plus qui connurent des
phases de négociationsdirectes, toujours avortées,entre les deux Etats.
Enfin voicidix longues annéesque l'affaire, émailléd e'incidents de toute
nature, a étéofficiellement portée devant notre Cour.
2. Dans cesconditions, on serait sans doute plus que légitimà espérer
que cette affaire connaîtra, avec l'arrêtrendu aujourd'hui par laCour, un
dénouementdéfinitifet heureux. Mais tous les ingrédientsdu succèsont-
ils été soigneusement.recherchéset réunisdans cet arrêt?A cet égard,
notre espoir s'embrume lorsque nous nous référonsau traitement de la
question des îles Hawar ainsi que de celle du tracé dela ligne unique de
délimitation maritimequi nous a paru avoir étéobtenu par une méthode
assez inéditerompant avec les habitudes les mieux établies.En effet le
tracéprovisoire de la ligne d'équidistancea étéeffectué entenant déjà
préalablementcompte de certaines circonstances spécialesdont certaines
sont d'ailleurs insignifiantes, comme Umm Jalid, formation maritime de
quelques dizaines de mètres, émergée à hauteur de 30 centimètres. La
règlefondamentale, «la terre domine la mer», n'a pas étérespectéedans
le tracéde la ligne provisoire dèslors que l'arrêta écartéla méthodede
calcul de masse terrestre à masse terrestre. Et c'est tout cela qui nous
pousse à rédigerla présenteopinion.
3. Dans un procès,les parties doivent avoir la sagessed'apprécieravec
un réalisme sereinleurs gains et leurs pertes respectifs, parfois inévitables
dans un règlement judiciaire. L'arrêtd'aujourd'hui est ce qu'ilest. Mais il
est là. Notre vŒuest que les Parties parviennentà tirer de cette situation,
mais surtout des inépuisablesressources que leur offre leur géniecom-
mun, la volontéde reprendre avec confiance les chemins de la concerta-
tion et de rétablir entre elles des relations mutuellement fructueuses,à
travers un dialogue transcendant leurs difficultésou leurs frustrations.
4. La question des îles Hawar est d'une sensibilitéextrêmetant pour
Bahreïn que pour Qatar. Elle est assortie d'une charge émotionnelle et
d'une densitéaffective exceptionnelles dans l'esprit des populations des
deux Etats.
5. Pour Bahreïn, perdre les Hawar c'est une capitis diminutio réelle-
ment aliénante, et aliénanteà l'extrême,car c'est une grosse partie d'un
petitpays qui s'en irait. C'est aussila perte d'un vestige de la splendeur DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 149
1. This case has divided Qatar and Bahrain for too long. For over 60
years now Qatar has ceaselesslyprotested at the British decision of 1939
attributing the Hawar Islands to Bahrain. We can look back on fruitless
attempts at arbitration over more than 30 years. The Saudi mediation
between the two countries, which was to end in disappointing failure,
began more than 20 years ago. For countless decades there have been
phases of direct, invariably abortive negotiations between the two States.
And finally, for ten long years, punctuated with a whole variety of inci-
dents, the case has officially been before this Court.
2. We would accordingly be more tlian justified in hoping that, with
the Judgment delivered by the Court today, this case will be satisfactorily
settled once and for all. Yet has this Judgment carefully identified and
met al1the requisite criteria for success? In this respect, Ourhope becomes
clouded when we consider the treatment accorded to the question of the
Hawar Islands and to that of the drawing of the singlemaritime delimita-
tion line, which has, in our view, been arrived at by a somewhat novel
method that breaks with the most soundly established practices. Thus,
the provisional course of the equidistance line was determined by taking
prior account of certain special circumstances, some of which are in fact
insignificant,such as Umm Jalid, a maritime feature a few dozen metres
long, projecting 30 centimetres out of the water. The fundamental rule
that "the land douriinntesthe sea" was not respected in drawing the pro-
visional line, the Judgment having opted not to apply the mainland-to-
mainland method. It is al1 of this that has prompted us to write this
opinion.
3. The parties involved in a lawsuit must have the good sense to assess,
calmly and realistically, their respective gains and losses - which are
sometimes unavoidable in a judicial settlement. Today's Judgment is
what it is. But it stands. It is our hope that the Parties will manage to
draw from this situation - but above al1 from the infinite resources
offered by their common genius - the will to set off again with confi-
dence along the road of co-operation and to restore mutually beneficial
relations through a dialogue that will transcend their difficulties or frus-
trations.
4. The question of the Hawar Islands is a highly sensitive one for both
Bahrain and Qatar. It is a subject that carries an exceptional emotional
charge for the people of the two States and one about which they feel
exceptionally strongly.
5. For Bahrain, losing the Hawar Islands would be a truly alienating-
cupitis diminutio - indeed alienating in the extreme, because a largepart
of a smafl country would be amputated. It would also involve the loss of 150
DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS . OMMUNE)
passée,un reste des temps déjàlointains ou Bahreïn régnaitsur presque
tout le Golfe et en tout cas sur la presqu'île qatarie elle-même.Pour
Bahreïn, Hawar représente un mythe politique fondateur, comme
il en existe dans beaucoup de pays. Dans le conflit séculaire franco-
germanique, aujourd'hui heureusement éteint, la question de l'Alsace-
Lorraine, entre autres conflits hautement inflammables, était comme un
silex qui faisait chaque fois jaillir l'étincellede la guerre.ar c'est un
peu I'«Alsace-Lorraine» de Bahrein.
6. Pour Qatar, la perte ou la non-récupérationdes Hawar, par laforce
du droit, devant une Cour pour la compétencede laquelle Qatar rompit
que de lances, créerait unedéceptiondont l'intensité seraitproportion-
nelle à l'attente confiante dans lajustice internationale. Chaque Qatari, a
la fin de chaque journée, depuis soixante et un ans, voit les vagues du
reflux quotidien de la mer emporter chaque fois ses illusions perdues.
Lorsque la mer se retire. chaque jour, chaque Qatari peut franchir à pied
sec ces quelques centaines de métres, et à certains endroits moins, qui le
séparent des Hawar ...
7. Alors quoi d'étonnant si la psychologie des foules, tant à Bahreïn
qu'à Qatar, est pétrie avecce levain aigre? C'estdire que la fonction apai-
sante et pacificatrice du règlement judiciaire doit remplir plus impérati-
vement que jamais son plein officedans une affaire comme celle-ci,dans
laquelle les deux Parties craignent une frustration que chacune d'elles
estime injuste d'avoir àsubir par l'effetd'un arrêt quiviendrait à lui enle-
ver les Hawar.
8. Tâche ardue et quasi impossible pour la Cour que de satisfaire dans
ces conditions les deux Parties a la fois, alors qu'il faut juger strictement
en droit et se garder impérativementde tout jugement ex aequo ex bono!
Mais il est clair que la persistance dans le temps de ce différendaigu
imposait de toutes façons à la Cour un surcroît de devoir. Nous voulons
entendre par là que, en disant le droit, en tranchant exclusivement en
conformité au droit international, la Cour se devait toutefois de recher-
cher, parmi de possibles solutions, celle qui pouvait paraître la plus apai-
sante, celle qui était susceptible de provoquer le moins d'insatisfaction
d'un côté comme del'autre.
9. Dans son opinion dissidente en l'affaire du Sud-Ouest africain, le
juge américain PhilipJessup a pu écrireque le droit international ne doit
pas être traité commeun recueil désuetde lettres mortes, remontant a une
période lointaine de l'histoire du monde et que (<le«standard» à appli-
quer par la Cour doit tenir compte des vues er des attitudes de la com-
munauté internutionuie contemporaine» '.
' C.I.J. Rrcué1966,p.441;les italiques sonttious
114 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.)
150
a vestige of bygone splendour, a remnant of the now-distant era when
Bahrain held sway over virtually the entire Gulf, and indeed over the
Qatar peninsula itself. For Bahrain, Hawar represents a fundamental
political myth, like those existing in many countries. In the age-old con-
flict between France and Germany, now fortunately laid to rest, the ques-
tion of Alsace-Lorraine, among other highly flammable flashpoints, was
like the flint that invariably sparked off a war. To some c.rtcnt, Hu~vuri.7
Buhuain's "Alsuce-Lorrrririe".
6. For Qutür, the loss of, or failure to recover, the Hawars through the
jOrcc of 1u)13b, efore a court for whose jurisdiction Qatar vigorously
fought, would give rise to a sense of disappointment as intense as its con-
fidence in international justice was great. At the end of every day for 61
years now, each and every Qatari sees his lost illusions swept away on the
waves of the daily ebb. Each day, when the tide goes out, every Qatari
can walk, without getting his feet wet, those few hundred metres - even
less in some places -- separating him from the Hawars . . .
7. Why then should anyone be surprised that the taste in the mouths
of the crowd, both in Bahrain and in Qatar, is a Sour one? It is more
essential than ever that judicial settlement fulfil to the utmost its calming,
peace-making function in a case such as this, where each Party fears
being unjustly despoiled by a Judgment depriving it of the Hawars.
8. Thus, for the Court to satisfy both Parties under the circumstances
is an arduous and well-nigh impossible task, and yet the decision must be
rendered strictly under the law and rigorous care must be taken to avoid
handing down any form of judgment cs aequo et bono! However, it is
clear that the fact that this bitter dispute has persisted for so long in any
case imposed an extra duty on the Court. What we mean by this is that in
ruling, in deciding solely in accordance with international law, the Court
was nevertheless duty-bound to seek out, from among the possible solu-
tions, that which appeared to be the most pacifying and likely to cause
the least dissatisfaction on either side.
9. The American judge Philip Jessup, in his dissenting opinion in the
South West Afiicu case, wrote that international law must not be regarded
as an antiquated compendium of dead letters, dating back to a long-gone
period in the history of the world: "the standard to be applied by the
Court rnust hc ono ii+iic.litukcs uccount of'the vieivs rrnduttitud~~sof the
contcnlporurj) intcrn~rtiotiuic.ot?lmunity" .
'I.C.J. Ri~port1966.p. 441: emphasis acided. 151 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
Deux auteurs, Garry Sturgess et Philip Chubb, ont par ailleurs
déclaré :
((Cette affaire a démontré[que] le droit n'est pasquelque chose qui
se situe hors de la réalité, a l'écartdu politique... L'affaire met en
lumière la ligne délicateque la Cour se doit de suivre. Elle essaie en
générad l'inclure dans sonjugement des prononcésqui rendent ses déci-
sions en purtie ciccc.ytuhl~lpsour lu purtic qui a perdu; elle ne recourt
jamais A la critique excessiveni à l'offense.La finesseconsiste à procé-
der de telle sorte que la décisionrendue fasse le rl1oi1l.1s71lossible au
perdant, dans le souci d'hiter (lut lu Courncj serende irl?popul(rirdca~ns
une partie quelconque de la communautéinternationale. »2
10. Ce serait erreur de penser un seul instant quetout cela est propre a
la juridiction internationale. Le mêmeproblème de rejet des décisions
judiciaires par l'opinion publique existe au sein de 1'Etatet prend parfois
des proportions préoccupantes allant de la grande émotion du peuple jus-
qu'Ades actes de violence. Qu'elle soit nationale ou internationale, la jus-
tice ne peut donc pas ne pas se préoccuper de se faire accepter, ii travers
des décisionsqui certes expriment l'étatdu droit, mais qui ne doivent pas
complètement négliger1'c;tatde l'opinion puhliqur. Un auteur a rappelé
que «les juges ne vivent pas dans l'isolement. Leurs opinions peuvent être
critiquées,et elles sont, et devraient être,influencéespar la réactionpopu-
laire. Ce processus se déroule souvent de manière subtiled.
11. A travers l'affaire du Sud-Oucst nfi.icui~l,on peut vérifierla jus-
tesse de la réflexionde Chaïm Perelman qui écrivait: (II est bien rare que
le raisonnement juridique puisse aboutir, comme ...les démonstrations
mathématiques, à une conclusion contraignante.)) Aussi bien se pose au
juge. interne ou international, avec une acuitéparticulière, le problème de
l'«ucc.c~ptuhilitis.ociale)) de sa décision".((De fait, ajoute Stéphane Rials,
en dépitde la majestéqui s'attache à ses décisions,lejuge ne peut pas se
passer de techniques qui rendront plus persuasive et plus légitimesa pro-
duction. ))S
12. A plus forte raison cela est-il vrai lorsqu'il s'agit du juge interna-
tional qui est trop dépendant, pour sa saisine et sa compétence, du
consentement des Etats. Dans l'affaire du Sur/-Ouest ufi.ic.ui17l,e juge
international avait par avance stérilisé laportée de la solution technique
qu'il avait avancée et qui ne pouvait apparaître au public que comme un
expédient dérisoiredès lors que la Cour avait déji consenti A sa compé-
' Garry Sturgess et Philip ChubbJlrt1,irigtlir Worltl Co-rrL(rii<trililPo1iNithe,
Worlil'.~Lruditlg Coirr1988, chap. 7. "The Courts in Collision". p. 713: les italiques
sont de nous.[ Tr(rtlu(,~ion(lu Grc.tfi,
Norman Redlich, «Judges as Instruments of Democracy», inTlir~Rolc~of tlic Colrrt.~
iil Soc.ic,Shimon Shetreet. 1988. çhap. 11. p. 149-15[Trtrthrc.tiot~th1Grc.fji,
Chaïm Perelinan. Lo,yiquc,jr(riclitllrl,.~io~(;t~ri(l1976. p. 7 et 9.
' Lcjs t,orrr.\rk, tl1950. p. 429 et 451. cité par Stéphane Rials« Les standards,
notions critiques duroit)). in Chaïm Perelm~inct Raymond Vander Elst. Lc., riotio~~.
cotitoiir vtrri(r,rrdroitravaux du Ceiitre national de recherches de logique. Bruxelles.
1984. p. 39-53. p. 46. Two authors, Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, have further stated
that :
"The case in question demoiistrated [that] law is not something
that is apart from reality, apart from politics . . . The case highlights
the delicate line the Court must tread. It generally attempts in its
judgment to include somestatements that make the decisions at least
purtly at.ceptuble to the losers; it is never highly critical or abusive.
The trick indeed, is to try to make the decision carry as little painfor
the /oser as possible, to tr),to uvoid muking the Court itselj'unpopu-
I(rrwith any part of the international Community."'
10. It would be wrrong to think for a single moment that al1 this is
peculiar to international fora. The same problem of rejection of judicial
decisions by public opinion exists within States and sometimes takes on
alarming proportions, ranging from displays of popular emotion to acts
of violence. Whether national or international, justice is therefore bound
to be concerned with ensuring that it is accepted, through decisions
which, while articulating the state of the law, must not completely ignore
the stute of'puhlic.opinion. One author has remarked that "Judges do not
live in isolation. Their opinions are subject to criticism, and they are, and
should be, influenced by popular reaction. The process often works in
subtle ways . . ."'
11. The Soutlz We.rtAjricu case provides confirmation of the view held
by Chaïm Perelman, who wrote: "It is indeed rare for legal reasoning to
be able to lead, like . . . the proof of a mathematical theorem, to a com-
pelling conclusion." Courts, whether domestic or international, are also
îaced, in a particularly acute manner, with the problem of the "sociul
ut~c~eptabilit~o ~f"their decisions? '711 fact", as Stéphane Rials added, "in
spite of the majesty which attaches to their decisions, courts cannot dis-
pense with techniques which will make their judgments more persuasive
and enhance their lepitirna~y"~.
12. This is true LI fortiori of the International Court, which is so
dependent, for the referral of cases to it and for its jurisdiction, on the
consent of States. In the So~rth Clfest Africrr case, the Court had in
advance robbed the technical solution put forward by it of any substance,
so that it could only appear to the public as a derisory expedient once the
Court had accepted jurisdiction and agreed that the Application was
Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, Jullgirig flic Worltl Cou-! Lirii tint1Politi<,sin tlrc
Fl.orltl's Lcutlir~g cour1988. Chap. 7. "The Courts in Collision", p. 213; emphasis
added.
'Norman Redlich, "J~~dgesas Instruments of Democracy". in TliczRolc of fliCourts
in So<,ic,ied. Shimon Slietreet. 1988,Chap. II. pp. 149-156.
Chüïm Perelman. Lo,qiclirt,jlrridicti.our.c,llc,rl~i.io.976,pp. 7 and 9.
'Lrs ('ollrs tic,tlro1050.pp. 429 and 451. quoted by StéphaneRials. "Les standards.
notions critiques du droit". in Chaïnl Perelman and Raymond Vander Elst, Lr.5notioii.(i
c~~rrr<~rtrritrhlrJriiroittravaux du Centre national de recherches de logiquc. Brussels.
1984.pp. 39-53, at p. 46. 152 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
tence et à la recevabilité de la requête. L'opinionet les expectatives du
«public» sont un élémentnon négligeable:cela constitue déjhce que cer-
tains auteurs appellent de 1'infi.u-droit".
13. Or, qu'a fuit lu Cour en Ir pr~;.ventce lspcke? Pour emporter sa
conviction, les Parties ont abondamment échangé leursarguments devant
elle sur des moyens de droit avancéspar I'une ou l'autre d'entre elles au
sujet de la question des Hawar et portant sur
u) l'existence d'un titre originaire;
6) la présence d'effectivités;
c) le principe juridique de proximité et l'intégritéterritoriale;
d) les preuves cartographiques;
e) le principe de I'utipossidetis juris; et enfin
f) la décision britannique du Il juillet 1939 portant attribution des
Hawar à Bahreïn.
Loin d'examiner tous ces moyens de droit et de leur attribuer tout prix
qu'ils pourraient éventuellement mériter en faveurde la thèsede I'une ou
de l'autre Partie, la Cour a délibérémené t cartéles cinq premiers d'entre
eux, pour bâtir sa solution sur lu seule décisionbritannique du 1l juillet
1939.
14. Choix à la fois douteux et périlleux.Douteux, car, spécialement en
matière de contentieux territorial, la première démarche intellectuelle
habituellement entreprise est plutôt la recherche de l'existence d'un titre
originaire, historico-juridique, déployant ou non ses effets dans les temps
présents. Douteux également, car en ne répondant pas comme elle le
devrait a la masse des autres moyens de droit articuléspar les Parties, la
Cour leur laisse (ainsi qu'à tout lecteur) la fâcheuse impression de
n'avoir que trop partiellement entendu ces Parties sur des thémesqu'elles
jugeraient pourtant décisifsde leur point de vue. En d'autres termes, la
Cour a ainsi pris le risque non seulement d'un mal-jugé, mais encore
d'une absence d'un plein-jugé. Les «infra-petitar)) la guettent alors dan-
gereusement. Choix périlleux au surplus car la nature de la présente
espèce n'est pas de celles qui permettent de faire aussi facilement I'éco-
nomie de divers moyens de droit du seul fait que l'examen d'un moyen
('André-Jean Arnaud. Critiquedt Itrruison,jurit/icOùc~vo lu .sociok)gdu,clroi/.
LGDJ. 1981.et spécialementses développements intitulés«Repkres pour une exploration
méthodique de l'infra-droit,p. 325 et suiv((L'trvunt-tlire-droicomme le dénomme
l'auteur. est constitué par un ensemble de facteurs. objectifs et subjecri.~ndans
l'imaginaire populaire véritablement les contours d'une décision judiciaire avant son pro-
noncéet qui nourrissent une attente du public: niveaux de conscience et culturejuridique,
c'est-à-dire comportement conformiste ou ré\,olutionnaire du public. assàcdes fac-
teurs plus subjectifs faits d'attitudes. d'opinions. de comportements. de croyances,
d'images... DELIMITATION AND QLIESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 152
admissible. The opinion and expectations of the "public" are an impor-
tant factor, constituting what is referred to by some authors as "inj'ru-
clroit"'.
13. Whc~tIlus tlie Court done in the present case? In order to convince
the Court, the Parties have argued at length on the following grounds of
law put forward by each of them on the question of the Hawars:
((1) the existence of an original title;
(hi the presence of gffi>ctivitPs;
(c) the legal principle of proximity and the matter of territorial integ-
rity;
(ri) the map evidence;
(ci the principle of utipossicletisjuris; and lastly,
(,O the British decision of II July 1939 awarding the Hawars to
Bahrain.
Far from examining al1 of these grounds and according them such full
value as they deserved to be given as support for the position of one or
other of the Parties, the Court deliberately ignored the first five, in order
to base its solution on the British decision of 11 July 1939 ulone.
14. A choice that is both questionable and hazardous. Questionable
because, particularl!i where territorial disputes are concerned, the first
intellectual step norrnally undertaken is rather to seek an original histori-
cal legal title, irrespective of whether or not it is currently still effective.
Questionable also because, by not responding as it should to the numer-
ous other legal grounds argued by the Parties, the Court leaves them (and
anyone reading the Judgment) with the regrettable impression that it has
only given the Parties a very incomplete hearing on matters which they
however considered to be crucial. In other words, the Court has thus
taken the risk not only of rendering an incorrect judgment but also of
failing to give a complete ruling. The Court thus exposes itself to the
danger of charges of having ruled "infiupetitcr". A hazardous choice, more-
over, as the nature of the present case is not such as to enable various
grounds to be so easily dispensed with simply because the examination of
" André-Jean Arnaud, Criticlire(1Itrr.oi.~onj~rridiqOir i8lu .\o<.iol»gilttiroi>.
LGDJ, 1981. in parti<:ular his arguments entitled "Repères pour une exploration
méthodiquede l'infra-droit". pp.5tJtsiJc/".L'urtrt~t-dirr-droif ".to use the term employed
by the author, is made iip of a number of factors. objective and subjective. which. in the
popular imagination, re.,ishtipea court decision beiore it is delivered, and fuel public
expectation:levels of consciousness and legal culture. i.e., conformist or revolutionary
tetidencies on the part the public- together with more subjective Factors made up of
attitudes. opinions. types of behaviour. heliefs. images, and so on.153 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
livrerait à coup sûr, et indiscutablement, croit-onla solution en dispen-
sant la Cour detout examen d'autres moyens. En cette affaire, comme en
bien d'autres, la solution tiréed'un moyen de droit pouvait se trouver
puissamment contredite, et du coup mise en échec et anéantie, par
d'autres moyens de droit. La science du droit international ne possède
pas la rigueur et la certitude logique des sciences mathématiques dans les-
quelles un raisonnement ne peut qu'exclure complètement ou rendre
superflu tout autre. La preuve en est qu'en droit international on ne
s'arrêtepas au premier résultat dans une dévolution territoriale, puisqu'on
se livre ensuite à la recherche de l'existence d'un ((meilleur titre)).
15. Commençonspar un examen de la décisionbritanniquedu 11juillet
1939, par laquelle le Royaume-Uni attribua les Hawar à Bahreïn et qui
constitue le moyen de droit sur lequel la Cour a fait reposer tout son
arrêt.A notre avis, cette décisionne saurait constituer le «meilleur titre))
recherché.C'est ce que nous devons démontrer d'abord. Ce faisant, nous
regrettons de devoir nous attaquer là à ce qui fait la substance mêmede
l'arrêt.
II. LA DÉCISION BRITANNIQUE DU 11JUILLET 1939
16. La Cour s'est prononcée sur la question de la souveraineté sur les
îles Hawar sur la seule base de la décisiondu Gouvernement britannique
du 11 juillet 1939. Selon la Cour, cette décision présentait un caractère
obligatoire pour Bahreïn et Qatar au moment de son adoption et leur
étaitopposable en dépit desprotestations ultérieuresdu cheikh de Qatar.
La Cour a fait observer que la conclusion ((sur la base de la décision bri-
tannique de 1939 la dispense de se prononcer sur l'argumentation des
Parties tirée de l'existence d'un titre originaire, des effectivités ou de
I'applicabilité en l'espèce du principe de I'uti possidetis jurir)) (arrêt,
par. 148).
17. La Cour a donc fait le choix délibéréet périlleux, déjàanalyséplus
haut. de trancher un différend territorial sur la base d'une décisiona la
valeur juridique douteuse et de renoncer à un examen attentif des autres
moyens avancés par les Parties à l'appui de leur argumentation, à savoir
I'applicabilitéou non en l'espècedu principe de l'uti pos.~idc>tij.urris, des
principes de proximité géographique et d'unité territoriale, l'existence
éventuelled'un titre originaire ou les effectivités.La Cour a ainsi choisi
de ne pas appliquer les principes de droit pertinents et évitéde tirer les
conclusions qui s'imposaient d'un examen des traités internationaux, du
droit coutumier applicable relatif aux îles, du droit maritime, ou des
nombreux élémentsde preuve cartographiques.
18. L'exerciceauquel la Cour s'est livréeau sujet de la souverainetésur
les îles Hawar aurait pu emporter la conviction si elle étaitalléeau bout
de sa tâche et de la mission judiciaire qui est la sienne. Mais la Cour non DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 153
one ground would definitely and indisputably - so it is believed- pro-
duce the solution, thereby relieving the Court of the need to examine any
other grounds. In this case, as indeed in many others, the solution
derived from one ground could be strongly contradicted - effectively
undermined and set at naught - by others. The science of international
law does not have thle rigour and logical certainty of the mathematical
sciences, in which one line of reasoning must inevitably completely exclude
or render superfluous any other. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in
international law, one does not halt at the first result in a territorial
award, but then goes on to see whether a "better title" exists.
15. Let us begin by considering the British decision of 11July 1939,by
which the United Kirigdom awarded the Hawars to Bahrain and which is
the legal ground on which the Court has based its entire Judgment. In
Our view, that decisicincannot constitute the requisite "better title". And
that is what we must first show. We regret that, in so doing, we are
obliged to attack at the very heart of the Judgment.
II.THEBRITISH DECISION OF 11 JULY1939
16. The Court ruled on the question of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands solely on the basis of the British Government's decision of 11 July
1939.According to the Court, that decision was binding on Bahrain and
Qatar at the time it was adopted and was opposable to them notwith-
standing the subsequent protests of the Sheikh of Qatar. The Court states
that its "conclusion .. . on the basis of the British decision of 1939makes
it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the arguments of the Parties based
on the existence of an original title, c~f2ctivités,and the applicability of
the principle of uti po.rsidetis juris to the present case" (Judgment,
para. 148).
17. The Court thus made the deliberate, hazardous choice, analysed
above, of deciding a territorial dispute on the basis of a decision of ques-
tionable legal value and to dispense with careful consideration of the
other grounds advaiiced by the Parties in support of their arguments,
namely whether or riot the principle of uti possideiis ,jura insd the prin-
ciples of geographical proximity and territorial unity applied to the case
and whether there kvasan original title or c:ffic.ti~~iti..sT.he Court thus
chose not to apply the relevant principles of law and avoided drawing the
inescapable conclusiconsthat followed from consideration of the interna-
tional treaties, of applicable customary law relating to islands, of mari-
time law and of the substantial map evidence.
18. The Court's treatment of the subject of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands might have been convincing had the Court carried through with
its task and performed in full the judicial mission incumbent uponseulement s'est refuséea procéderàun examen de la validité matériellede
la décisionbritannique du Il juillet 1939,alors qu'elle y étaitinvitéepar
les Parties, ce qui déjàl'expose à se prononcer «infru petitu)), mais encore
son examen de la validité formellede cette décision està la fois lacunaire
et sujet à caution.
19. Sur cette question particulière des Hawar, qui emporte des consé-
quences importantes en matière de délimitation maritime. l'ensemble de
l'édificejuridique bâti par la Cour repose ainsi sur une seule fondation, la
décision britannique de 1939, et cette fondation est elle-mêmedes plus
fragiles dans la mesure où elle a entraîné la Cour à la conclusion que le
consentement donné a la Grande-Bretagne en 1938 par les deux Parties
pour prendre ladite décisionn'est affectéd'aucun vice. Or, comme nous
le démontrerons, le consentement du cheikh de Qatar est manifestement
viciépar l'existence d'un dol.
20. Mais avant de procéder à l'examen des circonstances douteuses
dans lesquelles cette décision aétéprise, il n'est pas sans intérêtde rap-
porter a ce stade les propos d'un haut fonctionnaire du Foreign Office,
Christopher Long, qui, en 1964,en résumédes événementsde 1938-1939,
admettait ce qui suit:
«Aucun des cleus sou\leruins n'u Pt; invit4 à s'engugcr uu pri.uluhle
u reconnuître lusentence, ni à Iefuire /)LI/a suite. Le gouvernement
de Sa Majestéa simplement c<rendu» la sentence. Si celle-cia pris la
forme d'un arbitrage dans une certaine mesure, elle a néanmoins été
ii?zpo.sée'en kuut, et aucune question n'a été soulevée quant à sa
validité.11 s'agissait simplement d'une décision prise pour des rai-
sons pratiques afin de préparer le terrain pour les concessions pétro-
lières.»'
21. Autrement dit, le Foreign Office a lui-mêmereconnu en 1964 que
la décision de 1939 était «imposée d'en haut» et que le souverain de
Qatar ne s'étaitpas engagé a en accepter au préalable le contenu, ce qui
signifiait clairement que, quelle que fùt la façon dont elle était caracté-
risée, ellene pouvait pas êtreconsidéréecomme obligatoire.
22. Mais ce n'est pas seulement upr2.rla décision prise que l'on ren-
contre des témoignagescomme celui de Christopher Long. Des opinions
critiques existent aussi, qui datent d'uvtrntl'adoption de la décision de
1939 et émanent du mêmemilieu diplomatique britannique. On relève
dans les minute.^établiesle 30 décembre 1937par Rendel, un de ces hauts
fonctionnaires britanniques, ce qui suit: ((Concernant les îles Hawar
(no 17),je ne peux que déplorer que 1'India Office soit allé aussi loin (du
moins en apparence) en les allouant à Bahreïn.»R
D'une manière plus générale,le dossier soumis à la Cour montre
'Répliquede Bahreïn. vol. 2. annexe 2. p. 4; les italiques sont de nous.
Répliquede Qatar, vol. 3. annexe 111.56.p. 349.
118 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 154
it. However, not only did the Court decline to examine the substan-
tive validity of the British decision of 11 July 1939, even though it had
been invited to do so by the Parties - which in itself exposed it to
the risk of ruling "i~!frupetitu" -- but ils consideration of the formal
validity of that decision was, further. both incomplete and lacking in
credibility.
19. With respect to the specific question of the Hawars. which entails
important consequences for the maritime delimitation, the entire legal
edifice constructed b:y the Court thus rests on a single foundation, the
British decision of 1939, and that foundation is itself particularly flimsy,
in that it led the Court toconclude that the consent given by both Parties
in 1938to Great Britain to take that decision was free of any defect. Yet,
as we shall show, the Sheikh of Qatar's consent was clearly vitiated by
the existence of frautl
20. But before undertaking an examination of the questionable cir-
cumstances under which the decision was taken, it is worth quoting
at this point a comrnent made in 1964 by Christopher Long, a senior
Foreign Office official, who, in summarizing the events of 1938-1939,
admitted the followirig:
"Neiflier qf tlie tii30RuIers ivus usked beforrhund to promise his
consent to the aizlurd, nor ufterii,urd.s to givrit. H.M.G. simply
'made' the awarti. Although it followed the form of an arbitration to
some extent, it was imposedfrorn crhove,and no question of its valid-
ity or otherwise was raised. It was quite simply a decision which was
taken for practical purposes in order to clear the ground for oil
concessions." '
21. In other words, the Foreign Office itselfacknowledged in 1964that
the 1939 decision hatl been "imposed from above" and that the Ruler of
Qatar had not promised in advance to accept the content of that decision.
This clearly means tlnat, however it might have been characterized, that
decision could not be regarded as binding.
22. But statements like that of Christopher Long are not only to be
found ufier the decision was taken. Critical views were also expressed
within those same British diplomatic circles hqfor' the 1939decision was
adopted. The Minute drawn up on 30 December 1937 by Rendel, one
such British senior official, States: "As regards the Hawar Islands at
No. 17, 1cannot help regretting that the India Office went so far as they
seem to have done in allotting these islands to BahrahWx
More generally, the filesubmitted to the Court shows that the fact that
' Reply of Bahrain, Vol. 2. Ann. 2. p. 4; emphasis added.
Replyof Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann111.56p. 349.155 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
que, avant la décision dite ((provisoire)) de 1936, l'appartenance des
Hawar a Qatar n'étaitpas contestée.
23. 11est important de rappeler les faits et les circonstances qui ont
abouti à la décisionbritannique du 11juillet 1939.Cela est d'autant plus
nécessaire que l'arrêt, loinde livrer le contexte historique précisqui a
entouré ladite décision,s'est limité, enses paragraphes 118 a 135, a I'évo-
cation des faits les plus immédiats qui se sont déroulésentre le 10 mai
1938et le 25 septembre 1939.C'est dans les ((qualités)),au tout début de
l'arrêt,loin des développements consacrés ë l'examen de la décisionde
1939, que l'on trouvera, détachéspar conséquent de ces développements
et mêlés iid'autres, des faits plus déterminants susceptibles d'éclairer la
décisionbritannique prise en 1939.
24. Comme nous le montrerons plus tard en examinant la question du
titre historique, il étaitadmis, jusqu'en 1936au moins, que Hawar appar-
tenait à Qatar, à la faveur de la consolidation historique et de la recon-
naissance de son titre. Mais la remise en cause du titre de Qatar s'ex-
plique par la conjugaison de la politique locale de certains agents britan-
niques et de l'aventure du pétrole par le lancement de l'exploration (ofl'
shore)). Une lettre confidentielle du 30juillet 1933de Gastrell, agent poli-
tique britannique a Bahreïn, adressée au résident politique britannique
dans le Golfe. faisait état de la réticencedu souverain de Bahrein et de
son fils à désigner par leur nom les îles ë comprendre dans l'aire de la
concession pétrolièreaccordéepar Bahreïn. Par un télégrammedu lende-
main, 31juillet 1933,adresséau Gouvernement de l'Inde, le résident poli-
tique dans le Golfe accéda a cette suggestion, mais en précisant toutefois
que «l'île Hawar ne fait nettement pas partie de l'archipel bahreïnite))".
25. Après que le souverain de Bahreïn eut découvert que le «secteur
non attribué de Bahreïn)), sur lequel il pouvait accorder une nouvelle
concession pétrolière, comprenait moins de la moitié du territoire ter-
restre de l'île principale de Bahreïn ainsi que Muharraq, Sitrah, Nabi
Salih et Umm Na'asan, Charles Belgrave, conseiller politique du souve-
rain de Bahreïn, a présentéà son supérieur,l'agent politique britannique,
le 28 avril 1936,une revendication officielledu titre sur les îles Hawar au
nom du souverain de Bahreïn. Ces prétentions étaient exposéesdans le
document intitulé: «A propos des rzt;gociutionset7 cours au sujet d'une
concession pétroliéresur 1. territoire de Btrhrein qui nefuir pas partie de
lu concession pktrolière de 11925)) Io.Elles visaient des îles dont la majo-
rité est situéedans la limite de 3 milles de la mer territoriale de Qatar.
Cette donnée géographique n'est pas contestée.
26. Voici comment les Minutes confidentielles du Foreign Office,datées
du 10 juin 1964, intitulées «Sovereigntp over Hu)vur Island)) et signées
'>Mémoirede Qatar, vol. 6, annex111.88p. 451.
"'Mémoirede Qatar, vol. 7,annexe111.103,p.17.the Hawars belongetl to Qatar was not disputed prior to the "provi-
sional" decision of 1036.
23. It is important to recall the facts and circumstances which led to
the British decision of 11 July 1939.This is particularly necessary because
the Judgment, far from describing the exact historical context of that
decision, confined it:;elf, in paragraphs 118 to 135, to citing the most
immediate of the eveintsoccurring between 10 May 1938 and 25 Septem-
ber 1939.More cruci;il facts capable of shedding light on the British deci-
sion of 1939are to be found in the "quulités",at the very beginning of the
Judgment, far removed from the discussion devoted to consideration of
the 1939 decision, and thus separated from that discussion and inter-
mingled with other points.
24. As we shall shiow below in considering the question of historical
title, it was acknowledged, at least until 1936,that Hawar appertained to
Qatar, as a result of historical consolidation and the recognition of
Qatar's title. The challenge raised to Qatar's title may be explained by the
conjunction of the local policy of certain British representatives and the
rush for oil with the advent of off-shore exploration. A confidential letter
of 30 July 1933 from Gastrell, British Political Agent in Bahrain, to the
British Political Resident in the Gulf, referred to the reluctance on the
part of the Ruler of Bahrain and his son to designate by name the islands
to be included in the area of the oil concession granted by Bahrain. In a
telegram dated the next day, 31 July 1933, to the Government of India,
the Political Resident in the Gulf accepted this suggestion but did how-
ever state that "Hawar Island is clearly not one of the Bahrain group"'.
25. On 28 April 1936, following the Ruler of Bahrain's discovery that
the "unallotted area of Bahrain" for which he could grant a new oil con-
cession comprised less than half of the land territory of the main Bahrain
Island, Muharraq, Sitrah, Nabi Salih and Umm Na'asan, Charles Bel-
grave, the Political Adviser to the Ruler, presented to his superior, the
British Political Agent, a formal claim of title to the Hawar Islands on
behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain. The elements of the claim were set out in
a document the text of which began as follows: "In connection ~viththe
present nc)gotiurion.s fi~r rrnoil r.onr.rssionover the territory of Bahruin
fishichisnot ir~cludedin thc~1925 oil conccs.riotz." 'OThey related to islands
the majority of which lie within the 3-mile belt of Qatar's territorial sea.
This fact of geography is not disputed.
26. Here is the account given in the confidential Foreign Office minute
dated 10June 1964,entitled "Sovereignty over Hawar Island" and signed
" Mernorial of Qatar, 'Vol.6, Ann. 111p.8451.
"'Mernorial of Qatar, Vol. 7. Ann. 111.p.317156 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
par Christopher Long, relatent les événements quisuivirent la réclama-
tion de Bahreïn:
(t3. La première étapeva d'avril àjuillet 1936.Dans une lettre du
28 avril 1936 (E 3439), l'agent politique à Bahreïn signalait que
Bahreïn, encourugP pur de ,futurs concessionnuirc.~ pétroliers,ciilait
Cn1i.sune pri.tention sur Hrrit~~r.l ren~urqueque «celu pourrcrit ...
nous L;trepolitiquement utile d'uiwir un territoire crussivaste quc pos-
sible cornpris clans Bahreïrl)). Lc rcsident politique soutcnuit cette
positior~et lu questionfut clbbuttuc,en i?lc?n?emps que des questions
pc!trolière.rconnesc.s. lors cl'uncrkuniùnWlzitc~l~ulEl.n conséquence,
une lettre du 14juillet 1936à M. Skliros de Petroleum Concessions
Limited indiquait que «sur la base des élémentsde preuve dont dis-
pose actuellement le gouvernement de Sa Majesté, il ressort que
Hawar appartient au cheikh de Bahreïn et qu'il incomberait à tout
autre demandeur éventuelde réfuter sa prétention. (E 4490.)))''
27. Cette décisiondu 9 juillet 1936du Gouvernement britannique fut
notifiéeà Charles Belgrave qui en avisa le souverain de Bahreïn et à Skli-
ros de Petroleum Concessions Limited, mais nullement à l'émirde Qatar.
Celui-ci n'a étéinforméni de la revendication officiellede Bahreïn sur les
Hawar du 28 avril 1936, ni de la décisionbritannique du 9juillet 1936et
n'a étéassociéde maniire ni directe, ni indirecte, aux épisodesde cette
opération, alors mêmeque le Gouvernement britannique ne pouvait
avoir ignoré que la plupart des iles concernées étaient situéesdans une
limite de 3 milles des côtes de la péninsuleqatarie et queQatar les consi-
dérait comme sa possession. Ainsi, après les avoir survolées en 1934, la
Royal Air Force avait déclaréqu'elles faisaient partie du territoire de
Qatar. De plus, entre 1933et 1934,au débutdes négociations sur l'octroi
d'une concession pétrolière,les autorités britanniques dans le Golfe et à
Londres étaient convaincues que les îles appartenaient non à Bahreïn,
mais à Qatar. Bien que le Gouvernement britannique eût déclaréque la
décisionde 1936était fondée surles élémentsde preuve dont il disposait,
il ne lui avait certainement pas échappéque, dans les Rupporfs unnucls du
Gouvernement de Bahreïn ou dans le Journcil de Belgrave, il
n'avait absolunlent jamais été question des îles Hawar, ni d'une quel-
conque administration de ces îles par le souverain de Bahreïn ou pour
son compte; tout au plus, y trouve-t-on une mention de la visite de
Weightman à Hawar le 15 avril 1938.
28. 11ressort donc de ce qui précèdeque la décisionde 1936 avait été
prise non pas au vu des élémentsde preuve disponibles, mais en dépitet
à l'encontre de ces éléments,et, bien qu'elle ait étéqualifiéede ((provi-
soire)), son importance et ses effets pratiques ne pouvaient guére avoir été
sous-estimés. Elle a fixé,d'une façon définitive,les principes de la poli-
tique britannique des concessions «(~f',sliorc»dans la zone concernée.
" Répliquede Bahreïn. vol. 2. annexe 2, p. italiqusont de nous. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 156
by Christopher Long. of the events following Bahrain's claim:
"3. The first stage was from April to July, 1936. In a letter
dated April 28, 1936, (E3439) the Political Agent, Bahrain, reported
that Bahrain, .stimuluteclhyprospective oil concessionaires, liud put
filrivcwd a c.lui/n to Hu,i~ur.He oh.scri.1r.tshut 'if tnigl.t. suit u.r
politicull~~to lzui'eus large un urea us possible includod under Buh-
ruin.' T11eP01itic:ulResiUIL'n~tupport~dtllis attitude and the mutter
\ras di.~cussetl,togctlicr with reluted oil questions, ut u meeting in
Whitehull. As a result, in a letter to Mr. Skliros of Petroleum Con-
cessions Liinited.,dated July 14, 1936,it was stated that 'on the basis
of the evidence at present before H.M.G. it appears that Hawar
belongs to the Skiaikhof Bahrain, and that the burden of disproving
his claim would lie on any other potential claimant.' (E 4490.)"
27. This decision of 9 July 1936 by the British Government was noti-
fied to Charles Belgrave, who conveyed it to the Ruler of Bahrain and to
Skliros of Petroleurri Concessions Limited, but not to the Sheikh of
Qatar. The Sheikh was informed neither of Bahrain's forma1 claim of
28 April 1936 to the Hawars nor of the British decision of 9 July 1936
and was not made a participant, either directly or indirectly, in the vari-
ous steps in the process, even though the British Government must have
been aware that most of the islands in question lay within three miles of
the Coast of the Qatari peninsula and that Qatar regarded them as
belonging to it. Thus, at'terflying over them in 1934,the Royal Air Force
had stated that they were part of Qatar's territory. Moreover, between
1933 and 1934. early in the negotiations over the granting of an oil con-
cession, British officiialsin the Gulf and in London had had no doubt
that the islands appertained not to Bahrain but to Qatar. Although the
British Government stated that the 1936 decision was based on the evi-
dence before them, it clearly had not escaped them that neither the
Annual Reports of the Government of Bahrain nor Belgrave's "Diary"
contained any mention whatsoever of the Hawar Islands or of any
administration of those islands by or on behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain;
at most, ail we find is a reference to Weightman's visit to Hawar on
15 April 1938.
28. The foregoing thus demonstrates that the 1936 decision was not
taken on the basis of the available evidence, but rather in spite of and
against that evidence, and, even though it was characterized as "provi-
sional", its significance and practical effect could hardly have been under-
estimated. It was a definitive statement of the principles guiding British
policy with respect to offshore concessions in the area concerned.
''Reply of Bahrain, Vol. 2, Ann. 2, p. 2: emphasis added.
120157 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
29. Néanmoins, pour atténuer les réactionsprévisiblesdu souverain de
Qatar, les autorités britanniques précisèrentque cette décisionavait un
caractère provisoire et qu'une décisiondéfinitivene serait prise qu'après
l'examen des revendications que le cheikh de Qatar pouvait avoir sur ces
îles. Ces précautions furent vaines, car Belgrave tint à indiquer que le
souverain de Bahreïn inscrirait les Hawar sur la liste de ses possessions.
En conséquence,les négociations ultérieuressur l'octroi d'une concession
pétrolièredans le ((secteur non attribué)) de Bahreïn se sont déroulées
avec l'idéeque les Hawar faisaient partie de Bahreïn et que seul son sou-
verain étaiten droit d'accorder une concession sur ces îles. Les autorités
britanniques compétentes, dans le Golfe et à Londres, ont égalementagi
avec l'idéeque les îles Hawar appartenaient à Bahreïn.
30. Les autorités britanniques ont permis aux compagnies pétrolières
de continuer à négocieravec le seul souverain de Bahreïn l'octroi d'une
concession dans l'ensemble du secteur non attribué ou seulement sur les
îles Hawar, comme si elles avaient déjà décidé de manière définitiveque
ces îles appartenaient à Bahreïn. En outre, la ((décisionprovisoire)) de
1936avait inévitablement pour conséquence d'imposer à Qatar la charge
de réfuter la revendication de Bahreïn sur les îles, quand bien mêmela
proposition adressée plustard au souverain deQatar ne contenait pas les
élémentsde preuve sur lesquels Bahreïn fondait sa propre revendication.
Ainsi, il n'était pasdonné au souverain qatari la possibilitéde réfuterles
arguments de Bahreïn.
31. C'est dans ce contexteque, le 10 mai 1938, le souverain deQatar a
rappelé à Weightman, alors agent politique de la Grande-Bretagne, que
Hawar «de par sa position naturelle fait partie de Qatar)) et ((lui appar-
tient u". Sefondant sur ce fait, il a protestécontre le débutd'une occupa-
tion du nord de Jazirat Hawar par Bahreïn; invoquant les relations entre
Qatar et la Grande-Bretagne, il a demandé à cette dernière de prendre
((toutes les mesures nécessaires pour éviter toute difficultéqui pourrait
provoquer une rupture de la paix))". Dans sa réponse datéedu 28 mai,
Weightman, faisant référenceà la revendication de Bahreïn sur les îles
Hawar, a déclaréce qui suit:
«Il est de fait que, par l'occupation formelle de ces îles depuis un
certain temps, le Gouvernement de Bahreïn possède prin~u fcrcie un
titre sur ces îles, mais je suis autorisé par le résidentpolitique à vous
dire que, néanmoins, le gouvernement de Sa Majestéserait disposé à
considérer attentivement toute revendication formelle que vous pré-
senteriez au sujet des îles Hawar, sous réserve que celle-ci soit
appuyée par un exposé complet des moyens de preuve que vous
invoquez pour affirmer que vous. cheikh de Qatar, avez souveraineté
sur ces îles)>l3
''Ihitip.d256.tar, vol. 7. annexe 111.150,p. 255
l4Ihiii.. annexe 111.156.p. 281 et 282. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 157
29. Nevertheless, in order to soften the foreseeable reaction by the
Ruler of Qatar, the British authorities stated that the decision was pro-
visional and that a final decision would not be taken until any claims
which the Ruler of Qatar might have had to those islands had been con-
sidered. These precautions came to nothing, for Belgrave was at pains to
indicate that the Ruler of Bahrain would include the Hawars on the list
of his possessions. Consequently. subsequent negotiations for oil conces-
sions in Bahrain's "unallotted area" were conducted on the basis that the
Hawars were part of Bahrain and that the Ruler of Bahrain alone was
entitled to grant a concession covering those islands. The competent
British authorities, in the Gulf and in London, also acted on the basis
that the Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain.
30. The British authorities allowed oil companies to continue to nego-
tiate with the Ruler of Bahrain alone for a concession covering the whole
of the unallotted arecdor just the Hawar Islands, as if they had already
made a final decision that those islands belonged to Bahrain. Moreover,
the inevitable conseqiuence of the "provisional decision" of 1936was that
the burden of disproving Bahrain's claim to the islands was placed on
Qatar, even though the proposa1 later sent to the Ruler of Qatar did not
include the evidence on which Bahrain based its claim. Thus, the Ruler of
Qatar was not given an opportunity to rebut Bahrain's arguments.
31. It was against this background that, on 10May 1938,the Ruler of
Qatar told Weightman, the then Political Agent of Great Britain, that
Hawar "is, by its natiural position, a part of Qatar" and "belongs to it" 12.
It was on this basis tlnat he protested against Bahrain's initial occupation
of the north of Jazir,at Hawar. Referring to the relations between Qatar
and Great Britain, he requested the latter to "do what is necessary in the
matter so as to avoid any trouble which may cause a breach of peace" 13.
In his reply of 28 May, Weightman referred to Bahrain's claim to the
Hawar Islands and stated the following:
"It is indeed a fact that by their formal occupation of the Islands
for some time past the Bahrain Government possess a prima facie
claim to them, but 1 am authorised by the Honourable the Political
Resident to say that even so His Majesty's Government will be pre-
pared to give the fullest consideration to any formal claim put for-
ward by you to the Hawar Islands, provided that your claim is sup-
ported by a full and complete statement of the evidence on which
you rely in asserting that you, as Shaikh of Qatar, possess sover-
eignty over thern." l4
" Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 7, Ann. 111.p.255
''Ihirl.. 256.
'* IhirlAnn. 111.156pp. 281 and 282.158 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
32. Weightman ajouta qu'entre-temps le Gouvernement britannique
«ne sera pas disposé à interdire ou restreindre»15 l'occupation des îles
par Bahreïn. Dans sa réponse à l'agent politique datée du 27 mai, le
cheikh deQatar a acceptéque la procédurede règlement du problème fût
assuméepar les Britanniques dans les termes suivants: «Je vous suis très
obligédes termes excellents de votre lettre et je remercie aussi le gouver-
nement de Sa Majesté qui, cornnw vous l'avez dit, déciderade la question
en s'inspirant de la véritéet de la justice.»'" Le 30 mai, Weightman a
rencontré le cheikh à Doha. Puis, le 15juin, le cheikh a écrità Weight-
man en lui rappelant que, lors de sa visite, «[il l'avait remercie] de
[Il'avoir informé de [son] intention d'enquêtertrés sérieusementsur le
sujet, afin d'éclaircir les faits et de permettre au gouvernement de Sa
Majestéde prendre sa décision entoute justice et équité))''.
33. C'est dans ce contexte particulier, alourdi au surplus par des riva-
lités pétrolièresopposant Britanniques et Américains, que le Royaume-
Uni prit sa décisiondu II juillet 1939qu'il notifia, par deux lettres iden-
tiques, aux souverains de Bahrein et de Qatar et par laquelle il attribua
les Hawar a Bahreïn lx.
34. Nous sommes d'accord avec la majorité de la Cour pour déclarer
que la décision britannique de 1939 n'est pas une sentence arbitrale et
n'est donc pas revêtuede l'autoritéde la chose jugée.Nous approuvons le
raisonnement de la Cour et estimons avec elle que les éléments caracté-
ristiques d'une définitiond'une sentence arbitrale font ici défaut. La déci-
sion britannique est une décision politique, ou administrative et, en tant
que telle, elle constitue un simple fait historique.
35. Mais, selon l'arrêt, cettedécisionest juridiquement obligatoire à ce
jour pour les deux Parties, en vertu du consentement donné par chacune
d'elles en 1938 aux représentants locaux du Royaume-Uni. Nous mar-
quons notre désaccord total sur ce point.
36. Comme l'a souligné l'arrêt,en notant à juste titre au passage la
similitude entre la présenteespèceet l'affaire DouhnïlClzur~ljul~ ,econsen-
tement des souverains était certes requis. Nous admettons que, dans les
circonstances de notre affaire et compte dûment tenu du type de relations
entretenu par Bahreïn et Qatar avec le Royaume-Uni, un tel consente-
ment étaitnécessaire.Mais, dans notre arrêt de cejour, ce consentement
est artificiellement examiné, détachéde tout son contexte de l'époque et
analyséen fin de compte en toute abstraction.
37. Pour parvenir à la conclusion que la décisionbritannique était et
demeure obligatoire pour les Parties, I'arrêta considéréindivisible le
l5Mémoirede Qatar, vol. 7. annexe 111.156,p. 282.
IhIbid..annexe 111.157.p. 287: les italiques sont de nous
" Ibicl..annexe 111.160,p. 307.
IRMémoirede Bahreïn. vol. 5, p. 1176. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 158
32. Weightman added that meanwhile the British Government "will
not be prepared to prohibit or restrict"I5 Bahrain's occupation of the
islands. In his reply of27 May to the Political Agent. the Sheikh of Qatar
agreed in the followirig terms to having the proceedings for settlement of
the problem conducted by the British: "1 am very grateful to you for the
good expressions coritained in your letter and 1am also thankful to His
Majesty's Government who will, us you said, decide the matter in the
light of truth and justice." l"On 30 May Weightman and the Sheikh met
in Doha. Then, on 15 June, the Sheikh wrote to Weightman reminding
him that during his visit, "1 thanked you for informing me that you were
going to investigate the matter very thoroughly so that the facts may
become clear, and His Majesty's Government may be able to decide the
matter in the light of justice and equity" 17.
33. This was the specific context, further complicated by competing
British and American oil interests, in which Great Britain took its deci-
sion on 11 July 1939,which it notified by means of two identical letters to
the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar and by which it attributed the Hawars
to BahrainIX.
34. We agree with the majority of the Court that the British decision
of 1939 is not an arbitral award and therefore does not have the force of
rrs judicatu. We support the Court's reasoning and agree with it that the
characteristic features of an arbitral award are lacking here. The British
decision is a politicailor administrative decision and, as such, constitutes
a simple historical fa~ct.
35. However, according to the Judgment, that decision is still legally
binding today on the two Parties, as a result of the consent given by each
of them in 1938to tlnelocal representatives of the United Kingdom. We
wish to state Our total disagreement on this point.
36. As the Judgment pointed out, correctly noting in passing the simi-
larity between the present case and the DuhuilSharj(r11case, the consent
of the Rulers was of course required. We accept that, in the circum-
stances of this case and taking due account of the nature of the relation-
ship between Bahrain and Qatar and the United Kingdom, such consent
was necessary. But, in the Judgment now handed down by the Court,
that consent is artificially examined, detached from its temporal context
and, in sum. analysed in a totally abstract manner.
37. In order to reach the conclusion that the British decision was and
remains binding on the Parties, the Judgment deemed the consent of the
" Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 7, Ann. 111.156,p. 282.
'"Ihitl.. Ann. 111.157.p. 287; emphasis added.
l7Ibitl.. Ann. 111.160,p. 307.
" Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. p. 1176.159 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS. COMMUNE)
consentement du souverain de Qatar. Le consentement à la procédure
impliquant consentement à la décision de fond, les protestations du
cheikh deQatar seraient dèslorssans valeurjuridique: formulées ((àpos-
teriori)), elles exprimaient simplement le sentiment de déception de leur
auteur.
38. En la présente affaire, l'indivisibilité du consentement n'est pas
établie; elle est seulement présumée.Sur le plan politique, les relations
entre la Puissance protectrice et 1'Etat protégéne permettaient pas I'uti-
lisation d'un langage autre que de déférencedans lequel les souverains
locaux se sont exprimés; aussi interpréter ces expressions comme révéla-
trices d'un consentement à une renonciation iila compétence territoriale
est-il constitutif d'un véritable contresens dans la signification naturelle
des mots et des comportements en 1939. Sur le plan juridique, lorsque
l'arrêtoppose à Qatar son consentement, en véritéhypothétique, au
contenu de la décisionde 1939, il reproche à cette Partie de n'avoir pas
adhéréà la décisiondont elle avait étémenacée,dès 1937, en termes voi-
lés.Indépendamment du caractère dolosif des manŒuvres des agents bri-
tanniques, la question est de savoir si Qatar étaitjuridiquement tenu d'y
adhérer. Une réponsenégative s'impose. En nlntière territo~iule, le c.onsrn-
ternent ù un ub~~nclonde .roui~craineténe peut prr.sgtre pré.rumc'.;/a rrnon-
ciution ùoit gtre csprimée ct étuhlic~de rncrnièrc nori éyuiiloquc.IIs'agit
d'une règle absolue en droit international. L'acceptation d'une compé-
tence du Royaume-Uni pour disposer de la souveraineté sur les îles
Hawar n'est pas établie. Le consentement à la procédure. à supposer
mêmequ'il ait étévalablement donné, yuod non, ne signifiait pas consen-
tement automatique à la décision finale. On ne voit pas dans le dossier
soumis à la Cour, spécialementdans les lettres deQatar citéespar l'arrêt,
que Qatar ait donné son consentement à être juridiquement liépar la
future décision.
39. Nous répétons que,dans une affaire comme celle-ci, le consente-
ment devait être e,uplicite, éclairéet libreCe ne fut pas le cas. Le para-
graphe 141de l'arrêt,qui se rapporte à la question de la validité formelle
du consentement de Qatar, est déterminant en ce qu'il montre, dans un
certain surréalisme, la conception, sans prise sur le réel,que l'arrêt sefait
du consentement. Ce paragraphe mérite d'être cité:
«s'il est exact qu'au cours de cette procédure les fonctionnaires bri-
tanniques chargésdu dossier sont partis de la prémisseque Bahreïn
possédait prima fucie un titre sur les îleset que la charge de la preuve
contraire reposait sur le souverain de Qatar, Qatar ne saurait soute-
nir qu'il ait étécontraire à la justice de partir de cette prémissduns
lu mesure où il en avait et4 iulformt; rrvunt de consentùrlu proc6dure
et oli il n'en u pas r?~oin.rc~on.srnricc1rlu'cllc se déroitkesur cette
has~» '".
'"Les italiqusont de nous
123 DELIMITATION AND QLESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 159
Ruler of Qatar to be indivisible. Since consent to the procedure implied
consent to the substantive decision, the protests of the Sheikh of Qatar
were accordingly heltl to be without legal force: made "after the event",
they simply expressed the disappointment of their author.
38. In the present case, the indivisibility of the consent has not been
established; it is simply presumed. In political terms, the nature of the
relationship between the protecting Power and the protected State did
not permit the use of any language other than the deferential terms in
which the local rulers expressed themselves; thus to interpret that lan-
guage as evidence of consent to the renunciation of territorial jurisdiction
is in reality to give the opposite sense to the natural meaning of the words
and conduct in 1939. In legal terms, when the Judgment invokes against
Qatar its consent to i.he substance of the 1939decision - a consent that
was in reality hypothetical - , it reproaclies Qatar with its failure
to abide by a decision with which it had already been threatened in
veiled terms since 1037. Independently of the fraudulent nature of the
manŒuvres of the British representatives, the question is whether
Qatar was legally bound to abide by the decision. The answer must be
a negative one. in tize mrlttrr of' territorj>. consent to u rcnunciution of
sovereigrzty ctrnnot hc prrsutned; the renunciatiorz must hr expressrd urzd
'stuhlished in unequii~ocal tcrn7.r. This is an absolute rule in international
law. Agreement to a power on the part of the United Kingdom to
dispose of sovereignly over the Hawar Islands has not been established.
Consent to the procr:edings, even supposing that it was validly given -
yuod non - did not signify automatic consent to the final decision. There
is iiothing in the evidence submitted to the Court, and in particular in
the letters of Qatar cited in the Judgment, to show that Qatar gave its
consent to be legally bound by the future decision.
39. We repeat that, in a case such as this, consent had to be express,
iqformcd and Jieely giwn. This was not the case. Paragraph 141 of the
Judgment, which deals with the question of the forma1 validity of Qatar's
consent, is determinative in that it demonstrates, with a certain surreal-
ism, the construction. unfounded in reality. which the Judgment places
upon that consent. This paragraph is worth quoting:
"while it is true that the competent British officiaisproceeded on the
premise that Bahrain possessed prima facie title to the islands and
that the burden of proving the opposite lay on the Ruler of Qatar,
Qatar cannot maintain that it was contrary to justice to proceed on
the basis of this premise iixhrn Qtrtur hud hertz irgbrr?zcldbcjbrr ugrer-
ir~gto the procédure thut tl2i.sivould occur und Izud con~er~t~dto tlie
procceding.~ heirzg c~~t~ductcd oil tlrut husis"''.
'" Emphasis added En vérité,par ce seul paragraphe déjà,lejugement de la Cour s'arrête
au seuil de la question du do1et fait une pirouette.
40. Que s'est-il exactement passé en effet? Il faut restituer tout le
contexte et non pas se contenter d'un raisonnement abstrait. Par le traité
anglo-qatari de 1916,ainsi que par les assurances des années trente, liées
à l'octroi de la concession pétrolièreconsentie par Qatar en 1935,le Gou-
vernement britannique avait garanti l'intégritéterritoriale de Qatar. Il
n'en a pas moins pris la décision faussement dénommée«provisoire» de
1936par laquelle il a contrevenu i ce respect de l'intégritéterritoriale. Et
de plus ila veilléà ce que Qatar n'en fût pas informé. Déjà, et par ce seul
fait, on peut affirmer que le corzsnlfrn?cntde Qufur à lu proci)dure nefit
pas un consentement éclairt..La décisionbritannique de 1936 a non seu-
lement étécachéeau souverain de Qatar, mais encore n'est pas restéeà
l'état dedécision«provisoire» comme on l'avait qualifiée,puisque à par-
tir de 1937 Bahreïn avait commencé à occuper le nord de Jazirat Hawar
avec le concours des agents britanniques. Cela rendait irréversible cette
décision. Le do1 est alors bien caractérisé.Comment le Royaume-Uni
pouvait-il dans ces conditions entamer en mai 1938 une procédure par
laquelle il faisait comme s'il n'avait jamais pris de décisionauparavant?
La décisionétait bel et bien prise depuis 1936, et appliquée depuis 1937.
lorsque Weightman échangea sacorrespondance en mai 1938avec le sou-
verain de Qatar sur la procédure. Si l'on devait faire une comparaison,
dans le respect toutefois des limites spécifiquespropres à chaque cas, on
pourrait rapprocher cette situation de celle décrite dans l'article 17 du
Statut de la Cour qui interdit à tout membre de celle-ci de connaître
d'une affaire s'il avait déjà eu à traiter de celle-ci dans le passéà un titre
ou à un autre.
41. Mais il ya plus. Lorsque le souverain de Qatar découvrit les pre-
mières manifestations de l'occupation par Bahreïn de la partie nord de
Jazirat Hawar, il se plaignit de cette «ingérence» auprès du Gouverne-
ment britannique dont ilrencontra le représentant Weightman en février
1938. Le Gouvernement britannique ne lui révéla, nià ce moment-la, ni
au cours des échangesde correspondances de mai 1938, l'existence de la
décision qu'ilprit en 1936et qui autorisa précisément ces premiérem s ani-
festations d'occupation bahreïnite. Cela justifie une tout autre lecture de
la situation qui prévalait lors des échanges de correspondances de mai
1938, que celle donnée par le paragraphe 141 de l'arrêt, citéci-dessus.
Tout s'étaitpasséen effet comme si le Royaume-Uni voulait montrer au
souverain de Qatar que cette occupation bahreïnite était une réalité indé-
pendante de la volontébritannique, qu'elle étaiten somme dépourvue de
tout lien de cause à effet avec la décision de 1936 (qu'il continuait à
cacher), qu'il devait prendre cette occupation comme un fait qui le pous-
sait plutôtà penser que les Hawar appartenaient primu jucic à Bahreïn et
enfin qu'il n'entendait pas mettre un terme à une telle occupation sans
connaître au préalable les arguments de Qatar qui la condamneraient au
plan du droit. On voit par la que l'échangede correspondances de mai
1938, rétabli dans son contexte véritable et dans sa pleine signification, DELIMIT,$TION AND QLIESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 160
In effect, already iri this one paragraph, the Court's Judgment stands
at the threshold of the issue of fraud, only then to shy away from it.
40. What exactly happened in fact? We have to restore the entire con-
text and not content ourselves with abstract reasoning. Under the Anglo-
Qatari Treaty of 1916, and pursuant to the assurances given in the 1930s,
which were linked to the agreement by Qatar in 1935to grant an oil con-
cession, the British Giovernment had guaranteed the territorial integrity
of Qatar. Despite this. in 1936 it took the decision falsely described as
"provisional". whereby it breached this undertaking to respect territorial
integrity. What is more, it saw to it that Qatar was not informed of this.
Already. and by this fact alone, it may be said that Qarur's con.sc.ntIO tlze
procredings iiws not an informrd consent. The British decision of 1936
was not only concealled from the Ruler of Qatar, but, further, did not
retain the "provisiona~l"status with which it had been characterized, since
from 1937 Bahrain had begun to occupy the north of Jazirat Hawar with
the support of the British representatives. That rendered the decision irre-
versible. The fraudulent intent is thus clearly established. How, in these
circumstances, could the United Kingdom commence in May 1938a pro-
cedure under which it acted as if it had never taken any prior decision?
At the time of Weighitman'sexchange of letters on the procedure with the
Ruler of Qatar in May 1938,the decision had in fact already been taken
since 1936 and implemented since 1937. If one had to draw a parallel.
albeit white remaining within the parameters specific to each particular
case, one might compare this situation with that described in Article 17
of the Statute of the Court, which prohibits any Member of the Court
froin hearing a case if he had already dealt with it in the past in any
capacity.
41. But there is triore to it than this. When the Ruler of Qatar dis-
covered the first signs of occupation by Bahrain of the northern part of
Jazirat Hawar, he ccsmplained about this "interference" to the British
Government, meeting its representative, Weightman, in February 1938.The
British Government failed to disclose to him, either at that time, or in the
course of the exchange of letters in May 1938, the existence of the deci-
sion taken by it in 11936,which effectively authorized these first mani-
festations of Bahrairii occupation. This justifies a reading of the situa-
tion which prevailecl at the time of the correspondence of May 1938
altogether different from that given by paragraph 141 of the Judgment
quoted above. Thus everything happened as if the United Kingdom
wanted to demonstrate to the Ruler of Oatar that this Bahraini ocCuDa-
.
tion was an occurrence independent of Britain's wishes, that it was
entirelv unconnected with the 1936 decision (which Britain continued to
conceal), that it was bound to regard the occupation as a fact tending
rather to encourage iitin the belief that prima facie the Hawars belonged
to Bahrain and, finally, that it would not seek to put an end to that occu-
pation without first hearing any arguments from Qatar showing that the
occupation was contrary to law. From this we can see that the exchange
of letters of May 1938,with its true context and full significance restored,161 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
trahissait l'existence d'une situation qui empêchaitque le consentement
de Qatar fût parfaitement éclairé.Ce fut une opérution Liquatre ternps:
d'abord tuire l'existence de lu décision 1936; ensuite luisser accrkditer
l'idée que l'occupution buhrrïnite qui en est réellernrnt résultéeest totule-
rncnt indkpenduntc. de cetle décision; riprès quoi saisir toutqfois cette
occ~rpution cotnme une bonne occasion d'uf3rmrr qu'elle justijîc de penser
qu'«ci prcrniPrc~ilue» les Hu~rur uppurtirnnenù Bahreïn; et enfin se gar-
der do fuire irîterronîprccette oc.<.uputiosurisuvoir reçu uu préaluble
l'urgumentution contruire de Qutur.
42. Dans un tel contexte et dans cesconditions, il est surréalistede pen-
ser que le souverain de Qatar, «informé» ainsi du sentiment prima fucic
britannique, pouvait renoncerà ((participeà la procédure surcette base)).
De surcroît, en saisissant le Royaume-Uni de sa plainte contre Bahreïn
pour occupation illégale, lesouverain de Qatar ne mettait nullement en dis-
cussion, et ne soumettait nullement à décision,sa souverainetésur les
Hawar. Et il a confirméle 27 mai 1938cette mêmevision des choses: «Je
voudrais présenter ma plainteformelle contre les mesures prises par le
Gouvernement de Bahreïn dans des îles qui appartiennent àd'autres que
lui...»70 C'est là que l'équivoque,révélatricedu dol, affleure. Qatar ne
réclamaitaucune décisiondu Royaume-Uni sur sa propre souveraineté sur
les Hawar, au moment où, à son insu, la dévolutionde ces îles a Bahreïn
avait déjàété faiteen vertu de la décisionbritannique secrètede 1936.
43. Pour compléterle tableau, il conviendrait d'observer que ce n'est
pas seulement la décisionde 1936qui n'a pas étécommuniquée à Qatar.
La réclamation officielle formulée en avril 1936 par Bahreïn sur les
Hawar n'a pas non plus étéportée à sa connaissance. Du reste il fut tenu
dans l'ignorance de toutes les pièceséchangéesavant la décision finalede
1939.Le « Prrliminary Stutemrnt » de Belgravede 1939n'avaitjamais été
communiqué iiQatar, alors qu'ilétaitanalysédéjàdans lerapport Weight-
man « O~vnerslziof tlze Huizur f.slund.du 22 avril 1939qui futà la base
de la décisionbritannique de 1939.
44. C'est donc un semblant de (cconsentement)), chargéd'ombres et
d'équivoques,que l'arrêts'essaie à prendre en compte, tant pour la pro-
cédureque pour le fond,alors que ce consentement, limité entout étatde
cause i la procédure, étaitviciépar le do]. Ce consentement qui n'étaitni
explicite, ni parfaitement éclairé,ni totalement libre, a étéau surplus
déwouillé de tout son contexte aui le viciait. et en ~articulier de toutes les
séquenceséclairantes antérieures iil'échangede correspondances de mai
1938.Comment pouvait-on déclarerque ce consentement à la procédure,
viciéet invalide, pouvait générerune obligation d'êtreliépar la décision
britannique de 1939 qui n'étaitd'ailleurs que la décision priseantérieu-
rement en 1936'?
45. Comme nous l'avions fait observer plus haut, de hauts fonction-
naires du Foreign Office et de I'India Office ont du reste reconnu plus
L"Mémoirede Bahreïn. vol. 5, annexe 260, p. 1103
125 DELIMIT4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 161
disclosed a situation which prevented Qatar's consent from being fully
informed. This ivas un operution in four stages: jîrst, non-disclosure of
the esistcnce of the 1936 decision; then alloir,ingcrc.dencc to the notion
tliat the result~lnt B(~1zrainioccupution ivus totully independent of that
decision; then, hoi~ev~eru.sing thut occupution us CLprete.ut to support the
vieil. thtrt "at first sig,htWthe Huirurs helongcd to B~lhrain:and, ,final!,'.
doing rîothing to intrrrupt thtrt oc<.uputionun1c.s.sund until clrgunzcntsto
thclcorîtrurj, iivrr provitked h.Qatar.
42. In such a context and in these circumstances, it is surreal to con-
tend that the Ruler of Oa.ar. thus "informed" of the British mima facie
belief, was in a position to refuse to "participate in the proceedings on
that basis". Moreover, in complaining to the United Kingdom about
Bahrain's illegal occupation, the Ruler of Qatar was in no way throwing
open to debate or submittingfor decision his sovereignty overthe Hawars.
And on 27 May 1938he confirmed this view of the situation: "1 now sub-
mit my forma1 complaint against the steps taken by the Bahrain Govern-
ment in islandsbelonging to others . . ."20It is here that the equivocation,
manifestation of fraiid, becomes apparent. Qatar was not seeking any
decision from the United Kingdom on the matter of its sovereignty over
the Hawars at a time when, unknown to it, those islands had already
been awarded to Bahrain under the secret British decision of 1936.
43. To complete the picture, it should be noted that it was not only the
1936decision that was not communicated to Qatar. The official claim to
the Hawars made by Bahrain in April 1936 was not conveyed to Qatar
either. Moreover, Qatar was kept in ignorance of al1 the documents
exchanged before thie final decision of 1939. Belgrave's "Preliminary
Statement" of 1939 Iiad never been conveyed to Qatar, although it had
already been analysed in the Weightman Report of 22 April 1939, "0ii.n-
ership of'the Huivur I.slr~ntls",on which the British decision of 1939 was
founded.
44. It is thus a semblance of "consent". coloured bv Dretedc1 and
equivocation. that theJudgment seeks to rely on, in relation both to pro-
cedure and to substance. whereas that consent. which was in anv event
confined to the procedure, was tainted by fraud. A consent whch -
neither express, nor fully informed, nor freely given - has, moreover,
been stripped of its entire vitiating context, and in particular of the whole
illuminating sequence of events prior to the exchange of letters of May
1938. How could it be said that this consent to the proceedings, tainted
and invalid as it was, could create an obligation to be bound by the
British decision of 1939, which was in any case merely the prior
decision of 1936?
45. As we have already pointed out earlier, high officials of the For-
eign Office and the lndia Office moreover recognized subsequently that
Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. 5, Ann. 260. p. 1103 tard que la décisionde 1939avait étéimposéeau souverain deQatardont
le <<consentement>n >e possédait ni la qualité,ni la portée,pour équivaloir
juridiquement à un consentement explicite, éclairéet libre.
46. La conclusion aurait dû êtreun prononcé de nullitéde ce consen-
tement de la part de la Cour. Lu dkcision hritur~nique de 1939 ktuit de ce
,fuit iniproprrÙ servir(k.titre pour une dkijolution des Hc~ii-uù Bullr~ïn.
47. Nous nous sommes situés jusqu'ici dans l'analyse de la validité
seulement formelle de la décision britannique de 1939. Nous devons à
présentnous préoccuperde sa validité substantielle, en dépit d'ailleurs du
fait que son invalidité formelle nous aurait suffi pour nous dispenser
d'examiner la question de sa validité matérielle.Mais nous devons main-
tenant expliquer pourquoi nous traiterons ci-aprèscette seconde question
pourtant superflue, car si la Cour l'avait examinée, elle aurait pu du
moins, dans sa propre logique, parvenir à une solution
u minimu, nous
voulons dire une solution de partage des Hawar, en prenant la en
compte les effectivitésde Bahreïn.
III. UNE SOLUTION «A AII.YIMA»
48. Livrons-nous à présent A une lecture alternative de l'arrêtde la
Cour au sujet des Hawar. L'arrêts'est en effet limitéà l'examen de lu
l~uliditk purement fortnc~lde la décision britannique de 1939 en s'arrê-
tant au seuil des vices de consentement qui étaient patents et qu'il s'est
refuséà relever. Mais, de surcroît, l'arrêt a évité d'examiner la i.uliditk
suhstuntirlle de cette décision. L'arrêt toucheassez superficiellement cet
aspect en son paragraphe 140 qui rappelle, à juste titre toutefois, que le
Gouvernement britannique s'étaitengagéà rendre sa décision«dans un
esprit de véritéet dejustice)); aucune conclusion n'est cependant tiréepar
la suite de ce rappel pourtant significatif. 11est clair que, ce faisant, la
majoritéde la Cour a cherchéà éviterd'apprécierla consistance des effec-
tivitésinvoquéespar Bahreïn. Celles-ci, de l'avisgénéral,sont trop faibles
pour justifier la dévolution des Hawar à cet Etat. Ce n'est donc pas vers
cette question des effectivitésque l'on peut se tourner pour trouver un
meilleur titre en faveur de Bahreïn.
49. Mais arrêtons-nous quelques instants de plus sur cette question
pour vérifiersi la Cour n'aurait pas pu s'engager dans une voie autreque
celle de l'attribution des Hawar in totoà une seule partie et ce, en partant
de la logique mêmequi a inspiréla Cour.
50. La fameuse ((formule bahreïnite~ nous reconnaît sans réservele
pouvoir de déciderdu sort de la décisionde 1939et donc de la confirmer,
de l'annuler, de la modifier, ou de l'ajuster, le cas échéant,ou tout sim-the 1939 decision hadl been imposed on the Ruler of Qatar, whose "con-
sent" possessed neither thecharacter nor the scope to render it equivalent
in law to an express, informed and freely given consent.
46. The conclusiori that the Court should have reached was that this
consent was nul1 and void. In consequrncr, the British decision q/ 1939
couid not propcrly sc,.i1c LZStitle,fbr. an alrurd oj'the Huicur.~to Buhrairz.
47. So far, we have confined ourselves to an analysis of the formal
validity of the British decision of 1939. We must now examine its sub-
stantive validity, despite the fact that its formal invalidity would have
obviated the need to consider the issue of its substantive validity. How-
ever, we must now explain why we go on to deal with this second ques-
tion, even though it is superfluous, for, if the Court had considered it,
then it would at least have been able, in the terms of its own logic, to
reach an u n~inirnasolution, that is to say a solution that shared the
Hawars, taking account in so doing of Bahrain's eJfi.c.tivités.
48. Let us now undertake an alternative reading of the Court's Judg-
ment on the Hawars. that Judgment having confined itself to examining
th^purelj~ji>r.rîirrvluliditj3of the British decision of 1939, stopping short
of the issue of vitiation of consent which, tliough manifest, it refused to
acknowledge. But, in addition, the Judgment avoided examining thc sub-
.sturztivevulidity of the decision. This aspect is touched upon in a some-
what superficial manner in paragraph 140 of the Judgment, which does,
however, rightly point out that the British Government had undertaken
to give itsdecision "in the light of truth and justice". although no conclu-
sion is drawn from this albeit significant point. It is clear that, in so
doing. the majority of the Court sought to avoid evaluating the strength
of the cyfi.ctivitl:.srelied upon by Bahrain. These, in the general view, are
too weak to justify the award of the Hawars to that State. It is thus not
through recourse to this matter of c/fi.ctivitl:s that a better title in favour
of Bahrain may be found.
49. But let us linger a little longer over this question to see if the Court
could not have fountl some solution other than the award of the Hawars
in toto to one Party alone, taking as Our starting point the very logic
which inspired the Court.
50. The famous " Bahraini formula" unreservedly accords us the power
to rule on the Sate of the 1939 decision, and thus, where necessary. to
confirm it, annul it, amend it. adjust it, or quite simply to interpret it in163 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
plement de l'interpréter d'une manière qui lui restituerait sa cohérence
interne. La formule se lit comme suit: <<Lesparties prient la Cour de
trancher toute question relative à un droit territorial ou à tout autre titre
ou intérêtqui peut faire l'objet d'un différend entre elles...))
51. Ouvrons ici une parenthèse. Ne croit-on pas que cette ((formule
bahreïnite)) (qui, comme son nom l'indique, avait été proposéepar
Bahreïn) peut et doit s'analyser comme une invitation faite à la Cour de
ne pas tenir compte du tout du principe de I'utipossidc~tisjuris et donc de
soumettre la décisionbritannique de 1939 à tout examen, à toute critique
ou même à toute sanction qu'elle pourrait mériter? II nous semble en
effet que, là où I'uti po.s.sid~tisuris pouvait nous lier les mains et nous
imposer de confirmer purement et simplement la décisionde 1939,la for-
mule bahreïnite au contraire nous délivrait entièrement et nous invitait
au libre examen de cette décision. On observera aussi au passage que
plaider l'appartenance des Hawar à Bahreïn au nom de I'uti possidetis
juri.~exposait Bahreïn, qui l'avait tenté, a la fois à un inconvénientet à un
risque. Inconvénient de mettre en avant une présence bahreïnite aux
Hawar au jour de l'indépendance, présencefondéesur des effectivitésfra-
giles, voire insignifiantes, donc impropres à la justifier. Et surtout risque
pour Bahreïn de miner de l'intérieur sa stratégie judiciaire fondée sur
l'invocation du principe de I'uti possidetis juris. Bahreïn réclamait à la
fois Hawar et Zubarah, la première se trouvant sous l'autorité bahreïnite
au jour de l'indépendance et la seconde sous celle de Qatar à la même
date. Donc la stratégie judiciaire choisie par Bahreïn n'aurait permis à
celui-ci de gagner les Hawar qu'en perdant Zubarah, si l'on applique de
manière cohérente I'uti po.ssidc.tijuris que Bahreïn ne pouvait invoquer
dans le premier cas sans le faire dans le second. Fermons la parenthèse.
52. 11faut observer que la décisionde 1939sur laquelle l'arrêta choisi
de se fonder nous ramène, qu'on le veuille ou non, quant à son contenu,
à la question des ((effectivités))que l'arrêt acherchéà éviterd'examiner.
En effet le rapport de Weightman. proposant à son gouvernement d'attri-
buer les Hawar à Bahreïn, s'appuie seulement sur les effectivités réalisées
en 1937-1938à la suite de la décision secrètede 1936. A cet égard, rap-
pelons, une fois de plus, que la Cour avait le devoir de statuer sur le titre
historique invoqué contradictoirement par les Parties; mais, après avoir
tenu à fidèlement reproduire les arguments de chacune d'elles sur cette
question de titre, elle ne s'est curieusement pas du tout prononcée sur la
valeur de ces arguments respectifs, non plus d'ailleurs que sur le bien-
fondédu recours à ce moyen de droit".
" Comme on l'observera ci-dessous, les Parties ont abondamment plaidéce moyen de
droit.TOLI~ce qu'a bit la Cour dans le prébentarrèt c'est de l'avoir rappelé en divers
paragraphes.111ui.s uh.sol~l~i~(>~~tSU~I2 (IU(.1110117(,11i((/ll~,.td11 titrCf.
par exemple les paragraphes 100et 101danssqucls Bahreïn a invoquéun titre historique
remontant àdeux siècles.ainsi que les paragraphes 99 et 107dans lesquels Qatar invoque
<<laprimauté de son titre originaire)) <<surles cffectivitCsdont se prévaut Bahreïnn.such a way as would irestore its interna1 coherence. The formula reads as
follows: "The Parties request the Courtto decide any matter of territorial
right or other title or interest which may be a matter of difference
between them . . ."
51. Let us digress for a moment. 1sit not clear that this "Bahraini for-
mula" (which, as its riame suggests, had been proposed by Bahrain) can
and must be regarded as an invitation to the Court not to take any
account of the principle of u/ipo.ssidptisjuris and thus to submit the Brit-
ish decision of 1939 to whatever examination, criticism, or even sanction
that it might merit? Thus it seems to us that, whereas the principle of uti
possidetis juris could tie our hands and oblige us purely and simply to
confirm the 1939 decision, the Bahraini formula on the contrary fully
relieved us of that obligation and invited us freely to examine that deci-
sion. It will also be noted in passing that to argue that the Hawars
belonged to Bahrain by virtue of uti possidctis juris exposed Bahrain,
which had sought to do so, both to a difficulty and to a risk. It would
have been difficult tcl show that there was a Bahraini Dresence on the
Hawars at the date of independence - a presence based on cflectivités
that are sparse, not to Say insignificant, and hence incapable of substan-
tiating that presence. And, above all, Bahrain risks undermining from
within its legal strate,gy founded on the principle of uti po.ssidetisjuris.
Bahrain has claimed both Hawar and Zubarah: the former was under
Bahraini authority at the date of independence, the latter under the
authority of Qatar ori the same date. The legal strategy chosen by Bah-
rain would thus have enabled it to gain Hawar only by losing Zubarah, if
uti possideti.~juri.s - which Bahrain could not invoke in the former case
without doing so in the latter - were applied consistently. We now
return to the matter at hand.
53. It should be noted that the 1939 decision on which the Judgment
has opted to found itself leads us back, whether we like it or not, as far as
its content is concerned, to the question of the "cff~c/ivitc;s" that the
Judgment has sought to avoid examining. Weightman's report, in which
he proposed to his Giovernment that the Hawars be attributed to Bah-
rain, in fact relies solely on the cJfiic.tii1itisccomplished in 1937-1938fol-
lowing the secret decision of 1936. In this regard let us once again recall
that it was the duty of the Court to decide on the competing historical
titles invoked by the Parties; but, after taking the trouble faithfully to
reproduce the arguments of each of them on this question of title. it curi-
ously did not rule at ;a11 on the validity of those arguments, any more -
incidentally -- than it ruled on the Parties' right to invoke that ground".
''As will bc observed below. the Parties argued thisground at length. All that the
Court has done in thih Judgment isto refer to it in a number of paragrabut,trt rio ~iriir
riirikin!:uilj urtc,tiiprro .sc,/tlctlli., quc,srion(fritlc,. See, for exanip100 andagraphs
101. in which Bahrain invoked a historical title dating back two centuries. and para-
graphs 99 and 107. in which Qatar invoked "the primacy of its originatitle" "over the
qffc~tii.ic(;.cr.elicd byoBahrain". 53. On aurait pu comprendre que la Cour ait cherché à éviter de
s'engager dans un examen relativement difficile du titre historique. Mais
c'étaittomber de Charybde en Scylla. car elle s'est exposéeà déboucher
alors sur la question des effectivités évoquéepar le rapport Weightman et
escamotéepar nécessitépar elle. Du moins, en donnant l'apparence de ne
se fonder que sur la seule décisionbritannique de 1939,mais en s'arrêtant
soigneusement au seuil de la question des effectivitésimpliquéepar cette
décision,la Cour aurait-elle pu choisir une solution médianepar souci de
cohérence: aller au-delà d'un examen de la validitépurement formelle de
la décisionde 1939, tout en restant en deçà d'un véritable examen de la
validité matériellede cette décision. Agissant ~iminima, la Cour aurait pu
en effet éviterde chercher à remettre en cause les motivations du rapport
Weightman (fondées non seulement sur des effectivités trop fragiles, mais
encore sur de simples présomptions d'effectivités);elle aurait pu se bor-
ner plutôt à en tirer toutes les conclusions nécessaires, et non pas cer-
taines seulement comme l'avait déjàfait le Gouvernement britannique.
Expliquons-nous plus complètement sur les perspectives de cette solu-
tion médiane nécessairement inscrite, quoi qu'on dise, dans la logique du
choix de départ de la Cour.
54. Partons en effet de l'hypothèse, nécessairement impliquée par le
raisonnement de la Cour, à savoir que la décisionbritannique de 1939,
sur laquelle elle s'est fondée, aétémotivée,les motifs ayant étéclairement
explicitéspar le rapport Weightman au vu duquel le Gouvernement bri-
tannique s'est décidédans le sens que l'on sait. Force est alors de cons-
tater que l'arrêtde la Cour n'a pu écarter la question des effectivitésqui
est à la base des motifs avancés par Weightman qu'en se limitant à exa-
miner, comme nous l'avions relevé,l'aspect formel de la décisionbritan-
nique à l'exclusion de son contenu matériel. Ce faisant, la Cour n'a pas
craint
a) de s'arrêter ainsi a mi-chemin alors que les motifs de la décision
contenus dans le rapport Weightman ne sont pas sans pertinence
pour la solution de la question de la dévolution des Hawar;
b) de se prononcer inJiu p~titu, en deçà de ce que les Parties attendaient
d'ellelorsqu'elles l'ont habilitéeà aller vraiment et complètement au
fond du différend, grâce à la ((formule bahreïnite)).
55. Le document de base que la Cour aurait dû analyser en priorité est
donc le rapport Weightman, qui apparaît d'emblée
u) comme n'ayant fondé la décisionqu'en partie, en justifiant l'attribu-
tion de la grande île de Hawar par les effectivités; mais
h) comme ayant commis une erreur de fait et de droit en ((présumant))
simplement qu'il existait aussi des effectivitéspour le reste des îles
Hawar; alors que 53. It would be understandable that the Court sought to avoid embark-
ing on the relatively difficult task of examining the historical title. How-
ever, this was to faIl from Charybdis to Scylla, for it then exposed itself to
having to tackle the ejjCctivités issue raised by the Weightman report,
which, inevitably. it had to fudge. At least, having given the appearance
of basing itself solely on the 1939 British decision, while carefully stop-
ping short of the <//&.tivitc;sissue involved in that decision, the Court, for
the sake of consistericy. could have opted for a compromise solution:
going beyond an examination of the purely formal validity of the 1939
decision, while at the:same time stopping short of a full examination of
the substantive validlity of that decision. Acting u rninimu, the Court
could in effect have avoided seeking to cal1into question the underlying
reasoning of the Wei,ghtman report (which was based not only on exces-
sively flimsy cfictivirks but also on mere presumptions of </T~ctivitc;s);it
could instead simply have sought to draw al1the conclusions necessarily
flowing therefrom, ra~therthan only certain of them, as the British Gov-
ernment had already done.
Let us explain more fully what would be involved in this compromise
solution. which must logically follow, whether one likes it or not, from
the Court's choice of starting point.
54. Let us start then from the assumption, inevitably implied by the
Court's reasoning, that the 1939 British decision, on which it based itself,
was reasoned, the grounds having been clearly set out in the Weightman
report, in the light of which the British Government decided the matter in
the way we know it did. We are then bound to recognize that the Court's
Judgment was only able to ignore the ejfectivités issue, on which the
grounds put forward by Weightman are based, by confining itself, as we
have indicated, to examining the formal aspect of the British decision to
the exclusion of its niaterial content. In so doing, the Court was uncon-
cerned about :
(a) thus halting halfway, despite the fact that the grounds for the deci-
sion set out in the Weightman report are not without relevance for
resolving the issue of the award of the Hawars;
(h) ruling "infra petita": falling short of what the Parties expected of it
when they empowered it to make a full and complete examination of
the substance of the dispute under the "Bahraini formula".
55. The basic document, analysis of which should have been of pri-
mary concern to the Court, is thus the Weightman report, which appears
on the face of it
(a) to have provided only a partial foundation for the decision, in jus-
tifying the awar'dof the main Hawar Island on the basis of ejjkctiv-
itc;~;but
(h) to have committed an error of fact and law in simply "presuming"
that <i/iic.tivitésalso existed for the remainder of the Hawar Islands,
whereasc) Bahreïn, dans ses écritures, et notamment par la carte no 4 de
l'annexe 7 de son mémoire (voir ci-après, p. 213, situe les effectivités
EXCLUSIVEMENT dans la grande île de Hawar; et que
d) dans ses écritures Bahreïn parle d'ailleurs très souvent de «Hawar»
ou de «l'île de Hawar)) (au singulier). La terminologie est d'ailleurs
assez parlante par elle-mêmeparce que seule la grande île s'appelle
«Jazirat Hawar »(((l'îlede Hawar »), et a donnéson nom de Hawar »
a l'ensemble des îles alors que chacune des formations autres que
((Jazirat Hawar» possède son nom propre.
56. Sila Cour s'étaitlivrée a un examen du rapport Weightman qui est
à la base de la décisionde 1939, elle seserait donc rendu compte immé-
diatement d'une certaine contradiction interne qu'il comporte.
57. C'est cette contradiction interne qui a jusqu'ici affecté la pleine
application de la décision de 1939, puisque d'une part Bahreïn n'a pu
occuper que la plus grande de ces îles et que d'autre part Qatar se refuse
depuis soixante et un ans à acquiescer a ladite décision. Lu Cour ne pou-
vait rc.mplir con~pli.tement son n~undat qu'ell~ tient d~ la fbrmule huhreï-
nite qu'en mcttunt un terme Li cette situation et en ren~lunt lu dkcisiondc~
1939 applicable pur les Parties, grcîce uli remL.r/ecpi'elle devuit imugirzer
pour faire dispuraîtr la contradiction interne rclevée duns le rapport
Weightrnun et traduite dans lu ~lkcision britannique.
58. 11n'est pas difficile de se rendre compte que la décisionbritannique
de 1939 était inspiréepar des motifs politiques et des intérêtspétroliers.
Mais le rapport Weightman lui a donné également un habillage ou un
~wtif'juridique, en invoquant des effectivitésde Bahreïn. Sans avoir a
revenir sur la faiblesse de ces effectivités,on se bornera à noter que la
décision britannique de 1939 ne pouvait pas sur une telle base justifier
l'attribution des Hawar dans leur totalité, mais seulement la plus grande
île des Hawar, mêmesi la possession physique impliquée par ces effecti-
vitésétait,surtout au moment où Weightman écrivait,à la fois très faible
et très récente.
59. Mais la Cour pouvait observer que, au paragraphe 13de son rap-
port, M. Weightman s'étaithasardé à émettre irnr lijpothi..se, qui ét~iit
filusse et qui Ie &meure ricc,jour,en «prc;.vum(rnt»que les petites îles et
rochers autres que ((Jazirat Hawar)) («l'île de Hawar») devaient tomber
«presufllrib/j~» sous l'autorité du souverain qui contrôle la grande île.
Ainsi Weightman reconnut parfaitement que Bahreïn ne possédait pas
d'effectivitéssur les autres îles.
60. On ne voit dès lors pas qurlf0nclemcnt juridique on pourrait faire
valoir pour justifier en totulitkla décisionde 1939et attribuer à Bahreïn
l'ensemble des îles Hawar. On n'en voit d'autant moins que, pour les îles
autres que la grande, Qatar a pour lui non seulement l'absence de posses-
sion physique de ces îles par Bahreïn, mais aussi la proximité géogra-
phique et la présomption de droit international concernant la souverai- DELIMITATION AND Q~JESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 165
c) Bahrain, in its viritten pleadings, and in particular in map No. 4 in
Annex 7 to its Pvlemorial(see p. 215 below), locates the ~f~ectivitPs
EXCLUSIVEL1t' on the main Hawar Island: and. moreover.
(d) makes frequent reference in its written $eadings to "Hawar" or to
"Hawar Island" (in the singular). Indeed, the nomenclature speaks
for itself, since only the main island is called "Jazirat Hawar"
("Hawar Island"), and has given its name of "Hawar" to the entire
group of islandii, even though each one of the islands other than
"Jazirat Hawar" has its own name.
56. If the Court had undertaken an examination of the Weight-
man report, on which the 1939 decision was based, it would thus imme-
diately have appreciated the element of interrzcrl contrudictionii~hic.1it
contuins.
57. It is that inter:nal contradiction which has up to the present time
affected the full irnpi'c~rnentutioof the 1939 decision, since on the one
hand Bahrain has been able to occupy only the largest of those islands,
whilst on the other hand Qatar has refused for 61 years to acquiesce in
that decision. Thc Court couldful~~ acc~ornpli.shthe mandute caonjerred
uporl if hl, tlic Buhru~ni,firrnirluorziy hj. hrirzging t1li.ssituution to un end
und renciering it po.ssihlcfor the Purtie.~to irnplclment the decision under a
sol~ition ii~liicli it 11itic.urnhrnt upon the Court to devise. in order to
rlin~ir~rrtc~the iriternul' contru~lictioti ii,hich ive huve noted in the. W~ight-
rnu~ireport rrncl ii.hie.h ii,u.srqflrctc~rl in the British tIc>ci.sion.
58. It can readily be appreciated that the British decision of 1939 was
inspired by politic.rrl consi(/c~ru/ioand by oil interests. But the Weight-
man report also gave it tr lcgul rl?otii,utioor veneer, by invoking Bah-
rain's c~ffc~ctii~its.ithout having to return to the weakness of those
cg'bc-tiitité,~e will confine ourselves to noting that the British decision of
1939 could not on tlhat basis justify the award of the Hawars in their
totality. but only the largest Hawar Island, and even then the physical
possession implied by those gflCctii~itcwas - particularly when Weight-
man was writing - both very weak and very recent.
59. But the Court could have observed that, in paragraph 13 of his
report. Mr. Weightrrian ventured to formulate u hypothc.ri.~, ii~hicli ii3u.s
firl.~~an(/ ii.lii(.li rc~rnrrirlsso to thiintk"u.s.sur~iingthat the islets and
rocks other than "Jazirat Hawar" ("Hawar Island") must "pr'sur~~ublj,"
fall to the authority of the ruler establishing himself on the main island.
Thus Weightman clearly recognized that Bahrain had no c$i~c.tii,itover
the other islands.
60. We cannot thuefore see ii-htrt Ic~gulhusicould be relied upon to
justify irz its tottrlithe 1939 decision and the award to Bahrain of the
entirety of the Hawar Islands. This is al1 the more so in that. for the
islaiids other than the main one, Qatar has in its favour not only the lack
of physical possession of those islands by Bahrain, but also geographical
proximity and the presumption of international law concerniiig the sov-neté sur des îles situéesen totalité ou en partie dans la mer territoriale
de Qatar.
61. Par l'utilisation de l'expression ((lespctitc's îles uridet inhubitées
et les îlots rocuillrux qui ,firment lu totulit; de ll'arckipelde Huii,ur»,
Weightman laisse certes entendre dans son rapport que les îles autres
que la grande devraient suivre le sort de cette dernière. On pourrait inter-
préter cela comme une invitation à appliquer en droit international le
concept de «l'accessoire qui .suit le principal)).
62. Mais:
u) iln'existe pas en droit international de principe de cette nature;
b) on viendrait à appliquer à la grande île «Jazirat Hawarn une «ji)rce
d'uttructiotz» sur les autres, alors mêmeque les effectivités qui la
poussaient vers Bahreïn étaient déjà par elles-mêmestrès peu sub-
stantielles. surtout en 1937-1938: et
c) surtout, on viendrait à appliquer au bénéfice de «Jazirat Hawar)) ((un
pouvoir d'attraction)) qu'on dénierait à la masse continentale de
Qatar, qui a pour elle la présomption légaled'appartenance des îles
situéesdans la mer territoriale de I'Etat côtier: et enfin
d) à cet égard,on se souviendra des remarques déjàcitéessupru de Max
Huber dans l'affaire de I'Ilcdo Pulnzus et selon lesquelles d'une part
un «acte de prise de possession initiale ...peut difficilement s'étendre
à toutes les parties du territoire)) et d'autre part l'exercice de la sou-
veraineté qui est «une manifestation continue et prolongée, doit se
déployerà travers tout le territoire))".
63. Rien ne justifiait donc d'attribuer l'ensemble des Hawar à Bahreïn
du seul fait que la principale ile de Hawar lui reviendrait. La décisionde
1939aurait dû à tout le moins êtreinterprétéedans les limites de la cohé-
rence interne du rapport Weightman qui la motivait. Utze solution
moyenne ù lu question (lc~.H suit~~rpou~~uitdonc Ctrr eni>isug&e cluns le
clroit,fiLIClI kogi~p~de cc1rupport qui indique et?sot1purrrgraplzr 4 que Ir
principe de>pro.uirnitcjolie enjiri'eur (le II'Etcrtcôtier! En ne l'envisageant
pas, l'arrêt s'est davantage affaibli, car la Cour a implicitement jugé
«ultra petitu)) sur la base d'effectivités limitéeàs la grande île des Hawar
et totalement absentes dans les autres îles et îlots.
64. Ainsi donc, et pour nous résumeret conclure,
une pre111iPr(crpproc>l~à e,partir de l'analyse du c-ontrnude la décision
britannique de 1939, aurait dû consister à laisser à Bahreïn la souve-
rainetésur la grande île «Jcrzirut H(lii,crr»et à reconnaître à Qatar la
souveraineté sur les autres petites îles, où aucune effectivitébahreïnite
'lNations Unies, Rrc,ir<~tille.~srnt(Jncc,.rorhitrcrlc,.~v,ol. II. p. 855, et traduction fran-
çaise dans la R(,iuc.~<:n(le, tiroit intcrntriioncilpublic. op. (,il.. 1935.
130 DELIMIT/\TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 166
ereignty of islands which are situated wholly or in part in the territorial
sea of Qatar.
61. By using the expression "the small harren and uninhuhited islun~ls
und rocky islrts which jorm the c~mplete Haiilar group", Weightman
clearly implies in his report that the islands other than the main one
should follow the fate of the latter. This could be interpreted as an invita-
tion to apply in international law the adage "the accessory folloii~.sthe
principul".
62. But:
(u) no principle of tlhiskind exists in international law;
(h) this would be to apply to the main island of "Jazirat Hawar" a
"gruvitationul po11,er"over the others, whereas the eJ'ctii~itC..s push-
ing it towards Bahrain were already very weak in themselves, par-
ticularly in 1937-1938 ;and
(r.) above all, it would be to apply in favour of "Jazirat Hawar" "a
gravitational force" denied to the mainland mass of Qatar, which
has in its favour the legal presumption that islands situated within
the territorial sea of the coastal State appertain to that State; and
finally:
(d) in this regard, wi:would recall the observation already quoted above
by Max Huber in the Islantl c!f'Pulmuscase, to the effect that (i) the
"act of first takirig possession . . .can hardly extend to every portion
of the territory", and (ii) the display of sovereignty, which is "a con-
tinuous and prollonged manifestation. must make itself felt through
the whole of the territory"".
63. Nothing could therefore justify awarding the entirety of the Hawar
Islands to Bahrain simply because it was entitled to the main Hawar
Island. The 1939deciçion ought at the very least to have been interpreted
sub.ject to the limits of interna1 consistency of the Weightman report
which underlay it. It i~~oirltlker<firr have bec~nconsistcwt ,i,ith tlle logic
of'that report, puragruplj 4 of ii.11icstute~ltl~ntthe principle qf'pro.uimity
fkvoured the c.ocrsta[Stute(!), to envi.sage LIconlpromi.sr so/utiorr to the
issue of'tllc)HUIIYIYSI.n not doing so the Judgment has further weakened
itself, for the Court has implicitly ruled "ultra pctitu" on the basis of
pffictii~itP.slimited tci the main Hawar island and totally absent in the
other islands and islets.
64. Thus, to resunie and conclude:
rrfirst upprou(.h,s.tarting from an analysis of the conterlt of the British
decision of 1939,ought to have consisted in leaving Bahrain with sov-
ereignty over the main island of "Ju-irut HLI\IYI~" and recognizing
Qatar's sovereignty over the other small islands, where there was no
-- United Nations. R~,port.ofI~it<~rnrrrioulrhitrul Aivur.(l.\(RIAAVol. II, p. 855.
and French translation in R<,I,~~~S~~II>/~droit int<,~.~~ulprblic. op(.if.1935.
130 167 DELIMITATION ET QL'ESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
n'étaitdécelable;c'eût été unedivision «verticule» de l'archipel côtier
des Hawar;
- une seconde upproc~l~ce~ ll,e aussi fondéesur l'analyse du contenu de la
décisionde 1939,aurait pu être une division ((horizontule)) de Jazirat
Hawar ou mêmede l'ensemble des Hawar. Nous voulons dire par là
que cette seconde approche se serait nourrie essentiellement de l'idée
que les effectivités bahreïnites sont non seulement faibles dans cer-
taines régions et inexistantes dans d'autres, mais aussi et surtout
qu'ellesont la particularitéd'avoir ététrop tcrrtliitespour certainesd'en-
tre elles, ce qui les disqualifie pour servir de faire-valoir pour une sou-
veraineté. Les effectivitésétabliesen 1937-1939dans la partie nord de
la grande île de Hawar auraient inspirécette division «horizontale».
65. En tout état de cause, l'absence de consentement de Qatar a la
décision de 1939 et les hésitations consécutives du Royaume-Uni n'ont
pas fini de fragiliser juridiquement cette décisionbritannique. Celle-ci n'a,
semble-t-il, pas paru à son propre auteur comme absolument justifiée.Il
est plus que vraisemblable qu'elle ait étéinspirée plus par des intérêts
pétroliers que par des considérations tiréesdu dossier. Mais ce qu'il faut
surtout retenir comme significatif dans la conduite britannique, c'est le
fait que:
le Royaume-Uni commença par prendre en 1936une décision simple-
ment ((provisoire)),qu'il n'a pas divulguéeà Qatar, comme s'iln'était
pas tout à fait certain de sa rectitude juridique, étant remarqué au
surplus que ce comporten-ient aurait dû disqualifier par principe le
Royaume-Uni pour connaître une nouvelle fois de cette affaire en
1938-1939; il y a là en effet, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, un
« conflict of interr.vts» caractérisé;
le Royaume-Uni pressépar Qatar, qui avait protesté contre la déci-
sion définitive de 1939, avait invoqué, entre autres, la situation de
guerre mondiale pour justifier son refus de réexaminer la question;
le Royaume-Uni accepta dans les années soixante I'idéed'un réexa-
men de la décisionde 1939 par une autorité ((neutre)),dans le cadre
d'un arbitrage international.
66. Il convient par ailleurs de relever l'absence d'acquiescement de
Qatar et ses protestations persistantes contre la décisionde 1939. Celle-ci
n'a pas été acceptée par Qatar et a fait l'objet depuis lors et jusqu'à ce
jour de protestations répétéed se sa part. On reviendra plus loin sur les
conséquencesjuridiques des protestations de Qatar depuis soixante et un
ans contre l'occupation des îles Hawar par Bahreïn à la suite de la noti- DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 167
evidence of any Bahraini rffectivités; that would have been a "vrrti-
cul" division of the Hawar coastal archipelago;
- LIsccond rrpprouch,also based on analysis of the content of the 1939
decision, could have been a "horiiontul" division of Jazirat Hawar, or
even of the whole of the Hawars. What we mean by this is that this
second approach would have been based essentially on the notion
that Bahraini ejfectiiiités are not only weak in some areas and non-
existent in others, but also and above al1that they are specifically dis-
tinguished by having been too lutc as regards certain of them, which
disqualifies them from serving as a basis for a claim to sovereignty.
The rjj'c~ir istkslished in 1937-1939 in the northern part of the
main Hawar island would have formed the basis for this "horizontal"
division.
IV. EFFECTI~.IT AESD REFUSA TLO ACQUIESCE
65. In any event, the absence of consent by Qatar to the 1939decision,
and the subsequent doubts expressed by the United Kingdom, continued
to weaken that decision from the legal standpoint. It would seem that,
even to its own author, the decision was not Sullyjustified. It was more
than likely that it was inspired rather by oil interests than by considera-
tions based on materials in the case file. But what is particularly signifi-
cant in the British conduct is the fact that :
- the United Kingclom began by taking in 1936 a purely "proi~isionnl"
decision, which it did not disclose to Qatar, as if it was not altogether
certain of its legal correctne-- conduct, it should be noted, which
should in princip!lehave disqualified the United Kingdom from deal-
ing with this case again in 1938-1939: as we have already pointed out.
there was here a blatant "conflict of interests":
- the United Kingdom, when pressed by Qatar, which had protested
against the finalecision of 1939, had cited inter ulitrthe World War
situation as justification for its refusal to reopen the question;
- in the 1960s the IJnited Kingdom accepted the idea of a re-examina-
tion of the 1939 decision by a "neutral" authority, within the frame-
work of an international arbitration.
66. Note should be taken, moreover, of the absence of any acquies-
cence by Qatar and of its persistent protests against the 1939 decision.
That decision has not been accepted by Qatar and has from that time
~intilthe present day been the subject of repeated protests on its part. We
shall return later to the legal consequences of Qatar's protests over a
period of 61 years against the occupation of the Hawar Islands by Bah-168 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
fication de la décisionde 1939.On se bornera ici à analyser la prétendue
acceptation de cette décisionpar Qatar.
67. Il a été faitétatd'une lettre d'août 1939que le souverain deQatar
avait adresséeau résidentpolitique britannique et dont un passage, dicté
par des considérations de courtoisie et de déférence, aété interprété
comme un acquiescement du souverain à la décisionbritannique. Ce qu'il
faut en véritéretenir, c'est lalettre du 18 novembre 1939 adresséepar le
souverain deQatar à Prior. agent politique du Royaume-Uni à Bahreïn,
qui est d'une parfaite clarté:
«Je souhaite donc informer Votre Excellence que je nc. reconnuis
ni n'uclnic.tyuc 1. Gouvernemrnt [le Buhrcïn (rit 1. rl~oindrr-cl.icw de
droit uiJet.les îlc~sHniixuet que je considère toute mesure prise ces
derniers temps par le Gouvernement de Bahreïn comme un défiet un
empiétement sur mes droits, contre lequel je proteste crilcc lu plus
grun& chrrgie; en conséquence, commr jc iJou.ren c~idéjù iMfi)r~nL;j,e
rt;seri.~c.nies droits sur Ics îles Huiiwr ct je1 ne reco~~nuisuucune
mesure qui pui.s.sry ailoir &te:pri..»23
68. On peut se demander dans ces conditions si et pourquoi les pro-
testations de Qatar seraient inopérantes et si Bahreïn a réussi, depuis
soixante et un ans, une occupation effective, continue et paisible des îles
Hawar. C'est ce qu'il convient d'examiner maintenant.
69. Dans la pratique jurisprudentielle internationale, le comportement
des Etats est grandement pris en compte. Le silence d'un Etat, son
consentement, son acquiescement, sa renonciation, sa protestation,
l'estoppel qui peut frapper ses actes, constituent des élémentsimportants
dans la création ou l'extinction d'un titre sur un territoire. Dans le cas
présent, Qatar a toujours protesté, et ne cesse de le faire, d'une part
contre la décisionbritannique de 1939et d'autre part contre les activités
de Bahreïn dans les îles Hawar. Cette conduite constante deQatar est de
nature i empêcherla formation d'un titre au profit de Bahreïn.
70. Le refus d'acquiescement de Qatar aux effectivités potentiellesde
Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar est patent. On ne peut contester que, depuis
1938, Qatar n'a pas cesséde protester contre l'<<occupationillégale))des
Hawar. En 1939,lorsque la décisionbritannique lui fut notifiée,le souve-
rain deQatar protesta. Compte tenu du rapport d'inégalitéentre son pays
et le Royaume-Uni, et par-delà le langage de courtoisieet de déférence,la
position de Qatar ne pouvait pas êtreinterprétéeautrement que comme
un refus d'acquiescement et une demande de réexamen de la décision,
toutes choses qui empêchaient les c<effectivités>d)e Bahreïn, à supposer
qu'elles aient eu quelque consistance, de produire leurs effets de droit.
71. Depuis lors, bien des manifestations claires de l'absence d'acquies-
23Mémoire deQatar. vol. 8. annexe 111.213. p. 59; les italideenousnt I>ELIMI'TATlON AND QlJESTlONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 168
rain subsequent upon notification of the 1939 decision. At this point we
shall confine ourseIves to analysing the purported acceptance of that
decision by Qatar.
67. Reference has been made to a letter of August 1939from the Ruler
of Qatar to the British Political Resident, a passage from which, dictated
by considerations of courtesy and deference, has been interpreted as
acquiescence by the Ruler in the British decision. What should really be
noted is the letter of 18 November 1939 from the Ruler to Prior, British
Political Agent in Bahrain, the terms of which are crystal clear:
"1 therefore beg to inform Your Honour that 1 neithcr r<~cogni:e
tlor suhrîiit tl~trttlir Bahruirz Gollcrnnîcnt liuvr tllr least Iuiiful (.on-
noction ii,it/i t/~ Huiixr Iskrntls, and that 1view that whatever meas-
ure which have been lately taken by the Bahrain Government as a
challenge and an encroachment upon my rights rrguinstiihich 1rliost
strongb. protest, and therefore, us 1 lluve inforr~lr~ij'ou hc:fi)rc],
1 rc.rcriJe171)riglzts to the Huii~~r1.vlund.>327.llilerzot rccognizing un)'
r~ic~tr.nri~1lic.hu)) hr tukrn in tl~enz. . .
68. In these circumstances we may ask ourselves if and why Qatar's
protests should be inoperative and whether Bahrain has succeeded in
conducting for 61 years an effective, continuous and peaceful occupation
of the Hawar Islancls. It is to this that we must now turn.
69. International jurisprudential practice sets great store by the con-
duct of States. A state's silence, its consent, its acquiescence, any waiver
of its rights, any protest, any effect of estoppel upon its actions, al1rep-
resent important elements in the creation or extinction of a title over a
territory. In the present case, Qatar has always protested, and never
ceased to do so. on the onehand against the British decision of 1939and
on the other againsi. the activities of Bahrain in the Hawar Islands. This
consistent course of conduct by Qatar is such as to prevent any title
arising in favour of Bahrain.
70. Qatar's refusal to acquiesce in Bahrain's potential [email protected]é.~over
the Hawar Islands is manifest. It cannot be disputed that since 1938
Qatar has never ceased to protest against the "illegal occupation" of the
Hawars. In 1939,when the British decision was notified to him, the Ruler
of Qatar protested. Given the unequal relationship between his country
and the United Kingdom, and looking beyond the language of courtesy
and deference, Qatar's position could not be interpreted otherwise than
as a refusal to acquiesce and as a request for a re-examination of the deci-
sion, al1of which pi-evented Bahrain's </jbc.tivitc;s - assuming that there
was any substance 1.0them - from producing any effects in law.
71. Since then, a number of clear manifestations of lack of acquies-
'l Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 8. Ann. 111.2p.59: emphasis added.169 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS. COMMUNE)
cement peuvent êtrerelevées.Elles ont pris des formes diverses, telles que
des propositions de médiation, d'arbitrage ou de règlement judiciaire.
72. C'est ainsi que, dans les années soixante, Qatar avança l'idéed'un
arbitrage qui, en lui-même, nepouvait d'une part que réexaminer, voire
remettre en cause, tant la décision britannique de 1939 que la ligne de
1947et d'autre part qu'exprimer le refus d'acquiescement à ces deux déci-
sions. L'arbitrage proposé visait en effet à trancher les questions de la
délimitation maritime, du statut de Fasht ad Dibal et de Qit'at Jaradah et
de la souveraineté sur les îles Hawar. Ce refus d'acquiescement aux actes
d'occupation de Bahreïn dans les Hawar étaitd'autant plus intéressant à
relever qu'il doit être considéré comme ayant étéreconnu par le
Royaume-Uni lui-même,auteur des deux décisions,dans la mesure où
l'arbitrage proposé par Qatar avait reçu l'agrément du pouvoir britan-
nique, dont l'autorité protectrice était encore présentedans les deux pays.
73. On ne peut qu'admettre que Qatar fit preuve de persévérancedans
son refus d'acquiescement à l'attribution des Hawar en substituant à la
proposition infructueuse d'arbitrage celle tout aussi improductive de
médiation. Celle-ci fut confiéeà l'Arabie saoudite, pourtant réputéetra-
ditionnellement plus proche de Bahreïn que de Qatar, avec lequel elle
avait un contentieux territorial. Cette médiation, déployéedepuis en prin-
cipe 1976, en fait depuis 1983jusqu'à 1990, et considéréeencore comme
non éteinte depuis la saisine de la Cour en 1991, s'est soldéejusqu'ici,
après vingt-quatre ans, par un échec.11n'y a toujours pas étémis fin, car
elle se poursuit en principe à cejour en marge du Conseil de coopération
du Golfe lui aussi saisi.
74. Enfin le refus d'acquiescement aux décisions de 1939 et 1947 se
déduit fortement de la volonté de Qatar d'attraire Bahreïn devant la
Cour sur la base des accords de 1987et de 1990,eux-mêmes expressions
et témoins de ce refus d'acquiescement, et qui ont servi de fondement à
notre compétence. La Cour est bien placéepour témoigner de la persé-
véranceavec laquelle Qatar a réussià combattre l'exception d'incompé-
tence soulevéepar Bahreïn et à faire déclarerla Cour compétente. L'épi-
sode difficile de la phase de la compétence (1991-1995) est en effet
particulièrement significatif cet égard.On ne saurait perdre de vue non
plus que, en dépit,ou qu'au-delà, des arrangements procéduraux devant
la Cour, Qatar demeure clairement la partie demanderesse en cette affaire,
circonstance qui montre A l'évidenceque Qatar n'a jamais acceptéla per-
tinence des «effectivités» de Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar. Par le fait mime
de sa saisine la Cour est ainsi mise elle-mêmeen situation de reconnaître
le refus persistant d'acquiescement de Qatar aux deux décisionsbritan-
niques de 1939 et 1947.
75. En bref, les protestations de Qatar, soustoutes leurs formes, à pro-
pos de toutes sortes d'actions entreprises par Bahreïn dans les îles Hawar,
sont à la fois nombreuses, variées et persistantes. Elles montrent que
Qatar n'a pas laissése réaliserpar son silence des effectivitésbahreïnites.
Par ailleurs, et depuis l'introduction de l'affaire devant la Cour, Qatar a DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 169
cence can be noted. They have taken various forms, such as proposais for
mediation, arbitraticln or judicial settlement.
72. Thus in the 1960s Qatar put forward the idea of an arbitration,
which in itself could only have been with a view on the one hand to re-
examining, indeed ca.llinginto question, both the British decision of 1939
and the line of 1947and, on the other, to expressing a refusal to acquiesce
in these two decisioris. Thus it was envisaged that the proposed arbitra-
tion would settle the questions of the maritime delimitation, of the status
of Fasht ad Dibal arid Qit'at Jaradah and of sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands. This refusal to acquiesce in the acts of occupation by Bahrain in
the Hawars was particularly noteworthy in that it must be regarded as
having been recognized by the United Kingdom itself, author of the two
decisions, inasmuch as the proposal for arbitration by Qatar had been
approved by the Brii.ish,who still exercised protective authority over the
two countries.
73. We are bound to recognize that Qatar demonstrated perseverance
in its refusa1to acquiesce in the award of the Hawars, for, when the pro-
posa1 for arbitration failed, it replaced it with another, equally unsuccess-
ful, for mediation. This task was entrusted to Saudi Arabia, despite the
latter's being traditionally regarded as closer to Bahrain than to Qatar,
with which it had a territorial dispute. That mediation, conducted in
principle since 1976, in fact from 1983 to 1990, and still regarded as not
extinguished by the seisin of the Court in 1991,has up to the present day,
after 24 years, failed to achieve a result. It has still not been terminated,
for it continues in pi-incipleto this day, as an adjunct to the work of the
Gulf Cooperation Council, which is also seised of the matter.
74. Finally, the refusal to acquiesce in the decisions of 1939 and 1947
is clearly implied by Qatar's wish to bring Bahrain before the Court on
the basis of the 1987and 1990agreements, which are in themselves mani-
festations and evidence of this refusal to acquiesce, and which served as
the basis for our juirisdiction. The Court is well placed to attest to the
perseverance with which Qatar succeeded in overcoming the objection to
jurisdiction raised bli Bahrain and in having the Court declare itself com-
petent. The difficult episode of the jurisdiction phase (199 1-1995) is
indeed particularly significant in this regard. Nor should we lose sight of
the fact that notwithstanding, or looking beyond, the procedural arrange-
ments before the Court, Qatar clearly remains the applicant Party in this
case, a fact which patently demonstrates that Qatar has never accepted
the relevance of Bahrain's "c;ffi)ctiilitc;s"on the Hawar Islands. By
the very fact of its seisin, the Court is thus itself placed in a position to
recognize Qatar's persistent refusal to acquiesce in the two British
decisions of 1939 and 1947.
75. In sum. Qatar's protests, in al1their forms, with regard to al1kinds
of actions undertaken by Bahrain in the Hawar Islands, areboth numer-
ous, varied and persistent. They show that Qatar did not allow Bahraini
<f;fi~catiilt.s be acquired by remaining silent. Moreover, ever since the
case was brought before the Court, Qatar has consistently protested170 DÉLIMITATION ET Q~JESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
toujours protestécontre le non-respect du .stutu quo par Bahreïn. Entre le
dépôtde son mémoireet celui de son contre-mémoire, c'est-à-dire pour la
périodede deux ans seulement (1996-1997), on peut relever pas moins de
treize protestations en forme de notes verbales concernant:
i) la législationde Bahreïn lorsqu'elle affecte les iles Hawar;
ii) la violation de l'espace territorial dans ces îles;
iii) les annonces publiéespar Bahreïn dans la presse en ce qui concerne
ses activitésdans ces îles et ses prétentions a la souveraineté sur leur
en~emble'~.
76. La jurisprudence internationale se réfèreaux actes susceptibles de
constituer des manifestations d'exercice pacifique et continu d'une auto-
rité étatique sur un territoire. Les faits d'occupation des Hawar par
Bahreïn eurent lieu immédiatement après la décision<(provisoire)>britan-
nique de 1936. 11 importe d'en apprécier les caractères et de vérifier s'ils
constituent des effectivités susceptibles de constituer un titre de Bahreïn
sur ces îles.Ilimporte égalementd'étudier la conduite de Qatar pendant
toute cette période pour savoir si cette conduite était vraiment de nature
à emdcher ou non Bahreïn de constituer ce titre. Mais les circonstances
dans lesquelles Bahreïn avait entrepris ses actes d'occupation entre la
date de la décision provisoire de 1936et celle de la décisiondéfinitivede
1939sont telles qu'il y aurait lieu de distinguer les faits d'occupation pour
la période 1936-1939et les autres manifestations d'autorité après 1939.
77. Tout d'abord la période 1936-1939. Le Royaume-Uni s'étaitpro-
visoirement prononcé en juillet 1936 pour l'attribution des Hawar à
Bahreïn. Les autorités britanniques se sont abstenues d'en informer le
souverain de Qatar. C'était une périodemarquée par des rivalitéspétro-
lières.Le souverain de Bahreïn avait à accorder une concession pétrolière
supplémentaire pour un secteur non encore attribué dans lequel il com-
prenait les îles Hawar d'après sa déclaration d'avril 1936. De son côtéle
souverain de Qatar avait accordé en 1932 des droits d'exploration sur
toute la péninsule,autoriséen 1933des relevésgéologiquessur l'ensemble
du territoire de Qatar, y compris les îles Hawar expressément désignées,
et finalement accordé une concession complète sur toute la presqu'île et
ses adjacenceç en 1935.
78. Bahreïn reconnaît avoir procédé à diverses installations militaires
sur l'île principale des Hawar pendant cette période. C'est une forme
d'occupation. Mais elle étaitillégaledans la mesure ou elle s'étaitréalisée
d'une façon quelque peu clandestine. Ces activités ne se sont donc pas
dérouléesde façon paisible et ne peuvent alors pas compter au nombre de
celles qui constituent la manifestation d'un exercice d'autorité souve-
'4Cf contre-mémoire de Qatar, vo5.üppeiidices 1 2.
134 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 170
against the non-0bsi:rvance of the status quo by Bahrain. Between the
filing of its Mernorizil and that of its Counter-Memorial, that is to Say
over a period of a mere two years (1996-1997), we note no less than
13 protests in the foirm of Notes Verbales concerning:
(i) Bahraini legislatjon whenever it affects the Hawar Islands;
(ii) violations of airspace inhose islands:
(iii) advertisements published by Bahrain in the press relating to its
activities in the islands and its claims to sovereignty over the gr~up~~.
76. International jurisprudence refers to acts capable of constituting
manifestations of the peaceful and continuous exercise of State authority
over a territory. The acts of occupation of the Hawars by Bahrain took
place immediately after the "provisional" British decision of 1936. It is
necessary to assess the nature of those acts and to ascertain whether they
represent qfji.ctivitcapable of establishing a title by Bahrain over those
islands. We must also examine the conduct of Qatar throughout that
period in order to determine whether or not that conduct could effec-
tively prevent Bahrain from establishing such title. However, the circum-
stances in which Bahrain undertook its acts of occupation between the
date of the provisional decision of 1936 and that of the final decision in
1939are such that a distinction must be drawn between the acts of occu-
pation for the period 1936 to 1939 and the other manifestations of
authority after 1939.
77. First, the period 1936 to 1939. The United Kingdom had provi-
sionally ruled in July 1936in favour of awarding the Hawars to Bahrain.
The British authorities failed to inform the Ruler of Qatar of this. This
was a period marked by rivalry over oil interests. The Ruler of Bahrain
was preparing to grz~ntan additional oil concession in respect of a sector
that was still unallotted, in which, according to his declaration of April
1936, he included the Hawar Islands. For his part, the Ruler of Qatar
had in 1932granted exploration rights over the entire peninsula, while in
1933 he had authorized geological surveys over the whole territory of
Qatar, expressly including the Hawar Islands and ultimately, in 1935,
granting a full conclcssion over the whole of the peninsula and its adja-
cent islands.
78. Bahrain admits that it established various military facilities on the
main island of Hawar during this period. That is a form of occupation,
but it was unlawful in so far as it was carried out in a somewhat clan-
destine manner. Thus these activities were not conducted peacef~~llyand
cannot therefore be numbered among those constituting the manifesta-
tion of an exercise of sovereign authority. On the other hand. however, at
'JSce Couilter-Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. Appen1ands217 1 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
raine. Mais d'un autre coté, à l'époqueconsidérée,le cheikh de Qatar
étaitcensé exercerune autorité exclusive sur toute la péninsule,les Hawar
comprises et le fait d'avoir manqué de vigilance en ignorant l'existence
d'activitésétrangèressur son territoire laisserait à première vue un peu
perplexe. Il est vrai cependant que les Hawar étaient une régiondéser-
tique et inhospitalière. Les souverains de Qatar savaient qu'elles
restaient ouvertes à une pêchesaisonnière pratiquée par des personnes
de toutes origines traditionnellement affranchies de tout contrôle. En
termes modernes on pourrait assimiler le régimedes îles Hawar à celui
des zones franches.
79. Le manque de vigilance n'étaittoutefois pas total. Le souverain de
Qatar, le cheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani, aussitôt que les actes
d'occupation bahreïnites sont parvenus à sa connaissance, protesta ora-
lement en février 1938,puis par écrit le 10 mai 1938 auprès de l'agent
politique britannique à
80. Il convient aussi de remarquer la difficultédans laquelle se trouve
Bahreïn en soutenant d'une part le caractère juridictionnel de la décision
de 1939et en reconnaissant d'autre part l'existence des installations mili-
taires qu'il a effectuéesen 1937-1938. N'est-ce pas une façon de recon-
naître qu'il n'a pas respecté le stufu quo pendant la phase de préparation
de ce qu'il qualifie volontiers de sentence arbitrale de 1939? Pendant que
l'affaire était, de son point de vue, sub judice, il a pratiqué des actes
d'occupation.
81. Compte tenu de tous ces éléments etsurtout d'une part de I'absten-
tion du Royaume-Uni d'informer le souverain de Qatar de la décision
«provisoire>) de 1936d'attribuer les Hawar à Bahreïn, et d'autre part du
caractère forcément non paisible de ces opérations clandestines, on serait
fondé à considérer que les uctes uccon~pli.~pur Bahrc.ïnpour lu pkriode
1936-1939 ne constifucnt pus des <ffcctivitcl.opposables CiQutur ou sus-
ceptibles dc gi.ni.rpr un titre uu projt de Bulzreïn.
82. Bahreïn a fourni A la Cour un tableau reproduisant quatre-vingts
types d'activités qu'il avait entreprises sur les îles Hawar depuis le
XVIII' siècle.Sil'on s'entient àla périodepostérieure la décisionde 1939,
on notera que ces activités sont au nombre de vingt d'après ce tableau.
Mais, d'une manière généraleet comme le dit le tribunal arbitral en l'af-
faire ErythréelYkmen, elles ((ont beaucoup de volume, mais sont pauvres
de contenu utile» (par. 239). Le nombre d'«effectivités»,si tant est qu'elles
méritent d'êtrequalifiéesde telles, ne doit donc pas faire illusion. Uneà
une, les ((effectivités))invoquéess'évanouissentà l'examen, la quantité ne
réussissantpas à suppléerà l'absence de qualité.Trois sièclesavant Jésus-
Christ, Euclide avait dit: «un tas de bléne cesse pas d'êtreun tas si vous
ôtez un grain, puis un grain... Pourtant vient un moment ou, en enlevant
un grain, il n'y a plus de ta»L'enseignement à offrir A la méditation des
25MémoiredeQatar, vol. 7. annexe 111.150,p. 253, et réponsede l'agent inmémoire de
Qatar. vol. 7, annexe 111.156,p. 279. DELIMKATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 171
the period in question the Sheikh of Qatar was supposed to be exercising
exclusive authority over the entire peninsula, including the Hawars, and
his lack of vigilance in remaining unaware of the existence of foreign
activities on his territory might at first sight seem somewhat puzzling. It
is true, though, that the Hawars were an inhospitable desert region. The
rulers of Qatar knevvthat they remained open to seasonal fishing prac-
tised by individuals of any origin, who were traditionally free of any con-
trols. In modern terrns, the régime ofthe Hawar Islands could be assimi-
lated to that of a free zone.
79. The lack of vigilance was not, however, total. The Ruler of Qatar,
Sheikh Abdullah bin Qasim al-Thani, as soon as he became aware of the
acts of Bahraini occupation, protested orally in February 1938, then in
writing on 10 May 1938 to the British Political Agent in bah rai^^^^.
80. Note should a.lso be taken of the difficulty in which Bahrain finds
itself in, on the one hand, arguing in favour of the legal nature of the
1939 decision while, on the other, recognizing the existence of the mili-
tary facilities installed by it in 1937-1938. 1s this not in a sense an
acknowledgment of the fact that it failed to respect the status quo
during the preparatory phase of what it voluntarily characterizes as the
arbitral award of 1939'?At a time when the case was, from Bahrain's
standpoint, suh judicc, it carried out acts of occupation.
81. In view of al1of these circumstances and above al1of, on the one
hand, the failure by -theUnited Kingdom to inform the Ruler of Qatar of
the "provisional" decision of 1936to award the Hawars to Bahrain, and,
on the other, of the necessarily non-pacific nature of those clandestine
operations, we would be justified in taking the view that tlie ucts carried
out hy Brrhrriitzovcr the period 1936-1939 do not constitute effectivités
oppoxuhlr to Q~rturor cupahhleof'grnerating u rifle infuvour qf BuIlruin.
82. Bahrain has provided the Court with a table setting out 80 types of
activity which it hatl undertaken on the Hawar Islands since the eight-
eenth century. If we confine Our attention to the period since the 1939
decision, it will be noted that according to this table the activities in ques-
tion number 20. But, in gener-al terms, to quote the Arbitration Tribunal
in the Eritrrul Ye~îencase,they are "voluminous in quantity but sparse in
useful content" (para. 239). We must therefore not be deluded by the
number of ~fjectivités,even assuming that they merit being described as
such. One by one, i.he "~~fj>cti~~itbisn"voked evaporate upon examina-
tion, the quantity fa.ilingto make up for the lack of quality. Three cen-
turies before Christ, Euclid said: "a pile of wheat remains a pile of wheat
if you take away one grain, then another grain and so on. And yet there
comes a time when, by removing one grain, there is no longer any pile."
25Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 7. Ann. 111.150,p. 253, and Agent's reply in Memorial of
Qatar, Vol. 7. Ann. 111.156,p. 279.juristes est que les degrés de la quantité ne doivent pas masquer les
nuances de la qualité. Comme le dit un tribunal. ((une multitude d'indices
ne suffisent pas à constituer une preuve, de la même manièreque cent
lièvresne font pas un cheval)).
83. De surcroît,nombre de ces activitésont été entreprises aprèsI'accep-
tation du statu quo auquel les deux Parties s'étaient engagéea su moment
de la mise en place de la médiationde l'Arabie saoudite en 1983,ou encore
aprés l'acceptation du strrtu q~roconsécutif à l'introduction de l'affaire
devant la Cour en juillet 1991.Or toute action susceptible de modifier le
statu quo doit êtreconsidéréecomme nulle et de nul effet juridique.
84. Si des installations militaires dans l'île principale des Hawar
remontent aux années trente, par contre les aménagements ciililne datent
que de quelques années, singulièrement depuis l'introduction de l'affaire
devant la Cour (routes, port, hôtel, bungalows, palais et dépendances).
Ces installations, nécessairement improductives dans une ile dépourvue
d'eau douce qui doit être importée à grands frais de Bahreïn, sont desti-
nées,selon toute vraisemblance, à donner l'impression d'une occupation
effective.
85. En conclusion, toute l'analyse faite ci-dessus conduit à penser que
Bahreïn n'a pas réussià établir l'existence à son profit d'un meilleur titre
que celui formé et consolidé par Qatar sur les îles Hawar. Celles-ci
devraient donc revenir à Qatar, ou être partagéesentre les deux Etats,
dans une solution pacifiante et non dépourvue d'ailleurs de rectitude juri-
dique, si l'on s'en tient à la logique du choix de la Cour qui s'est arrêtée
sur le moyen de droit tiréde la décision britannique du 11 juillet 1939.
Mais ce serait quand même perdrede vue l'existenced'un autre moyen de
droit beaucoup plus décisif.En effet Qatar possèdesur les Hawar un titre
historique constitué progressivement, consolidéet reconnu. C'est cequ'il
convient d'examiner à présent.
V. LE TITRE HISTORIQUE
86. Selon nous, les vices relevésdans la décisionbritannique de 1939
ainsi que la construction d'ensemble de l'arrêtde la Cour, fondéunique-
ment sur cette décision, nepermettent déji pas une dévolution des Hawar
à Bahreïn. Mais de surcroît Qatar possède un meilleur titre, constitué par
son titre originaire sur les Hawar. C'est ce qu'il faut démontrer mainte-
nant.
87. Ce qui frappe d'embléel'homme de la rue lorsqu'il jette un coup
d'Œil sur une carte de la région, c'est l'appartenance physique indiscu-
table des «îles» Hawar au mêmecontinent dont relèveQatar. Lorsque la
mer se retire chaque jour, l'ensemble de la masse terrestre qatarie appa-
raît comme une main dont le pouce est constituépar la masse des Hawar.The lesson for lawyerijto reflect upon is that degrees of quantity must not
conceal variations in quality. As one court put it, "a vast mass of evi-
dence will not suffice to constitute proof, any more than a hundred hares
will make a horse".
83. Furthermore, a number of those activities were undertaken after
the acceptance of the status quo to which both Parties had committed
themselves on commencement of the Saudi mediation in 1983,or indeed
after acceptance of )the status quo subsequent upon the Court being
seised of the case in July 1991. But any act capable of modifying the
status quo must be considered as null, and devoid of effect in law.
84. While there arc:military facilities on the main Hawar Island which
date back to the 1930s, the civiliun works, by contrast, date back only a
few years, in particular since the institution of proceedings before this
Court (roads, port, hotel, bungalows, palace and associated buildings).
These facilities. necessarily unproductive on an island without any fresh
water, which has to be iinported at great expense Srom Bahrain, are in al1
likelihood intended to give the impression of effective occupation.
85. In conclusion, al1of the above analysis leads to the conclusion that
Bahrain has not succeeded in demonstrating the existence in its favour of
a better title than that formed and consolidated by Qatar over the Hawar
Islands. These shoulcl therefore be awarded to Qatar, or alternatively, in
a peacemaking solution which would moreover not be without basis in
law - assuming that we abide by the logic of the choice made by the
Court, which confined the ground for its ruling to the British decision of
11 July 1939 - they should be shared between the two States. But that
would nonetheless br: to lose sight of the existence of another îar more
decisive ground: the fact that Qatar possesses a historical title to the
Hawars that has beeinestablished progressively, consolidated and recog-
nized. That is what kvemust examine now.
86. We believe that the flaws noted in the British decision of 1939,
together with the overall structure of the Court's Judgment, founded as it
is solely on that deirision, already could not justify the award of the
Hawars to Bahrain. But, in addition, Qatar holds a better title, consisting
of its original title to the Hawars. That is what must now be shown.
87. What first strikes the man in the street when glancing at a map of
the region is the indisputable fact that, physically, the Hawar "Islands"
belong to the same continental mass as Qatar. When the tide goes out
each day, Qatar's whioleland mass resembles a hand, whose thumb is the
Hawars. As shown by British Admiralty Chart No. 2886 of 1994(see p. 215173 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. IIISS.COMMUNE)
Comme le montre la carte bathymétrique de l'Amirauté britannique
no 2886 de 1994 (voir p. 215, ci-après), intituléeJarîrelz-Yc Luvun und
Juzîrut Dûs toRu's TannÜrcrli»*" l n'existe pas de rupture entre le pouce
et le reste de la main: les «îles» Hawar ne sont pas en véritédes îles, mais
une partie indivisible de la masse terrestre qatarie envahie par la mer au
moment du flux et restituée à la terre à celui du reflux. Cette leçon élé-
mentaire de macrogéographie semble avoir échappé B la Cour. Les îles
Hawar sont en réalité,et avec la certitude que le plus exigeant des Saint-
Thomas d'Aquin ne saurait contester, une simple presqu'île faisant géo-
graphiquement partie intégrante du reste du continent.
88. A cet égard, il serait mêmesuperflu, voire inapproprié, d'invoquer
le principe tiréde la forte présomption juridique de I'appartenance B un
Etat côtier des îles situéesdans sa mer territoriale, car il n'est pas ques-
tion ici à véritablement parler d'«îles» Hawar, mais d'une presqu'île qui
surgit au quotidien à l'heure du reflux, solidement amarrée au continent.
89. Aucun raisonnement juridique, si sophistiquésoit-il, et en tout cas
aucun raisonnement du présent arrêt,ne peut faire voler en éclats cette
réalitéincontournable. La réalitémacrogéographique a décidéavant la
Cour, et pour toujours, I'appartenance de la presqu'île des Hawar à la
masse qatarie continentale dont elle fait partie intégrante. Un tel décret
de la nature ne peut souffrir d'abrogation. L'immense dossier cartogra-
phique soumis à la Cour par Qatar, et constitué par des cartes d'origines
aussi variéesdans le temps que dans l'espace, s'ajoute ëcette réalitégéo-
morphologique et montre clairement, comme on le verra plus loin, que
les Hawar ont étéet sont réputéesappartenir à Qatar.
90. Et, cependant, il faut admirer l'ampleur des efforts consentis par
l'arrêtde la Cour pour tenter de justifier le contraire. Mais, auparavant,
rappelons que, fort dommageablement, l'arrêt a évitéd'examiner la très
déterminante question du titre historique. Nous examinerons celle-ci
quant à nous, car cette question, comme d'autres encore, met en échecla
solution retenue par la Cour d'autant plus sûrement que le moyen tir6 de
la seule décision britannique de 1939 n'a étéselon nous examinépar la
Cour que sous un aspect, d'ailleurs superficiel et de pure forme, à I'exclu-
sion d'autres aspects plus déterminants, notamment de fond. On com-
prendra, dans ces conditions, que nous ayons tenu, quant à nous, a exa-
miner tous les moyens de droit invoqués par les Parties et en particulier
l'urgument du titre historique auquel nous arrivons.
91. Bahreïn a-t-il eu, et possède-t-il toujours, un titre historique sur les
Hawar? On peut, on doit, dire plus et moins à la fois sur ce sujet. L'his-
'"Elle porte la mention suivante: ((Published at Taunton 29th April 1994 under the
Superintendence of Rearmiral N. R. Essenhigh. Hydrographer of the Navy.)>below), entitled "Jazîreh-Ye Lavan and Jazîrat Dâs to Ra's Tannürah"'6,
there is no break between the thumband the rest of the hand. The Hawar
"Islands" are not actually islands but an indivisible part of the land mass
of Qatar, cut off by the sea when the tide comes in and joined to the land
again when the tide goes out. This elementary lesson in macrogeography
seems to have escaped the Court. In reality, and with a certainty beyond
the power of even the most rigorous Thomist to dispute, the Hawar
Islands are simply a peninsula which, in geographical terms, forms an
integral part of the rest of the mainland.
88. It would even be superfluous in this connection, not to Say inap-
propriate, to invoke the principle based on the strong legal presumption
that islands situated in a coastal State's territorial sea belong to that
State. because the Hawars cannot be said to be "islands" in the true
sense, but rather a peninsula - firmly attached to the mainland -
emerging daily when the tide goes out.
89. No legal reasoning, however ingenious - and certainly no reason-
ing in this Judgment - can overcome this inescapable fact. Long before
the Court, macrogeography determined, and for al1time, that the penin-
sula of the Hawars blrlongs to theQatari mainland, of which it is an inte-
gral part. Such a decree of nature cannot be abrogated. The enormous
map file submitted to the Court by Qatar, containing maps from a wide
variety of sources arid eras, confirms this geomorphological reality and
clearly shows, as will be seen below, that the Hawars were and are
recognized to belong to Qatar.
90. And yet the extent of the effort devoted by the Court's Judgment
to seek to justify the contrary conclusion must be admired. However, let
us first recall that theJudgment has, very damagingly, avoided examining
the absolutely crucial issue of historical title. We ourselves shall examine
that question, for, 1ik.ea number of other issues, it totally contradicts the
solution adopted by the Court, particularly since in Our view the Court
examined the ground based exclusively on the British decision of 1939
from one standpoint only - and a superficial and purely formal one at
that - to the exclusiionof other more decisive aspects, notably substan-
tive ones. In these cii-cumstances, Our concern to consider al1of the legal
grounds advanced by the Parties, including in particular the urgurnent
hn.sed on historical ritlc, can readily be understood. It is to this latter
argument that we shall now turn.
91. Did Bahrain hold, and does it still hold, a historical title to the
Hawars? Both more and less can and should be said on this subject. Even
'('The chart bears the. imprint: "Published at Taunton 29th April 1994 under the
Superintendence of Rear Admiral N. R. Essenhigh. Hydrographer of the Navy."
137 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
174
toire atteste, même par les plus superficiels examens, que Bahreïn, dans
les heures de prospéritéde la dynastie des Al-Khalifa, avait un empire sur
une grande partie du Golfe et, en tout cas, et pendant longtemps, sur
Qatar. Mais, depuis longtemps aussi (nous livrerons plus loin les dates
pertinentes), Bahreïn a perdu tout titre historique sur l'ensemble de la
presqu'île qatarie, les îles Hawar comprises. En effet la branche de la
tribu des Utubi, venue d'Arabie, qui avait donné naissance la dynastie
des Al-Khalifa à Bahreïn, s'était d'abord sédentariséedans le sud-ouest
de la presqu'île de Qatar, certainement vers Zakhnuniyah, peut-êtreaussi
aux Hawar du moins en hiver, mais en tout cas sûrement dans le nord-
ouest dans la régionde Zubarah.
92. Ces tribus «urubique.s» semi-sédentariséessur la côte ouest de
Qatar n'étaient pas des ctBahreïnites)), occupant Qatar. Elles n'avaient
pas encore pénétréa Bahreïn. Elles deviendront précisément«hulzreï-
nites» lorsqu'elles quitteront Qatar pour s'implanter à leur tour à Bah-
reïn, où d'autres tribus, égalementparties d'Arabiecentrale, se sont fixées.La
branche des Al-Khalifa, originaire d'Arabie et fixéeà Zubarah, berceau
de la future dynastie, deviendra bahreïnite lorsqu'elle quitteru Zubur~~h
pour s'installer,Ù purtir de 1783, LjBrihreïn.A cet égard,on pourra donc
dire que les tribus arabiques, ancêtres des Bahreïnites et de l'actuelle
dynastie régnante a Bahreïn, furent d'abord qataries par leur installation
à Zubarah avant de devenir bahreïnites par leur expansion vers Bahreïn
et dans le Golfe.
93. Avant d'aller plus loin dans la recherche du titre historique de
Bahreïn ou de Qatar sur les Hawar et de son devenir, nous voudrions
exprimer notre vif regret de voir l'arrêt évited r'examiner cette question
comme elle devrait l'être.L'arrêts'est en effet frileusement abstenu de
s'engager dans une recherche indispensable qui commandait après tout la
dévolution même desHawar. Certes la Cour n'est pas un aréopage d'his-
toriens et n'est pas techniquement outillée pour s'aventurer dans des
recherches historiques concernant le passéde deux Etats litigants. Mais le
juge est requis u' relever les déjs que lui lance I'lzistoiredans une affaire
donnée. Il doit tenir compte des faits historiques dans la dynamique des
controverses territoriales, en dépit de toutes ces difficultés que la dé-
marche juridique peut rencontrer. Dans sa relation tumultueuse et indécise
avec l'histoire, un droit s'est en effet bâti en prenant notamment en
compte les différentesétapespossibles dans la constitution du titre, telles
que la formation, puis la consolidation ou la disparition de celui-ci. Le
juriste a dû ainsi apprendre à identifier les critères et les conditions de la
création d'un titre,a choisir ((le meilleur)) parmi deux titres concurrents,
à distinguer le ((titre originel)) du «titre dérivé)),le ((titre absolu)) de
l'<<nchoate title», etc.
94. La question des titres historiques s'étant poséedevant les juridic-
tions internationales beaucoup plus souvent que l'on pense, le droit a DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 174
the most superficial historical review shows that, when the Al-Khalifa
dynasty was thriving, Bahrain had dominion over a large part of the Gulf
region, and in any event and for many years, over Qatar. But Bahrain
also long ago (we shall set out the significant dates below) lost al1histori-
cal title to any part of the Qatari peninsula, including the Hawar Islands.
The branch of the Utubi tribe from Arabia which gave birth to the Al-
Khalifa dynasty in IIahrain first settled in the south-west of the Qatar
peninsula, certainly iinthe vicinity of Zakhnuniyah and perhaps on the
Hawar Islands as well, at least in winter, but in any event definitely in the
north-west in the Zubarah area.
92. These semi-sedentary "Arahiun" tribes who settled on the west
coast of Qatar were not "Bahrainis" occupying Qatar. They had not yet
entered Bahrain. They were to become "Br/hr.uini"when they left Qatar
in order to establish themselves in turn in Bahrain, where other tribes,
also from central Arabia, had already settled. The Al-Khalifa branch,
natives of Arabia and settled in Zubarah, thecradle of the future dynasty,
became Bahraini ii.hrn thcy left Z~rharuhto settlc in Bahrain ,fi.on~ 1783
onii~ru',~.t can therefore be said in this respect that the Arabian tribes
which were the forebears of the Bahrainis and of today's ruling dynasty
in Bahrain were first Qataris, by virtue of their settlement in Zubarah,
before becoming Bahrainis as a result of spreading out to Bahrain and
through the Gulf region.
93. Before investigating any further Bahrain's or Qatar's historical
title to the Hawars and what was to become of it, we wish to express Our
deep regret that the Judgment avoids giving due consideration to this
question. The Judginent has timidly shied away from undertaking the
essential research wliich was, ultimately. determinative for the award of
the Hawars. Admittedly, the Court is not a learned assembly of histori-
ansand is not technically equipped to embark on historical research con-
cerning the past of two litigant States. Yet u court is ohligeu'to meet flic
challenges ivith ivhic-hhistory confronts it in a particular case. It must
take account of the interplay between historical events and territorial dis-
putes, notwithstanding al1 the various difficulties which the juridical
approach may face. In the course of its up-and-down, indecisive relation-
ship with history, a right will in effect arise on the basis, inter aliu, of the
various possible stages in the establishment of a title, such as its forma-
tion and subsequent consolidation or disappearance. The jurist has thus
had to learn to idenitify the criteria and conditions for the creation of a
title, to choose "the better" of two competing titles, to distinguish an
"original title" frorn a "derivative title", an "absolute title" from an
"inchoate title", and so on.
94. International fora have found themselves faced with the issue of
historical titles far more often than is thought, and the law has thus been 175 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
donc dû la prendre en charge. Cela signifie que, pour aussi peu qualifiés
qu'ils soient dans le domaine historique, et pour aussi mal outillés qu'ils
soient, lesjuges ont le devoir de trancher les controverses territoriales qui
leur sont soumises. De nombreux arbitragesinternationaux ont amenéles
juridictions arbitrales à traiter de titres historiques". De leur côté, la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale et la Cour internationale de
Justice ne pouvaient non plus éviterde se prononcer sur des titres histo-
riques. Ce fut notamment le cas avec les affaires du Statut juridique du
Groënlr~nd oriental (1933), des Ptrheri~s (Royuunze-Uni c. Norvègcl)
(1951). des Minquirrs ct Ecrc;/iou.\ (1953), de Ccrttlines parcell~sfrontu-
1ii.re.s(1959), du Droit rieprrs.sugcs 1ur territoire indien (1960), du Teniple
de PréuliVihéur(1962), du Dq](.rcnd,fronruIier(Burkinu FasolRc;publique
du Mali) (1986), du Diffrend territorial (Jurnaliiriya lrruh~ libyenne1
Tchud) (1994), de l'llc de KusikililSed~tdu(1999) et, dans l'ordre des avis
consultatifs, avec I'affaire du S(rhuru oc~ciclentu(11975). La Cour centra-
méricainede justice a également de son côtéaffrontédes questions d'his-
toire avec I'affaire du Golfe de Fonsecu (1917).
95. Nous avons tenu à citer presque exhaustivement toutes ces affaires
pour montrer combien elles étaient nombreuses et pour répondre à l'idée
fausse selon laquelle notre relative incapacitéscientifique à appréciercor-
rectement l'histoire devrait nous pousser prudemment ii confirmer le
statu quo en la présente affaire. Nous ne partageons pas ce point de vue.
96. 11faut donc déplorer le fait que l'arrêtse soit borné à égrener des
faits historiques sans jamais, ou presque, en tirer les conclusions juri-
diques, ce qui est pourtant le rôle de la Cour. L'exposédu contexte histo-
rique figurant dans l'arrêtest une succession linéaire d'événements, pré-
sentéed'une façon telle qu'elle permet de s'interroger sur son utilitéaux
fins de l'argumentation générale.L'arrêt nousoffre en effet une radio-
scopie floue et un scanner sans relief de l'histoire des deux pays, de sorte
que la recherche du titre historique sur les Hawar et de son titulaire en est
absente et reste encore à faire.
97. Et pourtant, le droit international dispose aujourd'hui de principes
et règlespour ((encadrer)) les faits historiques, les discipliner. les interpré-
ter, leur donner une sign~cution juridique et en tirer toutes les consé-
quences de droit. C'est là de toute évidence un rôle essentiel assignéau
juge qui a le devoir de l'exercer et dont ilne peut commodément s'exo-
néreren invoquant son manque de maîtrise de la science historique. En
réalité,il ne s'agit pas d'une question de connaissance de l'histoire par le
juge, mais bien de I'upplicution des principes et rkgles juridiques qui
'7 Cf. I'AIu~kunBoundcrrj Disputc,(1903). I'Ati~lo-BrrrziliunBoirndury Disp~rtr(1904).
l'lsltrttdof BulomirArhitration (1870).la D~ltrgooBuj. Arhirr(rtion(1875). la Grisbitd<rriîu
Arhitrution (1909). la Chur,iirulArhitrotion (1911).l'I.\/r/tit/oy Pult~iusArhitrutioti (1928).
la Colomhiu-Vrnrrueku Boutrdurj.Arhifration(1922). la Guuic~tnulu-Hoti(/~~.r~rndirrj
Arhitrution (1933),la W(i[fishBuj Arhitrutioti 1).la North Atlantic Fis1icsrhirru-
fion(1910).l'affaire Erj~rhrYl6ttrc(1998). DELIMITATION AND QUEST~ONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 175
obliged to deal with the matter. It follows that, however limited their
qualifications in the discipline of history and however poor the tools at
their disposal, judges are under a duty to decide the territorial disputes
submitted to them. There are many instances of international arbitral
awards where the arbitrators have had to deal with historical titles2'. Nor
have the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice, for their part, been able to avoid ruling on historical
titles, for example in the following cases: Legal Stutus qf'Eustern Green-
/und (1 933). Fisherics ( United Kingdot??v. Norizuy) (195 1), Minquiers
urîd Ecrchos (1953), 5;over~~ignto yver Certain Frontier Lund (1959), Righr
of'Pussugc oiler ItldicrnTerritory ( 1960), Temple of Prrah Viheur (1962),
Fronticr Dispute (Burkitln FusolRopuhlic. of Mali) (1986), Territoriul
Dispute (Libj~un Aruh J~zmuhiri~~uICl~ud()1994) and KrlsikililSedudu
I.vlund(1999); and by way of advisory opinion, in the Western Suhura
(1975) case. Furthermore, the Central American Court of Justice also
dealt with historical issues in the Gulf'of Fonsccu case (1917).
95. We have made a point of citing these various cases in a virtually
exhaustive manner iii order to show how numerous they have been and
to counter the erronieous notion that our relative lack of the scientific
ability to form accurate historical judgments should incline us to exercise
caution by confirming the status quo in the present case. We do not share
that point of view.
96. It is thus regrettable that the Judgment has confined itself to a reci-
tation of historical data without ever - or hardly ever - drawing legal
conclusions from them, despite the fact that this is the Court's role. The
historical narrative in the Judgment is a linear succession of events, pre-
sented in a way that raises questions as to its usefulness in terms of the
general reasoning. Tlhusthe Judgment presents us with a blurred X-ray, a
one-dimensional scan, of the history of the two countries, from which a
determination of the historical title to the Hawars and the identification
of the holder of thai title is iiiissing, and remains still to be undertaken.
97. And yet international law today possesses principles and rules
whereby it can crea1.ea "/ram~it~ork"for historical facts - bring them
under control, interpret them, give them a legal rneuning and draw from
them al1 of the conclusions that they entail in law. This is clearly an
essential role of a court, a role which it has a duty to fulfil and one which
it cannot shirk on the convenient nround that it is not a master of the
u
discipline of history. In reality it is not a question of historical know-
ledge, but rather of the applicution of thc legrrlrulcs and principlcs ii.hicl1
'' See the Altiskun Boirwtit~. isput(1903).Anglo-BrurilicnrBoutidur:iDi.s/?li(1904).
I.sl(rnofBultrrrrirArhirrtrri(1870). Bc,IugouB(iy Arhirrurior(1875). Grishudurnu Arhi-
rrcition(1909). Cl~uri~izlrhirrtrtion (11).I.~lutiojPu1111uA.srhirrritiorr(1928). Co1ori1-
hiri-Vc~nc,:ircuoun(ltrr.Arhitrution (1922). Guatrn~ulu-Hondurus Bouwdcirj.Arhitrutiorr
(1933). K11fi.sl1Bcg. Arhitrtlriotl 1).,VorrliAtluntit~Fishcrics Arhitrtrtion (1910) and
Eritrt~tilYc~ri~cc~a(1998).cncactrei~tl~.sfuits historiques.A cet égard,la démarchedu juge ne s'ana-
lyse pas en une incursion aventureuse dans ce qui représenterait pour lui
une «teuru incognitu)); elle constitue bien au contraire une opération
purenzent ,juri~/iquequi relèvede sa fonction et de sa compétence.
98. Dans le cadre de cette opération juridique, le juge est amené à
peser les manifestations d'autorité qu'un pouvoir étatique a imprimées
dans le passé sur un territoire donné. C'est dans la trame de l'histoire
qu'il relève ces«+fictivités erzuctiorz))et qu'il vérifie ledegréde conso-
lidation qu'elles confèrent a un titre historique de 1'Etat sur ce territoire.
Cette opération, juridique par nature, menéesur un matériau historique,
est souvent difficile, mais elle n'a jamais rebuté ou découragé
«le juge international qui a dû y faire face A maintes reprises en pre-
sence de situations rendues confuses par leurs origines historiques
lointaines qui défiaient toute détermination chronologique précise.
Ce qui est apparu à l'expérience,c'est la nécessitéde saisir l'effecti-
vitédans la vision totale de son développement historique. H"
Ce qui est intéressant à relever dans cette opération juridique, c'est le
fait que dans bien des affaires la Cour internationale de Justice n'a pas
craint d'aller loin dans l'analyse du détail historique quand il le fallait.
Dans l'affaire des Minquier.7et Ecrkhous par exemple, «la Cour a large-
ment et en grand détailpesé laforce probatoire de nombreuses manifes-
tations d'activités gouvernementale^»^^.
99. A côté de cette odration iuridiaue concernant la formation. la
consolidation ou l'extinction d'un «titre historique)) sur un territoire, le
juge relève parfois aussi l'existence d'un ((titre juridique)), constitué le
plus souvent par un traité concernant le territoire considéré. Et c'est la
encore une opération fondamentalement juridique à laquelle il se livre en
donnant, à travers des critèresjuridiques, leur poids respectif aux effec-
tivités, aux titres historiques et aux titres juridiques, avancés par les
Parties dans leurs prétentions contraires. Certains de ces critères juri-
diques d'appréciation ont étédégagéspar la Cour. C'est ainsi que la
Chambre constituée en l'affaire du Diffërend fiontulier (Burkina Fusol
Rkpuhliclue du Mali) a présentéun tableau des rapports dialectiques
pouvant exister entre effectivités,titres historiques et titres juridiques. A
cet égard, quatre situations peuvent êtreidentifiéespour permettre au
juge de trancher un différend territorial:
a) le titre couuespondà 1'c.ffc~c.tivitci:elle-ci ne fera que confirmer «l'exer-
cice du droit néd'un titre juridique)>3".Cette coïncidence des effecti-
vités etdu titre est reposante pour lejuge qui n'aura aucune difficulté
à trancher;
h) letitre nc correspondpr~.~ ù I'ejf~ctii~ité:ily a lieu de préférerle titu-
'"harles De Visscher. Lescffictii.i(11droit iti/<,r~~uplublic1967.p. 107.
'' Charles De Visscherop. citp. 105.
"' C.I.JRc,cc<c,i1l98p. 587. par. 63.,/rurnc rlrr1risroricuIJa.rt.s.n this respect the court's approach should not
be thought of as a hazardous venture into what for it may be "terra
incognitu"; quite to thlecontrary, it is a purrlj,juridic~ul oprrutiorzapper-
taining to a court's function and jurisdiction.
98. As part of this juridical operation, the court has to weigh up the
manifestations of authority which a State power has imposed in the past
on a given territory. It is in the warp and weft of history that it discerns
these "effectivités in ~iction" and ascertains the degree of consolidation
which they impart to the State's historical title to that territory. This
operation, juridical by nature. is often difficult when applied to historical
material, but that has never dissuaded or discouraged
"the international adjudicator, who has often had to tackle it in
dealing with situations rendered obscure by distant historical origins
which defied any precise chronological determination. What experi-
ence has shown ilthe necessity to assess the <ff.ctiilitc;in the overall
light of its historical development."'x
It is interesting to observe that in carrying out this juridical operation
the International Couirt of Justice in many cases has not shrunk from a
penetrating analysis of historical detail where that was necessary. In the
Minyuicrs atrd Ecrehos case, for example, "the Court comprehensively
and in great detail weighed up the probative force of numerous manifes-
tations of governmental activity"'".
99. Over and above this juridical operation regarding the formation,
consolidation or extiriction of a "historicul title" to a territory, the court
may find that a "legul titlc~"exists as well, created in most cases by a
treaty relating to the. territory in question. Here too it undertakes an
operation of a fundarnentally juridical nature by employing legal criteria
in order to assess the weight to be given respectively to the qfTectii.itc;.s,
the historical titles and the legal titles invoked by the parties in their con-
flicting claims. Certain of these legal criteria of assessment have been
identified by the Court. For example, the Chamber in the case concerning
the Frontier Dispute (Burki~ru Fu,solRrpuhlic of' Muli) established a
scheme of the dialectical relationships which may exist between ~fecti-
i.itc;.istorical titles and legal titles. In this respect four situations can be
identified that rnay enable the court to settle a territorial dispute:
(u) the titlr und the ieffectivitéc.orrespond:this situation will simply con-
firm "the exercise of the right derived from a legal titleW3OT .his iden-
tity of effictii.iti.s and title eases the court's task, and it will have no
difficulty in making a determination;
(h) 1/1ctiflc trtzdtlie effectivitédo ilot corrcspontt: "preference should be
Charles De Visscher, Lïs <:(fi~c./<h;.srlroirinfc~r.r~tr/ionprlrrlhlic,.1967. p. 107.
"'Charles De Visschcr,op. (,il.. p. 105.
"'1.C:J. Rr~porr1986. p. 587. para. 63.
140177 DELIMITATION ET QUESTlONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
laire du titre»3'. C'est là une situation également assez facile pour le
juge qui doit normalement conférer la primauté au titrejuridique sur
I'effectivit;
c) le titrc est peu cluir en tant que preuve de la souveraineté: dans ce
cas, les effectivitésjouent un rôle important pour interpréter le titre;
ces effectivitéscombinéesau titre donnent sa vraie couleur à celui-ci
et aident le juge à trancher;
d) le titre n'existe pus: dans ce cas, qui fait intervenir plus activement le
juge, les effectivitésjouent un rôle tout à fait primordial; elles cons-
tituent une sorte de titre suppl;tif:
100. La jurisprudence internationale, arbitrale et judiciaire, a élaboré
encore d'autres principes et règlespour reconnaître des conséquences de
droit à des faits et actes historiques. A la possession effective, élément
objectif d'une «corpore posse.rsio», devrait s'ajouter un élément subjectif
constitué par 1'«unirnuspo.~sidc~ndi:»
«il est peut-êtreopportun d'indiquer qu'une prétention de souverai-
neté fondéenon pas sur quelque acte ou titre en particulier, tel un
traitéde cession, mais simplement sur un exercice continu d'autorité
implique deux élémentsdont l'existence, pour chacun, doit être
démontrée: ..le corpus et l'unimuspo.s.sidcndiou ooccupundi»(affaire
du Stutzct juridique LIU Grocnlund oriental, urrêt, 1933, C.P.I.J.
skric AIB n" 53, annexes au contre-mémoire du Gouvernement nor-
végien.no 38; et opinion dissidente de M. Anzilotti, p. 78).
101. A cet kgurd, nous craignons que I'arr2t de cc,jour n'oit PUS rempli
I'ofJicequ'on pouvait escompter de lui pour une lecture et une interpréta-
tionjuridiques des séquenceshistoriques, aux fins de permettre d'une part
de vérifier l'existenced'un titre historique sur les Hawar et d'autre part
d'en identifier le titulaireLe seul effort de recherche et d'analyse histo-
riques entrepris par la Cour a porté sur Zubarah. Encore qu'il faille
regretter que la Cour n'ait pas tiréprécis;r?~enttoutes les conséquencesdu
résultat auquel elle était parvenue, à savoir l'existence d'un titre histo-
rique de Qatar sur sa péninsule! La Cour n'a ainsi reconnu l'intégrité
territoriale de la péninsule par Zubarah que pour la démanteler par les
Hawar. Quant à l'aspect méthodologique, par ailleurs, on peut se deman-
der pourquoi la Cour a recherchéle titre historique sur Zubarah, ce par
quoi l'arrêtcommence, et n'en a pas fait de mêmepour les Hawar, ce par
quoi l'arrêtse poursuit? Nous nous croyons largement justifiés,quant à
nous, de commencer comme il se doit par placer l'affaire des Hawar dans
le cadre historique qui est le sien.
102. La présence britannique dans le Golfe eut pour effet juridique,
entre autres, la création de deux entités politiques distinctes, Bahreïn et
''C.1.J.Rccirci1986, p587. par. 63. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 177
given to the holder of the title"". This too is a situation presenting
little difficultfia- the court, which will normally have to give
priority to the legal title over the rj'bctivité;
(c) tlre titlr i.sunclear as evidence of sovereignty: in this case the rffbc-
tiviti's play an important role in interpreting the title; when com-
bined with it, they give the title its true aspect and help the court to
reach a decision;
(d) tlzc.titlc is non-c~si.ste171i:n this case, which requires more active
intervention by the court, the effrctivité.rplay a role of absolutely
prime importance; they constitute a kind of rrsiduul title.
100. International arbitral and judicial jurisprudence has developed
yet other rules and pririciples for attributing legal consequences to his-
torical facts and actions. Effective possession, the objective element of a
"corpore posscssio", should be accompanied by a subjective element con-
sisting of the "wimu.r possidrndi" :
"it may be well to state that a claim to sovereignty based not upon
some particular ;act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely
upon continued display of authority. involves two elements each of
which must be shown to exist . ..: the corpus and the unimuspos,si-
drndi or occupundi" (Legul Stutus of Eustrrn Grernlund, 1933,
P.C.I. J., Serics .4/B,No. 53, Counter-Memorial of the Norwegian
Government, Ann. No. 38; and dissenting opinionofJudge Anzilotti,
p. 78).
101. Wr ,féuvin this resprcr thut toduy 'sJudgtncnt Iras net,ftrijîlled the
jilnction which could have been expected of it, that of a juridical review
and inter~retation of the seauence of historical events. with a view to
determinkg whether (4histori'caltitle to the Hawars existed and identify-
ing its holder. The Court's only effort at historical enquiry and analysis
concerned Zubarah, though it is regrettable that the Court in fact failed
to draw al1the conclusions from the result which it reached, namely that
Qatar held a liistorictrl title to its own peninsula! The Court thus recog-
nized the territorial iritegrity of the peninsula as far as Zubarah was con-
cerned, only to dismantle it when itcame to the Hawars. Moreover, as
for the methodology employed, why, it may be asked, did the Court
determine the historical title to Zubarah, the first issue addressed in the
Judgment, and not do the same for the Hawars, in the next part of the
Judgment? We believe that we are fully justified in beginning, as is
proper, by placing the matter of the Hawars in its historical context.
102. The British pi:esence in the Gulf had the legal effect, inter alia, of
creating two separate political entities, Bahrain and Qatar, in the late
''1C.J.R<.por.t1986,p. 587, para. 63.
141178 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
Qatar, à la fin du XIX' siècle. LesBritanniques s'installèrent eneffet dans
le Golfe pour protéger leur commerce maritime et sauvegarder leur route
des Indes. De 1797 A 1819,ils ripostèrent aux attaques et à la piraterie des
tribus et imposèrent en 1820 un <General Treaty » instaurant une paix
maritime perpétuelle entre la Grande-Bretagne et les cheikhs. trib~is,ou
personnes de la désormais ((Trucial Coast)). Les traits marquants de la
présencedes Britanniques peuvent se résumercomme suit:
a) Ils n'ont instauré ni souveraineté, ni suzeraineté, sur les cheikhats
(((Sheikhdoms))) ou territoires de cette Côte, comme on l'indiquera
plus loin.
h) Dans les limites in~poséespar les nécessitésde la paix maritime et de
la protection de leurs intérêts,ils furent en effet amenésà intervenir
dans les conflits entre tribus, ou iisoutenir telle tribu contre telle
autre. Ils n'allèrent cependant pas plus loin dans l'immixtion dans
leurs affaires. L'évolution des statuts respectifs de Bahreïn et de
Qatar, qui sera examinée plus loin d'un traité A un autre, le montrera.
c) D'un côtéles Britanniques maintinrent au pouvoir à Bahreïn les Al-
Khalifa qu'ils protégèrentnotamment contre Mascate en 1820,contre
les Wahhabites en 1835 et 1859 et contre les Perses en 1843 et 1869.
Mais de l'autre ils refusèrent de cautionner les réclamations intermit-
tentes de Bahreïn sur la côte ouest de Qatar, ou sur la côte de Hasa en
1861. Ils imposèrent à Bahreïn en 1861 un traité par lequel les Al-
Khalifa renouvelèrent leur engagement de s'abstenir de toute agres-
sion maritime.
d) Cette politique britannique était avant tout pragmatique et tenait
compte des équilibreschangeants de la région.Tout au long de la pre-
mière moitiédu XIX siècleetjusqu'aux années 1860,cette politique,
concrétiséepar deux traités avec Bahreïn en 1867 et 1868 (après
divers autres de 1820, 1847, 1856 et 186 1)et un traité avec Qatar en
1868, a eu pour effet juridique de c.on.suc,rerI'exi.~tenccdans les
c1nnL;c .860 (iedeux en titipo1itiyuc.spur-ritement distinctes, Bahreïn
et Qatar, et sans aucune .suhorcti'nrrtiocnlclI'unccnilersl'autre.
103. Qatar a en effet bénéficié tout au long du XIX' sièclede la rela-
tive faiblesse de Bahreïn qui permit aux cheikhs qataris de fbrrner et dc
cor~soliderleur titresur leur péninsule,à l'abri des revendications bahreï-
nites sur la côte ouest de Qatar. La présenceottomane dans la presqu'île
pendant quarante-quatre ans alla toutà fait dans le mêmesens.
104. Lcrfortnation, puis Icrcon.soliclutionprogrrssirr, du titrcldes Al-
TIzclnifut d'autant plus facilitéeque les Britanniques d'une part impo-
sèrent à Bahreïn des traités(qui seront analysésplus loin) qui leur inter-
dirent toute agression, donc toute conquête territoriale dans le contexte
de l'époque,notamment sur la côte ouest de Qatar avec ses îles adjacentes,
et d'autre part empêchèrent concrètement.ou sanctionnèrent fermement,
toute intervention bahreïnite dans la péninsule qatarie. ANz.yi Qntur, DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 178
nineteenth century. The British had established themselves in the Gulf in
order to protect their maritime trade and safeguard the route to India.
From 1797 to 1819 they rebuffed tribal attacks and piracy and in 1820
imposed a "General Treaty" establishing perpetual maritime peace
between Great Britain and the sheikhs, tribes and individuals of what
was now the "Trucial Coast". The salient characteristics of the British
presence may be sumlnarized as follows:
u) They established neither sovereignty nor suzerainty over the sheikh-
doms or territories of the Trucial Coast. as we shall see later.
(b) Within the limits dictated by the needs of maritime peace and the
protection of their interests, the British did indeed find themselves
intervening in trilbalconflicts or supporting one tribe against another,
but they did not interfere to any greater extent in their aftàirs. This
will be clear fronl the evolution in the respective statuses of Bahrain
and Qatar. a subject we shall consider later in detail as we move
from one treaty to another.
(c) On the one hancl the British maintained the Al-Khalifa in power in
Bahrain, protecting them against Muscat in 1820, the Wahhabis in
1835 and 1859, and the Persians in 1843 and 1869. On the other
hand, however. they refused to back Bahrain's intermittent claims to
the Westcoast of'Qatar. or to the Hasa coast in 1861.They imposed
a treaty on Bahrain in 1861 by which the Al-Khalifa renewed their
commitment to refrain from any maritime aggression.
(dl The British policy was above al1 pragmatic and took account of
shifting balances in the region. Throughout the first half of the nine-
teenth century and up to the 1860s, the legal impact of this policy.
formalized in tvvo treaties with Bahrain in 1867 and 1868 (after
others in 1820, 1847, 1856 and 1861) and a treaty with Qatar in
1868.was to c~t~iblislztlzeesistcncc in the 1860sof'tii~)quite distinct
politicul entities, Btrhruin uncl Qutur, neither of ~i,liichii.us in un},
ii.ujsuhorclinutc~to tl~cotlîcv..
103. Thus, througlhout the nineteenth century Qatar benefited from
the relative weakness; of Bahrain, which allowed the Qatari sheikhs to
fimn unti consalidtitr their ritle to their peninsula, secure from Bahraini
claims to the Westcoast of Qatar. The Ottoman presence on the penin-
sula for 44 years was to have very much the same result.
104. The,ji)rrnc~tiona,nd then tlle pr.ogres.sircc~onsoli~lution,f'tlir Al-
Tl~trr~isti'tle was greatly facilitated by two things: not only did the British
impose treaties on B~ihrain(to be discussed later) forbidding it to carry
out any form of aggression - and thus, in the context of the time, to
undertake any territorial conquests, in particular on the West coast of
Qatar and its adjacent islands - but they also physically prevented or
resolutely punished any intervention by Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula. 179 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
/'autorit&des Al-Thuni sëtenduit progr.essiveinerzt,pendunt que celle des
Al-KhuliJU.se contuuctuit grudu'lrel/~ment.
105. Les deux années 1867 et 1868sont à cet égardsignificatives. Elles
marquèrent chacune un tournant décisif.L'unnée1867 montra l'échecde
l'autorité bahreïnite à Qatar à la suite de l'arrestation d'un Bédouin
qatari dans la péninsuleet de son passage en jugement a Bahreïn. Quant
a 1'unnc;e18611,elle marqua d'une façon plus nette encore l'émergence
d'une entité politique qatarie totalement distincte de Bahreïn, à la suite
d'une expédition punitive bahreïnite a Qatar, puis d'une riposte qatarie à
Bahreïn. Le tout se traduisit par des conventions passéesentre la Grande-
Bretagne et respectivement Bahreïn et Qatar pour arrêterla «guerre» (le
mot avait été employédans les documents officiels britanniques) et en
liquider les effets, ainsi que pour consacrer définitivement l'existence de
deux entitéspolitiques distinctes et indépendantes l'une de l'autre, Bahreïn
et Qatar, dirigéeschacune par un ((Ind~pendent Rulcr)), selon l'expres-
sion dès lors en usage dans tous les traitéspasséspar la Grande-Bretagne
avec chacun des deux pays.
Ces deux annéessont donc capitales. En voici une brève relation.
106. u) L'année 1867 fut celle de l'arrestation par Bahreïn d'un
Bédouinqatari dans la péninsuleet son passage en jugement a Bahreïn:
les réactions violentes qui s'ensuivirent marquèrent lujin d'un titre et lu
ji)rmution d'un LIU~Y~.En riposte à cette arrestation, les autorités qataries,
menéespar la tribu des Naim, supposée pourtant fidèleau souverain de
Bahreïn, se soulevèrent, battirent le représentant bahreïnite à la têtede
ses troupes à Qatar et l'expulsèrent de Wakrah. Cet épisode historique,
qui mit fin à la représentation bahreïnite à Qatar, a pour trwductionjuri-
dique la fin d'un titre de Bahreïn sur la péninsuleqatarie et le débutde la
formation d'un titre de Qatar sur le même ensemble.
107. h) La guerre qui eut lieu entre Qatar et Bahreïn en 1867-1868fut
régléepar les traités de 1868 signéspar la Grande-Bretagne et chacune
des deux entités politiques désormais indépendantes l'une de I'autre. En
effet le cheikh Mohammed de Bahreïn envoya son frère Ali en octobre
1867 pour punir Qatar. Aidé par deux mille hommes mobilisés par le
cheikh d'Abou Dhabi, Zeid bin Khalifa, Ali détruisitun grand nombre de
bateaux qataris et pilla les villesde Biddah (Doha) et de Wakrah3'. Qatar
lança une contre-attaque contre Bahreïn. L'action navale qatarie se solda
pour Bahreïn par la destruction de bateaux et par des morts. Mais
" Cf:, outre les référencespertinente5 du dossier de la Cour, Gholam-Reza Tadjba-
khche, Lli yuc.stiondc.vîl<,.\Bul~rc,ïii.op. 122et.suiv.. ainsi que les sources bri-
tanniques officiellessuivantes:rurhciii(~ci,isi Pc,r.rioiiGulf: A[hcoVioltrtio/'
flrc,Mrri.ifinrc,TrJy the C'lzic~f0~1s'B<rciil</Ahiith(ihj. (Ahir-Dlipublication
du département étranger du Gouvernement del'Inde. no19. DELIMITfiTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 179
In Qutar, therefire, thleuuthority oj'the Al-Thuni gruduullg spreud, ~rhile
thut of the Al-Khulijü progressively shrank.
105. The two years 1867 and 1868 are significant in this regard. Each
marked a decisive turning point. The geur 1867 witnessed the collapse of
Bahraini authority in Qatar following the arrest of a Qatari Bedouin in
the peninsula and his transfer to Bahrain for trial. The geur 1868 then
demonstrated even more forcefully the emergence of a Qatari political
entity which was comlpletelyseparate from Bahrain, following a punitive
Bahraini expedition to Qatar which was met by a Qatari attack on Bah-
rain. All this was reflected in the agreements concluded between Great
Britain and Bahrain and Qatar respectively with a view to stopping the
"II.L~~"- this was the word used in the official British documents - deal-
ing with its consequen~cesand establishing conclusively that two separate
political entities existed. Bahrain and Qatar, each independent of the
other and each governed by an "independent Ruler", the expression
thenceforth customar!~in al1the treaties concluded by Great Britain with
each of the two countries.
These two years ari: therefore crucial. Briefly, what took place was as
follows.
106. ((1) In 1867 Bahrain arrested a Qatari Bedouin in the peninsula
and transferred him to Bahrain for trial: the subsequent violent reactions
marked the cnd cfone title and thcjbrnlrrtion oj'anotlzcr. In response to
the arrest, the Qatari authorities, led by the Naim, a tribe that was how-
ever supposedly faithful to the Ruler of Bahrain, revolted, defeated Bah-
rain's representative il?Qatar at the head of his troops and expelled him
from Wakrah. In legal terms, this historical episode, which put an end to
the Bahraini presence in Qatar, reflected the cesser of Bahrain's title to
the Qatari peninsula ;and the commencement of the formation of a title
by Qatar to that entire area.
107. (h) The war between Qatar and Bahrain in 1867-1868was settled
by the 1868 treaties between Great Britain and each of the two now
mutually independent political entities. In October 1867 Sheikh Moham-
med of Bahrain had despatched his brother Ali to punish Qatar. With the
help of 2,000 men mobilized by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Zeid bin Kha-
lifa, Ali destroyed a large number of Qatari vessels and sacked the towns
of Biddah (Doha) andWakrah 32.Qatar launched a counter-attack against
Bahrain. The naval ;action by Qatar resulted in the destruction of a
number of Bahraini vessels and in Bahraini dead. But Bahrain resisted.
?'Cf.. in addition to the pertinent references in the Court's case file. Gholam-Reza
Tadjbakhche, Lu (/lrr.stionrilcs Buhrc,iop.ci/.. pp. 171..Y(,(/.a.nd the following offi-
cial British sourc:sDist~rrhtrr~cincc,r.sitrnGulf: Ac~coorfthc Violtrtior~of'the,.Wtrri-
tiriic,Trui~~! th<,C11igf.iof Btrhr(rin(in(/ Ahurhuh~ (Ahu Dhrrhi]. publication of the
Forcign Department of the Govcrnmrnt of India, No. 19. 180 DELIMITATION ET QllESTlONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
Bahreïn résista. Face à cette guerre entre deux entités politiques désor-
mais bien individualisées, et convaincu que les cheikhs de Bahreïn et
d'Abou Dhabi avaient étéles premiers à troubler la « Muritirne Trucc»,
le résidentbritannique, le lieutenant-colonel Pelly, envoya alors, sur ins-
tructions de son gouvernement, au cheikh Mohammed de Bahreïn, le
2 septembre 186P, un ultimatum par lequel il l'accusa d'avoir itiolé ses
cngagcrllents pur scJsuctc.s contre Qutur et lui en demanda réparation.
108. En vertu d'un engagement signéle 6 septembre 1868, le cheikh
Ali déclara que le cheikh Mohammed, ayant commis à plusieurs reprises
des irrégularitéssur mer et ayant pris la fuite, était ((déchude tout droit
à son titre de principal cheikh et de chef de Bahreïr~))~~L . e cheikh Ali
devint l'« In&pcnr/ent Ruler» de Bahreïn à la place de son frèrele cheikh
Mohammed.
109. Par cet accord anglo-bahreïnite de 1868,qui prenait acte du chan-
gement de souverain, Buhreïn uvuit udmis n'uiwir uucurz droit tle souilc-
rtiitz~tc; .sur lu pri~~q~i'îlede QutcirCe traité du 6 septembre 1868, qui
imposait diverses sanctions britanniques financières et autres, s'ajoutait
juridiquement à la convention anglo-bahreïnite du 18 mai 1861 qui liait
déji les mains des cheikhs de Bahreïn et les obligeait à s'abstenir de toute
agression maritime35. L'engagement juridique du 18 mai 1861 a donc
reçu concrètement son application dans le traitédu 6 septembre 1868et a
eu polir c~onsc;i/uc~rzjirc(iyue clrire a"er?ipt%.lrerBtil~rrih de muirztenir ou
cl'Gtendre .sonuutorité sur Qritar. Les urzrzérs 1860 ont dotzc bien montri.,
Ù travers ces ~leu.~converztion~, (lue Bulzrcjïnperdait son titre sur lu pknin-
sulc yuturie. Tels sont les .fit$ jurit1iyur.s del lu prGst1nc.ehriturlniyue.
110. Mais ces effets juridiques ne s'arrêtèrent paslà. Après avoir reçu
à bord de son navire de guerre la reddition du cheikh Ali de Bahreïn
le 6 septembre 1868, le résident britannique Pelly invita par une lettre
du II septembre 1868 le cheikh Mohammed bin Thani de Qatar ë le
rejoindre à son tour à bord. L'initiative politique étaiten elle-même signi-
ficative de l'existence de deux entités distinctes auxquelles la Grande-
Bretagnes'adressait. Lc. Gouverner~~er~ btriturzniyue uppurriîf, dit-il, comme
un ((cirbitrutor (4' the Truce» entre &U.Y i.11eikhut.su'G.sormai.sindc;petz-
hnts l'un dc~I'uutre. C'est une yuulité noui?e/keet intérrssut~tc Ù retenir
pour lu suite r/eI't~nuIys~.
111. L'accord du 12septembre 1868,qui couronna cette visite à bord.
comprend évidemment la mise en garde habituelle de ne pas s'attaquer à
Bahreïn et de ne pas troubler la paix maritime. IIcontient aussi I'enga-
gement du cheikh Mohammed bin Thani de Qatar de «maintenir à
l'égarddu cheikh Ali bin Al-Khalifan les relations pacifiques qui exis-
Cf. Foreign Office 2481252.PeàlMohammed bin Khalih et, en son absence.àAli
bin Khalifa.
'4 Cf. Foreign Office 2481252.op. <.if.,àeC. Conne. et Aitchison. A Collrc,ov'n
Trc,crfic. iigugerlitvltscintlScr.~clufitrgto Iiidi<runil Ni~iiylgoiri7rr.ic.s1.933,
vol. XI.p.236-237.
'' Ménioiredc Qatar. vol. 5, annexe 11.p.47.Faced with this war between two now clearly distinguished political enti-
ties and convinced that the sheikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi had been
the first to disturb the Maritime Truce, the British Resident, Lieutenant-
Colonel Pelly. acting on instructions from his Government, then sent an
ultimatum to Sheikh Mohammed of Bahrain on 2 September 1868'3,
accusing him of haviing violrrtc~l 11i.s~tt~dc~rtukirzgtslîrough Izis uct.suguinst
Qutur and demanding reparation from him.
108. Pursuant to am undertaking signed on 6 September 1868, Sheikh
Ali declared that Sheikh Mohammed, having repeatedly committed
irregularities at sea, and having now fled, had "forfeited al1claims to his
title as principal Shaikh and Chief of bah rai^^"^^ .heikh Ali became the
"Independent Ruler" of Bahrain in the place of his brother Sheikh
Mohammed.
109. By this Anglo-Bahraini Agreement of 1868, which took note of
the change in ruler, Bcrlzrain cldmittrcI thut it lirl(/ no rights of soverrignty
over tlzc Qatar petîiti.sula.In legal terms, this Agreement of 6 September
1868 imposing various British penalties, both financial and otherwise,
supplemented the Anglo-Bahraini Convention of 18 May 1861, which
already tied the hantls of the Sheikhs of Bahrain and required them to
abstain from al1maritime aggression~'~.The legal undertaking of 18May
1861 thus received specific application in the Agreement of 6 September
1868 and its c.lr(ir 1r;yuI c~onsecluenicas to prrivnt Bahruin fioni r~iuin-
tuirzing or c>'ctrnding ifs u~ltlzoritj~ oivr Qatar. Cleurlj~ tl~rrefifore, tlirouglz
tlic.vc fii.o instt~irnierzt~:t,lie 1860s c1c.tnon.thut Bahruitz ii~rslosing its
title to the prtzin.sulcc?fQutar. S~/c./ziixere tlîc legul rffects of the British
prrsencc.
110. But those effirctsdid not stop there. Having received the surren-
der of Sheikh Ali of'Bahrain on board ship on 6 September 1868, the
British Resident Pelly, in a letter dated 11 September 1868,invited Sheikh
Mohammed bin Tha.ni of Qatar to join him in turn on board. In itself
this political initiative was significant of the existence of two separate
entities to which Great Britain addressed itself. The British Government
dc~c.larpclifsrIf' rrn "cïrhitrrrtoof' the Truce" hcticren fii20.sI~rikh~/oni.s
ii'Iiir.11irerc noic in&prnc/enof cac.11othrr. Its rzeii.c~ipucity drseri1c.sto he
hornc in mind in our suhsccluent unci1~~si.s.
11 1. The Agreement of 12 September 1868 which capped this ship-
board visit obviously contained the customary warning not to attack
Bahrain or disturb the maritime peace. It also contained an undertaking
by Sheikh Mohammlcd bin Thani of Qatar to "maintain towards Shaikh
Ali bin Khalifeh" the peaceful relations which had previously existed
'' Cf. Foreign Office 2481252.Pellv to Mohammed bin Khalifa and, in his absence. to
Ali bin~halic.
'Tf. Foreign Office 2481252.op[,ilPelly to C. Gonne, and Aitchison. A Colli~i~rioti
of'Treuties. Engtr~rrncnlsund SirnRel<rfitroInttiuund NciglihouringCozrr1trie.c1..933.
Vol. XI.PL 236-237.
" ~emirial of Qatar. Vol. 5, Ann. 11.20.p. 47taient antérieurement entre Bahreïn et Gutter (Qatar)et de soumettre au
résidentpolitique britannique tout conflit qui pourrait surgir entre eux3('.
Juridiquement, I'uc~.orden question établissaitainsi nettement une c;gulité
entre Qutar et Bahrein, dont aucun des dc>uxn'rrvuit ILdroit de>rhoudre
Ilri-tncme. et u son avantugc., un conflit entre eir.rdeu'c.
112. Après ces épisodesmarquants des années 1867et 1868,on assiste
àla consolidation progressive et à la reconnaissance du titre des Al-Thani
sur le territoire de toute la péninsule et des îles adjacentes (1868-1916).
Les deux accords de 1868 avec Bahreïn d'une part et Qatar d'autre part,
et consécutifs a l'intervention des Britanniques en 1867-1868, sont révé-
lateurs de lu conduite du Gouvernement britannique. Cette conduite,
exprimant une reconnaissance du titre du cheikh de Qatar, s'est mani-
festéedans le mêmeesprit à propos
LI) de l'arrivéedes Ottomans dans le Golfe en 1871;
b) des accords anglo-ottomans de 191 3 et de 1914et anglo-saoudiens de
1915.
a) L'urrivGr(les Ottomuns d~msIc Golf. en 1871
113. Après la mort du roi d'Arabie, Wahhabi Amir Fayçal bin Turki,
ses deux fils Abdallah et Saoud se disputèrent le trône en provoquant
quelques troubles, ce qui justifia une expédition militaire ottomane en
1871 a Hasa et au Nejd, l'Empire ottoman étant le suzerain d'Arabie. A
cette occasion, les Turcs offrirent leur protection au cheikh de Qatar
Mohammed bin Thani et a son fils Jassim, qui l'acceptèrent. C'est ainsi
qu'en janvier 1872une garnison turque fut installée a Biddah (Doha). Cc
fut le dkbut d'une prkscnce ottomane de qircrrunte-rluutw LIIISde JIN71u
1915 u Qutur, te qui en a ~/<fitzitiverncnetxclu toute prksentr de Bulzreïn,
1c.sBritunniqur.~uyunt cli.jLdit leur sutisjirction quc les Ottomuns nhient
pus espritnéclcjvi.sc;.~urBulzreïnlui-mêrnr.Progressivement l'administra-
tion ottomane s'installa dans toute IIpéninsulequturie. Qatar devint un
~kaza)) de l'Empire ottoman, c'est-a-dire une province de cet empire,
administrée comme telle. Le cheikh de Qatar fut nommé ((kaïrnakam~,
chef de cette province administrative. Ce fut toute la péninsulede Qatar
qui constitua le <kaza)) ottoman. Dès lors il est intéressant d'examiner Itr
'hMémoire deQatar. vol.5,annexe 11.28.p. 85 «Sealed in our presence by Mahomed
bin Sanee of Gutter and signed by Lewis Pelly. the British Political Resident. and
R. A. Brown, Captain of H.M.'sShip «Vigilant>>.between Bahrain and Guttur (Qatar) and to refer any difference of
opinion arising between them to the British Political Resident 76.From
the I~grrlpersprctivc., tl1i.sAgreement thus rstuhlished clrur rquulity
hrt~i,ern Qatar utld ~%lzruin,neitlier qf'~r/lic/z11.ucntitled tu tukc uni-
latrrul uction to resolitc in its o,iln,fivour uny conflic,tbet~i-eenthem.
112. The period after the significant events of 1867 and 1868 saw the
gradua1 consolidatioi~ and the recognition of the title of the Al-Thani to
the territory of the entire peninsula and adjacent islands (1868-1916).The
two Agreements of 1868, one with Bahrain and the other with Qatar,
which followed the British intervention of 1867-1868,bear witness to the
c.ondut.t of the Briti:sh Government. This conduct, which expressed a
recognition of the tiltle of the Sheikh of Qatar, manifested itself in the
same way in connection with:
(a) the arriva1 of the Ottomans in the Gulf in 1871 ;
(b) the Anglo-Ottoman agreements of 1913 and 1914 and the Anglo-
Saudi agreements of 191 5.
(a) The At,rirul of the 0ttorî1un.sin the. Gulf'in 1871
113. After the death of the King of Arabia, Wahhabi Amir Faisal bin
Turki, his two sons Abdullah and Saud disputed the throne, a situation
which created unresl.; this justified an Ottoman military expedition to
Hasa and Nejd in 1871, the Ottoman Empire being the suzerain of Ara-
bia. On this occasion the Turks offered their protection to the Sheikh of
Qatar, Mohammed bin Thani, and his son Jassim, both of whom accepted
it. As a result, a Turkish garrison was established at Biddah (Doha)
in January 1872. Thus hegun the 44-j~ur-long Ottotnun prrscnce in
Qutur. fioni 1871 to 191.5. This nir~deit itnpossiblr for Buhrui11to tnuin-
tuirzuny prc.srr1c.etIztlre,the British hu~~itzuirrudj. ijoiced tlzrir sutisfrlc-
riorithut flic Ottorl~trnsIicrci ot P.\-prcsscdunj3designs un Buhrr~initsrlf.'
The Ottoman administration gradually established itself tliroughout the
pc~ninsuluof'Qtrtur. Qatar became a "kaza", in other words a province, of
the Ottoman Empire.. and was administered accordingly; the Sheikh of
Qatar was appointed "kaimakam", head of the administrative province.
The Ottoman "kaza" constituted the entire peninsula of Qatar. It is
therefore interesting itoexamine thc conduct hoth ~f'Buhruin unrio/'Grcuf
Britclin.
'('Meniorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. Ann. 11.28.p. 85. "Sealed in our presence by Mahomed
biii Snnee of Guttur aiid signed by Lewis Pelly, the British Political Resident. and R. A.
Broun. Captain ofH.M.'s Ship "Vigilaiit'". 182 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS. COMMUNE)
i) Lu conduite de lu Grund(.-Bretagne d'uhord
114. Dès le début de la pénétration ottomane à Qatar, la Grande-
Bretagne chercha à connaître les intentions turques. Elle fit savoir à
Constantinople qu'elle ne serait nullement indifférente à une pénétration
ottomane à Balireïn et OIPI~I, I?ILIC'/ILIL'dit rirn (ru sujct do Qutar.C'était
une attitude assez cohérente dans la mesure où la Grande-Bretagne,
préoccupée d'assurerla paix maritime dans le Golfe, n'était liéeà cette
époquepar des obligations de protection que contre des conquêtesou des
agressions pur lu voie muritime. Ainsi Bahreïn pouvait escompter une
protection britannique en tant qu'ensemble insulaire. Ce ne pouvait être
le cas de Qatar qui pouvait êtreenvahi par la voie terrestre. De surcroît,
dans le cas de Qatar, il ne s'agissait nid'une agression par la voie «muri-
ti~iw~, ni mêmed'une «ugrc~ssion» des Ottomans qui s'y installèrent sur
invitation du cheikh de Qatar. On ajoutera que, au moment de la pénétra-
tion turque en 1871, la Grande-Bretagne n'étaitpas liéepar le mêmetype
d'accord avec Qatar qu'avec Bahreïn. Le premier ne signa aucun «accord
exclusif))avec la Grande-Bretagne pendant toute la périodeottomane.
115. La Grande-Bretagneobtint rapidement desassurances de l'Empire
ottoman qui limita ses ambitions à Qatar seulement: «La Porte ottomane
nie expressément toute intention d'établir sa suprématie sur Bahreïn,
Mascate et les tribus indépendantes du sud de l'Arabie et précise
qu'aucune attaque n'est envisagée contre eux.»37 Le ~~uli(gouverneur
ottoman)de Bagdad fit savoir de son côté aux Britanniques que ~l'affir-
mation par les Turcs selon laquelle ils ne s'immisceraient pas dans les
affaires de Bahreïn ne visait pas Qatar» jx.
116. La conduite de la Grande-Bretagne fut donc de ne pas s'opposer
à la politique ottomane à Qatar. Un «understanding» partagé par les
deux puissances signifiait que cette politique se déploieraitdans l'aire spa-
tiale de la péninsuleqatarie en tant que telle, puisque les assurances otto-
manes visaient <tBahreïn» mais nullement une quelconque partie - - de
Qatar nommément désignée,telle que Zubarah, ~awar ou Janan. Cette
conthritc hritunniyur u incontc.stuhlrriicnt t~onsolidé 1. titrr de Qutar sur
I'enscr~ihle de lu pc;ninsul~ et sur. ses iles tr4jaccwte.s. Elle .v'est donc ujoutkr
ircrllr yzrc lu Grunclc- Bretugnr u cwr duns 1c.sarzr1ée.~s.ru~.iuIr~1867-1868
pour ptrrfuirc le titre dc~Qtrtcrr.
117. La conduite britannique était une reconnaissance du contrôle de
fucto des Ottomans sur la péninsuleet ses îles adjacentes de 187 1 à 1915,
contrôle que les Britanniques n'ont jamais fondamentalement remis en
cause pendant cette période, tant que la sécuritéde Bahreïn et la paix
maritime n'étaientpas concernées. C'est au nom de cette conduite que la
Grande-Bretagne a repoussél'offre que lui fit en 1891le cheikh Jassim de
Qatar de conclure avec elle un traité dans les mêmes termesque ceux
" Mémoire de Qatar, vol. 4annexe 11.7.p.48.
'X Lorimer, in mémoirede Qatar. vol.3.annexe 11.5.p. 210.
146 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 182
(i) First, the conduct of Great Brituin
114. As soon as the Ottomans began to penetrate Qatar, Great Britain
attempted to ascertain their intentions. It made it known to Constanti-
nople that it would not remain indifferent to any Ottoman penetration of
Balzruinund Omrn?, but it suid nothing ubout Qutur. Great Britain's atti-
tude in this respect was perfectly logical, in so far as its main concern was
to ensure maritime Deacein the Gulf. and at that time it was not bound
by any obligations of protection other than against conquest or attack by
sea. Bahrain, being an insular entity, could therefore count on such pro-
tection. That was not so for Qatar, which could be invaded by land.
What is more, in the case of Qatar, there had been no attack by "seu",
nor even any "~ittuck" by the Ottomans, who had established themselves
there at the invitation of the Sheikh of Qatar. Also. at the time of the
Turkish penetration in 1871, Great Britain was not bound by the same
kind of agreement with Qatar as with Bahrain. The former did not sign
any "exclusive agreeinent" with Great Britain at any time during the
Ottoman period.
115. Great Britain quickly obtained assurances from the Ottoman
Empire that its ambitions were confined to Qatar: "The Ottoman Porte
explicitly denies al1 intention of extending supremacy over BuIlruin,
Mu.skut, or the independent tribes of'Soutlzern Arubia, and contenîp1ate.r
no uttück against tlzern." 37The vali (Ottoman governor) of Baghdad, for
his part, informed the British "thut Qatar it'usnot covered hy u previous
Turkislz assurunce that there ,shouldbe no interference ~ixithBul~ruin"~~.
116. Thus Great Britain's conduct was to refrain from opposing Otto-
man policy in Qatar. An understanding between the two Powers meant
that this policy woulcl be implemented in the area occupied by the Qatar
peninsula as such, silice the Ottoman assurances referred to "Bahrain"
but not to any part of Qatar by name, such asZubarah, Hawar or Janan.
This conduct on tlze part of the British unquestionubly consolidutrd
Qntur's title to tlze ~i'fzoof'thc pcwin.ruluund its cidjucrnt isluncls,t11u.s
supplernenting the co,ilduct,chich Grcut Britairî lzud &rnonstruted in the
cruc.iulyears 1867-1868 in such u ivuy us to perfect Qatar's title.
117. The conduct of the British was an acknowledgment of the Otto-
mans' defucto control of the peninsula and its adjacent islands from 1871
to 1915, something vvhich the British never seriously challenged during
that period as long as Bahrain's security and the maritime peace were not
involved. This conduct was exemplified by the rejection by Britain of the
offer made to it in 1891 by Sheikh Jassim of Qatar to conclude a treaty
witli it on the same terms as it had done with the Trucial Chiefs. Britciin
p ~
" Memorial of Qatar, 'Vol.4. An11.7.p. 48.
'Vorimer. in Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.5.p. 210. 183 DÉLIMITATION ET QLJESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
qu'elle avait signés avecles cheikhs de la Trêve.Lu Gran&-Bretugr~en'u
pus clzerchecirni.contcrltrrinutikrncnt Ic1.v tiorî~un.en rornpant su recon-
rzaisscrrzceu contrôle qu'i1.vpo.s.sCd~iien.tslirlu pc;ninsule-'".
ii) Lu conduitr~de>Bullrc'ïndurunt lu pc;riodc.d'irz.stul1rtionottonlane iI
Qatclri lc silence d'rict~uic~sccnicctl<. ulirc~i'n
118. L'examen du dossier soumis à la Cour ne montre crucuneprotes-
tution de B~ilzreïn,ni directement, ni par I'intermédiaire de la Grande-
Bretagne, contre l'autoritéexercéepar les Ottomans et les cheikhs qataris
sur l'ensemble de la péninsulede Qatar.
119. Lr silencc observé par Bahreïn pendant la période ottomane de
1871 à 1915 sera analysé plus en détail plus loin et élargi à la période
1915-1937.Mais. déji pour la périodeottomane, cette c-onthiitebal~rrïnitc.
se situait uu-des.so~.sdes ~tc/ndurd.sreuuAs AUT Ir rhoit ir~terr~irtionusli
Bahreïn avait voulu conserver ou reprendre son autorité sur les Hawar,
c'est-à-dire sur des îles qui, selon lrnrfbrtc pr6somptio11,juridiqu~ (sur
laquelle nous reviendrons plus tard), sont situéesdans la sphère de sou-
veraineté de Qatar en raison de leur proximité (mer territoriale) avec la
presqu'île.
120. Par cette conduite, Bahreïn n'a pas réussi i stopper la consolida-
tion du titre de Qatar sur Hawar (et Zubarah et Janan), non plus que la
reconnaissance de ce titre par des puissances tierces. Le major Prideaux
était,comme ses prédécesseurs, soucieuxde limiter la présenceottomane
a la péninsulede Qatar. Il fit en 1909 une visite à Zakhnuniyah chez les
Dowasir courtisés par les Ottomans, puis à Hawar. Rentré à Bahreïn, il
en informa le cheikh bahreïnite, avec la préoccupation de le voir élever
une revendication sur les deux. En réponse.le cheikh de Bahreïn formula
par sa lettre du 30 mars 1909 une revendication sur Zakhnuniyah, rî~uis
cruc~nesur Huii.rrr 4'!
iii) Lu conduitr lies cheikh$ de Qutcrret le d6i~~~Ioppemer dctleur uuto-
rit4 .Furtoute lu prc..squ'îkc
121. Les Al-Thani gagnèrent en autorité avec la présenceottomane. A
l'ombre de l'Empire ottoman, le cheikh Jassim renforça progressivement
son titre sur Hawar. Nommé par les Turcs <<kaïmakam)) du <kaza)) ou
province de Qatar, il avait juridiction aussi sur Odeid. Il sut profiter du
bouclier ottoman pour s'imposer à l'ensemble des tribus de la péninsule.
En dirigeant Qatar par I'intermédiairedu cheikh, les Turcs ne perdaient
rien quant à eux et lui faisaient gagner tout quant à lui. La protection
ottomane étaità la fois assez efficace pour lui permettre de se faire obéir
par les tribus et assez légèrepour le laisser maître de la presqu'île et de
ses îles adjacentes. L'excellent observateur politique qu'était Lorimer
'"Mémoirede Qatar. vol. 5, aniiexe 11.8.p. III.
Mémoirede Qatar. par. 5.40. et v6.annexe 111.52.p. 241
147sought tn uvoid upsetting the Ottomuns unnrc~ssurily by ending its
recognition of'their c(9ntrolover the peninsulu 3".
(ii) The condu'uc .f Bahruin during the period of Ottnt~iunestablishr~lent
in Qutar: Bahrain's tucit (rcquiescence
118. A perusal of the evidence before the Court reveals no protest on
tl~eptrrt cf Brrhrain,either directly or through Great Britain, against the
authority exercised t)y the Ottomans and the Qatari sheikhs over the
whole of the Qatar peninsula.
119. Bahrain's silcncc during the Ottoman period from 187 1to 1915
will be discussed in detail later, and expanded to cover the period 1915-
1937. Even in the 0i.toman period, however, this conclucf on Buhruin's
part jkll hcloii the sttrnd(rr~/.rsrcquirediinternational lu111if Bahrain had
wished to retain or ri:cover its authority over the Hawar Islands, that is
to Say, over islands which there was rrstrorlg Iegal prcsumption (we shall
revert to this later) to place in Qatar's sphere of sovereignty by reason of
their proximity (territorial sea) to the peninsula.
120. By this conduct, Bahrain failed to halt the (~on.solillutionof Qatar's
title to Hawar (and L!ubarah and Janan) and recognition of that title by
other Powers. Like his predecessors, Major Prideaux was anxious to limit
the Ottoman presenct: to the Qatar peninsula. In 1909he visited Zakhnu-
niyah to meet the Dowasir - whose allegiance was being solicited by the
Ottomans - and then proceeded to Hawar. On his return to Bahrain he
acquainted its Sheikh with his visit, out of concern that the Sheikh might
lay claim to both these places. The Sheikh of Bahrain's response, in a
letter of 30 March 1909. was a claim to Zakhnuniyah, />utnone to
Htr1i.ur4"!
(iii) Tlie con~f~[ct11j"tllc' S1zeikli.oj' Quttrr und tlic. spread of' thcir
uutliorit~~to the cntirr peni~isukr
121. The Al-Thanii gained in authority by the Ottoman presence.
Under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, Sheikh Jassim gradually
strengthened his title to Hawar. The Turks having appointed him "kai-
makam" of the "ka;!aWor province of Qatar, he had jurisdiction over
Odeid as well. Shielded by the Ottomans, he succeeded in imposing him-
self on al1 the various tribes in the peninsula. By controlling Qatar
through the sheikh. the Turks lost nothing themselves while being of
maximum benefit to him. The Ottoman protection was both sufficiently
effective to enable him to command the obedience of the tribes and suf-
ficiently light-handecl to leave him master of the peninsula and its adja-
'')Mernorial of Qatar. Vo5. Ann.11.8.p. 121.
"' Mernorial of Qatar. par5.40. andVol.6.Aiin. 111.52p.241.184 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
pouvait écrireque <<...peude changement sinon aucun ne s'est produit du
fait de la présence d'un poste turc à Doha ... les cheikhs Al-Thani de
Doha sont restésles principaux acteurs de la vie p~litique))~'.
122. Bahreïn4' a fait cependant observer que lecheikh Jassim de Qatar
ne possédait que l'apparence d'un pouvoir fantômatique. La Grande-
Bretagne lui avait une fois reprochéde n'avoir pas su assurer le maintien
de l'ordre dans la péninsule,non plus que la prévention ou la répression
de la piraterie tout le long de la côte ouest de Qatar. IIfaut alors relever
que :
en rendant ainsi responsable le cheikh Jassim, la Grande-Bretagne a
reconnu une fois de plus son autorité et son titre sur Qatar;
en droit international, I'Etat n'est pas soumis à une rrspon.ruhilité
ohjcctiiv pour tout ce qui peut se produire sur son territoire; il y a des
circonstances dans lesquelles il peut êtreexonéré desa responsabilité;
enfin et surtout, ce qui est plus important, c'est que la Grande-
Bretagne a engagé la responsabilité de Qatar pour les troubles sur la
côte ouest et nullement celle de Bahreïn dont elle ne reconnut plus,
par ce fait, une quelconque autorité aux Hawar ou à Zubarah
sur cette mêmecôte.
123. La consolidation et la reconnaissance conventionnelles du titre
des Al-Thani furent pleinement réaliséeslorsque intervinrent les accords
anglo-ottomans de 1913 et de 1914, l'accord anglo-saoudien de 1915 et
l'accord anglo-qatari de 191 6.
b) Lu convention du 29 ,juillet 1913 relrtiiv uu Golf2 et uu.u territoires
udjac.cnts
124. C'est une convention très importante pour notre propos, par ses
articles 11 et 13.
i) L'urticle II tout d'abord
125. Il est rédigécomme suit:
((Le sandjak ottoman du Nejd, dont la limite septentrionale est
indiquée par la ligne de démarcation définie à l'article7 de cette
convention, se termine vers le sud au Golfe faisant face à l'île de
Zakhnouniya qui appartient audit sandjak. Une ligne partant du
fond extrêmedudit golfe ira directement au sud jusqu'au Ruba'al-
Khali et séparera le Nejd de la presqu'île d'El-Katar. Les limites du
4'Mémoirede Qatar. vol. 3, annexe11.5p. 210.
42Mémoirede Bahreïn. par. 133.
148 DELIMllrATlON AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 184
cent islands. Lorimer, such an astute political observer, wrote that "little
or no change was produced by the presence of a Turkish post at Dohah
. . . the Al Thani Shaikhs of Dohah were still the principal factor in
politics"41.
122. Bahrain4' has, however, observed that the power seemingly exer-
cised by Sheikh Jassim of Qatar was no more than illusory. Great Britain
had once warned hini about having failed to maintain order in the penin-
sula and prevent or isuppress piracy throughout the Westcoast of Qatar.
It should be noted from this that:
- by thus attributing responsibility to Sheikh Jassim, Great Britain
again rc.c,ognizedhis authority over and title to Qatar;
- in international law, a State is not subject to objec.tii,rrespon.sibilit~~
for everything which may occur in its territory; there are circum-
stances in which it can be relieved of its responsibility;
- finally and above all, what is more important is that Great Britain
held Qatar responsible for the disturbances on the Westcoast, but not
Bahrain, thus ceasing to recognize any Bahraini authority over the
Hawar Islands or Zubarah on that same coast.
123. The Anglo-Ottoman agreements of 1913 and 1914, the Anglo-
Saudi agreement of 1915and theAnglo-Qatari agreement of 1916marked
the completion of the consolidation of the Al-Thanis' title and its recog-
nition by treaty.
(b) The Coni~ention oJ '9 Jul~' 1913 Respecfing the Persiun Gulf und
Adjucvnt Territorics
124. This Converition, because of its Articles 11 and 13, is of great
importance for our purpose.
(i) Fir.rt, Article II
125. This Article is worded as follows:
"The Ottoman sanjak of Nejd, the northern boundary of which is
marked by a line of demarcation defined in article 7 of this Conven-
tion, ends on the south at the gulf opposite the island of Zakhnuni-
yah, which belongs to the said sanjak. A line starting from the
extreme end of the said gulf shall run due south to Ruba-al-Khali,
and shall separate Nejd from the El-Katr peninsula. The boundaries
4' Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.5.p. 210
Meniorinl of Bahrain. para. 133. Nejd sont indiquées par une ligne bleue sur la carte annexée a la
présenteconvention (annexe Vu). Le Gouvernement impérialottoman
ayant renoncé a toutes ses réclamations concernant la presqu'île
d'El-Katar, il est entendu entre les deu.u gouvc.rnemcnts que ludite
presqu'île seru, comnw pur le passC,gouvrrnPepur Ir cheikh Jussim-
bin-Suni [bin Thunil et pur ses successeurs. Le gouvernement de Sa
Majesté britannique déclare qu'il ne permettra pas au cheikh de
Bahreïn de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures d'El-Katar, de
porter atteinte à l'autonomie de ce pays ou de 1'anne~er.n~~
126. Quelle est la signification de cet article?
1. Tout d'abord les deux grandes puissances de la région, Grande-
Bretagne et Empire ottoman, reconnaissent l'intégritéterritoriale
de Qatar. L'article 11 ci-dessus parle de la ((presqu'île)) de Qatar, en
tant qu'ensemble politico-géographique.
2. Les deux grandes puissances reconnaissent également, et consolident,
le titre de lu dyiiu.~tiedc~Al-T/~uninommément désignée.En parlant
de son «pc~ssP»,l'article11enracine dans le temps son titre et le Iéga-
lise.
3. L'Empire ottoman enregistre l'engagement renouveléde la Grande-
Bretagne de s'opposer ù toutc ininii.utiode la part de Bahreïn dans
ladite presqu'île. C'est la prise en compte de la fin de la présence
bahreïnite aux Hawar (à Zubarah et a Janan), telle qu'elle a été
déclaréedans les accords de 1868.
4. Ces trois éléments confirment la fin du titre bahreïnite et la substitu-
tion du titre des Al-Thani, telles qu'elles furent constatées et déclarées
quarante-cinq ans auparavant par les accords de 1868 entre la
Grande-Bretagne et Bahreïn et Qatar respectivement.
5. Point irnportunt Pgukernent,lu carfc cittut.liécù 1'unnc.u~.V a) de lu
convention confirmc les di.spo.sitiorisd~ l'rrrficlcII ef niontrc'que les
îl~sHu~vuruppiirtiennent ù Qutur.
6. Il serait impossible d'exclure de la dénomination ((presqu'île d'El-
Katarn une quelconque portion, si la convention, comme c'est lecas,
ne le dit pas expressément, surtout s'il s'agit d'exclure les Hawar alors
qu'elles sont situées dans la mer territoriale de cette presqu'île et,
mieux encore, qu'elles font physiquement partie intégrante de celle-ci.
ii) L'article13 de 11tcior~ventioti
127. Comme nous venons de l'indiquer, l'article 11 et la carte annexée
montrent que les Hawar ne font pas partie de Bahreïn, mais bien de la
presqu'île de Qatar. L'article 13 le montre tout autant lorsqu'il stipule:
«Le Gouvernen~ent impérial ottoman renonce à toutes ses récla-
mations concernant 1e.r îl~~sBcihrc~iii.y compris les deux îles
*'Les italiques sont de nous of Nejd are marked by a blue line on the map annexed to this Con-
vention (annex Va). The Imperia1 Ottoman Government having
renounced al1their claims with regard to the El Katr peninsula, it i.s
cr~rerdhctii7ern ,111tic30Goverrzmentsthut the suid peninsula shuli hc~
gover.net/,US her~t(?fi)re,bj?Slleikli Jussini-bin-Sun~i [hin Thani] und
his successor.s. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that
they will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrein to interfere in the interna1
affairs of El-Katr, to infringe the autonomy of the country, or to
annex it."43
126. What is the import of this Article?
1. In the first place the two major Powers in the region, Great Britain
and the Ottoman Empire, recognize the territorial integrity of Qatar.
Article 1I above talks of the "peninsula" of Qatar as a political and
geographical entiiy.
2. The two great Powers also recognize, and consolidate, the title of the
Al-Thcini r&nustj,, who are mentioned by name. By speaking of the
"hcret(?fiwp"of their title, Article 11 gives it a temporal foundation
and authenticates it.
3. The Ottoman Empire records Great Britain's renewed undertaking to
opposc unj interf>r.cnt.cby Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula, thus
acknowledging the end of the Bahraini presence in the Hawars (and in
Zubarah and Janan) as set forth in the 1868 Agreements.
4 These three e1emc:ntsconfirm the end of the Bahraini title and its
replacement by the title of the Al-Thani - events which had been
recorded and proclaimed 45 years earlier in the 1868 Agreements
between Great Briitain and Bahrain and Qatar respectively.
5. Another importantpoint: tllc n1upattcichcd to Aniles V (a) qf'tl~eCon-
ilcntionconfirrn.~the provision.^of'Artick Il und shoit'.~thut tlle Hairur
Islurlds bhrlongto Q~rtur.
6. It would be impossible for the denomination "El-Katr peninsula" to
exclude any portion of that peninsula unless the Convention expressly
said so - which it does not - especially where the question is one of
excluding the Haluar Islands, sit~iatedas they are in the territorial sea
of that peninsula and, better still, physically being an integral part
of it.
(ii) Artic.1~13 (!/'the Conivntiotz
127. As we have just said, Article 11 and the map annexed to the Con-
vention show that the Hawars are not part of Bahrain but definitely part
of the peninsula of Qatar. Article 13 demonstrates this just as clearly:
"The Imperikil Ottoman Government renounce al1 their claims
with regard to tllc Brrl~rrini.slunds. including the two islets of
" Emphasis iidded186 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
Lubainat-el-Aliya et Lubainat as-Safliya, et reconnaît I'indkpendunce
de ce pays. De son côté, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté britan-
nique déclare qu'il n'a aucune intention d'annexer à ses territoires
les îles Buhrein.»44
Si en effet la convention tint à désigner nommément, aux fins de les
inclure dans les «îles Bahreïn)), des îles comme les deux Lubainat, du
nord et du sud, pourtant proches de la grande île de Bahreïn, c'est qu'il
n'a nullement paru naturel et évidenten soi qu'elles pussent êtreincluses
dans Bahreïn sans avoir étéexpressément nommées. Afortiori alors, les
îles Hawar, qui sont plus lointaines et qui de ce fait ne sont pas citées
nommément, ne pouvaient pas êtreconsidéréescomme incluses dans
Bahreïn, faute de leur désignation expresse dans la convention.
128. La convention du 29juillet 1913a étésignée,mais jamais ratifiée.
Il faut cependant noter que son article 11 analyséci-dessus a étéexpres-
sémentvisépar I'«Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting the Boundaries
of Aden» du 9 mars 1914, qui a étédûment ratifiée.Ce mêmearticle 11
de la convention du 29 juillet 1913 a étéen outre visépar l'article IIIde
la convention anglo-ottomane de 1914,également ratifiée
129. Aussi importante que la précédentede 1913,cette convention fait
plusieurs fois référenceà «El-Katar)) en tant qu'ensemble (((presqu'île D).
Le fait qu'elle n'exclue pas les îles Hawar nommément de cet ensemble
péninsulaire implique que les deux puissances contractantes ont reconnu
et pris acte de la perte de tout titre de Bahreïn sur ces îles Hawar.
Celles-ci appartiennent à l'ensemble péninsulaire qatari en tant qu'îles
adjacentes.
130. En conclusion, les deux conventions de 1913 et de 1914 sont
venues s'ajouter a tous les élémentsqui, depuis les années 1860, ont
concouru à la création et a la consolidation du titre des Al-Thani sur les
îles Hawar.
d) Lcs trciitks crnglo-suoudicns(/LI1Y15 1927
131. Enfin, aprés les Britanniques et les Ottomans, ce fut au tour de
l'Arabie de reconnaître ce titre des Al-Thani. Cette reconnaissance était
d'autant plus importante qu'Ibn Saoud d'Arabie avait longtemps exprimé
un trniniuspossidendi sur l'ensemble deQatar. Après avoir conquis Hasa,
il revendiqua à nouveau en 1913 la péninsule. II y renonça finalement
aprèsdes pressions britanniques et conclut avec la Grande-Bretagne à cet
j4Les italiques sont de nous DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 186
Lubainat-el-Aliya and Lubainat-es-Safliya, and recognise the inde-
pendence of that country. His Britannic Majesty's Government on
their part declare that they have no intention of annexing the Buh-
vc.inislunds to their territ~ry."~~
The reason why the Convention took care to mention by name, so asto
include them in "the Bahrein islands", islands such as the two Lubainat,
north and south, clo,seas they are to the main island of Bahrain, is that
it did not seem natural and self-evident that they should be included in
Bahrain unless they were expressly named. A Jovtiovi, then, the Hawar
Islands, situated further away and therefore not mentioned by name,
could not be regarcled as forming part of Bahrain, not having been
expressly mentioned in the Convention.
128. The Convention of 29 July 1913was signed, but never ratified. It
should be noted, ho,wever, that its Article Il, which we have discussed
above, was referred to expressly in the Anglo-Turkish Convention respect-
ing the Boundaries of Aden of 9 March 1914, an instrument which was
duly ratified. This Article11 of the Convention of 29 July 1913was also
referred to in Article III of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914,which
was also ratified.
(c) Tilt Anglo- Turkisll Convention of'1Y14
129. Just as important as the preceding Convention of 1913, this
instrument makes several references to "El-Katr" as an entity ("penin-
sula"). The fact that it does not exclude the Hawar Islands by name from
that peninsular entity implies that the two contracting Powers recognized
and placed on record the fact that Bahrain had lost any title to the
Hawars. These belong to the peninsular entity of Qatar as adjacent
islands.
130. In conclusiori, the two Conventions of 1913and 1914represented
a further element to be added to al1the others which, since the 1860s,had
come together to create and consolidate the title of the Al-Thani to the
Hawar Islands.
(d) The Anglo-Suudi Trcuties of'1915 und 1927
131. Finally, after the British and the Ottomans, it was Arabia's turn
to recognize the Al-Thanis' title. This recognition was particularly impor-
tant in that Ibn Saud of Arabia had long expressed an uninzuspossidendi
to the whole of Qatar. Having conquered Hasa, he claimed the peninsula
again in 1913. He finally renounced his claim as a result of British
pressure and conclu.ded a treaty to that effect with Great Britain on
Emphasis added.
150187 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
effet un traité le 26 décembre 191545.Ce traité sera suivi par un autre
conclu à Djedda, le 20 mai 1927,dans le même espritde renonciation à
toute ambition territoriale sur Qatar.
132. Cet accord est important à plusieurs égards:
i) Pur les yuulitésrcspecfivcs des cocot?truc.tunts
133. Qatar est représentépar le cheik Abdallah Al-Thani en qualité
d'ccInu'cpcndent Ruler» de tout Qatar et de tous ses sujets. La Grande-
Bretagne est représentéepar le lieutenant-colonel sir Percy Cox, premier
signataire, en attendant que le vice-roi et gouverneur des Indes signe
l'accord à son tour. La Grande-Bretagne apparaît en une qualité nou-
velle: elles'engage à offrir ses«bons oJf;c.es» en cas d'agression (par voie
terrestre).Les bons ojfices ne .s'uppliquentqu'cntre deux entit6.r chucune
indépendanteen soi et vis-ù-vis de 1'uutre: Qatar se fait ainsi reconnaître
cette qualitévis-à-visde Bahreïn. De surcroît la Grande-Bretagne ne pou-
vait offrir ses «bons offices))à ces deux pays s'ilsavaient étéses colonies
ou ses protectorats.
ii) Pur lu nuturc'et l'6tendu~de lu protc~ction
134. Jusqu'ici les engagements conventionnels de l'Angleterre se limi-
taient à une protection en cas d'agression «by seu», ce qui, dans le
contexte de l'époque,visait une protection contre les actions de Bahreïn.
Le nouvel accord prévoitune telle protection, mais il y ajoute, par son
article XI, une obligation de la Grande-Bretagne d'accorder ses ((bons
offices» pour une agression pur voie terrestre, et «within the territories of
Qatar».
iii) Pur l'assiette territoriule concernée
135. L'article XI vise lesagressions «within the territories[au pluriel]
of Qatar)). Le traité couvre toute la péninsule. Celaest confirmé de
diverses manières :
- par un article «El-Katr, 1908-1916))dans Persiun Gulf'Historicul
Summaries, 1907-1 928 ;
- par une publication militaire britannique, le Handbook of'Arabia, qui
montre bien que par Qatar il faut entendre toute la péninsule;
- Bahreïn a cependant fait valoir un rapport du résidentbritannique du
12 mars 1934 au sujet de son entrevue avec le cheikh de Qatar.
Celui-ci a indiqué à son interlocuteur que le traitéde 1916indiquait la
45Mémoirede Qatar, vol. 5, anne11.46.p.179.26 December 191545.This treaty was followed by a further treaty con-
cluded at Jeddah on, 20 May 1927, likewise renouncing any territorial
ambitions to Qatar.
(e) The Anglo-Qatari Agrecwent of' 1916
132. This agreement is important for several reasons:
(i) The respectiile capacities of thc contracting parties
133. Qatar was represented by Sheikh Abdullah Al-Thani as "lnde-
pendent Ruler" of tEiewhole of Qatar and ull his subjects. Great Britain
was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, the initial signa-
tory, pending subsequent signature of the Agreement by the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India. Great Britain appears in a new capacity: it
undertakes to offer ils "good otfices" in the event of aggression (by land).
Good ojficrs trpp!,, .s~olc~ljs~betircen tiilo entities irliich arc uutonornous
and indclpendetit of eucli other: Qatar thus achieved recognition of that
status vis-ri-vis Bahrain. What is more, Great Britain could not have
offered "good offices" to those two countries if they had been its colonies
or protectorates.
(ii) The nature and c:Ixtent of'the protectiori
134. Until that time Great Britain's treaty undertakings had been
limited to protectiori in the event of aggression "by seu", which in the
context of the time meant protection against actions by Bahrain.
The new agreement, in addition to providing for that protection, con-
tained an obligation by Great Britain in Article XI to grant its "good
offices" in the event of an aggression hy /und, and "within the territories
of Qatar".
(iii) The territoviul uea involved
135. Article XI refers to aggression "within the territories [in the plu-
ral] of Qatar". The 1Treatycovers the entire peninsula. This is confirmed
in various ways:
- by an article entitled "El Katr, 1908-1916" in Persian Gulf'Historicul
Surnrnuric~s,1907-1928 ;
- by a British military publication, the Handbook of Arubiu, which
clearly shows that "Qatar" means the entire peninsula;
- Bahrain nevertheless cited a report dated 12 March 1934 by the Brit-
ish Resident on the subject of his interview with the Sheikh of Qatar.
The latter indicated to the Residcnt that the 1916 Treaty related to
I5Mernorial of Qatar. Vol. 5. An11.46p. 179.
15 1 «coustline», mais pas l'«interior». Cette interprétation du cheikh
étaitinspiréepar des considérations particulières et notamment par le
souci de ne pas se faire imposer le choix d'une compagnie pétrolière
britannique. Mais elle n'était pasconforme à l'article XI du traitéde
1916qui parle des ((territories» de Qatar. Par ailleurs, si le traitévise
la((coustline)),ilse réfèredonc aux îles Hawar nécessairement. Enfin
le mêmerapport de 1934 du résident britannique livre la réponse
appropriée donnée par celui-ci au cheikh: ((Vous êtesle souverain de
tout Qatar, et le traité s'étendà l'ENSEMBLE de Qatar.))46 Il est
uinsijuridiqucn7ent ucquis que le territoire iriséuus urticles X et XI du
traitéanglo-yutrrride 1916 c;tuit1'cn.semhlede lu presqu'île ckeQutur.
Une telle interprétation est égalementconforme aux articles 11 et 13,
respectivement, de la convention de 1913 et de la convention anglo-
ottomane de 1914.
136. En conclusion de cette analyse de la rencontre entre l'histoire rt le
droit, il paraît clair que, en purtunt de l'hypoth6se selon laquelle Buhrrïn
avait possédéduns Ir passéun titre historique sur l~sHuit*ar,nous consi-
déronsque les traitésanglo-bahreïnite et anglo-qatari de 1868 intervenus
par la suite consacrent la perte de souveraineté de Bahreïn sur la pres-
qu'île de Qatar. Ces accords scellèrentla fin d'un titre et la naissance d'un
autre, au profit de Qatar, nouvelle entité distincte de Bahreïn. Ce titre de
Qatar fut progressivement renforcé, tant et si bien que le traité entre la
Grand-Bretagne et Qatar de 1916enregistra la consolidation définitivede
ce titre. II est rcrnurquublc. muis nous croyons, regrettable, que le présent
arrêtuit évite d'uhorder et de trcinchcr lu question du titre I~istorico-
juridique, dont l'analyse était d'autant plus indispensable qu'elle consti-
tuait la clef traditionnelle en matière de dévolutions territoriales. L'effort
de recherche historique n'étaitpas, nous semble-t-il, hors de la portéedu
juge, d'autant plus que chaque étape historique était balisée par des
traités internationaux, type de piècesà l'interprétation desquelles le juge
est particulièrement rompu. De surcroît, si la Cour avait pris la peine
d'analyser la question du titre historico-juridique, c'est-A-diredu phéno-
mène de la rencontre entre l'histoire et Ic droit, elle aurait trouvé matière
à confirmation des résultats de son analyse dans l'examen de la rencontre
de lu géographieet du droit, c'est-à-dire dans:
1. le concept juridique de proximité géographique en relation avec la
question de l'intégritéterritoriale d'un Etat côtier;
2. l'identification universelle de l'appartenance des Hawar d'aprèsle dos-
sier cartographique;
3. l'identification et la détermination de la consistance territoriale respec-
tivement de Bahreïn et de Qatar.
4"Contre-mémoire de Bühreïn. vol. 2. annexe 122, p. 412: les italiques sont de nous. the "coustline" biit not the"interior."This interpretation on the part
of the Sheikh was inspired by special considerations, in particular a
desire not to have the choice of a British oil Company dictated to him.
But it was not consistent with Article XI of the 1916 Treaty, which
speaksof the "territories"of Qatar. Furthermore, if the Treaty envis-
aged the "cocutline" it was thus necessarily referring to the Hawar
Islands. Finally, this same 1934 report by the Resident records the
appropriate reply he gave to the Sheikh: "And you are the Ruler of
ALL Qatar and the Treaty extends to the WHOLE of Qatar."4h
Tlius. it i.s legally e.stublislzcd thut the territor-). rcfbto in Ar-
ticSIeX und XI of the Anglo-Quturi Treuty of'1916 izas tlie entire
Qutur peninsula. This interpretation is also consistent with Article11
and 13respectively of the Convention of 1913and the Anglo-Turkish
Convention of 1914.
136. In conclusiori to this analysis of the convergence of historj, und
Iutv,we believe it apparent that, ussurning tliut Buhruin had in tlze pust
hrld u lzistoricul title tothe Haivurs, the Anglo-Bahraini and Anglo-
Qatari treaties of 1868 established that it had lost sovereignty over the
Qatar peninsula. These agreements marked the end of one title and the
birth of another, belonging to Qatar, a new entity separate from Bahrain.
Qatar's title was progressively strengthened, to such a degree that the
1916 treaty between (GreatBritain and Qatar recorded the definitive con-
solidation of that title.t is striking, und lisehelieve ur?f0rtunute, tliar the
present Judgtnent h~1.suvoided nd~fre.s.singand rrsolving the question of'
thc historicul legul titlan analysis of which was particularly vital since
this constitutes the traditional key to deciding territorial attribution.
We do not think that undertaking the historical research was beyond
the capability of the Court, especially since each historical juncture was
marked out by international treaties and the Court has extensive
experience in interpreting instruments of that kind. Moreover, if the
Court had taken the trouble to analyse the issue of the historical legal
title, that is theconvergence cd 'istory and lutt~,it would have found
confirmation of the results of that analysis in considering the conver-
gence of geogruphy irnd luiz.,that is, in:
1. the legal concept of geographical proximity in relation to the question
of a coastal State's territorial integrity;
2. the universal agreement, according to the map evidence, on the appur-
tenance of the Hiiwars; and
3. the identificatiori and determination of the territorial extent of
Bahrain and Qatar, respectively.
4hCounter-Mernorial of Bahrain, Vol. 2, Ann.p.412; emphasis added189 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
C'est ce qu'il convient d'examiner a présent, à titre de contre-épreuve
en quelque sorte pour confirmer la conclusion tiréede l'examen du titre
historico-juridique.
VI. PROXIMIT ÉT INTECIRITE TERRITORIALE
137. Sur les questions de proxiniité, c~ontiguitéet intégritéterritoriule,
l'arrêt dela Cour est pratiquement tout aussi muet qu'il l'a étésur la
question du titre historique.
11existe pourtant en droit international urrefortr présonîptionjuridique
selon laquelle les îles situéesdans les eaux territoriales d'un Etat appar-
tiennent a cet Etat.
((11existe une forte présomption en vertu de laquelle des îles situées
à l'intérieurd'une zone de douze milles de la côte appartiennent à
1'Etatcôtier, à moins que la conclusion contraire ne soit parfaitement
établie (comme, par exemple, dans le cas des îles Anglo-Normandes).
Mais il n'existe pas de présomption analogue en dehors de la zone
côtiére,où la propriété desîles devient manifestement litigieuse. ))
Ainsi s'est expriméela sentence du 9 octobre 1998 rendue par le tribu-
nal arbitral dans l'affaire ErythréelYémensous la présidencede sir Robert
Jennings (par. 474). Cette sentence a appliqué le principe de droit inter-
national selon lequel une île situéedans les eulrx territoriales d'un Etut est
réputée jairc partie du territoire do cct Etat.
138. Il s'agit là d'une «,forte prPsomptiorz»juridique. Elle n'est certes
pas irréfragable. Mais elle ne peut ètre renverséeque:
- procédurrilcmrnt parlant, par un renversement de la charge de la
preuve; et
- quant LZUfond, par l'invocation d'un titre supérieur.
139. La présornption vise les îles situées dans les eau.u territoriales.
Aujourd'hui la largeur de la mer territoriale est de 12milles. La sentence
ErytllréelYémenen a tenu compte naturellement. Si l'on prend en consi-
dération cette largeur, ce sont toutcs les îles Hawar qui appartiendraient
à Qatar. Et si on retient la largeur de 3 milles en vigueur au moment du
traité anglo-qatari du 3 novembre 1916, c'est la rriujoritt;des îles et îlots
des Hawar qui se trouvent totalement ou partiellement dans la mer
territoriale de Qatar. La revendication formulée par Bahreïn le 29 mai
1938concernait dix-sept îles et îlots, dont onze se trouvent dans la limite
des 3 milles.
140. Bahreïn a nié l'existencede ce principe en droit positif et a ana-
lysépas moins de onze cas où ce principe se trouve en défaut dans le
monde. L'argumentation de Bahreïn manque cependant de pertinence.
Car les situations invoquées dériventtoutes de circonstances particulières
et ont étécrééesconilentionnellcmc.nt. On peut (presque) tout faire par It is these points which should now be examined, as a form of
countercheck to confirm the conclusion drawn from consideration of
the historical legal title.
VI. PR.OXIMIT AND TERRITORIAIL NTEGRITY
137. The Court's Judgment has almost as little to Say on the issues of
pro'ciinity, cotztiguitj8und territorirrlintegrity as it does on the question of
historical title.
There exists, however, a strong legal presuinption under international
law that islands lying within the territorial waters of a State belong to
that State.
"There is a strong presumption that islands within the twelve-mile
coastal belt will belong to the coastal State, unless there is a fully-
established case to the contrary (as, for example, in the case of the
Channel Islands). But there is no like presumption outside the
coastal belt, where the ownership of the islands is plainly at issue."
So states the Award of 9 October 1998 made by the Arbitration Tri-
bunal in the EritrecilYernen case under the presidency of Sir Robert
Jennings (para. 474). This Award applied the principle of international
law that un i.slundsifuated in the icrritoriul 1i.atrrof (1Stt~te is decmed
tojOrn7ptrrt of'the tiirritorjl of'thut Stute.
138. This is a "strong presumption" in law - one which admittedly is
not irrebuttable but which cannot be overcome except:
in tcrms of'procedure, by reversing the burden of proof; and
- suhstuntil~el~,by invoking a superior title.
139. Thc presunlption concerns islunds situuted ivithin territoriul
bruters.Today the breadth of the territorial sea is 12 miles. The Eritreul
Yenien Award of course took this into account. If we go by this figure, ull
the Hawar Islands belong to Qatar. And if we go by the 3-mile breadth
which applied at thr: time of the Anglo-Qatari Treaty of 3 November
1916, the mujority of the islands and islets of the Hawars lie totally or
partially within Qatar's territorial sea. The claim made by Bahrain on
29 May 1938 concerned 17 islands and islets, II of which are within the
3-mile limit.
140. Bahrain denied the existence of this principle in positive law and
cited no fewer than 11 instances worldwide in which the principle has not
prevailed. But Bahi-ain's argument is irrelevant, since the situations
mentioned al1 derivir from special circumstances and were crcuted hj*
treuty. Anything - almost anything - can be done by treaty, since thetraité, l'autonomie de la volonté souveraine des Etats étant un principe
fondamental. La sentence ErythréelYkmrn avait bien pris soin de dire «a
moins que la conclusion contraire ne soit parfaitement établie)).
141. Du reste la proximité ne constitue pas ù ellclseule un titre. Elle
s'ajoute ou se conjugue a d'autres élémentspour constituer ce titre. C'est
bien le cas ici.
On relèvera aussi que le concept de proximité n'est pas aussi étranger
au droit qu'on pourrait le penser a priori. La notion de «distance» est
bien présente endroit de la mer. Celle de «proximité» en dérive.Après
tout, le titre de 1'Etat côtier sur sa mer territoriale ne procède de rien
d'autre que de la proximité. Etdu reste un Etat «urchipélagiyue»,auquel
Bahreïn prétend, n'est pas autre chose qu'un ensemble d'îles dont le seul
point commun est la «pro.~imité».
142. Nous n'évoquons en la présente affaire que la forte présomption
d'appartenance d'une île à 1'Etatcôtier si elle se situe dans la limite de sa
mer territoriale. Cette présomption existe et le fait de la baptiser «prin-
cipe de proximité))ou autrement ne peut pas nuire à son existence du seul
fait que ce principe revêtd'autres habits, comme celui de la «contiguïté»,
ou qu'une partie de la doctrine, à vrai dire assez faible, le discute parfois.
143. Bahreïn semble présenter la jurisprudence de l'lle de Palmus
comme opposée au concept de proximité. Cette jurisprudence n'est pas
pertinente en la présenteespèce.L'arbitre Max Huber a en effet écartéla
question parce qu'il s'agissait simplement d'îles situées uu-delù de la
limite des eaux territoriales, ce qui n'est pas le cas ici.
VII. LE DOSSIER CARTOGRAPHIQUE
144. Tournons à présent notre regard vers le dossier curtographiyue.
La jurisprudence de la Cour a bien déterminé laplace relative du maté-
riau cartographique dans l'administration de la preuve. Nous ne revien-
drons donc pas sur cette question. Tout récemment encore, le tribunal
arbitral institué en l'affaire ErytlzrkelYémrna précisé laplace des cartes,
qui sont en quelque sorte le reflet de l'étatde l'opinion généraleet de la
réputation : «Le Tribunal doit se méfierde ces élémentsde preuve dans la
mesure où ceux-ci ne peuvent pas êtrerévélateursdu titre juridique, mais
il s'agit néannîoinsd'«élémrntsde preuve itnportunts dc~rrrconnuissunce
généraleou de cornmune renomn~kc)),comme le soutient le Yémen.»47
145. Alors que le matériau cartographique produit par Bahreïn était
insignifiant, Qatar a pour sa part déployéde grands efforts pour livrer un
dossier cartographique considérable qui vient confirmer sa position
concernant l'appartenance des îles Hawar. Une grande collection de
47Paragraphe 381 de la sentence: les italiqude nous
154 DELIMII'ATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 190
contractual freedom of sovereign States is a fundamental principle. The
Eritr.eulYenzen Award took good care to say "unless there is a fully-
established case to the contrary".
141. What is more, proximity ulone does not constitute a title. It sup-
plements or combines with other elements to constitute a title. This is
clearly the case here.
It will also be noted that the concept of proximity is not as alien to the
law as might at first be thought. The notion of "distance" is clearly
present in the law of the sea. That of "proximity" derives from it. After
all, the title of a coastal State to its territorial sea stems exclusively from
proximity. What is more, an "urclzipelugic" State, which is what Bahrain
claims to be, is nothing more than a collection of islands having in com-
mon "prosimity "alone.
142. In the presenitcase we are simply recalling the strong presumption
that an island belongs to a coastal State if it is situated within the limits
of its territorial sea. This presumption exists, and calling it the "principle
of proximity" or by any other name cannot detract from its existence
merely because the principle comes cloaked in a new guise, such as "con-
tiguity", or because a section of the doctrine - in truth. a rather small
one - on occasion challenges it.
143. Bahrain appears to be putting forward the Islund oJ'Pulmusjuris-
prudence as being opposed to the concept of proximity. That decision is
not relevant to the present case. The arbitrator Max Huber discounted
the matter of proxiniity simply because the islands concerned were situ-
ated beyond the limit of territorial waters, which is not the case here.
VII. THEMAPEVIDENCE
144. We shall now turn to the mup evidence. Since the Court's juris-
prudence has deterrriined quite clearly the relative importance of carto-
graphie material as evidence, we shall not revert to this point. Even quite
recently, the Arbitration Tribunal established in the EritreulYemcn case
spelled out the importance of maps, which are, as it were, a reflection of
general opinion and repute: "Although the Tribunal must be wary of this
evidence in the sense that it cannot be used as indicative of legal title, it is
norzethrless 'importu,~rc~irlc~ncoc.j'gcnertrl opiniorl or uc.pzrte'in the sense
advanced by Yemen."47
145. While the cairtographic material submitted by Bahrain was insig-
nificant, Qatar took great trouble to present a substantial collection of
map evidence confirming its position in regard to ownership of the
Hawar Islands. A large number of maps from Turkey, the United King-
47Paragraph 381 of the Award; emphasis added191 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
cartes, en provenance de la Turquie, du Royaume-Uni, de l'Allemagne, dela
France, de l'Italie, de la Pologne, de la Russie, des Etats-Unis, de
l'Australie, de l'Iran, montre que, selon l'opinion généralement répandue
dans le monde et à des époques très diverses, les îles Hawar ont appar-
tenu a Qatar.
146. Tout particuliérement lescartes postérieuresà 1868(guerre bahreï-
nite-qatarie et traités de la Grande-Bretagne avec Qatar et Bahreïn res-
pectivement) montrent l'existence de deux entités politiques désormais
distinctes, Bahreïn ensemble compact composé decinq îles et Qatar cons-
tituéen péninsule avecses îles et îlots adjacents, îles Hawar comprises.
147. Le dossier cartographique produit parQatar nous paraît donc de
loin le plus convaincant. Nous retiendrons plus particulièrement les
cartes établiespar le British War Office en 191,1908, 1911, ainsi que le
croquis que le département de la défensefit en 1934,et qui montrent tous
que la péninsuletout entière, les îles Hawar comprises, relevait de la sou-
veraineté de Qatar.
148. L'existence d'un dossier cartographique de l'ampleur de celui pré-
senté ila Cour par Qatar et tiréde sources aussi variées,et couvrant tant
le XIX' que le XXc siècle, ne peut pas ne pas avoir de signification.
Lorsque ce dossier donne de la situation politique et géographiquede Qatar
et de Bahreïn une description pratiquement uniforme couvrant une si
longue période de temps, il n'est pus possibde lui rcfiacr unpoids subs-
tantiel duns la con$rmation de l'existence d'un titre de Qatar sur les îles
Haleur (ainsi du reste que sur Zubarah). Il est cn tout ;tutde cause
impossible de l'ignorer totalement comme l'a ,fuit l'arrt?t de la Cour sans
aucune e.rpiicution.
VIII. DOCUMENT HISTORIQUES SUR LA CONSISTANCE TERRITORIALE
DE BAHRE~ NT DE QATAR
149. Nous disposons d'une dernière contre-épreuve nous permettant
de confirmer l'appartenance des Hawar a Qatar. Cette contre-épreuve est
constituée par l'identification territoriale respectivement de Bahreïn et de
Qatar par des documents et travaux divers.
a) L'assicttc territoriulde Bahrein
i) La description de Lorimer
150. Le témoignage de Lorimer est fort important. Entre autres tra-
vaux, il publia une étude intituléeBuliruin Principulity)qui, outre son
caractère scientifique, avait étéapprouvée par les officiers britanniques en
poste dans le golfe Persique, et notamment par l'influent capitaine DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS. OP.) 191
dom, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Russia, the United States, Aus-
tralia and Iran show that, according to general opinion in various parts
of the world at widely differing periods, the Hawar Islands belonged to
Qatar.
146. In particular. the maps subsequent to 1868 (the Bahrain-Qatar
war and Great Britain's treaties with Qatar and Bahrain respectively)
demonstrate the existence of two by-then separate political entities: Bah-
raiii, a compact set of five islands, and Qatar, made up of a peninsula
with its adjacentislaindsand islets. including the Hawar Islands.
147. The map evidence produced by Qatar therefore seems to us far
the more persuasive. We take particular note of the maps prepared by the
British War Office in 1901, 1908and 19 11, and the sketch-map prepared
by that Office in 1934,al1of which show that the entire peninsula, includ-
ing the Hawar Islands, was under Qatar's sovereignty.
148. The existence of a collection of map evidence as extensive as that
presented to the Court by Qatar, drawn from such varied sources and
covering both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, cannot fail to
be significant. Where this evidence gives a virtually uniform description
of the political and geographical situation of Qatar and Bahrain over
such a long period, it is irnpo.s~inot to uc(.ord it suhstantiul itvight in
confirming tlze e.uistcwceof'u title which Qutur possesses to the Ha~i,rrr
I.sltrnds(and to Zubarah as well). It is in uny event irnpossihle to ignore
thut evideizcc(~ot~~ple~elS~,e Court 'SJudgnzent dors, irithout providing
cri?e.up/unution.
VIII. HISTORICAL DOCUMEN TONCERNING THE TERRITORIAEL XTENT
OF BAHRAIN AND QATAR
149. We have a final countercheck confirming that the Hawars belong
to Qatar. This consists of the territorial description of Bahrain and Qatar
respectively in various documents and works.
(a) The Territorial Extent of'Bahruin
(i) Lorimer's clescription
150. Lorimer's de:icription is extremely important. Among otherworks
he published a study entitled "Bahrain Principality" which, over and
above its scholarly character, had been approved by the British officials
serving in the Persian Gulf, including the influential Captain Prideaux,192 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DIS. COMMUNE)
Prideaux, agent politique à Bahreïn, qui en revisa les divers projets4', ce
qui ajoute incontestablement à son intérêt.Pour l'auteur, les «Bah-
rain Islands)) constituent un ((group of islands)) compact composé de
cinq îles, à l'exclusion des îles Hawar.
151. Lorimer écrivait en 1905. 11 a ainsi tenu compte de la situation
politique dans la régionaprès le grand tournant de 1867-1868.
ii) Lu description de J. T. Ben/
152. Dans les Proceeditzgs cg tlzc Royul Gcogruphicul Society and
Montlilj~ Record of Geogr~phj?~",Theodore Bent publia une étude sur
«TlzeBulzrainIslands, in thr Pcrsiun Gulfi). accompagnéepar une cartes0.
L'étudetout comme la carte y annexéemontrent bien la consistance de
Bahreïn «groupe d'îles ... dans la baie du mêmenom a environ 20 milles
au large de la côte de Hasa, en Arabie, dans le golfe persique)^^'.
iii) Trois mén?orundumsconjdrntic1.s hritutzniques
153. Un premier mémorandum confidentiel a étéétabli le 25 mars
1874 par le British Foreign Service. Deux autres mémorandums confi-
dentiels ont été établispar I'India Office, l'un le 27 août 1928 et signé
J. G. L. Laithwaite et l'autre du mêmeauteur le 14juillet 1934.
Le premier mémorandum de 1874 concernait les revendications otto-
manes et perses sur Bahreïn ou sur les trîles Bahreïn)). II n'y inclut pas les
îles Hawar.
L'un des deux mémorandums Laithwaite de I'India Office de 1928 est
très intéressant en ce qu'il porte sur le «Stutus qf'Certain Croups ?/'
Islands in flic Prrsiun 11y est dit que «[l]'archipel [de Bahreïn]
comprend les îles de Bahreïn, Muharraq, Umm Na'sân, Sitrah et Nabi
Salih avec également quelques îlots et rochers formant le mêmegroupe
géographique compact ». Le second des deux mémorandums confidentiels
de Laithwaite de 1934s3donne la mêmedescription.
Rien n'a donc changé de 1874 à 1934, en soixante ans.
iv) Trois rapports militaires britanniques
154. Le premier est le Hundhook of'Arahiu, 191654,qui offre exactement
la même descriptionde Bahreïn en tant qu'ensemble compact de cinq îles.
4%émoire de Qatar. vol. 3. annexe 11.3.Lorimer. p. 87.
"'Vol. XII. no1.janvier 1890. p. 1.
'"Ihid.. p. 56.
Répliquede Qatar. vol. 4, annexe IV.35. p. 211.
52Répliquede Qatar, vol. 4. annexe IV.2, p. 5.
52Répliquede Qatar. vol. 2, annexe 11.61,p. 359.
cielles uniquement. Tout contrevenant sera puni en vertu de la loi sur les secrets
in répliquede Qatar. vol. 4, annlV.l.p. 3. I>ELIMIT4TION ANI) QIJESTIONS (JOINT DISS.OP.) 192
the Political Agent in Bahrain, who revised various drafts", a point
which undoubtedly enhances its importance. According to Lorimer, the
"Bahrain Islands" coristitute a compact group of islands consisting of five
islands, and does not include the Hawar Islands.
15 1. Lorimer was vvriting in 1905and thus took into account the politi-
cal situation in the region after the major turning point of 1867-1868.
(ii) J. T. BcII~'.d~c>scription
152. In the Procretlings of'the Royul Geogrtrphic.uISociety und Motztlzly
Rrcwrd «f'Gengruph~~~~ T,heodore Bent published a study entitled "The
Bahrein Islands, in the Persian Gulf', accompanied by a mapx'. Both the
study and the accompanying map indicate clearly that Bahrain consists
of a "group of islands . . . in a bay of the same name about 20 miles off
the Coast of El Hasa. in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf'".
153. The first confidential memorandum was drawn up on 25 March
1874 by the British Foreign Service. Two other confidential memoranda
were prepared by the India Office, one on 27 August 1928 and the other
on 14July 1934, bot11signed by J. G. Laithwaite.
The first memorandum, that of 1874, concerns the Ottoman and Per-
sian claims to Bahrain or the "Bahrain Islands". It does not include the
Hawar Islands in that term.
Laithwaite's 1928 IIndiaOffice memorandum is of great interest, deal-
ing as it does with the:"Status of Certain Groups of Islands in the Persian
Gulf'52. It States that the "[Bahrain] archipelago consists of the islands of
Bahrein, Muharraq, Umm Na'assan, Sitrah and Nabi Salih, and a number
of lesser islets and rocks forming part of the same compact geographical
group". The second of Laithwaite's two confidential memoranda, that of
193453,gives the samledescription.
Thus there was no change in the 60 years from 1874 to 1934.
(iv) Thrcr British rniliturj~rcJports
154. The first is the Hundhook of Aruhiu, 1916 54, which offers exactly
the same description of Bahrain as a compact group of five islands.
4X Memorial of Qatar. Vol. 3. Ann. 11.3,Lorimer. p. 87
"'Vol. XII. No. 1.Januarv 1890.o. 1.
"'Ihitl.. p. 56.
'' Reulv of Qatar. Vol4,Ann. IV.35. P. 211
" RI~~I;of Qatar. Vol. 4. Ann. IV.2. p: 5.
;' Reply of Qatar. Vol. 2, Ann. 11.61,p. 359.
'j"General. Admiralty War Staff. Intelligence Division. For Official Use only. Atten-
tion is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Act", in
Reply of Qatar. Vol. 4, A.nn. IV.1. p. 3.193 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
155. Le deuxième document est le Military Report on the Arahian
Shores of the Persiun Guy; Kuwait, Bulzruin, HUSU,Qatar, Trucial Oman
et Oman, 193355.Ce document offre à son tour la mêmedescription de
Bahreïn, ((groupe compact))constituant un archipel de cinq îles nommé-
ment désignées 56.
156. Le troisièmedocument est le Milituly Report und Route Book -
the Aruhiun Stutcs ef'the Pcrsiur~G~lf'1939~'. Mêmedescription à vingt-
trois ans d'intervalle.
V) Nonihreu'i ~~utresdocuments ofjïcirls britanniques
157. Il n'est pas possible de les examiner tous. On prendra presque au
hasard quelques-uns que l'on se bornera à citer simplement:
- la lettre de Laithwaite de 1'IndiaOffice de 1933;
- la lettre de1933du résident politique intérimaiaru e secrétaired'Etatpour
l'Inde, dans laquelleon relèverala simple et forte affirmationsuivante:
((l'îlede Hawar ne fait manifestement paspartie du groupe deBahreïn));
- la lettre de la mèmeannée1933du résidentpolitique en titre au même
secrétaire d'Etat pour l'Inde, décidantdans le mêmesens;
- les minutes redigéespar M. Rendel, 30 décembre 1937, ((Aruhian-
Boundary Disputes: Balirriin-Qutur, 1818-1991 », dans lesquelles on
lit ce qui suit: ((Concernant les îles Hawar, je rzrpeux que dkplorrr
que I'India Office soit allé aussiloin (du moins en apparence) en les
allouant à Bahreïn. Elles font sans aucun doute partie, du point de
vue géographique,de Qatar ..05#;
- le point de vue très critique bien connu exprimépar Prior, agent poli-
tique (1929-1932),puis résidentpolitique (1939-1945), selon lequel les
Hawar ((appartiennent à Qatar, point de vue soutenu par Lori-
mer »59.
b) L'ussiette territoriale dc Qatcir: coïncidence progressive uvec l'assise
territoricilc de /a pkninsule, î1e.yadjucente.~c,omprises
158. Cet aspect ne paraît pas devoir nous retenir longtemps étant
donné que l'exclusion des îles Hawar de l'ensemble de la péninsulede
Qatar ne saurait faire l'objet ni d'une supposition ni d'une présomption.
C'est au contraire l'inclusionde cesîlesqui doit seprésumerau nom de la
géographie,de l'unitéde la péninsule, ainsiqu'au nom du droit, du prin-
cipe de proximité etde la présencede ces îles dans les eaux territoriales.
159. Cette inclusion des îles est par ailleurs plus que présuméeau nom
de l'histoire aussi.Elleest établie. L'histoireque nous avons retracéetout
r5 «Réservéuniquement à un usage officiel, ce documeiit est la propriétédu Gou-
vernement de I'lnde))
5h Mémoirede Bahreïn. vol. 6, annexe 330. document présentépar Bahreïn.
57 Répliquede Qatar. vol. 4. annexe IV.3.p. II.
58 Répliquede Qatar, vol. 3. annexe 111.56.p. 349: les italiques sont de nous.
"' Mémoirede Qatar. vol 8, annexe 111.2?9p. 129. 155. The second document is the Militury Report on the Arubiun
Shorcs of the Persian Gulf: Kuwait, Bahruin, Hasu, Qatar, Trucial Onzan
und Oman, 1933j5. This too offers the same description of Bahrain as a
"compact group" forming an archipelago of five islands, whose names
are givens6.
156. The third document is the Militury Report and Route Book - tlze
Aruhiun States of thc Per.riun G~lf'lY39~' with the same description -
23 years after the first document.
(v) Nzimerous other c?fficiulBritish documents
157. It is impossible to examine al1 of these. Picking a few almost at
random, we shall confine ourselves to citing:
- the 1933 letter from Laithwaite of the India Office;
- the letter of 1933 from the Officiating Political Resident to the Sec-
retary of State for India, which contains the following simple, forth-
right assertion: ":Hawar is clearly not one of the Bahrain group";
- a further letter of 1933 from the incumbent Political Resident to the
Secretary of State for India expressing a decision to the same effect;
- the Minute drawri up by Mr. Rendel dated 30 December 1937,"Ara-
bian Boundary Disputes :Bahrain-Qatar, 1818-199 1 ", which contains
the following statement: "As regards the Hawar Islands .. .I cannot
hplp rpgretting that the India Office went so far as they seem to have
done in allotting these islands to Bahrein. They are obviously, from
the geographical point of view, a part of Qatar .. ."58;
- the well-known and highly critical point of view expressed by Prior,
Political Agent (1929-1932) and Political Resident (1939-1945), to the
effect that the Ha~warIslands "belong to Qatar, a view supported by
Lorimer" '9.
(b) The Territorial l?.~tent of Qatar: Its Grudual Identity ivith the Ter-
ritorial Area ($the Peninsulu, Including the Adjucent Islands
158. This aspect nieed not detain us long, since the exclusion of the
Hawar Islands €rom t.heQatar peninsula as a whole cannot be either sup-
posed or presumed. On the contrary, the presumption must be in favour
of their inclusion, by virtue of geography and the unity of the peninsula,
as well as by virtue of law, of the principle of proximity and of the
presence of these islands in the territorial waters.
159. Moreover, by reason of history too, their inclusion is something
more than a presumption: it is an established fact. The history we have
55 "For Official Use only. This document is the property of the Government of India."
rh Memorial of Bahrairi, Vol. 6, Ann. 330, document submitted by Bahrain
'' Reply of Qatar. Vol. 4, Ann. IV.3, p. 11.
Reply of Qatar, Vol. 3, Ann. 111.56.p. 349; emphasis added.
5'Memorial of Qatar, Vol. 8, Ann. 111.229,p. 129.194 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
au long de la présente opinion montre que 1'Etat de Qatar s'est progres-
sivement constitué dans les limites de la presqu'île.
160. L'Etat de Bahreïn est certainement de construction plus ancienne
que 1'Etat de Qatar. Mais, sur le plan de l'assiette territoriale, 1'Etat de
Bahreïn, qui contrôlait presque toute la côte arabedu Golfe jusqu'à Mas-
cate, au cours des sièclespassés, s'était rétrécE i.t,a partir de la fin du
XIXe siècle, c'est 1'Etat de Qatar qui a vu sa propre assise territoriale
s'étendreprogressivement jusqu'ii coïncider avec le territoire de la pénin-
sule.
161. Le témoignage d'un spécialiste à l'époque bien écoutéet bien
introduit comme Lorimcr confirme la consistance territoriale de Qatar
dans l'étudequ'il avait consacrée ii cette principauté. Dans cette Œuvre
érudite et fouillée,il donne en particulier la liste précise etdocumentée
des îles et îlots qui composent Qatar. L'on n'est pas surpris d'y trouver
les îles Hawar (de mêmeque Janan d'ailleurs).
162. Notre conclusion est que:
- la dynastie des souverains de Qatar s'est constitirke en 1868 un titre
sur l'ensemble de la péninsule et des îles adjacentes, îles Hawar
incluses;
- ce titre s'étaitsuh.rtitu6ii celui que Bahreïn possédait sans doute et
qu'il a perdu par son silence et son rl~fczutde reilcndicu~iondepuis
1868;
- ce titre s'est progressivement consolid6, de 1868 ii 1916;
- ce titre a été conventionnellement reconnu en 1913, 1914, 1915 et
1916, par les Britanniques, les Ottomans et les Saoudiens, puissances
de la région;
- ce titre a étéconjïnnP par le dossier cartographique et, pour ce qui
concerne Hawar, par le principe juridique de proximité notamment.
IX. LA DÉLIMITATION MARITIME
163. La partie de l'arrêtconsacréeà la délimitation par une ligne mari-
time unique ne recueille pas notre adhésion sur quatre points:
ci) l'arrêtstatue infra prtilu eu égard à la formule bahreïnite appliquée
au tracéde la ligne maritime unique:
b) la méthode de construction de la ligne médiane provisoire;
c) la qualification juridique de Qit'at Jaradah;
d) le tracéde la ligne finale de délimitation.traced throughout this opinion shows that the State of Qatar gradually
came into being within the limits of the peninsula.
160. The Stateof Bahrain is certainly an older edifice than the Stateof
Qatar, but in its territorial extent the State of Bahrain, which in earlier
centuries controlled almost the entire Arabian shore of the Gulf as far
as Muscat, has shrunk. And from the end of the nineteenth century
the State of Qatar has seen its territorial area gradually expand so as to
coincide with the terr.itory of the peninsula.
161. The evidence furnished by a well-connected specialist who com-
maiided great authority in his time, Lorirner, confirms the territorial
extent of Qatar in the study which he devoted to that Principality. In par-
ticular, in this erudite and well-researched work, he gives a precise, docu-
mented list of the islands and islets making up Qatar; it is not surprising
to find that the list contains the Hawar Islands (and Janan as well).
162. We conclude that :
the ruling dynast:y of Qatar crruted u title fbr itsclf in 1868 over the
entire peninsula and the adjacent islands, including the Hawar Islands;
- this title repluced the title which Bahrain undoubtedly possessed and
which it lost through its silence and juilurc IO cluini after 1868;
- this title was gradually consolitlrrtc~df,rom 1868 to 1916;
- this title was recognizrtl by treaty in 1913, 1914, 191 5 and 1916by the
British, the Ottornans and the Saudis, the regional Powers;
- this title has bee:n coqfinlied by the map evidence and, as far as
Hawar is concernied, by, inter ciliu,the legal principle of proximity.
163. As regards the section of the Judgment dealing with delimitation
by a single maritime boundary, we disagree with this on four points:
(u) the Judgment rules infiu petitu in terms of the Bahraini formula as
applied to the clourse of the single median line:
(h) the method adopted in order to draw the provisional median line;
(c) the legal characiterization of Qit'at Jaradah;
(d) the course of the final line of delimitation.195 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS.COMMUNE)
a) L'arrêtstutuc infra petita eu égc~rd ù lufi)rmuIc~brihreït~iteuppliquée
au truc6 d~ lu ligne n~uritinleunique
164. La formule bahreïnite représente la clef de voûte de la délimita-
tion maritime à laquelle la Cour doit procéder à la demande explicite des
Parties. Ainsi qu'il est rappeléau paragraphe 67 de I'arrêt:«Les Parties
prient la Cour de ..tracer une limite maritime unique entre leurs zones
maritimes respectives, comprenant les fonds marins, le sous-sol et les
eaux surjacentes. »
Une analyse du volet relatif à la délimitation maritime permet de déga-
ger trois élémentsdistincts:
tr) la définition de la mission de la Cour: tracer une ligne maritime;
b) la caractéristique de cette ligne: une ligne maritime unique;
c) l'énumération des zones maritimes à délimiter: les fonds marins, le
sous-sol et les eaux surjacentes.
165. Par ailleurs, il est utile de rappeler les trois données suivantes:
cl) la formule bahreïnite a étéacceptéepar Qatar en décembre 1990lors
de la réunion de Doha (voir paragraphe 69);
h) Qatar. en 1991, et Bahreïn, en 1993, ont étendu la largeur de leurs
eaux territoriales respectives à 12 milles (voir paragraphe 172) ;
c) enfin, le dépôtde la requêtepar Qatar, le 8 juillet 1991,est antérieur
aux décisions d'extension de la largeur de la mer territoriale; à cette
date précise. leslimites étant alors de 3 milles, aucun problème de
délimitation des eaux territoriales n'était en jeu.
166. Le présent arrêta, sans conteste, satisfait aux deux stipulations
énoncéesdans la formule bahreïnite. En revanche, s'agissant du troisième
élémentet plus exactement des relations entre celui-ci et les deux précé-
dents, l'affirmation de I'arrêtselon laquelle il s'agit d'une climite mari-
time unique qui soit valable aussi à d'autres fins» (voir paragraphe 174)
se situe nettement infiu prtitcc eu égard aux termes de la formule. La
question est, en effet, de savoir si l'identification du tracé de la ligne
unique de délimitation a pour conséquence d'en restreindre la portée au
seul effet divisoire. La réponsedépendde l'impact que l'énumérationexpli-
cite des zones maritimes a délimiterdoit avoir sur la détermination de la
mission de la Cour.
167. A l'examen, le tracé de la ligne divisoire unique, réalisédans les
termes de la formule, ne satisfait pas entièrement à l'équilibrede la cons-
truction élaboréedans cette clause compromissoire. Le recours à la tech-
nique de l'énumérationdes zones à délimiterrépondà un double objectif:
cnprer?iic.rlieu, énoncer uneà une les zones à délimiteret, en sec*ondlieu,
affirmer la distinction dechaque zone par rapport aux autres en raison de
sa propre cohérence juridique. C'est à juste titre que I'arrêtparle de
((ligne maritime unique qui soit valable aussi à d'autres fins». La ligne
unique de délimitation est une ligne non pas composite mais multifonc-
tionnelle, c'est-à-dire qu'elle tient lieu de ligne divisoire en mêmetemps DELIMIT4TION AND QIJESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 195
(a) The Judgment Rules infra petita in Terms of the Buhruini Forrnulu
us Applied to the Course oj'the Single Mediun lin^
164. The Bahraini formula represents the cornerstone of the maritime
delimitation which the Court must carry out at the express request of the
Parties. As paragraph 67 of the Judgment recalls: "The Parties request
the Court to . .. draw a single maritime boundary between their respec-
tive maritime areas, sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters."
An analysis of th(: section dealing with the maritime delimitation
enables us to identify three distinct elements:
(LI) a definition of the Court's task: to draw a maritime boundary;
(hl the nature of that boundary: a single maritime boundary;
(c) a statement of the maritime areas to be delimited: the sea-bed, the
subsoil and the superjacent waters.
165. We would mcireover recall the following three facts:
(u) The Bahraini foi-mula was accepted by Qatar in December 1990 at
the Doha meetirig (see paragraph 69);
(hj Qatar, in 1991, and Bahrain, in 1993,have extended the breadth of
their respective territorial seas to 12 miles (see paragraph 174);
(c) Finally, Qatar's Application was filed on a date, 8 July 1981. prior
to the decisions extending the breadth of the territorial sea; at that
particular date, the limits were then three miles, so that no problem
of delimitation of territorial waters arose.
166. The present Judgment has, indisputably, satisfied two of the
stipulations set out iil the Bahraini formula. By contrast, as far as the
third element is concerned, and more precisely the relationship between it
and the two preceding ones, the statement in the Judgment that this is to
be "a single maritime boundary that serves other purposes as well" (see
paragraph 174)falls clearly irzfiupetitu having regard to the terms of the
formula. Thus the question is whether identification of the course of the
single maritime boundary has the effect of restricting its scope to a purely
delimitational function. The answer will depend on the impact, in terms
of the definition of the Court's task, to be attributed to the fact that the
maritime areas for delimitation have been expressly enumerated.
167. On examination, it is apparent that the course of the single mari-
time boundary, whilst constructed within the terms of the formula, does
not entirely satisfy the structural balance established in that compromis-
sory clause. Recourse to the technique of enumerating the areas to be
delimited has a dual aim: ,first, to specify individually the areas for
delimitation and, sc~cc~~dltjo. emphasize the distinct nature of each type
of area in relation to the others, since each possesses its own coherent
character in law. The Judgment is correct in speaking of a "single mari-
time boundary that serves other purposes as well". The single maritime
boundary is not a composite line but a multifunctional one; that is to 196 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
pour chaque catégorie particulière d'espace a délimiter tout au long de
son parcours. Dans ces conditions, la ligne unique de délimitation ne doit
pas avoir pour effet de dénaturer ni d'affecter la définitiondu statut juri-
dique des espaces diviséspar elle. Ilfaut qu'elle assure de manière cumu-
lative, voire simultanée, la délimitation de chaque espace indépendam-
ment du régimede la zone maritime qu'elle traverse, sans préférenceni
amputation particulières au profit de tel ou tel régime,ou de telle ou telle
zone. Une telle précaution ne relève pas des seules considérations théo-
riques ou d'opportunité. Les tentations maximalistes ne peuvent êtreque
contre-productives compte tenu des exigences qui ont présidéaux condi-
tions générales d'équilibrede la convention de Montego Bay: une ligne
qui aboutit à l'application i la zone du seul régimede la mer territoriale
et de la zone contiguë n'a aucune chance de recevoir une large accepta-
tion de la part des Etats. Inversement, une ((libertétotale)) des régimesde
tous ces espaces maritimes heurterait les considérations de sécurité,entre
autres, qui ont étéà la base de la projection de la compétence territoriale
dans la mer adjacente aux côtes. Dans ces conditions, et par analogie au
test d'équitéauquel procède la Cour dans toute délimitation maritime,
l'énumérationstipulée dans la ((formule bahreïnite)) imposait à notre
juridiction de s'assurer de la cohérencedu résultat obtenu sur l'ensemble
de l'espace maritime délimité.
168. La délimitation maritime par une ligne unique multifonctionnelle
implique. par ailleurs, la garantie et la sécuritéde la jouissance et de
l'exercice des droits, facilitéset privilèges reconnus et aménagés par le
droit au profit, en particulier, des Etats voisins ou riverains de l'aire à
délimiter. Il s'agit d'un volet inhérent i l'acte de délimitation maritime
qui a pour objet de déterminer la ligne imaginaire qui sépareles espaces
maritimes sur lesquels chaque Etat exerce respectivement les compétences
qu'il détient aux termes du droit et qui constitue le bord extérieurde ces
espaces respectifs. La délimitation n'implique ni la faculté discrétion-
naire, ni le droit de disposer des droits qui sont rattachés à ces zones. En
l'absence de cette vérificationde l'effet sur le sort des statut et régimejuri-
diques des espaces délimitéspar la ligne divisoire unique, l'arrêtne satis-
fait pas pleinement aux exigences de la formule bahreïnite et statue infra
prtita.
169. Dans la présente affaire,cette vérificationde la validitédes régimes
des espaces maritimes du fait du tracé de la ligne unique de délimita-
tion s'imposait du fait de la dévolution des îles Hawar i Bahreïn et de la
non-navigabilité, pour insuffisance de profondeur, de la mer situéeentre
les îles Hawar et la presqu'île de Qatar. La conséquenceen est l'impossi-
bilitématérielle pour Qatar de joindre les parties septentrionale et méri-
dionale de son territoire terrestre par sa façade maritime occidentale. A
cette objection, il a étérépondu que le cabotage par la façade occidentale
de Qatar serait insignifiant, voire sans intérêt.Mais cette argumentation
ne peut êtreacceptée. Desconsidérations de fait ne sauraient, en soi, être
suffisantes pour faire échecà des droits, fermement consolidés au regard
du droit positif; la navigation représente en effet, avec la pêche,un des DELIMITATION AND QLIESTIONS(JOINT DISS. OP.) 196
Say, it serves simultaneously as a line of demarcation for each specific
category of area to be delimited throughout its length. It follows that
the single boundary line must not have the effect of changing the nature
of the areas divided by it, or of affecting their legal status. It must cumula-
tively and simultaneously delimit each area, independently of the régime
governing the maritirne zone through which it passes, without any special
preference or diminuition in favour of a particular régimeor zone. This is
a condition based not simply on considerations of theory or expediency.
Maximalist tendencie.~can only be counter-productive, given the require-
ments which governed the general conditions of equilibrium of the Mon-
tego Bay Conventiori: a line resulting in the application to that zone of
the sole régimesof the territorial sea and the contiguous zone would have
no chance of being generally accepted by States. Conversely, a "free-for-
all" in regard to the régimesgoverning these maritime areas would run
counter to the security considerations which, inter (llia, underpinned the
projection of territorial jurisdiction into the sea adjacent to coastlines.
Thus, and by analogy with the test of equity which the Court applies in
al1maritime delimitations, the specific enumeration of areas in the Bah-
raini formula required the Court to ensure that the result it achieved was
coherent over the enitire maritime area delimited.
168. Maritime delimitation by means of a single multifunctional line
implies, moreover, that the enjoyment and exercise of rights, facilities and
privileges recognized and accorded by law, in particular to neighbouring
or riparian States of the area to be delimited, be guaranteed and secured.
This is an element inherent in the act of maritime delimitation, the pur-
pose of which is to determine the imaginary line separating the maritime
areas over which eairh State exercises the respective powers held by it
under the law. and constituting the external boundary of each such area.
Delimitation implies neither a discretionary power nor a power of dis-
posa1over the rights attaching to those areas. In failing to investigate the
impact upon the legal status and régime ofthe various areas delimited by
the single maritime boundary, the Judgment does not fully meet the
requirements of the IBahraini formula and rules infiupetitcl.
169. In the present case, the Court was bound to investigate whether
the various maritime régimesremained valid in light of the course of the
single maritime bouridary, given that it had awarded the Hawar Islands
to Bahrain and that i.hesea between the Hawars and the Qatar peninsula
is not deep enough for navigation. As a result, it is impossible in practice
for Qatar to commuriicate between the northern and southern parts of its
land territory along its western seaboard. To this objection, it was replied
that coastal traffic along Qatar's western seaboard was insignificant or of
no importance. But that argument is unacceptable. Factual considera-
tions cannot. in themselves, suffice to defeat firmly established positive
law rights; navigation, along with fishing, represents one of the primary
uses of the sea. The Judgment kas sought to respond to this problem, butpremiers usages de la mer. L'arrêt a tenté de répondre à ce problème,
mais malheureusement de maniire réductrice par rapport aux droits des
Parties litigantes. La protection du passage des navires de Qatar serait
assuréedans le cadre du régimedu passage inoffensif dans la mer terri-
toriale de Bahreïn. L'exiguïtéde la zone pertinente faisant l'objet de déli-
mitation pose le problème du passage à travers les eaux surjacentes du
plateau continental et au-delà des limites extérieuresde chaque mer ter-
ritoriale. La formule bahreïnite implique un test de validité: il revenait a
la Cour de s'assurer que le tracé de la ligne provisoire ne portait pas
atteinte ab initio à la nature de ces zones. La simple observation maté-
rielle révélaitdéjàà ce stade que les droits de cabotage étaient en péril.
170. En droit strict, on ne saurait critiquer la consécration du droit de
passage inoffensif reconnu a Qatar, comme d'ailleurs à tout autre Etat
dans la mer territoriale bahreïnite situéeentre les iles Hawar et les autres
îles de Bahreïn. Le rappcl, au sccond alinéadu deuxièmepoint du dispo-
sitif de l'arrêt,de ce droit de passage inoffensif dans les rapports inter
purtes doit êtreévaluéà sa juste valeur: d'une part, le caractère définitif
et perpétuelde ces droits et, d'autre part, l'autonomie et l'inviolabilitéde
ce droit par rapport à toute tentation de proclamation de ces espaces en
eaux intérieures bahreïnites. Mais cette solution, qui sur le plan de
l'opportunité, manque de hardiesse, méconnaît une donnée de fait et de
droit.
171. Les relations entre les Parties ne sont pas affectéespar des pro-
blèmesautres que de délimitation maritime. L'usage pacifique et harmo-
nieux de cet espace ainsi que la cohabitation des habitants de ces deux
Etats ne devraient pas subir les effets pervers liésà la mise en Œuvre du
droit, c'est-à-dire à l'instauration légaleet légitimedu régimedu passage
inoffensif. Sans perdre de vue la question de savoir si un régimede droits
acquis des pêcheurs et usagers qataris est concevable ou possible, il
importait d'envisager l'aménagement concret des effets de la délimitation.
172. Une solution juridique, avec la définition d'un régimede jouis-
sance et d'exercice des droits d'usage de la mer, aurait pu êtreenvisagée
en la présente affaire, la question la plus délicate demeurant la liaison
entre les parties septentrionale et méridionale de la presqu'île de Qatar
par la façade maritime occidentale. Cette jouissance de droits et cette
liaison auraient pu être envisagéespar la Courdans le cadre d'une trans-
position dans la zone délimitéed'un régimeanalogue à celui de la ((ser-
vitude internationale)). On aurait alors affaire a des droits et des juridic-
tions reconnus a un Etat étranger et exercéssur un espace relevant de
la juridiction d'un Etat riverain"". Ce système dit de servitude aurait
eu pour résultats l'enclavement des îles Hawar et la définition du sort
des droits de Bahreïn, lorsque la liaison devait êtreeffectuéeentre l'île
Voir en ce sens ladéliiiition H. Lauterpacht. <<Règlesgénéralesdu droit de la
paix)).Rcc~iri~(lrei,.\(.oiir.s(le,I'c/ctl,roir ir~t~~rrre/rLtr H(rj.c,67. 1937,
p. 317-328.
16 1unfortunately in a reductionist manner in terms of the litigant Parties'
rights. The passage of Qatari vessels, it is said, is protected under the
rules governing the right of innocent passage through Bahrain's territo-
rial sea. The narrowness of the relevant area for delimitation poses the
problem of passage through the superjacent waters of the continental
shelf and beyond the external boundariesof each territorial sea. The Bah-
raini formula implie:; a test of validity: it was for the Court to assure
itself that the course of the ~rovisional line had no adverse effect ub inirio
upon the nature of these areas. A simple factual observation demon-
strates that. even at that stage, coastal shipping rights were jeopardized.
170. In strict law, there can be no criticism of the enshrinement of
Qatar's right of innocent passage - like that indeed of any other State -
through Bahrain's territorial sea between the Hawars and the other Bah-
raini islands. The resiatement, in the second subparagraph of point (2) of
the operative part of'the Judgment, of this right of innocent passage in
terms of the relations. inter prrr.tchsas to be assessed at its true worth: on
the one hand, the deihnitive and perpetual nature of these rights, and on
the other their autoriomy and inviolability against any attempt to pro-
claim these areas interna1 Bahraini waters. However, this solution, which
could have benefited from a bolder approach, ignores an element of fact
and law.
171. The relations between the Parties are not affected by any prob-
lems other than those of maritime delimitation. The peaceful and harmo-
nious use of this area, and the cohabitation of the inhabitants of these
two States, must not suffer undesirable effects as a result of the imple-
mentation of the riglit, that is to say the lawful and legitimate introduc-
tion of the régimeof innocent passage. Without losing sight of the ques-
tion whether a régimeof acquired rights of Qatari fishermen and users is
conceivable or possible, it was necessary to make specific provision to
deal with the effects of the delimitation.
172. In the present case, the Court could have envisaged a legal solu-
tion involving the est.ablishment of a régimefor the enjoyinent and exer-
cise of rights of user in respect of the sea, the most sensitive outstanding
question being passage between the northern and southern parts of the
Qatar peninsula alon~gthe western seaboard. The Court could have con-
sidered securing such enjoyment of rights and communication by apply-
ing withiri the delimited area a régimeanalogous to that of an "interna-
tional easement". This would have meant according a foreign State rights
and powers exercisable over a maritime area falling within the jurisdic-
tion of a riparian State0". The result of such an easement régimewould
have been to enclave the Hawar Islands and to determine how this was to
affect Bahrain's rights in regard to the need for a passage between its
"" See the dcfiiiition gi\cnH.qLauterpacht in "Règles gt.nér;ileadu drdela paix".
RLY II<,(/<,.Y 1 orir./'A(~tr~/~;il<i/r(~iiiit<~rr~trtii/1Lli Hrg,<,. Vol. 62.1937.
pp. 377.328.principale et Hawar. Ces questions auraient méritéun examen au fond
avant un aperçu des conséquences éventuellespour la présente instance.
173. L'enclavement juridique, facteur de garantie de lajouissance et de
l'exercice du droit de passage et consécutifà une délimitation maritime,
n'est pas une question inéditedans la jurisprudence internationale.
Dans l'affaire de la Di.lin~itation (lu plutcau continental entre
Royuunw-Uni u'r Gvuri~le-Bretugneet d'lvlundr du Nord et R~publiyue
fi.anpui.se,décisiondu 30 juin 1977, selon le tribunal arbitral"':
«le problème de fond qui est en cause est celui de savoir si la situa-
tion de l'archipel britannique des îles Anglo-Normandes auprès de la
côte française constitue une ((circonstance spéciale))ou une circons-
tance génératrice d'inéquité qujiustifierait le renoncement à la
méthode de l'équidistance que les Parties reconnaissent en principe
comme la méthode applicable, ou bien des modifications dans son
emploi D~'.
La solution retenue par le tribunal a consisté enune <<doublesolution)):
«sur toute la longueur de la Manche comprise dans la zone d'arbi-
trage, la principale limite du plateau continental sera une ligne
médiane passant au milieu de la Manche. Pour délimiter son tracé
dans la régiondes îles Anglo-Normandes ...il ne sera pas tenu compte
des îles Anglo-Normandes elles-mêmes,car leur plateau continental
doit faire l'objet d'une deuxième délimitation, distincte de la
première.
202. La deuxième partie de la solution consiste à déterminer une
deuxième limiteconstituant,pour les îlesAnglo-Normandes, la limite
méridionale du plateau continental que le tribunal considère comme
relevant de la République française dans cette région au sud de la
ligne médiane passant par le milieu de la Manche. De l'avis du tri-
bunal. cette deuxiéme ligne ne doit pas être tracéede manière que le
plateau continental de la République française puisse empiétersur la
zone de pêcheexistante de 12 milles marins à partir des lignes de
base existantes de la mer territorialedes îles Anglo-Normandes. Cette
décision aura pour effet d'accorder à la République française une
bande substantielle de plateau continental au milieu de la Manche
continuant son plateau continental à l'est et à l'ouest de la régiondes
îles Anglo-Normandes; elle aura en mème temps pour effet de laisser
aux îles Anglo-Normandes, au nord et à l'ouest de ces îles,une zone de
lit de la mer et de sous-sol s'étendant sur 12 milles marins à partir
des lignes de base des deux ballages. En ce qui concerne les îles
Anglo-Normandes, il s'ensuit qu'elles seront enfermées dans une
enclave formée, au nord et à l'ouest, par la limite de la zone de
"'Ihid.. p. 210, par. 148.uc~rill<z..sv<vrlc~~i.rr.l. XVIII. p. 1et suiv
162 DELIMIT,1TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 198
main island and Hawar. These auestions merited being examineL in
depth prior to identifying any consequences which they might have for
the present proceedings.
173. The creation of a legal enclave, which serves to guarantee the
enjoyment and exercise of a right of passage following a maritime delimi-
tation, is no novelty in international jurisprudence.
In the case concerriing Dclir?litutionof the Continentul Sheif'hetiiven
tllc United Kingdon) of' Greut Brituin und Northern Irrlrrnd, und the
Frenclz Rclpublic, Decision of 30 June 1977, the Court of Arbitration
stated :
"the substantial lsoint at issue is whether the presence of the British
archipelago of the Channel Islands close to the French coast is a
'special circumstance' or a circumstance creative of inequity that
calls for a departure from or variation of the equidistance method of
delimitation which the Parties agree to be in principle the applicable
method" ('2.
The solution adopted by the Court was a "twofold" one:
"throughout the whole length of the Channel comprised within the
arbitration area the primary boundary of the continental shelf
will be a mid-Channel median line. In delimiting its course in the
Channel Islands region . . .,the Channel Islands themselves are to
be disregarded, since their continental shelf must be the subject
of a second and separate delimitation.
202. The secoi~dpart of the solution is to delimit a second bound-
ary establishing, vis-à-vis the Channel Islands, the southern limit of
the continental shelf held by the Court to be appurtenant to the
French Republic in this region to the south of the mid-Channel
median line. This second boundary must not, in the opinion of the
Court, be so draiwn as to allow the continental shelf of the French
Republic to enciroach upon the established 12-mile fishery zone of
the Channel Isla~nds.The Court therefore further decides that this
boundary shall be drawn at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
established baselines of the territorial sea of the Channel Islands.
The effect will be to accord to the French Republic a substantial
band of continental shelf in mid-Channel which is continuous with
its continental shelf to the east and west of the Channel Islands
region; and at the same time to leave to the Channel Islands, to their
north and to thieir west, a zone of seabed and subsoil extending
12nautical miles from the baselines of the two Bailiwicks. The result,
so far as the Channel Islands are concerned, is to enclose them
in an enclave formed, to their north and west, by the boundary
"'See United Nations, RIAA, Vol. XVIII, pp. 3 ff.
"'Ihi( p/..76-77. para148.199 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS .OMMLINE)
12milles que vient d'indiquer le tribunal et, à l'est, au sud et au sud-
ouest, par la limite entre elles et la côte de la Normandie et de la
Bretagne, limite dont le tribunal n'est pas compétent pour définirle
tracé exact. ))03
Dans cette affaire, il convient de rappeler que les thèses de I'enclave-
ment ou du semi-enclavement ont fait l'objet de développen~entspar les
Parties litigantes devant le tribunal.
174. Dans la pratique internationale, on trouve des enclaves en haute
mer «dans l'Atlantique Nord, aux alentours de l'îledeJan Mayen et dans
la mer de Barents)) ainsi que dans
<!lamer d'Okhotsk ...situéeau large des cotes orientales de la Fédé-
ration de Russie et bordée par la péninsuledu Kamtchatka et l'îlede
Sakhaline ..., une enclave obéitau régimede haute mer, tout en étant
entourée entièrement par une ou des ZEE sous juridiction natio-
nale» h4.
On peut également faire remarquer que la décisionde créerun ((corri-
dor))ou un «couloir maritime)) n'est pas non plus inédite: voir dans
I'Afjuire de lu dGlirnitution &s cJ.spucestnuritin~esentre le Cunudu et lu
RGpubliquefrunquisc., l'arbitrage présidépar M. Jiménez de Aréchaga,
ancien président de la CourhS.
175. En la présente affaire, les circonstances sont telles que la question
de fond ne concerne pas un tracéde ligne médiane générateur d'inéquité
mais une inéquitéempêchant une des Parties de jouir et d'exercer des
droits consacrésen droit international. Une correctionjuridique s'impose
avec l'aménagement d'un régimede ((servitudeinternationale))constitutif
d'un «couloir de navigation)) dans la partie navigable de la mer entre l'île
principale de Bahreïn et les îles Hawar. Les eaux de cet espace resteraient
alors bahreïnites, tandis que ce couloir enclavé serait frappé de «servi-
tudes» liéesaux usages traditionnels de la mer.
176. Bien naturellement, il va de soi que l'aménagementde ce passage
ne doit pas pour autant être causede préjudiceet source d'inéquitépour
Bahreïn dans la jouissance et l'exercice de ses droits de navigation et de
survol lorsque les liaisons entre les deux parties de son territoire terrestre
lors du franchissement du couloir de navigation doivent êtreassurées.
Les droits de Bahreïn à la continuité entre les éléments deson territoire et
à la sécuritésont équipollents à ceux que le droit positif reconnaît à
Qatar. Dans ces conditions, l'aménagement du régimedudit couloir de
navigation doit également faire l'objet de dispositions juridiques plus
appropriées.
"' Nations Unies. Rc~c~u<t<i,l.c,scvlrc,n<,ctr,sr,ol. XVIII. p. 231. par. 201-202.
"' E. Nemoz, «Les mers enclavées:l'excmplede la mer d'Okhotsk: multilateralisnie et
unilatéralismen.dana Elsptrc,c,c.vr rc~.s.1c,1.\trrit., 0.1995.p. 197.
" Nations Unies, Rc.c,irc~ci.sc,~ir<,rrrhitrrrl<.ol. XXI. p. 267. DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 199
of the 12-mile zone just described by the Court and, to their east,
south and south-,west by the boundary between them and coasts of
Normandy and Brittany, the exact course of which it is outside the
competence of the Court to ~pecify."~~
It should be recalled that in that case the issues of the creation of
enclaves or semi-enclaves were discussed by the litigant Parties in their
arguments before the Court.
174. In international practice, enclaves on the high seas are to be
found "in the North Atlantic, around Jan Mayen Island and in the
Barents Sea" and also in
"the Sea of Okhotsk . .. off the eastern Coast of the Russian Federa-
tion, bordered by the Kamchatka peninsula and the island of Sakha-
line . ..,an enclave is subject to the régimeof the high seas, whilst
being entirely surrounded by one or more EEZs under national juris-
diction" ("'.
It should also be noted that a decision to create a "maritime corridor"
is not unprecedentecl either: see Cusr concerning tlîr Delimitation of'
Muritinw Arras bettt~rrn Canadu und Fruncc, arbitration presided over
by Judge Jiménezde Aréchaga, former President of this C~urt"~.
175. In the present case, the circumstances are such that the basic issue
is not that the course of the median line is creative of inequity, but rather
that this is an inequity which prevents one of the Parties from enjoying
and exercising rights enshrined in international law. A legal adjustment is
required, involving the creation of an "international easement" constitut-
ing a "navigation corridor" in the navigable part of the sea between the
main island of Bahrain and the Hawar Islands. The waters of this area
would then remain Bahraini, whilst the enclaved corridor would be sub-
ject to "easements" relating to the traditional uses of the sea.
176. It of course goes without saying that the creation of this corridor
must not, however, be a cause of prejudice or source of inequity for Bah-
rain in regard to the enjoyment and exercise of its rights of navigation
and overflight when it has to communicate between the two parts of its
land territory and cross the navigation corridor. Bahrain's rights to con-
tinuity between the component parts of its territory and to security are of
equal rank with those accorded by positive law to Qatar. It follows that
the régimefor the said navigation corridor traversing Bahrain's territorial
sea between its main island and the Hawars also needs to be subject to
some form of legal provision more specifically adapted to the circum-
stances.
(''United Nations. RIAA. pp. 94-95. paras. 201-202.
E. Nemoz, "Les mers enclavées:l'exemplede la Mer d'Okhotsk: multilatéralismet
~i"'lUnited Nations. RI.4A. Vol. XXI. p. 267.in~c~N.so.. 9. 1995.p. 197. 177. Le principe de cet espace sui generis résultant de l'enclavement
juridique des îles Hawar étant acquis, il convient d'en esquisser I'écono-
mie généralequant à son régime.En termes de représentation vectorielle,
ce régimejuridique serait situéentre celui du passage inoffensif et celui
traditionnel de la haute mer. Dans la zone actuellement délimitée,s'est en
effet créée unetradition d'usage que l'écoulementdu temps a consolidée;
les ressortissants tant bahreïnites que qataris, usagers de cet espace, ont
directement et à la fois bénéficiéde ces conditions. Le problème, dès lors,
est liéà l'effet créateur de droit instauré par la délimitation opéréepar la
présentedécision: la solution de continuité juridique, c'est-à-dire la rup-
ture avec la situation antérieure, ne doit pas être parelle-mêmesource de
tension dans les relations entre les Parties au différend ou de troubles
d'usage pour les ressortissants concernés. Dans l'affaire de 1'116d.e Kusi-
kililSedudu (Bots~runulNumihie), la Cour a effectuéla dévolution de l'île
contestée, procédé à la délimitation frontalière et fixéle régimede l'usage
à des fins de navigation de la rivièreChobe. La délimitation ne se réduit
pas, à notre avis, à un exercice abstrait qui se bornerait à la définition
théorique de la ligne de rencontre des limites extérieuresde l'espace sur
lequel s'exerce la juridiction de chaque Partie. En agissant de cette
manière, la Cour ne cherche pas à faire prévaloir des considérations
d'opportunité; elle vise à favoriser l'avènement de rapports pacifiéstant
dans les relations bilatéralesentre les Etats parties au différendque dans
les activitésau quotidien des populations concernées.
178. La compétence de la Cour pour indiquer les conditions qu'elle
considère comme indispensables au rétablissement et à la consolidation
des relations <<pacifiées»entre les Parties doit étre discutée. En effet,il ne
revient pas à la Cour de se substituer aux Etats pour définirles termes
d'un régimede droit qui leur soit directement opposable; par ailleurs,
l'organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies n'a pas de compétence
particulière pour exercer judiciairement des attributions en matière de
diplomatie préventive. A l'examen cependant, il convient d'atténuer la
portée de ces observations. Par ses attributions, la Cour est amenée à
procéderà une approche non exclusivement juridique, mais également en
termes d'opportunité, des circonstances de fait. Les articles 41 du Statut
de la Cour et 37-38 de son Règlement, relatifs aux mesures conserva-
toires, soulignent avec insistance, en tout pvernierlieu, l'importance des cir-
constances de fait. La Cour ne se fonde pas exclusivement sur des motifs
de droit pur pour indiquer ces mesures; les règlessus-rappelées lui con-
fèrent une compétence spéciale:celle d'apprécier, de manière discrétion-
naire, si les circonstances exigent l'indication de telles mesures et quelles
sont les mesures les plus appropriées. 11eût étéparadoxal qu'une décision
juridictionnelle fondée sur l'urgence fût dépourvue des effets voulus, du
fait des contraintes liéesà l'exercice de la compétencejuridictionnelle de
la Cour. Pour ce faire, dans un premier temps, la Cour évalueles risques
qui menacent les droits litigieux des Parties et, dans un second temps, elle
indique les mesures que requiert la conservation de ces droitsqui relèvent
de sa responsabilité du fait de la saisine. 177. Having established the sui generis nature of this area produced by
the legal enclavement of the Hawar Islands, we now have to outline the
general scheme of it:; régime.This legal régimecould be represented in
vectorial terms as lying between that of innocent passage and the tradi-
tional régimeof the high seas. Thus. in the zone currently delimited, a
tradition of usage has arisen which the passage of time has consolidated;
both Bahraini and Qatari nationals using this area have been the direct
joint beneficiaries of this situation. The problem thus concerns the effect.
in terms of right creation, of the delimitation established by the present
decision: the breach of legal continuity, that is to say the break with the
previous situation, n~ust not in itself be a source of tension in the rela-
tions between the Parties to the dispute or of disturbances in use for the
nationals concerned. In the case concerning KrrsikililSe(1udu 111und(Bot-
sit.nnc~lNumibi<ri,the Court made an award of sovereignty in respect of
the disputed island. tietermined the course of the frontier and established
the usage régime governing navigation on the River Chobe. Delimita-
tion cannot, in our view, be reduced to an abstract exercise confined to a
theoretical definition of the line marking the meeting point of the
external boundaries of the area over which each Party exercises its juris-
diction. When it so aicts,the Court is not seeking to make considerations
of expediency prevail, but to encourage the establishment of peaceful
relations, both in bilateral relations between the States party to the dis-
pute and in the day-to-day activities of the populations concerned.
178. The Court's power to state the conditions which it considers
indispensable for the restoration and consolidation of peaceful relations
between the Parties is a matter requiring examination. Thus it is not for
the Court to substitirte itself for States with a view to defining the terms
of a legal régime diirectly opposable to them; moreover, the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations has no specific competence to exer-
cise judicially powers pertaining to preventive diplomacy. On examina-
tion, however, it is clear that the scope of these remarks requires qualifi-
cation. The powers conferred upon the Court require it to adopt an
approach that is nclt exclusively a juridical one, but also encompasses
considerations of expediency, of the factual circumstances. Articles 41
of the Court's Statute and 37-38 of its Rules, concerning provisional
nieasures, place particular emphasis, uhoic crllrl.s~on the importance
of the factual circurnstances. The Court does not base itself exclusively
on reasons of pure law in order to indicate such measures; the above-
mentioned provisions accord it a special power: a discretional power to
determine whether the circumstances require the indication of such
measures and what the most appropriate measures are. It would be
something of a paradox if a jurisdictional decision founded on urgency
were to be deprived of the desired effect because of constraints relating
to the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction. In order to act, the
Court first assesses the risks to the Parties' rights in the case and then
indicates the measur.esrequired in order to protect those rights, for which
the Court is responsible by reason of its seisin of the case.201 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
179. En second lieu, dans l'affaire de l'lle de KasikililSedudu
(Bot.~ivunulNumibirj, la Cour a enrichi la jurisprudence du règlement
pacifique des différends.Auparavant, la Cour est restéefidèle à la doc-
trine traditionnelle, ainsi dans l'affaire du Pu.rsage par le Grand-Belt
(Finlunde c.Dunemark), la Cour a appeléde ses vŒuxla conclusion d'un
accord pour le règlement a l'amiable du différendentre la Finlande et le
Danemarkhh. Elle a réaffirmé avec forcece souhait dans l'affaire de
l'Incident uérien du10 août 1 Y99 (Pukistan c. Inde) 67.
L'apport de lajurisprudence de l'lle de KasikililSedudu (Bots~vunalNa-
mibie) résidedans le fait que,proprio ntotu, la Cour a considérécomme
un élémentde règlementau fond du différendle régimede la navigation
sur le Chobe. En la présente affaire, une évolution mérite d'êtresouli-
gnée:le second alinéadu paragraphe 2 du dispositif. Mais compte tenu
des circonstances particulières, et pour une jouissance et un exercice
appropriésdes droits d'usage dans la zone délimitéei,l eût étépréférable
de rappeler une obligation supplémentaire à la charge de Bahreïn et
Qatar: la conclusion d'un accord dont les termes devront êtrearrêtés par
les Parties elles-mêmes.
180. 11résultede ce qui précèdeque, en rappelant le respect tant des
régimesjuridiques des espaces délimitésque des droits des Parties à l'ins-
tance, la Cour aurait accompli la plénitude de la mission qui lui a été
prescrite dans la formule bahreïnite si elleavait effectuéle test de validité
et en avait dégagéles conséquences. Maisellen'a pas été invitée à définir
dans la présente instance les conditions et modalités de garantie de la
jouissance et de l'exercice par les Parties de leurs droits respectifs. La
Cour n'a donc pas compétence pour le faire.
La responsabilitéde la conception, de la formulation et de la mise en
Œuvre de ce régimede double garantie, par la création d'un couloir de
navigation maritime et le régimede traverséede ce couloir, revient aux
deux Parties. Selon une jurisprudence constante, la Cour se devait de
prescrire aux Parties l'engagement de parvenir à une solution équitable
dans le cadre de négociationsde bonne foi et de procéder a la correction
du résultat inéquitableobservépar voie de traitéou convention.
b) Lu métliodede construction de la ligne médiuneprovisoire
181. Lesdeux principes sur lesquels s'articule le droit de la délimitation
de la mer territoriale doivent être interprétés,à notre avis, comme suit:
" Voir C.1J.Re~~ur1il91.p.20. par. 35.
h7Arrêtdu 21 juin 2000C.I.JRc<uc~il2000,p. 33-34. p51-55.
165 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 201
179. Sec-orzdly.in the case concerning KusikililSedudu Island (Bot-
sii~analNatnihiu), the Court enriched the case law on the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. Previously, it had espoused the traditional doctrine.
Thus in the case concerning Pussuge through the Greut Belt (Finlatzd
v. Denmark). the Court stated that it would welcome an agreement
between Finland and Denmark for the friendly settlement of the dis-
puteoo. It forcefully i-estated this wish in the case concerning the Acriul
It~citlentof 10 August 1999 (Pukistun v. in di^)^'.
The contribution of the decision in the KusikililSedudu I.slund (Bot-
.~1t~nnalNrit~7ibiucase lies in the fact that, proprio moru. the Court
regarded as an element in the settlement of the merits of the dispute the
arrangements for navigation on the Chobe. In the present case, there has
been a development which is worth underlining: the second subparagraph
of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the Judgment. However, given the
particular circumstarices, and with a view to securing appropriate enjoy-
ment and exercise of user rights within the delimited area, it would have
been preferable to recall a further obligation incumbent upon Bahrain
and Qatar: the conclusion of an agreement, the terms of which it would
be for the Parties themselves to prescribe.
180. It follows from the foregoing that, by reminding the Parties to
these proceedings of the obligation to respect both the legal régimesgov-
erning the areas delimited and their own rights, the Court would have
carried out in full the:task required of it by the Bahraini formula if it had
applied the validity test and identified its consequences. However, the
Court was not invited in this case to prescribe detailed terms and condi-
tions guaranteeing the enjoyment and exercise by the Parties of their
respective rights. The Court is accordingly not competent to do this.
Responsibility for the conception, formulation and implementation of
this dual guarantee régime,through the creation of a maritime navigation
corridor and the establishment of rules for the crossing of that corridor,
are a matter for the two Parties. In accordance with its established case
law, it was incumbent upon the Court to instruct the Parties to endeav-
our to reach an eqiiitable solution through negotiations carried on in
good faith and to rectify by treaty or agreement the inequitable result
noted.
(b) The Metliod Adopted in Order to Dru111 the Provisionul
Metliun Line
181. The two principles upon which the law governing the delimita-
tion of the territorial sea hinges must, in Our view, be interpreted as
follows:
h"See I.C.J. R<~porIYYl, p. 20. para. 35.
("Judgmcnt ci27 Junr 2000. I.C.J. Rc'1î~000. pp. 33-34. paras. 51-55202 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
- «la terre domine la mer» vise la terre ferme ou trrruJirrna,concept
bien connu du droit international et de la jurisprudence;
- ~~équidistance/circonstances spéciales»: la prise en compte des cir-
constances spéciales nepeut intervenir yu'aprPs la construction de la
ligne médiane pure et ce aux fins d'ajustement pour parvenir à une
solution équitable.
Aussi, la méthode utiliséepour la construction de la ligne provisoire
d'équidistance est-elle contestable car non appropriée.
182. La méthode utiliséepour déterminer ((l'emplacement des lignes
de base ainsi que des points de base appropriés permettant de construire
la ligne d'équidistance)) (paragraphe 178 de l'arrêt)n'est pas correcte.
L'interprétation de la conséquence de la maxime «la terre domine la
mer n,selon laquelle
«[c]onformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 121 de la convention
de 1982 ..les îles,quelles que soient leurs dimensions, jouissent àcet
égard du mêmestatut, et par conséquent engendrent les mêmes
droits en mer que les autres territoires possédant la qualité de terre
ferme)) (paragraphe 185de l'arrêt),
est inexacte au regard du droit de la mer et de la jurisprudence interna-
tionale qu'il a généréeB . ien que raisonnable en apparence, cette proposi-
tion ne favorise pas nécessairement la possibilitéd'atteindre une solution
équitable, principe cardinal du droit de la délimitation de tous les espaces
maritimes.
183. Le droit international coutumier ne prescrit pas que les lignes et
points de base qui servent à la délimitation des espaces maritimes soient
obligatoirement les mêmesque les lignes et points de base utiliséspour la
fixation des limites extérieures des espaces maritimes vers le large.
184. L'arrêtse réfèreau paragraphe 2 de l'article 121de la convention
de 1982 pour justifier la méthode consistant à assimiler les îles à la terre
ferme en matière de régime de délimitation des espaces maritimes. La
proposition du paragraphe 185 invoquéerenvoie, en plus, à une idéede
régime généraclommun aussi bien à la terre ferme qu'aux îles, par l'usage
de l'adverbe «conformément )>.La question à laquelle I'arrêtdevait appor-
ter une réponse était de savoir si un tel régime générae lst bien prescrit
par le droit positif.
185. L'article 5 de la convention de Montego Bay représenteI'expres-
sion contemporaine du droit coutumier: le recours à la laisse de basse
mer et la référenceaux cartes marines reconnues par 1'Etat côtier.
L'absence d'une disposition analogue à propos des autres espaces mari-
times laisse présumer qu'on a affaire à un commencement de ce régime
généralinvoquéau précédentparagraphe. Mais I'applicabilitéaux autres
zones de la règleen matière de ligne de base de la mer territoriale n'im-
plique pas que la mêmeligne de base serve à la fois à la délimitation et à
la fixation des limites extérieuresdes espaces maritimes. Aucune disposi-
tion ne statue de manière explicite en ce sens.203 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
186. Un examen des travaux préparatoires tant des instruments de
Genèveque de la troisièmeConférence desNations Unies sur le droit de
la mer montre une évolution. La Commission du droit international
sembleavoir manifesté unepréférence pour que leslignesde base servent à
la fois pour fixer la limite vers le large et pour tracer égalementla ligne
d'équidistance. Mais cetteposition de la Commission n'a pas été enté-
rinéelors de la troisièmeConférencedes Nations Unies sur le droit de la
mer. Au sein du groupe de négociation VII, consacré à la question de la
délimitationdu plateau continental et de la zone économiqueexclusive,le
problèmedes points de base a étéun élémend t e divergence entre lesdélé-
gations: les unes favorables à la consécration de l'équidistanceet les
autres à celle de la solution équitable. Pour les premières, il s'agit non
seulement d'adopter l'extension pure et simple de la ligne de base nor-
male à tous les espaces mais encore de lui conférer ladouble fonction
considérée;le méritede cette solution résidaitdans la simplicitémathé-
matique. Pour les secondes, au contraire, la recherche d'une solution
équitable n'imposepas, dèsle départ,la prise en compte des facteurs qui
sont source d'inéquitéou l'application automatique de tel ou tel principe
ou telle méthodeen particulier. Dans certains cas, on aurait affaire des
effets si déformants qu'on ne saurait ériger unetelle méthode en règle
absolue. Cette méthode bloquerait la conclusion d'un accord entre les
Etats voisins en matièrede délimitation.L'absenced'accord sur ce point,
tant au sein du groupe de négociation VI1 qu'à celui de la Conférence
elle-même, remet encause les propositions et les interprétations avancées
par la Commission du droit international en 1953et 1956.
En conclusion, il n'est pas établi qu'endroit les lignes de base servent
à la fois pour la délimitation et la fixation des limites extérieures des
espaces maritimes.
187. La jurisprudence, de son côté,a eu à plusieurs repriseà statuer
sur cette question; ellen'a pas pour autant consacréle principe de la dua-
litéde fonctions attribuéeà la ligne de base normale. Dans la périodequi
a immédiatement suivi l'adoption de la convention de Montego Bay, la
Cour, informée des résultatsdes travaux de la troisièmeConférencedes
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, notamment les travaux du groupe
de négociation VII, s'est écartéedes propositions et conclusions de la
Commission du droit international.
188. Dès 1984,dans l'affaire de la Dklirnitation de lu frontière muri-
time dans lu rkgion du golf2 du Maine, la Chambre a exclu:
«une méthode consistant précisément à retenir comme points de
base, pour le tracéd'une ligne recherchant une division égalitéd'un
certain espace, de toutes petites îles,des rochers inhabités,des hauts-
fonds, situésparfoisà une distance considérablede la terre ferme»68.
La jurisprudence du Plurruu continental (Jamuhiriya urabe libyenne1
hxC.1J. Recu(>1984.p. 329-33par.201.
167 186. Examination of the respective travaux prépuratoires for the
Geneva instruments and for the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea discloses a change in approach. The International Law
Commission seems t,o have demonstrated a preference for having base-
lines serve both to firthe boundary with the high seas and also to fixthe
equidistance line. But this stance by the Commission was not confirmed
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Within
negotiating Group VII, which dealt with the question of the delimitation
of the continental shelf and the exclusiveeconomic zone, the problem of
basepoints was a matter on which the delegations were unable to agree:
some favoured adoption of the equidistance line, others an equitable
solution. The former wished not only purely and simply to extend appli-
cation of the normal baseline to al1areas, but also to accord it this dual
function; the merit of this solution lay in its mathematical simplicity. For
the latter group, on the other hand, the search for an equitable solution
did not reauire from the outset the ado~tion of criteria that were a source
of inequity, or the automatic application of one principle or method in
particular. In some c,asesthis approach would have such distorting effects
that there could be rio question of raising it to the status of an absolute
rule. To do so would be to create an obstacle to the conclusion of delimi-
tation agreements between neighbouring States. The disagreement on this
point, both within negotiating Group VI1 and within the Conference
itself, calls into question the proposals and interpretations espoused by
the International Law Commission in 1953and 1956.
In conclusion, itil;not established that in law baselines serveboth for
purposes of delimitation and for the fixing of the external boundaries of
maritime areas.
187. As far as cascelaw is concerned, the Court has had to rule on this
question on a numbe:rof occasions; it hasnot however endorsed the prin-
ciple that the normal baseline be accorded a dual function. During the
period immediately following the adoption of the Montego Bay Conven-
tion, the Court, aware of the results of the work of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and in particular of the work
of negotiating Group VII, did not follow the proposals and conclusions
of the International Law Commission.
188. Already in 1984, in the case concerning the Delimitation of tlîe
Maritime Boundary in the Guif of'Maine Area, the Chamber excluded :
"any method wlhichtakes tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low-tide
elevations, sometimes lying at a considerable distance from terra
firma, as basepoint for the drawing of a line intended to effect an
equal division of a given areaWbX.
The decision in the case concerning the Continental Slîelf' (Lihyrrn
I.C.J. Rq~ort1984,pp. 329-330. para. 201204 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
Malte) fut plus éclairante lorsque l'île de Filfla fut écartéecomme point
de base pour la construction de la ligne médianeprovisoire, bien qu'elle
fût retenue par Malte pour mesurer la largeur de sa mer territoriale. En
effet, pour la Cour:
«les lignes de base arrêtéespar un Etat côtier ne sont pas en soi iden-
tiques aux points choisis sur une côte pour permettre de calculer
l'étendue de plateau continental relevant dudit Etat. Dans ce cas,
l'effet équitable d'une ligne d'équidistance dépendde la précaution
que l'on aura prise d'éliminerl'effet exagéréde certains îlots, rochers
ou légerssaillants des côtes, pour reprendre les termes utiliséspar la
Cour dans le passage précitéde son arrêtde 1969.))")
L'adjectif équitablequalifie à la fois le résultaa atteindre et les moyens
a employer pour y parvenir7".
189. On pourrait certes se demander si l'affaire de la Délin~itufion
maritirne dans lu rtgion sitube entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Dane-
mark c. Norvégr) représente une solution de continuité dans la jurispru-
dence lorsque la Cour dit:
«La zone de chevauchement des revendications est définie en
l'espècepar la ligne médiane et la ligne des 200 milles du Groenland,
et ces lignes constituent toutes deux desconstructions géométriques;
il pourrait y avoir des divergences d'opinions au sujet de points de
base, mais dès lors que les points de base sont déterminés,les deux
lignes s'ensuivent automatiquement. La ligne médiane tracée a titre
provisoire comme premièreétapede l'opérationde délimitation a été
en conséquencedéfiniepar référenceaux points de base indiquéspar
les Parties sur les côtes du Groenland et de Jan Mayen.»71
Dans cette affaire, l'utilisation du conditionnel ((pourrait)) au lieu du
temps présent de l'indicatif indique l'absence de désaccord entre les
Parties sur l'identification des points de base. Le désaccord se réduith la
largeur des espaces maritimes. Par ailleurs, il convient de relever que, en
termes de «macrogéographie», les espaces en cause sont vastes, sans
commune mesure avec la zone entre Qatar et Bahreïn. Faut-il attribuer
une portéegénérale a la conclusion selon laquelle «dès lors que les points
de base sont déterminés,les deux lignes s'ensuivent automatiquement))?
L'utilisation de l'adverbe uuton~utiqucmrnt justifierait une réponse posi-
tive qui aurait a son actif les travaux de la Commission du droit interna-
tional sus-rappelés. Mais a l'examen, cette conclusion ne s'impose pas:
d'une part, le Danetnark et la Norvège sont tous les deux parties aux
conventions de Genève de 1958 et de 1960, et parties A un réseau
d'accords régionaux qui ont favorisé l'avènementd'un droit et d'une pra-
tique que partagent les Etats de la région. D'autre part, en l'absence de
" C.I.J. Re<,~d,l8.5p. 48, par. 64.
'"Voir C.I.J. Re,cucl982.p. 59. par. 70
" C.1.J. Re>(.ui4193.p.78. par. 89.Arab JumahiriyalMuita) made the position even clearer when it excluded
the island of Filfla as basepoint for thedrawing of the provisional median
line, even though it was used by Malta to measure the breadth of its
territorial sea. Thus, for the Court:
"the baselines as determined by coastal States are not per se identical
with the points chosen on a coast to make it possible to calculate the
area of continental shelf appertaining to that State. In this case, the
equitableness of an equidistance line depends on whether the precau-
tion is taken of eliminating the disproportionate effect of certain
'islets, rocks andl minor coastal projections', to use the language of
the Court in its 1969 Judgment. quoted ab~ve."~~
The term equituble characterizes both the result to be achieved and the
means to be applied to reach that result '".
189. Admittedly, it might be asked whether the case concerning Muri-
time Delimitution in tlze Areu hetiivcn Greerzluntland Jun Muyen (Den-
murk v.Norivuy) does not represent a break with the previous jurispru-
dence, when the Court States:
"The area of overlapping claims in this case is defined by the
median line and the 200-mile line from Greenland, and those lines
are both geometi-icalconstructs; there might be differences of opinion
over basepoints, but given defined basepoints, the two lines follow
automatically. The median line provisionally drawn as first stage in
the delimitation process has accordingly been defined by reference to
the basepoints indicated by the Parties on the coasts of Greenland
and Jan Mayen.""
Here, the use of the subjunctive "might" instead of the present indica-
tive denotes the absence of disagreement between the Parties over the
identification of the 'basepoints, their disagreement being confined to the
issue of the breadth of the maritime areas. It should, moreover, be noted
that in "macrogeographic" terms the areas in question are vast, having
nothing in common with thearea between Qatarand Bahrain. Should we
then accord general scope to the statement that, "given defined base-
points, the two lines follow automatically"? The use of the adverb auto-
nzaticully would justify an affirmative reply, which would find support in
the work of the International Law Commission. However, on examina-
tion this conclusion cannot be upheld: in the first place both Denmark
and Norway are pal-ties to the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and 1960,
and participants in a network of regional agreements which have favoured
the development of a law and practice shared by the States of the region.
In the second place, in the absence of disagreement between the Parties,
""I.C.J. Rc~port.985.p. 48. para. 64.
See I. J. Reports1982. p. 59, para. 70.
71I.C.J. ReporrslYY3,p. 78, para. 89.205 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS. COMMUNE)
désaccordentre les Parties, la Cour n'a pas éprouvéle besoin de s'expli-
quer sur une ((divergence d'opinions)), d'ailleurs hypothétique en la
matière. La Cour s'est contentéede prendre acte des points et lignes de
base proposés par chaque Partie respectivement, après s'être assurée
qu'aucune contestation sur ces désignations n'avait étésoulevée. La
conclusion de la Cour, dans cesconditions, esta rapprocher du test d'iné-
quité ab initioeffectuédans les affaires duPluteau continental (Tunisiel
Jurnulziriyu arabe lihyrnnc)en 1982et du Plutcuu corztinentul (Jumahi-
riju urahc lihyenne/M~iltc)en 1985. En effet, en 1993,lors de l'affaire de
la Délimitution nlaririnzc duns lu rggion située entre Ic Groenlund et
Jun M~ycc (Danernurk c. No~vége), elle a procédéde la mêmemanière
en rappelant l'absence de contestation sur la désignation des points et
lignes de base de chaque Partie. La Cour procède ainsi cas par cas et
se réservele droit de statuer sur le caractère équitableou non des points
et lignes de base, qu'ils soient ou non proposés par les parties a un
différend.
190. Contrairement à ce que l'arrêt semble suggérer, l'utilisationys-
tématiquedes points et lignes de base à la fois pour calculer l'étenduedu
plateau continental et de la zone économiqueexclusive, et pour fixer les
limites extérieuresde ces espaces, n'est pas prescrite par le droit et la
jurisprudence de la Cour. La solution finale se fondesur une appréciation
concrète des circonstances de fait que le juge apprécie discrétionnaire-
ment avec l'aide d'un minimum d'appareil mathématique et de son sens
de l'équité.
191. Dans la délimitation de la mer territoriale. ce sens de l'éauité
s'impose également endroit. On ne peut que critiquer, en particulier en la
présente affaire, I'interprétationque l'arrêtdonne de la règle ((équidis-
tancelcirconstances spéciales))qui est la norme applicable en la matière.
Contrairement a la solution de l'arrêt,les relations entre lesdeux notions
d'équidistance etde circonstances spécialessont des rapports entre des
éléments égaux et opposés,pour reprendre une description en termes de
mathématiques. En 1958,une proposition yougoslave hostile A la réfé-
rence aux «circonstances spéciales))a étérejetéenon pas pour des raisons
conceptuelles, mais a cause des difficultés liés l'interprétationde cette
notion considéréecomme trop vague et trop subjective. On se souvient
cependant de la magistrale présentation de la théorie des circonstances
spécialespar le délégué du Royaume-Uni, sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, plus
tard juge a la Cour internationale de Justice. Les circonstances spéciales
visaient, dans la penséede sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, les raisons d'équitéet
une configuration particuliére d'une côte; à ces deux circonstances ini-
tiales étaitajoutée laréférenceaux titres historiques, qui avait fait l'objet
d'un amendement proposé par la République fédérale d'Allemagne.En
revanche, il n'était pasfait mention de la présence d'île,ni dans les inter-
ventions, ni dans la version définitivede l'article 5. Dès 1958, et les tra-
vaux préparatoires le confirment, l'équidistancepouvait êtrela norme de
référence tant que son application n'aboutissait pas un résultatcontraire
aux exigences d'une solution équitable car, de manière générale: DELIMIT.4TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 205
the Court did not consider it necessary to deal with the question of a "dif-
ference of opinion", since this was in any case a hypothetical issue here.
The Court was conteint to place on record the respective basepoints and
lines proposed by each Party, satisfying itself that no challenge to those
proposals had been made. In these circumstances, the Court's conclusion
is to be contrasted with the test of inequity ah initio applied in the cases
ContinclntalSheij" ( Tzrni.siuILihyunA rub Jum~ihirij~a)of 1982 and Conti-
nrntul Sf~elf(Lihycrn Aruh Jatnahirij~trlM~ilt~of 1985. In effect iri 1993,
in its decision in the case concerning Maritirnc. Delitnitution in the Areu
hrtii,cen Greenlcruzdund Jrriî Mcr~" ,lrDzenn7urk v. Norii,ulti. the Court
proceeded in the sanie manner, relying on the lack of challenge to the
basepoints and lines designated by each Party. Thus the Court proceeds
on a case-by-case basis and reserves the right to decide on the equitable-
ness of basepoints and lines, irrespective of whether or not these are pro-
posed by the parties to a dispute.
190. Contrary to what the Judgment appears to suggest, the syste-
matic use of basepoints and lines to calculate the extent of the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and to fix the external boundaries
of those areas, is not prescribed by law, or by the Court's case law. The
final solution is based on a specific appreciation of the factual circum-
stances, which courtij assess at their discretion with the assistance of a
minimum of mathematical apparatus and of a sense of equity.
191. In a delimitation of the territorialsea. this sense of equity is also
a requirement of law. We can only criticize, and most particularly so in
the present case, the interpretation which the Judgment gives to the
"equidistancelspecial circumstances" rule, which is the norm applicable
here. Contrary to tht: solution reached in the Judgment, the relationship
between the two notions of equidistance and special circumstances is one
between equal and opposite forces, to borrow a term from mathematics.
In 1958,a Yugoslav proposal hostile to the reference to "special circum-
stances" was rejectedlnot on conceptual grounds, but because of the dif-
ficulties involved in interpreting this notion, which was regarded as too
vague and too subjective. However, we would recall the masterly presen-
tation of the theory of special circumstancesby the United Kingdom dele-
gate, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, subsequently judge of this Court. In Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice's view, special circumstances comprised considera-
tions of equity and the particular configuration of a Coast; to these two
initial circumstances was added a reference to historical titles, which had
been the subject of an amendment proposed by the Federal Republic of
Germany. By contrilst, there was no mention of islands, either in the
speeches or in the firial version of Article5. From 1958, and the truvuu.~
prc;parutoirrs confirrn this, equidistance could be applied as the standard
criterion, as long as this did not produce a result contrary to the require-
ments of an equitable solution, for, in general: «si le droit international exige que la délimitation soit enracinée
dans le titre, il la soumet également à 1'impératifd'un résultat équi-
table. Les deux conditions ...sont l'une et l'autre nécessaires;aucune
n'est a elle seule suffisante.)>72
192. En matière d'équidistance,la véritablequestion concerne l'identi-
fication des points de base. La réponse n'est pas facile à envisager de
manière systématique.Dans l'affaire de la DPlimitution maritime duiis la
rkgion situéeentre le Groenbnd et Jun Muyrn (Dunemcrrk c. Norvège), la
Cour n'a eu affaire à aucune difficulté,les points utiliséspar chacune des
Parties n'ont pas étécontestés, le choix apparaissait acceptable aux yeux
des Parties, parce que considérécomme équitable. En l'absence d'accord
entre les Etats concernés, il est difficile de parler de solution généraleou
de principe applicable aux hypothèses où des formations insulaires sont
situéesà proximité d'une côte; les îles sont tantôt ignorées,tantôt prises
en considération pour le tracéde la ligne médiane provisoire. En 1973,des
Etats africains avaient proposé que l'attribution d'espaces maritimes, en
général,au profit des îles, notamment des petites îles, doive êtreeffectuée
conformément à des principes équitables; il y aurait lieu de tenir compte
de tous les facteurs et de toutes lescirconstances, y compris la superficie, le
chiffre de la population, la distance par rapport au territoire principal, la
configuration géologiqueet les intérêts particuliersdes Etats insulaires et
des Etats archipels (Comitédes fonds marins, doc. AIAC.138189et rev. 1).
Les griefs formulésdans l'affaire de la Dklimitution de lufrontière mari-
time dans lu rkgion du golf2 du Muinr a l'encontre de la ligne d'équidis-
tance proposée par le Canada sur la base des points que ce dernier a
désignésmontrent les limites que rencontre en pratique la confusion entre
les points utiliséspour le calcul de la largeur des espaces maritimes et ceux
employés pourdéterminerles limites extérieuresde ces espaces 73.L'équité,
en effet, doit également présiderau choix des points de base utiliséspour
la délimitation maritime. La recherche d'une solution éauitable im~liaue . .
que les considérations liées aux exigences de l'équité soientprises en
compte d'une manière constante A tous les stades de l'acte et de I'opéra-
tion de délimitation. II étaitnécessairede rappeler que le choix des points
de base devait aussi être équitable,comme le doivent êtrela méthode uti-
liséeet le résultat recherché. ((L'effetéquitable d'une ligne d'équidistance
dépend de la précaution que l'on aura prise d'éliminerl'effet exagéréde
certains îlots, rochers ou légerssaillants des côtes.»74 Cette exigence est
liéeégalementau caractère provisoire attaché a la ligne d'équidistance,car
la prise en compte des circonstances spécialesn'implique qu'un simple
ajustement de la ligne ainsi tracée à titre provisoire. Les points de base
non équitables sont de nature à affecter le tracéde la ligne médiane pure
et, partant, le caractère équitable de la solution retenue.
" P. Weil. PCI..TI)L>~/d~rLit.Sde lu d6linlitictionnzuritir~~c1.988.p. 90.
'' VoirC.I.J. Rrcuci1984, p. 329-330.par.210.
CI. JR(>cui,ilY85,p. 48. par. 64. DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS. OP.) 206
"while international law requires that a delimitation be rooted in
title, it also imposes the requirement of an equitable result. Both
conditions . .. are necessary; neither is enough on its ~wn."~~
192. As far as equidistance is concerned, the real question concerns the
identification of the basepoints. No systematic answer can readily be
given on this point. In the case concerning Muritirne Drlirnitution in the
Arecl hrtiiren Grernlunci und Jun Muyen (Dennzurk v. Norivuy). the
Court was not faced with any problem, since the points utilized by each
of the Parties were not disputed, and the choice appeared acceptable to
them, because it was regarded as equitable. In the absence of agreement
between the States concerned, it is difficult to speak of a general solution
or applicable principle in circumstances where island features are situated
close to a Coast; in :;orne cases islands are disregarded, in others taken
into account. for purposes of drawing the median provisional line. In
1973, certain Africari States had proposed that the attribution of mari-
time areas to islands in general, and in particular to small islands, must
be made in accordance with equitable principles; al1factors and circum-
stances should be taken into account, including surface area, population,
distance from the principal territory, geological configuration and par-
ticular interests of island and archipelagic States (Seabed Committee,
doc. AIAC. 138189arid Rev.1).The objections in the Gulf'of Muine case
to the equidistance line proposed by Canada on the basis of points which
it had itself chosen demonstrate the limits encountered in practice where
there is confusion between the points utilized in order to calculate the
breadth of maritime areas and those adopted to determine the external
boundaries of those areas7'. Thus equity must also govern the choice of
the basepoints utilized for purposes of maritime delimitation. The search
for an equitable solution implies that considerations deriving from the
requirements of equity be consistently taken into account at every stage
of the actand operation of delimitation. It was necessary for the Court to
recall that the choice of basepoints must also be equitable, as must be the
method used and the result sought. "[Tlhe equitableness of an equidis-
tance line depends on whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the
disproportionate effiict of certain islets, rocks and niinor coastal pro-
jection~."~~This reqluirement also reflects the provisional character of
the equidistance line, since allowance for special circumstances merely
implies a simple adjustment of the line thus drawn on a provisional basis.
Inequitable basepoints will affect the course of the true median line,
and hence the equitaible nature of the solution adopted.
7' P. Weil. Prrspccrii.cchr droit (ILl,u (Ii.lirnitutionnzuritime. 1088. p. 90.
7z See1.C.J. Rr~port1984,pp. 329-330. para. 210.
7-'1C.J. Reports 1985. p. 48. para. 64. 193. Aprèsla dévolutiond'une part des îles Hawar et surtout de Qit'at
Jaradah à Bahreïn et d'autre part, et dans une moindre mesure, celle de
Janan à Qatar, la Cour, compte tenu de la modestie de la largeur de la
zone délimitée, devait s'interrogersur le caractère équitabledu choix des
points traditionnels de base. la raison rutione legiss'oppose, en l'espèce,
l'équité.En effet, en tenant compte des îlots ou formations plus éloignés
de l'îleprincipale de Bahreïn que ne le sont les îles Hawar par rapport a
Qatar. l'arrêts'est abstenu de prendre en considération toute donnée
autre que celle liéeau titre. Le test d'équitéutilisépour ajuster la ligne
unique a été effectuéà partir de points de base dont on ne s'estpas assuré
au préalabledu caractère équitabledu choix. En l'espèce,le choix défi-
nitif de points de base a eu pour résultatun emplacement situéexcessi-
vement vers l'est de la ligne d'équidistanceen raison des effets reconnus
de manièreexagérée à des points minuscules et sans intérêt. La construc-
tion de la ligne provisoire'iquidistance sur la base des points ici retenus,
en l'occurrence ce qui est appelé «les formations maritimes)) ou ((muri-
rimefeatures)), a pour portéela dénaturation de la direction généralede
la lignede côte.Il cst en efJi'trtrunge que ce nc soit pas lu terreferme qui
domine la mer mais lcs petites ,formutions maritimes dont les assises
nlunquent prkcisén~entde ,fL.rrnetk. Le respect de la prééminencede la
terre ferme sur la mer aurait eu pour conséquence directela fidélitéde la
ligne de baseà la lignede côte et une ligne d'équidistancerespectueuse de
la géographiedes terres et des côtes.
La ligne d'équidistance tracéeà titre provisoire, dans les circonstances
de l'espèce,devait être construite à partir de points de base choisis de
manière équitable,ce qui aurait imposé sa translation vers la direction de
l'ouest par rapport au tracéproposé par l'arrêt.Celui-ci devait respecter
cette direction, dans lescirconstances de l'affaire pour que la méthodede
tracé de la ligne provisoire fût équitable à partir de points également
équitables.
c) La qualification juridique de Qit'at Juradah
194. La conclusion, au paragraphe 195 de l'arrêt,selon laquelle
«la formation maritime de Qit'at Jaradah répond aux critères énu-
mérés [au paragraphe 1de l'article 10de la convention de 1958sur la
mer territoriale et la zone contiguë; paragraphe 1de l'article 121de
la convention de 1982sur ledroit de la mer] ...et qu'il s'agitd'une île
qui doit comme telle êtreprise en considération aux fins du tracéde
la ligne d'équidistance))
est contestable compte tenu des caractéristiques géophysiquesde cette
formation.
195. Plusieursélémentssont susceptibles de remettre en causela nature
géographique insulairede Qit'at Jaradah: la non-concordance de l'avis 193. Following the award of the Hawar Islands, and above al1 of
Qit'at Jaradah, to Bahrain and, to a lesser degree, of Janan to Qatar, the
Court, given the narrowness of the delimited area was bound to ask itself
whether the choice of the traditional basepoints was an equitable one.
Grounds of law are in this case opposed by equity. Thus, in giving effect
to islets or features located at a greater distance from the main island of
Bahrain than the Ha,war Islands are from Qatar, the Judgment failed to
take account of any e:lementother than those relating to title. The test of
equitableness used tc~adjust the single line was applied by reference to
basepoints which hacl not first been examined to ensure that their choice
was equitable. In the event, the final choice of basepoints resulted in
the equidistance line being located too far to the west, because of the
exaggerated effects accorded to tiny, unimportant features. The drawing
of the provisional equidistance line on the basis of the points chosen
here, namely what are called "maritime features" or "le,sjOrmations tnuri-
times". had the effeci:of distorting the general direction of the coastline.
It is surely curious thut the sea sl~ouldbe dominatecl not hj, terru jrrna
but hy minor mariti,we jkutures, precisely lucking jirm ,joundutions. If
the principle of the pre-eminence of terra firma over the sea had been
respected, the direct result would have been a baseline which faithfully
followed the coastliine, and an equidistance line which respected the
topography of the land and its coastlines.
The provisional equidistance line should, in the circumstances of the
case, have been constructed by reference to equitably chosen baselines,
which would have required its being moved to the west of the line pro-
posed by the Judgment. In the circumstances of the case it was incumbent
upon the Judgment to satisfy this requirement if the method for drawing
the provisional line was to be an equitable one, based on points which
were also equitable.
(c) Legal Characterizution of'Qit'at Jaradah
194. The conclusion, in paragraph 195 of the Judgment, that
"the maritime feature of Qit'at Jaradah satisfies the above-
mentioned critelria [in Article 10, paragraph 1,of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Article 121,
paragraph 1,of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea] and
that it is an islaild which should as such be taken into consideration
for the drawing of the equidistance line"
is disputable given tlnegeophysical characteristics of this feature.
195. There are a number of factors which cast doubt upon the view
that Qit'at Jaradah is geographically an island: the inconsistency of the208 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
des experts, l'omission de son indication comme île sur les cartes marines,
notamment française et de l'Amirautébritannique (cf. carte jointe ci-après,
p. 21 5) (voir paragraphe 193 de l'arrêt),le décapage de la couche supé-
rieure de la formation en 1986 (paragraphe 192 de l'arrêt)et enfin la
sédimentation intervenue depuis lors. En l'absence de donnéescertaines,
il semblerait qu'actuellement une formation maritime minuscule et de très
petites dimensions affleure à l'endroit appelé Qit'at Jaradah.
196. Il ne revient pas i la Cour de trancher une querelle relative à des
débats théoriques de géographie physique. Mais quelle que soit la portée
tant juridique que politique de la question de savoir si Qit'at Jaradah est
ou non une île en droit, on ne saurait perdre de vue une considération de
bon sens élémentaire:des conclusions ne peuvent être contradictoires
lorsqu'il s'agitd'une seule et même question. Selonle DicationnuireLe Robert:
«Une île est une étenduede terre ferme émergéed'une manière durable));
Tlze Cumbridgc. Intcrnationul Dictionury of Englisl~parle de «a piece of
land completely surrounded by water)). De son côté, le premier para-
graphe de l'article 121 de la convention de Montego Bay définit l'île
comme «une étendue naturelle de terre entourée d'eau qui reste décou-
verte à marée haute)). Par-deli les différencesde rédaction inhérentesaux
objectifs de chaque discipline, on observera que la problématique s'arti-
cule autour de considérations hydrographiques (la marée haute) et géo-
morphologiques (l'étendue naturelle de terre).
197. La considération hydrographique d'abord: «la maréehaute» est
un élémentimportant de la définition de l'île au regard de la convention
de 1982;ce critèreest plus précisque celui utilisédans le langage courant.
Dans ces conditions, l'affleurement à maréehaute est la condition essen-
tielle à la qualification d'«île», d'une étendue naturelle de terre à la dif-
férencedes hauts-fonds découvrants.
198. Les considérations géomorphologiques, ensuite, amènent à discu-
ter de la consistance de la ((terre)) constitutive d'une île: «étendue natu-
relle de terre)), ((étenduede terre ferme)). Le ((caractère natureln d'une
formation insulaire a fait l'objet d'àpres discussions au sein de la doctrine
et dans les travaux de codification. La terre. Œuvre de la nature. résulte-
t-elle de l'action géologiqueou de la sédimentation? Une proposition de
H. Lauterpacht d'ajouter le qualificatif «naturelle» entre les mots «une
étendue))et «de terre)) a étérepousséeau sein de la Commission du droit
international en 195475.Ce fut sur proposition des Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique, hostiles à toute extension artificielle et abusive de la mer territo-
riale et i tout empiétement sur la libertéde la haute mer, que fut adopté
l'amendement qui prévoyait l'adjonction du terme «naturelle» au para-
graphe consacré i la définitionde l'île7('.La signification de ce caractère
a, de son côté, évolué.Depuis l'affaire de I'Annu, on aurait, semble-t-il,
" Y(,urhookoftireInrc~rnutiorruli.Cot?ri~ii.v.1954..vol.1p. 92 et 94.
76Voir article 10 final de la convention du droit de la mer, doc. AIConf.13IClIL.I 12,
Doc.urn<wts(!fficics,l. III: première commissiop. 180et 265. DELIMIT/iTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 208
experts' opinions; the fact that it is not indicated as an island on British
Admiralty charts (see attached map, p. 215, below) (see paragraph 193of
the Judgment); the removal of the upper surface of the feature in 1986
(paragraph 192 of the Judgment); and, finally, the sedimentation which
has taken place since then. In the absence of precise information, it would
appear that there is currently a tiny maritime feature of very small size
appearing above the svaterline at the location known as Qit'at Jaradah.
196. It is not for the Court to settle a dispute involving theoretical dis-
cussions of physical geography. But, irrespective of the legal and political
dimension of the question whether or not Qit'at Jaradah is an island in
law, we must not los<:sight of a consideration of basic common sense:
one cannot have contradictory answers to one and the same question.
According to the Dic,tionnuirc Robert: "An island is an area of terra
firma which emerges permanently from the water"; the Cumbridge Inter-
r~ationulDictiotlary of E~zglislzspeaks of "a piece of land completely sur-
rounded by water". For its part, the first paragraph of Article 121of the
Montego Bay Conveiition defines an island as "a naturally formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide". Over
and above editorial differences inherent in the aims of the respective dis-
ciplines, it will be noted that the problem turns on considerations of
hydrography (high tide) and geomorphology (a naturally formed area of
land).
197. First, the hydrographie element: "high tide" is an important
factor in the definition of an island under the 1982 Convention; this
criterion is more precise than that used in everyday language. Here,
appearance above the waterline at high tide is the essential condition
in order for a naturally formed area of land to be characterized as an
"island" rather than as a low-tide elevation.
198. Next, geomorphological considerations, which entail examination
of the question of the composition of the "land" comprising an island:
"natural area of land". "area of terra firma". The "naturalness" of an
insular feature has been the subject of fierce debate, both in doctrine and
in the work of codification. 1sthe land - a product of nature - the con-
sequence of geological action or of sedimentation? A proposal by H.
Lauterpacht to inseri. the adjective "natural" before "area of land" was
rejected by the International Law Commission in 195475.It was on a pro-
posai by the United States, who were hostile to any artificial, abusive
extension of the territorial sea and to aily encroachment on the freedom
of the high seas, that an amendment was adopted providing for the inser-
tion of the word "natural" in the paragraph dealing with the definition of
an i~land'~.The sense of the term has itself changed. Since the Anna case,
it would seem that it had been accepted that the geomorphological com-
75 Yi~urhookoJ'thr Ii~fcriiutiLuit.(oii~inissio1954.Vol. 1.pp. 92 and 94.
7hSee the final Article 10of the Law of the Sea Convention, doc. A/Conf.13/CllL.I 12.
O/bc.iiDoc.r~nicrrt.ol. III: First Cornmittee. pp. 180and 265.209 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS .OMMUNE)
admis que fût indifférentela consistance géomorphologique de la forma-
tion: vase, boue, corail, madrépores ou terre ferme proprement dite7'.
Mais, contrairement à la sentence de sir William Scott en cette affaire, la
convention de Montego Bay s'est écartée de manière très sensible de ces
principes.
L'affleurement de l'étendueen soi ne suffit pas pour que la formation
soit qualifiéed'île, seules les étenduesde ((terre ferme)), ou terra ,firrna,
peuvent recevoir la qualité etle statut d'île au regard de I'article 121du
droit de la mer. En premier lieu, I'article 121 introduit une distinction
entre les îles et les ((rochers))dont le régimejuridique fait l'objet de son
paragraphe 3. Les traitements respectifs des rochers et des îles ne sont pas
identiques, bien qu'il s'agisse dans les deux cas d'affleurements perma-
nents de consistance géomorphologique ferme.
En second lieu, les affleurements ne selimitent pas aux îles. La conven-
tion de 1982viseexplicitement les atolls dont aucune définitionjuridique
n'est fournie; en géographie, il s'agit de ((récifscoralliens annulaires des
mers chaudes, enfermant un lagon communiquant avec la haute mer»
(Dictionnaire Le Robert). Laconsistancegéomorphologiquede laconstitu-
tion des atolls ne relèvepas de la nature de la terre ferme pour que la
qualification d'île puisse lui êtrereconnue. Les atolls sont en définitive
des formations ou des élévationsqui consistent en un mélangede vase, de
boue, de corail et de madrépores.
Les cayes constituent, également, des affleurements permanents car
«un caye est un îlot ou haut-fond constitué de sable plus ou moins
cimenté» (Grand Larous.se uniivr.se1). Il s'agit d'une catégoriede forma-
tion maritime qui reste découverte à maréehaute, mais qui n'est pas de
terre ferme au sens ordinaire et traditionnel de ce concept. A la différence
de l'îleou de l'atoll, ou mêmedes îles artificielles, laconvention de Mon-
tego Bay ne vise pas le caye comme catégorie géographique reconnueen
droit.
199. Concernant Qit'at Jaradah, lesdifférentes péripétieqsu'a connues
cette étendue s'expliquent d'un côté par l'absence de terre ferme et de
l'autre par sa formation par accrétion, c'est-à-dire par «un processus
d'agglomération d'élémentsinorganiques, solides ou fluides)) (Diction-
naire Le Robert). La question est, dèslors, de savoir sion peut l'assimiler
à une île au sens de I'article 121de la convention de 1982.Une réponse
négative s'imposecar sa nature géomorphologique la classe dans une
catégorienon viséepar la convention de Montego Bay.
200. Par ailleurs, l'assimilation del'îleau territoire terrestre s'explique
par de pures considérations de géomorphologie: la terre ferme, dans les
deux cas de figure, représentel'élémens tolide qui les supporte, contrai-
rement aux atolls et aux cayes; la conséquenceest la duretéphysique de
77Rc>portqf'Cusrs Arguc~dund Dctcrmitird in tlir High ofAdtniralty cotnrncnc-
ingii,i/tllJudgmetzts of Sir Williutii S<,ott,Micl1ac~ln7uT.s1,rtn1798. Chr. Robinson (dir.
publ.). 1799-1808, vol.V. 18p.337-385. DELIMIT/\TION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 209
position of a feature was irrelevant: sediment, mud, coral, madrepore,
or terra firma properly so-called7'. But contrary to the judgment of Sir
William Scott in that case, the Montego Bay Convention departed quite
significantly from those principles.
The fact that the land lies above the high-water line is not enough in
itself for a feature to be characterized as an island; only areas of terra
firma can be accorded the status of island under Article 121of the Law of
the Sea Convention. In the first place, Article 121introduces a distinction
between islands and "rocks", whose legal régimeis dealt with in the third
paragraph. The treatinents of rocks and islands are not identical, even
though both are featilres permanently above the high-water line and of
stable geomorphological composition.
Secondly, areas of land lying above the high-water line are not con-
fined to islands. The 1982Convention expressly refers to atolls. but pro-
vides no legal definition of these; in geographical terms, they are "ring-
shaped coral reefs in warm seas, enclosing a lagoon communicating with
the high sea" (Dictioiqnuire Robert). In terms of their geomorphological
composition, atolls are not terra firma, and therefore cannot be accorded
the status of islands. In short, atolls are features or elevations consisting
of a mixture of sedimient, mud, coral and madrepore.
Cays are also areas of land lying permanently above sea level. "A cay
is an islet or elevation composed of sand compacted to a greater or lesser
degree" (Grund Lar.oussr universel). This is a category of maritime
feature which remains above the waterline at high tide but which is not
terra firma in the ordinary, traditional sense of the term. Unlike islands,
atolls, or even artific:ial islands, the Montego Bay Convention does not
refer to cays as a geographical category recognized by law.
199. As regards Qit'at Jaradah, the various changes which this feature
has undergone can be explained on the one hand by the absence of terra
firma and on the other by the fact that it has been formed by accretion,
that is to say, "a process of agglomeration of inorganic elements, solid or
liquid" (Dictionnaire Robert). Thus the question is whether it can be
assimilated to an island within the meaning of Article 121 of the 1982
Convention. The answer must be a negative one, for its geomorphologi-
cal characteristics place it in a category not provided for in the Montego
Bay Convention.
200. The assimilation of islands to land territory is moreover expli-
cable purely in terms of geomorphological considerations: in both cases,
by contrast with atolls and cays, the stable underlying element is terra
firma; thus they have a physically durable base which ensures their per-
'' Reports of Cu.sesurgurtl utid dt~fctlthe High Court of'Adrnirulty cornrnencing
icirlthe JudgnrcrrO/'Slr Williu~nScort. Michurlmus TL'T?798, ed. Chr. Robinson,
1799-1808, VolV. 1806. pp. 337-385.
173210 DELIMITATION ET QCiESTIONS (OP. DISS. COMMUNE)
ce socle qui en assure la permanence. Dans le cas de Qit'at Jaradah, com-
ment expliquer autrement la facilité avec laquelle le décapage a pu être
réaliséet la consolidation effectuée?En droit, cette assimilation doit être
comprise en rapport avec l'idée d'effectivité de la souveraineté; la souve-
raineté, en droit international, implique un minimum de base terrestre
solide qu'on ne rencontre pas dans les formations maritimes affleurantes
qui ne sont pas des îles.
A l'appui de cette différencede traitement entre une île et les autres
formations maritimes qui affleurent a marée haute, on peut invoquer les
cartes marines officielles. Elles sont les meilleurs documents qui
décrivent, sinon attestent, l'emplacement, la qualification des forma-
tions situéesdans l'espace océanique en raison des impératifsde sécurité
de la navigation maritime.
201. Enfin, ce qui ajoute au caractère contestable de la solution donnée
par la Cour à Qit'at Jaradah, c'est le fait non seulement de l'avoir consi-
déréecomme île, mais encore de l'avoir attribuée à Bahreïn alors que les
calculs de distances précis effectuéspar l'hydrographe désignépar la
Cour indiquent qu'elle est plus proche de Qatar que de Bahreïn.
d) Le truc.éde lu lignejifinulede ddimitc~tion
202. Il est à déplorer que le tracéde la ligne de délimitation n'ait fait
l'objet que d'un vote unique. Ce vote unique ne s'imposait ni sur le plan
juridique ni sur le plan technique.
203. Sur le plan juridique, les Parties ont évoqué,arguments à l'appui,
l'existence de deux secteurs dans la zone à délimiter: un secteur septen-
trional et un secteur méridional. La similitude des positions n'impliquait
pas une identitéde points de vue sur les coordonnées du point de sépara-
tion entre ces deux secteurs. Cette divergence devait amener la Cour à en
déterminer les coordonnées compte tenu des circonstances de l'espèce,
notamment des données techniques.
204. Sur le plan technique, la détermination du point de division de la
ligne de délimitation est facile à opérer. En premier lieu, la figure géomé-
trique de référence estla ligne provisoire d'équidistance (carte no 2). Le
doute de la Cour sur le rattachement ou non de Fasht al Azm à l'île
bahreïnite de Sitrah a entraîné la construction de deux lignes médianes
théoriques dont les extrémitéspartent au nord au point où cessent les
effets de Fasht al Azm. Dans la partie méridionale, le point dejonction se
situerait aux environs de Qit'at el Erge. En second lieu, ce point méridio-
nal de jonction des deux lignes théoriquesest le point limite septentrional
des effets de Rabad al Gharbiyah sur la ligne d'équidistance. Ce dernier
point, dès lors, représente sur le plan technique la séparation entre les
deux secteurs de la ligne de délimitation.
205. En termes de délimitation, le secteur nord ainsi défini aurait
donnélieu à un vote affirmatif de notre part. Dans l'ensemble, la ligne demanence. In the case of Qit'at Jaradah, how otherwise to explain the
ease with which the upper surface could be removed and subsequently
restored? In law, thiç assimilation must be understood in cor~junction
with the notion of effectiveness of sovereignty; sovereignty, in interna-
tional law, implies a minimum stable terrestrial base, which is not to be
found in maritime feaitures above the waterline which are not islands.
In support of this difference in treatment as between an island and
other maritime features which appear above the waterline at high tide, we
may cite official marine charts. These documents, because of the need to
meet the safety requirements of marine navigation, offer the best descrip-
tions and evidence of the location and status of features situated within
maritime waters.
201. Finally, what makes the Court's solution for Qit'at Jaradah even
more debatable is the fact that not only did it treat it as an island, but it
then awarded it to Bahrain, whereas the precise calculations of distance
carried out by the Court-appointed hydrographer indicate that it is closer
to Qatar than to Bahrain.
(d) Tlzc Course of the Final Dclimitatinn LNZC
202. It is regrettable that a single vote was taken on the course of the
delimitation line. There was no need for such a restriction, either legally
or technically.
203. In terms of law, the Parties indicated, with arguments in support
of their positions, thait the area for delimitation consisted of two sectors:
a northern sector and a southern sector. The similarity in their positions
did not imply that they were in agreement on the CO-ordinates of the
point of separation csf the two sectors. This lack of agreement should
have led the Court to determine those co-ordinates in light of the circum-
stances of the case. and in particular of the technical data.
204. Technically. .the point of separation of the delimitation line is
simple to determine. First, the geometrical reference figure is the provi-
sional equidistance line (Sketch-map No. 2). The Court's uncertainty as
to whether Fasht al Azm was part of the Bahraini island of Sitrah
resulted in the construction of two theoretical median lines, whose ends
run northward from the point where Fasht al Azm ceases to have effect.
In the southern sector, the junction point is located in the area of Qit'at
el Erge. Src.ond this southern junction of the two theoretical lines is the
most northerly point where Rabad al Gharbiyah has effects upon the
equidistance line. Hence, technically, this latter point represents the point
of separation between the two sectors of the delimitation lines.
205. In terms of the delimitation, if the northern sector had been
defined in this way we would have voted in favour. Overall, the delimita-21 1 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DLSS. COMMUNE)
délimitation arrètéeatténue I'inéquitéde la solution finale en raison
notamment de la privation d'effets de Qit'at Jaradah. Quelques aména-
gements auraient pu cependant améliorer quelque peu la solution.
En fait, et à titre très subsidiaire,la localisation géographique de Qit'at
Jaradah par rapport aux masses terrestres respectives des deux Parties est
instructive. Comme nous venons de le signaler plus haut, cette formation
est située, selon les calculs en hydrographie, à 17,113 kilomètres de la
péninsuledeQatar et à 21,698kilomètres de l'ileprincipale de Bahreïn. Si
Fasht al Azm était rattachée à l'île de Sitrah, la distance aurait étéde
11,605kilomètres, mais, sur ce point, la Cour s'est abstenue de tout pro-
noncéjudiciaire, pour que cette donnéepuisse êtreprise en considération.
Ainsi, la délimitation maritime a étéaffectéepar un pouvoir d'influence
excessif reconnu à Qit'at Jaradah par l'arrêtsur la délimitation maritime,
ainsi distordue de manière inéquitable.
Cette anomalie est aggravéepar l'attribution d'un effet de 500 mètres a
Qit'at Jaradah, alors mêmeque la Cour avait décidéde la priver de tout
effet et de tracer la ligne de délimitation de façon strictement tangentielle
à Qit'at Jaradah. Cette attribution d'effet n'est pas sans conséquences
distordantes dans la partie septentrionale de la ligne.
Cette situation est de plus aggravéedu fait que la Cour a établila ligne
unique de délimitation maritime sur la base de deux cartes contradic-
toires, une américainepour le secteur sud de la ligneet une britannique pour
le secteur nord. Cette double position de la Cour laisse quelque peu per-
plexe, alors qu'il eût étéplus normal que la Cour fit référencea une carte
unique pour établir l'ensemble de la ligne et qu'elle le fit en choisissant
précisémentla carte la plus récenteoffrant les données les mieux actua-
lisées.Telle étaitla carte britannique établie en 1994par l'amirautéde la
puissance protectrice de la régionpendant longtemps et, de ce fait, assez
bien informéede la situation. Cette carte bathymétrique britannique fait
bien apparaître quant à elle la continuité géographiqueentre les Hawar et
Qatar, qui sont d'un seul tenant et qui ensemble constituent la presqu'île
qatarie. Mais en choisissant de se référerplutôt à la carte américaine
pour ce secteur sud de la ligne unique a établir, la Cour ne pouvait
qu'arbitrairement représenter la laisse de basse mer dans ledit secteur
sud, faisant ainsi craindre une mauvaise lisibilitéde la décisionet surtout
le risque rkel d'une urnputtrtion du territoire de Qutur proprctnent dit.
C'est pourquoi le choix de la carte la moins appropriée pour le sud laisse
des doutes sérieuxnon seulement sur l'équité, maisencore sur la simple
exactitude, de la ligne obtenue. Faute de choisir la carte britannique. il
eût mieux valu que I'arrêtne prenne pas la responsabilité d'une erreur
de tracéet invite plutôt les Parties négocier cetracésur la base d'indica-
tions de la Cour.
Pour toutes ces raisons, nous regrettons de ne pouvoir endosser la res-
ponsabilité d'une possible amputation du territoire de Qatar. DELIMITPLTION AND QUESTIONS (JOINTDISS.OP.) 211
tion line laid down in the Judgment mitigates the inequity of the final
solution, in particular by the lack of effect accorded to Qit'at Jaradah.
Some adjustments coiild, however, have slightly improved the solution.
In effect- and this is very much a subsidiary point - the geographi-
cal location of Qit'at Jaradah in relation to the Parties' respective main-
lands is instructive. PLswe have just pointed out above, this feature is
situated, according to the hydrographie calculations, 17.1 13 km from the
Qatar peninsula and 21.698 km from the main island of Bahrain. If Fasht
al Azm were attachecl to the island of Sitrah, the distance would have
been 11.605 km, but on this point the Court refrained from making any
judicial ruling that would have enabled this fact to be taken into account.
Thus the maritime delimitation was affected by the excessive influence
accorded to Qit'at Jaradah by the ruling on the maritime delimitation,
which was thus distorted in an inequitable manner.
This anomaly is aggravated by the fact that Qit'at Jaradah is accorded
an effect of 500 m, eviin though the Court had decided not to give it any
effect at al1and to draw the delimitation line at a strict tangent to Qit'at
Jaradah. This has distorting consequences for the northern part of the
line.
The position is further aggravated by the fact that the Court has estab-
lished a single maritime boundary on the basis of two contradictory
maps, an American one for the southern sector and a British one for
the northern sector. This duality in the Court's approach is somewhat
puzzling, since it would have been more normal for it to rely on a single
map for the entire colurse of the line and to choose the most recent one,
providing the most up-to-date data. This was the British map, prepared
in 1994 by the Admii-alty of the country that had for many years been
the protecting power in the region and was thus quite well informed of
the true situation. This British bathymetric chart clearly demonstrates
the geographical continuity between the Hawars and Qatar, which form
a single entity and together constitute the Qatari peninsula. But in
choosing to rely rather on the American map for this southern sector
of the single boundary, the Court was able to represent the low-water
line in that southern sector in an arbitrary manner only, thus raising
fears as to the legibility of the decision and above al1creating ~ireul risk
of trn~pututiorzof the territor}' od'Qutur.proper.. Thus the choice of the
less suitable map for the southern sector leaves serious doubts, not only
as to the fairness, but also as to the simple accuracy. of the line
obtained. Havine Lailed to choose the British man it would have been
better if the Judgment had not assumed responsibility for errors in
the course of the lin12and had instead invited the Parties to nezotiatL
that course on the basis of indications [rom the Court.
For al1of the reasons set out above. we regret that we cannot accept
responsibility for any amputation of Qatar's territory. 206. Dans cette affaire si délicate, où les opinions publiques sont
nerveuses, la Cour avait la possibilitéde mieux faire accepter son arrêt
si elle avait pris l'initiative de pousser plus ou moins directement
les deux Parties a envisager des négociations au sujet de possihi1iti.s
de c.ot?~pensutions.fin~rnci$res rr~trr elLa fonction judiciaire de la
Cour n'est pas fondamentalement incompatible avec une certaine
manière de faire des suggestions ou mêmed'indiquer des orientations
a l'adresse des Parties. La technique juridique possède a cet égard
plus de ressources qu'on ne l'imagine. Le premier jour des plaidoiries, le
professeur Salmon avait précisé que le retour des Hawar à Qatar s'accom-
pagnerait nécessairement d'indemnisations pour les intérêtsque cette
décision affecterait. Nous songeons plutôt à autre chose qui pourrait
s'y ajouter, moyennant quelque effort d'imagination que la Cour
n'aurait pas dû s'interdire. surtout en une telle affaire si sensible pour
les deux Parties.
207. Nous avons étémis sur la voie par deux éléments:le premier a été
l'invocation par Bahreïn de sa relative pauvreté; le second est le précé-
dent constitué par un accord de délimitation entre l'Arabie saoudite et
Bahreïn précisément. Si le premier est sans aucune pertinence juridique,
comme l'a indiqué avec constance toute la jurisprudence internationale,
le second par contre peut constituer un bon exemple à conseiller par la
Cour et à suivre par les Parties. Si le précédentconventionnel saoudo-
bahreïnite, offert par deux Etats du Golfe, dont l'un est Partie litigante
dans la présente instance, avait étéainsi suggéré,il aurait permis à la
Cour de tenir compte indirectement des arguments par ailleurs irrece-
vables concernant la relative pauvreté de Bahreïn.
208. Voici de quoi il s'agit. Bahreïn ayant invoqué dans ses négocia-
tions avec l'Arabie saoudite ses difficultéséconomiques,celle-cia proposé
à Bahreïn que celui-ci accepte de reconnaître la souveraineté saoudienne
sur une île en dispute, en contrepartie de quoi les deux Parties se parta-
geraient les ressources de la région.
209. L'accord de délimitation du 22 février 1958 (entré en vigueur
quatre jours plus tard après l'échangedes instruments de ratification le
26 février 1958)comporte un intéressant article 2 qui se lit comme suit:
((Conformément au vŒu de Son Altesse le Souverain de Bahreïn
et vu le consentement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Arabie saoudite, les
ressources pétrolières de la région désignéeet délimitéeci-dessus,
dans la partie qui appartient au Royaume d'Arabie saoudite, seront
exploitées de la façon qui sied iiSa Majesté, à la condition que
c,c~llr-cic/oizncuu Gourc~rt~ctni~n(tle Brrllrcïn lu n~oitik (1. du purt
rr1701u net tirc; rlr cette csploitutiqui rc~vicnt cru Goui'erncvnrnt
d'Aruhic stroutlitIl va de soi que celant. portrrrr cn ricvl atti.infc (ru I>ELIMIT.4TION AND QI'ESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 212
206. In this particularly sensitive case, where public opinion is easily
roused, it would have been open to the Court to render its Judgment
more readily acceptable if it had taken the initiative of more or less
directly encouraging the two Parties to envisage the possibilitj~of'n~utuul
Jinunciul c.ompensutic.~nT . he Court's judicial function is not basically
incompatible with a certain capacity to make suggestions, or even indi-
cate guidelines, to the parties. Juridical technique has more resources in
this regard than might be imagined. On the opening day of the hearings,
Professor Salmon made it clear that the return of the Hawars to Qatar
would necessarily be accompanied by the compensation of any interests
affected by such decision. We are thinking rather of an additional possi-
bility, which would lhave been open to the Court thanks to a certain
effort of the imagination from which it should not have debarred itself,
particularly in a case so sensitive for both Parties.
207. We were prornpted in this direction by two factors: the first was
Bahrain's reference to its relative poverty; the second is the precedent
constituted by a delimitation agreement between Saudi Arabia and,
precisely, Bahrain. While the former is of no legal relevance whatever,
as the entire body of international jurisprudence has consistently demon-
strated, the latter, by contrast, may be taken as a good example to
be recommended by the Court and followed by the Parties. If the pre-
cedent of the Saudi-Bahraini agreement, provided by two Gulf States,
one of which is party to the present proceedings, had been so suggested.
it would have allovied the Court to take account indirectly of the
otherwise inadmissible arguments concerning the relative poverty of
Bahrain.
208. What happened was the following. In the course of negotiations
with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain invoked its economic difficulties; whereupon
the Saudis proposed ithat Bahrain should recognize their sovereignty over
a disputed island, in return for which the two parties would share the
area's resources.
209. The delimitation agreement of 22 February 1958 (which entered
into force four days later following the exchange of instruments of rati-
fication on 26 Febriiary 1958) includes an interesting Article 2. which
reads as follows:
"ln view of the desire of His Highness the Ruler of Bahrain and
the consent of His Majesty the King of Saoudi Arabia, the oil
resources in the: area mentioned and delimited above in the part
belonging to the Kingdom of Saoudi Arabia shall be developed in
the manner which His Majesty may choose, on condition that licl
giixcs tlzc'Governnicwt of'Bulirui~zIzulf'qf'tliut ulhic/ipert~iins to tlie
S~iurliArrrhicrnC;oi.~~rnnlcotj'tlic.net inconle ~lc>rifon1 tlzisdevel-
opmrtzt. It is understood that this sliull not impair [lie right qf'.soi,- DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP.DISS.COMMUNE)
droit de souveruineti. et d'administration du Gouvernemcnt d'Arabie
saoudite duns lu rkgion .susmentionni.e.))"
210. Nous signalons en passant que cet accord n'a pas éténégociépar
le Royaume-Uni, Etat protecteur, au nom de Bahreïn, son Etat protégé,
mais par Bahreïn lui-mêmequi a exercéen cette circonstance, en 1958,
son jus tractutuum.
On notera, en second lieu, que la ligne tracées'est apparemment gardée
de tenir compte de l'attribution des Hawar à Bahreïn. Elle n'a pas vidéle
problème. Le point no 1 de la ligne médiane tracéeest le point d'équidis-
tance entre un point A (correspondant à l'extrêmepointe sud de l'île de
Bahreïn à Ra's-al-Barr) et un point B sur la côte saoudite à Ra's-abu-
Maharrah. Donc Bahreïn n'a pas fait entrer les Hawar en ligne de
compte.
On relèvera, en troisième et dernier lieu, que certaines îles et certains
hauts-fonds découvrants n'ont pas du tout étépris en compte dans la
délimitation.
211. Pour revenir à notre suggestion, nous verrions bien la fin de ce
contentieux de soixante et un ans par le retour au droit, grâce au retour
des Hawar à Qatar, assorti par un engagement de partager non pas seu-
lement les ((ressourcespétrolières))(coi1 resourcesn comme dans l'accord
de 1958 avec l'Arabie saoudite), mais également toutes autres ressources
(gazières,touristiques et de pêche)que pourraient compter ces territoires.
Car si ceux-ci ne recèlent pas de pétrole, comme c'est apparemment le
cas, l'accord qui concrétiserait notre suggestion perdrait tout intérêts'il
se réduisait aux coi1 resources)).
212. Enfin, il faut souligner que l'exemple saoudo-bahreïnite de 1958
ne constitue pas un cas isolé.11est plus fréquentqu'on ne le pense. Nous
signalons en particulier que, à l'occasion du Sommet de l'organisation de
l'Unitéafricaine (OUA) qui s'étaittenu à Rabat (Maroc) en juin 1972,
l'Algérieet le Maroc ont signédeux accords, l'un traçant la frontière
entre les deux pays en maintenant la régiondite de Ghara-Djebilet sous
la souveraineté algérienne, et l'autre reconnaissant au Maroc la moitié
des ressources minières (spécialement de minerai de fer iihaute teneur)
existant dans cette région. Les chefs d'Etat africains présents à ce Som-
met de Rabat ont ététémoinsde I'accord.
XI. CONCLUSIO NINALE
213. Pour conclure cette opinion, dissidente à regret, nous estimons
que la Cour a écartéà juste titre l'application du principe de I'utipossi-
''Les italiques sont de nous: voir United States of America. Departmrnt of State.
Bureau of Intelligenand Research. It~torncitioritrlBoirne/trr.jSt~rc/~.Scrir~sA. LNiiits in
tilt Sc(r.\.Contirlc,nrcilS/lr./fB.rilii.trir~(/ri.nhio, no 12.mars 1970. I>ELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (JOINT DISS. OP.) 213
ereignty and ud/?iinistrution of the Saudi Arabia Government in the
above mentionecl area." 7x
210. We would point out in passing that this agreement was not nego-
tiated by the United Icingdom, the protecting State, in the name of Bah-
rain, its protected State, but by Bahrain itself, which on this occasion
exercised, in 1958, its own,jus tr.acta~uun~.
It should be noted in the second place that the lir-iedrawn apparently
refrained from taking any account of the attribution of the Hawars to
Bahrain. It did not resolve the issue. Point No. 1 of the median line
drawn is the equidistance point between a point A (corresponding to
the southernmost point of the island of Bahrain at Ra's-al-Barr) and a
point B on the Saucli Coast at Ra's-abu-Maharrah. Thus Bahrain did
not have the Hawars brought into the equation.
Thirdly and lastly, it should be noted that certain islands and low-tide
elevations were not taken into account at al1in the delimitation.
211. To return to our suggestion, we feel that this 61-year-old dispute
would be finally given its quietus if the legal position were restored, with
the Hawars being retilrned to Qatar, subject to an obligation to share not
only "oil resources" (as in the 1958 agreement with Saudi Arabia), but
also al1 other resources (natural gas, tourism and fisheries) which those
territories might provide. For, if the latter do not contain oil, as would
appear to be the case, the agreement embodying Our suggestion would
lose its entire point if it were restricted to"oilresources".
212. Finally, it shc~uldbe emphasized that the Saudi-Bahraini example
of 1958does not represent an isolated case. Such arrangements are more
frequent than one might think. We would point out in particular that, at
the Summit of the Oirganization for African Unity (OAU) held in Rabat
(Morocco) in June 1972, Algeria and Morocco signed two agreements,
one drawing the froritier between the two countries, keeping the region
known as Ghara-Djebilet under Algerian sovereignty, and the other
granting to Morocco one half of the region's mineral resources (in par-
ticular. high-content iron ore). The African Heads of State present at this
Rabat Suinmit were witnesses to that agreement.
XI. FINALCONCLUSION
213. To conclude this opinion, a dissenting one to Our regret, we
believe that the Court was correct in refusing to apply the principle of uti
7hEmphiisis added. See United Stateof Americ;~.Department of State. Bure;iii of
Intelligence and ResearcIritc~rtr(rrirolrnt/rrrySrlrl/j., Srrivs A. Lit~iitsiil rli<,Sï(rs.
Cotltit~~~trtrIli<~lf'Botr~t.rhr.t~itrlAtrliuhNo. 12, Miirch 1970.dc(ftjuris à la présente espèce.Nous partageons entièrement l'analyse
que la Cour a faite i ce sujet. Et pourtant, en tant que représentants des
différents systèmesjuridiques du continent africain, nous sommes atta-
chésau principe en question, dont l'importance ne nous ajamais échappé
pour la phase postcoloniale du développement de 1'Etaten Afrique, dans
la stabilitéet la paix.
214. Mais notre adhésion à l'analyse de la Cour concluant au rejet de
l'application du principe a la présente espèce se nourrit de diverses rai-
sons. En prernirr lieu, les ((relations spéciales de protection)) qui ont
existéentre le Royaume-Uni et les deux Etats parties au présent différend
ont abouti à une répartition évolutiveet souple des compétencesentre la
puissance protectrice et 1'Etat protégé,de telle sorte que ce dernier a
conservésa personnalité, ce qui n'était pasle cas de la plupart des pays
du continent africain. L'application du principe de1'~tipossitleti.sjuris ne
pouvait qu'être écartéeen l'absence de création d'un nouveau sujet de
droit international, c'est-A-direfaute de succession d'Etats en l'espèce.
215. Er1 second lieu, des raisons de simple éthique juridique impo-
saient, à notre avis, le rejet de I'utipo.s.vi.sris comme titre pertinent.
On ne saurait en effet ignorer les véritables motifs qui ont sous-tendu
l'artificejuridique qu'a constitué la décisionbritannique de 1939,inspirée
directement par des intérètspétroliers rivaux. Les auteurs de cette déci-
sion ne se sont mêmepas embarrassés de cohérencejuridique, à tel point
que le seul ((principe))appliqué fut: «le pitrolc domine lu terrc. cf la
n7c.r)).Dès lors. nous ne pouvions trouver un refuge juridique pour vali-
der une décisionde cette nature, sans contribuer à notre tour à ce genre
de constructions juridiques artificielles et artificieuses qui masquent mal
des intérêts évidentsau détriment des droits des peuples.
216. Enfin, généralementle principe de I'utipossin'rtisjuris s'applique
«globalement», en ce sens qu'il se borne à photographier une situation
frontalière entre deux Etats nouvellement indépendants et i lui faire
reconnaître un statut d'intangibilité, sans que l'on ait besoin nécessaire-
ment d'examiner dans le détail les différents textes coloniaux qui, un à
un, ont contribué à créer cette situation frontalière. Dans le cas présent,
c'est au contraire ce détaild'un texte qui est directement soumis à notre
examen.
21 7. C'est pourquoi, au cas particulier d'une décisioncomme celle de
1939, nous ne pouvions alors que nous livrer à un examen critique de la
validitéde ce texte, mesurée à l'aune des méthodes modernes d'interpré-
tation et sur la base des principes et des règles du droit international
contemporain qui bannissent le droit colonial ou de protectorat.
(Signk) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.
(Signc;) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signk) Abdul G. KOKOMA.possidetis juris to the present case. We are in full agreement with the
Court's analysis in this regard. And yet, as representatives of the various
legal systems of the continent of Africa, we are committed to that prin-
ciple and have never lost sight of its importance for the post-colonial
phase of State development in Africa under conditions of stability and
peace.
214. However, Our agreement with the Court's analysis ruling against
the application of the principle to the present case is inspired by a variety
of reasons. First, the "special relationship of protection" between the
United Kingdom and the two States parties to the present dispute gave
rise to a flexible division, evolving over time, of responsibilities between
the protecting Power and the protected State, as a result of which the
State retained its personality; this wasnot the case for most countries in
Africa. There could be no question of applying the principle of uti pos-
sidetis juris, since no new subject of international 1awhad been created;
that is to say, there was no State succession in the present case.
215. Second in our view, simple reasons of legal ethics required the
rejection of uti possidetis jlrris as a relevant title. No one can be unaware
of the real motives underlying the legal contrivance which was the British
decision of 1939, directly inspired as it was by rival oil interests. The
authors of that decisicsntroubled themselves so little with legal coherence
that the only "principle" applied was: "oil dominates the land and the
scu". We could not tt-iereforefind a legal pretext for ratifyirig such a deci-
sion without making Our own contribution to this kind of contrived,
deceptive legal edificr:which poorly conceals the interests clearly under-
lying it and is damaging to the rights of the peoples concerned.
216. Finally, the principle of uti yossidefis juris is generally applied in
a "global" manner, in that it confines itself to "photographing" the
boundary situation between two newly independent States and conferring
on that situation the status of inviolability. There is not necessarily any
requirement to undertake a detailed examination of the various colonial
texts which contribut~~d,individually, to the creation of that boundary. In
the present case, by icontrast, it is the detail of a single text that we are
directly invited to examine.
217. It follows that, in the particular case of a decision like that of
1939, we were bouncl to undertake a critical examination of the validity
of that text, measured by the yardstick of modern methods of interpreta-
tion and on the basiij of the rules and principles of contemporary inter-
national law, in which colonial or protectorate law have no place.
(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.
(Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signed) Abdul G. KOROMA. W. ).(,
1
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Eîïectivitésbahreiniics
(Carten"4 de I'annexc7 du mcmoire
I de Bahreïnmentionnecaux
paragraphes 55 elsuivantsde la
j pré\enteopinion dissidentecommune)
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! Bahrainirfi<.rrr,ir4r
(Map 4 inAnncx 7 uf the Memanal
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LEOEND :
Map 4 : THE HAWAR ISLANDS -LOCATIONS
? j 2 !in-
? . - . ?-
O ,--- -J-
C *.rReproduit àpartir de la carte 2886 di: l'Amiraut0 Britirh Cron'nCopyright 1994. Reproduit avec l'autorisation du
Controllrr of.lier Maji~stySrationeiy Oflre et du bureuu h.vdrogruphiqurdu Royaume-Uni. (Cane mentionnée au
paragraphe 87 de l'opinion dissidente commune.)
Rrproducrdfrom Admiralty chart 2H.Y(Oi British CroivnCopyright 1994.Reproduced bypermis~ion ofthe Controllerof
Her Majeswi Stafione- Oflice and the UKHydrogruphicOflice. (Mup referred IO inparagraph 87 of thejoint
dissenfing opinion.)
Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma (translation)