Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs

Document Number
062-19781219-JUD-01-03-EN
Parent Document Number
062-19781219-JUD-01-00-EN
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Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

Whileconcurringin theCourt's principalfinding, 1do not consider that
the second basis on which Greececlaims tofound theCourt'sjurisdiction,
the BrusselsCommuniquéof 31May 1975,has been givenitsfull weight.1
agreewith theJudgment that there is no known "rule of international law
which might preclude [such a]communiquéfrom constituting an interna-
tional agreement to submit adispute to arbitration orjudicial settlement"
(para. 96).
It may be recalled how this Court has held that an undertaking "given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the
context of international negotiations, is binding" (I.C.J. Reports1974,
p. 267),inasmuch as, interalia, "parties are freeto choosewhat form they
pleaseprovided their intention clearlyresultsfromit" (I.C.J.Reports 1961,

p. 31, confirmed in I.C.J.Reports 1974, p. 268).

Granted that the question of form is not decisive,what we face in the
Joint Communiqué is an international instrument to which the long-
established principles apply that no construction may be entertained
which would imply that any provision was "not intended to have any
definite application" (American and British Claims Arbitration, Nielsen
report, Cayuga Indians, pp. 203 ff., at p. 322; cf. Moore, International
Adjudications, Modern Series, Vol. IV, p. 478).
These principles embrace a test which the Court has confirmed: "the
sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given
declaration does reveal a clear intention" (I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 32,
restated inI.C.J. Reports1974, p. 268).On thistest, what was visualizedin
the Joint Communiquéwas a joint subrnission on the basis of a special
agreement to be elaborated by the two States.

1am unable to agree with the Judgment that in respect of the Commu-

niqué'slegal consequences, it "is for the two Governments themselves to
consider those implications and what effect, if any, is to be given to the
Joint Communiqué" (para. 108). On the. contrary, in so far as the
Communiqué is an international instrument, the question of its precise
legal implications cannot be regarded as lying within the discretion of
either of the Governments concerned. 1therefore feel there isjustification
for considenng the matter in some detail.

The text of the CommuniquéStatesthat the two Prime Ministers gaveconsideration to the problems dividing them and that, as a result of their
meeting, they came to certain decisions. On the subject of the continental
shelf of the Aegean Sea, they "decided" that the problem should be
resolved "by the International Court at The Hague". Here the subject to be
dealt with and theinstitution to be called upon to resolve thedispute were
mentioned in clear terms. The remaining part of the Communiquéamply
justifies an inference that the representatives of the twoGovernments were
to discuss, inter alia, a special agreement.
1therefore feel that the text clearly commits Greece and Turkey to the
negotiation of a compromis.In myjudgment, thisisan objectiveobligation,
eventhough 1sharethe viewof Turkeythat it remained necessary to create

such a special agreement, and that the case should be submitted by both
parties and not by one.
The foregoingisconfirmed by theparticular circumstances in which the
Communiqué was drawn up. To these the Judgment refers at length
(paras. 100ff.).An exchange of Notesculminated with the Greek Govern-
ment "not[ing] with satisfaction that the Turkish Government accept in
principle their proposa1 that the question of the delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf of the Aegean Sea be subrnitted jointly to the International
Court of Justice inThe Hague" (10 February 1975);there soon followed a
statement by Turkey's Prime Minister, in theGrand National Assembly,
when he confirmed that: "The object of the talks will be the special
agreement (compromis) which will define the basis of the case"
(3 March 1975).
Next came the meeting of foreign ministers of 17-19May 1975at which
"initial consideration was givento the text of a specialagreement concern-
ing the submission of the [continental shelf problem] to theInternational

Court of Justice" (Application, Ann. III, No. 1).The matter was clinched
by the decisions recorded in the Communiqué of Brussels, which in my
viewconnoted a substantivecommitment on the part of both States. Had
this not been intended, the Communiqué should and could have been
limited to a text omitting the second sentence. Thus the circumstances
which led up to the Communiquéconfirm the legal consequencesimplicit
in its wording.

These consequences "must be considered within the general framework
of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust
which are so essential in the relations among States" (I.C.J. Reports1974,
p. 269).
With this borne in mind, it remains clearthat theBrusselsCommuniqué
wasnot initself a sufficient title for subrnission of thedispute to the Court,
for the parties agreed that the matter should be referred to the Court
jointly, and no other basis of reference can be shown to havebeen accepted
by the Government of Turkey; correspondingly, the rnodalities of seisin

remained to be agreed.
This being so, the Communiqué made it clear that the parties were to52 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. LACHS)

continue negotiations. In general, 1find that an obligation to negotiate
had been established.

This leads me to some general reflections on the relationship between
negotiations and the functions of this Court. There are obviously some
disputes which can be resolved only by negotiations, because there is no
alternative in viewof the character of the subject-matter involved and the
measures envisaged. But there are many other disputes in which a combi-
nation of methods would facilitate their resolution. The frequently unor-
thodox nature of the problems facing States today requires as many tools
tobe used and asmanyavenuesto beopened aspossible,in order toresolve
theintricate and frequently multi-dimensional issuesinvolved. It is some-
times desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instruments
and fora to which States may resort, for al1are mutually complementary.
Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some may be isolated,
givenpriority and their solution sought in a separate forum. In this way it

may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a dispute, its degeneration
into a conflict. Within this context, the role of the Court as an institution
serving the peaceful resolution of disputesshould, despite appearances,be
of growing importance.
Amongtheconsiderations to beborne in mind if the Court is to play its
part, two are paramount:

The Court may not act on any other basis than the established consentof
theStates in dispute, whether adcausamorbyvirtue ofmoregeneral bonds
ofjurisdiction. The disappointment engendered when the Court finds that
it lacksjurisdiction is doubtless bitter for a State which by an application
has borne witness to its faith in the judicial path to agreement. But the
Court may never overstep the law prescribed it, for it can inspire confi-
dence and gain strength only by acting within its Statute and Rules, and
consistently with its vocation.

In the light of the compatibility and complementarity of al1means of
peaceful settlement as enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations, judicial settlement must be viewed as simply an alterna-
tive to the direct and friendly settlement of disputes between States (cf.
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, p. 13). It is therefore important to rebut any
presumption that an alternative to friendly discussionmust of necessitybe
unfriendly, for the adversary image of contentious proceedings continues
to obscure the necessary place of the Court in the scheme of pacific

settlement. On the contrary, it has repeatedly been stated on behalf of
States that, in the words of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolu-
tion 3232 (XXIX):53 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. LACHS)
". ..recourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes, particularly
referraltotheInternational Court ofJustice, should notbeconsidered
an unfriendly act between States".

This has also been stressed by learned bodies.

Recognition ofthis principle, which consecratesthe intrinsiccharacter
of the Court, will assist it to discharge the function conferredon it by the
Charter as the principaljudicial organ of the United Nations.

(Signe Mdanfred LACHS.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

Whileconcurringin theCourt's principalfinding, 1do not consider that
the second basis on which Greececlaims tofound theCourt'sjurisdiction,
the BrusselsCommuniquéof 31May 1975,has been givenitsfull weight.1
agreewith theJudgment that there is no known "rule of international law
which might preclude [such a]communiquéfrom constituting an interna-
tional agreement to submit adispute to arbitration orjudicial settlement"
(para. 96).
It may be recalled how this Court has held that an undertaking "given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the
context of international negotiations, is binding" (I.C.J. Reports1974,
p. 267),inasmuch as, interalia, "parties are freeto choosewhat form they
pleaseprovided their intention clearlyresultsfromit" (I.C.J.Reports 1961,

p. 31, confirmed in I.C.J.Reports 1974, p. 268).

Granted that the question of form is not decisive,what we face in the
Joint Communiqué is an international instrument to which the long-
established principles apply that no construction may be entertained
which would imply that any provision was "not intended to have any
definite application" (American and British Claims Arbitration, Nielsen
report, Cayuga Indians, pp. 203 ff., at p. 322; cf. Moore, International
Adjudications, Modern Series, Vol. IV, p. 478).
These principles embrace a test which the Court has confirmed: "the
sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given
declaration does reveal a clear intention" (I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 32,
restated inI.C.J. Reports1974, p. 268).On thistest, what was visualizedin
the Joint Communiquéwas a joint subrnission on the basis of a special
agreement to be elaborated by the two States.

1am unable to agree with the Judgment that in respect of the Commu-

niqué'slegal consequences, it "is for the two Governments themselves to
consider those implications and what effect, if any, is to be given to the
Joint Communiqué" (para. 108). On the. contrary, in so far as the
Communiqué is an international instrument, the question of its precise
legal implications cannot be regarded as lying within the discretion of
either of the Governments concerned. 1therefore feel there isjustification
for considenng the matter in some detail.

The text of the CommuniquéStatesthat the two Prime Ministers gave OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LACHS

[Traduction]

Je m'associe àla principale conclusion de laCour, maisje trouve qu'elle
n'a pas attaché suffisamment d'importance à la seconde des bases sur

lesquelles la Grèce déclarefonder sa compétence, c'est-à-direle commu-
niquéde Bruxellesdu 31mai 1975.Je pense,commele dit l'arrêt, quel'on
ne connaît pas <<de règle de droit international interdisant qu'un [tel]
communiqué ..constitue un accord international destinéà soumettre un
différend à l'arbitrage ou au règlementjudiciaire (par. 96).
Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler que la Cour a jugé qu'un
engagement (exprimépubliquement et dans l'intention de se lier, même
hors du cadre de négociations internationales, a un effet obligatoire
(C.I.J. Recueil1974, p. 267), dans la mesure notamment où <les parties

sontlibres de choisir [laforme]quileurplaît, pourvu queleurintention en
ressorte clairement ))(C.I.J. Recueil1961, p. 3 1, confirmé dans C.I.J.
Recueil 1974,p. 268).
J'admets que la forme n'estpas décisive,maisnousnoustrouvons, avec
le communiquéconjoint,devant un instrument international auquel s'ap-
pliquent des principes établis de longue date, interdisant toute interpré-
tation qui donnerait à penser qu'une disposition n'était<<pas destinée à
avoir d'effet précis)>(American and British Claims Arbitration, rapport
Nielsen, Cayuga Indians,p. 322; cf. Moore, International Adjudications,

Modern Series, vol. IV, p. 478).
Ces principes comportentl'application d'un certaincritère,quela Cour
actuelle a confirmé : <(la seule question pertinente est de savoir si la
rédaction employéedans une déclaration donnéerévèleclairement l'in-
tention »(C.I.J.Recueil1961,p. 32,reprisdans C.I.J.Recueil1974,p. 268).
Or, si l'on a recours à ce critère, il apparaît que ce qu'envisageait le
communiqué c'étaitune saisine conjointe de la Cour sur la base d'un
compromis à établir par les deux Etats.
Je nepeux passouscrire àl'arrêtlàoù ilest dit, au sujet desconséquences

juridiques du communiqué, que c'est aux deux gouvernements eux-
, mêmesqu'il appartient d'examiner ces conséquences ainsi que l'effet à
attribuer éventuellement au communiquéconjoint (par. 108).Au con-
traire,dansla mesure où lecommuniquéestun instrumentinternational,la
questionde sesconséquencesjuridiques exactesne sauraitêtre considérée
comme étant du ressort discrétionnaire de l'un ou l'autre des gouveme-
ments intéressés.Je crois donc assez justifié de s'attarder à cette ques-
tion.
D'aprèsle texte du communiqué,les deux premiers ministres ont pro-consideration to the problems dividing them and that, as a result of their
meeting, they came to certain decisions. On the subject of the continental
shelf of the Aegean Sea, they "decided" that the problem should be
resolved "by the International Court at The Hague". Here the subject to be
dealt with and theinstitution to be called upon to resolve thedispute were
mentioned in clear terms. The remaining part of the Communiquéamply
justifies an inference that the representatives of the twoGovernments were
to discuss, inter alia, a special agreement.
1therefore feel that the text clearly commits Greece and Turkey to the
negotiation of a compromis.In myjudgment, thisisan objectiveobligation,
eventhough 1sharethe viewof Turkeythat it remained necessary to create

such a special agreement, and that the case should be submitted by both
parties and not by one.
The foregoingisconfirmed by theparticular circumstances in which the
Communiqué was drawn up. To these the Judgment refers at length
(paras. 100ff.).An exchange of Notesculminated with the Greek Govern-
ment "not[ing] with satisfaction that the Turkish Government accept in
principle their proposa1 that the question of the delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf of the Aegean Sea be subrnitted jointly to the International
Court of Justice inThe Hague" (10 February 1975);there soon followed a
statement by Turkey's Prime Minister, in theGrand National Assembly,
when he confirmed that: "The object of the talks will be the special
agreement (compromis) which will define the basis of the case"
(3 March 1975).
Next came the meeting of foreign ministers of 17-19May 1975at which
"initial consideration was givento the text of a specialagreement concern-
ing the submission of the [continental shelf problem] to theInternational

Court of Justice" (Application, Ann. III, No. 1).The matter was clinched
by the decisions recorded in the Communiqué of Brussels, which in my
viewconnoted a substantivecommitment on the part of both States. Had
this not been intended, the Communiqué should and could have been
limited to a text omitting the second sentence. Thus the circumstances
which led up to the Communiquéconfirm the legal consequencesimplicit
in its wording.

These consequences "must be considered within the general framework
of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust
which are so essential in the relations among States" (I.C.J. Reports1974,
p. 269).
With this borne in mind, it remains clearthat theBrusselsCommuniqué
wasnot initself a sufficient title for subrnission of thedispute to the Court,
for the parties agreed that the matter should be referred to the Court
jointly, and no other basis of reference can be shown to havebeen accepted
by the Government of Turkey; correspondingly, the rnodalities of seisin

remained to be agreed.
This being so, the Communiqué made it clear that the parties were tocédé à l'examen des problèmes qui les opposaient et, à la suite de leur

réunion,ontpriscertaines décisions.Apropos du plateaucontinental de la
mer Egée,ilsont ((decidé que leproblèmedevait êtrerésolu (<par laCour
internationale de La Haye )).Ici, le sujàttraiter et l'institution quiserait
appelée à résoudre le différend ont été clairementdésignés.Il paraît
amplementjustifié de déduire du reste du communiquéque les représen-
tants des deuxgouvernementsse proposaientd'étudier entreautres choses
un compromis.
J'estime par conséquent que le texte oblige nettement la Grèce et la
Turquie ànégocierun compromis.A mon avis, c'estuneobligation objec-

tive, encore que je pense comme la Turquie qu'il demeurait nécessaire
d'établirun tel instrument et que la saisine devait êtrele fait des deux
~arties et non d'une seule.
Lescirconstancesentourant la rédactionducommuniquéconfirment ce
qui précède.L'arrêt en faitlonguement état (par. 100et suiv.). Au terme
d'un échangede notes, le Gouvernement de la Grèce a noté (<avec satis-
faction que le Gouvernement turc accepte en principe sa proposition de
soumettreconjointement à la Cour internationale de Justiceà La Hayela
questiondela délimitationduplateau continental de la mer Egée (10 fé-

vrier 1975);peu de temps après,dans une déclaration faite devant l'As-
sembléenationaleturque, lepremier ministre deTurquieconfirmait: ([ces
entretiens]porteront sur le compromisqui définira la base de l'affaire
(3mars 1975).

Vint ensuite la réunion des ministresdes affairesétrangères des 17-19
mai 1975,au cours de laquelle eut lieu une première étuded'un textede
compromisconcernant la soumission [duproblème du plateau continen-

tal] devantla Cour internationale de Justice (Requête,ann. III, no 1).Et
la question fut véritablementréglée par les décisions enregistréesdans le
communiquéde Bruxellesqui, à mon avis, traduisaient un engagement de
fond de la part des deux Etats. Si l'intention avait étédifférente, le
communiquéaurait pu et dû consister en un texte où la deuxièmephrase
n'aurait pas figuré.Lescirconstancesprésidant àl'élaboration ducommu-
niqué confirment donc les conséquencesjuridiques implicites de son
libellé.

Ces conséquences (doivent êtreenvisagéesdans le cadre généralde la
sécuritédes relations internationales et de la confiance mutuelle si indis-
pensable dans les rapports entre Etats ))(C.I.J. Recueil1974, p. 269).

Ce rappel étantfait, il n'en demeure pas moins évidentque le comrnu-
niqué de Bruxelles n'était pas en soi un titre suffisant pour porter le
différend devant la Cour, car les parties étaient convenues de saisir
conjointementlaCour, et l'onnepeut pasdireque leGouvernement de la
Turquie ait acceptéuneautreprocédure;ilrestait par conséquent àarrêter

d'un commun accord les modalitésde la saisine.
Cela étant,le communiquéstipulait clairement que les parties devaient52 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. LACHS)

continue negotiations. In general, 1find that an obligation to negotiate
had been established.

This leads me to some general reflections on the relationship between
negotiations and the functions of this Court. There are obviously some
disputes which can be resolved only by negotiations, because there is no
alternative in viewof the character of the subject-matter involved and the
measures envisaged. But there are many other disputes in which a combi-
nation of methods would facilitate their resolution. The frequently unor-
thodox nature of the problems facing States today requires as many tools
tobe used and asmanyavenuesto beopened aspossible,in order toresolve
theintricate and frequently multi-dimensional issuesinvolved. It is some-
times desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instruments
and fora to which States may resort, for al1are mutually complementary.
Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some may be isolated,
givenpriority and their solution sought in a separate forum. In this way it

may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a dispute, its degeneration
into a conflict. Within this context, the role of the Court as an institution
serving the peaceful resolution of disputesshould, despite appearances,be
of growing importance.
Amongtheconsiderations to beborne in mind if the Court is to play its
part, two are paramount:

The Court may not act on any other basis than the established consentof
theStates in dispute, whether adcausamorbyvirtue ofmoregeneral bonds
ofjurisdiction. The disappointment engendered when the Court finds that
it lacksjurisdiction is doubtless bitter for a State which by an application
has borne witness to its faith in the judicial path to agreement. But the
Court may never overstep the law prescribed it, for it can inspire confi-
dence and gain strength only by acting within its Statute and Rules, and
consistently with its vocation.

In the light of the compatibility and complementarity of al1means of
peaceful settlement as enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations, judicial settlement must be viewed as simply an alterna-
tive to the direct and friendly settlement of disputes between States (cf.
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, p. 13). It is therefore important to rebut any
presumption that an alternative to friendly discussionmust of necessitybe
unfriendly, for the adversary image of contentious proceedings continues
to obscure the necessary place of the Court in the scheme of pacific

settlement. On the contrary, it has repeatedly been stated on behalf of
States that, in the words of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolu-
tion 3232 (XXIX): MERBGÉE (OP. IND. LACHS) 52

poursuivre lesnégociations. D'unemanièregénérale,j'estime qu'une obli-
gation de négocieravait étéétablie.

Yen arrive ainsi à formuler quelques réflexionsd'ordre généralsur le
rapport entre les négociations et les fonctions de la Cour. Il existeà
l'évidencedes différends que seules les négociationspermettent de ré-
soudre,la nature du problème et les mesures envisagéesne laissant aucun
autre choix. Mais il en est aussi beaucoupque l'on résoudrait plus facile-
mentencombinant diversesméthodes.Lecaractèresouventinhabitueldes
problèmesque doivent affronter les Etats de nosjours oblige à utiliser le

plus d'instruments età seréserver leplus de voiespossible pour résoudre
lesquestions complexeset souvent miltidimensionnelles qui seposent.Ily
a souventavantage à utiliser plusieursméthodes,ensemble ou successive-
ment. Il ne faut donc voir aucune incompatibilité entre les divers instru-
ments ettribunaux dont lesEtats peuventuser, carilssecomplètentlesuns
lesautres. Malgrél'interdépendancedesproblèmes,onpeut isolercertains
d'entre eux, leur donner la priorité et essayer de les soumettreun for
distinct. Ainsi peut-on espérerempêcherun différendde s'aggraveret de
dégénéreernconflit. Dans cecontexte, malgrélesapparences, lerôle dela
Cour comme institution mise au seMce du règlementpacifiquedesdiffé-
rends devrait revêtirde plus en plus d'importance.
Parmi lesconsidérations àne pas perdre de vue sil'on veutque la Cour
joue son rôle, il en est deux qui présentent une importance primor-
diale:

La Cour n'a la facultéd'agir que surla base du consentementdesEtats
en litige, qui doit être établiausamou en vertu de liensjuridictionnels
plus générauxL . a déceptionressentie quand la Cour se déclareincompé-
tente est sans aucun doute amère pour un Etat qui, par le dépôtde sa
requête, a manifesté sa foidans le règlementobtenu par voiejudiciaire.
Cependant la Cour ne doitjamais enfreindrela loiqui luiest imposée,car,
pour elle, le seul moyen d'inspirer confiance et de renforcer son rôle est
d'agir dans les limites de son Statut et de son Règlement,d'une manière

conforme à sa vocation.
Puisquetous les moyens de règlementpacifiqueénumérés àl'article 33
de la Charte des Nations Unies sont compatibles et complémentaires,le
règlementjudiciaire doit être considérécomme un simple succédanéau
règlementdirect et amiable des conflits entre Etats (cf.C.P.J.I. série
no22, p. 13).Il faut donc fairejustice de toute présomption qui voudrait
que le succédanédes entretiens amiables soit par nécessitéinamical,car
l'image antagoniste de l'instance contentieuse continue de masquer la
place qui revient nécessairementà la Cour parmi les modalitésdu règle-
ment pacifique. Au contraire, ilaétémaintesfoisdéclaréau nom desEtats
que, selon les termes du paragraphe 6 de la résolution3232 (XXIX) de
l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies:53 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. LACHS)
". ..recourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes, particularly
referraltotheInternational Court ofJustice, should notbeconsidered
an unfriendly act between States".

This has also been stressed by learned bodies.

Recognition ofthis principle, which consecratesthe intrinsiccharacter
of the Court, will assist it to discharge the function conferredon it by the
Charter as the principaljudicial organ of the United Nations.

(Signe Mdanfred LACHS. <(le recoursàun règlementjudiciaire desdifférendsjuridiques, parti-

culièrement le renvoi à la Cour internationale de Justice, ne devrait
pas être considéré comme un acte d'inimitiéentre Etats o.
La mêmeidée a étésoulignéepar diverses associations et sociétés sa-
vantes.

La reconnaissance de ce principe, qui consacrele caractèreintrinsèque
de la Cour, doit l'aider à s'acquitter de la fonction d'organe judiciaire
principal des Nations Unies que lui confère laCharte.

(Signé)Manfred LACHS.

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Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs

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