Dissenting Opinion of Judge Goitein | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GOITEIN

It is with diffidence that 1 dissent from the judgment of the
majority of the Court. 1 am strengthened in the decision 1 have
come to by the views of my learned colleagues who have dissented.
These appear to me to give a less strained interpretation of the
Statute that binds us than that adopted by the majority, and their
reading of the law enables this Court to fulfil and not deny the
purpose for which it was founded.

Bulgariahas submitted no facts to this Court and we can therefore
only rely on those stated in the Israel Memorial, facts which have
still to be proved. The chronicleof events, as set out by the Govern-
ment of Israel, is as follows: "On July 27,1955, a civil passenger air-
craft, registered in Israel ..while on a scheduled commercialflight
from London to Lod ..came down in flames in the region of Petritch,
Bulgana. Not one of the occupants ofthis aircraft-fifty-one passen-
gers and sevenmembers ofits crew-survived the disaster...the Bul-
garian Government, on 28July, officially ...announced how this had
come about. That Government's armed forces had shot down and
destroyed the aircraft, killing al1its occupants. This was amplified
...on 4 August when the Bulgarian Government ...again gave out
that its armed forces had destroyed the aircraft, those armed
forces having acted in haste and without taking al1 the neceçsary
measures.. . The Bulgarian Government gave .. undertakings
regarding the identification and punishment of those guilty ...as
well as regarding the eventual payrnent of compensation." (See the
full text on pp. 4 and 5 of the Memonal of the Government of
Israel.) After setting out the above chronicle of events, and after
refemng to the diplornatic negotiations which had failed to bear
fruit, the Government of Israel stated that it had turned to this
Court and prayed that it formally declare "that Bulgaria is res-
ponsible under international law for the destruction of the aircraft
and by determining the amount of compensation due". (Ibid., p. 5.)

If the facts are as stated in the Memorial, as summarized above,
then this would appear to be a dispute with which this Court and
this Court alone is competent to deal. In my opinion, therefore, this
Court should be anxious to right a wrong and take upon itself to
judge between the Parties before it. The Court should refuse to
exercise junsdiction only if its Statute clearly and unequivocally
withholds jurisdiction from it. 1 shall show in this Opinion that far
from withholdingjurisdiction from the Court, the law unequivocally
clothes it with power to decide the present dispute. The Statute of
72this Court, which otherwise follows that of the Permanent Court,
enacted a special paragraph-paragraph 5 of Article 36-precisely
in order to clothe this Court with the jurisdiction it might othenvise
have been unable to exercise.

1 respectfully agree with my colleagues in the majority that this
Court must first be satisfied that the Parties have voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction before it can take upon itself to decide
a dispute brought before it. 1 do not agree that that voluntary
submission may not be inferred from an express presumption of
law laying down that such a submission has been made.

The Israel Government in its Memorial (pp. 3 and 4), in order to
show that this Court had jurisdiction, relied upon Declarations

which had been made by both Parties accepting such jurisdiction.
Reference was made to the Declaration of Israel dated 3rd October,
1956, and to that of Bulgaria dated 12th August, 1921. 1shall refer
to the latter in this Opinion as the Bulgarian Declaration. In its
First Preliminary Objection, the only one with which the judgment
of the majority, and hence this Opinion, deals, the Bulgarian
Government subrnitted that "Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice is inapplicable in regard to the
People's Republic of Bulgana."

The question whether this Court has or has not jurisdiction de-
pends accordingly on the trueinterpretation of that paragraph, and
on the answer to the question whether that paragraph is applicable
to the Bulgarian Declaration. Indeed, the question raised by the
First Preliminary Objection of Bulgaria may be confined to narrower
limits: what is the meaning of the words in that paragraph "still
in force" and of the words "parties to the present Statute"? In the
ultimate analysis the Preliminary Objection may be accepted or
rejected in accordance with the interpretation given to the latter
words alone.
1 will first read the paragraph as a whole, without taking into
consideration the submissions made on behalf of Bulgaria and
without referring to the reply of the Agent for the Government of
Israel.

The submissions of Counsel for Bulgaria were intended to show
that the terms of Article 36 (5)of the Statute were not applicable
to the present case. To reach this conclusion he was forced to give
a special and peculiar meaning to the words used in the paragraph
in question, and in accepting his submissions the majority of this
Court has-and 1 Say this with the greatest respect-been bound
to give meanings to the terms employed by the legislator which
are not their ordinary meanings, and this Court has been forced to take into account considerations which, it seems to me, are
irrelevant .
The opening words of the paragraph are: "Declarations made
under Article 36 of the Permanent Court of International Justice ..."
It is agreed that Bulgaria made such a Declaration. The opening
words, therefore, as applied to the present case, may be interpreted
as: "The Bulgarian Declaration ..."

The following words are, in the English text, "which are still in

force", or, in the French text, "pour une duréequi n'est pas encore
expirée".Although 1 shall enlarge on this phrase in the following
paragraphs, here it may be said that there is no difficulty in giving
the ordinary and natural meaning to this phrase. As the present
tense is used and the word "still", the interpreter of these words,
without any reference to dictionanes, would understand that the
legislatoris speaking as of the Statute date. A declaration existing
on 24th October, 1945, was one to be "caught up" by the paragraph.
The French text, however, which is as binding upon us as the
English, suggests that a declaration is still in force when it has not
come to an end by effluxion of .tirne. Counsel for Bulgaria was well
aware of this and he vainly tried to find support in the Spanish,
Russian and Chinese texts rather than the French and, being a
Frenchman, expressed his regret at this unpatriotic preference.
But it needs more than mere pleading to make words change
their meaning. The words, therefore, "which are still in force"
mean, as 1 have said, in force on the Statute date, or, alterna-
tively, refer to declarations which have not come to an end by
effluxion of time.

Was the Bulgarian Declaration still in force in October 1945?
There is no doubt that it was. Here, too, the Bulgarian delegation
does not contend otherwise. It claims that the Declaration "died"

in the following year upon the dissolution of the Permanent Court.
The Declaration was also in force because it had not expired by the
effluxion of time. Nor had it been denounced. It was therefore a
declaration covered by Article 36 (5).1 accordingly read that part
of Article 36 (5) which 1 have now discussed as "The Bulgarian
Declaration, which is still in force.."

The following words of the paragraph are: "shall be deemed".
Reading these words 1 would infer that the legislator is about to
lay down a legal presurnption which would apply to the Bulgarian
Declaration from the Statute date and for the future. Here it is
important to stress, because the Bulgarian Government's represent-
atives appear to have overlooked this elementary fact, that the
legislator is not stating the legal position as it was at the time butthe legal position as he was declaring it to be from the date of the

enactment of the Statute and for the future. The draftsman must
have been fully aware of the fact that the Bulgarian Declaration
was in the nature of a consensual undertaking, made in connection
with a Court that was about to disappear and that not a jot of it
could be altered without the consent of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, as
far as concerned those who were or wished to be Members of the
United Nations, their declarations were from now-the year 1945-
and for thefuture to be deemed(seront considéréest)o be declarations
made in connection with the new Court, the International Court
of Justice.
The presumption would be as valid in 1955 as in 1945-provided,
of course, that Bulgaria had in the meantime become a Member of
the United Nations. With that point 1 shall deal when 1 come to
the words which foilow. The paragraph, as applied to the present
case, now reads: "The Bulgarian Declaration, which is still in force,
shall be deerned..."

The wordswhich followare "as between the parties to the present
Statute". 1 have already said that, in the final analysis, these are
the critical words of the paragraph andthe basic differencebetween
the majority of this Court and those dissenting lies in the inter-
pretation to be given to these words. There is no difficulty about
the words "present Statute". The word "present" appears because
the Statute of this Court (as is stated in Article 92 of the Charter)
is based on that of the Permanent Court, but nothing depends on
this word. Nor does any question anse as to the word "Statute".
What, then, is the meaning of "the parties" in the context of "par-
ties to the present Statute"? The same words are found when the
Court is first mentioned in the Charter. Article 93 reads:

"Al1Membersof the United Nations are ipso factoparties to the
Statute..."

Article 94 reads :
"Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with thedecision ofthe International Court of Justice."

Unless there were a contrary intention expressed in Article 36 (5)
of the Statute, 1would see no way of interpreting the words "parties
to the present Statute", except as is expressly declared to be their
meaning in Article 93 of the Charter. No contrary intention is
expressed in Article 36 (5); therefore, using ordinary canons for the
interpretation of Statutes, 1 would hold without hesitation that
whenever a State becomes a Member of the United Nations it
becomes a "party to the present Statute", and the words found in
Article 36 (5) of that Statute apply specifically to that State. (For
the purposes of the present case it is not necessary to refer to those
States which "may become aparty to the Statute" under Article 93 (2) of the Charter.) If further elucidation of the words were neces-
sary. one might tmn to paragraph 2 of the selfsame Article 36,
where precisely the same phrase is used, "the States parties to the
present Statute", which must refer to Members of the United
Xations, whether to those who were Members at the time of the
enactment of the Statute or to those who would subsequently
become Members, ten or twenty or thirty years later. Any inter-
pretation which would give one meaning to the words "parties to
the present Statute" in Article 36 (2)and a different meaning to
those words in Article 36 (5) would be untenable. Again, the words
"parties to theStatute" appear in Article 36 (4)and obviously refer
to al1Members of the United Nations and not to the original signa-
tories of the Charter. The majority of the members of this Court are

of the opinion that in Article36 (5)the words "parties to the present
Statute" must be confined to original signatories of the Charter.
and not to those who subsequently became "parties to the present
Statute". When the legislator wished to refer to "original Members"
he did so in plain words (see for example Article 3 of the Charter).
The words in Article 36, paragraph 5, cannot accordingly be
confined ?O "original Members". I therefore read the words of the
paragraph so far discussed as meaning: "The Bulgarian Declaration
which is still in force shall be deemed as between Members of the
rnited Sations ..."

The questions that next arise are whether Bulgaria, when raising
its Preliminary Objection or, earlier, when Israel brought its dispute

with her before this Court, was (a) a Member of the United Nations
and therefore ipso facto a party to the Statute, and (b) whether it
had or had not denounced its Declaration-for there is no question
of effluxion of time-and (c) whether Israel was a Member of the
Tjnited Nations and a party to the Statute. The answer to (a) is
that Bulgaria had become a party to the Statute in December 1955.
The answer to (b) is that Bulgaria had at no time and has not until
today denounced its Declaration, and the answer to (c) is that
Israel was at al1 relevant dates a Member of the United Nations
and a party to the Statute.
I come now to the last words of the paragraph which need concem
us and which have not directly given rise to any question of inter-
pretation. The words are: "to be acceptances of the compulsory

jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice...".
These words mean that a declaration under Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court accepting the compulsory juris-
diction of that Court shall from the date of the Statute and for the
future be deemed to be a declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court, the International Court of Justice.

As applied to the present case, Article 36 (5) now reads: "The
Bulgarian Declaration which is still in force shall be deemed, as
between ivlernbers of the United Nations, to be acceptance of the

76200 AERIAL INCIDENT (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE GOITEIN)

compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice."

It would accordingly follow that the law presumed that Bulgaria,
having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court, had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court.
That would lead me to overrule the first Bulgarian Preliminary
Objection.
Counsel for Bulgaria, however, submitted to us that we were not
entitled to read Article 36 (5)as it stands but that we must give a
special meaning to the phrase "which are still in force" and that
there must be some contemporaneity: that is to Say, the State must
be a Member of the United Nations while its declaration is still in
force and that no declaration of a non-Member could survive the

dissolution of the Permanent Court. The paragraph does not support
this contention, so the Bulgarian Delegation would ask us to read
into the words: "still in force" the following: "which shall at
the time the Declarant becomes a Member of the United Nations,
provided always that the Permanent Court has not been dissolved,
be still in force".

For the "parties to the present Statute", Counsel for Bulgaria
would apparently read "parties to the present Statute at the time
of the dissolution of the Permanent Court". To interpret the former
expression he would add some twenty-four words and to interpret
the latter some ten words. He did not explain to us why, if that was

the intention of the legislator, the appropriate words had not been
used. 1 do not remember that he contended for the interpretation
which the majority of the Court has given to the phrase.

It would appear as if the majority of the Court accepts part of
this Bulgarian contention. If the words are capable of a reasonable
interpretation according to their ordinary meaning, it does not
seem to be consonant with a proper interpretation of the Statute
to add words which are not there. The interpretation which 1 have
adopted is that the time referred to in the words "are ..stiIl.. i."
the Statute date or, in the alternative, that the words used refer
to a declaration which is no longer in force by effluxion of the term
for which it was made. Accordingly, there is no neédto alter the

wording of the paragraph to give it the meaning contended for by
the Government of Bulgaria. The legislator in Our case has done
something very simple. "Live" declarations at the time of the
enactment are to be kept alive for the future. These rnight "die"
witb the "death" of the Permanent Court, were they not kept
"alive" by Article 36 (5).

It is at this point that the second divergence appears between
the majority of the Court and the Judges dissenting. The Bulgarian

77representatives repeated over and over again that once the tree
was felled the branches died with the tree. The tree, of course, was
the Permanent Court andthe Bulgarian Declaration was the branch.
Counsel for Bulgaria said:

"Mais à partir de la dissolution de la Cour permanente, cette
déclaration s'est trouvéedans la situation bien connue de la fameuse
paf malheur, elleétaitmorte. Et aucun historien n'ajamais prétendu
qu après ce petit accident elle était encore en vie."

Nothing could revive the dead branch, just as nothing could
revive the dead horse. This is to misunderstand the whole purpose
of the paragraph. Perhaps rather than a misunderstanding, it is

an attemptto nullify the paragraph. An acceptance of the paragraph
as it stands inevitably puts an end to the first Bulgarian Preliminary
Objection. It must, therefore, be read away, removed from the
Statute. There are several ways of doing this. One, as 1 have said,
is to misunderstand its whole purpose. The other is to submit that
perhaps the Conference of San Francisco, at which Bulgaria was
not present, could not have enacted the paragraph for, by doing
so, it would have been acting ultra vires: the Conference could not
keep alive, without the consent of Bulgaria, a declaration that was
doomed to "die" with the "death "of the Permanent Court. This
was soberly argued before us and it would seem as if echoes of
the latter part of this submission are to be found in the Judgment
of the majority.

Article 36 contemplates two kinds of declarations:

(1) those to be made by Members of the United Nations in the
future (paragraph 2);

(2) those already made by States (whether at the time Members
of the Vnited Nations or not) in the past in connection with
the Permanent Court (paragraph 5).

The legislator knew that the Permanent Court was in extremis
and that it would soon be dissolved, to make room for the Inter-
national Court of Justice. If there were no legislation to prevent it,

the declarations made in connection with. the Permanent Court
-wouldindeed, as Counsel for Bulgaria argued, come to an end. The
legislator, anxious that al1the progress that had been made between
the two wars in furthering international jurisdiction should be
preserved, legislated for the preservation of declarations already
made. Thé Permanent Court would be dissolved: the declarations
would survive. That is why Article 36 (5)was enacted, and there is
nothing in the paragraph that even hints that the declarations in
question should survive only until the dissolution of the Permanent
Court. To introduccl the proviso into the paragraph that the decla-

78202 -4ERIAL INCIDENT (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE GOITEIN)

rations were to end with the end of the Permanent Court is not to
read but to misread the paragraph. This Court is being asked not
to interpret the law but to make new law. In so far asthe majority
of this Court bases its Judgment on this submission of Counsel for
3ulgaria it is not, in my opinion, interpreting the Statute as it
jtands but is remoulding it as it considers it should have been
drafted.

The further argument that the paragraph is somehow ultra vires
need not detain us long. Article 92 of the Charter lays it down
that this Court "shall function in accordance with the annexed
Statute which ... forms an integral part of the present Charter".
-4rticleI of the Statute lays it down: "The International Court of

Justice ..shall function in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute." This Court has no authority to look behind the
articles of the Statute and question the right of the legislator to
enact any particular article or paragraph. We only exist ascreatures
of the Statute, andthe only decisions we are authorized to make are
those made in accordance with the Statute as it is: not as we might
like it to be.

A further reply to the Bulgarian contention is that on becoming
a Member of the United Nations Bulgaria accepted "the obligations
contained in the present Charter" (Charter, Article 4), and thus
became "a party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice" (Charter, Article 93) and was bound by Article 36 of the

Statute as by al1 the other articles thereof.
Long before her admission to the United Nations, the Bulgarian
Government had publicly declared in 1948 (see Annex 43 at the
end of the Written Observations of the Government of Israel)
its adherence to the Charter and, therefore, to the Statute of this
Court. These are the terms of the declaration:
"In the name of the People's Republicof Bulgaria, 1 ...declare
that the People's Republic of Bulgaria hereby accepts without
reserve the obligations arising from the United Nations Charter
and promises to observe them as inviolable from the date of her
accessionto the United Nations."

Before December 1955, when Bulgaria was admitted as a Member

of the United Nations, she had two clear courses open to her: to
refuse to become a Member of the United Nations, or to denounce
her Declaration of 1921. She chose to become a Member: she did
not denounce her Declaration. Whether the States at San Francisco
had the authonty or not to enact Article 36 (5), Bulgaria ratified
what had been done there when she became a Member of the United
Nations without denouncing her Declaration.

1hold, therefore, that there is no reference to the dissolution of
the Permanent Court in Article 36, which gives a terminus ad quemfor declarations, and we are not entitled to read such a reference
into the Article. Further, we are not entitled to ask the question
whether the States at San Francisco were authorized or not to
enact a paragraph that might affect a State not present at San
Francisco ; in any event, Bulgaria ratified what had been done at
San Francisco and accepted al1 the obligations of the Statute
when she became a Member of the United Nations.

Reference must be made to two other contentions. Both of these
were stressed by the Bulgarian delegation and both appear to have
played some part in leading the Court to arrive at its conclusion.
One contention was that even if Article 36 (5) did at one time apply
to the Bulgarian Declaration, it could not be supposed that the
paragraph kept alive a dead declaration for ten years. So to read a
transitional section of the law would be to give an unreasonable
interpretation to it. The second contention was that this Court
could not possibly accept jurisdiction unless Bulgaria had speci-
fically and in clear terms accepted the jurisdiction of this Court.
Submission to jurisdiction must not be inferred.

The former contention was buttressed by a large number of
illustrations from the Russian theatre and from Scandinavian
folklore, but not by any sound submission in law. It was said that
a declaration could not wander about in the Land of Shades from
194.5 to 1955 and then, by the touch of a magic wand, come to
life. It was argued further that if, between those years, Bulgaria
had been brought before this Court, she would have had a complete
answer, namely, that she was not a party to the Statute. If, there-
fore,in the year 1953 Bulgaria could not have been bound by her
Declaration of 1921, she could not be bound by it in 1957. These

arguments, however attractively and persuasively put before us,
cannot convince so long asArticle 36(5) stands,and their submission
was but another attempt not to interpret but to repeal the para-
graph. If the legislator chose to consider a declaration as binding
upon Members of the United Nations, whenever they might belrame
Members thereof, it might certainly happen, as it did in this case,
that a particular declaration would not be effective for a number
of years. In the present case,also, the mention of the period of ten
years is misleading. Not alone did the law keep the Declaration
alive, but the Bulgarian Govemment did so as well. For in 1947,
within two years of the enactment of the Statute, Bulgaria was
asking to become a Member of the United Nations. In 1948 she
made the solemn declaration 1 have cited above. She continued to
press for admission throughout the years until 1955. It was due to
political considerations, not dependent on Bulgaria, that she was
not admitted earlier. On the correct reading of the Statute, of which
she was continuously asking to become a party, her Declaration
was still alive and would become effective on the day she became
a Member. At least from 1947,Bulgaria was continuously breathingthe breath of life into an ancient declaration, a declaration volun-
tarily made in 1921 and, according tothe argument of the Bulgarian
delegation, still alive in1946.

As has been said, at no time during those years did she denounce
her Declaration. In the light of these facts, it cannot be held that
her Declaration lived in a World of Shades. It lived a full life in
the Permanent Court for a quarter of a century, it lived in this
Court for the next ten years, by virtue of two very powerful life-
givers, the Statute and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The second contention, that an acceptance of jurisdiction must
be explicit and not implicit, appears to have been accepted by this
Court in its Judgment. The draftsman of the Statute drew no such
distinction. He made provision for two kinds of declarations, those
made in the past, those to be made in the future. Future declarations
are dealt with in Article 36 (z), and past declarations in Article 36
(5). There is no particular sanctity given to the former nor less
validity to the latter. The only difference the legislator has drawn
between them is that the former are to be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (Article 36 (4)),while the
latter, for obvious reasons, need not be. The effectiveness of the
two kinds of declarations is the same. New declarations made by
States prove that such States "recognize as compulsory ...the juns-
diction of the Court ..."(Article36 (2)). Old declarations made by
States are "deemed ...to be acceptances of the compulsory juris-
diction of the ...Court" (Article 36 (5)).It is to be noted that by
Article 92 of the Charter, al1 Members of the United Nations are
-the wording is not "are deemed to be"-parties to the Statute.
So that when Bulgaria became a Member, she became i$so factoa
party to the Statute, and the single presumption made by the
Statute was that her voluntary declaration recognizing as com-
pulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was a declaration
recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of this Court.

ln my opinion, the First Preliminary Objection of the Govern-
ment of Bulgaria should be ovenuled.

(Signed) GOITEIN.

Bilingual Content

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GOITEIN

It is with diffidence that 1 dissent from the judgment of the
majority of the Court. 1 am strengthened in the decision 1 have
come to by the views of my learned colleagues who have dissented.
These appear to me to give a less strained interpretation of the
Statute that binds us than that adopted by the majority, and their
reading of the law enables this Court to fulfil and not deny the
purpose for which it was founded.

Bulgariahas submitted no facts to this Court and we can therefore
only rely on those stated in the Israel Memorial, facts which have
still to be proved. The chronicleof events, as set out by the Govern-
ment of Israel, is as follows: "On July 27,1955, a civil passenger air-
craft, registered in Israel ..while on a scheduled commercialflight
from London to Lod ..came down in flames in the region of Petritch,
Bulgana. Not one of the occupants ofthis aircraft-fifty-one passen-
gers and sevenmembers ofits crew-survived the disaster...the Bul-
garian Government, on 28July, officially ...announced how this had
come about. That Government's armed forces had shot down and
destroyed the aircraft, killing al1its occupants. This was amplified
...on 4 August when the Bulgarian Government ...again gave out
that its armed forces had destroyed the aircraft, those armed
forces having acted in haste and without taking al1 the neceçsary
measures.. . The Bulgarian Government gave .. undertakings
regarding the identification and punishment of those guilty ...as
well as regarding the eventual payrnent of compensation." (See the
full text on pp. 4 and 5 of the Memonal of the Government of
Israel.) After setting out the above chronicle of events, and after
refemng to the diplornatic negotiations which had failed to bear
fruit, the Government of Israel stated that it had turned to this
Court and prayed that it formally declare "that Bulgaria is res-
ponsible under international law for the destruction of the aircraft
and by determining the amount of compensation due". (Ibid., p. 5.)

If the facts are as stated in the Memorial, as summarized above,
then this would appear to be a dispute with which this Court and
this Court alone is competent to deal. In my opinion, therefore, this
Court should be anxious to right a wrong and take upon itself to
judge between the Parties before it. The Court should refuse to
exercise junsdiction only if its Statute clearly and unequivocally
withholds jurisdiction from it. 1 shall show in this Opinion that far
from withholdingjurisdiction from the Court, the law unequivocally
clothes it with power to decide the present dispute. The Statute of
72 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. GOITEIN
[Traduction]
Ce n'est pas sans quelque défiancede moi-mêmeque je m'écarte
de l'opinion exprimée dans son arrêt par la majorité de la Cour.
Ce qui me confirme dans la décisionque j'ai prise, c'est la manière
de voir de mes savants collègues qui ont exprimé une opinion
dissidente. Ceux-ci me paraissent adopter une interprétation un

peu plus normale du Statut qui nous lie que celle de la majorité,
et leur conception juridique permet à la Cour de remplir l'objet
pour lequel elle a étéfondée et non pas d'écarter cet objet.
La Bulgarie n'a pas soumis de faits à la Cour; nous ne pouvons
donc nous fonder que sur les faits énoncésdans le mémoire du
Gouvernement d'Israël, faits qui demandent encore à êtreprouvés.
La relation des événements, telle que la fait le Gouvernement
d'Israël, est la suivante: «Le 27 juillet 1955 un avion civil de
voyageurs, immatriculé en Israël ...s'est abattu en flammes dans la
régionde Pétritch en Bulgarie ...alors qu'il effectuait un vol com-
mercial régulier de Londres à Lod.. . Aucun des occupants - cin-
quante et un passagers et sept membres de l'équipage - ...n'a
survécu au désastre.. . Le 28 juiUet, le Gouvernement bulgare a
annoncé officiellement ...comment cela s'était produit. Les forces
armées de ce Gouvernement avaient abattu et détruit l'avion,
tuant tous ses occupants. Cette déclaration a étécomplétée ...le
4 août, date à laquelle le Gouvernement bulgare ...a déclaréune
nouvelle fois que ses forces armées avaient détruit l'avion, qu'elles
avaient fait preuve d'une certaine hâte et qu'elles n'avaient pas
pris toutes les mesures nécessaires.. . Le Gouvernement bulgare
...prenait des engagements quant à l'identification et au châti-

ment des coupables et quant au versement éventuel d'une indem-
nité. »(Voir le texte complet aux pp. 4 et 5 du mémoire présenté
par le Gouvernement d'Israël.) Après avoir exposé les événe-
ments ci-dessus rappelés, et après avoir mentionné les négociations
diplomatiques demeurées sans résultats, le Gouvernement d'Israël
indiquait qu'il s'était tourné vers la Cour, demandant à celle-ci
de (déclarer formellement que la Bulgarie est responsable, selon
le droit international, de la destruction de l'avion et de fixer le
montant des réparations dues 1)(Ibid., p.5.)
Si les faits sont tels qu'ils ont étéénoncésdans le mémoire,ainsi
qu'ils ont étérésumésci-dessus, il semblerait s'agir d'un différend
que la Cour, et la Cour seule, a compétence pour régler.En consé-
quence, à mon avis, la Cour devrait être très désireuse de remédier
à une injustice et prendre sur elle de faire droit entre les Parties
comparaissant devant elle. La Cour ne devrait refuser d'exercer
sa compétence que si son Statut lui retirait cette compétence d'une
façon claire et sans équivoque. Je démontrerai, dans le présent
avis, que, bien loin de retirer compétence à la Cour, le droit lui

72this Court, which otherwise follows that of the Permanent Court,
enacted a special paragraph-paragraph 5 of Article 36-precisely
in order to clothe this Court with the jurisdiction it might othenvise
have been unable to exercise.

1 respectfully agree with my colleagues in the majority that this
Court must first be satisfied that the Parties have voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction before it can take upon itself to decide
a dispute brought before it. 1 do not agree that that voluntary
submission may not be inferred from an express presumption of
law laying down that such a submission has been made.

The Israel Government in its Memorial (pp. 3 and 4), in order to
show that this Court had jurisdiction, relied upon Declarations

which had been made by both Parties accepting such jurisdiction.
Reference was made to the Declaration of Israel dated 3rd October,
1956, and to that of Bulgaria dated 12th August, 1921. 1shall refer
to the latter in this Opinion as the Bulgarian Declaration. In its
First Preliminary Objection, the only one with which the judgment
of the majority, and hence this Opinion, deals, the Bulgarian
Government subrnitted that "Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice is inapplicable in regard to the
People's Republic of Bulgana."

The question whether this Court has or has not jurisdiction de-
pends accordingly on the trueinterpretation of that paragraph, and
on the answer to the question whether that paragraph is applicable
to the Bulgarian Declaration. Indeed, the question raised by the
First Preliminary Objection of Bulgaria may be confined to narrower
limits: what is the meaning of the words in that paragraph "still
in force" and of the words "parties to the present Statute"? In the
ultimate analysis the Preliminary Objection may be accepted or
rejected in accordance with the interpretation given to the latter
words alone.
1 will first read the paragraph as a whole, without taking into
consideration the submissions made on behalf of Bulgaria and
without referring to the reply of the Agent for the Government of
Israel.

The submissions of Counsel for Bulgaria were intended to show
that the terms of Article 36 (5)of the Statute were not applicable
to the present case. To reach this conclusion he was forced to give
a special and peculiar meaning to the words used in the paragraph
in question, and in accepting his submissions the majority of this
Court has-and 1 Say this with the greatest respect-been bound
to give meanings to the terms employed by the legislator which
are not their ordinary meanings, and this Court has been forced confère sans équivoque la faculté de trancher le présent différend.
Le Statut de la Cour qui, par ailleurs, suit celui de la Cour perma-
nente, contient un paragraphe spécial - le paragraphe 5 de l'arti-
cle 36 - dont l'objet est précisément deconférer à la Cour une
compétence qu'elle pourrait, sans ce paragraphe, ne pas êtreen
mesure d'exercer.
Je reconnais respectueusement, avec mes collèguesde la majorité,
que la Cour doit d'abord se convaincre que les Parties se sont

volontairement soumises à sa juridiction avant de trancher un
différendqui lui est soumis. Mais je ne suis pas d'accord pour ad-
mettre que cette soumission volontaire ne puisse pas être déduite
d'une présomption expresse du droit indiquant que cette soumission
a eu lieu.
Le Gouvernement d'Israël, dans son mémoire (pp. 3 et 4),afin
de démontrer que la Cour est compétente, s'est fondésur les décla-
rations des deux Parties acceptant cette juridiction. Il a étéfait
mention de la déclaration d'Israël, datée du 3 octobre 1956, et de
celle de la Bulgarie, en date du 12 août 1921. Je mentionnerai,
dans le cours de la présente opinion, cette dernière comme la

((déclaration bulgare ».Dans sa première exception préliminaire,
la seule dont s'occupe la majorité de la Cour dans son arrêtet, par
conséquent, la présente opinion, le Gouvernement bulgare a fait
valoir que [(l'article 36, paragraphe 5, du Statut de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice est inapplicable à l'égard de la République
populaire de Bulgarie ».
Le point de savoir si la Cour est ou non compétente dépend donc
du sens exact attribué à ce paragraphe, ainsi que de la réponse à
la question suivante :le paragraphe est-il applicable à la déclaration
bulgare? En fait, la question soulevée par la Bulgarie, dans sa
première exception préliminaire, peut êtreenserréedans des limites
plus étroites: quel est, dans ce paragraphe, le sens des mots (pour

une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée ))et ((parties au présent
Statut »? En dernière analyse, c'est selon l'interprétation attribuée
à ces derniers mots seuls que l'exception préliminaire peut être
acce~téeou reietée.
~'éxaminerd d'abord le paragraphe comme un tout, sans prendre
en considération les arguments présentésau nom de la Bulgarie et
sans me référer à la réplique de l'agent du Gouvernement d'Israël.

L'objet desarguments du conseil pour la Bulgarie était de démon-
trer que les termes de l'article 36 (5) du Statut n'étaient pas appli-
cables au cas présent. Pour aboutir à cette conclusion, il a été

contraint d'attribuer un sens bien spécialaux expressions dont on
se sert dans le paragraphe dont il s'agit; en acceptant ses conclu-
sions, la majorité de la Cour - ceci je le dis avec le plus grand
respect - a étécontrainte de donner aux expressions employées
par le législateur un sens qui n'est pas leur sens habituel, et la Cour to take into account considerations which, it seems to me, are
irrelevant .
The opening words of the paragraph are: "Declarations made
under Article 36 of the Permanent Court of International Justice ..."
It is agreed that Bulgaria made such a Declaration. The opening
words, therefore, as applied to the present case, may be interpreted
as: "The Bulgarian Declaration ..."

The following words are, in the English text, "which are still in

force", or, in the French text, "pour une duréequi n'est pas encore
expirée".Although 1 shall enlarge on this phrase in the following
paragraphs, here it may be said that there is no difficulty in giving
the ordinary and natural meaning to this phrase. As the present
tense is used and the word "still", the interpreter of these words,
without any reference to dictionanes, would understand that the
legislatoris speaking as of the Statute date. A declaration existing
on 24th October, 1945, was one to be "caught up" by the paragraph.
The French text, however, which is as binding upon us as the
English, suggests that a declaration is still in force when it has not
come to an end by effluxion of .tirne. Counsel for Bulgaria was well
aware of this and he vainly tried to find support in the Spanish,
Russian and Chinese texts rather than the French and, being a
Frenchman, expressed his regret at this unpatriotic preference.
But it needs more than mere pleading to make words change
their meaning. The words, therefore, "which are still in force"
mean, as 1 have said, in force on the Statute date, or, alterna-
tively, refer to declarations which have not come to an end by
effluxion of time.

Was the Bulgarian Declaration still in force in October 1945?
There is no doubt that it was. Here, too, the Bulgarian delegation
does not contend otherwise. It claims that the Declaration "died"

in the following year upon the dissolution of the Permanent Court.
The Declaration was also in force because it had not expired by the
effluxion of time. Nor had it been denounced. It was therefore a
declaration covered by Article 36 (5).1 accordingly read that part
of Article 36 (5) which 1 have now discussed as "The Bulgarian
Declaration, which is still in force.."

The following words of the paragraph are: "shall be deemed".
Reading these words 1 would infer that the legislator is about to
lay down a legal presurnption which would apply to the Bulgarian
Declaration from the Statute date and for the future. Here it is
important to stress, because the Bulgarian Government's represent-
atives appear to have overlooked this elementary fact, that the
legislator is not stating the legal position as it was at the time but a étéobligéede tenir compte de considérations qui me paraissent
dénuées de pertinence.
Les mots par lesquels débute le paragraphe dont il s'agit sont
les suivants: (Les déclarations faites en application de l'article 36

du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ...1)
Il est admis que la Bulgarie a fait une déclaration de cet ordre.
Les mots par lesquels le paragraphe débute peuvent donc, si on les
applique au cas présent, êtreinterprétés comme signifiant: cLa
déclaration bulgare.. . 1)
Les mots qui suivent sont, dans le texte anglais, ccwhich are
stilin force », ou dans le texte français «pour une durée qui n'est
pas encore expirée ».Bien que, dans la suite de la présente opinion,
je revienne plus en détail sur cette phrase, on peut dire ici qu'au-
cune difficulté ne s'oppose à lui attribuer son sens ordinaire et

naturel. Comme on se sert du présent et du mot ((encore », l'inter-
prète de ces mots, sans procéder à des recherches dans des diction-
naires, comprendra que lelégislateur veut dire «à la date du Statut ».
Une déclaration qui existait le 24 octobre 1945 était une déclaration
à laquelle le paragraphe s'appliquait. Le texte fransais, cependant,
qui a pour nous force de loi aussi bien que le texte anglais, donne
à penser qu'une déclaration est encore en vigueur tant que le terme
de sa validité n'a pas expiré. Le conseil pour la Bulgarie s'en est
bien rendu compte et c'est en vain qu'il a essayé de trouver à sa

thèse un appui dans les textes espagnol, russe et chinois du Statut,
plutôt que dans le texte français de cet instrument, et, étant
lui-mêmeFrançais, il a exprimé son regret de cette préférence peu
patriotique. Mais, pour faire changer les mots de sens, il faut plus
qu'un simple plaidoyer. Les mots, donc, «pour une durée qui n'est
pas encore expirée » signifient, comme je l'ai dit, qu'il s'agit d'une
clause en vigueur à la date du Statut ou, alternativement, visent
des déclara6ons non expirées.
La déclaration bulgare était-elle en vigueur au mois d'octobre
1945? Elle l'était sans aucun doute. Ici également, la délégation

bulgare ne prétend pas le contraire. On prétend que la déclaration
«a expiré » l'année qui a suivi la dissolution de la Cour perma-
nente. La déclaration était également en vigueur parce que ça
durée n'avait pas encore expiré. Elle n'a pas non plus étédénon-
cée. 11s'agissait donc d'une déclaration viséepar l'article 36 (5).
Par conséquent, je lis cette partie de l'article 36 (5) que je viens
d'examiner comme signifiant: «La déclaration bulgare qui est
encore en vigueur ..))
Les mots du paragraphe qui suivent sont: ccseront considérées s.
D'après moi, ces mots signifient que le législateur est sur le point

d'établir une présomption juridique qui s'appliquera à la déclara-
tion bulgare à partir de la date du Statut et pour l'avenir. Ici il est
important de souligner, parce que les représentants du Gouverne-
ment bulgare semblent avoir perdu de vue ce fait élémentaire,que
le législateur ne mentionne pas la situation juridique telle qu'ellethe legal position as he was declaring it to be from the date of the

enactment of the Statute and for the future. The draftsman must
have been fully aware of the fact that the Bulgarian Declaration
was in the nature of a consensual undertaking, made in connection
with a Court that was about to disappear and that not a jot of it
could be altered without the consent of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, as
far as concerned those who were or wished to be Members of the
United Nations, their declarations were from now-the year 1945-
and for thefuture to be deemed(seront considéréest)o be declarations
made in connection with the new Court, the International Court
of Justice.
The presumption would be as valid in 1955 as in 1945-provided,
of course, that Bulgaria had in the meantime become a Member of
the United Nations. With that point 1 shall deal when 1 come to
the words which foilow. The paragraph, as applied to the present
case, now reads: "The Bulgarian Declaration, which is still in force,
shall be deerned..."

The wordswhich followare "as between the parties to the present
Statute". 1 have already said that, in the final analysis, these are
the critical words of the paragraph andthe basic differencebetween
the majority of this Court and those dissenting lies in the inter-
pretation to be given to these words. There is no difficulty about
the words "present Statute". The word "present" appears because
the Statute of this Court (as is stated in Article 92 of the Charter)
is based on that of the Permanent Court, but nothing depends on
this word. Nor does any question anse as to the word "Statute".
What, then, is the meaning of "the parties" in the context of "par-
ties to the present Statute"? The same words are found when the
Court is first mentioned in the Charter. Article 93 reads:

"Al1Membersof the United Nations are ipso factoparties to the
Statute..."

Article 94 reads :
"Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with thedecision ofthe International Court of Justice."

Unless there were a contrary intention expressed in Article 36 (5)
of the Statute, 1would see no way of interpreting the words "parties
to the present Statute", except as is expressly declared to be their
meaning in Article 93 of the Charter. No contrary intention is
expressed in Article 36 (5); therefore, using ordinary canons for the
interpretation of Statutes, 1 would hold without hesitation that
whenever a State becomes a Member of the United Nations it
becomes a "party to the present Statute", and the words found in
Article 36 (5) of that Statute apply specifically to that State. (For
the purposes of the present case it is not necessary to refer to those
States which "may become aparty to the Statute" under Article 93 (2)était à l'époque, mais la situation juridique telle qu'il la déclarait
être à dater de la promulgation du Statut et pour l'avenir. Le

rédacteur doit s'être pleinement rendu compte que la déclaration
bulgare était, par sa nature, un engagement consensuel pris à
l'égard d'une Cour qui était sur le point de disparaître et que pas
un iota ne pouvait en être modifié sans le consentement de la
Bulgarie. Néanmoins, en ce qui concernait les Etats Membres des
Nations Unies ou désireux de le devenir, leurs déclarations étaient,

à partir de la date choisie - l'année 1945 - et pour l'avenir, à
considérer comme des déclarations faites vis-à-vis de la nouvelle
Cour: la Cour internationale de Justice.
La présomption aurait la mêmevalidité en 1955 qu'en 1945,
pourvu, bien entendu, que la Bulgarie, dans l'intervalle, soit
devenue Membre des Nations Unies. J'examinerai ce point quand
j'en arriverai aux mots qui suivent. Le paragraphe, si on l'applique

au cas présent, signifie maintenant: La déclaration bulgare dont
la durée n'est pas expirée sera considérée ...))
On trouve ensuite les mots ((entre parties au présent Statut )).
J'ai déjàdit qu'en dernière analyse ce sont là les mots essentiels du
paragraphe et que l'on trouve la différencefondamentale entre les
juges de la Cour qui constituent la majorité et les juges dissidents

dans l'interprétation que l'on donne à ces mots. Les termes ((pré-
sent Statut )) ne soulèvent pas de difficulté. Le mot ccprésent ))
figure dans le texte parce que le Statut de la Cour (ainsi qu'il est dit
à l'article 92 de la Charte) se fonde sur le Statut de la Cour per-
manente, mais rien ne dépend de ce mot (présent ».Aucune ques-
tion ne se pose non plus au sujet du mot (Statut ». Quel est donc le
sens de l'expression «les parties 1) dans l'expression ((parties au

présent Statut »? On trouve les mêmesmots lorsque la Cour est
mentionnée pour la première fois dans la Charte. L'article 93 est
ainsi conçu:
cTous les Membres des Nations Unies sont ipso facto parties

au Statut ...»

L'article 94 dispose que:
((Chaque Membre des Nations Unies s'engage à se conformer à
la décisionde la Cour internationale de Justice. »

A moins qu'une intention opposéen'ait étéexpriméeà l'article 36
(5) du Statut, je n'entrevois aucune autre manière d'interpréter les
mots (parties au présent Statut )que selon le sens queleur attribue

expressément le texte de l'article 93 de la Charte. Aucune intention
opposée n'est exprimée à l'article 36 (5); aussi, appliquant les
règles habituelles d'interprétation des Statuts, j'estime sans hési-
tation que, lorsqu'un Etat devient Membre des Nations Unies, il
devient partie au présent Statut », et les mots que l'on trouye à
l'article 36 (5) de ce Statut s'appliquent spécifiquement à cet Etat.

(Aux fins de la présente espèce, il n'est pas nécessairede mention-
ner les États qui ((peuvent devenir parties au Statut )selon l'arti-
75 of the Charter.) If further elucidation of the words were neces-
sary. one might tmn to paragraph 2 of the selfsame Article 36,
where precisely the same phrase is used, "the States parties to the
present Statute", which must refer to Members of the United
Xations, whether to those who were Members at the time of the
enactment of the Statute or to those who would subsequently
become Members, ten or twenty or thirty years later. Any inter-
pretation which would give one meaning to the words "parties to
the present Statute" in Article 36 (2)and a different meaning to
those words in Article 36 (5) would be untenable. Again, the words
"parties to theStatute" appear in Article 36 (4)and obviously refer
to al1Members of the United Nations and not to the original signa-
tories of the Charter. The majority of the members of this Court are

of the opinion that in Article36 (5)the words "parties to the present
Statute" must be confined to original signatories of the Charter.
and not to those who subsequently became "parties to the present
Statute". When the legislator wished to refer to "original Members"
he did so in plain words (see for example Article 3 of the Charter).
The words in Article 36, paragraph 5, cannot accordingly be
confined ?O "original Members". I therefore read the words of the
paragraph so far discussed as meaning: "The Bulgarian Declaration
which is still in force shall be deemed as between Members of the
rnited Sations ..."

The questions that next arise are whether Bulgaria, when raising
its Preliminary Objection or, earlier, when Israel brought its dispute

with her before this Court, was (a) a Member of the United Nations
and therefore ipso facto a party to the Statute, and (b) whether it
had or had not denounced its Declaration-for there is no question
of effluxion of time-and (c) whether Israel was a Member of the
Tjnited Nations and a party to the Statute. The answer to (a) is
that Bulgaria had become a party to the Statute in December 1955.
The answer to (b) is that Bulgaria had at no time and has not until
today denounced its Declaration, and the answer to (c) is that
Israel was at al1 relevant dates a Member of the United Nations
and a party to the Statute.
I come now to the last words of the paragraph which need concem
us and which have not directly given rise to any question of inter-
pretation. The words are: "to be acceptances of the compulsory

jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice...".
These words mean that a declaration under Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court accepting the compulsory juris-
diction of that Court shall from the date of the Statute and for the
future be deemed to be a declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court, the International Court of Justice.

As applied to the present case, Article 36 (5) now reads: "The
Bulgarian Declaration which is still in force shall be deemed, as
between ivlernbers of the United Nations, to be acceptance of the

76cle 93 (2) de la Charte.) S'il était nécessaire de préciser davantage
le sens des mots, on pourrait utiliser le paragraphe 2 du même

article 36, dans lequel on se sert précisément des mêmestermes (les
Etats parties au présent Statut », ce qui doit viser les Membres des
Nations Unies, qu'il s'agisse de ceux qui étaient Membres de
l'organisation à l'époquede la promulgation du Statut, ou de ceux
qui deviendraient, par la suite, Membres de l'Organisation, dix,
vingt ou trente ans plus tard. Toute interprétation qui attribuerait

un sens aux mots ((parties au présent Statut ))à l'article 36 (2) et
un sens différent aux mêmesmots à l'article 36 (5) ne saurait être
soutenue. De même, les mots ((parties au Statut 1)figurent à
l'article 36 (4) et visent évidemment tous les Membres des Nations
Unies et non pas les signataires de la Charte à l'origine. La majorité
des membres de la Cour estime qu'à l'article 36 (5)les mots (parties
au présent Statut ))doivent se limiter aux signataires de la Charte

à l'origine et non pas s'appliquer aux États qui sont devenus par
la suite (parties au présent Statut )).Lorsque le législateur a voulu
viser les ((Membres originaires )),il l'a fait en termes clairs (voir
par exemple l'article 3 de la Charte). Par conséquent, le texte de
l'article 36, paragraphe 5, ne se borne pas aux ((Membres origi-
naires 1).C'est pourquoi j'interprète les termes du paragraphe

examiné jusqu'à présent comme signifiant: ((La déclaration bul-
gare, dont la durée n'est pas encore expirée, sera considérée,dans
les rapports entre les Membres des Nations Unies.. . ):
Les questions qui se posent ensuite sont celles de savoir si la
Bulgarie, lorsqu'elle a soulevé son exception préliminaire ou, anté-
rieurement, quand Israël a porté devant la Cour son différend
avec cet Etat, était a) Membre des Nations Unies et, partant,

ipso facto, partie au Statut, b) si elle a ou non dénoncésa décla-
ration, car il n'est pas question de durée expirée - et c) si Israël
était Membre des Nations Unies et partie au Statut. La réponse à la
question a) est que la Bulgarie est devenue, en décembre 1955,
partie au Statut. La réponse au paragraphe b) est qu'à aucun mo-
ment et jusqu'à ce jour, la Bulgarie n'a dénoncé sadéclaration, et,

enfin, la réponseàla question c) est qu'à toutes les dates pertinentes
Israël était Membre des Nations Unies et partie a11Statut.
J'en arrive maintenant aux derniers mots du paragraphe dont
nous devons nous occuper et qui n'ont pas directement soulevéune
question d'interprétation. Ces mots sont : ((comportant acceptation
de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice.. . 1).
Cesmots signifient qu'une déclaration, faite en vertu del'article 36

du Statut de la Cour permanente et par laquelle on accepte la
juridiction obligatoire de celle-ci, sera, à partir de la date du Statut
et à l'avenir, considérée commeune déclaration par laquelle on
accepte la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour actuelle, la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice.
Tel qu'il est appliqué dans le cas présent, l'article 36 (5) signifie
maintenant: (tLa déclaration bulgare, dont la durée n'est pas

expirée, sera considérée,dans les rapports entre les Membres des
76200 AERIAL INCIDENT (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE GOITEIN)