LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SEPARATION OF THE CHAGOS
ARCHIPELAGO FROM MAURITIUS IN 1965 (REQUEST FOR ADVISORY
OPINION)
WRITTEN STATEMENT
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
27 FEBRUARY 2018
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LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SEPARATION OF THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO FROM MAURITIUS IN 1965 (REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
1. By Resolution 71/292 adopted on 22 June 2017, the United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, specifically:
(a) “Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?”;
(b) “What are the consequences under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?”.
2. The following observations are submitted by the Government of Australia in line with the Orders of the Court of 14 July 2017 and 17 January 2018 fixing the time-limits within which written statements relating to these questions may be submitted to the Court by the United Nations, its Member States, and the African Union.
SUMMARY
3. For the reasons outlined in this Statement, the Court should not give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly.
4. First, the request from the General Assembly does not contain an exact statement of the legal questions upon which the opinion of the Court is actually sought but, rather, a proxy for those questions. The questions referred therefore do not comply with the requirements of Article 65 of the Statute of the Court (ICJ Statute) and thus lie outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
5. Secondly, even if the Court has jurisdiction, it should exercise its discretion to decline to give the requested advisory opinion for a number of reasons. The request from the General Assembly in reality seeks to have the Court adjudicate upon a pre-existing bilateral dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and related matters. The giving of an advisory opinion involving such a dispute would be inconsistent with the fundamental principle which requires the consent of both the United Kingdom and Mauritius to be present before any court or tribunal, including this Court, may adjudicate upon a bilateral dispute between them.
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Further, the Court should not provide the opinion sought as it will not assist the General Assembly in the performance of its functions, because the General Assembly is not performing any substantive functions with respect to the Chagos Archipelago. Finally, the Court cannot be confident that it has sufficient factual material to found a proper examination of the matters before the Court.
6. Given Australia’s position that the Court should decline to give the requested advisory opinion, this Statement does not address the substance of the questions put to the Court.
BACKGROUND
7. The Chagos Archipelago, which is situated in the northern Indian Ocean, was formally ceded to the United Kingdom under the 1814 Treaty of Paris and from that time was administered by the United Kingdom as a dependency of Mauritius.
8. In 1965, the United Kingdom and the Mauritian Council of Ministers negotiated the Lancaster House Undertakings, which set out the elements of Mauritius’ independence. As part of that process, the Chagos Archipelago was detached from Mauritius1 on 8 November 1965, with the prior agreement of the Mauritian Council of Ministers, on the understanding that a series of conditions would be met by the United Kingdom. From this time the Archipelago was administered by the United Kingdom as part of the British Indian Ocean Territory.
9. In 1966, the United Kingdom agreed with the United States that Diego Garcia, the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago, could be used by the United States for defence purposes for an initial period of 50 years. The United Kingdom has undertaken to cede Diego Garcia to Mauritius once it is no longer required for such defence purposes.
10. Mauritius gained formal independence from the United Kingdom in 1968 and was then removed from the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Between 1968 and 1973, all residents of the Chagos Archipelago were relocated to Mauritius and the United Kingdom, with a number of payments being made by the United Kingdom to Mauritius to assist in this process.
11. In 2016, the 1996 agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States in respect of Diego Garcia was extended for a further 20 years.
12. In the period between 1968 and 1980, Mauritius “did not raise the question of the Chagos Archipelago in public fora and diplomatic communications”.2 However, beginning in 1980, Mauritius commenced asserting its sovereignty over the Archipelago. This has resulted in a legal dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and the circumstances of its detachment from
1 British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965 (S.I. 1965 No. 1920), amended by the British Indian Ocean Territory (Amendment) Order 1968 (S.I. 1968 No. 111), at Annex 1.
2 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (The Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) (Award) (18 March 2015) <https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf>, para. 100 (UN Dossier No. 409).
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Mauritius, including the interpretation and application of the Lancaster House Undertakings.3
13. This bilateral dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which has been ongoing for decades, has manifested itself in a range of legal cases before both international and domestic courts and tribunals. Most pertinently, it included proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea4 (Chagos Arbitration). A majority of the Tribunal declined to consider three of the four submissions of Mauritius on the basis that they involved issues of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, being issues over which the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.5
14. Both the United Kingdom and Mauritius, in their respective declarations lodged under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the ICJ Statute, exclude all legal disputes between them from the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. It is therefore plain that this Court cannot resolve the above dispute in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction.
15. The General Assembly, acting at the request of Mauritius, now seeks to bypass the required consent of the parties by requesting an advisory opinion from the Court.
16. Australia, in voting against General Assembly Resolution 71/292 requesting the opinion of the Court, noted its long-standing position that it is not appropriate to use the Court’s advisory opinion jurisdiction to determine the rights and interests of States arising from a specific context – in this case, a bilateral dispute over sovereignty.6 That view is widely shared.7
THE COURT’S JURISDICTION
17. Article 65, paragraph 1, of the ICJ Statute establishes the power of the Court to give an advisory opinion. It provides that the Court “may give an advisory opinion on any legal question” at the request of a body authorised by the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) to request it. Article 96 of the UN Charter complements that provision, by authorising the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the Court “on any legal question”. The fact that only certain public international organisations can request an advisory opinion emphasises that the jurisdiction to give such an opinion exists to
3 Ibid, para. 209-10.
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entry into force 16 November 1994).
5 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (The Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) (Award) (18 March 2015) <https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf> (UN Dossier No. 409).
6 For example, in the Wall case, Australia stated that “[t]o allow the advisory opinion procedure to be used in this way to overcome this rule [concerning consent] has profound implications for States’ participation in treaties and is clearly contrary to judicial propriety: ‘Written Statement of the Government of Australia’, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 29 January 2004, p. 8, para. 15.
7 UN Doc. A/71/PV.88 (22 June 2017), p. 18 (UN Dossier No. 6). A total of 15 States joined Australia in voting against the resolution. A further 65 States abstained from the vote, many for reasons which echo those of Australia and which particularly emphasise the importance of resolving such disputes at the bilateral level.
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enable the Court to provide guidance to those organisations, who would otherwise not have access to the Court.8
18. The reference to “legal questions” in Article 65, paragraph 1, confines the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. The Court has held that “[i]f the question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested."9 The formulation adopted in Article 65, paragraph 1, of the ICJ Statute is narrower than that contained in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which accorded the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) a power to “give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it” (emphasis added). It is narrower not just because the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ does not extend to an opinion on “any dispute”, but also because it is confined to “legal questions” rather than “questions”.10 As a result, purely factual disputes fall outside the advisory jurisdiction of the Court.11
19. Article 65, paragraph 2, of the ICJ Statute assists in identifying the kind of “legal question” that falls within the advisory jurisdiction, as it requires the Court to be provided with a “written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which the opinion is required” (emphasis added). That reveals that the “legal questions” that may properly form the subject of a request for an advisory opinion are questions of a kind that are capable of “exact statement”.
20. It may be accepted that the reference to “legal questions” has not been interpreted restrictively. A question “directed to the legal consequences arising from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of international law”, being a question “framed in terms of law” and “susceptible of a reply based on law” has been held to be a “legal question” for the purpose of Article 65 of the ICJ Statute.12 Further, the Court has accepted that “a mixed question of law and fact is none the less a legal question” for the purposes of Article 65 of the ICJ Statute and Article 96 of the UN Charter.13
21. However, the Court has pointed out that “if it is to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, it must ascertain what are the legal questions really in issue in questions formulated in a request.”14 The barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is that the “legal questions” that have been referred
8 “Since States alone have capacity to appear before the Court, public (governmental) international organizations cannot as such be parties to any case before it. A special procedure, the advisory procedure, is, however, available to such organizations and to them alone”: International Court of Justice, Advisory Jurisdiction <http://www.icj-cij.org/en/advisory-jurisdiction>.
9 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, p. 155.
10 See Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), Vol I, p. 285 and 288; Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013), Vol II, p. 1978-79; Zimmermann et al, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012), p. 1673.
11 See Kolb, The International Court of Justice, (Hart, 2013), p. 1068.
12 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 153, para. 37; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15.
13 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 19, para. 17.
14 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 88, para. 35.
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to this Court do not raise – and, in fact, obscure – the real issue of international law with respect to the Chagos Archipelago for which an answer is sought. While the referred questions ostensibly concern decolonisation, their true purpose and effect is to seek the Court’s adjudication over a question of sovereignty. That question is the subject of the long running dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. The conclusion that the request is, in substance, an attempt to bring that dispute before the Court, notwithstanding that the questions are framed as “legal questions” concerning decolonisation, is apparent from the following facts (which are not exhaustive):
a. Mauritius’ Aide Memoire to the General Assembly in May 2017, which stated that the request is directed towards “enabling Mauritius to exercise its full sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”.15
b. A press release issued by the Government of Mauritius dated 31 October 2017 concerning a meeting in Port Louis between the Prime Minister of Mauritius and the Chairman and Leader of the Chagos Refugees Group, Mr Louis Olivier Bancoult, which refers to the meeting being “focused on joint efforts being undertaken at the International Court of Justice for Mauritius to effectively exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”.16
c. When introducing Resolution 71/292, the representative of Congo, speaking on behalf of the African States Members of the United Nations, stated that the action had been initiated by the African States “to allow a State member of both the African Union and the United Nations to exercise its full sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”.17
22. A request for an advisory opinion that contains questions that ostensibly relate to one topic, but that in fact relate to a different topic, falls outside the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. In such a case, there is no “exact statement” – or, indeed, any statement at all – of the real “legal question” upon which the opinion of the Court is sought.
23. Unlike other cases where the Court has been able to interpret or “even reformulate” questions that have been expressed infelicitously or vaguely,18 that course is not available in this case, because any reformulation of questions about decolonisation could never encompass the substantive issue on which the Court is asked to give its opinion.19
15 Government of the Republic of Mauritius, Aide Memoire dated May 2017 in relation to Item 87 of the Agenda of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, para. 1-2, at Annex 2.
16 Government of the Republic of Mauritius, Prime Minister Meets Chagos Refugees Group Leader on Advisory Opinion Request (31 October 2017) <http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Prime-Minister-meets-Chagos-Ref…;, at Annex 3.
17 UN Doc. A/71/PV.88 (22 June 2017), p. 5 (UN Dossier No. 6) (emphasis added).
18 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 154, para. 38.
19 In Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st, 1926, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.16 at p. 14, the Court recognised that it may not always be possible to reformulate the question where no exact question was referred to it.
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24. This point is jurisdictional, because the Court’s advisory jurisdiction depends on the terms of the questions that are referred to it. In a case where a request for an advisory opinion does not contain a statement of the legal questions upon which the opinion of the Court is actually sought (but, rather, a proxy for those questions), the Court’s jurisdiction is not engaged. The Court cannot properly reformulate the questions because it cannot rule out the possibility that the General Assembly would not have requested the opinion if the real legal issues had been identified. Indeed, a reluctance to expressly identify the “true legal question”20 may be the very reason that the questions referred in this case were framed as questions about decolonisation rather than sovereignty.
25. In those circumstances, the questions referred do not comply with Article 65 of the ICJ Statute, with the necessary consequence that the Court lacks jurisdiction.
THE COURT’S DISCRETION TO GIVE AN ADVISORY OPINION
26. If the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, a question arises as to whether it should exercise its discretion to decline to render the advisory opinion sought in this case.
27. Under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the ICJ Statute, the Court “may give an advisory opinion” (emphasis added). The text plainly conveys that the jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion is discretionary. Consistently with that text, the Court has acknowledged many times that it may be appropriate for the Court to “decline to answer” a request for an advisory opinion,21 and that the Court “possesses a large amount of discretion in the matter”.22
28. The Court has not comprehensively defined the factors that govern the exercise of this discretion, beyond stating that it will only decline to give an advisory opinion where there are “compelling reasons” to do so.23 That formulation does not assist in identifying the factors that – alone or in combination – will constitute “compelling reasons”. As Judge Bennouna said in the Kosovo case, the Court has applied the “compelling reasons”
20 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 88-89, para. 35-36.
21 See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 21, para. 23; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p.416, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 156, para. 44. Given the settled existence of the discretion, the statement in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 235, para. 14 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 156, para. 44 that the Court “should not, in principle, refuse to give an advisory opinion” clearly must be understood as meaning that the Court should not decline to give such an opinion unless there is a proper basis on which to do so.
22 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 72.
23 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints made against the UNESCO, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 27, para. 41; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 156, para. 44; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 416, para. 30.
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formulation “without making clear what it means”.24 In the same case, Judge Keith remarked that “[t]he exercise of the discretion… should not… be unduly hampered by a label such as ‘compelling reasons’.”25
29. In the Namibia case, Judge Fitzmaurice said that the Court has an admitted right to “refuse entirely to comply with a request for an advisory opinion if it thinks that, for sufficient reasons, it would be improper or inadvisable for it to do so”.26 While usefully recognising the width of the discretion, that formulation again provides little guidance as to the factors that inform the discretion.
30. The clearest guidance appears in the Wall case, where the Court, having referred to the “compelling reasons” formulation, nevertheless recognised that it has a “duty to satisfy itself, each time it is seised of a request for an opinion, as to the propriety of the exercise of its judicial function”.27 As Judge Owada explained in the same case:
“… the issue of jurisdiction and especially the issue of judicial propriety is a matter that the Court should examine, proprio motu if necessary, in order to ensure that it is not only right as a matter of law but also proper as a matter of judicial policy for the Court as a judicial body to exercise jurisdiction in the concrete context of the case.”28
31. Why might “judicial propriety” require the Court to decline to give an advisory opinion, whether as a matter of law or judicial policy? Without being comprehensive, Australia submits that judicial propriety would require such a course if:
a. to answer the request would be inconsistent with the fundamental requirement of State consent underpinning the judicial settlement of disputes under international law, that being the foundation upon which the Court’s authority is based;
b. the request for an advisory opinion is made by an organ of the United Nations in circumstances where that opinion, if given, will not assist it in the performance of its functions; or
c. the Court cannot be confident that it has access to sufficient factual information to allow the issue to be properly examined, as to attempt an answer in those
24 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 501, para. 5.
25 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge Keith, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 483, para. 5.
26 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 303, para. 12.
27 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 157, para. 45 (emphasis added). See also Accordance With International Law Of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence In Respect Of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p.416, para. 29, where the Court stated that the discretion exists in order to “protect the integrity of the Court’s judicial function and its nature as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 332, para. 1 (referring to reasons of “judicial propriety and economy”).
28 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 260-1, para. 2.
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circumstances may be unfair to the parties and would be incompatible with the Court’s judicial character.
Those considerations are examined in turn below.
(a) Absence of Consent
The fundamental requirement of consent
32. The key principle underpinning international dispute resolution is that a State cannot be compelled to any form of dispute resolution – including before this Court – without its consent (fundamental requirement of consent).29
33. In Status of the Eastern Carelia, the PCIJ relied on the fundamental requirement of consent in refusing to exercise its discretion to render an advisory opinion over what was a bilateral dispute.30 It did so notwithstanding that the advisory jurisdiction of the PCIJ under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations expressly extended not just to “legal questions”, but also to “disputes”.31 Eastern Carelia has subsequently been distinguished on the basis of Russia’s non-membership of the League of Nations at the time.32 However, while Russia’s non-membership of the League explains why Russian consent was absent, it was the absence of consent per se which underpinned the Court’s decision to decline an advisory opinion, rather than the reason for that lack of consent.33 Eastern Carelia should therefore be understood as establishing that the Court should decline to exercise its advisory jurisdiction if that would be inconsistent with the fundamental requirement of consent. As the PCIJ observed:
"It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration or to any other kind of pacific settlement… The submission, therefore, of a dispute between [Russia] and a Member of the League for solution according to the methods provided for in the Covenant, could take place only by virtue of [its] consent. Such consent, however, has never been given
29 Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, p. 27; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, para. 25, 32-33, referring to Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion, First Phase, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 65, para. 71. See also Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2010), p. 396; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2012), p. 718; Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed, 2014), p.733.
30 Importantly, the PCIJ affirmed the “well-established” principle that "no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement": see Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, p. 27.
31 See Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013), Vol II, p. 1978 (Oellers-Frahm).
32 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 23, para. 31; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 23-24, para. 30; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 235-6, para. 14.
33 Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, p. 27-28. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 262-3, para. 6-7.
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by Russia… The Court therefore finds it impossible to give its opinion on a dispute of this kind.” 34
34. The PCIJ went on to say:
“The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of the controversy between Finland and Russia, and can only be decided by investigation into the facts underlying the case. Answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties. The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court.” 35
35. The Court strongly affirmed the relevance of the fundamental requirement of consent to its discretion whether to render an advisory opinion in Western Sahara. It stated:
"[l]ack of consent might constitute a ground for declining to give the opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case, considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an opinion… In certain circumstances, therefore, the lack of consent of an interested State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial character. An instance of this would be when the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent. If such a situation should arise, the powers of the Court under the discretion given to it by Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, would afford sufficient legal means to ensure respect for the fundamental principle of consent to jurisdiction." 36
36. That statement unequivocally recognises that, if the provision of an advisory opinion “would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent”, the Court must decline to provide the opinion. To do otherwise would be incompatible with the Court’s judicial character.
37. This principle has been cited in subsequent decisions of the Court.37 It remains critical today, particularly in the face of increasingly familiar attempts by claimant States to recharacterise disputes in a way that avoids limits on jurisdiction that respondent States have put in place. The fundamental requirement of consent has particular force when it comes to territorial disputes. As Spain put to the Court in Western Sahara, “the consent of a State to adjudication of a dispute concerning the attribution of territorial sovereignty is always necessary”.38 The Court implicitly accepted this, but noted that “[t]he questions in the request do not however relate to a territorial dispute, in the proper sense of the term,
34 Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, p. 27-28.
35 Ibid p. 28-29 (emphasis added).
36 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 32-33 (emphasis added).
37 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 191, para. 37; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 158, para. 47.
38 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 27-28, para. 43.
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between the interested States” and found that “the request for an opinion does not call for adjudication upon existing territorial rights or sovereignty over territory”.39
38. That is apposite here, because Question (b) cannot be answered without the Court adjudicating upon a territorial dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius as to which State has territorial sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.
39. Finally, some aspects of the dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius have been determined by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos Arbitration. It appears that the arguments that Mauritius will advance in seeking particular answers to the referred questions will be inconsistent with binding determinations already made in the Arbitration.40 That raises particularly acute questions of judicial propriety, as this Court is being asked to utilise its advisory jurisdiction not just contrary to the fundamental requirement of consent, but also in a way that would circumvent a determination binding on the United Kingdom and Mauritius that has already been made.
Circumventing the contentious jurisdiction of the Court
40. A closely related point is that, as a matter of both law and judicial policy, the Court should not allow its advisory jurisdiction to be used to circumvent the optional nature of its contentious jurisdiction.
41. The respective declarations of the United Kingdom and Mauritius made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the ICJ Statute do not accord the Court jurisdiction over legal disputes which may arise between those two States. The declaration of acceptance of the United Kingdom under Article 36, paragraph 2, deposited on 22 February 2017 and updating and replacing earlier declarations, accepts the jurisdiction of the Court “over all disputes arising after 1 January 1987” but excludes from that acceptance “any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.41 Similarly, the declaration of Mauritius under Article 36, paragraph 2, deposited on 23 September 1968, excludes from its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court “[d]isputes with the Government of any other country which is a Member of the
39 Ibid.
40 By way of example, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos Arbitration considered the legal effect of the 1965 Agreement between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago in exchange for compensation and a series of detailed undertakings. It found that “upon Mauritian Independence, the 1965 Agreement became a matter of international law between the Parties” and that any concerns about defects in Mauritius’ consent in this respect were resolved (Chagos Arbitration (Award) (18 March 2015), para .428. See also paras. 424-7). The statement made by the Mauritian Representative (Mr Jugnauth) immediately prior to the adoption of UNGA Resolution 71/92 on 22 June 2017 is indicative of the intention of Mauritius to revisit the binding determination of the Arbitral Tribunal that the 1965 Agreement forms part of international law in the current proceedings. In so doing Mr Jugnauth suggested grounds of invalidity including duress, lack of legal competence and breaches of peremptory norms of international law (A/71/PV.88, p. 6-9) (UN Dossier No. 6).
41 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute, deposited 22 February 2017.
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British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree.”42
42. By virtue of these declarations, the ongoing dispute between two Commonwealth members, the United Kingdom and Mauritius, concerning sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago is not subject to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The absence of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction cannot be overcome through the General Assembly seeking an advisory opinion. As Judge de Castro said in Western Sahara:
“[It] seems evident that there is a compelling reason for refusal when the request for an advisory opinion implies that the advisory function of the Court is being used to get round the difficulty represented by the optional nature of the contentious jurisdiction.”43
43. While closely connected to the absence of consent principle addressed above, the fact that the giving of an advisory opinion in these proceedings would result in circumventing the optional nature of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction is an additional reason why the Court should not give an advisory opinion. That reason is particularly powerful where the disputing States have expressly excluded a particular category of disputes from their general acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. In such a case, the issue goes beyond the absence of consent to jurisdiction (which is itself fundamental), for to give the advisory opinion sought would negate the express refusal of both parties to the Court determining disputes between them.
44. Furthermore, the giving of an advisory opinion in the current proceedings will only serve to encourage the reference of other bilateral disputes to the Court through the medium of a request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly. For reasons of judicial economy, and to protect its judicial function, the Court should not give such encouragement. As Judge Bennouna said in the Kosovo case, by declining a request for its advisory opinion, the Court could have put a stop to any further “requests which political organs might be tempted to submit to it in future, and indeed thereby protected the integrity of its judicial function.”44
Other authorities
45. Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of consent, there are cases where the Court has rendered an advisory opinion despite the existence of a related legal controversy between States. However, for the reasons addressed below, those cases do not deny the importance of the fundamental requirement of consent to the proper exercise of the discretion whether to give an advisory opinion. On the contrary, they affirm that fundamental requirement, but then turn upon particular features – being features that are not present in this case – that explain why an advisory opinion could properly be given without infringing upon that fundamental requirement.
42 Mauritius, Declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute, deposited 23 September 1968.
43 Western Sahara, Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 143.
44 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 500, para. 3.
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46. The cases discussed below are therefore consistent with Australia’s submission that judicial propriety requires the Court to decline to exercise its advisory jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case, because to do otherwise would be inconsistent with the consensual foundations of the Court’s authority, and would require it to depart from the fundamental requirement of consent governing judicial involvement in the settlement of disputes under international law.
47. In several cases, the Court has decided it was proper to give an advisory opinion despite an underlying bilateral dispute because the “legal position of the parties to [the] disputes cannot be in any way compromised by the answers that the Court may give to the Questions put to it.”45 The Court has indicated that may be so for several different reasons:
a. The opinion concerned the procedure for settling the dispute, and not its merits
In the Peace Treaties case, the advisory opinion that the Court was asked to give related to the appointment of representatives to the Treaty Commissions responsible for the settlement of disputes arising under the respective Treaties of Peace between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and the Allied States. The Court considered that to give an opinion on that question related only to the procedure for the settlement of the disputes. It “in no way touches the merits of those disputes” which may later come before the Treaty Commissions.46 In substance, therefore, the advisory opinion was sought on a specific matter that was incidentally related to, but not in fact the subject of, an existing dispute.
b. The opinion concerned the applicability of the Convention generally, rather than its application to any particular dispute
In the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations case, the Court noted that “the nature and purpose of the present proceedings are… that of a request for advice on the applicability of a part of the General Convention, and not the bringing of a dispute before the Court for determination.”47 In giving its opinion, the Court was concerned with an abstract legal question, and it steered well clear of the actual dispute “between the United Nations and Romania with respect to the application of the General Convention”.48
c. The opinion did not concern the present-day rights of the non-consenting party
In Western Sahara, the Court observed that the issue before it concerned the rights of Morocco over the Western Sahara at the time of its colonisation. It did not
45 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 72.
46 Ibid (emphasis added).
47 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 190, para. 35 (emphasis added).
48 Ibid, p. 191, para.38.
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concern the rights of the administering power (Spain) at the time of the hearing.49 For that reason, the Court concluded that “[t]he settlement of this issue will not affect the rights of Spain today as the administering Power”.50 Therefore, the fact that Spain had not consented to the resolution of such a dispute was no impediment to the provision of an advisory opinion, because that opinion had no ramifications for Spain’s rights.
d. The underlying legal issue had already been determined
In the Namibia case, the Security Council, by resolution, had already declared the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal, and had called upon States to act accordingly. In those circumstances, the advisory opinion was sought to guide the Security Council’s future actions in respect of Namibia (see paragraph 52 below). It did not “[relate] to a legal dispute actually pending between two or more States”,51 as that dispute had already been resolved by the Security Council.
e. The request was located in a broader frame of reference than any individual bilateral dispute
In the Wall case, the Court noted that the question on which its opinion had been requested was “one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute”.52 It was for that reason that the Court concluded that to give the opinion would not “have the effect of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement”, and therefore that it could not on that basis exercise its discretion to decline to give an opinion.53 As is apparent, that conclusion acknowledges the significance of consent in the exercise of the Court’s discretion whether to provide an advisory opinion.
48. Unlike the cases summarised above, the advisory opinion that is sought in this case would compromise the legal positions of the United Kingdom and Mauritius in their dispute concerning sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. In particular, in responding to Question (b), the Court will have to confront directly the substantive legal issue in dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius (cf Peace Treaties; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations), that being a dispute that concerns the present day rights of the parties54 (cf Western Sahara), that has not already been decided (cf Namibia), and that specifically relates only to the existing bilateral dispute (cf Wall).
49 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 27, para. 42.
50 Ibid.
51 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 24, para. 32 (emphasis added).
52 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 159, para. 50.
53 Ibid.
54 Question (b) refers to the “continued administration by the United Kingdom... of the Chagos Archipelago” (emphasis added).
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49. The circumstances identified in each of the authorities cited in paragraph 47 do not apply in the present case. There is therefore no reason to qualify or depart from the long-standing authorities that establish that judicial propriety requires the Court to decline to give the advisory opinion that has been sought, in order to respect the fundamental requirement of State consent that underpins the judicial settlement of disputes under international law.
(b) The General Assembly lacks a sufficient interest in the subject of the opinion
50. In the overwhelming number of cases in which requests have been made by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion, its interest has been manifest and did not need to be expressly stated in the request. That is why the Court was able to state, in the Wall opinion, that:
“As is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of furnishing to the requested organ the elements of law necessary for them in their action.” 55
51. It is the fact that an advisory opinion is sought in order “to guide the United Nations in respect of its own action”56 that has underpinned the Court’s statements that “compelling reasons” are needed before it will refuse to provide an advisory opinion, for the exercise of the advisory jurisdiction represents the Court’s participation in the activities of the organisation.57
52. The premium that the Court places on the performance of this role has caused the Court to exercise its discretion to provide such an opinion even if the subject matter has some relationship to an existing dispute.58 However, that has occurred only in cases where the opinion is sought, not to obtain an adjudication of the dispute, but to guide the United Nations in the performance of its own functions. For example:
a. In the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, the Court dismissed an objection to its competence to give an advisory opinion on the basis that “[t]he object of this request for an Opinion is to guide the United Nations in respect of its own action”.59
b. In the Western Sahara case, the Court held that “[t]here is in this case a legal controversy, but one which arose during the proceedings of the General Assembly
55 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 162-163, para. 60 (emphasis added).
56 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.
57 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71.
58 This is a factor additional to those outlined in paragraph 47 where the Court will provide an opinion notwithstanding the existence of a bilateral dispute.
59 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 19.
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and in relation to matters with which it was dealing. It did not arise independently in bilateral relations.”60
c. In the Namibia case, the Court again cited this reason, emphasising the express wording of the preamble to the Security Council resolution requesting the opinion, which stated “that an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would be useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Namibia and in furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking”.61
d. Finally, in the Wall case, the Court stated that “[t]he object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions. The opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute.”62 That “acute concern” manifested itself through “the adoption of many Security Council and General Assembly resolutions” on the subject matter.63
53. Unlike the cases summarised above, the advisory opinion sought in this case would not assist the United Nations in respect of its own actions (that usually being the basis upon which the Court finds that a request for an opinion is “not devoid of object or purpose”64). Thus, the interest of the General Assembly is not manifest. Also, there is no suggestion in the wording of Resolution 71/292 that the opinion of the Court is required to guide the General Assembly in discharging its responsibilities in relation to decolonisation, or in matters relating to the Chagos Archipelago (cf Namibia).65 While the questions referred to the Court have been framed through a lens of decolonisation, as Judge Higgins observed in the Wall case, “[t]he request is not in order to secure advice on the Assembly's decolonization duties, but later, on the basis of our Opinion, to exercise powers over the dispute or controversy.”66
60 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 34; See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 158, para. 47.
61 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.24, para.32 (emphasis added).
62 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 159, para. 50.
63 Ibid, p.159, para. 49.
64 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 20, para. 20 and p. 37, para. 73.
65 The letter dated 14 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations requesting an item on the Agenda of the General Assembly concerning a request for an advisory opinion relating to the Chagos Archipelago (UN Doc. A/71/142) (UN Dossier No. 1) suggested that the General Assembly would benefit from an advisory opinion from the Court in carrying out the functions attributed to it by Mauritius. However, that benefit asserted by Mauritius is not reflected in the wording of Resolution 71/292 (UN Dossier No. 7).
66 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 210, para. 12. The Court in Western Sahara referred to the same
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54. Here, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly have been actively considering matters relating to the Chagos Archipelago (whether in the context of decolonisation or otherwise) (cf Namibia; Wall). On the contrary, notwithstanding the fact that the bilateral dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius concerning sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago began in the early 1980s, it has never been considered actively in the General Assembly through any form of resolution.67 In those circumstances, the General Assembly does not have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the request to warrant an exercise of the Court’s discretion to answer the request (particularly where it would cut across a pre-existing bilateral dispute and infringe the fundamental principle of consent). As Judge Keith put it in the Kosovo opinion:
“In the absence of such an interest, the purpose of furnishing to the requesting organ the elements of law necessary for it in its action is not present. Consequently, the reason for the Court to co-operate does not exist and what is sometimes referred to as its duty to answer disappears.” 68
(c) Procedural and evidential effects
55. A final reason why “judicial propriety” requires the Court to exercise its discretion to decline to give an advisory opinion is that, where the requested opinion in substance relates to a dispute between States, the procedural and evidentiary aspects of advisory proceedings are ill-adapted to the determination of the question, and the Court may lack sufficient information to allow the issue to be properly examined.
56. The Court has long recognised that the question of whether it has sufficient evidence available to give an advisory opinion must be decided in each particular instance, the question being:69
“whether the Court has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its judicial character”.
57. If the Court lacks sufficient information, it should decline to provide an advisory opinion.70 In the Wall case, for example, Judge Buergenthal and Judge Owada expressed concerns about the inadequacy of the factual foundation relied on by the Court to support
circumstances but said that they did not apply in that case. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 26-7, para. 39.
67 Rather, it has only been raised by Mauritius in the annual general debate.
68 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge Keith, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 489, para. 16.
69 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 28-29, para. 46, quoted with approval in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 161, para. 56.
70 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 161, para. 56, suggesting that Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, p. 28 is an example of this occurring (which is true, although this was a secondary reason for the Court’s conclusion, as it was introduced as another “other cogent reason” for declining to answer).
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its conclusions, which may have resulted in unfairness to the parties to the underlying bilateral dispute.71
58. Even if there is sufficient evidence to enable an opinion to be provided, judicial propriety may nevertheless require the Court to decline to exercise its advisory jurisdiction if to exercise that jurisdiction would be unfair to a particular State, or if to proceed would be “incompatible with the Court’s judicial character”.72 In particular:
a. In contentious proceedings, each party is afforded the opportunity in the oral phase of the proceedings to put forward detailed arguments in support of their case, as well as to respond to the arguments made by the other party. This provides an important means of identifying matters fundamental to resolving the dispute and of narrowing the issues between the parties, which is unlikely to be available in advisory proceedings. In part for that reason, judicial propriety would require the Court, in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, to refrain from departing from findings made by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos Arbitration, being contentious proceedings that are binding on the United Kingdom and Mauritius.
b. In advisory proceedings, if the Court does not have sufficient information to resolve a particular issue of fact, it cannot fall back on considerations of burden of proof that are available in contentious proceedings.73 That is a real risk in this matter, in circumstances where the dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius includes a dispute as to bilateral dealings between the United Kingdom and the Mauritian Council of Ministers in the mid-1960s and thereafter.
(d) Summary on Court’s discretion
59. In summary:
The bilateral legal dispute that arose between the United Kingdom and Mauritius in the early 1980s concerning territorial sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and associated matters lies at the heart of the questions posed by the General Assembly. The United Kingdom and Mauritius have not consented to this Court resolving that dispute. In those circumstances, to render the advisory opinion requested in the current proceedings would be contrary to the fundamental principle recognised in the Western Sahara case (and earlier by the PCIJ in the Status of the Eastern Carelia) that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent, and thus would be inconsistent with the judicial character of the Court. Indeed, if that principle is not applied to preclude the giving of an advisory
71 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 240-246; Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 267-231, para. 20-30.
72 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 33.
73 Greenwood, ‘Judicial Integrity and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’ in Gaja and Stoutenburg (eds), Enhancing the Rule of Law Through the International Court of Justice (Brill Nijhoff, 2014), p. 68-69.
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opinion in the present case, it is difficult to comprehend the circumstances in which it would be so applied.
The General Assembly lacks a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the opinion sought as it will not assist in the performance of any of its functions.
The matters that have previously been identified by the Court as weighing in favour of the exercise of discretion to provide an advisory opinion, notwithstanding some overlap between the subject matter of that opinion and a pre-existing dispute between States who have not consented to the adjudication of their dispute by the Court, are not present.
CONCLUSIONS
For the reasons outlined in this Statement, Australia respectfully requests the Court to decline to give the advisory opinion sought by the General Assembly in its Resolution 71/292 adopted on 22 June 2017.
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CERTIFICATION
I certify that the annexes attached to this Statement are true copies of the documents reproduced therein.
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LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex 1 British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965 (S.I. 1965 No.1920), amended by the British Indian Ocean Territory (Amendment) Order 1968 (S.I. 1968 No. 111).
Annex 2 Government of the Republic of Mauritius, Aide Memoire dated May 2017 in relation to Item 87 of the Agenda of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly.
Annex 3 Government of the Republic of Mauritius, Prime Minister Meets Chagos Refugees Group Leader on Advisory Opinion Request (31 October 2017).
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Annex 1
22
23
24
25
Annex 2
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27
28
29
30
31
32
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Annex 3 http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Prime-Minister-meets-Chagos-Ref… Home > News > Prime Minister meets Chagos Refugees Group Leader on advisory opinion request procedure News Prime Minister meets Chagos Refugees Group Leader on advisory opinion request procedure Date: October 31, 2017 Domain:Judiciary; International Relations; Foreign Affairs Persona: Business; Citizen; Government; Non-Citizen GIS – 31 October, 2017: The Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs, External Communications and National Development Unit, and Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Mr. Pravind Kumar Jugnauth, had a working session yesterday with the Chairman and Leader of the Chagos Refugees Group, Mr Louis Olivier Bancoult, at the New Treasury Building in Port Louis. The meeting focused on joint efforts being undertaken at the International Court of Justice for Mauritius to effectively exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and for the right of Mauritian citizens, including those of Chagossian origin, to return to and resettle in the Chagos Archipelago. In a statement following the meeting, Mr Bancoult said the meeting was very positive and cordial. Recalling the historic adoption on 22 June 2017 by the United Nations General Assembly of the resolution seeking International Court’s advisory opinion on pre-independence separation of Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, Mr Bancoult pointed out that the working session reviewed the status regarding the presentations of written statements and comments to the International Court of Justice. The time-limit within which statements on the question may be presented to the Court has been set for 30 January 2018. According to Mr Bancoult, members of the Chagossian community are finalising their arguments on the violations of rights and sufferings endured in their deportation, and their statements will be ready by next week. He added that all submissions will be made in consultation with the Government. The Leader of the Chagos Refugees Group stated that the coordinated efforts of everyone, both the Government and the Chagossian community, are required for a positive outcome. Government Information Service, Prime Minister’s Office, Level 6, New Government Centre, Port Louis, Mauritius. Email: [email protected] Website:http://gis.gov.mu
Written Statement of Australia