Translation

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Non-corrigé Uncorrected
CR 2000/4 (traduction) CR 2000/4 (translation)

Thursday 6 April 2000 at 10 a.m. Jeudi 6 avril 2000 à 10 heures

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Th e sitting is open. I should like firs t of all to inform you that Judge

Vereschechtin, for urgent reasons of which he has info rmed me, will not be present at this morning's hearing.
Furthermore, I hasten to assu re the Parties, and Sir Elihu in particular, that, since I was obliged to attend to urgent
official duties and miss part of yesterday's session at the end of the morning, I of course read the verbatim record of
the hearing very carefully yesterday evening. This morning the Republic of India will be presenting the second
round of its oral arguments. Je vais donc sans plus at tendre donner la parole à S. Exc. M. Soli Sorabjee,
Attorney General de l’Inde. M. Sorabjee, vous avez la parole.

M. SORABJEE : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les honorables membres de la Cour, je vais répondre
à l’argumentation présentée hier au nom du Pakistan.

1. L’une des thèses s outenues par le Pakistan était que l’exception à la compétence de la Cour soulevée par l’Inde
constituait un exercice abusif de se s droits. Monsieur le président, l’Inde répond à cela que l’exception
d’incompétence est un moyen de défense légitime dont une partie peut se prévaloir et qu’en soulevant son exception
à la compétence de la Cour, l’Inde n’ a en aucune façon abusé «pour autant des droits qu’e lle tire en la matière du
paragraphe 6 de l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour et de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour». A cet égard, permettez-
moi d’attirer votre attention sur un rappel de l’affaire concernant l’Application de la convention pour la pr véntion
et la répression du crime de g noéide (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 , p.622, par.46). A des fins de commodité, je cite la
partie du paragraphe 46 qui nous intéresse :

«Au terme du présent arrêt, [la C our] tient à préciser qu’e lle n’en considère pa s pour autant que la
Yougoslavie aurait, en pr ésentant des exceptions, abusé des dr oits qu’elle tire en la matière du
paragraphe 6 de l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour et de l’article 79 du Règlement. La Cour rejette donc la
demande formulée à cet égard par la Bosnie-Herzégovine dans ses conc lusions finales. La Cour doit,
dans chaque instance introduite deva nt elle, vérifier si el le a compétence pour c onnaître de l’affaire et,
le cas échéant, si la requête es t recevable; les exceptions éventu ellement soulevée s par la partie
défenderesse peuvent être utiles pour clarifier la situation juridique.»

Je me permets aussi d’appele r votre bienveillante attention sur l’argumentation que j’ ai présentée dans le premier
tour de plaidoiries (CR 2000/3, p. 10).

2. Le Pakistan s’est également repor té hier (CR2000/3, p.11) à l’acceptation par l’Inde de la compétence
obligatoire dans le cadre de la convent ion sur le droit de la mer et des pro cédures de règlement des différends de
l’OMC pour attaquer la réserve relative aux membres du Commonwealth ou en tout état de ca use contester le droit
de l’Inde d’invoquer ladite réserve. On a fait grief à l’Inde de ne pas avoir répondu aux arguments présentés par le
Pakistan dans le premier tour de plaidoiries.

Monsieur le président, qu’est-il be soin, à notre humble avis, de répondre à n’importe quelle allégation sans tenir
compte de sa pertinence ou de son importance pour la question à l’examen ? La thèse de l’Inde est que l’acceptation
de la juridiction obligatoire au titre de quelque convention internationale que ce soit ne s’applique en aucune façon à
la question fondamentale de la compétence de cette éminente institution pour connaître de la requête présentée par le
Pakistan.

Le sujet traité et le champ d’application au tit re de la Convention sur le droit de la mer et des procédures de

règlement des différends de l’OMC sont différents. La décision d’accepter telle ou telle convention internationale et
d’accepter la juridiction oblig atoire est, pour tout Etat souverain, y compris l’Inde, un exercice de raisonnement
tactique fondé sur l’appréciati on des avantages qu’a le pays considéré à agir ainsi, en tenant compte des facteurs
économiques du moment et de s impératifs pratiques qu i s’attachent à une conven tion donnée. L’acceptation par
l’Inde de la compétence obligatoire au titre de la Convention sur le droit de la mer et de la procédure de règlement
des différends de l’OMC ne se rapporte ou ne s’applique en aucune faç on à la question de sa voir si la réserve
relative aux membres du Commonwealth est valable ou peut être invoquée.

3. Un autre point de l’argumentation en faveur du Pakistan soulevé hier (CR 2000/3, p. 13 et suiv.) est que l’Inde n’apas répondu aux observations qu’il a faites da ns son premier tour de plaidoiries sur la dé suétude de la réserve
relative aux membres du Commonwealth ou son inopposabilité au Pakistan. A cet égard, il ne faut pas perdre de vue
les faits suivants :

a) le Pakistan, dans le mémoire qu’il a fait tenir à la Cour le 7 janvier 2000, a prétendu que la réserve relative
aux membres du Commonwealth «étant contraire aux normes fondamentales de la Charte des Nations Unies, à
savoir le principe de l’éga lité souveraine et le caract ère universel des droits et obligations des Membres de
l’Organisation des NationsUnies, elle n'a aucun effet juridique » (mémoire du Pakistan, p.15, par.C4; les
italiques sont de nous).

L’affirmation suivante du Pakistan dans son mémoire est que la réserve sortant des limites des dispositions du
paragraphe 3 de l’article 36 est «dénuée d’effet juridique» (mémoire du Pakistan, p. 16, par. D 1).

b) Au paragraphe D 2, page 16 du mémoir e, le Pakistan a décrit et consid éré la réserve relative aux membres
du Commonwealth comme «illicite et non valable».

c)S. Exc. l’ Attorney General du Pakistan, le 3avril2000, au cours de sa plaidoirie, s’est exprimé comme
suit :

«S’agissant de la première, la réserve relative aux membres du Co mmonwealth, le Pakistan présente

deux conclusions principales: la pr emière conclusion, que je soumets très respectueusement à la Cour
au nom du Pakistan est que la réserve relative aux membres du Commonwealth que l’Inde prétend
invoquer n’entre pas dans les différentes catégories de réserve autorisées aux termes du paragraphe 3 de
l’article 36 du Statut.» (CR 2000/1, p. 17, par. 20.)

Au paragraphe 22 ( ibid., p.19), l’éruditAttorney General du Pakistan a déclaré que: «La première thèse défendue
par le Pakistan est que la réserve est incompatible avec les dispositions du Statut et ne peut par conséquent être
invoquée par l’Inde à l’encontre du Pakistan.»

Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, la conséquence juridique incontournable de ces conclusions
au nom du Pakistan c’est que la réserve constitue un abus de droit et est donc non valable et entachée de nullité.

d) se rendant compte que répondre à la thèse de l’Inde sur l’impossibilité de disso cier la réserve de la
déclaration représente une difficulté insurmontable, le Pakistan a mainte nant changé de perspective et a
cherché à établir une distinction entre la nullité et l’inapplicabilité de la ré serve. Nous faisons très
respectueusement observer que cette distinction qu’il s’est efforcé de fa ire est spécieuse et que la thèse de la
désuétude de la réserve relative aux membres du Commonweal th tout comme celle de son inopposabilité au

Pakistan sont des inventions de de rnière minute. Mais, quoi qu’il en so it, l’Inde y a donné réponse dans son
premier tour de plaidoiries par l’entremise de son Attorney General (voir CR2000/2, p.13, par.3), et la
réponse détaillée et exhaustive qu’y a faite en outre M.Ian Brownlie, Q.C., da ns son premier tour de
plaidoiries, pourrait occuper deux plei nes pages, dont j’ai do nné les références dans la transcription ( ibid.,
p. 26-28).

Maintenant, Monsieur le président, il fa ut souligner que le Pakistan, en prétenda nt que la question de la divisibilité
n’a pas à être examinée parce qu’il n’invoque pas la nullité de la réserve mais seulement son inapplicabilité, ne fait
qu’admettre clairement que la réserv e n’est pas entachée de nullité. Ce ch angement de position du Pakistan a pou r

conséquence incontournable qu’il n’est plus possible de soutenir à aucun moment ni dans aucune procédure devant
la Cour que la réserve est nulle. Le Pakistan ne peut plus s’abstenir de prendre position su r cette question. En
conséquence, la validité de la réserve relative aux membres du Commonwealth ne peut plus être contestée. La seule
question qui reste posée est de savoir si la réserve est devenue caduque ou n’est pas opposable au Pakistan. Comme
l’a fait ressortir l’Inde da ns sa réponse lors du premier tour de plaidoiries du 4avri l2000, ces affirmations sont
dénuées de fondement et je n’y reviendrai pas, notre argumentation ayant été développée alors.

Monsieur le président, Mada me et Messieurs les honorables membres de la Cour, en réponse à celles du Pakistan,
les thèses de l’Inde concer nant l’Acte général de 1928 seront exposées en détail au cours du second tour par M.

Alain Pellet, mon éminen t et savant collègue. Toutefois, je tiens à m’exprimer briève ment sur l’Acte général de
1928 en réponse aux propos tenus hier à ce sujet par le Pakistan (CR 2000/3, p. 13 et suiv.) La tentative faite par si r
ElihuLauterpacht pour mett re l’accent sur l’arrêt de la Cour suprême du Pakistan dans l’affaire Yangtze (London)
Limited v. Barlas Brothers (Karachi) and C.o est, avec tout le respect que je lui dois, aussi simpliste
qu’inacceptable. L’autorité et le caractère contrai gnant d’un arrêt de la plus haute cour du pays, à savoir la Cou rsuprême du Pakistan, dé pend de ses motifs (ratio decidendi) et de ses conclusions. Le fait que le Gouvernement
pakistanais n’ait pas été partie à l’affaire susmentionnée est sans importance. Ce qui importe, c’est qu’à aucun
moment, ledit gouvernement n’a directement contesté ou mis en doute l’autorité du droit dit par la Cour suprême du
Pakistan dans l’affaire précitée,dictum déterminant pour la question de l’applicabilité de l’Acte général de 1928.

Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de conclure en vous exprimant une fois encore mes remerciements pour votre
amabilité et votre patience et de vous demander de bien vouloir maintenant donner la parole à mon éminent et érudit
ami, Ian Brownlie, Q.C., pour qu’il s’exprime devant la Cour.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur l’ Attorney General . Je donne maintenant la parole à
Monsieur Ian Brownlie.

M. BROWNLIE : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour.

Il me revient de traiter des questions qui divisent les Part ies en ce qui concerne la ré serve de l’Inde relative aux
membres du Commonwealth. Avant, toutefois, d’entrer dans le vif du sujet, je voudrais commenter la proposition du
Pakistan selon laquelle la Cour devrait adopter une «conception plus large» de l’interprétation et de l’application des
réserves et, par voie de conséquence, des déclarations des Etats, lesquelles, comme l’ a dit la Cour dans l’affaire
Espagne c. Canada «doivent être interprétées comme formant un t out». Etant donné la natu re des conclusions du
Pakistan concernant la réserve relative au Commonwealth, cette proposition obligerait la Cour à déroger à son Statut
et à sa propre jurisprudence. De fait, le conseil du Pakistan a parlé, à propos de la jurisprude nce de la Cour, de

«futilités plutôt passées».

Il a également été suggéré au nom du Pakistan que d’autres tribun aux s’étaient montré s moins pointilleux
concernant leur propre comp étence et que, de plus, ce s autres tribunaux avaient à connaître d’affaires plus
importantes que celle dont est saisie cette Cour. De telles suggestions sont peu convaincantes sur le plan des faits --
et, point plus important, dénuées de pe rtinence sur le plan du droit. Compte tenu de tout cela, le Gouvernement de
l’Inde ne doute pas que la Cour appliquera les dispositions pertinentes de son Statut et les principes mûrement pesés
qui ont enrichi au fil du temps sa propr e jurisprudence. Comme l’a fait observe r sir Hersch Lauter pacht, la Cour a
examiné les arguments relatifs à sa compétence «avec un soin méticuleux».

J’en viens à présent au caractère géné ral de l’argumentation du Pakistan en ce qui concerne la réserve relative au
Commonwealth. Dans sa plaidoirie d’hier, le conseil du Pakistan a souligné que cette argumentation ne reposait pas
sur le défaut de validité.

Monsieur le président, ce changement de position demande à être examiné.

En premier lieu, il s’agit d’un changement de position très significatif. Le Pakistan a invoqué le défaut de validité
dans son mémoire. Sir Elihu y a fait allusion lundi dans sa plaidoirie (CR2000/1, p.27, par. 5). Il déclarait que la
réserve «a cessé d’avoi r le moindre fondement légitime » et que la désuétude «est un aspect qu’il est légitime de
considérer lorsque l’on examine l’applicabilité -- je dirai même la validité -- d’une réserve».

La position adoptée par le Pakistan hier ne se fonde plus que sur la propositi on selon laquelle, le Pakistan n’ayant
pas consenti à la réserve de l’Inde, ce lle-ci ne peut lui être opposée. Comme je l’ai longue ment souligné dans ma
plaidoirie du premier tour, le conseil du Pakistan n’a pas expliqué en quoi précisément le concept d’opposabilité est
ici pertinent. Le mot n’a rien d’e xplicite et ne peut désigner que le résultat d’un ensemble de conditions

préexistantes.

De quelles conditions s’agit-il en l’espèce ? Il est difficile de le savoir. Il n’existe aucun principe qui voudrait qu’une
réserve dépende de l’approbati on d’autres Etats auteurs d’une déclaration. De plus, le Pakistan a attendu plus de
cinquante ans avant de manifester son opposition.

Aussi l’argument «nouveau» avancé par le Pakistan, à savoir que la «r éserve relative aux membres du
Commonwealth» est une réserve «extra-sta tutaire», est-il absurde. A ce compte , tout Etat à l’en contre duquel est

invoquée une réserve, quelle qu’elle soit, peut s’y soustraire en déclarant qu’elle a un caractère extra-statutaire. C’est
là, de l’avis du Gouvernement de l’I nde, un argument déraisonnabl e et mal fondé. Cet argum ent est contraire à la
position bien acceptée selon laquelle les réserves formulées en vertu du paragr aphe2 de l’article36 ne sont pas
soumises au régime du dr oit des traités. Les réserves s’ inscrivant dans le cadre du pa ragraphe 2 de l’article 36 ne
sont pas des réserves conventionnelles auxquelles peuvent s’appli quer les dispositions de la convention de Vienne
sur le droit des traités.Tout bien considéré, l’argument fondé sur l’opposabilité se heurte selon mo i aux même difficul tés que l’argument
fondé sur la désuétude. J’ai indiqué mardi à pr opos du second que l’analyse devait s’appuyer sur l’acte unilatéral
pertinent. L’acte unilatéral pertinent est de toute évidence la déclaration de l’Inde, en tant qu’instrument indivisible,
et non la réserve considérée isolément. Sur cette base, c’es t le Statut de la Cour et le droit et la pratique en matière
de formulation des déclarations qui s’appliquent. La question de l’opposabilité ne se pose tout simplement pas. Il en

résulte que la réserve de l’Inde est valide, ce que l’on nous concède à présent, et au su rplus que la question de la
divisibilité ne peut se poser, comme le distingué Attorney General de l’Inde l’a montré ce matin.

Sir Elihu s’est plaint hier que le conseil de l’Inde n’avait pas dit mot de l’ar gument du Pakistan relatif à
l’opposabilité. Avec tout le respect qui lu i est dû, ce n’est pas ex act (CR2000/2, p.27). En revanche, le conseil du
Pakistan est resté silencieux sur un certain nombre de points importants.

La position générale de l’Inde en ce qui concerne la question des réserves n’ a suscité aucun commentaire. Dans ma

plaidoirie de mardi, je me suis abondamment référé à la question des réserves ratione personae . J’ai évoqué la
littérature et cité ou menti onné les sources les plus autorisées. J’ai montré, force preuve s à l’appui, que le
paragraphe 3 de l’article 36 du Statut auto rise les déclarations précisant les Etats vis-à-vis desquels la juridiction est
acceptée.

A de rares exceptions près, le conseil du Pakistan s’est montré peu enclin à aborder ces aspects, qu’il considère sans
doute comme des «futilités plutôt passées». Cela est fort dommage car, au bout du compte, la réserve de l’Inde n’est
qu’un exemple parmi d’autres d’une réserve ratione personae , ni plus ni moins.

En réponse aux conclusions que j’ai présen tées lors du premier tour, sir Elihu a fait observer que le caractère inédit
d’un argument ne prouve pas qu’il est faux. La proposition est logique et doit bien sû r être acceptée. Mais les
circonstances dans lesquelles l’argument nouveau est avan cé ne sont pas sans cons équence. L’application du
système de la clause facultative a fa it l’objet de longs développements dans la litté rature depuis quelque quatre-
vingts ans. Aucune des sources mentionnées au nom de l’Inde (CR 2000/2, p. 25-26) ne cherche à mettre en cause,
sur le plan juridique, la va lidité de la réserve relative au Commonwea lth. Le fait que sirElihu n’a pu citer que
l’opinion dissidente de M.Ago dans l’affaire Nauru C(I.J. Recueil 1992 , p.327, par.5) ne fait que souligne r
l’absence de tout autre appui dans la littérature et la jurisprudence. Et , de toute façon, le co mmentaire de M.Ago
n’est au mieux qu’un élément d’une réflexion spéculative, et non une analyse juridique ayant un caractère définitif.

Même si, pour les besoins de la discussion, on devait concéder que la doctr ine de la désuétude s’applique aux actes
unilatéraux, elle ne pourrait s’appliquer au cas d’une réserve formulée en 1974 et qui fait depuis longtemps partie de
la pratique du Gouvernement de l'Inde.

Que M.Ago note qu’aucun tribunal sp écial propre au Commonwea lth n’a été institué n’ est d’aucun secours au
Pakistan. La chose est notoire depuis bon nombre d’années et n’a pas empêché différents Etats d’invoquer la réserve
relative au Commonwealth. L’existence de huit déclarations, dont certaines très récentes, dans lesquelles figure cette

réserve autorise à conclure qu’elle n’ est pas devenue superflue, ni d’un point de vue juridique ni d’un point de vue
politique. Pas plus que le Commonwealth lui-même ne l’est devenu. De nouveaux membres ont grossi ses rangs ces
dernières années et il regroupe aujourd’hui cinquante-quatre Etats au total.

Il convient à présent que je récapitule la position du Gouvernement de l’ Inde concernant la réserve relative au
Commonwealth.

Premièrement, la réserve demande à être a ppréciée en tant qu’elle fait partie in tégrante de la déclaration pertinente,

laquelle, comme la Cour l’a relevé dans l’affaire Espagne c.Canada doit être interprétée et appliquée comme
formant un tout.

Deuxièmement, la réserve est compatible avec le paragraphe 6 de l’article36 du Statut et , du reste, le Pakistan n’a
pas prétendu autrement.

Troisièmement, la réserve es t compatible avec le paragraphe3 de l’ar ticle36 du Statut, comme s’accordent à le
reconnaître les experts.

Quatrièmement, l’affirmation selon laquelle la réserve ne serait pas vali de est dénuée de fondement juridique, ainsi
que l’a admis l’Etat demandeur lors du deuxième tour de plaidoiries.

Cin quièmement, ni le Statut de la Cour, ni les principes du droit international général n’autorisent à invo quer unequelconque opposabilité, comme le soutient le Pakistan.

Sixièmement, l’affirmation du Pakistan selon laquelle la réserve ne vise que le Pakistan et a en quelque sorte un
caractère discriminatoire est tout à fait gratuite.

Enfin, tant la pratique réce nte des Etats que les écrits des publicistes confirment que la réserve est valide et
compatible avec les dispositions du Statut.

Monsieur le président, j’en ai terminé avec mes conc lusions concernant la réserve relative aux membres du
Commonwealth.

Dans son exposé hier, sir Elihu n’a pas apporté de nouveaux développements aux arguments précédemment avancés

au nom du Pakistan au sujet de la réserve relative aux traités multilatéraux.

Sur ce point, je me bornerai à rappeler les arguments que j’ ai présentés lors du premier tour de plaidoiries, à savoir
que le Pakistan ne peut, à la fois, faire fond sur sa propre réserve en la matière et a ffirmer que la réserve de l’Inde
n’est pas valide, comme il le fait dans son mémoire. Cela est contraire à la doctrine qui, par équité, prescrit la
constance dans l’approbation et la réprobation. Par sa conduite, en faisant figurer cette réserve dans sa déclaration, le
Pakistan l’a approuvée et a re connu qu’elle était compat ible avec le Statut de la Co ur et tous autres principes
pertinents du droit international général.

Même si, comme le prétend à présent le Pakistan, la requête a pour fondement le droit international coutumier, la
réserve de l’Inde relative aux traités multilatéraux s’a pplique chaque fois que sont invoqués des moyens qui, en
dernière analyse, se fondent sur la Charte des Nations Unies.

Monsieur le président, ainsi s’achè ve ma plaidoirie du deuxièm e tour. Je vous remercie, vous et vos distingués
collègues, de votre coutumière courtoisie et vous demande de bien vouloir donner la parole au professeur Pellet.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup Monsieur Brownlie. And I now give the floor to Professor Alain Pellet.

Mr.PELLET: Mr. President, Members of the Court, Si rElihu Lauterpacht yesterday devoted the bulk of his
argument to the General Act of Arbitrati on. I listened to him very carefully, but I admit that I left the Great Hall o f
Justice without really knowing what point we, or rather Pakistan, had got to.

I did understand that he had changed his mind about a number of points between the firs t and second round of his
oral arguments. As SirElihu said , "that was on Monday" (CR2000/3, p.20) ! What was true on Monday became a

mistake on Wednesday! But what is Wednesday's truth conc erning, for instance, the alleged succession of the two
parties to the General Act of 1928? Who is the continuator? Who is not? And, fi rst, has there been succession? Or
not? What conclusions does my eminen t opponent draw from the lengthy reading -- barely commented upon -- o f
Volume III of the 1947 Partition Proceedings in which he indulged himself? If there are any conclusions, I have to
say that they have escaped us . . .

Our perplexity is increased by the fact that after sharply reproaching us for not having replied in every detail to some
of Pakistan's arguments, Pakistan "has done the same", if I may say so, and gone even further! And it has refrained

from reacting to what is still at the heart of our argument (I am refe rring in particular to India's 1974
communication), in the hope, no doubt, of drawing your attention to incidental items in or der to deflect it from the
crux of the matter.

With your permission, Mr.Pres ident, and without losing sight of the we lcome recommendations that you made to
the Parties at the end of Tuesday's sitting, I am therefore now going to endeavour to reply to what I think I
understood of my opponent's arguments ye sterday, while at the same time placing them ag ain within the general
context of India's position, wh ich did not have the good fortune to attract his attention. I shall by and large follow
the order he adopted himself, while deviating where I feel he has departed from the Ca rtesian logic in which I was

trained . . .

1. The maintenance in force of the General Act of 1928

With regard first to the maintenance in force of the General Act, counsel fo r Pakistan attempte d to minimize the
Act's links with the League of Nations by pointing out that only Articles 9, 43, 45, 46 and 47 expressly referred to it.
This list, albeit extensive, is both incoplete and misleading.It is incomplete because my opponent forgot to mention Article6, which enabled the parties to ask the Acting
President of the League of Nations to make the necessary appointments fo r the constitution of the conciliation
commissions.

But above all it is misleading. And it is misleading for a number of reasons:

z in the first place, it excludes the 11 Articles which referred to the Permanent Court (namely Articles 17, 18,
19, 20, 28, 30, 33, 34, 36, 37 and 41);
z in the second place, it flouts the general spirit of the text, which is clearly rooted in what I shall refer to as the
"legal idealism" of the 1920s;
z in the third place, it fails to take account of an important aspect to which I drew attention on Tuesday

(CR 2000/2, p. 34), namely the fact that a number of States party to the General Act (including British India)
had expressly made their acceptance of Chapter II thereof, concerning judicial settlement, and, in particular,
Article 17, on which Pakistan purportedly bases the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to the possibility of
"requir[ing] that the procedure prescribed in Chapter II of the said Act . . . be suspended in respect of any
dispute . . . submitted to the Council of the League of Nations" pending a decision of that Council.

This reservation of British India, on which Pakistan is maintaining a stubborn silence, and which was the subject o f
paragraph 2 of British India's 1931 Act of Accession of, is, in its original language, worded as follows:

"His Majesty's Government reserves the right in relation to the disputes mentioned in Article 17 of the
General Act to require that the procedure prescribed in Chap ter II of the said Act shall be suspended in
respect of any dispute whic h has been submitted to and is under consideration by the Council of the
League of Nations , provided that notice to suspend is give n after the dispute has been submitted to the
Council . . " (Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the S ecretary-General, Status as at 30April 1999 ,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales No. E.99.V.5, p. 97) (emphasis added);

[«En ce qui concerne les différends me ntionnés à l'article 17 de l'Acte général, Sa Majesté se réserve le
droit de demander que la procédure prescrite au chapitre II dudit Acte soit suspendue pour tout
différend soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations et en cours d' examen par ce dernier, à condition
que la requête de suspension soit déposée après que le di fférend aura été soumis au
Conseil . . .» (raités multilat éaux d poé s éupr s duèSecr taire é n ral, é ét au 30 avril 1999 ,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, numéro de vente. F.99.V.5, p. 1017)]

this is followed by the conditions concerning the time-limits.

Moreover, this is not the only rese rvation of British India expressly relating to the League of Nations. The
reservations contained in paragraphs 3 (i) and 3 (ii) of the Act of Accession of British India and the other members
of the Commonwealth are formulated along the same lines with regard to both Chapter I and Chapter III, relating to
conciliation and arbitration respectively.

These conditions, which could be referr ed to as "reservations concerning e xhaustion of procedures before the
Council of the League of Nations" also show how, for countries party to the old General Act, this Act was
inextricably linked to the League system. And this was pa rticularly true for those c ountries which had expressed
reservations of this type in one form or another. The number was not insignificant, Mr. President, since it concerned
seven of the 20 parties listed by the Secretary-General: in addition to British India, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, France and Italy (cf. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as
at 30 April 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales No. E.99.V.5, pp. 1015-1018).

Furthermore, these conditions quite clearly show that the 1928 Act cannot have remained in force after the demise of
the League of Nations, at least vis-à-vis the States which had accepted the procedures described by the Act only as a
second resort, giving clear priority to the Council of the Geneva Organization, as wa s the case with British India.
With regard to those States at least it was the whole phi losophy of the system which became inapplicable, as they
could no longer obtain suspensi on of the procedures of the General Ac t (including those ba sed on Article17)
pending examination of the dispute by the Council of the defunct League of Nations, even though they had clearly
made their accession subject to that condition. This factor alone at any ev ent shows that the General Act of 1928

cannot have remained in force, at least in so far as these seven States are concerned.

Having thus minimized the li nks between the General Act and the League of Nations Pact system, SirElihu
undertook to convince you that, after all, the numerous provisions of this instrume nt that refer to the Lea gue ofNations related to purely technical points covered by United Nations General Assembly resolution 24 (I) concerning
the "Transfer of certain Functions, Activities and Assets of the League of Nations".

Although, in fine, the United Nations Secretary-General assumed th e functions of depositary of the General Act o f

1928 when, as from 1973, certain States endeavoured to bring it back to life, as I mentioned on Tuesday
(CR 2000/2, p. 38), the same Secretary-General had taken the view, as from 1949, that these depositary functions no
longer fell to him (see ibid., pp.37-38). And that is where Professor Laut erpacht's reasoning is flawed: one has to
believe that the member States of the General Assembly in 1949 did not co nsider that this was a problem o f
succession to purely technical functi ons, since these States undertook to "restore to the General Act o f
26September1928 its original efficacy" by adopting the new General Act of 1949. With this substitution, the
General Assembly found that the transfer of the functions of the League of Nations to the United Nations effected by
resolution 24 (I) was not sufficient to "restore its efficacy" to the General Act. And it is interesting to note that none
of the States which took part in the debates prompted by the Belg ian initiative-- whether they voted for or against
the resolution--that none of the Stat es participating in the 1949 debate argue d otherwise and therefore shared the

opinion of Sir Elihu.

In brief, on this point, Mr. President:

(1) the 1928 Act appeared to all member States of the United Nations in 1949 to be too closely linked to the
League of Nations and the PCIJ for its survival to be assured, either by resolution 24 (I) or by Article 37 of the
Court's Statute;

(2) in addition, certain parties to the General Act, including British India, had further strengthened, in so far as
they were concerned at least, the links between the Ge neral Act and the Pact system, by reserving the right to
make settlement by the Council of the League of Nations prevail over solu tions offered by the Act; with the
result that

(3) with regard to those States, the Ge neral Act cannot in any case be regarded as still be ing in force, as this
priority given to political settlement by the Council of the League of Nations--on which they had expressly
made their accession contingent -- can no longer be ensured.

2. Article 43 of the General Act and the reservations expressed in 1931 by British India

I now come, Mr. President, to two questions which I regard as inseparable: first, Article 43 of the General Act (this
involves answering the question of who could be bound by this instrument); and, second, the reservations expressed
by British India in 1931 when it acceded to this treaty (here we need to know who can be bound with India ).
Yesterday my opponent only briefly touched upon Article 43, being very careful not to allude to the reservations in
question. Yet the two questions are relate d: they both concern the pr oblem of participation in the General Act, first

in a general manner (Article 43 clearly addresses this point), and, secondly, in British India's relations with the other
parties to the General Act (and the rese rvations of 1931 enable this second question to be addressed). In both cases,
membership of the League of Nations is the key factor.

The unavoidable starting point (but deftly avoided by counsel for Pakistan) is Article 43, paragraph 1, of the General
Act, which I should like to read:

"1. The present General Act shall be open to accessi on by all the Heads of States or other competent

authorities of the Members of the League of Nations and the non-Member States to which the Council of
the League of Nations has communicated a copy for this purpose." (Emphasis added)

Thus it is undoubtedly a closed treaty, to which only Members of the League of Nations were able to accede, unless
they had been invited to do so by the Council of the Lea gue. However, as I pointed out on Tuesday, on the basis in
particular of the joint dissenting opinion of 1974 so dear to the Pakistani side (CR2000/2, p.34), this possibility
disappeared irrevocably with the demise of the League of Nations, and no on e is suggesting that Pakistan would
have received such an invitation.

This starting point must be linked to another item that our opponents haughtily continue to ignore. This concerns, as
I have said, the reservations to wh ich British India made it s accession subject in 1931, in particular the two
reservations which I drew to the atte ntion of the Court and Pakistan in th e hearing of the da y before yesterday
(CR 2000/2, pp. 44-46). These two reservations are both closely rela ted to the question with which we are dealing
and, since I quoted them in English on Tuesday, I shall now read them a gain in their French translation. I thereforequote British India's reservations of 1931:

«1. Sont exclus de la procédure décrite dans l'Acte général, y compris la procédure de conciliation :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii) les différends entre le Gouvernement de l'I nde et les gouvernements de tous autres Membres
de la Société des Nations, me mbres du Commonwealth britannique des Nations, différends qui
seront réglés selon une méthode convenue entre les parties ou dont elles conviendront;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v) les différends avec tout Etat partie à l'Acte gé néral qui n'est pas memb re de la Société des
Nations.» ( Traités multilatéraux d éos séaupr s èu Secr tairé g n raé é , état au 30 avril 1999,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, n° de vente F.99.V.5, p. 1017.)

["1. That the following disputes are excluded from the procedure described in the General Act,

including the procedure of conciliation:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(iii) Disputes between His Majest y's Government in the United Ki ngdom and the Government of any
other Member of the League which is a member of the British Comm onwealth of Nations, all of which
disputes shall be settled in such a manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(v) Disputes with any Party to the General Act who is not a Member of the League o f
Nations." ( Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 30 April 1999,
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales No. E.99.V.5, p. 973)]

Apart from a very brief reference in Pakistan's Memorial (section A.2), p.7), I am not aware that the legality o f

these reservations has been challenged. Like those I referred to earlier concerning the priority given to settlement by
the Council of the League of Nations, th ese reservations are identical to those expressed by the other four parties to
the General Act which were both Members of the League of Nations and members of the Commonwealth (the
United Kingdom, Canada, Austra lia and New Zealand) (see Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-
General, Status as at 30April 1999 , ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Sales No. E.99.V .5, pp.1015-1018). No party to the
General Act has ever voiced the slight est objection to these reservations, a ny more than those commenting on the
Act have asserted or suggested that they might be in any way unlawful.

Now there is no doubt that the reservations which I have just read out again -- I already read them on Tuesday -- the

reservations which I have just read rule out the possibility of Pakistan invoking the old General Act against India, if
we assume, for the purposes of the argument , that it is still in force and that India is a party ther eto, which is most
certainly not the case.

It follows from these two reservations , Mr.President, that British India only adhered to the General Act on the
twofold condition that the procedures described therein w ould not apply to disputes between it and either other
members of the Commonwealth which were also Members of the League of Nations or States which were not
members of the League. Thus if Pakistan could be regarded as party to the General Act--which of course I am
assuming only for the purposes of the argument -- it would inevitably fall into one or other of those categories that I

shall now briefly consider in turn.

First scenario: Pakistan is regarded as a Member of the League of Nations. This is not possible, Mr. President, since,
for the reasons to which I shall be returning in a moment, in this connection it neithe r represented a "continuation"
of, nor succeeded to, British India.

This is not possible, but if it were, the Court's jurisdicti on would be ruled out in any ca se because of British India's
reservation concerning disputes between it and a Member of the Lea gue of Nations that is also a member of theCommonwealth--and on this second asp ect I should like to refer to what my learned collea gue and friend Ian
Brownlie said on Tuesday morning and ear lier today, since the probl em arises in terms simi lar to those relating to
the "Commonwealth reservation" contained in India's optional declaration.

Second scenario: Pakistan cannot be regarded as a Member of the Lea gue of Nations. This is indeed quite true.
However, in this case not only could it not accede to the General Act because of the ac cession clause contained in
Article 43 of that instrument, which rese rves this possibility solely for Member s of the League of Nations, but also
British India's reservation concerning di sputes with States that are not Memb ers of the League of Nations must
apply.

There is no other possib ility: the alternative is between being and not being, ha ving been or not having been, a
Member of the League of Nations -- and this, for the Members of the Commonw ealth at any rate, leads to the same
result concerning the Court's lack of jurisdiction in their disputes with India.

3. Pakistan's non-succession to the General Act of 1928

This being so, Mr.President, it cannot reasonably be cl aimed that Pakistan was some how a Member of the League
of Nations, nor that it succeeded to Briti sh India in this respect. And this le ads me on to my th ird point concerning
the alleged succession, or rather, non-succession of Pakistan to the General Act.

According to counsel for Pakistan, Paki stan «était partie par ce que l’Inde l’était dès le début» (CR2000/3, p.16),
which implies that in this respect it would have succeeded to British India. If I have understood correctly (although,
as I said at the beginning of my statem ent, I am not sure that I did understand correctly...), the whole thrust o f
Sir Elihu's argument on this point apparently follows from the lengthy extracts he quoted from the Report of Expert
Committee No.IX, on Foreign Relations, with a view, it would seem, to uncovering a "tru th" concerning the legal
situation of the two States with regard to the succession of States, a truth which, I repeat --subjective though it be,
like any truth -- eluded me. I shall now attempt to be clearer in so far as "my portion of truth" is concerned . . .

In fact all this discussion on the succes sion of States is important only in so far as the General Act of 1929 is

concerned and it is on that Act that I am going to endeavour to refocus the debate, for, without underestimating the
very great documentary interest of the reading with which SirElihu obliged us, it is that, after all, which is o f
concern to us.

I shall not inflict a further readi ng of this fascinating document upon you, Members of the Court, since what
emerges from it can be summed up in a few words: the repr esentatives of India and Pakistan were not in agreement
on the legal analysis of the situation re sulting from partition and I do not thi nk that much more can be drawn from
that reading.

From the passages concerning the position of Pakistan's representatives referred to by Sir Elihu, it would appear that
these affirmed that the future Pakistan had a vocation to succeed fully to British India. Th is position emerges, for
instance, from the refusal of Mr.Ikramullah and Mr.Iskande r Mirza to accept "their pos ition", to accept «la thèse
selon laquelle le dominion de l’Inde sera seul contin uateur de la personnalité internationale de l’Inde
actuelle» (Partition Proceedings, Vol. III, p. 206, CR 2000/3, p. 19).

With regard to the majority position, this is clearly illustrated by that of Mr.Pai, Mr.Menon and Mr.Jha, who
«considèrent qu'en réalité, certaines parties de l'Inde ont été séparées de l'entité principale, qui reste continuatrice de

la personnalité internationale de l'Inde actuelle» (Partition Proceedings , Vol. III, p. 206, CR 2000/3, p. 18).

There is nothing new under the sun (if we can talk about sun in this fine city of TheHague...): these positions
correspond very accurately to those maintained before you respectively by Pakistan on the one hand, and India on
the other.

Sir Elihu has endeavoured to persuade you that these opposing positions were r econciled by the text of paragraph 4
of the Schedule to the Indian Indepe ndence (International Arrangements) Order 1947: «C'est donc de cette manière

que le conseiller constitutionnel a concilié les positions des deux États, et a tenu compte à la fois de l'avis de l'Inde et
de celui du Pakistan, en particulier de celui du Pakist an» (CR 2000/3, p. 27). It is a, sh all we say, optimistic or...
Pakistani view of the «dénouement»!

We must be clear about this, Mr.Pr esident: there can be no doubt that the Schedule is indeed the «dénouement».
But, far from giving satisfaction to Pakistan, it ver y much inclines to the Indian side, at an y rate in so far as we areconcerned.

There can obviously be no question of talking in terms of superiority or inferiority: the two States are equal and
equal in terms of sovereignty and no one has ever had the preposterous idea --which Sir Elihu seems to be ascribing

to us (cf. CR2000/3, pp.17 or 27)--to suggest that Pakistan is devoid of international legal personality. There is
not even any need to determine whether India alone constitutes a continuation, in abstracto , of the legal personality
of British India for all possible purposes. Rather it is sufficient to establishhat for the purposes of interest to us --
i.e., succession to the status of Member or former Member of the League of Nations, there can be no doubt about the
answer: independent India, and it alone, succeeded to British India: not Pakistan.

And this emerges from the é d nouement described by Sir Elihu, and I am not sure that it is necessary for this purpose
to adopt the part of a "detective unravelling a mystery" (CR 2003/3, p. 16). It is sufficient to read the Schedule to the
Order of 14August 1947-- but it is necessary, unlike our sleuth, to re ad it in full and not make do with hal f

measures and race straight through to paragraph 4.

Paragraph 4 does indeed state that:

"rights and obligations under all inte rnational agreements to which Indi a is a party immediately before
the appointed day will devolve both upon the Dominion of India a nd upon the Dominion of Pakistan,
and will, if necessary, be apportioned between the two Dominions".

But only -- and this is how paragraph 4 begins -- " Subject to Articles 2 and 3 of this agreement". Article 3 does not
concern us; it deals with treaties cove ring territorial aspects. But Article2 is fundament al for us, and the first
sentence of paragraph 1 thereof deserves to be cited again:

«La qualité de membre de toutes les organisa tions internationales ainsi que les droits et obligations
attaché àcette qualit é seront dévolus exclusivement au Dominion de l'Inde.» (Emphasis added)

Pakistan was not a Member of the Lea gue of Nations. Nor could it become one , as the League was now defunct. It
could not succeed to British India because of this cruc ial provision. This amply dem onstrates, I believe, that
Pakistan could not have succeeded to the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League of Nations as
enjoyed by British India.

This, moreover, was precisely the position of the Pakistan Supreme Court in the 1961 Yangtze case, from which I
cited the relevant passages the day before yesterday (CR 2000/2, pp. 46-47).

My friend SirElihu Lauterpacht exhibite d great discretion on this matter. He e xplained to us that this was a very
complicated case -- which, incidentally, is true -- that the Pakistan Government, since it was not party to the case,
had not been able to make its views heard -- which is perhaps also true (I do not know, I have to say, how Pakistan's
Supreme Court works and I have unfortunately not ha d the time to obtain the relevant information; I assume that
Sir Elihu has done so?); he also told us that the Supreme Court did not have available all the information it needed to
decide; as he said: «cette Cour n'aurait en tout cas pas pu avoir connaissa nce de toutes les indications détaillées des
Partition Proceedings dont j'ai donné lecture ici ce matin» (CR2000/3, p.32); in other words, Pakistan's Supreme
Court allegedly did not decide with full knowledge of the facts, as it did not have the benefit of the arguments of the
learned counsel for Pakistan.

As I have shown, I do not th ink that my eminent opponent's police investigation (it was he who described his
investigation in this way . . .) has provided us with anything very new: the ex tracts from the Pa rtition Proceedings
which he read out simply established that there were two opposing arguments. That is still the case today.

But what is interesting is that the J udgment of the Pakistan Supr eme Court (which all the same could hardly have
been unaware of Pakistan's position with regard to the conditions of its accession to in dependence) adopted,
specifically with regard to an arbitrat ion treaty (in fact a number of arbitrat ion treaties), a position totally at odds
with Pakistan's own stance:

«Le Pakistan ne pouvait pas, en vertu de l'ordonnance relative à l'indépendance de l'Inde (accords
internationaux) succéder aux droits et obligations de l'I nde britannique comme Me mbre de la Société
des Nations...» (Documentation con cernant la succession d'Etats, S éie législative des Nations Unies,
1967, ST/LEG/SER.B/14, p. 139 -- for the complete quotation, see CR 2000/2, p. 47).And, contrary to what Sir Elihu asserted (CR 2000/3, p. 31), India's Attorney General has not had caused anything to
be said on this Judgment other than what he said on Tuesday. This is bor ne out if one simply compares the relevant
passage of his presentation with the Judgment itself:

z I quote the Attorney General:

«L'ordonnance relative à l'indépendance de l'Inde (accords internationaux) de 1947 ne prévoyait pas et,
de fait, ne pouvait pas pré voir la dévolution de dro its et obligations convent ionnels qui n'étaient pas
susceptibles d'être transmis par voie de succession à un pays séparé de l'Etat originel et élevé au rang de
puissance souveraine indépendante, comp te tenu de la pratique des Etat s. Tel est le point de vue qu'a
adopté la Cour suprême du Pakistan...» (CR 2000/2, p. 15);

z there is no need to cite theYangtze Judgment: it says the same thing word for word (ST/LEG/SER.B/14,
précis, p. 137); the Attorney General's only mistake was perhaps not to have inserted the quotation marks . . .

The inevitable interpretation of the 1947 Order adopted by the Pakistan Supreme Court results from the clear text of
that Order. It is also c onfirmed by the practice followed by Pakistan itself. A practice which, incidentally, is
sometimes a little stretched.

Thus, for instance, as was pointed out in a study of the United Nations Secretariat prepared for the International Law
Commission in 1968, "it was considered that, because of its se paration from India, Pakistan had ceased to belong to
the Berne Convention [for the protecti on of literary and artistic works] from the date it became independent,
14 August 1947". On 4 June 1948 Pakistan issued a declaration of accession to the 1928 Rome text of the Berne
Convention, in accordance with the te xt [... which] became effectiv e from 5July 1948. According to the
International Office,

"when Pakistan formed pa rt of India, it was ipso facto a party to the Union; s ubsequently it left the
Union when India and Pakistan were separated. On 5 July 1948, it again became a member of the Union
as a contracting country" ("Succe ssion of States to multilateral treaties: studies prepared by the
Secretariat",Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 1968, Vol. II, p. 16, para. 38).

The same applied to the Constitution of FAO, to which India had been pa rty since 16 October 1945, while Pakistan
submitted an application for membersh ip on 25August 1947 ("Succession of Stat es to multilateral treaties: sixth

study prepared by the Secretariat", Yearbook of the Inter national Law Commission , 1969, Vol.II, pp.37-38,
para. 49), not to mention the United Nations Charter and numerous treaties establishing international organizations.

But the same happened wi th regard to many other conventions to which British India had been party, in particular
the 1929 Geneva Conventions that Si r Elihu mentioned both on Monday (CR 2000/1, p. 57) and yesterday morning
(CR 2000/3, pp. 22-23). These treaties do not, however, fall directly within the ambi t of Article2 of the 1947
Schedule, which leads me to move on br iefly to a fourth point re lating to the list of 627 treaties which seems to

intrigue the Pakistani side so much.

Before doing so, I should like to briefly sum up this third point:

(1) the representatives of India and future Pakistan were, during the travaux pr éaratoires for the 1947 Order,
at loggerheads over the continuity of the personality of British India; that is all that the work of Committee
No. IX shows;

(2) these disagreements still exist today between India and Pakistan;

(3) with regard to both participati on in international organizations and the rights and obligations resulting
therefrom, paragraph 2 of the 1947 Agreement clearly settles this matter in favour of succession thereto solely
by India, to the exclusion of Pakistan;

(4) this is confirmed by the clear interpretation adopted by the Pakist an Supreme Court itself in the 1961
Yangtze Judgment and by the practice followed, volens nolens , by Pakistan itself; and, of course

(5) the same applies to the General Act of Arbitration, to which British India was party only because it was a
Member of the League of Nations.Mr. President, I need another 20 minutes or so. May I continue?

The PRESIDENT: Please continue, Professor.

4. List of the six hundred and twenty-seven treaties

Mr. PELLET: I shall therefor e now move on to the list of 627treaties enumerated in Annex5 to the Report o f
Expert Committee No. IX.

According to Professor Lauterpacht I said a lot of silly things yesterday about this list, but he has shown indulgence:

«deux exemples suffiront. Contrairement à ce qu'il a dit, le comité d'experts n'a pas préparé l'annexe où
figure la liste des traités ... Contrairement aussi à ce qu'il a déclaré, le rapport du comité d'experts, bien
que signé par les experts, ne constituait pas un accord...» (CR 2000/3, p. 28).

On the first point, Mr. President, I duly apologize since it does in fact seem that this famous list was prepared notby
experts but forthem, by a certain Mr.Branch of the External Affairs Branch of the External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Department (India) ( Partition Proceedings, Vol. III, p. 217). However, I did not state that
this list constituted or formed part of an agreement. What I sa id was completely different, namely that the list
"formed the basis on which the [devolution] agreement was negotiated. It constitutes the key element in the travaux

préparatoires and demonstrates the agreement of the negotia tors on the position in relation to the treaties
cited" (CR2000/2, p.50). And this I maintain: whilst the Co mmittee's report refers-- ve ry systematically, it would
seem--to the disagreements between its members, it does not mention any disagreem ent relating to the list--
something which cannot be said of the legal status of Paki stan in their eyes (pp. 213-215, paras. 42-46), and it is on
this last point, which I have alr eady touched upon, that the Committee recommends that "a more thorough
examination ... of the legal aspect s of the matter" [«un examen plus a pprofondi des aspects juridiques de la
question»] be made (p.214, para.45), not on the list itself or the distinction it makes between three categories of
treaty.

It is quite possible, and even probable, that this list contains a number of errors and omissions. It is nonetheless
highly significant, if only because it doesnot contain any treaty of arbitration, which strengthens the position of the
Pakistan Supreme Court in the Yangtze case concerning the arbitration agreements of 1923, 1927 and 1937, and also
India's position with respect to the non-transmissibility, as a general rule, of this type of agreement.

As for the three "significant omissions" [«importantes om issions»] which SirElihu saw fit to refer to, there is
nothing surprising about them (CR 2000/3, pp. 22-23). I shall look at them briefly one by one:

(1) the Geneva Conventions of 1929 on Prisoners of War and the Treatment of Sick and Wounded: contrary to
what Pakistan seems to think, these conventions quite clearly found no place in the list and, incidentally, gave
rise to an incident when Pakistan attempted to become party theret o by means of a notific ation of succession
of 31 January 1948. This attempt

"by the Pakistan Government had no effect as re gards the participation of Pakistan in the 1929
Conventions as a separate party. Pakistan became a party by accessi on and not by succession
. . ." ("Succession of States to multilateral treaties: studies prepared by the Secretariat", précis,

Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1968, Vol. II, p. 40, para. 167);

(2) the 43extradition treaties which my opponent lumped t ogether: if anything is surp rising about them, it is
not their absence from the list. Concluded intuitu personae , bilateral extradition treaties do not lend
themselves to succession imposed by a newly independent State on the co-contracting party of the predecessor
State, with which these agreements must inevitably be renegotiated (see H. J. Keith, "State Succession to
Treaties in the Commonwealth", ICLQ, 1964, p.1442). What is more surpri sing is the presence of two
extradition treaties on the list (the 1911 Treaty with Siam and the 1931Treaty with Iraq--see Partition
Proceedings Vol.III, pp.220 and 218); unless specific reasons of which I am unaware made this solution

necessary, it is these two treaties which should not have been included in the list, and not the 43 others which
were erroneously omitted. This reduces , if I may say so, the level of erro r which SirElihu believed he had
been able to identify;

(3) the Protocol relating to the arbitration clauses of 1923: as we have seen, this is one of the instruments
which was ex pressly involved in the Yan gtze case, heard in 1961 b y the Pakistan Su preme Court, which rightly held that Pakistan could not su cceed to British India with respect to these clauses. Furthermore, in the
publication entitled Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Se cretary-General, Status as at 30April1999 ,
the Secretary-General confirms that Pakistan is still not party to these clauses ( é cis , p. 974).

What can we conclude from all this, Mr .President? Firstly, without doubt, that the list of the 627treaties is clearly
less fanciful than SirElihu would have us believe. Secondly, that the abse nce of any arbitrat ion treaty is by no
means fortuitous, which conf irms India's position with regard to the non-transmissibilit y of these types o f
agreement, at least as they were viewed at that time. Finally, following on from this, that Pakistan was not entitled to
succeed to British India with respect to the General Act of Arbitration of 1928, partly because the Act comes under
this category -- and this also applies to India -- and pa rtly because only Members of the League of Nations (which
status Pakistan could not claim) could become party thereto.

5. Pakistan's communication of 30 May 1974

This brings me to the fifth point whic h SirElihu addressed yester day. It concerns what pur ports to be Pakistan's
notification of succession of 30May1974 --and, Mr. President, I did say of 30 May 1974 , not 3October1973,
contrary to what Pakistan sa ys it discovered «plutôt à la de rnière minute» thanks to th e copy of the "original text"
bearing that date which its Permanent Mission supplied to Pakistan's team of lawyers (see CR 2000/3, p. 29).

And to the astonishment of detective Lauterpacht:

«L'aspect le plus singulier du doc ument déposé par le Pakistan le 3 octobre 1973 est que certains
passages semblent avoir disparu dans la version imprimée du recueil du Secrétaire général. Les passages
omis concernent trois endroi ts différents de la lettre du Pakistan, et ils ont tous un contenu similaire --
leur omission ne peut donc guère avoir été accidentelle. C'est comme si quelqu'un--je ne dis pas que
c'est le cas, mais je dis que c'est comme si quelqu'un--avai t décidé pour une raison quelconque
d'omettre dans la versio n imprimée qui serait diff usée au monde entier certains passages de la
communication d'origine.» (Ibid.)

Counsel for Pakistan then endeavours to systematically compar e what he presents as the original text o f
3October1973 with that published by the Secretary-Genera l. And, having remarked that "Pakistan's basic legal
position is here being di storted or omitted" [«la pos ition juridique fondamentale du Pakistan est ici déformée, ou
éludée»] (CR2000/3, p.30) and that, if the omitted passage s had appeared in the offi cial publication, "then there
would have been a wider general understa nding of what the true nature of the succession of Pakistan and India was
to the obligations of the original Brit ish India" [«la vraie nature de la succession du Pakistan et de l'Inde aux
obligations de l'Inde britannique originelle aurait d'une manière générale été plus largement comprise»] (CR 2000/3,
p. 31), he concludes:

«J'invite donc la Cour, à qui une copie de cette lettre sera bien évidemment fournie, à en tenir compte [il
parlait d'une différence entre le texte de la lettre de 1973 et la publication des Nations Unies] lorsqu'elle
examinera la vraie nature de la succession.

Il me semble [Sir Elihu pa rle] que cette analyse des Partition Proceedings et de cette lettre amène à
s'interroger sur la validité des vues exprimées par le s conseillers juridiques du Secrétaire général de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies, auxquelles M. Pellet a fait référence à la page [46 du compte rendu --
CR 2000/2, p. 46].

Voilà donc pour ce point, qui est, je crois, un élément vraiment centr al de l'argumentation relative à
l'Acte général.» (Ibid.)

All things considered, Mr. President, I believe that my eminent opponent and fri end's vocation as a detective is less
well-founded than his vocation as a lawyer! Although a co mmunication was indeed addr essed to the Secretary-
General on 3 October 1973 by Pakistan's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, the Secretary-General responded
to this Note with another Note dated 31January1974 (a copy of which was obtained by the Indian delegation
yesterday evening by India's Permanent Mission in New York and will of course also be made available to the Court

and Pakistan, if they so wish). If I ma y, Mr. President, I should like to read the important part of this note (begging
your indulgence if I continue to mispronounce the language of Shakespeare and Bentham . . .):

«Il a été pris bonne note de la déclaration figurant au paragraphe 5 de la note de la mission permanente
précisant que «le Pakistan c ontinue d'être lié par la ratification faite par l'Inde britanni que de l'Acte général de 1928» et que «en re vanche, le Gouvernement pakistanais ne confirme pas les réserves
faites par l'Inde britannique».

A cet égard, il convient de rappeler l'usage international que le Secrét aire général s'es time obligé de

suivre en ce qui concerne les tra ités multilatéraux pour lesquels il assume les fonctions de dépositaire :
selon cet usage, une notificati on de succession qui, tout comme une ratification ou une adhésion,
constitue un acte par lequel un Etat confirme sur le plan international son consentement à être lié par un
traité, doit émaner soit du chef de l'Etat ou du gouvern ement, soit du ministère des affaires étrangères.
La notification est alors o fficiellement portée à l'attention des Etats intéressés par le Secrétaire général
en sa qualité de dépositaire, et versée aux archives.

En conséquence, le Secrétaire général saurait gré à M. le Représentant permanent de bien vouloir faire
établir une notification sous la forme prescrite ci-dessus.

Dès que cette notification aura été reçue, le Secrétaire général ne manquera pas d'en enregistrer le dépôt
et d'en informer officiellement tous les Etats intéressés.» [Translation by the Registry]

This, Mr. President, explains the mystery in which Sir Elihu believed he wa s immersed (and carried you along with

him, Members of the Court): following th is Note from the Secretary-General to Pakistan's Permanent Mission, the
Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed a new notificati on of succession to the Secr etary-General on 30May1974. I
have to say that we have not been able to obtain this second notification as it will apparently take two to three days
to extract it from the United Nations archives. But evidently what is reproduced in the publication of the Secretary-
General are the terms of this letter from the Prime Minister dated 30 May 1974.

This explanation -- mundane, I am afraid, but unambiguous -- dispels the dark suspicions harboured by the Pakistani
side. If anyone deliberately omitted to include certain passages from the in itial Note of Pakistan's Permanent

Mission, it was not the United Nations Secretariat, but the Prime Minister of Pakistan himself. And if the true nature
of the succession is to be found in one of these co mmunications, we should, of course, look for it in the
communication dated 30May1974, not in that dated 3Oct ober1973. Indeed the Pakistani side is scarcely in a
position to attempt to cast doubt on the competence or integrity of United Nations officials or (I quote Sir Elihu) "the
value of the view of the United Nations Secretary-General's legal advisers".

Similarly, ProfessorLauterpacht saw fi t to point out, with re gard to the date of 3 October 1973 on which he

erroneously based himself: «Si je précise la date, c'est qu'il faut la rattacher à la répons e, ou à la réaction, de l'Inde,
qui a tardé pendant près d' un an, jusqu'au 18 septembre 1974» (CR 2000/3, p.29). However, India clearly reacted
promptly: it responded within three and a half months of the notification of succession being received by the United
Nations Secretariat, which, bearing in mind the likely transmission delays, is particularly swift.

This is, moreover, less than the time it took Pakistan to rectify the text of its first "so-ca lled" notification of
succession. And, in four months, it had ample time to reflect upon the precise wording of this notification (to which
the Secretary-General, incidentally, drew attention in the note I read out a few moments ago).

Therefore it was certainly no accident that, in the end, Paki stan, in its "notification of succession" (I put this
expression in inverted commas) of 30 May 1974,

z omitted any reference to its purported "continuation of the former personality of British India" [«continuité de
la personnalité juridique de l'ex-Inde britannique»] (para. 3 of the initial Note) and its purported agreement "to
be bound by all multilateral obligations of British India" [«d'être liés par toutes les obligations multilatérales

de l'Inde britannique»] (para. 4 of the same Note of 1973); and it was no accident that it
z substituted the word "accession" for what initially appeared as "ratification", a point dwelt on by my
opponent.

And I also note in passing that the corr ect notification ends as follows: "The Government of Pakistan does not,
however, affirm the reservations made by British India" [«En re vanche, le Gouvernement pa kistanais ne confirme
pas les réserves faites par l'Inde britannique»] , which confirms that here we ar e dealing not with a succession but,

contrary to what was stated earlier, a de novo accession.

This perhaps no longer represents Pakist an's current position, but Pakistan is clearly estopped from deviating from
the position it adopted in 197 4, from that reproduced in "the printed text that the world was made aware of" to
repeat the words used by my opponent -- CR 2000/3, p. 29).This being the case, I shall be more cautious than Sir Elihu and should like to point out that we have not been able to
obtain a copy of the Prime Mini ster of Pakistan's original text dated 30 May 1974 but fra nkly I hardly think that an
official from the United Nations legal service could perform anything less than a scrupulous retranscription. I hasten
to add that what I have just been saying in no way call s into question the integrity of the talented counsel for
Pakistan, who has simply allowed hims elf to be misled by an ove r-hasty and incomplete "investigation". However,

we feel we had to "set the record straight", if I may say so, to banish any misunderstandings and doubts to which his
pleading yesterday may have given rise.

6. Matters on which Pakistan has remained silent

Rest assured, Mr.President, I am co ming to the end of my presentation. Be fore concluding, however, I should like
to refer to certain matters on which Pakistan has remained silent. This will be my sixth and, in short, final point.

Counsel for Pakistan yesterday reproached India's lawyers for not replying in full to the arguments presented during
the first round of pleadings. Wi ll he allow me to point out that neithe r during the first nor the second round did we
have any more time than he had to prep are his own reply (but in so far as he is concerne d this applies only to the
second round)? To paraphrase his words, we could also say:

"As the Court will realize, in the manner in which these hearings have been organized, with no whole
day between the presentation of Paki stan's case or the opportunity for India to reply to it, we have
worked under considerable pressure to prepare ourselves."

[«Comme la Cour le comprendra, ét ant donné la manière dont ces audiences ont été organisées--il ne
s'est pas écoulé vingt-quatre heures entre la plaidoirie du Pakistan et la présente matinée où l'Inde est
invitée à répondre--nous n'avons di sposé que de très peu de temp s pour nous préparer.»] (See C R
2000/3, p. 8.)

This being the case, we have done our best given the circumstances, and I hope , for my part, not to have left any
important points uncovered.

Like my friend and colleague Ian Brownlie, I would point out, with all due respect to our opponents, that they have,
for their part, left out a substantial part of the argument that we put forw ard during the first round. It goes without
saying that the Republic of India sta nds by this argument in full, and that I am not about to start going over
everything the Islamic Republic of Pakistan did not see fit to discuss. I should just like to enumerate the main points
which have thus been passed over in silence.

The most striking of these is undoubtedly Pakistan's complete silence concerning India's position regarding the

General Act. The fact of the matter is -- as I had the honour to e xplain in some detail on Tu esday -- that not only is
Pakistan not party to the Ge neral Act of 1928, a point to which it chose to devote yesterday morning's pleadings
exclusively, but also that India itself is not bound by the Ge neral Act either. It never has been bound by it since its
independence, first because the Act does not lend itself to the succession of States, and, second, because independent
India did not in any case give the notification that would have been esse ntial for succession, assuming that this had
been possible. Furthermore, its communi cation of 18September1974 (this date cannot possibly be disputed ...)
cannot leave any doubt as to I ndia's desire not to be bound by it and, at the very worst, has to be seen as an
unambiguous denunciation.

I also draw attention to Pakistan's e qually surprising silence concerning the rese rvations attached to British India's
Act of Accession in 1931. Now, I repeat, each of these three reservations to which I referred on Tuesday (see
CR 2000/2, pp. 44-45) and which also appear in the Counter-Memorial (pp. 11-12) are such as to rule out the Court's
jurisdiction in the present case.

In addition, although I am surely forget ting other important items --I too, Mr. President, have had to work under
pressure!--I would mention, for the r ecord, Pakistan's silence concerning the Simla Accor d, the provisions of the
Charter which it initially invoked, and the estoppel or acquiescence--all arguments to which Mr. P.S.Rao
responded the day before yesterday, and about which not a word has been uttered by the Pakistani side, which means

that our excellent colleague and friend has been denied the pleasure of speaking before you again this morning.

So there is silence on many matters and it speaks volumes!

Mr. President, as the Attorne y General Mr. Soli Sorabjee reminded us in the introduction to India's pleadings, Indiaremains committed to your distinguished Court and has demonstrated this by maintaining its optional declaration o f
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, subject to the reservations which it has, as it is entitled to do,
appended thereto. It is this declaration that marks both its consent to your jurisdiction and the limits of your
jurisdiction if there is no special agreement between the Parties. And it is surely not by attempting, for a second
time, to resuscitate the General Act of 1928 -- by which India has clearly let it be known that it was not bound -- that

the Pakistani side is serving the cause of international justice of which you are the vigilant guardians.

Members of the Court, I thank you most sincerely for your patient attention and, Mr. President, may I ask you now
to call upon His Excellency Mr.Menon who, in his capacity as Agent, will read the Republic of India's final
submissions pursuant to Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. Je donne la parole à S. Exc. l'ambassadeur Menon, agen de l'Inde.

M. MENON: Monsieur le président, Madame et Messi eurs de la Cour, cela a été un honneur pour Monsieur
l’Attorney General de l’Inde, pour moi-même en qualité d’agent et pour les autres membres de la délégation
indienne de venir devant vous. La délégation indienne exprime sa profonde reconnai ssance à la Cour pour la
patience avec laquelle elle a bien voulu nous écouter. Dans sa lettre du 2 novembre 1999, le Gouvernement de l’Inde
a exposé ses exceptions préliminaires à la compétence de la Cour, en ré ponse à la requête présentée par la
République islamique du Pakistan le 21 septembre 1999 dans l’affaire de l 'Incident a éien du 10ao ût 1999
(Pakistan c. Inde). Le contre-mémoire soumis par l’Inde le 28février2000, sur les observations présentées par le
Pakistan dans son mémoire daté du 7 janvier 2000 a développé la position de l’Inde.

Les audiences de ces qua tre derniers jours ont donné à l’Inde l’occasion de réaffirmer et de développer encore ses
arguments, en rejetant ceux qui ont ét é avancés par le Gouver nement du Pakistan. L’I nde répète qu’aucun des
arguments avancés par le Pakistan n’ est solide, et qu’aucun d’ entre eux ne fournit de base pour invoquer la
juridiction de la Cour. Le Gouvernement de l’Inde prie donc respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger qu’elle n’est
pas compétente pour examiner la requête du Gouvernement du Pakistan. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Menon. The Court takes note of the final submissions which you have read on
behalf of India, as it took note yesterday of the final submissions presented by the Co-Agent of Pakistan.

This brings us to the end of this series of hearings on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court.

I should like to thank the Agents, couns el and lawyers of both Parties most sincerely for th e quality of their
arguments and the courtesy they have exhibited throughout these proceedings.

I also wish to thank them for the restraint they have shown following my appeal concerning the second round of the

pleadings.

In accordance with practice, I shall request both Agents to remain at the Court's dispos al to provide any additional
information it may require, and, with that proviso, I now decl are closed the oral pr oceedings concerning the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain th e Application in the case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999
(Pakistan v India).

The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due course of the date on

which the Court will deliver its Judgment.

As the Court has no other business before it today, the session is closed.

The Court rose at 11.45 a.m.

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