Translation

BHY

CR 2006/31 (translation)

CR 2006/31 (traduction)

Tuesday 18 April 2006 at 3 p.m.

Mardi 18 avril 2006 à 15 heures - 2 -

10 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. Pour des raisons impérieuses qu’il vient juste de

m’expliquer, le juge Abraham n’est pas en mesure de siéger cet après-midi. Monsieur Pellet, vous

avez la parole.

M. PELLET: Je vous remercie infiniment, Madame le président. Madame le président, je

crains que, compte tenu des incidents techniques surv enus au cours de la matinée, la Cour ait à

m’écouter plus longtemps que ce n’était pré vu. Je voudrais également en appeler à votre

compréhension, si nous devions aller au-delà de 18 heures, cela avec votre accord bien entendu.

Le PRESIDENT : Nous nous attendons certain ement à une audience se prolongeant quelque

peu cet après-midi.

M. PELLET : Je vous remercie beaucoup.

Madam President, Members of the Court,

G ENERAL OVERVIEW OF B OSNIA ’S LEGAL ARGUMENT

1. Having listened attentively to our opponents’ oral presentation last month, we feel that it is

necessary, now that we are starting on our second ro und of oral argument, to refocus the debate on

the real issues of law posed by this tragic affair.

2. In terms of law, leaving aside for the moment issues of jurisdiction, to which we will

return at length later on, matters are relativsimple and depend on the Court’s replies to two

questions:

1. Was genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

2. Is that genocide attributable to the Federl Republic of Yugoslavia, today called Serbia and

Montenegro?

3. The Respondent, exclusively concerned to escape the Court’s jurisdiction under Article IX

of the Genocide Convention of 1948, has end eavoured, not unskilfully, to change, and ⎯ if I may

so put it ⎯ “sweeten” the terms of the debate. Professor Stojanovic clearly announced this clever

ploy in his speech of 10 March: - 3 -

11 “It is... obvious that ethnic homogenization [Ah, words so fair for acts so
1
dire! . . .] was one of the consequences of all the wars in the territories of the former
Yugoslavia, above all because of the country’s extremely complex ethnic structure.

It is undeniable that homogenization was in part the result of migration of the

population, which was admittedly forcible but made so by the context of the war, by
the fighting, by poverty and by the insecurity in herent in any war. It is also true that
the parties to the conflict went to great lengths to displace the population by force and

used criminal methods; first, however, this policy was pursued by all parties to the
conflict, and secondly, despite the fact that criminal methods were used and these acts
can admittedly amount to war crimes and sometimes to crimes against humanity, in no
case do they amount to genocide.” 2

4. This discourse, reiterated in subsequent speeches by counsel for Se rbia and Montenegro,

amounts to the following: yes, heinous crimes were committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

BUT ⎯ and there are three big “buts”:

(i) these were war crimes, crimes against humanity, but not genocide;

(ii) crimes were committed on all sides and not exclusively by the Serbs;

(iii) in any event, these appalling acts were co mmitted in the course of a civil war, in which

Serbia and Montenegro took no part.

5. Why is this approach such a clever one, Madam President? Because, by containing part of

the truth, it enables the remaining part to remain hidden ⎯ the part involving the transition from

“simple” (and of course I put that word between quotes), from “simple” war crimes or crimes

against humanity, to genocide; and at the same ti me it jibes perfectly with a strategy calculated to

prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. Because it transforms an international dispute

into an internal problem, leading to both protag onists in the tragedy which befell Bosnia and

Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 being sent away empty-handed. Because it absolves Serbia

and Montenegro of all responsibility whilst not de nying that of the Bosnian Serbs. Because,

finally, it enables our opponents to demonstrate their compassion for the victims of the crimes

committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina without co mpromising the legal position which they have

adopted before this Court.

12 6. It is not my task in this speech ⎯ which is both a recapitulation and an introduction ⎯ to

rebut point by point our opponents’ argument: my colleagues will do so over the coming days.

1
See Molière, Le Misanthrope, Act 1, Scene 2 (Philinte).
2
CR 2006/15 (Stojanovic), p. 42, paras. 203 and 203. - 4 -

However, it does appear to us that many of the arguments put forward by counsel for the

Respondent are based on a failure to understand ⎯ or on a systematic misrepresentation? ⎯ the

argument made by Bosnia, both in its written pleadings and in its first round of oral pleadings ⎯ in

so far as they saw fit to refer to the latter at ll. Thus in general, as Maître van den Biesen has

pointed out, Respondent’s counsel, rather than answ ering our oral presentation, preferred to attack

Bosnia’s Reply, which they could a nd should have done in their Rejoinder ⎯ and which,

incidentally, does not make our task any easier, si nce it obliges us to go back and repeat ourselves,

and deprives us (and the Court too) of a genuine adversarial debate.

7. With your permission, Madam Presi dent, I therefore propose to show you ⎯ or rather

remind you:

that the Bosnian position is not based on the (c learly mistaken) view of the law of State

responsibility which Serbia and Montenegro ascribes to it;

that genocide was in fact committed in the territo ries of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the

Serbs; and

that this most serious violation of a peremptory norm of international law is attributable to the

Respondent.

I. The applicable rules of the law of State responsibility

8. It seems to me helpful, Madam President, to begin by revisiting our argument in the

overall context of the law of international Stat e responsibility, an area to which our opponents

returned a number of times. Despite our having , as we thought, expressed ourselves clearly, they

ascribe to us in this respect a position which we do not in fact hold regarding the true nature of that

responsibility, whose scope they misrepresent (A); and from whose rules they draw conclusions

which appear to us to be totally erroneous (B).

13 A. The nature and scope of the responsibility incurred by the Respondent

9. Professor Brownlie went to considerable lengths to show that State responsibility in

international law is not a criminal one. His ar gument on this point occupies no less than six full - 5 -

3
pages of his presentation of 13 March . With all the respect that I owe to my sagacious opponent, I

cannot help thinking of a certain DonQuixote, wh en he battled with what he took to be giants;

and, like Sancho Panza, I have to say to him: “F or Mercy’s sake! Did I not indeed beseech Your

Graciousness to have care, that these were naught else but windmills?” 4

10. Yes, a windmill, this hypothesis of the State’s criminal responsibility ⎯ a position never

taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from which my learned friend Thomas Franck and I were at

5
great pains to dissociate ourselves in advance during our first round of oral argument , to which I

am sorry that Professor Brownlie did not attend with greater care.

11. As we have already explained, we are in no sense seeking, Members of the Court, a

criminal condemnation of Serbia and Monteneg ro. International law does not recognize the

criminal responsibility of States, and it was to a void all confusion that, in 2001, the International

Law Commission in its wisdom ultimately aband oned any attempt to characterize as “crimes”

serious violations of obligations deriving from peremptory norms of general international law, even

though that term had been included in the Draf t Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the

Commission on first reading in 1996, and in particular in Article 19.

12. The fact nonetheless remains that:

⎯ there are indeed degrees of gravity in the internationally wrongful acts which a State may

6
commit ; and that,

⎯ notwithstanding the terminology used in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the “Crime” of Genocide, every violation of the Convention engages the responsibility of its

14 author, whether this be a private individual or a State ⎯ which does not mean that the

consequences are the same in either case.

13. In the former case, this is a criminal responsibility, whose prosecution is a matter either

for the States themselves (all have an obligation to punish “[p]er sons committing genocide or any

3CR 2006/16, pp. 24-31, paras. 66-82; see also CR 2006/17, p. 43, para. 304 and p. 48, para. 324.
4
Miguel Cervantès, Don Quixote de la Mancha, Chap. VIII.
5CR 2006/5, pp. 10-13, paras. 1-9 (Franck); CR 2006/8, pp. 11-17, paras. 4-18 (Pellet).

6See Arts. 40 and 41 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
appended to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001. - 6 -

7
of the other acts enumerated in articleIII” of the Convention ) or, where one exists, for an

international penal tribunal 8, in this case the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the international r esponsibility of the State author of the genocide,

or of other acts prohibited by the Convention, is a ma tter of general international law; it is one that

can be tried in the present forum, Members of th e Court, and carries the consequences attaching to

any internationally wrongful act of the State; I wi ll return to this in a moment. Moreover, it is

self-evident that the one does not preclude the othe r: the responsibility of the individual does not

absolve the State from its own responsibility and, co nversely, an individual having perpetrated (or

been complicit in) an act of genocide cannot i nvoke his official position in order to escape a

criminal sanction 9.

14. Of course, there are certain obligations which are incumbent only upon the State: it is

only for the State to prevent genocide and punish its perpetrators ⎯ obligations in regard to which

Serbia and Montenegro is strangely silent, alt hough it has failed in this regard in the clearest

manner possible and, as to the second of them, continues so to fail. As evidence of this, I need only

cite its obstinate refusal ⎯ a refusal which has lasted for ten years ⎯ to hand over General Mladić,

10
despite insistent demands from the international community .

15. On the other hand, as regards the acts enum erated in Article III of the Convention, they

are capable of engaging not only the responsibility of the individual perpetrators but also that of the

States which planned, ordered and organized or tolerated them.

15 16. In rebuttal of our position, in his speech of 13March last Professor Brownlie confined

himself to recycling his presentation of 30April1996 during the preliminary objections phase:

pages 15 to 23 of CR 2006/16 (paras. 20-58) reproduced word for word (subject to a few omissions

and minimal variations) pages8 to21 of CR1996/ 7, as can be seen from document No.2 in this

7Art. IV; see also Arts. V and VI.
8
Art. VI.
9
See Art. IV of the Convention.
10For recent examples, see the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General on his visit to the ICTY, of
e
12April2006, Press Release OK/MOW/1067 , available on the Internet at: http ://www.un.org/ icty/latest-f/index-f.htm
(checked on 15April2006); the Press Release of the IC TY Prosecutor, 22 February 2006, http://www.un.org/icty/
briefing/2006/PB060222.htm (checked on 5March2006); the de claration by the Council of the European Union
(General Affairs, External Relations), Press Release SN6343/06 Press 46, 27 Februa ry 2006. See also recent statements
by President. ostunica in Press Conference of the Spokesman for the ICTY Prosecutor, 6April2006,
http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/2006/PB060407.htm. - 7 -

morning’s judges’ folder. It seems to me that it would not be helpful to try the Court’s patience by

repeating what ProfessorThomas Franck said on 1 and 3May1996 in reply to this unchanged

argument. That reply can be found at pages 49 and 50 of CR 1996/9 (paras. 8-9) and at pages 11

to 23 of CR 1996/11 (paras. 4-24); we have also included this in the judges’ folder at tab 3. As to

the position taken by the Court in its Judgment of 11 July 1996 following these exchanges, it can

be summed up in a few words; they are quite unambiguous and represent a clear disavowal of the

argument relied on by Serbia and Montenegro: “A rticle IX [of the Genocide Convention] . . . does

not exclude any form of State responsibility” ( I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 616, para. 32). It is difficult

to see, Members of the Court, why, in 2006, you should go back on what you decided ten years

ago, given in particular, as I have said, that Respondent’s counsel has provided us with no new

element whatever in support of the argument made by him in 1996. Furthermore, on 1 March last,

ProfessorFranck showed that, during the travaux préparatoires , this Article was precisely and

expressly conceived in such a way as to include w ithin the scope of the Convention the notion of

responsibility of the State in the case of an act of genocide or complicity therein1. Our opponents

ignore this and have not a word to say on this objective and, as I believe, irrefutable demonstration,

and continue imperturbably to argue precisely as they did before this Court a decade ago.

17. There can be no doubt, Madam President, th at, under the very terms of Article IX of the

1948 Convention, the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the responsibility of the Respondent

16 State “for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in articleIII” ⎯ which I note

incidentally that Maître de Roux, more sensitive to the authority of res judicata, appears to accept

notwithstanding the reiterated position of Professor Brownlie 12. This has consequences which the

Respondent refuses to draw, or on which it remains studiously silent, as to the manner in which a

State’s responsibility under the Convention is to be implemented.

B. The consequences of the Respondent’s responsibility under the Convention

18. Madam President, not only does Serbia and Montenegro refuse to admit the obvious ⎯

moreover, a judicially established one ⎯ regarding the nature and exte nt of that responsibility, but

it also behaves as if the Convention, which it interprets in an unreasonably narrow way, were a type

11
CR 2006/5, pp. 10-13, paras. 1-9.
12
See CR 2006/18, p. 20, para. 38. - 8 -

of “black box”, impervious to the general rules of the law of State responsibility for internationally

wrongful acts. One even has the feeling that it refuses to see the Convention as an international

treaty imposing obligations on States, with all the attendant consequences.

19. Whether the Respondent likes it or not, the 1948 Convention is a treaty ⎯ and I am

referring here to Article 12 of the ILC Articles of 2001 ⎯ which, like all treaties, places the States

parties under international obligations w hose violation entails their responsibility ⎯ not their

criminal responsibility, but their international responsibility ⎯ to any other State party ⎯

moreover, without there being any need to enquire into the injury which the other party may have

suffered, because ⎯ and no one denies this 13⎯ genocide is the very archetype of a particularly

serious breach of an obligation deriving from a pe remptory norm of general international law, a

14
breach which entitles any State to invoke the responsibility of the State in breach .

20. Two points warrant attention:

⎯ first, the Respondent, in conformity on this poi nt with its basic (but misconceived) argument

that the responsibility invoked by Bosnia and Her zegovina is criminal in nature, seeks to lock

the Court into such an approach, in particular in respect of proof of the acts capable of

17 engaging Respondent’s responsibility; I shall speak about this shortly when I turn to showing

that genocide was indeed committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

⎯ secondly, Serbia and Montenegro is trying to deprive you, Members of the Court, of any

possibility of addressing the consequences of its responsibility once you have found that such

has been incurred as a result of the breach of its obligations under the Convention.

21. At the beginning of his statement on 13 March, Mr. Brownlie admitted: “The applicable

law is clearly the law of treaties, together with the principles of State responsibility for breaches of

15
the obligations laid down in the treaty instrument.” We concur, as we also obviously agree that

“the principles of State responsibility must be app lied by reference to the pertinent cause of action:

13
See CR 2006/12, p. 10, para. 2 (Stojanović), p. 46, para. 1.5 (Mr. Varady), CR 2006/18, p. 13, para. 12
(de Roux).
14
See Art. 48 of the ILC Articles.
1CR 2006/16, p. 13, para. 13. - 9 -

16
they cannot be applied in the abstract” . Yet the obligations in question must be correctly

understood: it is the breach of these which constitutes the pertinent “cause of action”.

22. Since, contrary to the other Party’s asser tions, the responsibility of a State extends not

only to possible breaches of the obligations to prevent and punish but also to breaches of its

obligations in respect of “genocide or any of th e other acts enumerated in article III”, all such

breaches are, barring a specific provision in the C onvention, subject to the law of international

responsibility of States. They must be judged in the light of the rules of that law and they entail the

ordinary consequences which that law lays down and which, as generally accepted, are set out in

the second part of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

23. It is therefore of no significance that “the Convention makes no provision for remedies

relating to the case of direct responsibility” 17: there was no point in including any such provisions

in the Convention; international law is well settled on this issue. And it is obviously incorrect that

the only possible remedy would be a declaratory judgment 18: this form of reparation might be

appropriate for certain Convention violations attributable to the Respondent, but, since the various

19
18 types of damage suffered by Bosnia and Herze govina and its nationals are financially assessable ,

reparation in the form of compensation is required. In no way is this tantamount to “extend[ing]

the jurisdiction available to the Court by virtue of Article IX of the Convention by invoking the

general principles of international law relating to remedies” 20. On the contrary: this is merely

addressing the consequences of the obligations which the Convention imposes and which are

clearly embodied in Article IX.

24. I moreover note incidentally that, just as the Convention does not expressly address the

consequences of a breach of its provisions by th e States parties, equally it contains no provision

governing the imposition of criminal liability on indi viduals: it enumerates the prohibited acts and

provides a partial definition of them in Articles II and III; in subsequent Articles it establishes the

jurisdictional rules applicable to the punishment of perpetrators of those acts, just as ArticleIX

16CR 2006/17, p. 42, para. 298 (Brownlie); see also CR 2006/21, p. 21, paras. 3-4 (Brownlie).

17CR 2006/16, p. 24, para. 65 (Brownlie).
18
CR 2006/17, p. 43, para. 304 (Brownlie).
19See Article 36, paragraph 2 of the ILC Articles of 2001.

20CR 2006/21, p. 22, para. 5 (Brownlie). - 10 -

establishes the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes “rel ating to the interpretation, application or

fulfilment of the present Convention, including t hose relating to the responsibility of a State for

genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III”. But none of these provisions define

the régime applicable either to th e criminal liability of individuals ⎯ which is a matter for the

domestic law of the competent States or for the statutes of international criminal courts ⎯ or to the

international responsibility of States, the governing régime of which is that applicable to any

internationally wrongful act.

21
25. By the same token, and contrary to what Professor Brownlie told you on 16 March ,

there is nothing to prevent the Court from upholding an applicant State’s claim for reparation when

a Respondent has failed to comply with provisional measures ordered (in this case, twice ordered)

in the course of the proceedings.

26. I am willing to concede, Madam President, that the concept of “cause of action” may be

difficult to grasp by a mind trained in the civil law but, all the same, I am, to be quite honest,

22
19 somewhat puzzled by Respondent counsel’s use of the term in this context . It seems to me that

23
the issue can be stated very simply :

⎯ the Court has in a number of recent judgments he ld that it had jurisdiction over claims raised

by a party in respect of the failure by the other party to comply with provisional measures

indicated by the Court;

⎯ the Court made clear on those occasions that such measures were legally binding on the parties;

⎯ failure to comply with them is thus an internationally wrongful act, which, like any such act 24,

entails the international responsibility of the party in default, with all attendant legal

consequences; and

⎯ in my statement on 7 March, I endeavoured to determine what those consequences could or

25
should be in the present case .

21Ibid., pp. 22-24, paras. 1-9.

22See ibid., p. 23, paras. 6 and 7.
23
See CR 2006/11, pp. 42-49, para. 34 (Pellet).
24See Article 1 of the ILC Articles of 2001.

25See CR 2006/11, pp. 46-49, paras. 46-56. - 11 -

27. In actual fact, Madam President, my opponent does not really dispute this analysis.

Instead, he simply asserts that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not entitled to submit such a claim at this
26
stage in the proceedings . This makes no sense: obviously, in general it is only at the end of the

proceedings that it becomes possible to determine wh ether, and to what extent, a State has fulfilled

obligations under an order indicating provisional measures. Further, with the exception of

Germany in the LaGrand case (LaGrand (Germany v. United States) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

2001, p. 474, para. 12) ⎯ but those were special circumstances ⎯ all States which have submitted

similar claims to you have done so during oral argument and you have made no objection to this

(Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial

Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002 , pp.453-454, paras.320-322; Armed

Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment

of 19 December 2005, para. 25).

20 28. Before turning to some general points concerning the real substantive issues of law raised

in this case, I should like, Madam President, to set out, in the form of concise summary points,

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s position on the nature and scope of the obligations borne by parties to

the Genocide Convention and the consequences of a violation of those obligations. These points

are as follows:

(1) The Convention requires States not only to prev ent and punish genocide, but also to refrain

from committing it themselves, and from committi ng any of the other acts enumerated in

Article III of the Convention.

(2) Any violation of these obligations gives rise to the responsibility of the State in breach.

(3) This responsibility is in no way penal in nature and coexists with the potential criminal liability

of the individuals who committed the violation, such criminal liability lying within the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tri bunal for the former Yugoslavia or, possibly, the

domestic courts of Serbia and Montenegro.

(4) Unless otherwise provided in the Convention, the Respondent’s responsibility for any violation

of its provisions is subject to the general rul es applying to the international responsibility of

26
CR 2006/21, p. 23, para. 6 (Brownlie). - 12 -

States for serious breaches of obligations deriving from peremptory norms of general

international law.

(5) The Court thus has jurisdiction not only to hand down a declaratory judgment on the various

breaches of the Convention which can be attributed to the Respondent, but also to decide the

form and amount of the compensation owed by way of reparation for such damage caused to

Bosnia and Herzegovina and its nationals as lends itself to reparation in this form.

(6) Finally, the Court also has jurisdiction to dete rmine, in accordance with the rules applicable to

the international responsibility of States, the consequences to be drawn from the failure by

Serbia and Montenegro to comply with the two Orders indicating provisional measures

adopted by the Court in 1993.

21 II. Genocide was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina

29. Madam President, there is no material di sagreement between the Parties on either the

legal definition of the various elements of genocide enumerated in Article II of the 1948

Convention when viewed separately, nor on the defi nition of the acts listed in Article III. On the

other hand, it is apparent to me that the Par ties remain deeply divided on a number of important

points, particularly the following:

⎯ the definition of genocide as an overall legal concept;

⎯ proof of genocide; and

⎯ the way in which the genocide alleged by Bosn ia and Herzegovina combined with, or was an

integral part of, the civil war on which Serbia and Montenegro places exclusive emphasis.

A. The definition of genocide

27
30. No matter what Maître de Roux said during his statement on 14 March , Bosnia and

Herzegovina does not deny either that genocide is defined by Article II of the 1948 Convention 28or

that the elements of its physical component, the actus reus, are exhaustively enumerated in that

Article, which nevertheless requires interpretation 29. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not asking the

27
CR 2006/18, pp. 20-23, paras. 40-50.
28
CR2006/5, pp.14-15, paras. 14-21 (Fra nck); CR2006/8, p. 20, para. 28 (P ellet); CR2006/9, p.58, para.19
(Condorelli).
2CR 2006/5, p. 15, para. 19 (Franck). - 13 -

Court to extend this definition. Nor does it deny th at the “hallmark” of genocide, the characteristic

which distinguishes it from a crime against humanity, lies in the intent of the perpetrator(s) “to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” 30. However, the

Parties remain divided on several important points wh ich, apart from proof of genocidal intent, to

which I shall return in a few moments, concern in particular:

⎯ first, the definition of the “group” whose “destruction” is sought;

⎯ second, the geographic framework in which this intent must manifest itself; and

22 ⎯ third, and perhaps most importantly, the way in which the various elements in the definition of

genocide must fit together in order to justify the conclusion that genocide has taken place.

31. First, as to the definition of the group which is the target of genocidal intent, I must admit

to a certain astonishment at a comment made by Mr . de Roux during his statement on 15 March.

He finds fault with us for considering that “there are two victims of this genocide:

⎯ the first is the Bosnian people or the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and

⎯ the second is the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina” 31.

Our opponent cites paragraph 1.3.0.9 of Bosnia’s Memorial, which does not deal with determining

the group protected by the Convention, but with th e definition of an intern ationally wrongful act

under the law of responsibility.

32. I fear that Maître de Roux is seriously confused on the following point: under the

international law of responsibility, it is indeed Bosnia and Herzegovina wh ich is the victim of

genocide or, in other words, the injured State. Bu t the perpetrators of the genocide did not aim to

destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina ⎯ a State is not a group within the meaning of the Convention;

rather, it is the holder of the right under Article IX of the Convention to have recourse to the Court.

33. This clarification having been made, it nevertheless remains true that the Parties disagree

as to the very definition of a group within the mean ing of Article II of the Convention. Serbia and

Montenegro protests the fact th at we sometimes refer to “non- Serb groups” and sometimes to

30Article II of the 1948 Convention. On this point,see CR2006/5 p. 15, para. 215 (Franck); CR2006/7,
pp. 29-30, para. 90 (Stern); ibid., pp. 46-48, paras. 7-11 and p. 56, para. 39 (Franck); CR 2006/8, p. 27, para. 47 (Pellet);
and CR2006/18, p. 19, para. 35; p. 23,para. 45; p. 50, para. 125 or p. 5para. 132 (de Roux); CR2006/19, p.50,

para. 281 (de Roux); CR 2006/20, pp. 18 et seq., paras. 330 et seq., p. 28, para. 31 (de Roux) ; or pp. 29-30, paras. 36-39
(Fauveau-Ivanović).
31CR 2006/20, p. 10, para. 296 ; emphasis original. - 14 -

“Muslims” (“Bosniaks” in English) 32. I shall confine myself at this stage to making two points

here:

⎯ first, a group may be defined in two different ways: either positively, as including all

individuals sharing a national, ethnic, racial or re ligious trait, or negatively, as all individuals

not having such a trait; the Convention provid es no guidance in this respect, the case law is

33
divided and, as a practical matter, it is rare fo r genocide to affect only one group defined

according to a single, specific criterion: genocide in Rwanda was committed against the Tutsis

34
23 but it also affected “moderate Hutus” ; and, while the Jews were of course victims of the

Shoah, it is clearly not absurd to see the N azis’ genocidal undertaking as directed more

generally against non-Aryan peoples (as vague as that notion was) ⎯ Gypsies, for example,

were also victims of it;

⎯ secondly, while Bosnia and Herzegovina did ofte n refer in its pleadings, both written and oral,

more specifically to “Muslims”, that is quite si mply because, as a matter of fact, they were the

“preferred” ⎯ if that is the term ⎯ victims of the killing and other acts of maltreatment

enumerated in Article II of the Convention.

34. The fact remains that the proclaimed objec tive of the FRY leadership, reiterated by Serb

leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was to crea te an “ethnically pure” territory, that is, one

“cleansed” of its non-Serb populations, be they Muslims, “ethnic Croats” (the two dominant

minorities in the Serb-controlled regions) or peop le of the other “nationalities” living in that

territory.

35. This leads me to say a few words about the second point of disagreement between the

parties as regards the definition of genocide. According to Serbia and Montenegro, we are not here

faced with a case of genocide becau se the ethnic and religious groups subjected to heinous acts on

the territory of Republika Srpska were treated pr operly elsewhere, including on the Respondent’s

territory. On 15March last, Mr.Cvetkovi ć devoted an entire presentation to demonstrating this

32
See CR2006/19, p. 51, para. 285 (de Roux); CR2006/20, p. 10, para. 297 (de Roux); or CR2006/21, p.43,
para. 54 (Stojanović).
3See CR 2006/20, pp. 11-13, paras. 304-308 (de Roux).

3See, notably: ICTR, Judge ment of 2 September 1998, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu , case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, note 57, or Judgement of 4 September 1998, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda , case No. ICTR-97-23,
para. 39. - 15 -

35
point . Bosnia and Herzegovina has very explicit r eservations regarding the facts, and there is a

great deal of evidence pointing in the opposite direction 36. In law, however, this is in any event

irrelevant: Article II of the Genocide Convention is not as categorical and absolute as Serbia and

Montenegro claims it to be. The intention to destroy a group “as such” does not mean that the

perpetrators of genocide must necessarily wish to destroy that group in its entirety and wherever it

may be. ArticleII clarifies this point by stating that the “destruction” in question may target the

group “in whole or in part”; and the words “in part’ may mean ⎯ and do mean in this case ⎯ a

well defined section of territory: in this instance, the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina which the
24

Belgrade and Pale authorities intended to detach fro m that country in order to incorporate it in the

FRY after “cleansing”, “purging” it of all its non-Serb elements 3.

36. I should add in this connection that I fi nd it particularly scandalous that one of the

counsel for Serbia and Montenegro should have fe lt able to invoke the humanitarian law of war in

order to justify the forced displacement of the non-Serb populations, and that he had the audacity to

state that “displacement of populations has always been a way of settling certain conflicts between

opposing parties” 38. This is to ignore the fact that, in this case before us today, those “transfers”

were effected in a wholly discriminatory manne r, against non-Serb populations alone, and were

forcibly implemented through a policy of terror.

37. We all know, Madam President, that the Genocide Convention was adopted in the

aftermath of the Second World War and that its drafters had in their minds the Shoah: the

unimaginable horror, the genocide of genocides. However, even if there is always something

deeply unpleasant about attempting to establish a hierarchy of horror, genocide cannot be limited to

the Shoah ⎯ otherwise the 1948 Convention would be no more than just another rather futile

memorial dedicated to the millions of victims of a tragedy which one would have us believe was

unique: a dead letter, of no assistance to the victims of other attempts, on a smaller scale, to

35
CR 2006/20, pp. 33-58.
36
See Reply, pp. 730-758, paras. 439-483; see also CR 2006/22, p. 52 (testimony of Mr. Riedlmayer).
37See in particular: Memorial, pp. 59-61, paras. 2.3.1.1-2.3.1.4;CR 2006/2, pp.28-32, paras.1-12
(vandenBiesen); CR 2006/4, pp.18-20, paras.35-40, pp. 38-39, paras.9-10 (van den Bi esen); CR 2006/6, pp.29-30,

paras. 8-9 (Franck); CR 2006/10, pp. 50-53, paras. 33-38 (Pellet). Cf. CR 2006/20, pp. 15-18, paras. 318-329 (de Roux).
38CR 2006/18, p. 53, para. 140 (de Roux). - 16 -

destroy certain human groups. To put it plainly, Madam President, we are arguing the case of a

genocide, a monstrous event like any genocide; not the Shoah.

38. In this connection, the comparison which the Agent of Serbia and Montenegro 39 and

40
Maître de Roux felt obliged to draw between the exterm ination of 67percent of the European

Jews by the Nazis and the ⎯ happily ⎯ much smaller percentage of the Bosnian Muslim

population which perished in Bosnia and Herze govina between 1992 and 1995 is to my mind not

only highly questionable in moral terms, but also to tally irrelevant in terms or law. Not only under

ArticleII of the 1948 Convention is killing just one of the elements that serve to determine the

existence of genocide. But also, in term s of the facts, the physical elimination ⎯ onwhatwas

25 undoubtedly a massive scale ⎯ of Muslims and of the members of other non-Serb ethnic or

religious groups was only one of the means employed in order to induce the members of those

groups to leave their ancestral lands and to achieve the intended aim of ethnic cleansing ⎯ that is

to say, I repeat, the destruction, “in part”, of agroup within the meaning of the Convention, such

part being limited to the members of the group living in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of

which the Serbs had gained control, but which represented as much as 70 per cent of the territory of

that State.

39. Madam President, there is a third major di fference between the parties in their approach

to the definition of genocide under the 1948 Conventi on. Serbia and Montenegro is not concerned

with genocide as an overall concept, but focuses atte ntion on what I think should be characterized

as “genocidal acts” ⎯ and I am referring more particularly to the statements made from this

podium by Maîtres de Roux and Fauveau-Ivanović. Our opponents sought to analyse in succession

each of the categories of acts enumerated in Article II of the Convention. I do not consider this

approach to be wrong in itself, but it is not sufficient: such acts constitute genocide only if they

form part of an overall plan, which cannot be identified through a purely analytical approach.

40. An isolated case of killing, torture or rape, whether motivated by racism or by the

intention to destroy a human group within the mean ing of Article II of the Convention, cannot be

characterized as “genocide”, at least in relatio n to issues of responsibility between States.

39
CR 2006/15, p. 39, para. 196.
40
CR 2006/18, p. 12, para. 7. - 17 -

Conversely, it may be that cumulative acts of th is kind, which, taken separately, do not meet the

definition of genocide because the perpetrators were not personally motivated by the intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such, constitute genocide because they form part of an

overall plan of which those individuals were only the more or less conscious executants.

41. This serves at the same time to expl ain why the ICTY, up to now, has handed down so

few convictions for genocide or complicity in ge nocide, and why the acts which the Tribunal has

had to deal with nevertheless cons titute elements of an overall picture ⎯ a pattern ⎯ which

26 establishes the existence of genocide. This lead s me, Madam President, to consider briefly the

difficult and complex question of the proof of genocide.

B. Proof of genocide

42. Madam President, the Parties to th ese proceedings both accept that genocide is

determined by the combination of a material element, the actus reus , the various possible

manifestations of which are enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of ArticleII of the 1948

Convention, and a psychological element, the mens rea, entailing the “intent to destroy, in whole or

in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”.

43. Proving the existence of the first element, the actus reus, poses no particular problem,

and I think that the pleadings of both parties (not just those presented on behalf of Bosnia and

Herzegovina) have adequately established:

⎯ that numerous Muslims and other non-Serbs were killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

⎯ that bodily or mental harm, on a massive scale, was caused to the members of this group;

⎯ that the group was deliberately subjected to cond itions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part; and

⎯ that the group was the victim of measures intended to prevent births in its midst and was even

subjected to the forcible transfer of children, given the rapes and other forms of sexual violence

perpetrated against non-Serbs, and particularly Muslim women.

44. As regards the mens rea, Serbia and Montenegro claims by contrast that Bosnia and

Herzegovina has failed to prove this, inasmuch as it has failed to show that all these acts, and each

of them individually, were committed with genocidal intent. It is certainly true, for example, that - 18 -

“to be a component of genocide, the act of killing must be accompanied by a pre-existing genocidal

intent” . However, contrary to what is claimed by our opponents, such pre-existing intent need

not ⎯ for the purpose of establishing, in a dispute between States, that genocide was perpetrated ⎯

27 be present in the mind of each of the perpetrators: as I said before, they may be the executants of

42
genocide (or accomplices thereto) without however being personally motivated by genocidal

intent.

45. In this connection, our opponents’ obsessi on with criminal law principles leads them

astray. Maître de Roux is certainly right to affirm that the Parties to these proceedings are not the

same as those who appear before the ICTY, and to note that “this difference in parties to the

proceedings justifies... viewing the decisions of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in a

43
different light” . But it is unfortunate that he failed to draw the necessary conclusions from this

excellent observation, since he concentrated exclusively on demonstrating that our neighbour

44
tribunal had generally failed to convict its accused of genocide .

46. All this is of course true, Madam President; but the reason for this is quite simple: the

Tribunal is a criminal court which tries individuals ⎯ not States ⎯ on the basis of rules which,

though international in character, are nonetheless rule s of criminal law. It cannot convict persons

brought before it unless, “beyond a ll reasonable doubt”, the judges in the different trial chambers

are persuaded that the individuals in question we re personally motivated by genocidal intent. You,

however, Members of the Court, are not criminal judges; the Parties that appear before you are not

prisoners or prosecutors; and the evidence admissib le is not the evidence that applies in criminal

law. Had that been the case, there are hundreds of witnesses, thousands perhaps, whom we would

have been obliged to call to testify. We did not do so ⎯ and for a very good reason, I believe: it

would have served no purpose (except, no doubt, to irritate you...), but it would have made no

contribution whatsoever to proving what we are requ ired to prove. I would add, however, that this

in no way amounts to saying that the decisions of the ICTY and the ongoing proceedings before

41
Ibid, p. 30, para. 72 (de Roux).
42
Cf. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement of 19 April 2004,
paras. 135-144.
43CR 2006/18, 14 March 2006, p. 41, para. 102.

44See ibid., pp.33-43, paras.81-107; see also p. 44, paras.109-110 or p. 49, para. 123; and CR2006/19,
15 March 2006, p. 14, para. 158, p. 39, para. 246 or p. 49, paras. 278-279. - 19 -

that tribunal are not relevant; it only means that these are pieces of a puzzle which it is for us, for

you, to put together in order to obtain an overall picture of what really happened.

28 47. What we have to prove is not that each of the individuals who committed the killings and

the other acts constituting genocide was motivated by genocidal intent, but that the Respondent’s

organs of government, the State which was behi nd the genocide, which conceived and organized it

(or which became guilty of complicity in it), were so motivated. This does not make our task ⎯ or

yours, for that matter ⎯ any easier; but it has to be acknowledged, first of all, that it differs from

that of the Prosecutor or the judges of the ICTY, a fact which our opponents persist in denying or

blithely ignoring 45.

48. It is quite obvious that we cannot expect to find evidence of genocidal intent on the part

of the respondent State in explicit declarations calling for the destruction, even the partial

destruction, of the non-Serb populations or Musl ims in that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina of

46
which it had control: as I said during the first round of oral argument , even Hitler attempted to

conceal the Shoah in “night and fog”. It goes wit hout saying that no late-twentieth century leader

would have been reckless enough to call openly for genocide. It is for you, therefore, Members of

the Court, to decipher the coded language used by the authorities of the FRY and their auxiliaries in

Republika Srpska as an incitement to genocide; we have submitted a substantial body of evidence

47
establishing such incitement . I would add that we would doubtl ess have been better able to do so

if, as the Agent of the Respondent informed us 48, the country that he represents had actually opened

its State archives; unfortunately, it has done nothing of the sort. Or if it had been so good as to

submit to the Court evidence it is keeping to itself.

49. It is no easy matter to prove the genocidal intent of the respondent State ⎯ a genocidal

intent which, I hasten to point out, it harboured at the time of the facts at issue, between 1992 and

4See for example CR2006/18, 14 March 2006, p. 21, para. 41; p. 19, para. 36, p. 20, paras.37-38, p. 21,
paras.41 and 43, p. 22, para. 46 (de Roux); CR2006/19, 15 March 2006, p. 22, para. 181, p. 25, para. 193, p.30,

para. 216, p. 51, para. 287 (de Roux); CR 2006/20, 15 March 2006, p. 12, para. 306, p. 22, para. 346 (de Roux).
4CR2006/8, 3 March 2006, pp.23-24, pa ras. 39-41, p. 36, para. 67 (P ellet); see also: CR2006/10,
6 March 2006, p. 50, para. 31 (Pellet).

4Memorial, pp.59-61, paras. 2.3.1. 1-2.3.1.4. Reply, pp.819-823, pa ras. 157-169; CR2006/10, 6March 2006,
pp. 49-55, paras. 30-41 (Pellet).

4CR 2006/12, 8 March 2006, p. 14, para. 19. - 20 -

1995, but which it obviously no longer harbours today ⎯ but it is not impossible to do so. Such

proof emerges from:

29 ⎯ the careless statements, usually coded, as I said, but frequently decipherable, made by the then

leaders of the FRY and their surrogates in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

⎯ the massive scale and simultaneous nature of th e acts of genocide that occurred throughout the

territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serb control;

⎯ the “selective destruction” of the most influe ntial members of the group of non-Serbs or

49
Muslims present on that territory ; and

⎯ the systematic destruction of all the religious or cultural buildings of those groups, of which

50
Mr. Riedlmayer, in his testimony on 17 March last , provided convincing evidence.

50. In this connection, I should like to provi de a clarification which I consider to be

51
important. Contrary to what our opponents app ear to believe or wish to have us believe , Bosnia

and Herzegovina is most assuredly not asking the C ourt to find that Serbia and Montenegro was

responsible for a “cultural genocide” falling outside the terms of the 1948 Convention. The reason

why the systematic destruction of the Croatian (a nd Catholic) and, above all, the Muslim cultural

heritage is of particular relevance to this case has to do with the fact that it makes it extremely clear

that those were in fact the groups that were targeted, as such, and that every trace of their existence

and their centuries-old presence in the territories wh ich the Respondent wished to annex or bring

under its control was to be eradicated for ever.

51. And, Madam President, there is something else. On various occasions during the first

round of oral argument, the representatives of the other Party allowed themselves a confession ⎯

or at least a semi-confession. Both Agent and c ounsel for Serbia and Montenegro laid stress on

“the fear of the Serbs”, a fear “accounted for by the recollection of crimes committed by the

52
Ustashi during the Second World War” , crimes which can perhaps be regarded as constituting a

49
Cf. CR 2006/20, 15 March 2006, p. 16, para. 323 (de Roux).
50See CR2006/22. See also Memorial, pp.48-54, paras. 2. 2.5.1-2.2.5.16 and p. 57,para. 2.2.6.7; Reply,
pp. 168-186, paras. 248-286 and pp. 295-296, paras. 547-550; and CR 2006/5, 1 March 2006, pp. 44-59 (Dauban).

51See CR2006/19, 15 March 2006 (de Roux), p.21-22, para s.178-179, or CR2006/20, 15 March2006, p.15,
para. 319 (de Roux).

52CR2006/15, 10 March 2006, p. 43, para. 214 (Stojanovi ć); see also CR2006/21, 16 March 2006, p. 37,
para. 23. - 21 -

true genocide. That is indeed the view of Mr . Brownlie: “the genocide during the Second World

War did take place” 53 ⎯ which led that eminent counsel to justify the assistance given by the FRY

30 to the Bosnian Serbs, another remarkable confessi on: “The circumstances in which the assistance

was given included the likelihood of acts of genocide directed against Bosnian Serbs” 54. It is clear

that by thus raising the spectre of anti-Serb genocide, the Belgrade authorities could only

encourage Serbs to commit what might be termed “preventive genocide” 55.

52. At the very least, Members of the Court, this constitutes a body of evidence leaving no

doubt as to the deliberate, clear, undeniable intention to destroy the group or groups thus targeted;

“in whole” in the area controlled by the Serbs; or “in part” whenever, fortunately, their existence

was not threatened outside that area.

C. Genocide and civil war

53. Madam President, the Respondent blithely counters these facts with one single

explanation, summed up in two words, which it uses as a “wild card”: “civil war”.

54. I shall be brief on this as Mr. van den Biesen discussed it this morning: it is clear that the

war waged between the ethnic and religious groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina ⎯ between

Muslims, Serbs and Croats and, on occasion, even within each of them, including in some cases

between Muslim factions, as at Biha ć, where for a time the Serbs form ed an alliance with a group

of Muslims of whom they made use in order to fight against the legitimate (and multi-ethnic)

Sarajevo government.

55. But contrary to Serbia and Monteneg ro’s assertion, the civil war does not explain

everything. We are told that “the purpose of any armed conflict” is to bring about the departure of

what are regarded as enemy populations 56; but in this case, the exodus was triggered not by

military operations, but by the spate of crimes and acts of violence perpetrated against the civilian

populations. We are told that, in any war, the distinction between civilians and military personnel

53
CR 2006/17, 13 March 2006, p. 19, para. 202; see also CR 2006/19, 15 March 2006, p. 41-42, paras. 253-255
(de Roux).
54
CR 2006/17, 13 March 2006, p. 17; see more generally pp. 17-20, paras. 192-204.
55See on this point, Reply, pp.55- 63, paras.1-13; CR2006/2, 27 February 2006, p.28-30, paras.1-8

(van den Biesen).
56CR 2006/15, p. 22, para. 157 (Stojanović). - 22 -

57
becomes blurred ; perhaps, but in this case the Muslim and, more generally, the non-Serb civilian

population was subjected to a policy of systematic terror intended to bring about its complete

disappearance from the areas which were to be “cleansed” of all their non-Serb elements.

58
31 Sometimes we are told that this war was a war of territorial conquest , sometimes that it was a war

of secession 59 ⎯ two notions which, incidentally, are scarcely compatible . . .; but it is not readily

understandable why an armed conflict of this type would be accompanied by the wholesale murder

of prisoners as was the case in Sr ebrenica, by the internment of civilians in camps in appalling

conditions or by what was clearly an organized policy of sexual violence.

56. “Military necessity” or the inevitable “foul- ups” which occur in all armed conflict really

offer no satisfactory explanation in themselves for these systematic, planned and premeditated

60
crimes . In reality, genocide was the method used by the Serbs in this war of conquest (or of

secession, the name is unimportant), who were c ontrolled, directed, organized and financed from

Belgrade. A civil war? Yes, partly so, even though the massive involvement of the FRY does not

allow one to say that it was so exclusively, but a “genocidal” war in both methods and aim: the

eradication of the non-Serb populations from the territories controlled by the Serbs.

57. Our opponents put forward another argumen t. While not acknowledging that the Serb

strategy was essentially genocidal, they accept th at abominable crimes were committed by the

61
Serbs but, they say, this was also true of th e other parties to this “fratricidal conflict” . Three

observations will suffice on this point, Madam President:

(1) Bosnia and Herzegovina does not deny and h as never denied, that inexcusable crimes have

been committed by Bosnian Muslims or Croats ; it is dismayed by this and, unlike the

5Cf. CR 2006/15, p. 23, para.. 158 (Stojanović); CR 2006/18, p. 51, para. 132, or p. 52, para. 135 (de Roux).
58
CR2006/15, p.13, para. 122, p. 25, pa ra. 164, pp. 27-29, paras.167-172, p. 31, para. 178, p. 33, para. 184,
p.36, para. 188, p. 39, para.196, p. 43, para. 211 (Stojanovi ć); CR2006/18, p. 42, para. 105; CR2006/19, p. 18,
paras.165 and 167, p. 38, para. 242, p. 43, para.259, p. 47, para. 273 (deRoux); CR2006/21, 16 March 2006, p. 41,
para. 46, p. 42, para. 51 (Stojanović).
59
CR 2006/12, p. 48, para. 1.16 (Varady); CR2006/16, p. 32, para. 86; CR 2006/17, p. 17, paras.192, 194 and
196, p. 20, paras.204 and 206, p. 29, para. 254 (Brown lie); CR2006/19, p. 40, para. 249, pp.47-48, para. 273;
CR 2006/20, p. 13, para. 310, p. 15, para . 316, p. 22, para. 347 (de Roux); CR 2006/21, p. 10, para. 14 (Brownlie); ibid.
p. 39, para. 35 (Stojanović).

6CR2006/14, p. 11, para. 3; CR2006/15, p. 23, para 158 (Stojanovi ć); ibid., p. 22, para. 157; CR2006/18,
p.12, para. 6, p.52, paras.134-136; CR2006/19, pp.12-13, para. 152, p. 21, para. 178, p. 50, para. 279 (de Roux);
CR 2006/20, pp. 23-24, paras. 5-6 (Fauveau-Ivanović).

6CR2006/19, p. 18, para. 155 (de Roux); see also, CR2006/1 2, p. 46, para. 1.7, p. 48, para. 1.14 (Varady);
CR 2006/18, p. 38, para. 92; CR 2006/19, pp. 16-17, paras. 163-164 (de Roux). - 23 -

32 Respondent, has sought to punish the guilty and ther efore co-operated with the ITCY to ensure

62
that those responsible are brought to justice .

(2)But however odious these crimes were, they can in no way be equated with genocide.

Moreover, unless it is regarded as having been ex clusively tactical, the withdrawal of Serbia

and Montenegro’s counter-claim s shows that it shares this position and never during the

hearings did its representatives claim otherwise; and above all,

(3) Whatever the case, one genocide cannot excuse another which, moreover, our opponents have

63
the grace to acknowledge .

58. Madam President, I have now finished the second part of my long presentation, in which

I have tried to show the persisti ng discrepancies between the Parties on the legal issues related to

the genocide against the non-Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly against

the Muslims, between 1992 and 1995. Before coming to the question of the attributability of this

serious violation of an obligation deriving from a norm of jus cogens, allow me to summarize the

conclusions from what I have said, once again in the form of propositions:

(1) The genocidal acts enumerated in Article II of the 1948 Convention are not to be confused with

genocide as a global internationally wrongful act which may engage the responsibility of a

State party.

(2) Such genocide must be directed against a gr oup which may be defined positively on the basis

of the ethnic or religious characteristics of its members, or negatively, through the absence of

either of these characteristics.

(3) Genocide may be “total” and, like the Shoah, aimed at the total destruction of a group, or

partial and then, as in the case before us, it may seek the destruction of a human group in a

particular territory.

33 (4) The “ethnic cleansing” perpetrated in the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the

Serbs thus constitutes genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Convention.

62See Reply, pp. 900-903, paras. 23-25. See also, Assess ment and report of Judge Fausto Pocar, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the fo rmer Yugoslavia, provided to the Securi ty Council pursuant to paragraph6 of

Council resolution 1534 (2004),United Nations, doc.S/2005/781, 14 Decem ber 2005, p. 11, para. 35. See also,
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, IT601-47, docs. DH 119, DH 155/2, DH 274, DH 275, concerning the proceedings before
the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
63CR2006/15, p. 40, para. 199 (Stojanovi ć) See also CR2006/20, 15 March 2006 (Fauveau-Ivanović), p.26,
para. 19, p. 27, para. 25. - 24 -

(5)The evidence that genocide has been committed may, under pub lic international law, be

adduced by any means and is not governed by the relevant criminal law rules in this field.

(6) The evidence used must make it possible to est ablish with certainty that the author of the

genocide ⎯ the State which was the author of the genocide ⎯ was motivated by the intention

to destroy in whole or in part a group defined in ArticleII of the Convention. Such certainty

may result from a body of concordant evidence.

(7)Civil (or international) war cannot serve as a screen to excuse or exclude the genocide

committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case before us, genocide constituted the purpose

of the war waged by the Serbs and that war was the context of the genocide.

Madam President, I still have about half an hour to inflict on you; I do not know whether

you prefer to suffer this now or after a break?

The PRESIDENT: I think we will take a short break now and be back within ten minutes.

Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much.

The Court adjourned from 4.30 to 4.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.

PMELr.LET:

III. The genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina is attributable to the Respondent

59. I now come, Madam President, with your permission, to the question of the

attributability to the Respondent of the genocide which, as I have just recalled, was indeed

committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the pe riod from spring 1992 to the conclusion of the

Dayton-Paris Agreements on 1 December 1995.

60 60. Curiously, Serbia and Montenegro proved, during the first round of oral pleadings, to be

particularly unforthcoming on this nevertheless crucial aspect of the case. Mr.Brownlie did

admittedly deal with the question on two occasions: at length in his two statements on 13 March 64

64
CR 2006/16, pp. 31-53, paras. 83-161 and CR 2006/17, passim. - 25 -

65
and much more briefly on 16March . But in both cases my opponent confined himself, on the

legal aspects, first to repeating several times th at Republika Srpska was an independent State,

without attempting to prove this or to draw from this questionable assertion any precise

consequences as to responsibility and, secondly, to defend the celebrated “Nicaragua test”, without

seeking to answer the much more complete argument we had put forward.

61. For our part, during the first round of oral argument we showed that the Respondent was

responsible for the genocide committed agains t the non-Serb populations in Bosnia and

Herzegovina and, particularly, the Muslims. Professor Luigi Condorelli established that, during the

relevant period ⎯ from 1992 to 1995 ⎯ Republika Srpska was completely in the hands of the FRY

authorities and was to be considered as an organ of that entity, as such engaging its responsibility,

66
pursuant to the rule set out in Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility . I, for my part,

showed that, even if you do not accept this assimila tion of Republika Srpska to an organ of the

Respondent, the criterion of control, as set out in Article 8 of those Articles in any case led to the

67
same result and, in the alternative, that in any case it was impossible to avoid the conclusion that

the FRY had made itself guilty of complicity “in genocide” ⎯ within the meaning of Article III (e)

of the Genocide Convention ⎯ or of being an accomplice to “genocide” under the general

principles of international law 68.

62. The Respondent remained almost totally s ilent during the first round of oral pleadings,

both on the “organic” argument and on complicity. We must simply accept this, Madam President,

but I must, once again, stress that this attitude, in which I am not sure whether we should see

35 contempt or negligence, is not likely to promote genuine debate between the two Parties, and that

we would take it very badly if Serbia and Monteneg ro were now to reply to our first round of oral

argument when we, for our part, would be unable to respond.

63. Subject to this preliminary remark, I shall confine myself to a few observations ⎯ which

my colleagues will add to where appropria te during our further oral pleadings ⎯ on the legal

65CR 2006/21, pp. 15-17.
66
CR 2006/10, pp. 10-31, paras. 1-45 (Condorelli).
67
CR 2006/10, pp. 38-48, paras. 3-23 (Pellet).
68CR 2006/10, pp. 58-62, paras. 51-63 (Pellet). - 26 -

considerations, on which it is clear that the Parties are still at odds. These somewhat brief

observations will relate to the following points in turn:

⎯ the alleged independence of Republika Srpska;

⎯ the control test and its relationship to the issue of attributability; and

⎯ the issue, blithely ignored by counsel for the Respondent, of complicity.

A. The alleged independence of Republika Srpska

64. On numerous occasions during his oral pleadings devoted to the attribution of

responsibility for the genocide committed in Bosn ia and Herzegovina, Mr.Brownlie mentioned

69
“the appearance of the Republika Srpska as an independent State” . Without ever rebutting the

very detailed argument to the contrary put forward both orally and in writing 70by Bosnia, he

confines himself to stating that neither that entity nor its army, the VRS, were under the control of

the FRY authorities.

65. Allow me, Madam President, if you will, to poi nt out that it is to say the least difficult to

hold that an entity which is over 99 per cent depende nt for its budget on the aid of a dominant and

extremely comprehensive State, whose Central Bank cannot make any decision without the say-so

71
of its counterpart in Yugoslavia , whose army is wholly “subsidised” by the FRY, its officers even

72
receiving their pay and promotion directly from Belgrade , that such an en tity can truly be

36 regarded as a State, within the meaning given by in ternational law to this term. Here, it is no more

possible to speak of a sovereign State than it w as in the case of Manchukuo, the former Bantustans

of South Africa or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ⎯ which I fail to see how my

opponent can distinguish from Republika Srpska on the ground, as he maintained, that: “It is the

independence [but which independe nce?] of Republika Srpska and its territorial separation [but

which separation?] which makes the comparisons with Northern Cyprus . . . inapposite.” 73

69
CR 2006/16, p. 31, para 85, p. 33, paras. 91-92, p. 39, paras. 115 and 117; CR 2006/17, p. 26, paras. 238 (c)
and 242, pp. 44-45, paras. 309-310 or p. 46, para. 314; see also CR 2006/21, pp. 44-45, paras. 63-64 (Stojanović).
70
Reply, pp. 674-685, paras. 346-358, pp. 788-816, paras. 80-145; CR 2006/9 (Torkildsen); CR 2006/10,
pp. 18-24, paras. 19-32 (Condorelli).
71
Reply, pp. 674-685, paras. 346-358; CR 2006/9, pp. 27-48, paras. 14-59 (Torkildsen).
72CR 2006/9, pp. 25-27, paras. 7-13 (Torkildsen).

73CR 2006/16, p. 39, para. 117. - 27 -

66. In reality, Madam President, in all these cases, including Republika Srpska, these are

puppet States, whose internationally wrongful act s engage the responsibility of the dominant

State . As Luigi Condorelli demonstrated in his oral pleading of 6 March , Republika Srpska was

at the time no more than the intermediary of Be lgrade’s decisions and could be regarded as an

organ of the FRY, as contemplated by Article4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for

Internationally Wrongful Acts. And this was so notwithstanding the case ⎯ the only case ⎯ in

which this de facto Serb province opposed the Belgrade Government (in connection with the

Vance-Owen Plan) and the trompe l’oeil sanctions which ensued from it; as Professor Condorelli

pointed out: happy the central government wh ich only encounters opposition from its territorial

components in just one isolated circumstance!

B. The control test and its relationship to the issue of attributability

67. Madam President, as we showed in the first round, the “organic theory” ⎯ which

undoubtedly applies to the de jure organs of the FRY: its army, the JNA, then the VJ; its Ministry

of the Interior (the MUP) and that of the Republic of Serbia and, in gene ral, to all its governing

organs ⎯ the organic theory, as I was saying, is just one of the routes whereby the Respondent’s

responsibility for the genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be established. Another

leads to the same result ⎯ and I hasten to add that although the two routes rely on slightly different

reasoning, they are not mutually contradictory or incompatible: the interpreter ⎯ yourselves,

Members of the Court ⎯ can in fact follow either of them; th ey both lead to the same conclusion,

on the basis of the same facts. Essentially, these facts lend themselves to two distinct
37

interpretations: we may rely on the organic argumen t, as Article4 of the ILC Articles asks us to

do, or we may apply the more flexible test of actual direction or control, as set out in Article 8.

68. However, this very general rule is itself subject to divergent interpretations. Yet, our

opponent does not hesitate: the only accepta ble test of such control, indeed, “ the criteria of State

76
responsibility” he told us on 13 March is that of “effective control”, as applied by the Court in its

74Reply, pp. 812-816, paras. 137-145.
75
CR 2006/10, pp. 18-24, paras. 19-32 (Condorelli).
76CR 2006/16, p. 33; emphasis added. - 28 -

Judgment of 1986 in the Nicaragua case, from which he quotes very long passages supported by

77
almost equally long extracts, from the commentary on Article 8 of the ILC Articles .

69. Well, Madam President, I wholeheartedly agr ee: control must be effective; Bosnia and

Herzegovina has never said otherwise. What, howev er, seems to us more open to discussion is not

the effectiveness of the control, it is its purpose. Should it, as in the Military Activities case, relate

to each of the internationally wrongful ac ts committed by the entity “under control” ⎯ the contras

in the case which gave rise to the 1986 Judgment, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the one

before us now? Or should it be assessed from an “inter-subjective” standpoint and is it enough for

the entity in question to be under the effective control of the State under whose authority it falls?

70. At the hearing on 3March, I took the liberty, Members of the Court, to invite you to

78
“forget Nicaragua” . This is what my eminent oppone nt humorously calls the “amnesia
79
argument” . But a witty remark, to which I willingly pay tribute, cannot take the place of

argument, or suffice to discredit the argument whic h engendered it... And again I invite you,

Members of the Court, to reflect on the validity of applying this criterion in the present case. As

regards the effectiveness of the control, there is no problem of course: for the genocide committed

in Bosnia and Herzegovina to e ngage the responsibility of the Res pondent, the different organs or

individuals, the direct authors of the acts of genocide, must clearly have been in a situation of close

38 dependency with respect to the FRY. Bosnia and Herzegovina showed, in the first round of its oral

pleadings, that there can be no doubt about this, e ither as regards Republika Srpska itself, its army,

the VRS and the volunteers who joined it and, in gene ral, the organs falling within its apparatus of

State, or as regards the Serb pa ramilitary groups, created, trained and organized by the Ministry of

the Interior of the Republic of Serbia and involve d in the most sinister operations linked to the

genocide ⎯ including in Srebrenica. We saw terrible visual evidence of this during the hearing of

28 February 2006, in the film we were shown of the execution of six young Muslims by members

of the “Scorpions”, one of these paramilitary groups. We will revert to this global control

77
Ibid., pp. 33-35, paras. 94-98. See also CR 2006/17, p. 24, para. 226 or CR 2006/21, p. 16, para. 2.
78
CR 2006/8, p. 34, paras. 63 et seq. (Pellet); and see also CR2006/10,pp.39-40, para.8 and pp.46-47,
paras. 20-23 (Pellet).
7CR 2006/16, p. 39, para. 114. - 29 -

exercised by Belgrade over all these entities in the coming days and will again establish the

effectiveness of that control.

71. Thus, from the legal perspective, that is not the major issue. It is, rather, whether, for the

responsibility of the Respondent to be engaged in the present case, Bosnia and Herzegovina is

obliged to establish that, over and above an eff ective general control ove r the persons and entities

that perpetrated genocidal acts in Bosnia and He rzegovina, the Belgrade authorities had effective

control over each of those acts, as required by th e Court in its 1986 Judgment with respect to a

context and circumstances which differed greatly from the present case 80. Mr.Brownlie sees no

reason for you not to follow that precedent. I do.

72. Needless to say that I am in no sense asking you, Members of the Court, to apply to

81
Yugoslavia a “low standard of proof in cases of genocide” ; nor, moreover, to invent a principle

of “strict liability”2, which does not appear justified by any legal argument in the present case. All

that I am asking you to do is to find that genocide, as I have just shown, is a global offence, the

existence of which is established by a series of genocidal acts (those set out in ArticleII of the

1948 Convention) — not one act, Madam President, but several acts; a combination of

39 co-ordinated acts with but a single purpose: the de struction, in whole or in part, of a group of

humans having one or more of the characteristics indicated in that Article.

73. If this analysis is correct— and I sincerely believe it is ⎯ the question of the

applicability of the “Nicaragua test” and the choice between that and the “ Tadić test”, again cited

83
by counsel for Serbia and Montenegro at the hearing of 13 March , are not valid issues. Members

of the Court, all that you have and need to assure yourselves of is that the Belgrade authorities had

effective general control over the perpetrators of genocidal acts and wielded this control with the

intent, in an area of the Republic of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina, to destroy the non-Serb populations,

and in particular the Muslims, with a view to making the territories concerned “ethnically pure”.

80See CR 2006/9, p. 32, para. 57 and pp. 34-37, paras. 65-70 (Pellet); see also CR2006/16, p.39, para.116
(Brownlie).
81
Ibid., para. 111.
82
CR 2006/17, p. 44, para. 307 (Brownlie).
83Ibid. pp. 36-38, paras. 100-110. - 30 -

C. Complicity revisited

74. Madam President, during the first round of oral argument, Serbia and Montenegro said

little regarding the issue of its complicity in this genocide. Mr.deRoux touched on it when, on

15 March, he analysed the ancillary cr imes to genocide listed in paragraphs (b) to (e) of Article III

of the 1948 Convention 8. The analysis he gave was extrem ely brief, but then this brevity

doubtless shielded it from criticism; in any event, I could see no major difference from what I had
85
myself said on the subject before the Court on 3 March last .

75. I noted, in particular, that our opponent seemed to accept, albeit in a rather oblique

86
manner , the distinction that I had made between, on the one hand, complicity in genocide, within

the meaning of Article III of the Convention and, on the other, aiding and abetting genocide

pursuant to the general rules of international law on responsibility. In either case, the accomplice

aids and abets the principal perpetrator of the wrongful act — in the present case, the perpetrator of

the genocide. And that, Members of the C ourt, if you were to reject the proposition ⎯

self-apparent to us ⎯ that the FRY was the perpetrator, could only have been Republika Srpska —
40

irrespective of whether it was or was not a subject of international law. It is clear that the

prohibition of genocide and of comp licity in genocide applies to all, regardless of the legal nature

of the persons or entities responsible ⎯ on whatever basis ( Reservations to the Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genoc ide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951 ,

p.23. See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1996 (II), p. 616, para. 31).

76. The distinction between the two types of complicity on which the two Parties seem to

agree, at least from a legal standpoint, lies in the fact that, in the first instance ⎯ complicity in

genocide under Article3 (e) ⎯ the accomplice must himself be motivated by genocidal intent,

whereas, in what we might term “common law complicity”, in aiding and abetting genocide, the

84CR 2006/19, pp. 29-32, paras. 213-222.
85
CR2006/8, pp.26-28, paras.45-50 (Pellet). See alsoCR2006/10, pp.58-59, paras.51-54 and pp.59-60,
para. 58 (Pellet).
86CR 2006/19, p. 31, paras. 219-220. - 31 -

responsibility of the accomplice is incurred by the me re fact that he knowingly aided and abetted

the perpetrator of the act but without necessarily sharing the latter’s genocidal intent.

77. This second form of complicity is not legally based upon the precise wording of

Article 3 (e) of the Convention, but upon the general principles of international law on State

responsibility (of which there is an equivalent in terms of individual criminal responsibility in

Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, which formed the basis of the conviction of General Krstić for aiding

and abetting genocide) 87. And while, as Mr.Brownlie so firmly asserts 88, it is true that in the

Nicaragua case the Court did not conclude that the United States had sufficient control over the

contras in order for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the latter to be attributed to the

Respondent, it, nevertheless, was of the opinion th at the responsibility of the United States was

engaged by the multifaceted aid that it had grante d the counter-revolutionary forces: the Court

“takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their own acts, and that the United States is

not responsible for the acts of the contras, but for its own conduct vis-à-vis Nicaragua, included

41 conduct related to the acts of the contras” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p. 65,

para. 116; emphasis added).

78. In the present case, it appears difficult to de ny that the FRY was, at the relevant time,

motivated by a genocidal intent. Indeed, the Resp ondent’s Agent has, on a number of occasions,

89
characterized the régime in power then as “criminalized” and its leaders as “criminals” —

without, of course, openly admitting that amongst the crimes concerned was the genocide for which

Serbia and Montenegro is responsible. But, in any case, the criminal intent of the leadership of that

period was not denied and this, I believe, should, Members of the Court, be sufficient for you, as

far as the notion of complicity is concerned, to opt for “Article3 (e) complicity” rather than

“Nicaragua complicity” — the complicity corresponding to aiding and abetting the commission of

87
ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 19 April 2004, Prosecutor v. Radislav Kristić, case No.IT-98-33-A,
paras.135-144; compare, ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Judgement, 17 January 2005, Prosecutor v. Vidolje Blagojević and
Dragan Jokić, case No. IT-02-60, para. 797.
8CR 2006/16, pp.33-35, paras.94-95, p.39, para.116; CR 2006/17, p.24, para.226; CR 2006/21, p.16,

paras. 1-3.
8See CR 2006/12, p.12, para.11 (Stojanovi ć); see also p.13, para.15 or pp.15-16, para.23, or CR 2006/21,
p. 40, para. 40 (Stojanović). - 32 -

a wrongful act without the accomplice necessarily shar ing the criminal intent of the perpetrator of

the act. Unfortunately, the leadership in Belgrade shared only too readily the genocidal intent of its

counterpart in Pale.

90
79. As for the bare fact of assistance, we dealt with it at length last month and will return to

it again in this second round of oral argument. I would just like to emphasize that, far from

91
denying the provision of massive aid to the Bosnian Serbs during the period of genocide , the

Respondent has attempted to justify its attitude, not ably by the fear (or likelihood as Mr. Brownlie

92
put it ) of a genocide being committed against the Serbs. I have just said what can be made of this

unlikely attempt at justification. In any case, th e fact is that Serbia and Montenegro provided

massive aid to Republika Srpska and, as Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown in great detail, without

this aid, this entity could not have existed and certa inly could not have put into effect its genocidal

policy known as “ethnic cleansing”.

42 80. Mr.Brownlie sees nothing wrong in this: “the assistance provided by the FRY to the

Republika Srpska and its armed forces was perfect ly compatible with the principles of general

international law and the provisions of the United Nations Charter” 93. This is somewhat disturbing,

Madam President. Thus, massive aid contributing decisively to a genocidal policy carried out

openly with a view to the “serbianization” of the territories claimed as being a part of Greater

Serbia is apparently compatible with the principles of international law and with the United Nations

Charter? That was not the opinion of the organs of the United Nations, which condemned such aid

94
repeatedly . It did not appear to be the opinion of Serbia and Montenegro’s Agent before this

Court, who, as I have just noted, is less indulgent than his counsel towards the actions of the former

Government of his country. And it is certainly not the opinion of Serbia and Montenegro’s Council

9Reply, pp. 468-498, paras. 11-58, pp. 588-589, para. 212; CR 2006/4, pp. 12-21, paras. 10-44 (van den Biesen);
CR 2006/8, pp.39-50, paras.1-36 (van den Biesen); CR 2006/9, pp. 25-44, paras 7-47 (Torkildsen); CR 2006/10,

pp. 18-27, paras. 19-37 (Condorelli), ibid., p. 45, para. 16 (Pellet).
9See, for example, CR 2006/16, p.39, para.116 (Brown lie) or CR 2006/17, pp.16 and on, paras.1991 and on
(Brownlie).

9CR 2006/17, p. 17.

9Ibid., p. 23, para. 222.
94
See United Nations, doc. A/RES/46/242, 25 Ap ril 1992; United Nations, doc. A/RES/47/121,
18December1992; United Nations, doc. S/RES/819 (1993), 16 April 1993; United Nations, doc. S/RES/820 (1993),
17April 1993; United Nations, doc. S/RES/838 (1993), 10 June 1993; United Nations, doc. A/RES/48/88,
20 December 1993. - 33 -

of Ministers which, in a declaration it adopted on 15June2005, in commemoration of the

10thanniversary of Srebrenica, expressly attribut ed to the “undemocratic regime of terror and

death” of Milosevic (that is the Government of the FRY at the time) this “massive crime” . 95

81. In so doing, the Government of Serbia and Montenegro has, in truth, gone a lot further

than mere recognition of past aid and complicity. It has admitted its full responsibility as the

perpetrator of the atrocities committed at Sr ebrenica. In view of such a declaration ⎯ a

commendably dignified admission, although it would have been more convincing had it contained

the word “genocide”— we, on this side of the floor, have great difficulty in understanding how

certain members of Serbia and Montenegro’s lega l team can continue to assert blandly that the

Respondent was in no way involved in the ge nocidal policy implemented in Bosnia and

96
Herzegovina , or that the victims of massacres were ju st combatants engaging in attacks against
97
the Serb forces .

43 82. The fact is, in any case, Madam President , that the Respondent was present in a wide

variety of ways in that part of Bosnia and He rzegovina controlled by the Serbs and subjected to

“ethnic cleansing”; it made an active contribution to that end; and it recognizes its responsibility

for one of the most terrible episodes of this trag edy— Srebrenica. We believe that this goes far

beyond mere aiding and abetting or complicity in ge nocide or just conspiracy within the meaning

of ArticleIII (b) of the 1948 Convention. We are convinced that Serbia and Montenegro’s

involvement in genocide was such that it should be regarded as the real perpetrator, either because

Republika Srpska was under the control of th e FRY in accordance with Article8 of the

2001ILCArticles or because it should be regarded as one of the FRY’s organs in line with

Article 4 of the same text.

83. As I have done for the other sections of my presentation today, before I finish I would

like, Madam President, to resume the main points of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reasoning

95
Available at http://www.info.gov.yu/aveznavlada/detaljis.php?strid=699; copy in judges’ folder of
6 March 2006.
96
CR 2006/17, pp. 10-15, paras. 162-183 (Brownlie).
9CR 2006/16, pp. 10-12, paras. 3-12 (Brownlie); CR 2006/18, p. 38, para. 94 (de Roux); CR 2006/19, pp.10-11,
paras. 146-147 (de Roux). - 34 -

concerning the attribution to the Respondent of th e genocide carried out on the former’s territory

between 1992 and 1995.

(1) If Republika Srpska was a State, it was a puppet St ate, with no legal existence at international

level and its internationally wrongf ul acts engage entirely the r esponsibility of the “dominant”

State, in this case the FRY, of which this so-called State was no more than an organ.

(2) Or else the FRY exercised undivided and effective control over this entity and its responsibility

as organ of the genocide is thus engaged.

(3) In view of the global nature of the geno cide committed against the non-Serb populations of

Republika Srpska, and in particular the Muslims, th ere is no need to require that this control be

demonstrated for every — unfortunately countless — genocidal act which, together, constituted

the genocide for which the Respondent is responsible.

(4) It is only in the alternative that Bosnia and Herzegovina requests you, Members of the Court, to

find that the Respondent should, at the very least, be regarded as an accomplice to genocide

within the meaning of Article III (e) of the Convention and, in the further alternative, as having

44 aided and abetted genocide on account of the multif aceted and decisive aid to the commission

of genocide provided by it.

84. Madam President, we felt that it would be helpful, on this first day of the second round of

oral argument, to provide an outline of our position, so that the Court might have an overview of it.

It was, one might say, a transition between the two phases of our argument. But this is of course

just an “overture” — long as it may have been — and much as I hope that it has proved clear and

coherent, the main “themes” of our reasoning need to be addressed in greater detail and developed

both in terms of the facts and of the law. My colleagues will now use their time to cover these

areas more closely while following roughly the same outline as I have just used; we will conclude

by conducting a lengthy and necessary analysis of the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction.

Members of the Court, I thank you for your patient attention and kindly ask you,

MadamPresident, to recall the Deputy Agent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who will sum up what

we have learnt from hearing the witnesses, experts and witness-experts. Thank you very much.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Pellet. Je donne la parole à M. van den Biesen. - 35 -

M. van den BIESEN :

APPRECIATION DES DEPOSITIONS DES TEMOINS ,EXPERTS ET TEMOINS -EXPERTS

Introduction

1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la C our, je ne pense pas exagérer en disant que

l’audition des témoins, experts et témoins-expe rts a constitué pour nous tous une expérience

judiciaire exceptionnelle. Si en général les avocats ⎯ et je ne m’exclus pas du nombre ⎯ qui ne

plaident pas au pénal n’aiment guère les auditions d’experts ou de témoins et, en fait, n’en ont pas

vraiment l’habitude, il est apparu clairement que les pénalistes ne sont pas non plus

particulièrement à leur place dans une procédure «civile».

2. Sans doute est-ce aussi pour cela que, selon nous, les deux Parties n’ont pas retiré

grand-chose de ces auditions, même s’il semble juste de dire que la Bosnie-Herzégovine a

45 finalement remporté un certain avantage sur le dé fendeur. La qualité des deux experts appelés à la

barre par la Bosnie en est sans conteste l’unique raison. De manière générale, on peut penser que la

Cour et les Parties auraient probablement tiré un plus grand bénéfice du concours des experts s’il

avait été demandé à ceux-ci de présenter leur point de vue par écrit bien avant leur audition. Cela

nous aurait vraisemblablement permis à tous d’avoir avec eux des échanges plus satisfaisants.

3. Je consacrerai cette partie de nos plaidoiri es à un bref examen de l’intervention de chacun

des témoins, experts et témoins- experts mais, évidemment, nous aurons encore à revenir sur leur

déposition.

4. Madame le président, il est incontestable que les témoins appelés à la barre par le

défendeur ⎯pour notre part, nous n’avons pas présenté de témoins ⎯ n’ont fait que répéter, à

maintes reprises, les arguments que le défendeur avait avancés au cours de ses trente heures de

plaidoiries du premier tour. Cela n’a toutefois pas été le cas de l’expert appelé à la barre par le

défendeur, ni de ceux présentés par la Bosnie-Her zégovine. S’agissant des seconds, le conseil du

défendeur a posé à M. Riedlmayer la question de sa voir si son exposé n’était pas, en réalité, «plus

la déposition d’un avocat que d’un témoin impartial extérieur» 98. Quoi qu’on puisse penser de

98
CR 2006/22, p. 54 (Fauveau-Ivanović). - 36 -

M. Riedlmayer, on ne peut certainement pas lui re procher de plaider. Ses connaissances étendues

ont paru confirmer la thèse présentée par la Bosnie-Herzégovine tout au long de cette affaire. Mais

il n’est pas parvenu à ces conclusions parce que la Bosnie-Herzégovine lui avait demandé de le

faire ou parce qu’il voulait lui faire plaisir. Ce qu’il a dit, il l’a dit parce que, à sa connaissance,

c’était la vérité. Si l’on compare cette remarque du conseil du défendeur et celle que M. Brownlie

avait faite au sujet de M.MortenTorkildsen, la seconde était plus aimable et sans doute aussi

beaucoup plus juste: M. Brownlie a qualifié M. Torkildsen de «témoin-expert présenté comme

conseil», ce qui revenait en r éalité à reconnaître l’indépendance et la qualité de l’exposé de

M. Torkildsen 9. Madame le président, permettez-moi à présent de passer en revue les différents

exposés, et je commencerai par celui de M. Riedlmayer.

46 M. Andras Riedlmayer

5. En définitive, M. Riedlmayer a établi clai rement deux points par l’exposé de trois heures

qu’il a fait le vendredi 17 mars 2006. Il a démontré :

1. qu’il est incontestablement le grand spécialis te de la question de la destruction des biens

culturels en Bosnie-Herzégovine (et au Kosovo également, d’ailleurs).

2. que la destruction par la Partie serbe de mo squées et d’autres lieux de culte musulmans, ainsi

que d’églises catholiques et d’autres lieux de culte catholiques, ne s’était pas produite dans le

cadre de combats armés, mais s’inscrivait en réalité dans une politique mûrement planifiée,

réfléchie et menée à grande échelle, politique visant à détruire l’esprit et l’âme de la population

non serbe de Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Oui, nous nous félicitons d’avoir à nos côtés un expe rt de si haut niveau, notamment parce qu’il a

su, par sa sincérité, démontrer sans l’ombre d’un doute qu’il avait observé sans idées préconçues

les événements qui s’étaient déroulés en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

6. M. Riedlmayer a fourni une description dé taillée des différents épisodes de la destruction

du patrimoine culturel non serbe, destruction commen cée en 1991 par la JNA, qui s’est intensifiée

en avril 1992 par des actes de la Partie serbe, et s’est poursuivie tout au long du nettoyage ethnique

99
CR 2006/17, p. 27, par. 245 (Brownlie). - 37 -

pour s’étendre également à la destruction des mosquées de Srebrenica après le massacre de

juillet 1995.

7. M. Riedlmayer a également confirmé que l’ Institut oriental de Sarajevo avait été détruit

par des obus incendiaires le 17 mai 1992, et indiqué pour quelle raison il l’avait été. Cet incendie

constituait, sans nul doute, une attaque délibérée contre l’identité musulmane et contre les

Musulmans en tant que partie constitutive de la soci été et de l’histoire de la Bosnie. En outre,

M.Riedlmayer a établi non seulement que l’attaqu e menée contre la Bibliothèque nationale de

Sarajevo avait bien été menée par les Serbes, mais aussi qu’elle visait manifestement à détruire ce

bâtiment, symbole de la composition multiethnique et multiculturelle de la société bosniaque;

l’épisode le plus révélateur de l’ incendie de la Bibliothèque étant que des tireurs isolés avaient fait

feu depuis les collines environnantes pour empêcher que l’on sorte les trésors du bâtiment pour les

sauver et que l’on éteigne l’incendie.

8. La façon dont M. Riedlmayer a répondu à toutes les questions qui lui ont été posées au

cours de son contre-interrogatoire a, de toute évid ence, empêché le défendeur d’en tirer avantage.

La sincérité avec laquelle il a répondu à la ques tion concernant la lettre qu’il avait envoyée au

47 président Clinton, lui demandant ⎯ au président Clinton ⎯ de mettre fin à l’embargo sur les armes

que les Etats-Unis avaient imposé à la Bosnie-Herzégovine, a démontré, une fois encore, qu’il était

un homme de qualité. A cet égard, nous souhaiteri ons ajouter que M.Riedlmayer a envoyé cette

lettre après que le Sénat américain, le 26 juillet 1 995, eut voté à une majorité écrasante la levée de

l’embargo, en s’appuyant sur l’article 51 de la Ch arte des Nations Unies, comme M. Riedlmayer le

faisait dans sa lettre. La Chambre des représentants avait auparavant voté dans le même sens, à une

100 101
majorité similaire . Cette mesure était clairement soutenue par les deux partis . Autrement dit,

le fait de défendre cette position n’était pas po litiquement orienté: il est clair qu’à l’époque,

M. Riedlmayer était un citoyen du monde extrêmem ent inquiet, et cette position était aussi celle de

millions d’autres citoyens du monde.

100104 congrès des Etats-Unis d’ Amérique (première session), Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defence Act
of 1995, H. R. 1172 et S. 21, adopté par le Sénat le 26 juillet 1995 ( legislative day 10 juillet 1995)Voir :
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_bill….

101Voir le procès-verbal du vote par appel nominal : www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=104&session=1&vote=00331 - 38 -

9. En comparaissant en tant qu’expert au nom de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, M.Riedlmayer a

clairement étayé l’argument de la Bosnie concernant l’intention génocidaire qui a présidé aux actes

commis, argument qui occupe une place centrale dans notre thèse. M.Riedlmayer a également

renforcé la position de la Bosnie concernant l’«a tteinte grave à l’intégrité…mentale de membres

du groupe», prévue à l’alinéa b) de l’article II de la convention su r le génocide, dans la mesure où

la destruction de ce précieux et vivant patrimoine culturel a vé ritablement atteint, affecté et

sérieusement meurtri les cŒurs et les esprits, tant des Croates de Bosnie que des Bosniaques.

Le général Richard Dannatt

10. Au cours de son intervention de près de trois heures devant la Cour, le lundi

20 mars 2006, le général Dannatt a fait la démonstration éclatante des raisons pour lesquelles il est

sur le point de devenir commandant en chef de l’état-major des forces armées du Royaume-Uni,

c’est-à-dire l’officier le plus gradé du pays. Ses vues hautement stratégiques sur les questions

militaires et, plus particulièrement, sur les relations qui existent entre les dirigeants politiques,

d’une part, et les exécutants militaires, d’autre part , ont donné à la Cour une idée claire de la façon

dont se prépare le recours à la forc e armée, et dont ce recours à la force est guidé et dirigé par les

autorités politiques.

11. Le général Dannatt a répondu à des questions à première vue d’ordre général sur le

«pourquoi», le «qui» et le «comment» exactement comme on peut s’y attendre de la part d’un

48 commandant en chef de l’armée de terre appelé à conseiller les plus hautes autorités politiques de

son pays, ce qu’il fait actuellement. Répondre à ce genre de questions à ce niveau du processus de

décision est, par définition, quelque chose qui requiert à la fois une vision d’ensemble et une

connaissance détaillée de la manière dont les choses se passent dans la réalité.

12. Il apparaît clairement que l’analyse du général Dannatt n’est pas fondée sur un point de

vue personnel, mais sur des années d’expérience du terrain, des années d’étude et d’enseignement,

et des années passées à concevoir et à mettre en Œuvre la stratégie militaire d’un grand Etat, l’un

des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. - 39 -

13. Sur la base de cette expérience, qu’il a démontrée à la Cour dans son exposé sur les

différents niveaux de prise de décisions 102, et de sa connaissance du fonctionnement des armées,

des moyens qui leur permettent d’agir, ainsi que des règles fondamentales qui régissent le

fonctionnement de toute armée, il a établi claireme nt que la notion de Grande Serbie, qui s’est

propagée à Belgrade à la fin des années quatre-ving t et au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, avait

été traduite en plans plus concrets et constitué le ressort principal des événements qui se sont

déroulés dans les Balkans: tout d’abord ⎯ en 1991 ⎯ en Croatie puis, à partir du début de

l’année 1992, en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

14. Le général Dannatt a précisé à la Cour que la JNA avait effectivement distribué des

103
quantités énormes d’armes en Bosnie et indiqué que, compte tenu de la nature de la structure de

commandement de la JNA, cette distribution n’ avait pas été décidée à un niveau subalterne 104. Il a

expliqué le caractère inhabituel de ce qui s’est p assé lorsque la JNA s’est retirée, indiquant que s’il

avait lui-même retiré une armée en abandonnant ses armes, il aurait été tenu pour «personnellement

105
responsable de la mauvaise utilisation de l’équi pement et de [sa] négligence en la matière» . Le

généralDannatt a expliqué qu’il n’était pas illogi que en soi que des Bosno-Serbes demeurent en

Bosnie après l’indépendance de ce pays et postulent à un emploi dans l’armée locale. Sa réponse a

suscité quelques sourires de la part des conseils du défendeur, mais il n’y avait en réalité pas de

quoi : le général Dannatt n’a pas dit qu’il était norma l de rester sur place et de postuler à un emploi

au sein d’une armée sécessionniste, c’est-à-dire d’une armée qui s’opposerait au gouvernement

légitime de l’Etat. Au contraire, et ce point est très important, il a dit qu’il était «inhabituel» de
49
106
faire partie de deux armées à la fois : la VRS et l’armée yougoslave .

15. En outre, à propos de ce caractère «inhabituel» pour un officier d’être employé par

deux armées en même temps, le général Dannatt a analysé le cas de deux des officiers qui se sont

trouvés dans cette situation «inha bituelle», les généraux Krsti ć et Pandurević, les considérant tout

simplement comme des exemples d’officiers ayan t une double «casquette», mais dont le véritable

10CR 2006/23, p. 13.

10Ibid., p. 27.
104
Ibid., p. 11-12.
10Ibid., p. 39.

10Ibid., p. 19. - 40 -

e 107
supérieur était en réalité l’armée yougoslave, à travers le 30 centre du personnel . Nous

souhaitons rappeler à la Cour que ces deux personnes ne sont que des exemples, des exemples d’un

phénomène fort répandu: selon M. Lili ć ⎯ à l’époque président de la RFY ⎯, qui a témoigné

devant le TPIY en l’affaire Milošević, environ mille huit cents officiers de la VRS étaient en fait

108
des officiers de l’armée yougoslave .

16. S’agissant de la question des «opéra tions conjointes», le général Dannatt a très

clairement établi que les opérations du type de celles que nous avons présentées à la Cour,

auxquelles participaient des unités de l’armée et des unités paramilitaires des trois entités serbes, ne

109
sont possibles que sur la base d’un processus de décision élaboré d’un commun accord .

17. La Bosnie-Herzégovine considère que le général Dannatt, sur la base de sa propre

expérience, de ses connaissances et de sa clairvoyance, a confirmé les raisons pour lesquelles, dans

les années quatre-vingt-dix, le Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies avait, dans

de nombreuses résolutions successives, désigné Belgrade comme le principal responsable de ce qui

se passait en Bosnie. Le général Dannatt a confirmé ⎯de son propre point de vue ⎯ que la

présente Cour avait à bon droit, dans ses deux ordonnances de 1993, demandé au défendeur: en

substance, de s’abstenir de tout soutien aux forces qui commettraient un génocide en

Bosnie-Herzégovine; il a également confirmé que la Bosnie-Herzégovine a raison de soutenir que

c’est Belgrade, c’est-à-dire le défendeur, qui est le premier et le principal responsable des

problèmes en cause en la présente affaire. Nous reviendrons sur la déposition du général Dannatt

par la suite et j’en viens maintenant à M. Lukić.

50 M. Vladimir Lukić

18. M. Vladimir Luki ć, le premier témoin appelé à la barre par la Serbie-et-Monténégro, a

fait partie des dirigeants de la Republika Srpska durant la majeure partie de la période pertinente en

l’espèce. Au cours de sa déposition, il n’a pas vrai ment fait mystère de ses antécédents en qualité

de premier ministre de la Republika Srpska entr e janvier1993 et août1994: il s’est longuement

107
CR 2006/23, p. 27-28.
108TPIY, Le procureur c. Slobodan Miloševi ć, affaire n IT-02-54, compte rendu d’audience du 17juin2003,

p. 22591. Voir www.un.org/icty/transe54/030617IT.htm.
109CR 2006/23, p. 29-34. - 41 -

exprimé en tant que tel, abordant de nombreuses questions dans des termes plutôt généraux. Il n’a

jamais été très concret et ne s’est à aucun moment efforcé d’appuyer ses dires sur des éléments de

preuve supplémentaires. De plus, il n’a ab solument rien ajouté à la propagande que la

Bosnie-Herzégovine n’a que trop entendu, se contentant de la reprendre. Il n’a pas non plus ajouté

le moindre élément de fond à ce que le défendeur av ait déjà dit à la Cour. En réalité, il a plaidé

pour le défendeur, bien que de manière assez répétitive. Ce faisant, il a également donné le

sentiment de mélanger des observations personne lles avec des choses qu’il avait entendu dire à

l’époque, des rumeurs ou d es informations floues dont il avait pu avoir vent. A aucun moment, le

rôle précis qu’il a personnellement joué dans le processus de décision n’a été éclairci. Sans doute

n’y a-t-il là rien de surprenant, dans la mesure où le défendeur a indiqué à plusieurs reprises que, si

quelqu’un devait être tenu pour responsable des actes reprochés par la Bosnie en la présente affaire,

ce devrait être la Republika Srpska. A l’évid ence, les responsables serbes de Bosnie venus

témoigner en ces lieux ne pouvaient pas y voir une invitation à faire preuve d’une grande franchise

au sujet du rôle qu’ils ont joué personnellement à l’époque.

19. Les allégations de M. Luki ć concernant un massacre de civils serbes à Pofali ći et

l’expulsion de six mille civils serbes 110, événements auxquels il prétend avoir assisté

personnellement, semblent n’être rien de plus qu’une rumeur infondée. En tout cas, le demandeur,

dont le gouvernement siège à deux pas de là, à Sarajevo, ne reconnaît aucun des événements

auxquels M. Lukić fait allusion.

20. Le récit de ce que M.Luki ć a appelé la «libération de Trnovo» 111est révélateur. A cet

égard, nous aimerions rappeler à la Cour que le recensement de 1991 montrait que la municipalité

de Trnovo avait une population mixte, avec une la rge majorité de Musulmans (69,2%). Cette

municipalité a été prise par le défe ndeur et a subi un nettoyage ethni que. Le témoin, lui, considère

112
qu’elle a été «libérée» . Après Dayton, la municipalité a été divisée en deux parties, l’une

relevant de la Fédération et l’autre de la Republika Srpska. Une partie de la population musulmane

110CR 2006/24, p. 18-19.

111Ibid., p. 16.

112Voir TPIY, Le procureur c. Slobodan Milosevic , affaire noIT-02-54, «Ethnic composition, internally
displaced persons and refugees from 47 municipa lities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991 to 1997-98» , rapport d’experts
présenté par Ewa Tabeau, c.s., annexe A1, 4 avril 2003, p. 69-84. - 42 -

51 y est retournée; non plus dans une municipalité ethni quement mixte, mais dans une partie de cette

municipalité dite ethniquement «pure», dont le témoin considère qu’elle a été «libérée».

LuMk2i.1. ć a en outre fait montre d’un manque total de crédibilité en tentant de faire croire

à la Cour qu’il n’était pas au courant de l’ex istence des six objectifs stratégiques. Ceux-ci

s’inscrivaient dans la politique officielle de la Republika Srpska, ils y ont été publiés au Journal

officiel, ils étaient au cŒur du plan que les Serb es de Bosnie s’employaient à mettre en Œuvre : il

semble totalement inconcevable que le premier ministre de l’époque n’en ait pas eu connaissance.

22. Qu’il n’ait pas le souvenir d’avoir créé une commission pour le droit international, cela

est hautement invraisemblable eu égard à la mission assignée à cette commission, laquelle a été

énoncée dans une décision officielle portant la signature de M. Luki ć et publiée au Journal officiel

de la Republika Srpska. Je ne citerai qu’une partie des tâches confiées à la commission ⎯ la liste

intégrale figure dans le dossier des juges. Sa mission était la suivante :

«⎯ préparation du procès relatif au génocide commis contre des membres du peuple
serbe;

⎯ participation au travail des organes comp étents chargés de préparer une réponse
dans le cadre du procès pour le génocid e prétendument commis par la République

fédérale de Yougoslavie;

⎯ coopération avec les experts juridiques de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie

dans le cadre de l’instance introduite deva nt la Cour internationale de Justice de
La Haye et d’éventuelles procédures ultérieures;

⎯ coopération avec des institutions juridiques respectables et d’éminents experts du
monde entier.» 113

Lorsque ces objectifs de la commission ont été présentés à M. Luki ć au cours de sa déposition, il a

114
formellement déclaré: «C’est faux, c’est entièrement faux.» Puis il a prétendu ne pas être au

courant de l’instance introduite par la Bosnie, de la présente instance devant la Cour internationale

de Justice, affirmant ne pas en avoir entendu pa rler «pendant la guerre [et] pas davantage…à

115
Dayton» . Et il a ajouté : «Si nous en avions eu connaissance, je peux vous assurer [je peux vous

assurer] que nous nous serions comportés de manière très différente à Dayton.» 116

113Journal officiel de la Republika Srpska, n 6, 20 mai 1993, p. 265, art. 2.
114
CR 2006/24, p. 29.
115Ibid.

116Ibid., p. 30. - 43 -

23. Soit M. Luki ć ment purement et simplement, soit, ce qui est sans doute plus

vraisemblable, son récit démontre qu’il n’avait p as voix au chapitre à Dayton. En effet, à Dayton,

52 c’est M. Milošević qui était aux commandes, et M. Luki ć, en tant que membre de la délégation, ne

faisait que de la figuration. Quoi qu’il en soit, il est certain que la demande de la Bosnie, qui avait

donné lieu à deux séries d’audiences publiques et à deux ordonnances de votre Cour, n’est pas

passée inaperçue dans la région à l’époque. En outre, chacun sait que M. Miloševi ć a inscrit cette

demande en tête de l’ordre du jour de toutes les négociations de paix ⎯y compris celles de

Dayton ⎯, exigeant son retrait inconditionnel et immédi at; comme je l’ai dit, il l’a fait aussi à

Dayton.

M. Vitomir Popović

24. M. Vitomir Popovi ć, le deuxième témoin du défendeur s’est placé nettement dans la

même catégorie que M. Lukić : celle des témoins sans aucune crédibilité.

25. Bien que M. Popović ait exercé plusieurs fonctions en Republika Srpska, y compris celle

de vice-premier ministre, il n’a jamais, pas plus que M. Lukić, traité concrètement le moindre sujet

dans sa déposition.

26. Il a adopté la position bien connue de la Republika Srpska et du défendeur au sujet des

divergences d’opinion sur le plan Vance-Owen qui, comme nous le savons, a finalement été rejeté

par la Republika Srpska. Il y a des raisons de mettre en doute aussi bien les explications du

défendeur que celles de la Republika Srpska —et de M. Popovi ć— au sujet de ces prétendues

divergences d’opinion, mais l’essentiel, pour nous, est de savoir si le rôle du défendeur a — comme

celui-ci l’affirme— ou n’a pas changé après le mois de mai 1993. Sur ce point, M.Popovi ć a

mauvaise mémoire, à moins qu’il ne soit tout simple ment mal informé. Il a déclaré que l’aide

humanitaire était «réduite au strict minimum», ma is on a compris ensuite qu’il n’avait pris en

compte ni l’aide financière, ni le financement du corps des officiers de l’armée serbe de Bosnie

dans son explication. Ce financement rele vait selon lui —qui était à l’époque vice-premier

ministre— d’un ministère qu’il ne «dirigeai[t ] pas», ajoutant qu’il n’avait jamais vu aucune

information en ce sens 11. La chose est tout à fait incroyable, étant donné que nous avons montré

117
CR 2006/25, p. 16. - 44 -

que 90% du budget de la Republika Srpska était financé par Belgrade, ce que le vice-premier

ministre devait savoir. Cela vaut aussi pour le paiement de la solde de mille huit cents officiers des

forces armées serbes de Bosnie ⎯ ce n’est pas quelque chose qui passe inaperçu de quelqu’un qui

occupe un tel poste. Cela vaut également pour l’accord de mai 1994 entre les banques nationales

53 des trois entités serbes, accord qui a placé les principales institutions financières de la Republika

Srpska sous le contrôle de la banque nationale yougoslave.

27. Comme M. Lukić, et de manière tout aussi incroyable, M. Popovi ć a lui aussi affirmé ne

pas avoir eu connaissance des six objectifs straté giques qui constituaient la clef de voûte de la

politique adoptée publiquement par la Republika Srpska.

28. M. Popovi ć, lui, s’est souvenu de la commission du droit international, ce qui pourrait

s’expliquer par le fait qu’il en était le président. En revanche, il semble avoir plus de difficulté à se

rappeler le mandat précis de cette commission qui —comme nous le savons maintenant—

consistait principalement à aider le défendeur à me ttre sur pied sa défense devant la Cour en la

présente instance. M. Popovi ć pensait que cette commission — qu’il présidait — était chargée de

la mise en Œuvre des dispositions de la conventi on européenne des droits de l’homme, mais il n’a

pas précisé ce que cela pouvait recouvrir. Dans ce contexte, il lui a semblé se souvenir de

problèmes de logement que rencontraient les offici ers de la JNA qui quittaient le territoire de la

118
Republika Srpska . Puis, comme on insistait, M.Popovi ć a ajouté aux attributions de la

commission —qui semblaient lui être revenues à l’esprit— les «crimes commis contre la

119
population serbe sur le territoire de l’ancienne Bosnie-Herzégovine» . Nous tenons à attirer

l’attention de la Cour sur cette déclarati on singulière, non pas tellement parce qu’elle est

manifestement fausse, mais parce que le témoin parle en l’occurrence de l’ «ancienne»

Bosnie-Herzégovine. Si cette déclaration traduit s on état d’esprit de l’époque, elle est révélatrice;

si elle traduit son état d’esprit actuel, elle est inquiétante, puisqu’il exerce aujourd’hui la fonction

de médiateur pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

118
CR 2006/25, p. 16.
119
CR 2005/26, p. 18. - 45 -

Sir Michael Rose

29. Contrairement au général Dannatt, le généra l Rose a comparu en tant que témoin devant

la Cour. Il a donné un tour singulier à sa déposition en déclarant, d’entrée de jeu: «Je me

considère comme un témoin de la Cour, et rien d’autre.» 120 Ce faisant, le témoin s’est

expressément distancié de la décision prise par la Cour et communiquée par le greffier aux Parties

par lettre en date du 15 novembre 2005 (124553), selon laquelle la Cour avait décidé, à ce stade, de

ne pas user du pouvoir que lui confère le paragr aphe2 de l’article62 du Règlement de faire

déposer des «témoins de la Cour». Madame le président, vous vous en souviendrez, la Cour avait
54

pris cette décision après que la Bosnie-Herzé govine se fut opposée à la proposition du défendeur

tendant à ce que la Cour fasse immédiatement usage de ce pouvoir, en convoquant comme témoins

—en vertu de cette proposition — notamment le gé néral Rose. Puisque le général Rose tenait à

être considéré exclusivement comme un «témoin de la Cour», le défendeur aurait même dû

d’emblée enlever son nom de la liste.

30. Au cours de sa déposition, le général Ro se a répété que, selon lu i, la période allant

de 1992 à 1995 en Bosnie-Herzégovine était une période de guerre civile. Nous avons déjà indiqué

aujourd’hui que cette définition n’est pas en soi pe rtinente par rapport à ce qui est en jeu dans la

présente espèce. Ce qui est plus important, c’ est qu’il a confirmé l’absence d’équilibre des

responsabilités en l’espèce. Il a déclaré que «[b]ien entendu, les forces militaires qui étaient sous le

commandement du général Mladić ont été de très loin les principaux auteurs de crimes de guerre et

d’atrocités pendant la guerre civile» 12. Il a également confirmé que l’armée du Gouvernement

bosniaque comprenait des membres de tous les groupes ethniques, que ce n’était pas une armée

exclusivement musulmane et qu’«[i]l [était] donc plus juste de parler de forces du Gouvernement

122
bosniaque» . Il a aussi confirmé ce qu’il avait dit dans sa déposition deva nt le TPIY: «[l]es

Serbes ne peuvent en aucun cas être décrits comme des artisans de la paix. C’étaient eux les

123
agresseurs.» Enfin, il a confirmé la thèse qu’il avait déjà avancée dans son livre, à savoir que

120
CR 2006/26, p. 10.
121
Ibid., p. 11.
122Ibid., p. 24.

123Ibid., p. 29. Voir aussi TPIY, Le procureur c. Stanislav Galić, affaire n IT-98-29, compte rendu de
l’audience du 20 juin 2000, p. 10267, voir : www.un.org/icty/transf29/020620FE.htm. - 46 -

⎯pendant cette guerre civile ⎯ une seule partie était coupable de génocide: «c’est le régime de

Pale qui commettait un génocide» 124, a-t-il déclaré. Le défendeur devra clarifier sa position au

cours du deuxième tour de plaidoiries, après avoi r maintes fois répété qu’il n’y avait pas eu de

génocide.

31. Le général Rose a affirmé, à partir de ce qu’il avait personnellement pu observer, «qu’il y

avait un soutien matériel sous forme de carbu rant, de munitions, de renforts en soldats

125
«volontaires» pour combattre dans les rangs de l’armée de la Republika Srpska en Serbie» . Il a

aussi confirmé les déplacements réguliers de Mladić à Belgrade et expliqué que, par l’intermédiaire

126
de Belgrade, il pouvait obtenir des choses qu’ il ne pouvait obtenir en s’adressant à Pale . Il a

affirmé qu’il n’existait pas de dispositif officiel de commandement militaire et que, du côté des

Serbes de Bosnie, «il n’y avait pas … de commandeme nt général, ce qui aurait été le cas dans une

55 coalition de forces» 127. Lorsque le juge Owada lui a demandé sur quoi reposaient ces observations,

il a répondu :

«C’u étaeit conclusion déduite des impressions que j’avais eues pendant cette
période. Il n’y avait aucune preuve conc rète les confirmant ou les infirmant mais,
ayant passé toute ma carrière dans l’armée, je sais ce que sont des relations officielles

de commandement militaire et, à mon avis, il n’y en avait pas entre ces deux
organisations.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)

32. Madame le président, le général Rose a illu stré par là la grande différence entre son

témoignage et la déposition faite par le général Dannatt en tant qu’expert. La déposition du général

Rose repose entièrement ⎯ comme il l’a indiqué ⎯ sur ses impressions et sa propre expérience de

militaire. Le général Dannatt a une bien meilleure connaissance théorique des armées en général, il

a une expérience considérable et il a assumé des responsabilités beaucoup plus larges que le

général Rose au long de sa carrière. En plus ⎯et cela a son importance ⎯, alors que le général

Rose a déclaré qu’il «n’y avait aucune preuve concrète … confirmant ou … infirmant [ses

impressions]» 12, le général Dannatt, avant de venir dépo ser en tant qu’expert, avait étudié

124CR 2006/26, p. 34.

125Ibid., p. 13.
126
Ibid., p. 13 et 28.
127
Ibid., p. 13.
128Ibid., p. 33. - 47 -

longuement de nombreux rapports militaires et documents connexes du TPIY qui étaient

accessibles au public.

33. A la fin de sa déposition, le général Rose s’ est écarté de son rôle de témoin et il a donné

son point de vue personnel sur la présente instan ce. Ce point de vue est bien connu de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine. Que ce point de vue soit erro né et ne réponde pas à l’objet même de la

présente instance ni d’ailleurs à la finalité même des décisions qu’il est demandé à la Cour de

129
rendre, tout cela a été traité par M. Franck durant le premier tour de plaidoiries . Le point de vue

du général Rose n’ébranlera pas la conviction et l’ engagement ferme de la Bosnie-Herzégovine en

l’espèce.

M. Jean-Paul Sardon

34. Le défendeur avait soumis à la Cour un résumé très succinct de l’exposé qu’allait faire

M. Sardon. L’exposé lui-même a été tout sauf succi nct. A une vitesse extrême, M. Sardon a lu un

exposé très long et extrêmement technique, ce qui ne nous a pas permis de mener un véritable

56 contre-interrogatoire. Comme nous examinerons pl us tard dans la semain e le sujet traité par

M. Sardon, je me limiterai maintenant à quelques remarques concernant sa déposition.

35. M. Sardon s’est manifestement contenté de faire de longues observations sur les rapports

établis par les experts du TPIY. Il a souligné qu’il n’avait jamais effectué aucune recherche

lui-même 130et reconnu qu’il n’avait jamais soumis ses thèses aux auteurs des rapports du TPIY. Il

n’a pas non plus proposé d’approche et de méthode différentes de celles des enquêteurs du TPIY et

encore moins fourni de nouvelles conclusions étayées par des recherches approfondies.

36. De ce point de vue, le demandeur estime que l’exposé de M. Sardon ne peut pas être

considéré comme une véritable contribution au débat engagé dans la présente instance.

M. Dušan Mihajlović

37. M. Mihajlovi ć, appelé en tant que témoin, s’est placé dans la double position

d’observateur extérieur et de participant de l’intérieur. Observateur extérieur, parce qu’il n’exerçait

aucune fonction officielle dans le Gouvernement de la Serbie au cours de la période qui nous

129
CR 2006/11 (Franck).
130
CR 2006/26, p. 36. - 48 -

intéresse; participant de l’intérieur puisque son parti était une composante du Gouvernement de la

République de Serbie de 1993 à 1997.

38. Le participant Mihajlović ne peut être considéré comme un témoin crédible, puisque son

parti figurait parmi les autorités coupables précisé ment des actes de génocide dont nous tenons le

défendeur pour responsable. Et l’observateur ex térieur n’est pas davantage crédible puisque, en

cette qualité, il ne pouvait avoir connaissance de ce qui se passait à l’intérieur.

39. Il a parfaitement illustré son statut d’ observateur extérieur en affirmant que le

Gouvernement de la République de Serbie ne discutait pas des événements de

Bosnie-Herzégovine 131. Cette déclaration n’est absolument pas crédible : à l’époque, la République

fédérale de Yougoslavie, dont la Serbie était l’entité dominante, fa isait l’objet de sanctions de

l’ONU et de toutes sortes d’autres pressions extérieures. La Cour a ordonné à la RFY, dans deux

ordonnances consécutives, de — en substance ⎯ veiller à ce que les personnes ou entités relevant

de son contrôle ne commettent pas de génocide en Bosnie 132. On ne peut donc absolument pas dire

57 que les autorités de la République de Serbie ne discutaient pas de la situation en

133
Bosnie-Herzégovine à l’époque ; si cette affirmation devait être tenue pour vraie ⎯ ce qu’elle

n’est assurément pas ⎯, le témoin n’a en aucune manière expliqué comment il «savait» que l’aide

humanitaire apportée aux Serbes de Bosnie en Bosnie-Herzégovine n’était qu’occasionnelle.

40. De manière générale, son statut d’observa teur extérieur a été confirmé par le fait qu’il

n’avait jamais été au courant des opérations militaires conjointes menées par la RFY en

coopération avec les forces armées de la Republika Srpska et de la Republika Srpska de Kraïna 134.

Et aussi par le fait qu’il n’avait eu aucune inform ation sur l’argent versé et les fournitures livrées

135
par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie à la Republika Srpska .

41. En fait, M. Mihajlovi ć a fait une seule observation intéressante: «Le 5octobre, nous

avons fait tomber M. Miloševi ć, mais nous n’avons pas changé le système: nous avons hérité du

13CR 2006/27, p. 13.

13C.I.J. Recueil 1993, mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 8 avril 1993, p. 3, par. 52 A) 2.
133
CR 2006/27, p. 12.
13Ibid., p. 19.

13Ibid. - 49 -

legs criminel de l’ère Miloševi ć et Legija faisait partie de cet héritage dont nous ne sommes pas

parvenus à nous débarrasser rapidement.» 136

42. Dans cette observation, premièrement, M. Mihajlovi ć qualifie l’ ère Miloševi ć de

criminelle ⎯ ce qu’a d’ailleurs fait aussi l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro dans ses plaidoiries 137.

Tout au long de sa déposition, M.Mihajlovi ć n’a rien dit qui permette de considérer que ce

qualificatif ne peut pas s’appliquer à la période pertinente pour nous (de la fin des années 80

jusqu’à 1995). La Bosnie-Herzégovine approuve donc sans réserve M. Mihajlović sur ce point.

Deuxièmement, M. Mihajlovi ć confirme que «Legija faisait partie de cet héritage

[criminel]». Sur ce point aussi, la Bosnie-Her zégovine approuve sans réserve le témoin. Nous

avons démontré que Legija éta it le second d’Arkan, qu’il était membre du ministère serbe de

l’Intérieur et qu’il était impliqué dans les actes de violence armée perpétrés à diverses reprises en

138
Bosnie-Herzégovine .

43. Le comportement de M. Mihajlovi ć est typique de la ligne de conduite des représentants

de la Serbie-et-Monténégro en la présente espèc e, qui est d’ailleurs aussi celle du conseil des

139
ministres de la Serbie-et-Monténégro: tous qualifient l’ère Miloševi ć de régime criminel , mais

58 lorsqu’on les interroge sur cette criminalité ou lorsque — comme en l’espèce — il s’agit d’en tirer

les conséquences juridiques, ils adoptent sans peine l’attitude consistant à soutenir qu’il n’y a pas

eu le moindre crime. En cela, M.Mihajlovi ć ne s’est pas comporté comme un véritable témoin,

mais comme un avocat du défendeur.

M. Vladimir Milićević

44. M. Milićević, qui a aussi déposé en tant que témoin, a dirigé un camp à Mitrovo Polje, en

Serbie, du mois d’août 1995 au mois de février 1996. Il a qualifié ce camp de «centre d’accueil» et

décrit les personnes qu’il hébergeait comme «peu instruit[e]s», dans un

140
«état…psychologique…très mauvais» et n’ayant «pas mangé depuis longtemps» . Ces

136CR 2006/27, p. 23.

137CR 2006/12, p. 12, par. 11; p. 13, par. 15; p. 15, par. 23; CR 2006/21, p. 40, par. 40.
138
CR 2006/8, p. 53, par. 56 (Van den Biesen).
139CR 2006/11, p. 10-11, par. 2-4 (Condorelli).

140CR 2006/28, p. 11. - 50 -

personnes étaient en fait des réfugiés qui avai ent fui l’enfer de Srebrenica et de Žepa en

juillet 1995.

141
45. M. Milićević a tout d’abord déclaré que les hommes étaient âgés de 18 à 55 ans , mais

il a admis ensuite qu’il y avait aussi dans le nombre des jeunes de moins de 18 ans. Selon son

témoignage, ces jeunes gens avaient été estafettes dans la brigade à laquelle —toujours selon le

témoin — ils avaient été affectés 142.

46. M. Mili ćević a d’abord indiqué avoir eu une parfa ite connaissance de la situation des

personnes hébergées dans son centre mais, lorsqu’on lui a demandé de faire le rapprochement entre

les réfugiés et les horreurs de Srebrenica et Žepa , il s’est contenté de dire: «Eh bien, d’après ce

qu’elles nous ont indiqué, elles étaient passées de manière illégale sur le territoire de la

143
Yougoslavie et avaient fui celui de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, en proie à la guerre.» Lorsque nous

avons insisté sur le rapprochement entre ce qui s’ét ait passé à Srebrenica et à Žepa et ses réfugiés,

144
il a ajouté : «Non, il n’entrait pas dans mes attributions de faire un tel rapprochement.» Madame

le président, Messieurs de la Cour, nous parlons du mois d’août 1995, alors que la prise de

Srebrenica monopolise l’attention des médias. Les nouvelles des massacres se répandent.

M. Milićević, selon ses dires, accueille des personnes épuisées et affamées, en mauvais état

psychologique et physique. Ces personnes lui disen t d’où elles viennent: de l’autre côté de la

59 rivière. M. Mili ćević prétend savoir exactement à quelle brigade militaire appartenaient ces

hommes, mais il nie avoir eu la moindre idée des év énements qui avaient provoqué leur fuite et les

avaient obligés ⎯ «de manière illégale», c’est tout ce qu’il sait ⎯ à traverser la rivière à la nage.

47. Je ne sais pas ce que le défendeur a essayé de prouver en appelant ce témoin à la barre,

mais ses déclarations sont simplement trop peu fiables pour corroborer quoi que ce soit d’utile.

M. Dragoljub Mićunović

48. M. Mi ćunović a participé, avec l’agent actuel du défendeur, à la création du parti

démocratique. Comme son collègue, il a insisté sur le pacifisme de l’opposition démocratique et à

141CR 2006/28, p. 10.
142
Ibid., p. 16.
143
Ibid., p. 17.
144Ibid. - 51 -

maintes reprises souligné son opposition, et ce lle de son parti, au régime de Miloševi ć. Cela étant,

il n’a jamais précisé contre quoi exactement s’ élevait cette opposition démocratique durant les

années qui nous intéressent en l’espèce.

49. M. Mi ćunović décrit toutes sortes de conférences politiques et émet toutes sortes

d’opinions sur MM. Tudjman, Izetbegovi ć et Milošević, les présentant tous comme des dirigeants

incapables 14; comme le défendeur, il attribue les responsabilités de manière égale aux deux

146
camps , et il ne fait que répéter ⎯ à sa manière ⎯ ce qu’a dit le défendeur. A aucun moment, le

témoin ne semble avoir une connaissance concrète des faits pertinents en l’espèce, pertinents pour

notre affaire. Interrogé sur les opérations militaires et les activités des 30 eet 40 e centres du

personnel à Belgrade, il a déclaré n’en avoir pas eu connaissance. Dans ces conditions, il est même

surprenant que ce témoin ait confirmé, sans réserve, qu’il était simplement normal de supposer que

la République fédérale de Y ougoslavie continuait d’approvisionner en armes les Serbes de

Bosnie 14.

50. A son retour à Belgrade, M. Mićunović a rendu compte de sa déposition devant la Cour à

plusieurs médias, en indiquant que les accusations de la Bosnie étaient principalement des

instruments de propagande 14. Du moins, Madame le président, cela montre-t-il que ce témoin

⎯ce qui est en soi tout à fait concevable ⎯ s’identifie complètement avec la position du

défendeur. Il ne montre pas la moindre compa ssion pour les victimes, ne fait preuve d’aucun

60 sentiment de responsabilité, ne met même pas en cause la responsab ilité des anciens dirigeants de

la RFY que ses collègues qualifient de groupe de criminels.

Remarques finales

Madame le président, j’en ai terminé avec mon analyse de l’audition des experts, témoins et

témoins-experts. Nous nous reporterons à leurs dépositions à chaque fois que cela pourra se révéler

utile dans la suite de nos plaidoiries.

145
CR 2006/29, p. 12.
146
Ibid., p. 14.
147Ibid., p. 20.

148Chances of genocide case, ‘50-50’”, B92, 10 avril 2006. Voir : www.b92.net/ english/news/
index.php?nav_id=34401&style=headlines&dd=10&mm=4&yyyy=2006. - 52 -

Madame le président, ainsi s’achève notre plaidoirie d’aujourd’hui.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur van den Biesen. Je voudrais juste confirmer à l’agent,

M. Softić, que si M. Franck souhaitait commencer sa pl aidoirie malgré l’heure tardive, la Cour

serait disposée à dépasser quelque peu l’horaire prévu. La décision vous appartient.

M. van den BIESEN: Nous en avons parlé, Ma dame le président, et nous vous remercions

de nous le proposer à nouveau, mais nous pensons que nous en avons déjà peut-être fait un peu trop

et préférons que M. Franck commence sa plaidoirie demain.

Le PRESIDENT : L’audience est levée et reprendra demain à 10 heures.

L’audience est levée à 17 h 55.

___________