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Traduction
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CR 93/25 (traduction)
CR 93/25 (translation)

Jeudi ler juillet1993
Thursday1 July 1993 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vousasseoir. Je donnela parole à

M. Cassese.

Mr. CASSESE: Mr. President,yesterday1 endeavoured to show thatas
6
earlyas 1919 the Frenchby theireffective hold on Borkou,Ennediand

Tibesti hadacquiredsovereignrights over the region. This is confirmed

by theItalianrecognition - explicit or implicit- derivinginter alia

from the Laval-MussoliT nieatyand the Jef-Jefincidentof 1938.

But our honourable opponenctsaimto deriveadvantage from another

incidentin which Italyand Francewere pittedagainst each other in

1941,in connection with the implementatioonf the Franco-Italian

Armistice Agreemen tf 1940.

Accordingto our opponents this incidenptrovesthatat that period

Italywas stillclingingto theideathattherewas no frontierin the

southof Libya (RL, para.6.247).

6. The Franco-ItalianArmistice Agreemen tf 1940

Let us thereforelookat thefacts. Buto understandthe factsand

the relevantlegalrulesit is necessaryto sketch intheirhistorical

context.

The Franco-ItaliaAnrmistice Agreemen was signedon 24 June 1940.

Italy hadentered thewar against Franceonly twoweeksbefore,at a time

when the Germanswere at the gatesof Parisand therewas no doubtof the

issueof the battle. Mussolinitherefore decidedto imposethe armistice

upon the French some daybeforethe Franco-German armistice The

fascistdictator, withhis usual presumptuousnea ssd opportunism, hoped

to takeadvantageof thatopportunity toimpose hurniliatincgonditions

upon Franceand to seize French territoriesin Europeand Africa.

However, Hitler, anxiousto treatthe Vichy Governmen with consideration
* O11
and fearingthatthe FrenchEmpirein Africawouldflareup in reaction to increased extortionforced Mussolintio moderatehis requirements.

Nevertheless, the armistice condit ionesdictatedby Italyto

France, eventhoughthe Italianauthoritiesmade some minorconcessions.

1 am stressing the historical conteMr.,President,becauseit is

vital foran understandingof the provisionof the Agreementthatare of

direct interestto us. It was Italythatdraftedtheproposed Armistice

Agreement- in bad French- and in fact imposeit on Franceexceptas

far as marginal pointsere concerned.

The provisionof the Agreementhich is centralto Our case is

Article3, paragraph 3of which,Membersof the Court,you will findin

Ourhearingsfolderandwhichis alsoshownon the screen.

Thisprovidesinteralia thatto the southof Libya: "a zone

extendingfromtheLibyanfrontierto a parallel line 200 kilometres

distant therefro mhall bedemilitarizedf"or thedurationof the

armistice(CMC, Ann.84).

Moreover, Articl4eof theAgreementadded that thzeonesto be

demilitarizedunderthe terms of Article3wouldbe evacuated by French

forces. Article 23 providedthatan "ItalianArmisticeCommission"

underthe authorityof theItalianSupremeCommandwouldbe entrusted

with "theregulationand supervision,eitherdirectlyor throughits

organs"of the implementatio of theAgreement.A "French delegation"

established attheheadquartersof the Commissionin Turinwas authorized

to makeknown"thewishesof itsGovernment with regardto the

implementationo"f the Agreement.

O12 The textof theseprovisions confirms wh atsaidjustnow,namely

that theItalians considered themsela vesthe victors.Let us lookat

Article3, paragraph3. One pointis obvious, Mr. PresidentMembersof

the Court. This is thatItaly,whichruled the roost at thetime,

imposedthe Articleupon Franceand in thatArticlespeaksof the southern"Libyanfrontier".Therefore - 1 stressthispoint - Italy

based itself on the idethata southern Libyanfrontier well and truly

existed. This is the first glarincontradictionof the contentionof

our opponents. a

Wherewas this frontier located?

Clearly Article d id not haveto andcouldnot specifythis: it

was sufficientto referto the existing southern frontier.But it is

just as clear thatto implement Article thatfrontier had to be

identified.To thatend, General Grossi,President of the Italian

Armistice Commissiosn,nta letterto the Presidentof the French

delegation(CMC,Am. 85).

The purportof thatlettermay besummarized in threepoints.

First,Grossiindicated that the courseof the southernfrontierhad

not yet been "determinedin jointagreement1 with Italyand France.

Second,he admitted that the Treaty of 1935,he Laval-Mussolini

Treaty, hadneverentered into forceand thatconsequently the lineset

out in Article2 of the Treatwas not legallybinding.

Third,he nevertheless stated thatwhen Italy had"fixedthe outer

limitof the demilitarizedzone inArticle3" -thesearehis ownwords -

w
"it could onlyhave beentakingas the baseline the lin which must,on

its own interpretationhave beenthe frontier"(ouritalics). In other
Cl3
words: as it was we,the Italians, who established Arti clit is our

interpretatioonf thatArticleand therefore itis the coursethatwe,

the Italians, choosthatmustprevail. This wasa bare-faced returnto

the quia sum leoof Aesop'sfables!("1 shalldecidebecause1 am the

lionand you are the lamb".)

In their reply(CMC,Am. 93), the Frenchdottedthe ils: the

1935coursewas unacceptable, saidthe French,for theLaval-Mussolini

Treatyhad beenI8rejected by the Italiansthemselves.It was truethat there hadbeenno "convention or treaty fixing ct ourseof thatportion

of the boundarybilaterallywith Italy". Nevertheless,the French note

continued,despitethe absenceof a bilateral convention, Italy had

recognizedthe 1899-1919line; consequently the only lt inbe

consideredfor the purposesof theArmistice Agreemen tas thatof

1899-1919.Thiswas the Frenchreply, firm, clear,reasonedand

absolutely consistewntth the positionthatFrancehad always adopted.

Whatwas the Italianreaction?

In the faceof theFrenchattitude one mighh tave expecteda

reactionthatwas al1 theharderand more categoricas linceItalywas -1

repeat - in aposition of strength. Just asit had imposedArticle3

of theArmistice Agreemen ttaly couldhaveimposedupon Franceits

interpretatioa nnd its implementatioof Article3, namelythe

Laval-MussolinTireatyline. But thatwas not so. Far fromit: Italy

preferredto give in to the Frenchcontention.In a letterof

14 July 1941,the Presidentof the ItalianArmisticeCommission merely

pointed out thatthe questionwas not withinthe competenceof the
014

Armistice Commissio and was ofno practicalimportance.

Mr. President, Memberosf theCourt,what conclusionscanwe draw

from thisexchangeof letters?

To my mind, fourpointsneed to be made. First,Italy by the very

factof drafting Articl3 e formally recognizethat asouthern frontier

of Libya existed,thusconfirming the positionit had longheld.

Second, Italy anFdranceagreedon the factthat therewas no

bilateraltreatybetweenthemspecifically covering the delimitat ofon

the southernfrontier of Libya.

Third, Italy,in the faceof the specific argumentput forwardby

France, dropped its insistence onthe 1935 linwhich it had triedto

impose. Evenmore - thisis my fourthpoint - duringthebargaining of 1941,

Italynevercontested, thougi ht had thepolitical powero do so, the

force and the validity of the French contentiothat onlythe

1899-1919frontiercounted.

7. Conclusion

Mr. President,Membersof the Court,1 cometo the end of my remarks

on the Italianrecognitionof the Frencheffectivitésin the B.E.T. 1

believe1 have shownthatItaly undeniablr yecognizedthose

effectivitésand acceptedthe sovereignrightsof France. The

015 reiteratedaffirmation of the FrenchState presenceas answeredby

reiteratedrecognition of thatlineby the ItalianGovernment.That

recognition contributt edconsolidatingthe Frenchtitlederived from

customarylaw.

III.THE RECOGNITIONOF FBENCH SOVEBEIGNTBY LIBYA

31. Mr. PresidentMembersof the Court,up tillnow 1 have spoken

of Italianrecognition.

1 shouldlikenow to stressthatLibyatoo after independence

recognizedFrenchsovereignty ovet rheAozoustripup to the frontier

thatthe Italians had previouslyaccepted.

Libyanrecognitionwas expressedin obviousfashionin 1955on the

occasionof an important incident.
In this connection1 must repeatwhat

1 saidyesterdayconcerning theJef-Jef incident namelythatconflicts,

confrontations and incidents betw States havealways actedas a

detectorof the existing lega situation.On the occasionof such

conflicts, thSetatesconcerned takae positionon the controversial

points and clearl show theiropinionsand legalcontentions. 32. The incidenton which 1shouldliketo dwell fora momentis

thatof Moya (orAozou aswe have calledit up tillnow). It took place

in 1955, four yearafterthe independence of Libya.

On 21 February 1955a Libyanteamleft Koufra foA rozou.

On 28 February 1955a groupof threejeepscarryingsix civilians

accompanied by an officer,a corporaland 11 Libyansoldierswere stopped

by a French detachmenatt Moya, ten kilometres north of Aozt ou,t is to

say 80 kilometres frotmhe Franco-Libyafnrontier. This is the account
-16
of the incidentgivenby Mr. Pinay, Minister for Foreign Affairto the

French National Assembly,written inreplyto a question from theMP

Mr. Bardow:

"Thesubalterncommanding the French patrol, having
stoppedthe vehicles,invitedthe Headof the Libyan Mission to
returnto the frontier imrnediately;sincethe latterinsisted

on seeingthe officer of the guar at Aozou,one of the jeeps
was authorizedto continuethus far, having been disarmet d,e
other vehiclesremainingon the spotunderthe guard of French
soldiers. The commanderof the Libyan columninformed the
subaltern, officeorf the guard,thathe had the taskof making
a censusof the population of Aozoaund of carrying out a
medicalvisit there;requestedto returnto thefrontier, he
immediatelyleft the oasis wherehe had spenta quarterof an
hour and was notinvitedto lunchby the officer ofthe guard
who, on the contrary, refushedm authorizatiotno takeon
fresh supplieson the spotand immediatelysenthim back to
Moya, whencethe three vehiclesof the convoyreturnedto Libya
without furtheirncident." (MC, Ann. 341.)

33. What wasthe impact of thi abortive Libyamnission?

Let us firstof al1 point outthatthe Libyan mission waosf a

civiliannature, even if theLibyan delegation wa accompaniedby a

militaryescort. The tasksof themission were of an administrative

nature: to make a censusof the populationand have it inspectedby a

doctor. Neverthelessthe Frenchsoldiersrepelled the Libyanteamin

the firmestmanner. It should also be notedthatwhile mostof the

Libyan mission remaine in Moyaunderthe guardof Frenchsoldiers,those

of itsmembers who were authorizedto continueto Aozouwere disarmed. This conduct byFrance showsin the clearestfashionthe determinationto

signifythat theforeign missiow nas underfullFrenchsovereignty.

017 In the faceof thisFrenchreaction, what did themembersof the
- -
Libyan missiondo? Did theyprotest? Did theyassertan allegedclaim @

to move freelyin the Aozou strip?Not at all. The Libyans packedup

and turnedbackwithout saying w aord. They left immediatelydespitethe

fatigueof a seven-dayjourney fromKoufrato Moya,the fact thatone of

the participantswas laterto describeas exhaustingand nerve-wracking

in the stiflingand inhospitable heaotf the desert(MC,Am. 272).

Mr. President,one might evebne surprised at the attituodethe

French, whichwas not only firmand energetic bueven ratherharsh:

theyevendeliberately omittedto invite theLibyan missionto lunch.

The fact is,Mr. President,Membersof the Court,that theFrench

authorities considere thatthere was no time fopoliteness.

In the faceof an unauthorized intrusion inFroenchterritory,in

the faceof a flagrant violatio of Frenchsovereignty, therceould only

be one hard and energeticreaction: to expelthe intruders

immediately,to return them to the frontier.

None the less,Mr. PresidentMembersof the Court,the reactionof
c? 8
Francedid not stopthere. On 4 March 1955theMinisterof Francein v

Tripoli sentthe LibyanGovernmenta forma1protest. Theseare the words

used by the Ministe of France. We have beenunableto find the texotf

thisnote in the diplomaticarchives. But thereis no doubtof its

existence forit is mentionedin thewrittenreplyof Mr. Pinay which1

have just quotedand in fourFrenchdocuments(seeRC, Am. 86; MC,

Anns. 256 and 257;andML, Vol. III,p. 167).We alsoknow the content

of the French"forma1protest"for it wassummarized as follows by

Mr. Pinay: theFrenchMinisterin Tripoli"recalledfirmly"to theLibyan Governmen" tthatAozouis on the territoryof French Equatorial

Africa, whose frontier s,ttledby instruments of international la aw,

incontestable( "MC,Am. 341).

At the requestof theMinister foO rverseas Territories, whhod

requested Mr. Pinayto address"a strongprotestto theLibyan

Governrnent "MC,Ann. 252),theFrenchprotestwas reiterated on 19 March

(seethe previously quotw edittenreplyby Mr. Pinay,ibidem). So

therewere two Frenchprotests.

The Libyan Government, with whi the British Government authorities

had intervenedin the hope ofmakingit see reason,eventually cameround

to France'sview. It gave anassurance thaTtripoli wouldin future

respect Frenchsovereignty ove Aozouandwouldrefrain from sending

troopsintothe region(intotheAozoustrip). Theseassurances were

givenat the highest level thatis to Say by Prime MinisteBren Halim.

This emerges fromseveralFrench diplomatic document isn,particulaa

telegramsent to Parisby theFrenchMinisterin Tripoli. After giving

an accountof steps takenby theBritish Minister in Tripol Mr. Graham,

the telegramreportedthat:

"The [Libyan]Prime Ministert,o whom 1 had givena
seriouswarning in thatregard,confirmed whaM tr. Grahamhad
done andmade it clearthathis Government hadno intention of

revertingto thequestionof Aozouas he recognized that that
village was located on French territory.

He alsopromisedto notifythatpositionto the Commander
of the Security Forces oCyrenaicaand tothe civilian
authoritiesof thatregion."(MC,Ann. 264.)

There, once morew,e have the clearest possibaedmissionof French

sovereignty ovetrheAozoustrip.

1 may add that theibyan undertakings ae retablishedby several

sources. Becauseof theirimportance, theywere reportedby the

Quai dgOrsayto theMinisterforOverseas Territorie (MC,Ann. 266)and confirmedby the FrenchMinisterin Tripolito theMinister for Foreign

Affairs,Mr. Pinay,in a further despatc( hMC,Ann. 267).

34. What lessoncan be drawnfromthis incident?

Two conclusions appea ro me to be calledfor. t

First,the sharp reaction o the French authoritie sn the fieldand

the Libyans' acquiescence confirm witt houleast doubt that the zone

we now cal1 the "Aozou stripwas indeed,at the timetheseevents took

place,underthe effective contro and authorityof France.

Second, theLibyanattitude is quiteunambiguous.It is perfectly

clear-cut. Both bytheir conduct in the field and bytheir reactiotno
w
the two Frenchprotests, theLibyanauthorities recognizi en the most

explicit fashiot nhatthe zonein questionwas indeedunderFrench

620
sovereignty.

Allowme to add one comment,Mr. President.Who coulddeny a

striking and astonishing parallelisbetween the inciden 1thave just

described and the Jef-Jef incid 1espoke about yesterdayJ?ust as at

Jef-Jefin 1938 - 17 yearsearlier,Mr. President: - the State whose

sovereignty habdeen violatedin 1955 exercisedits sovereign power sn

the field by expelling theintruders,and later protestedin the most

energetic manner. To my mind, the 1955 incide oftMoya and Aozouis

even more eloquent. It showswithmuch greater forc e were this

possible - that the Aozou striwas underFrench authority, if only

becauseon this occasion the explicit acknowledg menFrance's

sovereignrights emanatef srom thehighestLibyanauthority,

PrimeMinisterBen Halim.

35. To conclude,Mr. President,theAozou incident confiri ms

exemplary fashiotnhatfrom the momeno tf its independencLibya

recognized the effective sovereig oftyrance over the Aozostrip.

Libyaadmittedthe validity of a protestin which Parisclaimedthat the southern boundaroyf Libya hadbeen "definedby international

instruments".That is Mr. Pinayspeaking. Theseinternational

instruments are thesameas the "international instrumen tsforce"to

whichthe Franco-Libyan Treao ty Friendshipand Good Neighbourlineswas

to refersix months later,on 10 August1955. Thus,without the

slightest breakin continuity,the frontierbetweenChad and Libyahas

remained that determinb ed the Agreementof 1899-1919.

As you see, the thirdChadianhesis,while logically autonomo us

- - relationto Chad'stwo othertheses,finally becomes incorporat ind

them, it finally confirmsnd strengthensthem.

The Aozoustrip,then,is indeedin Chadian territora ynd the

1899-1919boundary, reiterate and formallyendorsed bythe

1955 Franco-Libya Treaty,is the one thatseparatesChad fromLibya

southof that country.

Thankyou verymuch,Mr. President, foy rour patientattention.May

1 askyou to cal1on Mr. Cot.

Le PRESIDENT:Je remercie beaucouMp. Cassese. Je donnela parole

à M. Cot.

Mr.COT: Mr. President, Member of the Court,it seemedusefulto

us, at this stageofOur oral argumentst,o presentto you,with the aid

of Engineer General Gateau d,few observationosn the maps producedby

the twoParties.

The RepublicofChaddoesnot accordany overriding importanceto

geographicalmaps inthiscase. We certainly do notregardmaps as

. 02 2 establishing lega litle. Somemaps have beenalludedto atgreater

lengthin Our statements, the main the FrenchLivre jaune comingto

mind, but thiwsas in orderto throw more lightn the will ofthe

Partiesand 1 shall notrevertto thosedemonstrations. Al1 the same,jurisprudence has by now determinedwith a certain

precisionthe role of maps before a judiciablody such as yours. As

statedin 1986by the Chamber,in the Frontier Dispute case:

"maps can stillhave no greater legal valutehan that of
corroborative evidenc endorsinga conclusion at which a court
has arrived by othermeansunconnected with the maps"
(I.C.J.Reports 1986,p. 583, para. 56).

Maps may thus constitute corroborative evidence, particulw arlny a

seriesof maps establishesthe notorietyof a boundaryline ...or

invalidates suchnotoriety.

That, it seems to me, washow the Chamberproceeded lastyear in the

case concerning the Land Islandand Maritime Frontier Dispute

(El Salvador/Honduras:Nicaraguaintervening), where,afterrecalling

the judicialprecedent 1 have just cited,the Chamberwent on to say:

"for the reasonsexplainedby the Frontier DisputeChamber,
it [theChamber]attachesonly thevalue of corroborative
evidence to anumberof maps of the 19th century,to which
Hondurasin particularhas drawnattention, showintghe
politicallimitsof the two States,includingthe present
disputedsector ofthe land boundary. The large majorityof
these,to the extentthat theyshow a clearline in the area,
do howeverreflectthe positionthat it is the present course
of the Goascoran whichconstitutesthe boundary."
(I.C.J.Reports 1992, p. 550, para. 316.)

The Libyan Partyobservedin its pleadingsthatwe had mainly

producedFrench maps,to be suspectedthereforeof partiality.

1would point out that Our little atlaswas not intended onlyto
f'2.3
amassmaps in order to emphasizethe notorietyof the boundary line that

we are defending,but also to providethe Courtwith the necessary

cartographicmaterialfor an understanding of specific passagesof Our

pleadings.

The compositionof Our atlasthus did not seekto reflectany

particularbalance. But our opponents mayrest assuredthat,in the

selectionof maps for my statement,1 have takenaccountof their observation,and 1 shall naturally highligmhtps preparedby third

States or international bodies not lia tolee taxedwith partiality.

Our honourable opponents haa veso criticizedus for not providing

the Italianmaps unfavourableto us, in that they showno boundaryline.

1 referhere in particularto the maps distributedin your folderand

projectedby Professor Condorelliin the courseof his statement. The

quitesimpleexplanationis that,as 1 must avow,we were unableto find

them in London,Paris orRome,and in Rome againnot in the military

geographical service, noitn the Italian Ministryf ForeignAffairs,and

not in the archivesof the Ministry of thCeolonies.

1 concedethis point to Our colleaguesof the LibyanParty, but let

me at thesame time return the selectivity complime bytobservingthat

the Libyan Party,for its part,has producedonly the maps serving its

purposes. Our opponents have deliberately discardedl1 the maps that

might embarrassthem and not hesitatedto interrupta seriesof maps when

theywere becoming unfavourabl to them, asin the caseof the United

Nationsmaps that theyvery generously producedup to 1960,but

refraining from continuitnge series.
. .
Q24 BeforeprojectingOur maps, 1 should liketo make a few general
-
observationson the cartographicmaterialpresentedby the two Parties.

We have madean inventoryof al1 themaps and diagrams publisheadnd

producedby the Partiesin their pleadings.We left aside the

demonstration diagrams prepar bydthe Partiesad causam,abundantand

suggestive diagramsdrawnup on behalfof Libya and the fewer, more

Chad.
modest diagrams prepared for

We finally listed277 maps and diagramsthat are public,hence

contributing to or negatingthe notorietyof the boundaryline. They

comprise: - 203maps and diagramspresentedby Chad and filedwith the Registryof

the Court,in accordance with yourRules;

- 98maps and diagramspresentedby Libya, of which only adozenor so

have beenfiledwith the Registry;

- 24 of thesemaps ordiagramshave beenpresentedsimultaneously by both

Partiesand are thereforecounted twice in my calculation.

But be reassured, itis not a mere statistical exercise for this

case,an exercisethatwouldbe quitepointless!

The Republicof Chadhas presentedfew mapsin itsMemorial. We had

no particularreasonto do otherwise. Our contentiow nas, and is for rir

thatmatter,thatthe boundary betwee the two Partiesis formedby two

straightlinesdefinedby the Treatiesof reference. On suchan

assumption, amap can neverserveto specify a line determinb ed

astronomicalpointsbut, at themost,to situatethat line better on the

ground.

But on the other hand,facedwith a remarkable arrao yf cartographic

- - illustrationsin theMemorialof Libya,to which 1shallreturnin a

moment,Chadhas thoughtit necessaryto correct the impression givenby

Our opponentsand to show thatthemaps actually publishd edd in fact

w
bolster the submissioo ns the Republicof Chad. Hencethe small atlas

annexedto out Counter-Memorial with reproductionosf maps thatare

sometimesdifficultto decipher becauseof the formatchosen. 1

apologize forthis,and we have consequently hadtheselittle magnifying

glassesdistributed to you. We must make do with whattechnologywe have!

The LibyanArab Jamahiriyh aas presentedfew originalmaps in its

Memorial. In general, as you will see,it has producedfew mapsin its

pleadings, half asmany as Chad - with, as 1said, 98 as against 203maps

for us- and mainlyin defenceas it were, to counterChad'sassertions;

but seldom,and for good reason,in supportof its own arguments. Not single publisheadnd hencepublicmap has been produced that givethe

boundary lineclaimed byLibya inits submissions.There is a certain

consistency aboutthatsinceLibyaclaimsthatthe boundary betwee the

two Partieshasneverbeen delimitedand that,as a resultof the Libyan

proposition, the non-existent boundary line c benenteredon a map.

On the otherhand,the LibyanPartyhas had a great many colour

sketch-mapsprepared for demonstrati purposes. 1 take myhat off to

the aestheticand instructive performanoce Our opponents.Theyhave in

the process adroitly soug tot"impress"the Court. A case in point is

" L. map No. 1 of the LibyanMemorial. Al1 the African boundaries are

faithfully showna,s you can see,with justone exception(whichis of

course the southern boundaroifeLibya),but otherwise you will just

about find the other boundaries, ai stiwere the only areof the

Africancontinent withoud tefined boundaries.Furthermore, the arrowing

producesa clearly visiblefunnel-shaped effecintimatinga sortof

invitation for the southward extension of Libyan sovereignty.

Beingunableto usepublicmaps to illustrate its boundary claims,

asemergingfrom its submission and roughly coincidentawith the

, Tj2 7 15thparallel,Libyatriesto suggestthatline,to work it in by
- -
presenting it as a self-evident boundary:

- a naturalboundary,

- a historicboundary.

Map No. 8 of the Libyan Memorials fairly typicaolf a seriesof

Libyan mapspresentedin theMemorial, fairly typico althismannerof

indirectly accrediting t hethparallel. You see whereit is and, there

you are,you seethe colourschange. Thisrnapdescribes the vegetation

in Africa. But other mapsof the samekind are to be found,al1 equally

eloquent and attractive e,ually colourefdor soil, rainfalor climate. The demonstrationis clear: Nature takes careto draw on the ground

the line tiresomely overloob kedthepoliticians and the cartographers.

We find thesame techniqueas regards social activities, for insti ance

map No. 19 of the Memorialof Libya.It is a map which,as you can see,

distinguishes the Islam and the Christianareas,and stillwith the

samedivide,that is, roughlt yhe 15thparallel. It is here,as though

by chance, that the tw main religious zonesshareout Chad equitably,as

it were. We alsohave,and in the samestyle,a map of the distribution

of the Toubousand related tribesthatalso happens to followor pickup

thesame line. rr

- The demonstration thenbecomes more dubiou in taste. 1 am calling for

map No. 103 of the LibyanMemorialto be projected. Thereit is.

When the authorsof the LibyanMemorial refert ,o underpintheir

argument,to Colonel Spartacus' sketch-mapconcerning theManta

operation,with the "redline"here,whichis at the 16thparallel - the

"redline"being,as you know,the military defence line s uptby the

02.8 Chadian and Frenchtroopsduringthe Libyaninvasionof 1983-1984 - a
. .
linedrawnon the basisof the rangeof the Frenchair force callei dn to

help the Libyanlegalauthorities.

For Our part,we hope that the perioodf large-scaleinvasions has

passedand 1 wouldadd thatLibya didnot greatly appreciate this

reminder.

There arefewmaps in the LibyanCounter-Memorial and thosethere

are aremainly illustrativ sketch-maps.This is quitenatural,since

Libyahad not yet had an opportunityto see and critically assesOsur

smallatlas. The LibyanReplyis the response. And this attempt to

refuteOur cartographic materialis, 1 must say, rather difficu lt

follow sinceit is divided between the boo dy the textof the Reply,the

Supplementary Annexe of Volume2 and theExhibits. In this connection,1 wouldpointout that the LibyanReplydoesnot

seek to suggest,to illustrate, evenindirectly, the thesisof the

15thparallel. On the other hand,a new lineappears. Coulydou show

map No. 10-B of the LibyanReply?

It is stillthe sameprocedureof suggestion and overprinting; here

it is the mathematicalline (truesouth-east).Here,we see it printed

on the JustusPerthes map of 189a 2ndwe findit againon many maps of

the Libyan Reply, in particularon themaps illustratint ghe French

military presenci en theregionfrom1914to 1930.
. .
* c29 - Lastly,we find themathematical linp erintedover asketch-map
- -
relatingto the "border régimeo "f the 1955Convention.You can see it

here (mapNo. 6-A,p. 69 oftheLibyanReply).

- At the same time, moreovera,s anotherline - an anachronisticone

on the admission of both Parties- thatof the 1935 Treatyof Rome.

One maywonderwhy themathematical lineis printedover a

sketch-map illustratingthe 1955Treatywhenno one had givenany thought

to this mathematical line fordonkey'syears!

DoesLibya's insistence, in i Resply,on the so-called

"mathematicall "ine constitute faall-backposition fromthe lineof the

15th parallel? Professor Higginr saisedthis question las Friday. It

is not forus to judge. However, 1note thattheseoverprintings arn eot

innocuousand that theyshiftvery appreciabl yorthwards, or more

precisely could shif veryappreciably northwards, Libya'ssubmissions,

forma1submissions or informa1 suggestionw s, will see!

Let us now returnto the setof publicmaps and sketch-maps produced

by theParties. 1 am not goingto showal1 theseitems, let me reassure

you, but shallconfine myself tomakinga few pointsand takinga few

samples.

To begin with,themap in AtlasNo. 2. Prior to 1899,as we know,most ofthe maps do not showany boundary

in the modernsense. However,this one, the JustusPerthesmap of 1892,

does depict aGrenze, inotherwords a border,to indicatethe boundary

of Tripolitania. Onean see it, onecan senseit, and 1 would referyou

. 0 3 0 to ProfessorPellet'sexplanations on this subject. Furthersouth,the
. -
area is littleknown and unexplored; thiexplainsthe absenceof any

borderline -moreover,at that time,the areawas not coveredby

internationalagreements.
From 1899 onwards,everythingchangeson the maps. A line appears.

The Livrejaunemap, please. #

Yes, a line appearswhich is sometimesthe course representdn the

Livrejaunemap (ML, map No.40), which is being shownat this moment

and whichyou see appearingnow, thismap from theLivre jaune which,

as we know, accompaniesthe 1899 Declaratioat the time of the

negotiationsthen initiated betweenthe Frenchand Italianauthorities.

1 shall not dwellany furtheron this chapter,which we havealready

discussed.

We encounter thisame courseon the map publishedas earlyas 1899

in Le Figaro,as well ason thatpublishedin the Bulletindu comité

de l'Afriquefrançaise. Can you show it, please? Yes, this is moreor

less the courseof the Livre jauneap.

And here, it is interestinto note that theTibesti massifas it

was known at the time, is situatedentirelysouthof the boundaryline.

Logically,this courseof the line in the Livrejauneis foundon al1

the maps published bythe Frenchauthoritiesat the time; you will find

examplesof it in Our smallatlas. Maps from other sources show othlines,particularly thseo-called

"mathematicall"ine. An exampleis map. No. 14-Ain the Libyan

Counter-Memorial, whosinterestinggeographical sectowe have had

enlarged.

Thisis a British mappublishedby the Royal GeographiSociety.

Here,you see it; itshowsthe strictlysouth-east,so-called
. .
"mathematicall"ine. But we shall see,in this respect, thatnce the
. 0 3 1
- - Franco-British Declarati on8 September 191h9as been signed, British

maps adopt the lineending at point9'30'of latitudenorth,about

here. And we alsonote thatthe negotiatorof the 1919 Agreement,

MacMichael,sendsto Lord Allenby, British Hi ghmmissionerin Cairo,a

letterexplaining the reasons for wh haconsidersto be an error made

by the British cartographe rsthe precedingperiod(RC,Ann. 43,

5 March 1923).An errorof whichthis map is an illustration, according

to MacMichael.

As we know,Libyahas produced,in its pleadingsItalianmaps from

the sameperiod - canyou show mapNo. 16-B in the LibyanReply, for

example- which bear thseo-called"mathematicall"ine. This one,which

dates from 1912,is interestinbecauseit too indicates that tehetire

Tibesti massif, accordi ngthe information availablto the Italian

cartographersof the period, wasouthof the boundary line, even though

themap also adopts th"emathematical" line.TheseItalianmaps record

what 1 shallcal1an undeniable squabble between vtheiousItalian

government departments,incetheyscarcely correspon to the positions

adoptedby the Italian Governmeant thatperiod,whichhave been

analysedby ProfessorCassese.

The Franco-British Declarati on8 September1919clarifies the

cartographicsituationin relationto the interpretatioof the

1899 Declaration.As we know,it fixes the boundary line follow ingsouth-easterldyirection1'makingit endat the pointdefinedon the

Sudaneseboundaryby the CO-ordinates 24' eastand 190301north. This is

imrnediatelyecordedon themaps producedby thepartiesto the

Franco-British Declaration.

Can you showmapNo.15A on the LibyanCounter-Memorial ,lease.

Here is thisnew Britishmap, also bythe Royal GeographiScociety,of

1924; it has rectified the position You willfind thesame course,in

otherwords the course define by the 1919 Agreementon-theother

British maps,of the Royal Geographic Socieaty wellas of theWar

Office, which have bee producedby theParties. You will find thesame W

lineon the French maps, whicthhusgain inprecision. Lastly,you will

find thisline on themaps of the 1919Peace Conferencaend on themap

attachedto the 1924Agreement. But aboveall,what it seemsto me

importantto note here is the factthatthe "mathematicall"inehas

disappeared.You will notfind it againon a singlepublic map

producedby the Parties. Fromhistimeon, whenthe boundary is

indicated,it is the 1919line. Anwe willvirtuallyhave to await the

overprintingsof the LibyanReply,or more preciselytheLibyanMemorial,

but aboveal1 of theLibyanReply,in other words ove7 r0 years,to see
w
the mathematical phoenr ixbornfrom theashes.

ProfessorCassesehas retracedthehesitations and divisionsin the

Italianadministrationduringthe inter-war period. Hesitations

reflectedin the mapswithout boundariesshownby Professor Condorelli,

and even moreso in themaps relatingto the colonial programmeswhich

convey thenostalgiaand appetitesof the Italiancoloniallobby.

From 1935and with the signatureof the Treaty of Romethemaps
once morefa11 intostep withone another.

- the Italianmaps,which naturally recor the courseof the Treaty of

Rome, - the Britishmaps still- couldyou showrnap No. 16B from thLibyan

Counter-Memorial herewe have the courseof the Treatyof Rome, on a

1935map,

- lastly, theFrenchmaps, which alsoi ,mmediatelafter the signature of

theTreaty,recordrnap No. 53 in the atlas, thirnapof 1935,a French

map,which therefore corrects French cartogru aphny the signaturof

the Treaty,anticipating theexchangeof ratifications, thi is the

irnmediateecisionwherethe French geographica maps are concerned.

This periodof happy harmonyis short-lived,sinceas earlyas 1938

themaps once againbeginto diverge,when it appears that the exchange

of ratificationsof the Treaty oRomewillnot take place, in other

words thattheLaval-MussolinT ireaty will not enter into force,

1s there,at thattime,a returnto the status quo?

Not at ail. As we have seen,the so-called "mathematicl al"ehas

disappeared fogrood from the maps afte1919.

The Italian mapsshowingthe absenceof delimitation in southern

Libyaalso disappear, afte arshortreappearance.Couldyou show the

1941 Italianrnapof theMinistryof Foreign Affairs.

You will recognize thimsap, whichProfessor Condorelli show you.

Take a good lookat this map, Members othe Court,and note it one last

time: Take a good lookat it, becauseyou willnot seeit againfor

50 years: This typeof rnapis goingto disappear fohralf a century. No

- -Cd State,no public orprivatecartographer, neithe of the Partiesin the

case,nor France, naturally ,or Chad,nor the UnitedKingdom,nor Italy,

nor Libya,was subsequently to claim,on the basisof the maps,that

therewas no delimitedboundary.

Thisrnapis the Swansongof themaximalist Italiancolonial

claims. And one will haveto wait until1991and theLibyanMemorialto see

this type of map reappear, with the corresponding claim relt athalf

of Chad'sterritory.The other mapspublishedafterthisdate hesitate

betweenthe course of theTreatyof Rome of 1935; canyou showmap

No. 72 fromOur atlas?

Here, for example,is a Germanrnapof 1940, whichadopts the

Laval-Mussolini line as we can see quiteclearly.

This is also the casewith other Italianaps. Can you showrnap

No. 78 fromOur smallatlas? The boundaryis less clear here but onecan

just makeit out,bisectingthemassif; here it is.

It is an Italian map from thArmedForces Supreme Command. It

dates from 1941,in other words frotmhe sameyear as thernap1 have

called the "colonia swan song"map. But itbearsthe lineof the

1935Treatyof Rome.

On the otherhand - and as earlyas 1938- Frenchmaps revert to

the 1919 courseof the boundary.Can you showrnap No. 67 in our atlas?

This mapdates from 193a 8nd adopts- one canmake out the angl -e

the lineof the 1919Agreement. It isa rnapfrom the FrencA hrmy's

geographicaldepartment.It did not wait for the ink to dry on the

letterby whichCountCiano renouncet dhe exchangeof ratificationsto

returnto the 1919line.

You will findother examplesof Frenchmaps in the smallatlas, both

the IGN maps and the Micheliroadmaps, geological maps etc.

All, after1938,indicate the boundar oyf the 1919Agreement.

WhereasFranceimmediately record thenon-ratificatioo nf the treaty,

the otherStatestake slightly longe to amendtheirmaps.

Hence,for example,rnapNo. 87, thismap, or ratherthissketch-map,

publishedin 1943 by"TheGeographer", theofficia1American department,

stillcarriesthe boundary of the Laval-Mussolini Agreemen Along the same lines,we have pointedto a National Geographic Socie map of 1950,

whichcontinuesto show this anachronisti line; you will find itin

your smallatlas.

As for the Britismhaps,theywerenot corrected untilafterthe

war. We have submitted a WarOfficemap of 1948 whichdoes, indeed,

returnto the 1919line. So heretoo, there is somewaveringin this

period. It is a waveringthat is easily understandableF.rom 1940

onwards,the principal protagonistisnOur caseswere at war. Priorities

lay elsewhere,and from 1945to 1949, uncertainty reigns bo ashregards

the fateof the formerItaliancoloniesand the possible adjustmei nnt

theirboundaries. Incidentally, 1 am not goingto recapon what,alas,

has to be termedthe shamblesof French diplomatic representation that

Conferenceof DeputyForeignMinistersof the Four Powers, or the error

made by the United Nations Secretari ia1950,for ProfessorFranckhas

explainedal1 of thisto you.

But, in this case, although diploma and politicians arneot

capableof seeingthe woodfor the trees - both sideshave shownyou

this- one well understandsthatcartographers, carrying out the

political linea,re scarcelyon theirside.

*- O36 However,let us be clear aboutthenature ofthiswavering. In
fact,thehesitations of the 1940-1950decadeare very differentfrom

thosewe have observed priotro 1919. Here,it is no longer a question

of a divergenceof interpretatiornegarding thcourseof the boundary

line,nor is it a questionof establishingwhat "south-easterly

direction" means. Al1 of thatwas settled in 1919.

The "mathematicall"ine, as1 have said,is definitivelydead and

buried. And everyoneis convinced, accordin to the publishedmaps,that

thereis indeeda boundary. Thereareno longerany maps without

boundaries, "funnel-maps":The uncertainty,duringthisperiodofvacillation, relate esxclusivelyto the pointof the entry into forcoer

not of the aval-Mussoli Treaty,and thereforeof the substitution or

not, for the linedescribedby the Franco-British Agreemeo nt 1919, of

the linedescribed by the 1935 Treatyof Rome. In otherwords,the

choicenow is betweentwo lines: 1919or 1935.

Cartographersand publishers no longerhave to dealwith a problem

of the accuracy ofthe courseor ofinterpreting texts: thematteris

settled: But a problem of choosingbetweenthesetwo boundarylines,

which enclosewhatwas laterto be calledtheAouzoustrip. From 1950,

the maps bear the 1919 line, sometimes, moreover, indicating the

territorial disput betweenthe twopossible lines.

Let us give an example: map No. 153 in Our atlas.

This is a recentAmericanmap by the National Geographic Socie ofy

1990. It bears - we are goingto see an enlargement- the two lines; as

you see, it principally beartshe 1919boundaryline and the

Laval-MussolinT ireatyline in dots, witha note reading"claimed and

partly occupied byLibya". And this indicatior nefersto the"Aouzou's

strip".

We therefore clearlsyee here,on thismap, that theNational

Geographic Society reflec the dataof the problemas it standsafter

the Second WorldWar, the problem beingthatof theAouzoustrip.

A wordon theUnited Nations maps. 1 shallnot go overthe

demonstration bmyy colleague Professor Francagain,who explained the

halting progresosf the Four-PoweCrommission of Investigation,

- the 1950 sketchillustratingthehesitations of the GeneralAssembly's

Interim Cornmittee,

- and theoriginof the error addet do theUnited Nations maps. Couldyou showUnited Nations rnapNo. 235 please; thiis the first

of the maps on which counsel forLibya basetheir demonstration. With

the 1935 line, this is the UnitedNations"mapNo. 235" of December 1949,

and the littlecrenellations characterist icthe Laval-Mussolinl iine.

This map,the purposeof whichis to describethe principal routes and

trails,let me stress"as principal transport routesd ",tes from 1949

and therefore shows the 1935 line. This rnapis interestingbecauseit is

the matrix ofthe erroneous maps publishedby the United Nations in the

following decade. We have madeenquiriesat the United Nations

Secretariatconcerning thir snapand Professor Franckhas outlinedits

genesisand posterity.

Libyahas made much of this seriesof maps starting with the

1935 map. Unfortunately, as 1 mentionedjust now theircuriositydid not

extendbeyond1958; otherwisetheywouldhave told therest of the story

and published the completeseriesof the United Nations maps. They could

evenhave publishedrnapNo. 141 of Our little atlas; thatwas a rnap - 1

believe thatit was the February 1963 rnapof the United Nations- which

does show the 1919line.

1 note that sincethe beginning of th1 e960sal1 the maps

publishedby the UnitedNations showthe 1919 frontier. Professor Franck

projecteda seriesidenticalto this one, whichcontinuedup to the

1980s. Thesemaps do not indicatethe frontierwith Chad in any

particularway and, asyou see, it is shownwith the samekind of dotted

line as al1 Libya'sinternational frontiers. They do not indicatethat

this course is particularlycontested. The approvalof the

Organization's cartographs iecrvicereflects thealmost unanimous

consensus - we shallsee this in a moment- of cartographic opiniow nith

respectto the southern frontierof Libya. Libya hastriedto reducethe scope ofthe Organization'm sore

recentmaps by considering themas technical maps illustrating technical

reports.

This istrue. But it is also true,Mr. President, of the earlier

maps. The rnaporiginating the error,which1 showedyou before,rnap

No. 235 of 1949,was intended for th UnitedNationstransport and

communications review. As to the sketchaccompanying the reportsof

Mr. Pelt,the High Commissioner,theirfunctionwas not to spell out the

frontiers, a problemwhichdid not fa11withinhis competence.After

1955,i.e. after the signatur of theTreatyof 10 August1955,consensus w

on the 1919 linebecame overwhelmin in al1 themaps published.

- Al1 the United Nation msaps, as1 have said,

- al1 the French maps,

- al1 the British maps,

- al1 the American maps,

- al1 the Italian maps,

- eventhe Soviet maps,

if you will projectit forme, hereis a Sovietrnapof 1985.

This is an interestingmap. It emanates from a great power, a great

powerwhichat the timewas rathersympathetic toward the Libyan -rll

régime; and yet it reproducesthe 1919 linebecauseit registersthe

international consenst uhsathad formedat the time.

Only the Libyanmaps continue to showthe lineof the 1935Treaty.

(You can projectrnapNo. 150 fromour atlas for me.) We have a rnapof

Libyan origin,and not an English one as indicated by mistak in the

hearings folder. This Libyan rnapwhich followsthe Treaty,we can see

the little crenellationof theLaval-Mussolinl iine. In this case,1 stress,it is not that thefrontieris missing;no,

it is there. It is not in thiscase,1 stress,a mathematical line - it

has nothingmathematical about it- it is the lineof the Laval-Mussolini

TreatythatOur opponents todayagreehas no legalbasis.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court, this unanimity- or

quasi-unanimity- of themaps (withthe exceptionof the Libyanmaps)

sincethe signature of theTreatyof 10 August1955 seemsto me to have

met, for at least30 years,the criterialaiddom by the Courtof

Arbitrationin the Beagle Channelcase.

"Wherethereis a definitepreponderance on one side -
particularlyif itis a very marked preponderance- and while
of courseeverymap mustbe assessedon its own merits - the
cumulativeimpactof a large number of maps,relevantfor the
particular caset,hat tellthe samestory - especially when

some ofthememanatefrom theoppositeParty,or fromthird
countries,- cannotbut be considerable, eitheras indications
of generalor at least widespreadreputeor belief,or elseas
confirmatoryof conclusions reached as in the present case,
independentlyof themaps." (Awardof 18 April1977,p. 84,
para. 139.)
Mr. President,in thiscase,it seemsto me that theindications
041
. -
givenby themap, al1 cartography since1955and for 30 years domeet

theseconditions.

We shall, moreover, set ehat,in thewordsof the Courtof

Arbitration inthe BeagleChannel case, "someof themaps" - at least

one - "emanate fromthe opposite Party".But let us not anticipate.

Mr. President, Membero sf the Court,to complete this projectio1

shallrefer tothe caseof threesignificant maps, to replyto the

argumentsof Libya.

The first concernsthemap publishedby "TheGeographer", the

officia1institution of theUnited Statesof America. You may project

map No. 135 in Our atlas.

* 042 This map isan interesting onb eecauseof its origin.It is justa
-.
sketch,but it is a sketchwith particularauthority.

0563c/CR93/25/Trans Studying the frontieo rs Africain his authoritativeork,

Professor Brownlie expresses himselfhus concerning thiksind ofmap:

"Variouscategories of evidence mo ayerlap. Thus the

Geographerof the United States Departme oftState publishes
material(InternationaB loundaryStudies),which is both
officia1in provenance, sincehe is an authorized government
agency, and alseoxpertevidencein termsof its technical
provenance.Evidenceof the viewsof thirdstates is relevant
not onlywhen the locationof tripointboundaryjunctionsis in
issue, butin generalas evidence of general recognito ioan
alignmentand of its notoriousand publiccharacter.Thus
officia1maps producedby theUnitedKingdom,Frenchand
Americangovernment agencie provideevidenceof the alignments
of Africanboundaries."(AfricanBoundaries, p. 5.)

Libya,embarrassed by thismap,has tried toget roundthe argument

by observing that the studi ies"InternationaBloundary Studiesa"re

certainly not neutral but expresshe officia1positionof the United

States Governmen( tRL,Supplementary AnnexVol. 2, No. 2, p. 15).

Mr. President, Memberosf the Court, lets not commit any

anachronismshere. In 1961theUnited States Government h nodreasonto

favour the Republi of Chad ratherthantheUnitedKingdomof Libya,

where therewere thensubstantial American interests,may 1remindyou,

strategic interests, economic intera estoil interests.

We thereforemaintainthat the opinionof the Geographerin 1961 was

of considerableinterestto Our case.

The secondmap waspublishedby the International Civil Aviation

Organizationin 1959.

- This map, whereyou see the frontier course, herwhich is indeed
c43
the 1919 course,is the expressionby another internationalrganization

of the shared convictio as to the courseof the frontier line;

- this mapwouldnot beworthyof further commeni tf Libyahad not

produced thebeginningof correspondence exchangi ed1955 between the

FrenchGovernment and the Secretary-Generaof the International CivilAviation Organization concerning the frontierto lineindicatedon

aeronautical maps.

Our Libyancolleagues concludein their pleadings in the

Supplementary Annex toVolume2 of theirReply: "The endof this saga is

not revealedby documentsfoundin the Quaid'OrsayArchives." (Ibid.,

Supplementary Annex Vol. 2, p. 4, para.4,)

May 1 respectfullypointout, that the end of the saga is not

perhapsin the documents in the QuaiD'OrsayArchives but probabl in the

rnapprojected,issuedby ICAO in 1959,ICAOhaving meanwhile successfully

concluded its survey?

Lastly, the thirdseriesof maps concern oil research.

- The initialsketch-map(mapNo. 1) is annexedto the petroleum

regulations proclaimedon 14 August1955. And you see it here, it is a

sketchto which Libyaattachesimportance.

The Replyof Libyadescribesthissketchas follows:

"a conservative linbeasedon theU.N. rnapthat illustratet dhe
uncertainty attache to thisboundarywas a safe line to pick
as a guideto foreign oil companies (RL,p. 74, para. 5.63
in fine).

May 1 say,Mr. President, Membero sf the Court, that Libyaas a

rather curious concep of a "conservativeline". Moreover,it

demonstrated this contradiction its inlftsrnap -please project now

the sketchthatwas made by Libyaand publishedin its Reply. This is

rnapLR 2 of the LibyanReplyin which Libyademonstrates its

contradiction.

Thisrnapsuperposes - 1 don'tknow if you can see it closely- the

line of the United Nationrsnap(UNrnapNo. 241) and the sketch-mapthat

we have just projected(No.1955, Libyan Petroleum Regulatir onspNo, 1). You will seethat thesetwo linesdo not coincideand that the

Libyanpetroleumrnaptakes some liberties i,n particularin this sector,

with the United Nation rnap

- notablyin the petroleum areas, a littlehigherin theEdjelé

sector which is roundhere;

- we see that it penetratesintoAlgerianterritoryand thatthis

penetration in sot negligiblesince it is a goodhundredkilometres away

fromGhat.

Al1 the same,the petroleum sketct hhat1 showedyou firstthat

accompanied thL eibyan oil lawof 1955 broughtan immediateprotest from v.

the FrenchAmbassadorin Tripoli.

- Just as Francewas to protestagainstthemaps publishedby theWorld

Bank in its studyon the economic developmentof Libya in 1960.

- Libya in its Replyalso produced thre privateoil exploration maps,

based,as is normal,on the officia1sketch-map of 1955.

- On the other handit triesto underestimate the importan ocfethernap

publishedby its own servicesin 1962,a rnapthatwe have reproduced in

the AtlasNo. 142.

- Thisrnapis a rnapto whichwe attachimportance.It was established by

the officia1American geologist sor theLibyanGovernment and clearly W

shows, asyou see, the frontierof 1919and of the 1955Treaty.

- It was established following consultat with thevariouscompetent

LibyanMinistries.As you see, theUnitedStatesDepartment of the

Interior'sGeological Surved yrew upthernapfor the LibyanGovenunent,

UnitedKingdomof Libya,Ministriesof National Economy, Petroleum

Affairsand Industry. - Light is throwonn the historyof this mapby thenote from

Mr. Sebilleau,FrenchAmbassadorin Tripoli, dated 28 April 1961,which

is reproducedin the Replyof Libya(Exhibits, PartA (1-6),Vol. 3,

Exhibit6.10,lastdocument).

-Ambassador Sebilleau fears publicao tionn officialLibyan map

showinga frontier different from the front oferhe 1955 Treaty.

-He therefore proposet shatthe Department should approach Lt ibeyan

Governmentand the other Governments concer toednsurethatan

officia1 map contradicti the textof the 1955 Treaty shoun ldt be

issued.

- 1note thatthesevariousapproaches met with successsincethe

officia1map, containing certain disclaimers, publii shtdhenarneof

the UnitedKingdomof Libya,showsthe 1919 frontier indicatb eyd the

1955Treaty.

Mr. President, Member of the Court,to sumrnarizmey argument, four

findingsin connectionwith themany mapsproduced by the Partiesto the

presentcase:

1. 1 note thatnot a single published ma showsthe line claimeb dy

Libyain its submissions

- that is to Say the frontierof the 15thparallel;

2. 1 note thatnot a singlemap publishedsince1919 showsthe line

knownas the "mathematicall "ine;

3. 1 note thatnot a singlernappublishedsincethe independenco ef
- -O47 the two Partiesshowsthe lineof the 1935 Treaty of Rome (withthe

exception, of course,of theLibyanmaps); at the most this line is

indicatedin alternative with the 1919 frontier enclosing the Aozou

strip,as we have seen in the National Geographmicp. 4. Lastly, 1 note thatnot a singleLibyanprotesthas beenmade

against the many maps publishedsincethe independenco ef the two

Parties,whereasthe French Governmen and then the Chadian Government

reserved their rights whenev any maps showed the couro se the frontier

of 1935.

Mr. President, mayit please the Court to hold on thispointthat

the mapsfiled by the Parties constituta e, a whole,a consistentpiece

of evidence supporting the contenti oofnshe Republicof Chad.

1 thankyou foryour attentionand after the brea k will ask you to

be kind enoughto cal1Professor Franct ko the bar.

Le PRESIDENT :Je remercie beaucou M. Cot. Nous allons maintenant

faireune pause.

The Court adjourned from11.25a.m. to 11.40 a.m.

Le PRESIDENT :Je donne la parol àe M. Franck.

M. FRANCK :

~'effectivitéde la ligne après l'indépendancede la Libye et du Tchad
-
La reconnaissance internationalede cette ligneà l'organisationdes
Nations Unies : aux dates critiques,la Libye a bénéficiédu
nouveau droit de la décolonisation appliquépar I'OW
et elle ya acquiescé à plusieurs reprises

1. La reco~aissance internationalede la ligne de 1955 àl'Organisation
des Nations Unies

1. Monsieurle Présidentet Messieursde la Cour. Ainsique le

Tchadle réaffirme constamment, le traité de 1955est la pierre angulaire

sur laquellenotreargumentation repose. Mais le Tchadest également

convaincu quem,ême s'iln'y avait pas eu de traitéen 1955,la ligne que

ce traité décrit était déjà deven ene,roit,la frontière entrl eaLibyeet l'Afrique équatoriale française. Cela découlede l'opération

des traités coloniau et des effectivitésm,ais cela découle aussde

l'opération des droitset des pratiquesde la décolonisation

l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies. La frontièrede la Libyen'a pas été

contestée aumomentde son accession à l'indépendance en 1951et elle a

donc été confirmée commefrontière entrlea Libyeet le Tchadau moment

de l'accessiondu Tchad à l'indépendancee,n 1960. Le droitcoutumieret

la pratique de la décolonisatioprésumentque les nouveaux Etats

accèdentà l'indépendance ave les frontièrestelles qu'ellesse

présentaient lorsqu'ilsont cesséd'êtredes entitésdépendantes. Cette

forte présomptioenst réfutablemais elle n'estpas facileà réfuteret

elledoit l'êtreau momentopportunpar ceuxqui demandentqu'ellene

s'appliquepas.

2. Au momentde son indépendancel,a Libyea expriméson fort

attachementà ce principe, et elleen a bénéficié. De 1948à 1952,

1'Egypteavaitrevendiqué des ajustementsde frontières et la

reconnaissancde'un titrehistorique sur l'estde la Libye. La France,

faisantvaloirdes facteurs ethnique et géographiques, avait formulé des

revendications sulr'ouestde la Libye. L'émirIdrissde Cyrénaïque, qui

allait bientôt deveni roi de Libye,a informéle Secrétaire général

TrygveLie de safaroucheopposition à "toutedécision prisepour

découperune partie quelconqu de la Libye en faveudr'un autrepays..."

(mémoiredu Tchad,p. 233,par. 99, aveccitations).Contrairement à la

thèsede la "pauvreLibye" avancée ici,l'émiret ses conseillers

n'étaientni ignorants ni passifs. Cependant,l'émirs'en est bien remis

aux Nations Unies,et non sans résultat,ourdéfendrel'héritage

territorialde la Libye. M. Pelt, leCommissaire des Nations Unies,

s'estvraiment défendc uommeun lion dans cetteaffaire. Sir Ian

Sinclair observe, comnmoeus le faisonnous-mêmes, que leCommissaire des NationsUniespour la Libyen'avait pas compétence po résoudre des

revendicationdse frontières.En revanche,il avaitbien compétencepour

garantirl'unitéinternede la Libyeet la défendre contre des

prétentionsextérieures. C'eainsi,par exemple,qu'agissant au nom

des intérêts libyens telqu'ilslui apparaissaient, le Commissaire des

NationsUniespour la Libye s'estfermementopposé aupointde vue

soutenu parle ministrefrançaisde l'intérieur,M. Queuille,qui était

responsablede l'administratiodnu Fezzanlibyen. Lorsque Queuille

avancél'idéeque,peut-être, les habitantde la provincedu Fezzan

devraient avoirle droitde choisirde faire sécessioavant W

l'indépendance(mémoiredu Tchad,p. 235,par. 104,annexe312),il s'est

heurté à la vigoureuse opposition dePelt.

3. Et c'estavec lamême vigueur que. Pelt s'estélevécontre le

souhait exprimé, selocertainesindications,par la populationtouareg

de Ghat de ne pas rester danle cadred'une Libye indépendan(teémoire

du Tchad,p. 234, par. 102,annexe313) -quelqueséléments touaregs

avaient faitdes démarches dance sens. Le Commissaires'estopposéà

ces revendications sécessionnist erouvant pource faireun soutien

sansambiguïté dans la résoluti 289 (IV)dans laquellel'Assemblée

générale avaitrecommandé quees différentesrégions soient administrées "v

de manièreà faciliter laréalisation"de l'unité...de la Libye"

(mémoiredu Tchad, annexe 307a,rt.lob)). Les Membres del'Assemblée

étaientunis dans leur déterminationamener à l'indépendance une Libye

définiepar ses frontièrespré-existanteséritéesde l'époquede la

. 0 50 colonisation italiennse,ns rieny retrancherou y substituer.La

notiond'intégrité territoriale e donc quelque chose dont la Libaye

largementprofitéet c'estune notionqui lui était familière. 4. Le soucide l'ONUde voirla Libye accéder à l'indépendance avec

ses frontières coloniales antérieu etesne intégrité territoriale

intactea été une des premières manifestatiodnsnouveau droitde la

décolonisation qui étae ittrain de s'élabore dans lapratiquedes

NationsUnies. La Libyea étél'un destoutpremiers bénéficiaires de

Aussiaurait-iléténaturel quela
cette pratique normatin veissante.

Libyefût parmi les premier àstrouver justed'appliquerles mêmes normes

pratiquesau Tchad lorsque celui-ci,dix ans plus tard,a accédéà son

indépendance et estentré à l'organisatiodnes NationsUnies. Et c'est

bien ce quis'estproduit, la Libye accueillant chaleureuse lmeTchad,

sansdonnerla moindre impression qu'un différend pour apparaître.

5. C'estaussi précisément l'intégrité territor dualehad quia

été ratifiée par la Libye avec lteraitéfranco-libyedne 1955. En 1960,

il y avaitdeuxnouvellesnotions. Une frontière commune- et pas de

problème. L'intégrité territorialen,otionabsolument déterminanp teur

la réussitedu processus de décolonisation, semblait l'a emporté.

Pourtant,aujourd'hui, dans ses écritures,la Libyetraitepar le mépris

la revendication d'intégrité territord iaTchad,en reprenant par

exempleà son comptela remarque perfide qu'elle ci dans son mémoire

selonlaquellele Tchad n'était qu'u "sous-produiatrtificielde

priorités politique et stratégiques qulea France avait ailleurs"

(mémoirede la Libye,par. 5.532). Le Tchad, en effet, comme la Liby et

commela plupartdes Etatsd'Afrique, est un sous-produide sonhistoire

coloniale.Mais il est bien davantagl ee fruitde la déterminationde

l'Afrique etde l'ONUà préserverces frontières, cette intégrité

territoriale, qulea Libyeprésenteaujourd'hui avec mépris, p ses

paroleset par ses actes, comme"artificielle". S'il se peut queces

frontières aient été tracé par les puissances colonial sasnssonger au

bien-êtredes Africains, que le bien-êtredes
il n'en demeure pas moins Africains est aujourd'hui indissociablemen tcleséfrontières.
. 0 5 1
Presquetousles autres Etats africaie nsarabesreconnaissentque c'est

là une nécessité pratique, en mêtemps qu'uneexigence dudroit.

6. La Libyeconserveune attitude ambiguë sur la quest deon

l'intégrité territorialeD.'un côté,elleméprise le principde

l'intégritéterritorialey, voyantune rémanencedu colonialisme, bien

qu'elleen ait largementbénéficiéelle-mêmelorsque1'Egypteet la

France avaiendes prétentions surson territoire.D'un autrecôté,elle

acceptethéoriquementl'utispossidetis.Mais la Libye cherch àe

limiter laportéede cette doctrineen enrestreignant l'applicatioaux
w
seuls territoirenon contestéset aux seules frontièrequi ne sontpas

en litige. Une frontière esune frontièreuniquementlorsqu'ellen'est

pas contestée.C'estainsi que la Libyeconçoitl'intégrité

territoriale.L'onne sauraitassortirl'utipossidetisd'unetelle

L'objectifessentielde ce concept esde défendrel'intégrité
réserve.

territorialeet les frontières des nouveaux Etats telsilsse

présententau momentde l'indépendance contre touremise en questiodne

la part d'autres Etats.C'estprécisément poulrégitimerdes frontières

qui risquaiend'êtreremisesen question que le princia peété élaboré

au momentde la décolonisation dl'Amériquelatineet réaffirmé, plus

récemment, amomentde la décolonisation dle'Afrique.

7. L'indépendancdee la Libyeet du Tchaà l'intérieur des

frontières territorialéesabliesau momentde la colonisation est

garantie,de même quel'intégrité territorialde tous les Membresp,ar

l'article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte des Nationsnies. La Libyenie

maintenant avoir viollé'intégritterritorialedu Tchad. Elle justifie

ces dénégationsen affirmantque lazonequ'ellea envahieen 1973

n'étaitpas vraiment,pas légitimementtchadienne. Ellene contestepas

que le Tchadadministraitcette zoneen 1960, ellene conteste pas que la Francey était présente e n955. Et pourtant, laLibyevoudraitnous

faire croire qulea notiond'intégritéterritorialn'a pas à s'appliquer

parce qu'ellea une revendication territorialeformuler. Mais cet

argumentest par tropétrange. Non seulementil vide l'utispossidetis

de son sens maisencoreil le rendinopérant.La Libyen'a pas
, O5 2
revendiquéces territoires lorsqu'elalaccédé à l'indépendance, la

fin de 1951et ellene les a pas revendiquéson pluslorsqu'ilsont été

placéssous l'autoritésouverained'unTchad indépendan tn 1960,ni

lorsquele Tchadest entréà l'ONUavec la bénédictio de la Libye

(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 151à 154,par. 4.52 à 4.58). Ce n'estque

dans lesannées1970 que la Libyea commencéà remettreen cause la

situation pacifique, fruit de l'uptossidetis.

8. Bien évidemment, les principdesl'intégrité territoriaelede

l'utipossidetisne deviennent pas inapplicabldeusseul faitqu'un

Etat a une revendication historiquer leterritoired'un autreEtat.

Et, de toute façon, même la revendicatiodn'un titre historique

pouvait rendre inapplicabl'utipossidetis, lL aibyen'a formulé

pareille revendication aucundes momentscritiquesoù on auraitpu

s'attendrequ'ellele fasse. Et si l'on peut concevoir qlue
'353
revendication contre l'intégrité territoriale d'une colonie surundée

titre historique puisse demeurer même apl'accessionde cette colonie

à l'indépendance,u moinsaurait-ilfallu que cette revendication existe

et soit exprimée publiquement, aveanau momentde l'accessionde la

colonieà l'indépendanceet de son entréeà l'organisationes

NationsUnies.

9. Naturellement,le faitque laLibyeindépendanten'a pas formulé

pareille revendicatiopnour s'opposer l'applicationde

l'utipossidetisau momentcritique del'indépendancdeu Tchad etde

son admissionà l'ONUcadre avec cequi a pu être observauparavant. Ces nouveaux silences de la Libye,rèsson accessionà l'indépendance,

doiventse comprendrecomme confirmanlt'absence de contestation des

déclarations faitepar la Francedevant l'Assemblé générale ausujetde

la frontière méridionalde la Libyedurantla périodede la tutelledes

Nations Uniessur la Libye,entre1948et 1952. Il faut considérer
I
qu'ilsconfirmentl'acceptationpar la Libye desa frontière méridionale

telle que définie dans tleaitéde 1955.

10. Monsieurle Président, Messieurde la Cour,nous avons vu

commentle nouveau droit de la décolonisation s'est appliqué, undans

premier temps, danls'intérêtde la Libye. Si la Libye avaitestiméque
w
ce nouveau droite la décolonisatio ne pouvaits'appliquer au Tchad,

aurait-elle signéet ratifié letraitéde 1955 ? Et n'aurait-ellpas dû

le dire clairement l'ONUdès la premièreoccasionconstituant un moment

critiqueengageant l'organisatio nn,l'occurrenceau moment de

l'indépendancdeu Tchad, en 1960e,t au momentde l'entréede ce dernier

à l'ONU ? Assurément,par rapport auTchad, en 1960, la Libyou bien

estimaitavoirune frontière avecce pays,ou bien estimaitavoirun

différend frontalier avl eci. Il est impossiblede déduire de

l'attitude chaleureuseet bienveillantde la Libyeà l'ONUqu'elle

estimaitavoiravec le Tchad non pas unefrontièremais un différend.

11. En 1960, rien n'indiquait qupe,us tard, la Libyse

rebellerait contre le nouve droitde la décolonisation.Les deux

grands principedse ce nouveaudroit sontl'intégritéterritoriale(ou

l'utipossidetls) et l'autodéterminationL.e sens à donnerà ces
0 5 4
deux principesest au coeurde la présenteaffaire. L'argumentdu Tchad

est sans ambiguïté: lorsqu'ila accédéà l'indépendancel,e Tchadétait

fondé à recevoir les frontièrqesi correspondaienàt l'"instantanéwu

territoiresous administrationfrançaisequi lui a été légué,incontesté,

au momentde sa décolonisation.Le contenude cedroitavaitété clairement exposépar la Francequi s'étaitexpriméesur cesujet à

maintes reprisesp,ubliquementet clairement,à l'ONU. Et il a été

confirmé par la Libye dal ns traitde 1955. L'acted'autodétermination

du Tchadest intervenu dansle cadredes frontières résultant de dceoit

territorial.Si, malgré toutl ,a Libyeavaitsouhaité revendiquer une

partiede ce territoire oucherchéà faire reconnaîtr ene autre

frontière,la pratiquequi s'étaitinstauréeà l'Organisationes

Nations Uniesen matière de décolonisation montrcaitirement comment

cela pouvaitse faire aumoment critiqudee l'accessiondu Tchadà

l'indépendance e de son admissionà l'ONU. L'intégrité territoriale

étaitun droit, mais ce n'étai pas un droit irréfutable.e nouveau

droitcoutumierde la décolonisatio permettait égalemen de demander

qu'il soit dérogé a urincipedans certainescirconstancesspéciales.

Mais la Libyen'a pas cherchéà obtenirpareilledérogation.Il faut

assurémenty voir la preuveque la Libyeétaitsatisfaite du jeu normal

des principes applicables en matièdeedécolonisationet des frontières

établiesen accord avecces principes.

II. L'indépendancedu Tchadà l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies

12.Monsieurle Président, Messieur de la Cour,arrêtons-nousun

momentà la décolonisatiodnu Tchad. L'Organisatiodnes Nations Unies

n'a pas supervisél'accessiondu Tchadà l'indépendancde'aussiprès

qu'ellel'avaitfait pour la Libyedix ans plus tôt. Elle a néanmoins

supervisé l'administratione tousles territoirenson-autonomes.De

1947à 1959, la Francea régulièremenstoumisà l'Assembléedes rapports

sur sescolonies(ibid.,par. 4.56),y compris des renseignements

détailléssur leTchad. Dans ces rapports, laFrance affirmait qu ee

. 0 5,5 qui estmaintenant leTchad couvraiutn territoirequi englobaitle BET.
-.
Ainsi,en 1955,l'annéemême où le traité franco-libye confirmait leur

frontière mutuelle, la Fran stipulaitdans son rapporà l'ONUque le Tchad comprenai t38 000kilomètres carrés expressément attria buBsET

(ibid.,avec citations).Cette définitiodnu BET englobtoutle

territoire occupeén 1973par la Libye. Or, il ne s'agissaipas d'un

mémorandum secredtes dossiersdu Quaid'Orsay. La Libye,en sa qualité

de Membrede l'ONU,recevaitces rapportsqui étaientpubliés. On aurait

attendud'ellequ'ellese plaignesi, en 1955,elle estimait que

l'attributionde territoirefaitepar la France était extravagan ouesi

elleavait pului opposer une revendicatt ionritoriale.Dans les

années cinquantec,'étaitpratique courant eour les EtatsMembresde

critiquer violemmen les aspects déplaisandse l'administration V

coloniale français (ibid.,par. 4.57 et 4.58). Pourtant,la Libyen'a

pas contestéles dimensions territorial esTchad tellesqu'indiquées

par la Franceni formulé une revendicati onr une partie quelconqdu

territoire donlta Franceétait encore responsable Ellen'a

certainementpas dit àl'ONUque sa frontière était incertai oue

indéterminéen,i qu'elle avait besoid'uneassistance technique pour

s'assurerdes droits quiétaientles siensen vertude la doctrine

ottomanede l'hinterland.

13. Ce silencde la Libyeest particulièrement significatà la

lumièrede la pratique normativcontemporaine.En 1960,le Tchadest

parvenu à l'indépendance.
En 1960,l'ONUavait fixé en matièrede

décolonisatiodnes règlesqui s'appliquaiente manière généralaeux

territoires qusi'acheminaienvters l'indépendance.En même temps

s'étaitétablil'usagede protester contre leur applicat dans des cas

particuliers. J'en donnerai bientôt quelqueesemples. Pourtant,on

voyaitalorsle Tchadse dirigervers l'indépendance, ave un territoire

définiet administréet des frontières défendues plar France, pale

régimecolonial. On avaitl'ONUqui insistait pourque l'indépendanceu

Tchad intervienndeans lerespectdes paramètres normatifde
. 0 5 6l'autodétermination de l'utipossidetis ou del'intégrité

territoriale.N'y avait-ilpas lieud'attendre que la Libye,si elle

pensaitalors cequ'elleaffirmeaujourd'hui, s'écrie :"Un instant !

Avantque nousn'encouragions l aranceà remettreses pouvoirs à un

gouvernement élu au Tchadet avant quenousn'admettions le Tchad à

l'ONU,faisonspression sur la Franceet les autoritésde N'Djamenapour

qu'ellesredressent un tortancienet rendent à la Libyedes terreset

des peuplesqui lui appartiennendte droit :" ? N'est-onpas en droitde

tirerdes conclusions du fait quela Libyese soit abstenue d'élever la

voix à ce momentcritiqueen destermesquelque peu analogue ?s N'est-il

pas raisonnabld ee penser quela Libye s'esttue parcequ'elle

n'imaginait pas alorsqu'elle avaitune raison quelconqu de demander une

dérogation à la règlegénéralede l'autodéterminati ?on Ne pouvons-nous

pas en déduirequ'en1960la Libyeétaitsatisfaite des frontières

qu'elleavaitet qui étaient protégée par le principede l'intégrité

territoriale ?

III. Les nouvellesrèglesde la décolonisation

14. Commel'a fait observeurne Chambre de la Cour en 1986 dans

l'affairedu Différendfrontalier, le principede l'utipossidetis

avait été consacréet universalisépar le nouveau droitde la

décolonisation afi que l'indépendancnee conduise pas"à des luttes

fratricidesnées dela contestation des frontièresà la suitedu retrait

de la puissanceadministrante" (C.I.J.Recueil 1986,p. 565). Selon

les termesde la Cour,cette règle "gèle le titre territore iav"igueur

au momentde l'indépendancec ,'est-à-dire"aumomentde l'accession à

l'indépendance..." (ibid.,p. 566, 568;contre-mémoird eu Tchad,

p. 131 et 132,par. 4.12 à 4.14, etp. 152,par. 4.54). Ce même souci

étaitimplicite dans la déclaration histori dqel'Assemblée générale

sur l'octroide l'indépendancaeux pays et peuples coloniau(xla fameuse résolution1514 (XV)de l'Assembléegénéraledu 14 décembre1960) adoptée
057
-. en 1960 juste aumomentoù le Tchadparvenait àl'indépendance.Elle

condamne"toutetentative visan àt détruire partiellemeont totalement

l'uniténationaleet l'intégrittéerritorialed'unpays". Cette même

norme figure naturellement dans la Déclarad tion70 de l'Assembléesur

les relations amicales (Déclaration relaa tivprincipesdu droit

international touchant les relations amic eatlescoopération entre les

Etats, résolution 2625(XXV) de l'Assemblée généraldu 24 octobre 1970;

contre-mémoird eu Tchad,p. 132 et 133,par. 4.16). La Libyea en effet

voté en faveurde ces deuxrésolutions (pourl'examende la

résolution 2625 (XXV)de l'Assemblée,voir contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,

p. 133,par. 4.17). Ellen'a pas dit : ce sont de bonnes règles, mais

ellesne s'appliquent pas aux frontières queous contestons,ni aux

territoires sur lesquelsnous avonsune revendicationinsatisfaite.

058 15. Dans la pratique del'ONU,l'universaliteét le prestige dont
-
était investi le nouveaudroit de la décolonisation signifiait leque

EtatsMembresde l'ONUfaisaienttout ce qui étai en leurpouvoirpour

que les colonies accèdentà l'indépendance en conservant exactement les

frontières territoriales qu'elles avaient lo lasdernière phasedu
w
processusde décolonisation.La fermeté decet attachement ressor de la

résistance opposé par l'ONUaux quelques demandes de dérogatà iones

règles. L'examendes demandesde dérogation auxdites règlesnous donne

un aperçude ce qu'auraitété la transitiodnu Tchadde l'étatde colonie

à celuide nationsi une revendication avait été formulée col ntrepar

la Libyeou même par les populationsdu BET administrées para France.
l

16. Ces demandesde dérogation ont généralement été présentées dans

deux typesde situations.L'une étaitcelleoù l'onprétendait que

l'autodétermination devait être appli deuéenièreà donnerà un groupe

ethnique distincett cohérentdu territoire colonia l'occasionde se détacher avant qu ee territoire dépendan'accède àl'indépendance.

L'autre situation dans laqueldles demandesde dérogation onété

présentées était celole un Etat déjà indépendaent déjà membre de

l'ONiJ,d'ordinairun Etat voisin, revendiquait tooutpartied'un

territoire dépendanqui s'acheminai ters l'indépendance, généralement

en se fondantsur un titre historique.ien que 1'ONü ait très rarement

accédé à ces demandesde dérogationcelles-cin'étaientpas rares. En

tantque Membrede l'ONUdepuis près d'une décennie avl antndépendance

du Tchad,la Libyene pouvait guèreignorer cette pratique, cealleen

avaitdes exemples partout autodurelle.

17. Premièrement, la dérogation fonsurel'autodétermination.

En 1960,on pouvaitfortbien imaginerune demandede dérogation fondée

sur l'autodéterminatioc'est-à-direl'autodéterminatiod'un sous-groupe

vivantà l'intérieurde la colonie. La demandede sécessionaurait pu

être présentée palres populations vivant dans BET oumême parla

Libyeparlanten leur nom. Aucune demanneefut formulée.De plus,le

référendum quia eu lieu au Tchadn 1958sur laquestionde

. O 5 9 l'autodérminatione suscita aucun mouvement de sécessiT on.t le BET

-. participaaux électionsde 1959précédant l'indépendandceTchad,et il

y eut de nombreuxpartis, dont plusieurs réussirentliredes députés à

l'Assembléenationale. M. Bowett, le22 juin,a parléde l'absence

totalede preuvesd'acquiescemendtes populations autochtondesns la

zone appeléeles confins(CR 93/20,22 juin1993,p. 19). Pas du tout.

En 1960,les populationsdu BET,y compris celleslAouzou,avaient

exercé leur droià l'autodétermination,ommele montrentbien les

résultatsdes électionsde 1959 publiédansPerspectiveAfricaineà

Parisle 16 juin 1959,dontnous avons jointle texte,en tant

qu'annexe107, au contre-mémoireu Tchadet qui se trouvent projetés

derrièremoi. Lors de ce scrutinnul ne préconisaitla sécession. C'était

en 1959. L'annésuivante, l'Assemblée tchadienne dûmentaéd léueidé

de proclamer l'indépendance de la nation. nC eelascita panon plus

d'appelà la sécession,ni de la partdes représentants élusn,i de la

part de la population(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 135,par. 4.21,avec
.
citations,y comprisl'annexe107 du contre-mémoirdeu Tchad).

18. Il est toujours dangereux de prétendre savoir c eeqgens

pensaienttrente-troisans auparavant,maisnous pouvons faire certaines

déductionsen comparantla façon dont l'autodétermination fonction auait

Tchad avecles événements très différents q sedéroulaient au même

momentdans d'autrescoloniesafricaines.Ainsi,au momentmême où le

Tchads'acheminait pacifiquement vers l'indépendancel'intérieurde

frontières territorialq esi n'étaient contesténi sur le planinterne,

ni sur le plan international,a Belgique mettaitin à sa tutelleau

Ruanda-Urundi.Là, au cours des années 1959-1962, d lesx régionset

les populations avaient, lodrsplusieurs élections, exprimé clairement

leur préférence pou la sécession mutuelle plutôt que p ourntégrité

. 6 0 territoriale.Aprèsune forte résistance initial l'ONUfinit par bénir
-
la séparationjusteavantl'indépendancea ,vecune grande réticence
w
(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 133 à135,par. 4.19 et 4.20). Elle avait

reconnul'intensité des sentiments séparatistaes Ruanda-Urundi et

acceptéde dérogerdans ce cas-làau principede l'intégrité

territoriale. Le contraste entre ce quse passaitau Tchadet ce qui

arrivaitau mêmemomentau Ruandaet au Burundi ne saurait être plus

frappant. Les populationsdu BET n'ont exprimaucundésirde sécession,
L
la Libyen'a pas présentéde demandeen leurnom et, bien entendu,les

règles pratiquées par'ONUont été appliquées.Il serait désastreux,

plusde trenteans plus tard, que la Cour reviennsur desrègleset

méthodesde décolonisation élaborées av soinpour lesmodifier. 19. La Libye savaitcertainement commen user de la cartede

l'autodéterminatio si elleen avait eu une à sa disposition.En effet,

ellejouaitun rôle actif dans un cas d ce genre aumomentmême où le

Tchad allait devenir indépendaa nt,ntbeaucoup contribuéà persuader

l'ONU, en 1960,d'autoriser un plébiscite qudievait révéler slia

population du Cameroun septentrional, sous administration britannique,

souhaitait faire sécessia on momentde l'indépendanceet se joindre au

Nigériavoisin(contre-mémoird eu Tchad,p. 142 à 145,par. 4.33à 4.38

En effet,la Libye aida le Cameroun septentrionaà
avec citations).

obtenirune dérogation à l'utipossidetis et au principede l'intégrité

territoriale.Ses représentants savaient parfaitement com dmemander

la dérogation.Pourtant, la Libyn e'a faitaucuneffort pour presse la

Franced'organiser dans le BETun plébiscite distinct comparaà bcelui

qu'elleavaitréussi à obtenir pourla régiondu Cameroun septentrional

britannique. A ce momentcritique, avant l'indépendanc du Tchad, la

Libyene présenta aucund eemande. Certes, le Cameroun britanniq était

un territoire soustutelle alors qulee Tchadétaitune colonie. Mais,

en 1960,l'Assemblée générale avait largemee ntfacé la signification

pratiquede cettedifférence et supervisait activemen le processusde

décolonisation. Il faut présumer que s la Libyen'a présentéaucune

demande,c'estparce qu'elle a estimé qu'en llevaitpas de demandeà

formuler.

20.M. Bowettinvitela Courà tenircomptedu fait"qu'àl'époque

contemporainel'accent esmtis sur les populationsf,ait quise reflète

dans les principes juridiqu reslatifsaux droitsde l'homme etdans le

droitdes peuples à disposerd'eux-mêmes" (CR93/18,p. 71). Pour bien

intentionnées qupeuissentêtreces bellesparoles,Monsieurle

Président, vousn'ignorez pasquelles conséquence s'ensuivraient- les

"peuples"ne seraientpas lesderniers à les subir- si la Cour commençaità revoirle tracédes frontières d'Etatssouverains pour

appliquerdes théories relativesà ce que veulentles "peuples",en

particulierdes théories proposée sar les gouvernementvoisins. La

Libyea présenté à la Courdes pétitions de personne qui vivent dansla

bande d'Aouzousous son occupation militair:ele gambitdu "paysdes

Sudètes". La Courne va certes pas aider maintena latLibyeà redéfinir

l'intégritéterritorialedu Tchad,ni àréexaminer l'acte

d'autodéterminatio de ses populations.Ces questions ont été résolues

en 1960. Aucunedes populations du Tchad,y compris celles qui subissent

maintenant l'occupation libyen n'a,expriméun quelconquedésirde

sécessionil y atrenteans. Elles n'ont pas demandé être consultées

en qualitéde "peuples"distincts de tousles autresTchadiens. Le

processus démocratiqpuaer lequelle Tchadest parvenuà l'indépendancae

droitau même respect queceluide toutautre Membre de l'organisation

des NationsUnies. A aucun moment pendant ces événements, a lors

l'Assembléegénérale examinai les progrès accomplipsar les Français

vers l'indépendancdeu Tchad,la Libye n'ademandéque l'Assembléedonne

à la Francedes instructionspour qu'elle aligneles frontièreset le

régime territoria du Tchadsur une quelconque revendicati denliens

w
ethniques transnationaux Ni le mot"Ottoman", ni le mot "Senoussi"ne

franchirentJamaisles lèvresdes représentants dl ea Libyeà

l'organisatiodnes NationsUnies. Bienplutôt, ce qui se passaen 1960,

lorsde la déclarationd'indépendancdeu Tchad, ce fut précisément ce que

062 prescrivit plutsardl'avisconsultatif rendd uans l'affairedu Sahara

occidental(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 139 et 140, par. 4.26à 4.28):

la mise en oeuvredansune autre coloni du "principe d'autodétermination

grâce à l'expression libr et authentiquede la volontédes populations

du territoire" (Sahara occidental,avis consultatif,

C.I.J. Recueil 1975,par. 162,et voir aussi par. 52 à 54). Aucunevoix, tchadienne ou libyenn nee,s'éleva poudemander une autre forme

d'autodétermination que ceq lle fut effectivementise en oeuvrede

façontrèsappropriée et démocratique. Il est certes irresponsable de

demander à la Cour, comme lceonseilde la Libyel'a faittoutrécemment

encorele 22 juin,de consulter quelqu ehose qu'on appelle l "facteur

humain" etde prendre, en 1993, une décision fond sur ce que la

population de la banded'houzou,ou del'ensemble du BET, pourrait

maintenant vouloir. Nous avons présentdées preuvesd'où semblerésulter

que le seul pointcommunentre toutes les factionsdu BET, c'estqu'elles

ne se considèrentpas elles-mêmescomme libyennes. Notre agenta été

éloquentsur cepoint. Mais ce que leQuébec, ou la Bretagne, ou l'est

de Sri Lanka,pourraient vouloirà un momentquelconque, cen'est certes

pas, quoiqu'ilarrive,une question qu'ilfailleadresser à la Courou

qu'elledoiveredresser. L'acted'autodéterminatio du Tchadde 1960

peut être comparé enfait avec avantageà celuide n'importe quelle

nationnouvelle. Pourtant, en définitive, lqauestionne réside paslà

non plus. La Courn'estpas le lieuet 1993n'estpas le moment pour

réexaminer la bonnfeoi de l'acted'autodéterminatio du Tchad. Nul,

s'il s'intéressevraimentau "facteur humain",ne pourrait souhaite rn

revirement qui port en germeun tel chaos.

21. Voilàpour l'autodéterminationQ .ue diredu titre historique?

Une foisencore,il y aurait euune époque,à la fin des années

cinquante,pendant laquelll ea Libyeauraitpu demanderavec insistance à

l'organisatiodnes NationsUnies deprévoirdans lecas de la coloniedu

Tchad une dérogatio au droitde la décolonisatiopnar déférence pourla

revendication d'utnitre historique. Si la Libye avait eu une telle

revendicationà formuler,elleaurait pusoulever des objectionà s,ce

moment-là,à l'applicatiodne l'utipossidetis.Un tel moment aurait

pu êtrepropicepour que la Libye, dirigé par un roi senoussi,formule une revendication fondée ssuorn prétendu rôlde successeuraux titres

et revendicationdses Ottomans,des Senoussi,des Italiens,ou de tous

ensemble. Mais il s'agitde la revendication que l Libye formule

maintenant,en 1993. Au moment critique, quau nde telle demande de

dérogationau droit moderne de la décolonisation aurait pu être

appropriée, quanodn préparaitle Tchadà l'indépendanceq ,uand diverses

commissionsde l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies contrôlaie ses progrès

et en discutaient, quand vint le momd enl'indépendancel ,e

Gouvernement libye ne prononçapas une seule parolierrédentiste.

22. Au Conseilde sécurité, alors même ql ue Franceprésentait le v
-. O64
nouveaucandidatà la qualité de Membre et décrivaitson territoire comme

incluantun "immensetrapèze"d'environ 1 300 000 kilomètrescarrés,y

comprisles "hautes montagnes déchiquetd éesTibesti"(mémoiredu Tchad,

p. 320à 321,p. 116, avec citation), la Libyene fit aucuneffortpour

parleren sens contraire. A l'Assemblgéenérale,le représentantde la

Libye (M. Fekini)exprima auTchad,ainsi qu'aux autres nouveaux Membres,

au nom du roi de Libye,"de son peupleet de son gouvernementles

félicitationsles plus chaleureuses...("mémoiredu Tchad,p. 322,

par. 120,avec citation). Il rappela, avec"touteson appréciation",
W
l'"espritwde la décolonisation française, alors m qêu'ilcritiquaitla

France - celan'estpas dépourvu de pertinen deela partd'un

gouvernement qui restai prétend-on,sous l'influence française- alors

même qu'ilcritiquait la Franceen termes acerbes parce qs ue conduite

n'étaitpas aussi éclairé vis-à-visde l'Algérie. Si la Libyeà cette

époque avait entendu revendiquer une pa dutierritoiredu Tchad -le
*
Tchad arrivaià t l'organisatiodnes NationsUnies -n'aurait-elle pas

estiméqu'unetelle revendication la sienne, méritaiatu moins autant

une mention queses objections contrl ea manière donla Francetraitait

l'Algérie ? Le silencede la Libyene démontre-t-il pas qu'elle n'estimaitpas elle-même,au momentcritique, avoir une revendicat ion

formuler?

23. Tout commel'affaire du Cameroundoit avoir démontréà la

Libye commenton présenteune affaire fondéesur l'autodétermination il

y avait de même unaebondanced'exemplescontemporains instructid fsnt

la Libyepouvaits'inspirer si ellesouhaitait persuaderl'organisation

des Nations Unies qulee Tchadne devait pasaccéder à l'indépendance

tantque la France n'auraitpas reconnu,sansparlerencored'y faire

droit, la revendicatiloinbyenne relative certaines partiedsu

territoire tchadien alors soumiseà l'administration françaie sesur le

pointde passersous l'administratiot nchadienne. La Libyen'aurait

certes pas étéle seulMembrede l'organisatiod nes Nations Uniesà

réclamerune telledérogation à l'application del'uti possidetis.
, 65
- - De nombreux demandeuravaient montré lc ehemin: en formulantavec

énergieet à maintes reprisedses revendicationrselativesà un titre

historique devand tes organesde l'ONU. Ces demandeursd,'ordinaire des

Etats voisins d'unecolonie,présentaient avei cnsistance leurasrguments

pas tellementdans l'espoird'obtenir une décision favorad ble

l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies-bien qu'enfaitl'ONUait à l'occasion

témoignéde la sympathiepourde tellesrevendications (voirla

discussion des revendicationdse l'Espagneet de l'Argentinecontre la

Grande-Bretagnd eans lecontre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 156 à 159,par. 4.65

à 4.70) - mais surtoutafinde sauvegarder la viabilitéde la

revendication au-delàdu moment critiqudee l'indépendancdee la colonie

et de l'acquisition, par celle-d cila qualitéde membrede l'ONU

- au-delàdu momentdu gel - au-delàdu momentauquell'utipossidetis

prendraiteffet. Ces demandeursq ,ui affirmaienet réaffirmaient leur

titre historique devant li esstancesde l'ONU,comprenaient qul ee

silence avait la valeurd'un assentimentdonné au nouvel Etat, ql ue silence validailt'intégritéterritorialede celui-ci,"gelait"les

frontières existante et excluait les effortultérieursde revisionnon

consensuelle.Cela, la Libye a dû le savoir.

24. Ce n'estpas une simple conjecture qulees silencesde la Libye

attestentl'absencede touterevendication au moment critid que

l'indépendancdeu Tchad. Tout autour, les autres Etats sauvegardaient

leurs revendicationtserritorialesau momentoù les colonievsoisines

approchaientde l'indépendance.Quelquesexemplessuffiront

(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 160 à 162,par. 4.59 à4.82,avec citations)

et je me suis efforcéd'éviter d'évoquece qui touchepersonnellement

aux expériencesde membres dela Cour. Pendant la périod qui s'est

écouléede 1955 à 1960, les organes dle'ONUont entendule Yemen

revendiquer la colonie d'Ade le,Guatemalala coloniede Belize,

l'Espagnela coloniede Gibraltar, leMaroc lescoloniesde Mauritanie et

du Sahara occidental, l'Indonés laecoloniede l'Irianoccidental.Au

moment même où la Libye félicitaitle Tchadde son indépendanceet

appuyaitson admissionà l'ONU,le Marocaffirmait bruyammen son titre

historique, ethniqueet géographiquesur la Mauritanieet s'opposait
* 066
férocementà la demande d'admissiode celle-cià l'organisation. Il

W
agissait ainsid,isait-il, "pour sauvegarn derre position sulre plan

international"(contre-mémoirdeu Tchad,p. 161 à 162,par. 4.73à 4.75

avec citation). Or que faisait lLibye ? La Libye apportaietn réalité

un soutien actifau Maroc dansson opposition à la demanded'admission

présentéepar la Mauritanie.Si la Libyeavaitestimé,à cetteépoque,

qu'ellepouvaitformulerune revendication historiqueme entethniquement

fondéesur leBET semblable à celledu Maroc sur la Mauritanie,

aurait-elle souhaité labienvenue au Tcha domme nouveau Membretouten

aidantle Maroc à fermerla porteà la Mauritanie ?
N'aurait-ellepas

essayéde sauvegarder sa position juridique,comme le Maroc,en la définissantde façon réitéréea,vec énergie,touten s'opposant à

l'admissiondu Tchadcomme membre de l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies?

25. Le faitqu'alors leMarocait revendiqué la totalitéde la

Mauritanie, tandis que, maintenant, la Libye reven "seulement"à peu

près la moitiédu Tchadn'y changerien. S'ily avait là un élément

importantà distinguer, la Cour préférerpeut-êtreenvisagerle cas de

l'admissionde la Somalieà l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies, Avec

beaucoupde passionet defréquentes répétitionl s, Somalies'est

efforcéed'empêcher le "gel"de ses frontièresau moment critiqueet de

sauvegardersa revendication sur de partiesde 1'Ethiopieet du Kenya

(mémoiredu Tchad,p. 155 et 156,par.4.60 à 4.64). Alors mêmequ'elle

demandaitson admissionà l'ONU,la Somaliea présentéavec énergieà

l'Assembléeson pointde vue bienconnuselon lequel ses frontièresau

momentde l'indépendancne'étaientpas conformes aux exigencesde la

résolution392 (V) de l'Assembléegénérale,notrevieilleconnaissance,

c'est-à-direla résolution même su laquellese fonde maintenant- mais

maintenant seulement la Libye à l'appuide sa revendication sur

Aouzou. La Libyeétait présentq euandla Somaliea donnél'exemple de ce

qu'ilfallait fairepour tenter de sauvegarder la revendicati d'un

titrehistorique, malgrlée nouveaudroitde la décolonisation, malgré

"l'instantané"m,algréle "gel". N'est-ce-pas au moinsun indicequ'en

présencede toutecette pratiqued ,ont l'intentiojnuridiqueest

évidente,la Libye n'aitrigoureusemenrtiendit ?

. 0 6 7 IV.A quelmoment la Libye aurait dû présentersa cause,si elle en
, . avait une

26. Il y a eu, Monsieurle Président, trois moments critiq ues

i) en décembre 1951ou février1952, lors de la déclaration

d'indépendancdee la Libyeet de sa reconnaissancpear

l'Assembléegénérale; ii) en 1955, lorsde la conclusiondu traité franco-libyen;

iii) en 1960, lorsde l'indépendancd eu Tchadet sa demanded'admission

à l'organisatiodnes Nations Unies.

En toutesces occasions, ou en l'unequelconque d'entreelles,la Libye

avaità la foisl'occasion et l'obligationde se faire entendres,i elle
i
estimait, au moment critiqueq,ue le nouveau droidte la décolonisation

- avec ses élémentsd'autodéterminatio dans le cadre des unités

coloniales existante que légitimait l'ut possidetis -que ces règles

ne devaientpas s'appliquer au Tchad pd our raisons spéciales. Il

semble quetousceuxqui avaient une revendicatio non satisfaitese

faisaiententendre. Que la Libyene l'aitpas fait, cela donne à

entendrequ'elle n'avaia tucunerevendicatiod ne ce genre, pasà cette

époque. Elle ne peut donc pas espéren ru,nc protunc,se servirde la

Cour pour substitue la décision decelle-cimaintenant à celle que

prit la communautéinternationale en 1960, surtoutétantdonnéqu'elle

n'a pas établiqu'ily ait euune fraude ou aucune irrégularité grave en

ces momentscritiques. Monsieur Pleésident, Messieurde la Cour, rien

de tel n'a été établi. Riendu tout. Nous l'affirmons : les dés étaient

jetéset le livre fermé, et l'onavaitsatisfaitaux règlesen vigueur à
w
l'époque. Demain, dans la dernièp rertiede mon exposé, je m'efforcerai

de démontrerqu'aumomentoù la Libyea effectivemend técidéde formuler

une revendication sur up nertiedu Tchad,ellesavait une chose : elle

savait qu'elleavait renoncé depuis longtem àpses prétentions

juridiques, elle savai qu'iln'existaitaucunerègle sur laquelle elle

pût se fondersauf le droitdu plus fortet elle a donc préféré tireses

argumentsnon du droit, mais dela puissance. Je vous remercieM,onsieurle Président, de la patiene cede

l'indulgence dontvous avezfaitpreuveen m'écoutant et je proposerai,

si je peuxme permettre, que vous donniez laparole àmon collègue

M. Sorel.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie beaucoup Monsieur Franck.

MonsieurSorel.

Mr. SOREL: Mr. President, Members of the Courtit is an immense

honour for me to appear beforyou for the first time,and 1 hope that

you will pardonthe imperfectiondsue to the slight nervousness ofthese

initialsteps. Thiswill at leasthave the advantageof makingme brief:

1. 1 am takingover fromProfessor Franct ko dealwith another

fundamental aspect ofeffectivitésproving the existenceof a boundary

confirmedafterindependence.My predecessor has alludedhere to the

international recognitiont ofatlinein theUnited Nations ant do the

successive acquiescenco es Libya. For my part, 1 shouldlikebrieflyto

describethe effectivitésof Chadafter itsindependence throug two

complementaryaspects.

First,the territorias lovereigntyexercisedby Chad over theAozou

stripfollowingthe Statesuccession.

Second,conventional activity betweenChadand Libya subsequent to

the independenco efChad.

2. The two aspectsconfirmthatChad exercised effectiv sovereignty

over theAozou strip up to the time of thfeorceful invasion o fhe strip

by Libya,and thatnothing inthe conventional activity supportsOur

opponents' assertionthatno boundaryexists. 1. The territorialsovereigntyexercisedby Chad followingthe State
0 59 succession

3. 1 should liketo takeup the first pointoncerning the

territorial sovereigne tyercisedbyChad following the instanoce State

succession that occurred.Chadhas been a sovereignand independent

State since11 August1960,and Chadhas sincethen intendedto exercise

the entireextentof its sovereign jurisdiction overwt hhole ofits

territory. The accessionof Chad to independencwas no doubtan

occasion for rejoicin in Africa, asur honourable opponentemphasize,

independence aren occasionfor rejoicing,and
but al1 accessionsto
*
thisdoesnot prevent the expressio on specific claimosr the raisingof

particularprotestswhere sufficient caue seists. At that time,Libya

had been independent for nearlyineyearsand,despiteits relative lack

of resources frequentlrecalledby the opposingParty,it was

neverthelessin a positionto drafta note ofprotestif it saw theneed

for one. It tookno suchaction.

4. On becoming independenCt,adsucceededto Franceand thefacts

clearlyshow that,at thattime,the partof Chadian territory since

referredto as the "Aozoustrip"remained subjectto theeffectiveand

exclusiveauthorityof the successor of France, nametlye Republicof

Chad. Thereexiststhena phenomenon of continui tyth Francesince

that State,in conformitywith the boundary line confirmed 1955,had

up to 1960 exercisedal1 the attributeof sovereigntas far as the

southernboundaryof Libya. Treatiesand effectivitéswere quite

logically mergesdinceLibya,Franceand subsequentlyChad recognized the

existenceof the sameboundaryline.

5. Theeffectivitésof Chadare numerous, thoug"hproportional"
070

as it were- to the special situatioof the B.E.T.,and matchthe

"classic"exerciseof the jurisdictioonf a Stateover its territory.Some rapidreferenceto theseactions will be in place (detailsof such

aspects aregiven in the Memorial ofChad,ChapterVI, pp. 293

et seq.),with a topic-by-topic regrouping. 1 apologizein advancefor

this rather descriptive reminder, particuls arlyate in the morning,

but therewas a need to cut short certain insinuatioo ns the opposing

Party. For, as recalledby the Chamberof the Courtin the case

concerning the Frontier Disputebetween Burkina Faso and Mali:

"Wherethe act corresponde sxactly tolaw, whereeffective
administration is additionalto the uti possidetisjuris,the
role of effectivité is to confirmthe exerciseof the right
derived from a legaltitle." (I.C.J.Reports 2986,
pp. 586-587,para. 63.)

This will be the purposeof my brief demonstration but if one

supposes - and only if - as Libya asserts,that thereis no legal

title - somethingthat Chad challenges - then 1 ventureto continuemy

relevant quotation from the FrontD ierputecase sincethe Chamberof

the Court goes on to specify:

l1Inthe eventthat the effectivité does not CO-exist
with any legaltlitle, it must invariably betakeninto
consideration." (Ibid.)

It is thereforein two respectsthat this reminderis necessary.

6. Chad first exercised, startin in 1960,an administrative

authority - in the generalsense - over the B.E.T. region,which becamea

prefecture dividedinto threesub-prefectures.Up to 1965,it was

admittedlyFrench officerswho held high administrative posts, bu that

was the outcomeof defenceand technicaland military assistance

agreements concluded betweenChad and Francein August1960. The French

officers,it must be added, were appointe by the ChadianGovernmentand

took instructions only fromit (MC,p. 303, paras.37-38). There was

consequently not a continuityof military occupationa ,s Libyainsinuates

in its Counter-Memorial(CML,para. 5.107),but simply a "continuity of

individuals"made necessary for obviousand very practical reasons pendingthe trainingof key Chadian personnel(whichmaterializedby

1965). Furthermore,theutilizationby one State oforgansof another

State, whichthe latter makes availablto it, is a well-knownphenomenon

in internationallaw, as JudgeAgo hadoccasionto point out in his

reporton State responsibility(cf. R.Ago, Third Reporton State

Responsibility, Yearbookf the InternationalLaw Commission,1971,

Vol. II, 1st Part,paras.198-214). We may thereforenote a continuous

presenceof administrative personne in the sub-prefectureof the B.E.T.

until 1968(MC,p. 304, para.41, listingthe prefectsand

sub-prefects). At that time,Libya issuedstrictlyno protestagainst

that effective presenc eCMC, paras2.100-2.101,4.44).

7. That presenceof Chad was to be reflectein actual functions

commonto al1 Stateson their territory.For instance, electionwsere

held in the B.E.T.,includingthe Aozou strip,on4 March 1962,under the

controlof the ChadianGovernment; or again,accordingto the reportsof

the monthly political bulletiof the sub-prefecof the Tibesti,taxes

were regularlylevied.

8. Also noteworthywas the exerciseof police activitin the
C72
region,despitedifficulties and imperfectionsdue to the geographical

situation(MC,p. 313, para. 76). That activitycomprisedboth border

surveillanceand the arrestof bandits. Mentionis made, for example,of

the presenceof a policeinspectorat Aozou in 1968,in the

correspondenceof the B.E.T.prefect(MC, p. 319, para.107).

O73 9. One of the rolesof thosepoliceofficiaisand of the armed

forceswas also the monitoringof population movements through

supervision both ofthe passes requirefor individualtravel andof the

transhumancepermit. Very significantlyt,he prefectof the B.E.T.was

in 1964 to require passportto be stampedwith a residence visin Chad

in the case of Libyannationals.This wasnotifiedto the headof post at Zouarand concernedLibyannationals, particulart lyose"of the north

zoneof the boundary line"(MC, Am. 126). As of 1965,the sub-prefect

of the Tibesti alscoalledfor the establishmenof customs offices in

themain population centre( sWour,Aozou,Bardaïand Yebibou- cf. MC,

Ann. 120). Thismade the authorities more effecti ivearresting

smugglersin the borderzone.

10. Closely linketo this latter activity, the populat census

already activuenderFrench administratio (MC,p. 279,paras.269-271)

was carriedon by the Chadian authoritiesdespitethe difficulties

resulting from the nomad way of life, which made that accounting

somewhat haphazar ds mentionedina reportby the sub-prefectof the

Tibestiin June 1966 (MC,p. 306,para.51).

11. In addition,if thereis onedomainthat makesit possibleto

determine the effective author oita Governmentover the population it

is well and truly thaof teachingand education. A considerable effort

was made to promote schoolnrolment (MCp,. 310,para. 68), this being

linkedto the development of civil registraa tionmore generalloyf

good citizenship(MC,p. 307,para.53). The aim was, despitethe

difficulties,to interestChadiansin the requirementosf the smooth

runningof a modernState. For thatpurpose,"tournées de contact"(the

expressionthenused),or toursof contact, with the populati were

organized.The school-enrolmenc tounts, incidentallwy,re amongthe

o7 most accurate,and we thuslearn that,in 1966,therewere some 20 pupils

at the Aozou cafeteribut thattheir numbercouldrise to 30 or

40 children dependinon the movements otfhe population(MC,p. 317,

para.100). A listof schools was alsomaintained and Aozo and Zouar

are mentionedin the 1970and 1971reports. We evenlearnfrom them

whichschools had to be closeddownbecauseof the rebellion!Which

proves that foCrhadtherewas no questionof givingup part of its territorybut, on the contrary,the requirement was to combata situation

needingto be remedied.

12. There is another aret ahat confirmsChad'seffectivités:that

of economic development. Thus in the area of hydrocarbon prospectiona,

licencewas granted, for example,in 1961to a FrenchCompanyto prospect

in the Aozoustrip zone (MC,pp. 313, para. 80). This turnedout to be

fruitless, but the issuio ng thispermitis quitesignificant, It was

on 31 October1961 that the Chadian Ministerfor Public Works granted an

exclusive licenct eo prospect for oil ogras (No. 189/PC-TPMHH,Journal

Officielde la Républiquedu Tchad,15 Nov. 1961,pp. 468-469)to the

Sociétéde participations pétrolières Petropar. This licencewas

grantedfor a five-year perioa dnd was renewable; it coveredan area of

152,000 square kilometres locat atdthe extremenorth-eastof the

Ennedi,boundedon the north by the frontierwith Libyaand on the east

For the purposeof exploration Petropar
by the frontier with Sudan.

built a privateairfieldnear Tekro inEnnedi,which also resulted in the

establishment of a policepost (Journal Officielde la Républiquedu

Tchad,15 Oct. 1963,p. 567). This activity provet shat Chad exercised

governmental attributes ovt ehre regionand Libya didnot protest.

Needlessto Say, for itspart Libyanever delivered any licenc ef this

kind!

13. Similarly attempts were mat de develop agriculturdeuringthe

period from 1960 to 1966 and, in1966, thesub-prefectof Tibestiin an

economicbulletinmentioned the gushin gf a well at- Aozou! The

developmentof tourist infrastructure was also considered. This was not
a
followedup. Lastly, it was notpossibleto develop any economic

activityin the regionof the Aozou strip and in generalin the B.E.T.

afterthe independence of Chad sincethe difficulties encounterw edre

too great(geographical isolation, desertarea,etc.). Mr. Cassesehas already mentionedthesepoints. A vehicle essentiat lo trade butof the

most basic kind was a rare and preciousasset in such a vast area(MC,

p. 305, para.44). This is, however, of little importani cethe context

of the present dispute.What is importantis that Chad exercised over

the whole of the B.E.T. including, 1stress, the Aozou stri -p

exclusive rightsof sovereignty.

14. This global situation leaduss to stressa point already

mentionedby Mr. Cassese: "intense"administrative activity cann bet

The
expectedin such a disadvantagedand underpopulatedregion.
effectivités must therefore be consider ind,ermsof this situation,

accordingto a criterionthat 1 woulddescribeas that of

proportionality.Moreover,the Courthas constantly recognized thi in

its case-law(~asternGreenland,P.C.I.J.,Series A/B,No. 53, p. 48;

Minquiersand Ecrehos,I.C.J.Reports 1953, p. 47; Western Sahara,

Z.C.J. Reports 1975,pp. 46-47). But aboveal1 when it is recognized

that a Statehas titleand thata frontier is established - which is the

0 7 6 casewith Chad - it isunnecensaryto requiresubstantialsignsof
sovereignty.Each State is free to manifest,in a manner corresponding

to its geographical, politica ald social situation, its sovereign asy

it wishesand with the intensitythat it wisheswithinits frontiers.

15. From 1968 onwards,the central GovernmenotfChad ceasedto have

control over partof the B.E.T. The Chadian army left the Aozp oust in

1968 followinga revoltby nomadguards(MC,p. 34, para. 77). Chad then

entered a"turbulentzone"whichwas to last morethan 20 years,and the

B.E.T.was to become the base for successive movements revolting against

the central authorit( ythiswas the casewith Doctor AbbaSidick's

Frolinatand in the northwith the armedforcesof HisséneHabré and

GoukouniOueddeî). This was also the period thamtarked the beginningof

the Libyanclaimsin 1971(by means of a touristmap) before thearmed invasionof the regionin 1973. In thisconnectiomentionshouldbe

made ofthe strangenessf the Libyanargumentthatjustifiedsuch

actionsby athreatto its securityin the southbecauseof the

rebellionsin Chad(ML,para.3.07)and the needto protect the

exploitatioof its petroleum resourcies thenorthof the frontier zone

(ML,para. 5.538). Libya creates confusion thisregard. The

rebellionin the north ofhad,which hadno secessionistaim,did not

mean that theState ofChad renounced the exercse effective authority

there. On the contrarythatwas whatwas essentiallyat issuein the

struggle thawas to takeplace,whileLibya, stirrinugp that struggle

by variousformsof assistance, hopedo see in it a renunciatithat

did not exist.

16. Al1 the actionand eventsdescribed nevertheless constitute

unquestionablsigns ofthe presence of the Chadian authorities after

independencin the zonethat is the subjectof thedispute. This

indicateno less clearlythatthe frontierbehindwhich these

effectivitéwere exercisedwas delimitedand acceptedas suchby the

0 7 7 two States. This is not surprisiand correspondto the firm principle

of internationalaw that achange dueto a State successionesnot

affect the statusf a frontiertreaty. The frontierofChadwere

"inheritedfrom theentityof whichthenew Statewas previouslypart.

And, sincethe frontierhad been unambiguously confirbydthe Treatyof

August1955, theabsenceof claims or evenprotestsfromLibyauntil1971

is quitelogicaland in accordancewith the law (CML,para.2.04).

Frontiershave an objective character opposatoeal1 and this principle

is respectedby all, including Statthatare rather favourablto the

"cleanslatewin mattersof succession. 17. The conclusionof thisshort account on the firstpointis

simple: the incontestable titlethatChadderived from the Treao ty

10 August 1955 is faithful lyflectedon the groundby theeffective

presenceof the Chadian authorities. This concurrenceis clearlyno

accident.

The incontestable territorial title oChadover the regionclaimed

by Libya is againconfirmed by a studyof the treaty relations between

the two States subseque nt Chad'sindependence.

This is the second pointMr. President, Members of the Cout rta,t

1 should like to dealwith inmy shortspeech.

II. Treatiesconcluded betweeC nhadand Libyasubsequent to the
independenceof Chad

18. The treaty relations betweCenadand Libyasubsequent to the

independence ofChad confirm,despitethe civilwar, despitethe

disturbances of the period,the consistencyof the attitudeof Chad and

the convictioonf the two countriesthat afrontierexistsandhas always

existed and that it remaintshe frontierthatwas defined beforethe

independenceof Chad. A brief survey of the variousagreements confirms

this.

19. On 2 March1966 a Treatyof Friendshipand Good Neighbourliness

was signedin Tripoli(MC, Ann. 15) which organizetdhe movementof the

population livino gn eithersideof the frontierand commercial and

caravantrafficbetweenthe two countries. This agreement confirme the

peaceful frontier relations betw then twoStatesand it seemshardly

realistic thatsuchan agreementshouldhave been conclude idf therewas

a claimon the course of the frontieranda fortiori if therewereno

frontiers(MC,p. 33, para.75). This confirms that the Treao ty 1955

was consideredas the right referencbey the two States.Without going intodetailsof this agreementM,r. President, Article, paragraph1,

shouldbe quoted:

''Othe frontier betwee the territoryf theUnited
Kingdomof Libyaand thatof the Republicof Chad,the
Governmentsof Libyaand Chad shall takeal1 necessarystepsto
ensurethe maintenancoef orderand securityby promotinga
working relationshiand CO-operation between their security
services." (Emphasisadded.)

"On the frontier",Mr. President,and thiswas notan isolated

expression in the Treaty,or the subsequent articles also retferthe

frontier. Thus Article2 is very instructiv(ethisis documentNo. 1 in

your pleadingsfolder)becauseit mentions"thepopulations livin gn

either sideof the frontier, withithe geographicalareas",and these

geographicalareasunambiguouslyplaceZouar,Largeauand Fada in Chad.

These three localities arof coursein the B.E.T.,very farnorthof the

line claimedby Libya inits pleadings. Similarly Article Statesthat

"trans-frontier traffipermits"shall beissued. Lastly, Articl7 e

mentions the measure that the"frontier authorities" shatake.

Thesereferences are not innocuoa us, the moreso becausethe

Treaty makesno mention ofthe frontierto be delimitedwhichtendsto

prove thatit was already delimiteidn themindsof the signatories.An

existing delimitatioins used very simplyin the frarnewkfo

trans-frontier CO-operatioI n.is thusclear that the1966Agreement

was conceived withoutthe slightest doubt being expressed about the

sovereignjurisdictionof the partieson theirterritory. It follows

that for the two countrieshe frontierwas locatedwithinthe zone

establishedby the Agreement.

20. The subsequent agreements werert of a different context

since,as 1 have mentioned, from 1968 onwaradsore troubledperiod

. O 80 startedfor Chad. Libya,in its written and oral pleadings,everal

times asserts thaChadhad been silenton the frontier questionfrom1972onwardsand that thissilenceis inexplicable if Chadhad

wishedto protestagainstthe occupation of the Aozoustrip. Here 1 open

a srnallparenthesis,Mr. President,to point outto our opponentsthat

Libyadid not hesitateto employthis argument to statethat in 1960

therewas no legal obligatiof norLibyato raisean objectionat the time

of independence(CR 93/18,p. 30). The contradiction is clear,but 1

close theparenthesis.

This,Mr. President, is not a matterof "silence"but one of

"prudence".As Professor Higginw sill demonstrate aftemre, the prudence

that emerges fromtheseaccordsshouldnot be confusedwith a

renunciation.Numerousinstances of bilateralrelations betweetnhe

two States derivingfromtheseaccordstestifyto a diplornatia cctivity

in which Chad'sprotestswere clearlyexpressed.Why, then,such

prudencein the Agreements?It is perfectly clear, and1 see no reason

fornot sayingso, thatChad fearedthe reprisalsof its increasingly

threatening neighbou to thenorth. It thereforesoughtto avoid direct

confrontationa,nd it is in this context thatheAgreementsthat

followed shoulbde understood.Of course,or as Mr. Cahier tells us

(CR 93/18,p. 40), it can be thoughtthat internationalaw doesnot

concernitselfwith theulterior motiveo sf statesmen even if,as

PaulValéryput it: "Theonlytreatiesthatcounted shoulb de those

concludedbetweenulteriormotives." (Regard sur lemonde actuel.)

But legal instruments arneverisolated and lackingin foundation.The

sourcematerial,the context,the specific condition of a periodgive

declarationsand treatiestheirfullmeaning. The "circumstanceo sf [a

treaty's]conclusion" form part ofsupplementarymeansof interpretation,

as providedin Article32 of theViennaConvention on theLaw of

Treaties. 1 willnot revertto the legal consequence osf theseprovisions; ProfessorCot has alreadyspokenat lengthon thatsubject

(CR 93/22,p. 24). It is prudence,then,prudencejustifiedby the

specific contexo tf the period,thatcharacterizes theseagreements, not

silenceor givingin. Did Chadgive in? Absolutely not. And we shall

see that it did not.

21. 1 will refrain from expatiatio ngthe "Tombalbayeletter"(MC,

Ann. 343) thatLibya sets so much store by; Professor Pell will refer

to thisaspect later. In any event, thisletter,if it exists,doesnot

constitute an agreementand is thereforenot germaneto thestudyof

treaty relationsduringthisperiod.

22. The Treatyof Friendship, Co-operation anMutualAssistance

between Chad and Libya of23 December1972was situatedin a special

context. The Chadian régime was weaken bydthe rebellionin thenorth

and, in faceof the Libyanthreats(the1971map is a portent),

President Tombalbaye eoug totavoidconfrontation. Aftarshort

crisis,diplomatic relation were resumedin April1972and the Chadian

President, on a visitto Tripoli from20 to 23 December- duringwhich

the Treatywas to be signed - therefore sought appeasement but absolutely

did not give in before theLibyanclaims. A readingof the Treaty proves

this, sinceno mention is made o tfhe questionof boundariesand since w

the Treatyconfines itselt fo a seriesof very vague declarations,

without much relevance, incidentallt y,the caseunderconsideration.

As a matterof fact, the issuw eas raised shortly afterwards a Chad

protested stronglyat bilateral meeting sithinthe framework of a joint

commission provided fi orArticle4 of the Treaty. This aspectwill be
4
developedby Professor Higgins.

If we go forwardin timewe findthat the Agreemeno tf

12 August1974was signed followina gvisitby Colonel Qaddaft io

N'Djamenain March 1974 (ML,Ann. 35). ThisAgreementis markedby the sarnspiritas the 1966Accord. True,its Article 2tacklesthe issueof

boundaries(it is documentNo. 2, whichyou will find in your folder)by

statingthat "thefrontiers betweetnhe two countries ara colonial

conceptionin whichthe two peoplesand nationshad nohand". It is

hardly necessartyo analysethissentencein depthto noticethat it does

not speak ofa colonial concept of frontiers the challeo ngwngich

would necessitataenew delimitation, but simplytatesthatexisting

"frontiers"originatein the colonial partitionn which thetwo peoples

. 083 "hadno handql.This is true- at leastfor Chad - and is, incidentally,

the casewith the greatmajorityof African States.It shouldbe

observedin this respect, howeverthat the1955 Treatywas concludedby

independent Libya. That arare privilegoen the Africancontinent.

In short, whawe have hereis a regret in respecotf an earlier

situationwhoseexistenceis recognizeda contrario,not a modification

of thatsituation.The frontier exists independeno tlythe colonial

conception that motivataedd fashionedit. It therefore appears

difficult,to Say the leastto affirmthat thisis the expressio of an

absenceof a boundary or othe absence of its delimitatio as,Libya

does in its Reply(RL,para.11.25).

The dispute concernintheLibyan occupatio was more thanever

present and, onceagain,the Chadianshad not givenin. Onceagain,this

agreementmust simply berestoredto its context.Chadwas in the throes

of seriousinterna1troubles(President Tombalbayewas to be overthrown

shortlyafterwards) and ha to "ternporizeand concedea few tokensto

itslurkingneighbour; but, repeat,Mr. President,outsidethis the

negotiations continued with the commissions establishednderthe

agreements.Indeed, parallel wit the conclusioof the agreementa,

Chadian missiownas in Tripoli for theurposeof tackling this question

of the occupatioonf the Aozoustrip. 24. If we go forwardstillfurtherin time,we come to the Treatyof

Friendship and Allianof 15 June 1980(ML,An.. 37). This Treaty was

concludedin themidstof civilwar. Confusion was at its heighand the

Treatyofferedto Libyathe pretextit was waiting foin orderto .

interveneofficiallyin the civilwar. What valueis to be attachedto
.
it when it is knownthatthisTreaty wassignedon the Chadiansideby a

memberof one of the rivalfactionsand thathe had no officia1function

in theGovernment?In faceof thissituation. how to believeour
O84
adversaries'argumentwhen theyaffirmin theirpleadings(ML,
para.5.565)that sucha Treatycouldnot have beenconcludedif the
-
unlawfuloccupation oa part of the territory hbeen recognized?Yet,

in this accordas in thatof 1974,mentionis made of freedomof

movementbetweenthe twoStates,which presupposetshe existenceof a

frontier andof an administrative authorty eithersideof the

frontier. From this it maybe concluded that texistenceof a boundary

is recognizedthatboundary - in the absenceof any indicatino the

contrary- correspondingo theboundaryconfirmedby theTreatyof
10 August1955.

25. Lastly,mention mustbe made of the jointcommuniqué between

Chadand Libyaof 6 January1981,a communiqué describeas an "Accord

defusion"(Libyamakes a habitof this typeof accord). The contents

of this communiqué are highly virulefo;r example,it denouncesthe

attemptsof imperialism, Zioniand reactionbackedby colonialism(ML,

An.. 38) to destabilithe region. The tone is set. Neverthelesand

despitethe virulent toneone articleof the communiquis significant. 4

In his writtenstatement(CR 93/18,p. 47) Mr. Cahier cited two articles
(8 and 10) of the agreement.1 will takethe libertyof goingon to

referto Article11 (thisis documentNo. 3 in your folder),which,with a view to achieving"fusion"betweenthe two peoples,decidesthat the

frontiers between thtwo States shall bepened. Frontiers therefore

existed,and sinceno action whatevewras takenfollowing this communiqué

andsince"fusion"was neveraccomplished, it may be inferredthatthe

frontiersthatwere to be openedstillexist. Furthermore, it should

alsobe pointed outthatopeninga frontieris not tantamount to

abolishing it. This plan of "fusion", whonseturewas notfinaland

binding,which wasdenounced with indignationby the international

8 comunity and theAfricanHeadsof State(CMC, Ann. 129),and which

reflecteda mere declaratioof intention- as wasto be very quickly

realizedby Chad - remains,by default, highlyinstructive.One of its

pointswas the opening of frontiers whichere regardedas a realityin

1981by the twoStates.

26. There wereto be no further treaty relatiobnstweenthe two

States until the 1989 Algiers Framework Agreement (Ann. 17),which

provedunambiguously thattherewas a disputeto be settled, thatdispute

actually formingthe subjectof theAgreement.

27. To conclude,Mr. President, Membersf the Court,it can be

confirmedthatthereis a continuity and a consistencin Chad's

attitude, but, contraryto what Libya assertsit is not a continuity

covering theperiodbetween 1972 and 1983(RL, par. 11.32),but a

continuity that runs fromhad'sindependence in 1960to the Framework

Agreementin 1989. If we look closelyoncemore at theseagreements,

including thoseof the "timeof troubles",we see thatnothing indicates

any Chadian acquiesceni ceLibya's presencien the Aozou striopr,

a fortiori,an absenceof a frontierwith Libya. On the contrary,

notwithstanding th playof changing alliances,Chadneverlost its

concernto recover its sovereignty ov thewholeof its territorya ,s

was clearly stated otnhe occasionof the bilateral negotiatiowithLibya. This attitudehas themeritof clarityand continuity.And the

presenceof the President of the Republic of Chadbeforeyour Courton

the firstday, provesthe consistency of thatState'sattitude. When

Libyasays in its oralarguments: "ast gradually becamm eore familiar *

with the case,Libya wasto specify its claims"(CR 93/18, Eng. Trans.
t
p. 23), one has reasonto be surprised.Fortyyears (from 1951-1991i )s

a long time to take to decidewhat onewants! Right from 1960C ,hadknew

its frontiersand the areaof its territory.

28. Professor Higginswill speak next on an aspect complementar to

my briefstatement. 1 shall be grateful i yfou will cal1on her - no

doubt tomorrow - and 1 thankyou foryour kind attention.

Le PRESIDENT : Je remerciebeaucoup M. Sorelde sonexposé. Nous

reprendrons demain matin à 10 heures.

The Court roseat 1.05 p.m.