INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTH1::E
REQUEST BYTHE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION ON THE QUESTION OF THE
"LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCOTFA~WANL IN
. THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY"
WRITTEN STATEMENT pF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
3JANUARY2004 Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION.. .........................................1..........
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................... 4
A. The Referral Resolution...............................4........
B. The Roadtnap.........................................6..............
C. The Negotiating Process .............................8.........
III. CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TD THE
JUDICIAL PROPRIETY OF GIVING AN
ADVISORY OPINION ............................................. 16
A Key Considerations in the Court's
Assessment of the Propriety of Giving an
Advisory Opinion ................................................. 18
B. Observations with Respect to the Iudicial
Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion in
this Proceeding......................................................
IV. CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE
NEGOTIATING PROCESS MORE
GENERALLY ........................................................... 23
A. The Permanent Status Issues AIe to be
Negotiated by the Parties ...................................... 23
B. The Parties Must Carry Out Their Security
Responsibilities for the Peace Process to
Succeed ................................................................. 25
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 31 CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
1.1 In its Order dated 19 December 2003, tllls Court invited
States to submit written statements on the question ofthe Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory. The United States submits this Statement
to apprise the Court of the Middle East peace process for which
the United States shares responsibility and ta identify concerns
ithas regarding the Court's consideration of the General
Assembly's request for an advisory opinion.
1.2 The United States is a co-sponsor, along with the
Russian Federation, of the Middle East peace process initiated
at the 1991 Madrid Conference. Since 2002, the United States,
together with the Russian Federation, the European Union and
the United Nations Secretary-General, basworked as a member
of the Quartet ta promote a peaceful, negotiated resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian confliet within the framework ofthe
Madrid Conference princip les. The goal of this process is a
comprehensive peace that will include not only Israel and a new
Palestinian State, but also Lebanon and Syria.
1.3 Both the United Nations General Assembly and the
United Nations Security Council have endorsed the Quartet's
"Performance-based Raad Map ta a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict" (the "Roadnuip")l.
The General Assembly and Security Council have also called
upon the Israelis and Palestinians ta fulfill their responsibilities
under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet ta achieve
the vision oftwo States living side by side in peace and
security. Thus, the United States, as a co-sponsor of the Madrid
1A Performam:e-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
lsrael-Palestinian Conflict,03/529, annex, Annex 1. 2
peace process and as a member of the Quartet, has an important
role in assisting the efforts toacrueve peace between Israelis
and Palestinians under relevant United Nations resolutions and
previous agreements between the parties.
lA In light ofthis role the United States submits this
Statement. As made c1earin its statement in opposition tothe
adoption of the referral resolution in the General Assembly, the
United States believes that the giving of an advisory opinion in
this matter risks undennining the peace process and politicizing
the Court. The United States also feels a special responsibility
to bring to the Court's attention the essential elements of the
Madrid peace process, particularly as itpertains to resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This Statement therefore initially
describes the Roadmap and the negotiating process it embodies
(Chapter II: Background). In this context it is possible to
evaluate the General Assembly's request and its relationship to
the negotiations designed to bring peace to the area.
1.5 The Statement next identifies sorne of the key factors
relevant to the Court's decision whether to provide an advisory
opinion (Chapter III: Considerations Relating to the Judicial
Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion). Because of the
manner in wruch this proceeding has arisen, including the
fonnulation of the question, itis not clear what issues might be
engaged in this case. The United States therefore wishes to
emphasize that, in deciding whether to address the different
issues that may be presented in written and oral submissions,
the Court should give due regard to the principle that advisory
opinion jurisdiction is not intended as a means of cÎrcurnventing
the rights of States to detennine whether to submit theÎr
disputes to judicial settlement. As the Court has itself
recognized, trus principle is important to preserve the
independence and sovereign rights of States and to maintain the
appropriate judicial character ofthe Court in an advisory
opinion context. The United States believes this principle has 3
special importance where there is an established frarnework for
addressing disputed issues through a negotiating process.
1.6 Finally, tbis Statement highlights two key aspects of the
Middle East peace process that the United States does not
believe the General Assembly's resolution invites the Court to
disturb (Chapter N: Considerations Relating ta the Negotiating
Process More Generally). First, it is a fundarnental principle of
fuis process that the permanent status issues at the core of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are, by agreement and under the
applicable international framework, ta be resolved through
negotiations by the parties to the dispute. It would be
inconsistent with the resolutions of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, and create a serious risk to the peace
process, if any party unilaterally, or this Court, were ta seek ta
determine the outcome ofany of the permanent status issues.
1.7 Second, Israelis and Palestinians must fulfill their
security responsibilities, separately and in coordination and
cooperation with one another. These responsibilities are spelled
out in their prior agreements. AU parties and international
organizations must continue to emphasize the responsibility of
bath Israelis and Palestinians to fulfill their security
undertakings in arder for the peace process ta succeed. CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
A. Tbe Referral Resolution
2.1 By resolution ES-l 0/14 of 8 December 2003, the United
Nations General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from
this Court on the following question:
What are the legal consequences arising from
the construction of the wall being built by Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around
East Jerusalem, as describ ed in the report0 f the
Secretary-General, considering the mIes and
principIes ofintemationallaw, încluding the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and
relevant Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions ?
In the same resolution ("the referral resolution"), the United
Nations General Assembly
AffirmfedJ the necessity of ending the [Israeli
Palestinian] confliet on the basis of the two
State solution of Israel and Palestine living side
by side in peace and security based on the
Armistice Line of 1949, in accordance with
relevant Sec3rity Council and General Assembly
resolutions .
2AfRESfES-10/14(2003).
JId. 5
In this connection, the referral resolution reaffirmed General
Assembly resolution ES·IO/13 of21 October 2003, which
CaUsupon both parties ta fulfil their obligations
under relevant provisions of the road map, the
Palestinian Authority to undertake visible efforts
on the ground to arrest, disrupt and restrain
individuals and groups conducting and planning
violent attacks, and the Government of Israel ta
take no actions undermining trust, inc1uding
deportations and attacks on civilians and
extrajudicial killings4.
2.2 The referral resolution also recalled United Nations
Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003,
in which the Security Council
1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based
Roadmap to a Pennanent Two-State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (SI2003/529);
[and)
2. CaUson the parties to fulfil their obligations
under the Roadmap in cooperation with the
Quartet and to achieve the vision oftwo States
living side by side in peace and seeurity.
2.3 Thus, the framework endorsed and relied upon by both
the General Assembly and the Seeurity Council for resolving
the Israeli·Palestinian confliet is the Roadmap, under the
auspices of the Quartet. Most importantly for this proceeding,
the General Assembly's decision ta request an advisory opinion
from the Court must be understood within the context of its own
4 NRESIES-IO/13 (2003), para. 2 (citing the Roadmap, 8/2003/529, annex).
sSIRES/ISIS (2003). 6
affirmation of the essential elements of the peace process,
inc1uding the centralityof the negotiating process within the
framework of the Roadmap.
B.The Roadmap
2.4 The Quartet's Roadmap is a phased diplomatie
framework for achieving a final and comprehensive settlement
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. !ts fulfillment will result in
the emergenee of an independent, democratic and viable
Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security with
Israel and its other neighbars. As stated in the Roadmap
The settlement will resolve the Israel
Palestinian confliet, and end the occupation that
began in 1967, based on the foundations of the
Madrid Conference, the principle of land for
peace, UNSCRs 242,338 and 1397, agreements
previously reached by the parties, and the
initiativeof Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah -
endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit -
calling for acceptance ofIsrael as a neighbor
living in peace and security, in the contextof a
comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a
vital element of international efforts to promate
a comprehensive peace on aIl tracks, includin~
the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks .
2.5 Israeli andPalestinian authorities have both accepted
and commirted themselves ta the Roadmap. As the Prime
Minister ofthe Palestinian Autharity stated on 4 June 2003:
A new opportunity for peace exists, an
opportunity based upon President Bush's vision
6 Roadmap at 2, S/2003/529, annex, Annex 1. 7
and the Quartet's road map, which we have
accepted without any reservations. Our goal is
two states, Israel and Palestine, living side~by-
side, in peace and security. The process Îs the
one of direct negotiations to end the Israeli.
Palestinian conflict, and to resolve aHthe
permanent status issues, and end the occupation
that began in 1967, under which Palestinians
have suffered 50 much. At the same time, we do
not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout
history. It is time to bring an this suffering to an
end. Just as Israel must meet its responsibilities,
we, the Palestinians, will fuIfIl our obligations
for this endeavor to succeed. We are ready to do
our part 7•
The Prime Minister of Israel echoed similar sentiments on the
same day:
Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for
President Bush's vision expressed on June 24,
2002, oftwo states, Israel and a Palestinian
state, living side-by-side in peace and security.
The govenunent and people of Israel welcome
the opportunity to renew direct negotiations
according ta the steps of the road map as
adopted by the Israeli govemment to achieve
this vision. It is in Israel's interest not to govem '
the Palestinians, but for the Palestinians to
govem themselves in their own state. A
democratic Palestinian state, fully at peace with
7 Rema!lcsofPresidentBush.HisMajestyKingAbdullahofJordan.Prime
Minister Sharon ofIsrael, and Prime Minister Abbas of the Palestinian
Authority, 4 June 2003avoUableat http://www.whîtehouse.gov/newsl
releases/2003/06/20030604-1.html, Annex 2. 8
Israel, will promote the long-tenn security and
well-being ofIsrael as a Jewish states.
2.6 As stated by Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the essence
of the Roadmap is a negotiating process between Israelis and
Palestinians on the basis of agreements between the parties and
principles set out in previous United Nations Security Council
reso1utians.
C. The Negotiating Process
2.7 For the Roadmap ta succeed, Israelis and Palestinians
must conduct good faith negotiations to resolve the pennanent
status issues that lie at the heart of their fifty-year conflict. This
negotiating process derives from resolutions ofthe United
Nations Security Council and prior agreements of the parties.
2.8 In resolution 242 (1967) of22 November 1967, the
Security Council. inter alia,
Affirm[edJ that the fulfilment of [United
Nations] Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East which should indude the
application ofboth the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal ofIsraeli armed forces
from territories occupied in the recent
eonfliet; [and]
(ii) Tennination of ail daims or states of
belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political
'Id------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---
9
independence of every State in the area
and their right to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries free
from threats or acts of force 9.
2.9 In resolution 338 (1973) of22 October 1973, the
Security Council
2. Callf edJ upon the parties concemed to start
immediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council resolution
242 (1967) in aIl ofits parts; [and]
3. Decidefd} that, immediately and
concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations
shaH start between the parties concemed under
appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just
1o
and durable peace in the Middle East .
2.10 Egypt and Israel successfully concluded a peace
agreement on 26 March 1979, on the basis of this negotiating
frarnework. As stated in the Prearnble, they did 50
Convinced of the urgent necessity of the
establishment of ajust, comprehensive and
lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance
with Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 11.
2.11 Limited progress was made to broaden this success to
include other parties until the United States and the Soviet
Union convened a Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in
9 S/RES/242 (1967), para. 1.
10S/RES/338 (1973).
IlTreaty ofPeace, 26 Mar. 1979, Egypt-lsrael, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115. 10
1991. Here, for the first time, Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians,
Lebanese, Syrians and others from the region joined with the
common objective of a comprehensive peace. In their
invitation, the United States and the Soviet Union as co
sponsors stated that they were
prepared to assist the parties to achieve ajust,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement,
through direct negotiations along two tracks,
between Israel and the Arab states, and between
Israel and the Palestinians, based on United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and
12
338 .
2.12 Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. the invitation
proposed a phased negotiating process, beginning with talks on
interim self-government arrangements and culminating with
negotiations on permanent status. As stated in the invitation
These pennanent status negotiations, and the
negotiations between Israel and the Arab states,
will take Flace on the basis of resolutions 242
and 338 1 •
2.13 On 13 September 1993, Israel and the PLO concluded a
Declaration ofPrinciples on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (the "DOP") 14witnessed by the United States
and the Russian Federation. The DOP set out a framework for
lsraeli-Palestinian negotiations envisioned at the Madrid
conference, starting with the creation of a "Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority". That step was then to be followed
IlInvitation, 18 Del 1991, Annex 3.
1)Id.
14Declaration ofPrinciples on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Al48/486, S/26560 (1993), annex. Il
by the negotiated solution to pennanent status that "willlead to
the implementation ofSecurity Council resolutions 242 (1967)
and 338 (1973),,15. Regarding pennanent status, the DOP stated
that
It is understood that these negotiations shaIl
cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem,
refugees, settlements, security arrangements,
borders, relations and cooperation with other
neighb 0J6s, and other issues of common
interest •
2.14 Israel and the PLO subsequently concluded a large
number of specifie agreements relating to the creation and
acquisition of responsibilities by the Palestinian interim
authority (the "Palestinian Authority" or "PA"), which was [Ifst
established in Gaza in 1994. Their mûst significant agreement
was the "Israeli-Palestinian Inte.rirnAgreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip" (the "Interim Agreement,,)17, signed
in Washington, D.C. on 28 September 1995, where it was
witnessed by the co-sponsors and the EuropeanUnion, as weIl
as Egypt, Jordan and Norway. Like the DOP, the Interim
Agreement specified that the negotiations on pennanent status
willlead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions
242 and 338. And, like the DOP, the Interim Agreement stated
that
It is understood that these negotiations shaH
cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem,
refugees, settlements, security arrangements,
borders, relations and cooperation with other
IId., art. I.
1Id., art. V.
17Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, N51f889, S/1997/357,annex. 12
neighbors, and other issues of conunon
interestl8.
In parallel, the Interim Agreement also provided that
Neither side shall initiate or take any step that
will change the status of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the
.. 19
permanent status negottatlOns .
2.15 This provision is reaffirmed in subsequent agreements
20
between the parties . It complements and reinforces the
parties' cornrnitment to resolve each of the permanent status
iSsues through negotiation.
2.16 The Interim Agreement also elaborated a detailed
arrangement for maintaining security in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip during the interim period. It provides for the
creation of a Palestinian police force, and stipulates how that
force in conjunction with Israeli security forces an~ other
measures was intended to ensure tranquility as civil and security
jurisdiction was transferred hy Israel to the newly created
Palestinian Authority. The arrangements for cooperation and
coordination in the West Bank are particularly complex, given
the mixed population ofIsraelis and Palestinians there and the
agreement of the parties that the issue of the Israeli settlements
was left to be resolved in the permanent status negotiations.
Unfortunately, many of the difficulties that have arisen m the
efforts to resolve the permanent status issues are a result of
18Id., art. XXXI(S).
19Id.art. XXXI(7)
20See Wye River Memorandum, 23 Oct. 1998, 371.L.M. 1251; Shann El
Sheikh Memorandum. 4 Sept. 1999,38 I.L.M. 1465. 13
continued violence in the area and, in recent years, the absence
of effective cooperation between the parties in suppressing it 21•
2.17 In 2002, the Quartet was fonned to assist the parties in
overcoming the deep distrust that had developed between them
and provide support for cooperative security efforts and a
resumption ofnegotiations. The United Nations Security
Council then adopted resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002.
That resolution
Affirm[ edJ a vision of a region where two
States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side
within secure and recognized borders, [and]
Welcom[edJ and encourag[edJ the diplomatie
efforts of special envoys from the United States
of America, the Russian Federation, the
European Union and the United Nations Special
Coordinator and others, to bring about a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the
Middle East 22.
2.18 In May of2003, the Quartet obtained the agreement of
the Palestinians and IsraeIis to work together under the auspices
of the Quartet on the basis of the Quartet's Roadmap. In
November of2003, the United Nations Security Council issued
resolution 1515, which endorses the Roadmap and calls on the
parties to fulfill their obligations under il. The Roadmap
21Article XXI ofthe Interim Agreement provides that "Any difference
relating to the application of this Agreement shan be referred to the
appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this
Agreement". Differences pertaining to the interim period that are not
resolved by that mechanism are to be settled through the Parties' Liaison
Committee. Failîng that, ArticleXI provides that the Parties may agree to
refer the dispute to a conciliation or arbitration mechanism.
12S/RES/1397 (2002). 14
incorporates by reference the previous Israeli-Palestinian
agreements and relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions. It provides a concrete structure for the parties to
reach a two-State solution through a negotiated resolution of the
permanent status issues.
2.19 As it states, the Roadmap is intended to lead "to a final,
permanent status resolution in 20023 including on borders,
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements.. . ln the third and final phase,
the
Parties [will] reach [a] final and comprehensive
permanent status agreement that ends the Israel
Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a
settlement negotiated between the parties based
on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the
occupation that began in 1967, and includes an
agreed, just, fair, and realistic solutionto the
refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the
status ofJerusalem that takes into account the
political and religious concerns ofboth sides,
and protects the religious interests of Jews,
Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills
the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign,
independent, democratic and viable Palestine,4 .
living side-by-side in peace and securitl •
2.20 Movement through the phases of the Roadmap is
entrusted to the consensus judgment of the Quartet, based upon
their assessment ofwhether conditions are appropriate to
proceed, taking into account performance ofboth parties.
Sustained and high-Ievel efforts continue by the United States,
along with the other members of the Quartet, to promote
23Roadmap at 7, SI2003/529, annex, Annex 1.
24Id.at 8. 15
progress by the parties through these phases 50 the goal of a
two-State solution can be achieved.
2.21 In addressing the General Assernbly's request in this
case, the Court should be guided by the overriding
consideration that the Quartet-Ied Roadrnap is the method for
bringing peace between Israelis and Palestinians that has been
endorsed by both the General Assernbly and the Security
Council. The Court therefore should avoid any actions that
would interfere with or be inconsistent with the Roadmap. CHAPTERIII
CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO
THE JUDICIAL PROPRIETY
OF GIVING AN ADVISORY OPINION
3.1 The United States voted against adoption of the referral
resolution. ln its statement in the General Assembly concerning
the resolution, the United States said in part:
The international community has long
recognized that resolution of the [Israeli
Palestinian] conflict must be through negotiated
settlement, as called for in Security Council
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was
spelled out clearly ta the parties in the terrns of
reference of the Madrid Peace Conference in
1991. Involving the International Court of
Justice in this conflict is inconsistent with that
approach and could actually delay a two-State
solution and negatively impact road map
iroplementation. Furthermore, referraI ofthis
issue to the International Court of Justice risks
politicizing the Court. It willnot advance the
Court's ability to contribute to global security,
25
nor will it advance the prospects ofpeace .
25AJES-l OIPV.23 (1993). at 19. A number of other delegations did not
support the resolution.e. e.g., id. at 15 (Italy on behalf of the European
Union, the Acceding Countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the
Associated Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the countriesthe
Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as weIl as the European Fair Trade
Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European
Economic Area) ("[T]he proposed request for an advisory opinion from the 17
The United States continues ta believe that referral ofthis
dispute ta the Court is inappropriate and that tbis referral will
not advance but may impede efforts ta implement the Roadmap
and ta achieve a two-state solution.
3.2 Despite these dangers, the resolution was adopted by the
General Assembly by 90 votes ta 8, with 74 abstentions (with
19 Member States not participating). ln responding ta the
General Assembly's request, the Court will now need ta decide
whether it has jurisdiction and whether it should ~xerc itse
discretion to issue an advisory opinion on the particular issues
that rnay arise in this proceeding.
3.3 Without prejudice ta other considerations, the United
States believes il is particularly important for the Court to give
due regard to the principle that advisory opinion jurisdiction is
not intended as a means of circurnventing the right of States ta
determine whether ta submit their disputes ta judicial
settlement. This principle carries special importance where
there is an established framework for addressing disputed issues
through a negotiating process.
International Court Justiee will Dothelp the efforts of the two parties ta
relaunch apolitical dialogue and is therefore inappropriate".); id. at 17
(Russian Federation) ("It is important ta now restore direct Palestinian and
lsraeli dialogue".); id. at 18 (Uganda) ("The sa\ution lies in a negotiated
settlement by bath sides. That is why, in our optnion, referring the matter to
the International Court Justice would not serve the cause ofpeace".); id. at
21 (United Kingdom) (''Topursue an advisory opinion will in no way help
the parties to re-Iaunch the much-needed political dialogue necessary to
implement the road map - and implementing the road map should be the
priority".); id. at 22 (Canada) ("[W]e ... question whetber this request for an
advisory opinionis a usefui step at this time .id.(Switzerland) ("We
do not judge it to be appropriate in the current cireumstances to bring before
a legal body a subject in which highly political implications predorninate".);
id. (Singapore) ("We do not consider it ta be appropriate to involve the ICJ
in this dispute this way".). 18
A. Key Considerations in the Court's Assessment of the
Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion
3.4 It is weIl established that, pursuant to Article 65 of its
Statute, the Court has discretion whether to give an advisory
26
opinion even where it has jurisdiction to entertain the request •
The Court's concem for judicial propriety in exercising this
discretion has been focused in particular on ensuring that the
Court maintains the distinction, reflected in its Statute, between
contentious and advisory proceedings. In the fonner case, the
Court is empowered by consent of the States concemed to
27
resolve a legal dispute between thern in a binding fashion . In
contrast, the Court's authority ta issue advisory opinions is
discretionary, and the Court may decline ta accede to a request
for an advisory opinion where the request requires the Court ta
resolve a dispute in wruch a State party ta the dispute has not
provided its consent. As stated in the Western Sahara
proceeding:
In certain circumstances ... the lack of consent
of an interested State may render the giving of
an advisory opinion incompatible with the
Court'sjudicial character. An instance ofthis
would be when tbe circumstances disclose that
ta give a reply would have the effect of
circwnventing the principle that aState is not
obliged ta aUowits disputes to be submitted to
judicial settlement without its consent. If sucb a
situation should arise, the powers of the Court
26See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C] Reports 1950, p.72;
Reservations ta the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C] Reports 1951, p. 19;Western
Sahara. Advisory Opinion, rCl. Reports 1975, p. 2I.
27See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36.--------------------------;------------------------- -------
19
under the discretion given ta it by Article 65,
paragraph 1, of the Statute, would afford
sufficient legal means to ensure respect for the
fundamental principle of consent to
28
jurisdiction .
3.5 The Court (and its predecessor Court, the Permanent
Court of International Justice) has explained the importance of
this principle on several grounds. First, it is necessary ta
preserve the independence of States, which retain sovereign
control over whether 29 submit a dispute ta which they are a
party to the Court • Second, itwould be incompatible with the
2aWestern Sahara, Advisory Opinion. I.CJ Reports 1975, p. 25. The Court
reaffmned this principle in Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, l,CJ Reports 1989, p, 191; see a/sa 2 The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary 1185 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) ("A
decision to entertain a request [for an advisory opinion] would be
inappropriate if a legal dispute relating to States which have not recognized
the jurisdiction of the ICI on the basis of Art. 36 of the Statute, were brought
before the Court, in the absenceof the States concerned, by a request for
advisory proceedings".).
:MSee Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P,CI,J., Series B,
No 5, p, 27 ("It is weB established in intemationallaw tbat no State can,
wilhout its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States
("Ither 1mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kînd of pacifie
S('nlcment",). The Court has noted that Eastern Carelia involved unique
clrcumslances posed by Russia's nan-membershîp in the League of Nations
in that case. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
v/South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
('UlUleilResolution 276 (1970), Advîsory Opinion, I.Cl. Reports 1971, p,
23. Thal distinction nevertheless does not undermine the continued vitality
of the principle or the underlying considerations identified in Eastern
Cardia far purposes of the Court's ascertaining whether itshould as a matter
of discretion decline a request. The Court bas twice since the Namibia
opmion reaffmned the core principle of Eastern Carelia, although it bas
considered the principle in terms ofjudicial propriety and discretion rather
wn as a jurisdictional hurdle. See Western Sahara. Advîsory Opinion, 1.Cl.
R,'ports /975, p, 25; Applicabilîty of Article VI, Section 22, of the 20
purpose of the advisory opinion procedure for it to be used for
dispute-resolution between non-consenting parties, or in a way
that effectively deterrnines the substantive o30come of a
particular legal dispute between parties . Third, an advisory
setting Îs ill-suited to application of principles oflaw to
particular factuaI situations where the lack of participation by an
interested party may deprive the Court of necessary
infonnation, and the format of the proceedings is ill-suited to
the development of a factual record) 1•
3.6 The United States would submit that these underlying
considerations take on special importance where an alternative
framework already exists for addressing disputed issues through
a negotiating process. In that context, the Court's intervention
by way of an advisory opinion may be bath inconsistent with
that framework and harmful to its irnplementation. It was
largely for that reason that the United States declined to support
the General Assembly's referral resolution in this case.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 191.
30See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.CI Reports 1950, p. 72 ("[I]t is
justifiable to conclude that it no way touches the merits of those
disputes. . .. It follows that the legal position of the parties to these disputes
cannot be in any way compromîsed by the answers that the Court may
give... ".).
31See Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.CI.J., Series B,
No. 5, p. 28 ("lt appears now to be very doubtful wbether there would be
available to the Court materials sufficient to enable it to arrive at any judîcial
conclusion upon the question offact ... ".); Western Sahara. Advisory
Opinion, I.e] Reports /975, pp. 28-29 (examining "wbether the Court bas
before it sufficîent information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a
judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions offact the determination of
wbich is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its
judicial character"). 21
B. Observations with Respect to the Judicial Propriety of
Giving an Advisory Opinion in.this Proceeding
3.7 It is not possible at this juncture to anticipate precisely
how the foregoing considerations will bear on the instant
proceeding. It is not known who will be participating in the
proceedings. Nor is it known what information or issues may
be presented ta the Court during the written and oral
proceedings.
3.8 The United States nevertheless believes that in at Ieast
one respect it is possible ta offer specifie views on how this
principle of propriety should be applied to this proceeding. The
permanent status issues underlying the peaee process are
undoubtedly in dispute, for that is the reason they have been
remitted ta a negotiating process. And no party has consented
ta their resolution by the Court, in tbis or any other proceeding.
Aceordingly, the Court should not allow these advisory
proceedings to be used ta eircumvent the negotiating process
over the permanent status issues.
3.9 A similar issue arase in the Court's consideration of the
Western Sahara case. Spain had objected that the case
concemed a territorial dispute and argued that the advisory
opinion procedure should not properly be used to adjudicate the
attribution of territorial sovere3rty in the absence of the
requisite consent of the parties • The Court did not question
the validity of Spain's underlying concem, but rather
emphasized how the issue it was addressing would not prejudice
the legal position of any of the parties to the existing territorial
dispute 33. The Court found that the request for an advisory
opinion did not "calI for adjudication upon existing territorial
32See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.c.J Reports 1975, pp. 27-28.
33 See id. at 28. 22
rights or sovereignty over territory,,34and would "not affect the
rights of Spain today as the administering Power,,35. The Court
indicated in this regard that the General Assembly's request had
not been made with "the object of ... bring[ing] before the
Court ... a dispute or legal controversy ... [with a view to its
subsequent] peaceful settlement" but only to assist the General
Assembly in carrying out its special responsibilities concerning
the decolonization of the territoif6.
3.10 The Western Sahara precedent is instructive for the
present proceedings because territorial status is among the
permanent status issues that must be resolved through
negotiations (along with J erusalem, settlements and other
issues). Should questions arise during the proceedings
regarding any ofthese pennanent status issues, the Court's
jurisprudence strongly counsels against addressing them. It is
in precisely these final status matters - matters directly bearing
on the substance of a pending dispute, the resolution ofwhich
has been conunitted ta a negotiating process, where the facts are
unusually complex and contentious - that the potential tlrreat to
the Court'sjudicial character in an advisory proceeding is
greatest. The Court will, also, need to examine any other issues
raised in the proceeding ta detennine whether similar
considerations counsel against providing its legal views with
respect to thase issues as weIl.
W Id.
li Id.al27.
lb Id.al26. CHAPTERIV
CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE
NEGOTIATING PROCESS MORE GENERALLY
4.1 The paramount interest of the United States as eo-
sponsor of the peaee proeess and as member of the Quartet at
this time is to ensure that every effort is made to return the
parties to the bargaining table where they ean address interim
issues, and more importantly the permanent status issues central
to realizing the shared vision of a two-State solution ta their
dispute. As recognized by the Security Council, the General
Assembly, the Quartet and the parties themselves, only in that
way can ajust and lasting peaee be aehieved.
4.2 The General Assembly's referral resolution asks the
Court to address just one of the many issues eurrently in dispute
between the Israelis and Palestinians during this interirn periad
prior to permanent status. Should the Court decide ta provide
an advisory opinion, the United States would urge the Court ta
keep in mind two key aspects of the peace proeess: the
ftmdamental principle that pennanent status issues must be
resolved thraugh negotiations; and the need during the interim
period for the parties to fulfill their seeurity responsibilities sa
that the peaee process can suceeed. In the view of the United
States, the referral resolution must be read as preserving both of
these elements, and therefore the Court should do nothing that
would interfere with either ofthem.
A. The Permanent Status Issues Are to be Negotiated
by the Parties
4.3 The foundation of the peaee process embraced by the
United Nations Seeurity Council, the General Assembly, and
the Israelis and Palestinians is a bilateral negotiating process
between Israelis and Palestinians to resolve their permanent 24
status issues. It would be inconsistent with this assignment of
responsibility to the parties to interpret the General Assembly's
referral resolution as a request for an advisory opinion on any of
the permanent status issues.
4.4 Progress has been made during previous negotiating
efforts by the parties ta identify solutions to these
extraordinarily difficult and sensitive issues. The United States,
as co-sponsor of the peace process, and the other members of
the Quartet are deeply involved in efforts ta advance those
negotiations, with the support and encouragement of the
Security Council and the General Assembly. It would be
extremely damaging to future negotiating efforts if the Court
were to set forth, even on a non-binding advisory basis, legal
conclusions with respect to the permanent status issues.
4.5 A durable and rnutually acceptable resolution of the
permanent status issues will require the parties ta fmd ways to
addresstheir own and each other's interests through a
negotiating process. The Israelis and Palestiniails have long
agreed not to take unilateral acts that would preempt their
negotiations. For example, as previously noted, several oftheir
agreements provide that
Neither side shaH initiate or take any step that
will change the status of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip pending the outcome of37he
pennanent status negotiations •
4.6 Any expression of legal views by the Court on the
permanent status issues can be expected to make the necessary
political accommodations between the parties on these issues
far more difficult or even impossible. Even if in setting out its
legal views the Court were ta acknowledge that the parties are
37Interim Agreement,art.XXXI(7), A/51/889, SI1997/357, annex. 25
free ta disregard or ta bargain away a «Iegal" solution identified
by the Court, the parties would face substantial, new constraints
on their ability ta negotiate with one another to find mutually
acceptable compromises.
4.7 In light of these considerations, the United States does
not believe the referral resolution canor should be read ta invite
the Court to create such new obstacles ta peace-making efforts.
The referral resolution itself reaffirms the principle that the
pennanent status issues are ta be resolved through negotiations.
The General Assembly therefore should not be understood as
having asked for legal guidance from the Court on what those
solutions must consist of or otherwise ta reach legal conclusions
aboutthem.
B. The Parties Must Carry Out Their Security
RespoDsibilities for the Peace Process to Succeed
4.8 As is refIected in the "Report of the Secretary-General
prepared pursuant ta General Assembly resolution ES-1O/13"38,
the dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians over Israel's
construction of a barrier centers largely on their different views
ofhow ta address the problem of terrarist attacks against Israel.
Should the Court deem it appropriate ta consider the issues
underlying this dispute, it is crucial that in doing sa it
emphasize the responsibilities ofboth the parties ta address this
serious threat ta the Roadmap and the overall peace proc~ss.
4.9 The Roadmap states that
A two state solution ta the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict will only be achieved through an end to
violence and terrorism, when the Palestirrian
people have a leadership acting decisively
3RA/ES-I 0/248 (2003). 26
against terror and willing and able ta build a
practicing d.emocracybased on tolerance and
liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what
is necessary for a democratic Palestiruan state ta
be established, and a clear, unambiguous
acceptance by both parties of the goal of a
negotiated settlement as described below 39.
In recognition ofthis fact, the first phase of the Roadmap is
entitled "Ending Terror and Violence, Nonnalizing Palestinian
Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions". Among the steps it
requires are:
Palestinians de clare an unequivocal end to
violence and terrorism and undertake visible
efforts on the ground ta arrest, disrupt, and
restrain individuals and groups conducting and
planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority
security apparatus begins sustained, targeted,
and effective operations aimed at confronting aIl
those engaged in terror and dismantlement of
terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This
includes cornmencing confiscation ofillegal
weapons and consolidation of security authority,
free of association with terror and corruption.
GOI [Israel] takes no actions undennining trust,
including deportations, attacks on civilians;
confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian
homes and property, as a punitive measure or ta
facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of
Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and
39Roadmap at 2, S/2003/529, annex, Annex 1. 27
other measures specified in the Tenet work plan
[a V.S. security initiative]. ...
As comprehensive security performance moves
forward, IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] withdraws
progressively from areas occupied since
September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore
the status quo that existed prior to September 28,
2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to
areas vacated by IDp4°.
4.10 The focus in the Roadmap on the need for viable and
effective security measures between the parties is consistent
with their previously concluded agreements. The Interim
Agreement, which established the framework for security
cooperation in the West Bank,
REAFFIRl\1[S] their mutual commitment ta act,
in accordance with this Agreement,
immediately, efficiently and effectively against
acts or threats of terrorism, violence or
incitement,41hether committed by Palestinians
or Israelis •
It provides generally that
Both sides shall take aIl measures necessary in
order ta prevent acts of terrorism, crime and
hostilities directed against each other, against
individuals falling under the ather's autharity
and against their property, and shaIl take legal
measures against offenders 42.
40Id. at 3-4.
41Interim Agreement, preamble, A/511889,8/1997/357,annex.
42Id.art XV(I). 28
4.11 The applicable arrangements are complex, given the
division ofresponsibilities between the parties and the evolving
situation. The Agreement divides the West Bank into three
areas. In Area C, Israel retains exclusive security authority. In
Area B, Israel has"the overriding responsibility for security for
the purpose ofprotecting Israelis and confronting the threat of
terrorism" while the PA has responsibility for public order for
Palestinians. In Area A, the PA largely has sole responsibility
for security 43. These geographic divisions and further
adjustments in their territorial scope have been disrupted by the
violence during the past three years. One of the purposes of the
Quartet's Roadrnap is to retum the parties to their previous
areas ofresponsibility and to promote further territorial
adjustments en route to permanent status.
4.12 The Interim Agreement sets out in detail the respective
security responsibilities of each party in its area of operation.
For the Palestinians, the Agreement provides that
In order to guarantee public order and internaI
security for the Palestinians ofthe West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, the Council [PA] shaH
establish a strong police force as set out in
Article XIV be1ow.... 44.
Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli
military forces, no other armed forces shall be
established or operate in the West Bank and the
· 45
G aza Stnp .....
4]Id.,annex I, art. V, Annex 4.
44Id., artXII(1).
4SId., art. XIV(3). 29
The Palestinian security policy [will be
implemented in West Bank areas under PA
responsibility] as follows:
a. The Palestinian Police is the only
Palestinian security authority.
b. The Palestinian Police will act
systematically against ail expressionsof
violence and terror.
c. The Council [PA] will issue permits
in order to legalize the possession and
carrying of arms by civilians. Any
illegal anns will be confiscated by the
Palestinian Police.
d. The Palestinian Police will arrest and
prosecute individuais who are suspected
ofpe~etra actsiof iolence and
terror6.
At the same time, under the Interim Agreement,
Israel shaHcontinue to carry the responsibility
for defense against extemal threats... as weIl as
the responsibility for overall security ofIsraelis
and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding
their internaI security and public arder, and will
have ail the powers to take the steps necessary to
7
meet thisresponsibilitl .
46Id., annex l, art. 11(1), Annex 4.
47Id., arXII(1). 30
4.13 Against this complex backdrop, it is essential that the
Court, if it should take up the question referred to it in any
degree, not call inta question the detailed security arrangements
previously agreed upon by the parties. To do so could create a
vacuum, which either or both sides might feel compelled to fill
unilateral1y. This could further reduce the prospects for ending
violence and restarting the negotiating process. Even more
seriously, it could embolden those opposed to peace in their
violent efforts to disrupt the pracess. It is vital ta the efforts of
the co-sponsors and the Quartet that bath the Israelis and
Palestinians carry out their security responsibilities, while at the
same time addressing their other obligations under the
Roadmap. Since this view is shared by the General Assembly48,
the Court should treat this as part of the essential framework far
addressing the General Assembly's question.
48SeeNRE81E8-10/13 (2003), para. 2 (dring the Roadmap, 8/2003/529,
annex). CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION
5.1 The United States takes seriously its responsibilities as
co-sponsor of the Middle East Peace Process launched in
Madrid in 1991. Most recentl y, together with the other
members of the Quartet - the Russian Federation, the EU and
the UN Secretary-General- the United States has exerted
intensive and continuing efforts to bring an end to the conflict
that for more than half a century has tragically affected the lives
ofboth Palestinians and Israelis. A shared vision oftwo States,
al peace with eaeh other and their neighbors, basDOW been
achieved. As signifieantly, a mechanism - the Roadmap - has
been established for realizing that vision. TheUnited Nations
Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the
Quartet and other members of the international eornmunity, and
Israelis and Palestinians have agreed on the path ahead.
5.2 The United States has therefore subrnitted fuis
Statement to assist the Court in understanding the eomplex
diplomatie proeess underway. This is the context in whieh the
General Assembly has aeted and in whieh this proeeeding
arises. The United States would urge the Court ta avoid any
steps that would interfere with or make this negotiating proeess
more difficult than it already is. This risk could be avoided
altogether if the Court declined to issue an advisory opin.ion.
5.3 If the Court chaoses to provide its views, however, then
as a matter of judicial propriety the Court should examine any
proposed issues to ensure that addressing them will not offend
the principle that advisory proceedings are not a means to
address disputes of States without their consent. This would be
espeeially true ifit is suggested that the Court should address
any of the pennanent status issues that the parties have agreed
to resolve through negotiations. Additionally, given the 32
General Assembly's support for the Roadmap and the efforts of
the Quartet. the referral resolution should not be interpreted to
question either oftwo key e1ements underlying the peace
process: (i) that permanent status issues are to be resolved
through negotiations; and (ii) that the Israelis and Palestinians
must fuifi11their security responsibilities for the peace process
to succeed. A lasting peace requires fulfillment ofboth these
conditions.
5.4 The matter referred by the General Assembly to the
Court - the barrier under construction by Israel- is of concem
to the United States. But 50 is protecting the peace proce5S
agreed upon by the parties and endorsed by the Security
Council and the General Assembly. For that reason, the United
States respectfully requests that the Court consider the points in
this submission carefully in deciding how to respond to the
General Assembly's request to ensure that nothing it might do
undennines the Roadmap or the negotiating process.
Meanwhile, with the other members of the Quartet, the United
States will continue itsOWD efforts to promote progress in
implementing the Roadmap 50that issues such as barriers give
way to normal, peaceful relations between two equal, sovereign
States.
William H. Taft, N
Legal Adviser
.U.S. Department of State Annexes to the Written Statement
Table of Contents
Annex 1- A Performance-based Road Map to a Pennanent
Two-State Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the
"Roadmap")
Annex 2 - Remarks of President Bush, His Majesty King
Abdullah of Jordan, Prime Minister Sharon ofIsrael, and
Prime Minister Abbas ofthe Palestinian Authority, 4 June
2003
Annex 3 - Invitation, 18 Oct. 1991
Annex 4 - Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Annex 1 Annex 1
A Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State
Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the "Roadmap")-----~--~~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ United Nations S12003/529
,~) Security Council oistr.: General
7 May 2003
~
~ Original: English
Letter dated 7 May 2003 from theSecretary~Gen aerrsled to
the President of the Security Council
1 have the honour to t10nyou herewith the texl of a 10reali?e
the vision of Iwo States, Israel and· Palestine, living side by side in peace and
security, as affirmed in Sccurity Counc1397(2002) (see annex).
The tex! bas been preparcd by the Queonsisling of reprcsentatives of
the United Statcs of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the
United Nations -and was presented la the Governmeof Israel and the
Palcstinian Authority on 30 April 2003.
1shauld be grateful if you would bring Ihis texl to the attention of the members
of the Security Council.
(SigneU) Kofi A. AnnanSIlOOl/Sl9
Annn
A performance·based road map to a permanent two-State solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
The tolJowing is a periormance-ba!;ed and goal-driven roadmap, with c1ear
phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciproca1
steps by the two parties in the political. security, economic, humanitarian, and
institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The destination is a final
and comprehensive settlement of the lsrael-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in
President Bush's speech of24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the
16 Jul)' and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.
A two state solution ta the Israeli-Palestinian confliet will only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism. when the Palestinian people have a leadership
acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy
based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel' s readiness to do what is necessary
for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a c1ear, unambiguous
acceptance by bath parties of the goal ofa negotiated settlement as described below.
The Quartet :will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I.
including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a
realistictimeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress
will require and depend upon the good faith efforts orthe parties, and their compliance
with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their
obligations rapidly, progress within and thraugh the phases may come saoner than
indicated in the plan. Non-complîance with obligations will impede progress.
A settlement. negotiated between the parties. will resuh in the emergence of an
indC'pendent,democratic, and viable Palestinian slale living side by side in peace and
security with Israel and hs other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the Israel
Palestinian contlict,and end the occupation that began in 1967. based on the
foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle ofland tor peace. UNSCRs 242,
338 and 1397. agreements previously reached by the parties. and the initiative ofSaudi
('rown Prince Abdullah ~ endorsed by the Beirut Arah l.eague Summit ~ calling for
acceptnnce of Israel as a neighbor living in peaee and security. in the context ofa
I,.'omprehensive senlement. This initiative is a vital e1ement of international ctTons to
pwmote Ilcomprehensive peace on alltracks. încluding the Syrian-Israeli and
Lchanese-I sraeli tracks.
The Quartet will meet regularly alsenior Icvels to c\"llluate the parties'
performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase. the parties are cxpected to
pc!'rfonntheir obligations in parallel. unless otherwise indicated.
l 512003/529
PHASE 1:
ENDJ.NG TERROR AND VIOLENCE, NORMALIZING PALESTINIAN LIFE,
ANDBUILDING PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS
PRESENT TO MA y 2003
InPhase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of
violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by
supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resurne security
cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement
through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake
comprehensive political refonn in preparation for statehood, including drafting a
Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures.
Israel takesail necessary steps to help nonnalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from
Palestinian areas occupied from September 28,2000 and the two sides restore the status
quo that existed at that time, as security perfonnance and cooperation progress. Israel also
freezes all settlement activity, consistent with.the Mitchell report.
At the outset of Phase 1:
• Palestinian leadership issues unequivoca1statement reiterating Israel's right to exist
in peace and security and calling for an immediate and Wlconditional ceasefire to
end anned activity and ail acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. Ali official
Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
• IsraeIi leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the
two·state vision of an independent. viable. sovereign Palestinian state living in
peace and security alongside Israel. as expressed by President Bush. and calling for
an îmmediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. Ali officiallsraeli
institutions end ÎncÎtement against Palestinians.
SECURITY
• Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible
efforts on the ground ta arrest. disrupt. and restrain individuals and groups conducting
and planning violent attacks on lsraelis anywhere.
• Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained.
targeted, and effective operations aimed al confronting ail those engaged in terror and
dismantlement of terrorist capabilitics and infrastructure.This includcs commencing
confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority. free of
association with terror and corruption.
• GOI takes no actions undennining trust. including deportations. altacks on cÎ\'i!ians;
confiscation andlor demolition of Palestinian homes and propert y.as a punitive 381100)/529
measure or to facilitate lsraeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and
infrastructHre; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
• Relying on I!xisting mechanisms and on-the-ground resources. Quartet representatives
begin informai monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a fonnal
monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
• Implementation, as previously agreed, oru.s. rebuilding, training and resumed
security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt
Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting. comprehensive cease-fire.
)0 Ali Palestinian security organizations are consolidàted into three services
reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
);> Restructuredlretrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts
progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in
implementation of the Teoet work plan. including regular senior-Ievel meetings.
with the participation of U.S. security officiais.
• Arab states eut off public and private funding and ail other forms of support for groups
supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
• AHdODorsproviding budgetary support for the Palestinians channel the se funds
through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
• As comprehensive security performance moves forward. IDF withdraws progressively
from areas occupîed since September 28,2000 and the two sides restore the status quo
that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas
vacated by lOF.
P ALESTINI AN INSTITUT ION-Bu 1LOI NG
• Immediate action on credible process 10 produce draft constitution for Palestinian
statehood. As rapidly aS possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian
constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered
prime minister. for public commentldebate. Constîtutional cornmittee proposes draft
document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian
iostitutions.
• Appointment ofinterim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive
authority/decision-making body.
• GOI fully facilitates trave) ofPalestinian officiaIs for PLC and Cabinet sessions.
intemationally supervised security retraining. e1ectoral and other refoml aclivity. and
other support ive measures related to the reform efforts.
4 SIlOOJ/5Z9
• Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered ta undertake fundamentat
refonn. Cempletion of further steps to...achievegenuine separation of powers,
including any necessary Palestinian legal refoons for this purpose.
• Establislunent of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and
revises election law.
• Palestinian perfonnance onjudicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks. as
established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Refonn.
• As early as possible, and based upon theabove measures and in the context of open
debate andtransparent candidate selectionlelectoral campaign based on a free. multi
party process, Palestinians hold &ce. open, and fair elections.
• GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance. registration ofvoters. movement of
candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
• GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian
institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate
strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.
HUMANIT ARIAN REsPONSE
• Israel takes measures ta improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians
implement in full a1lrecommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian
conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persans and goods.
and allowing fuIt, safe. andunfettered access of international and humanitarian
personnel.
• AHLe reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in
the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including 10the
refonn effort.
• GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, inc1uding
arrtars. in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.
CIVIL SociETY
• Continued donor support, inc1uding increased funding through PVOslNGOs, for people
to people programs, private sector development and civil society initjativ~s.
SETTLE.MENTS
• GOI immediately dismantles seulement oulposts erecled since March 2001. •
• Consistent with the Mitchell Report. GOI freezes ail seulement activity (including
natural groVi1hof settlements). 5SIlOO3/529
PHASE Il: TRANSITION
JUNE 2003-DECEMBER 2003
ln the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new
constitution, as a way station to a pennanent status settlement. As has been noted. this
goal canbe achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively
against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and
liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the
Palestinians will have the active supportthe Quartet and the broader international
community in establishing an independent. viable, state.
Progress ioto Phase II will he based upen the consensusjudgment of the Quartet of
whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking ioto account perfonnance of both
parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and huild
Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible
creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its prirnary
goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security
cooperation. continued nonnalization of Palestinian life institution ~ubterilding,
building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase 1,ratification of a democratic
Palestinian consti tution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of
politieal reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
• INTERNATIONAL. CONFERENCE: Convened by the Quartet. in consultation with the
parties, irrunediately after the successful conClusion of Palestinian eleetions, to support
Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process. leading to establishment of an
independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.
~ Such a meeting would he inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive
Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria. and Israel and
Lebanon), and based on the princip les described in the prearnble to this
document.
}o Arab states restore pre-inti fada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
~ Revival ofmultilateral engagemenl on issues including regional water
resources, environment. economic devcJopment. refugees, and arms control
issues.
• New constitution for democratie, independent Palestinian state is tinalized and
approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further eleetions. if requircd. should
follow approval orthe new constitution.
6 sn0031529
• Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally estabJished,
consÎstent-with draftconstitution.
• Continued comprehensive security perfonnance, including effective security
cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase 1.
• Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process
of Israeli-Palestinian engagement. launched by the international conference. As part of
this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial
contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of
a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
• Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and
operational support of the Quartet.
• Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state. induding
possible UN membership.
PHASE III:
PERMANENT ST"\TUS AGREEMENT
AND END OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
2004-2005
Progress into Phase III. based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking ioto
account actions ofhoth parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are
consolidation of reforrn and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective
Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a pennanent
status agreement in 2005.
• SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Convened by Quartet. in consultation with the
parties, at beginning of 2004 ta endorse agreement reached on an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the
active. sustained, and operational support of the Quartet. leading to a final, permanent
status resolution in 2005, incJuding on borders, Jerusalem, refugees. settlements; and,
10 support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Ismel and
Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
• Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the refonn agenda laid out by the Task
Fort.:ein preparation for final stalus agreement.
• Continued sustained and effective security perfonnance, and sustained, effective
security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase 1.
• International efforts to facilitate refonn and stabilize Palcstinian institutions and the
Palestinian economy. in preparation for final stalllSagreement. 7SIlOOJJS29
• Parties reaeh final and comprehensive pennanent status agreement that ends the Israel
PalestinilUl-Contlictin 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based
on UNSCR"242, 338, and1397, that emis the occupation that began in 1967, and
includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a
negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and
religious concems ofboth sides. and protects the religious interests of Jews. Christians.
and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign,
independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and secwily.
• Arab stale acceptance of full nonnal relations with Israel and security for ail the states
of the region in the context ofa comprehensive Arab-lsraeli peace.
Il Annex 2
Remarks of President Bush, His MajestyKing Abdullah of
Jordan, Prime Minister Sharon of Israel, and Prime Minister
Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, 4 June 2003 -------------
!n(.'~1'•.-_~ ;,.". 1 Click to Print~
.-. u'le ~_ l({iJe this documentl..J;:fO--"
PresidentGeorgeW.Bush
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
June 4,2003
President Meets with Leaders of Jordan, Israel and
Palestinian Authority
Presidenl's Remar1ls
Remarks by President Bush, His Majesty King Abdullah of Jordan,
Prime MinisterSharon of Israel, and Prime Minister Abbas of the I§I view
Palestinian Authority c: IItn
Beit al 8ahar
Aqaba, Jordan
3:30 P.M. (Local)
KING ABDULLAH: President Bush; Prime Minister Sharon; Prime Minister Abbas; distinguished guests: We
gather today in Aqaba, this small city that symbolizes the immeasurable potential of bringing different peoples
together. Not far from here, Jordan andael signed a peaee treaty in 1994. Nine years later, what brings us here
is the same dream -- the dream of peace, prosperity, coexistence and reeonciliation. But dreams alone cannot
fultill hopes. It is thanks to the efforts of President Bush, and the commitments of Prime Minister Sharon and
Prime Minister Abbas, that we meet here today to transform these dreams into real achievements on the ground.
Mr. President,Prime Ministers, let us have ambitions - ambitions to
move beyond the violence and occupation; to the day when two
states,Palestine and Israel, can live together, side-by-side, in peaee
and security.
And in our hands today, we hold the mechanism that can translate
these ambitions into realitieshe ground. It is a plan, the road
that addresses the needs of both Palestinians and Israelis. Ta the
Israelis, this plan offers collective security guarantees by ail Arabs, a
peaee treaty andnonnal relations with Arab states, and an end to the
conflict. To the Palestinians. it offers an end to the occupation, a
viable state, and the promise tae as a free and prosperous people.
To be sure, the road to realizing this vision will not be straightforward or without obstacles. l'm aware that many in
our region and around the world view our gathering today through amarred with skepticism and suspicion.
The failures and fruslrations of the past have left many disbelievers wake,
Today we have an opportunity and an obligation to reinstate faith in the process, and to reinvigorate hopes for a
beUer tomorrow. We simply cannot afford the alternative. The road to confrontation has shawn its consequences:
1055 of innocent lives, destruction and fear. Most costly, however, was the loss of hope. The most precious gift
that you can present to your peoples over the coming weeks is renewed hope borne out of tangible progress on
the ground. And lt's not only your people who will be watehing and waiting. The eyes of the entire world will be
upon you.
The nature of our new borderless world means that ail have a stake in what happens here today. Jordanians,
Americans, Europeans, and many around the world stand ready and willing lend ail their support to ensure your
suecess. But at the end the day, it is you, the Palestinians and the Israelis, who have to come together to
resolve the many outstanding issues that divide you.
Many will view the compromises that will be made during your
negotiations as painful concessions. But why not view them as peace
offerings, ones that will provideturn the priceless gifts of hope,
security, and freedom for our ehildren and our children's children. lt is
1only by putting yourselves in each other's shaes that we can hope 10
aehieve real progress.
Thus, we reaffirm loday our strong position against violence in any form and from whatever source. Blowing up
buses willnot induce the lsraelis ta move forward. And neither willthe killing of Palestinians or the demolition of
their homes and theÎr future. Ali this needs ta stop. And we pledge that Jordan willdo its utmost ta help achieve it.
Mr. President, you have stayed the course. Your presence here today, ta witness the two leaders meeting
together, agreeing on comman grounds ta solve this eonftiet, provides a great impetus ta move forward and a
etear answer ta ail the skeptics. 1thank you, sir, for your leadership and your courage.
Prime Minister Sharon, Prime Minister Abbas, 1urge you today to end the designs of those who seek destruction,
annihilation and occupation. And 1urge you ta have the will and the courage ta begin ta realize our dreams of
peaee, prosperity and coexistence. And, remember, that in the pursuit of these noble goals, Jordan will always
remain a true friend.
Thank you very much. And il is with great pleasure, if 1may introduce Prime Minister Abbas ta say a few words.
PRtME MINISTER ABBAS: 1woutd tike ta thank King Abdullah for hosting our meeting here today. 1would like
also ta thank President Mubarak and King Abdullah, King Hamad, and Crown Prince Abdallah who met in Egypt
yesterday. 1thank them for their statements supporting our efforts. 1also would like ta thank the Israeli Prime
Minister Sharon for jaining us here in Jordan. And many thanks, especially, ta President Bush, who took the
longest joumey for peace of ail of us.
As we ail realize, this is an important moment. A new oppartunity for peaee exists, an oppartunity based upon
President Sush's vision and the Quartet's road map, which we have accepted without any reservations.
Our goal is two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-be-side, in peace and seeurity. The process is the one of
direct negotiations ta end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ta resolve ail the permanent status issues. and end
the occupation that began in 1967, under which Palestinians have suffered sa much.
At thesame time, we do not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout history. Il is time ta bring ail this suffering
ta an end.
Just as Israel must meet its responsibilities, we, the Palestinians, will fulfill our obligations for this endeavor ta
succeed. We are ready ta do our part.
Let me be very elear: There will be no military solution ta this cenfliet50 we repeat our renunciation, a
renunciation of terror against the Israelis wherever they might be. Such methods are inconsistent with our
religious and moral traditions and are dangerous obstacles ta the aehievement of an independent. sovereign state
we seek. These methods also confliet with the kinds of state we wish ta bUild, based on human rights and the rule
oflaw.
We will exert ail of our efforts, using ail our resources ta end the militarization of the Intifada, and we will succeed.
The armed intifada must end, and we must use and resort ta peaceful means in our quest ta end the occupation
and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis. And to establish the Palestinian state, we emphasize our
determination ta implement our pledges which we have made for our people and the international community.
that is a rule of law, single political authority, weapons only in the hands of those who are in charge with upholding
the law and arder, and political diversity within the framework of democracy.
Our goal is elear and we will implement it firmly and without compromise: a complete end ta violence and
terrorism. And we will be full partners in the international war against occupation and terrorism. And we will cali
upon our partners in this war ta prevent financial and military assistance ta those who oppose this position. We do
thÎs as a part of our commitment to the interest of the Palestinian people, and as members of the large family of
humanity.
We will also aet vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred, whatever their forrn or forum may be. Wewill take measures to ensure that there is no incitement - from Palestinian institutions. We must also reactivate
and invigorate the U.S.-Palestinian-Israel i Anti-I ncitement Comm ittee. We will continue our work to establ ish the
rule of law and to consolidate govemment authority in accountable Palestinian institutions. We seek to buitd the
kind of democralic state that will be a qualitative addition to the international community.
Ali the PA security forces will be part of these efforts, and will work together toward the aehievement of these
goals. Our national future is at stake, and no one will be allowed to jeopardize il.
We are committed to these steps because they are in our national interesl. In order to succeed, there must be a
clear improvement in the lives of Palestinians. Palestinians must live in dignity. Palestinians must be able ta
move, go to their jobs and sChools, visit their families, and conduct a normal life. Palestinians must not be afraid
for their lives, property,r livelihood.
We welcome and stress the need for the assistance of the international community and, in particular, the Arab
states, ta help us. And we also welcome and stress the need for a U.S.-led monitoring mechanism.
Together, we can achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian state, sovereign, viable, in the framework of
good neighbors with ail states in the region, including Israel. Thank you very much. (Applause.)
PRIME MINISTER SHARON: Thank you. 1would like to thank His Majesty King Abdullah for having this meeting,
and express Israel's appreciation ta President Bush for coming here to be with Prime Minister Abbas and me.
Thank you.
As the Prime Minister of Israel, the land which is the cradle of the Jewish people, my paramount responsibility is
the seeurity of the people of Israel and of the state of Israel. There can be no compromise with terror. And Israel,
together with ail free nations, will continuefighting· terrorism until its final defeal.
Ultimately, permanent security requires peace, and permanent peaee can only be obtained through security. And
there is now hope of a new opportunity for peace between lsraelis and Palestinians.
Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush's vision expressed on June 24, 2002, of two
states, Israel and a Palestinian state, living side-by-side in peaee and security. The govemment and people of
Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations aecording 10the steps of the road map as adopted by
the Israeli government ta achieve this vision.
It is in lsrael's interest not to govem the Palestinians, but for the Palestinians to govem themselves in their own
state. A democratic Palestinian state. fully at peace with Israel, will promotè the long-term seeurity and well-being
of Israel as a Jewish state.
There can be no peaee, however, without the abandonment and elimination of terrorism, violence and incitement.
We will work alongside Palestinians and other states to fight terrorism, violence and ineitement of ail kinds. As ail
parties perform their obligations, we will seek ta restore normal Palestinian life, improve the humanitarian
situation, rebuild trust and promote progress, follow the President's vision. We will aet in a manner that respects
the dignity, as weil as the human rights of ail people.
We can also reassure our Palestinian partners that we understand the importance of territorial contiguity in the
West Bank for a viable Palestinian state. Israeli policy in the territories that are subject to direct negotiations with
the Palestinians will reflect this fact. We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudge
the outeome of our negotiations.
ln regard to the unauthorized outposts, 1want to reiterate that Israel is a society governed by the rule of law.
we will immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts.
Israel seeks peace with ail its Arab neighbors, Israel is prepared to negotiate in good faith wherever there are
partners. M normal relations are established, 1am confident that they will find in Israel a neighbor and a people
committed to comprehensive peaee and prosperity for ail the peoples of the regian.Thank you, ail. (Applause.)
PRESIDENT BUSH: King Abdullah, thank you for hosting this event. Her Majesty, thank you for your hospitality. It
is fitting that we gather today in Jordan. King Abdullah i5 a leader on behalf of peaee and is carrying forward the
tradition of his father, King Hussein.
t'm pteased to be here with Prime Minisler Sharon. The friendship between our countries began at the time of
Israel's creation. Today, America ls strongly committed, and 1am strongly committed, la Israel's security as a
vibrant Jewlsh state.
t'm also pleased to be with Prime Mlnister Abbas. He represents the cause of freedom and statehood for the
Palestinian people. 1strongly support that cause, as weil. Each of us is here because we understand that ail
people have the right ta live in peaee. We believe that with hard work and good faith and courage, it is possible ta
bring peace to the Middle East. And today we mark important progress toward thatal.
Great and hopeful change is coming to the Middle East. In Iraq, a dictator who funded terror and sowed centlict
has been removed, and a more just and democratic society is emerging. Prime Minister Abbas now leads the
Palestinian Cabinet. By his strang leadership, by building the institutionssUnian democracy and by
rejecting terror, he is serving the deepest hopes of his people.
Ail here today now share a goal: the Holy Land must be shared between the state of Palestine and the state of
Israel, living at peace with each other and with every nation of the Middle East.
Ali sides will benefit from this achievement and ail sides have responsibilities 10meet. As the road map accepted
by the party makes dear, both must make tangible immediate steps toward this two-state vision.
1welcome Prime Minister Sharon's pledge to improve the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas and to
begin removing unauthorized outposts immediately. 1appreciate his gestures of reconciliation on behalf of
prisoners and theïr families, and his frank statements about the need for the territorial contiguïty.
As 1said yesterday, the issue of settlements must be addressed for peace to be achieved. In addition, Prime
Minister Sharon has stated that no unilateral actions by either side can or should prejudge the outcome of future
negotiations. The Prime Minister also recognizes thatls in Israel's own interest for Palestinians to govem
themselves in theïr own state. These are meaningful signs of respect for the rights of the Palestinians and their
hopes for a viable, democratic, peaceful, Palestinian state.
Prime Minister Abbas recagnizes that terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his
people seek. He agrees that the proeess for achieving that state is through peaceful negotiatians. He has pledged
taconsolidale Palestinian institutians, including the security forces and te make Ihem more accountable and more
democratic. He has promised his full efforts and resources to end the armed intifada. Heromised to work
without compromise for a complete end of violence and terrar. In ail these efforts, the Prime Minister is
demonslraling his leadership and commitment 10building a belter future for the Palestinian people.
Bath Prime Minislers here agree that progress toward peace also requires end to violence and the elimination
of ail ferms of halred and prejudice and official incitement - in school books, in broadcasts, and in the words used
by politicalleaders. Bath leaders understand that a fu.opeace cannot be founded on hatred and falsehood
and bitterness.
Yet, these two leaders cannat bring about peaee if they must acl alone. True peace requires the support of other
nations in the region. Yesterday, in Shael~Shei we made a str.ong beginning. Arab leaders stated that they
share our goal ofwo states, Israel and Palestine, and liside~by· inspedee and in security. And they have
promised la eut off assistance and the flow of money and weapons to terrorisl groups, and ta help Prime Minister
Abbas rid Palestinian areas of terrarism.
AIl sides have made important commitments, and the United States will strive to see these commitments fulfilled.
My government will provide training and support for a new, reslructured Palestinian security service. And we'lI
place a mission on the ground, led by Ambassador John Wolf. This mission will be charged with helping theparties to move towards peace, monitoring their progress and stating clearly who was fulfilling their
responsibilities. And we expect both parties to keep their promises.
l've also asked Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice ta make this
cause a matter of the highest priority. Secretary Powell and Dr. Rice, as my personal representative, will work
c/osely with the parties, helping them move toward true peace as quickly as possible.
The joumey we're taking ls difficult, but there ls no other choice. No leader of conscience can accept more months
and years of humiliation, killing and mouming. And these leaders of conscience have made their declarations
today in the cause of peace.
The United States is committed to that cause. Iail sides fulfill their obligat1know that peace can finally come.
Thank you very much, and may Gad bless our work. (Applause.)
END 3:54 P.M. (Local)
Return to thls article at:
http://www..t!hiteb~use.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030604-1.html
Cllc:to Prlnt ~
thls document l.}:s:::P' Annex 3
Invitation, 18 Oct. 1991 October 18, 1991
INVITATION
After extensive consultations ~ith Arab states, Israel and
the Pa1estinians, the United states and the Soviet union believe
that an historie opportunity exists to advance the prospects for
genuine peace throughout the region. The united states and the
Soviet Union are prepared ta assist the parties ta achieve a
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct
negotiations along t~o tracks, between Israel and the Arab
states, and between Israel and the palestinians, based on United
Nations Security council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective
of this process is real peace.
Toward that end, the President of the United States and the
President of the USSR invite you ta a peace conference, which
thêir countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct
negotiations. The conference w~ll be convened in (to be provided
in execute cable) on October 30, 1991. President Bush and
President Gorbachev request you~ acceptance of this invitation no
later than 6:00 p.m. Moscow time, October 21, 1991, in arder to
ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.
Direct bilateral negotiations will beqin four days after the
opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend"
Multilateral negotiations will convene t~o weeks after the
opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The
co-sponsors believe that those negotia't;.j..9.n_s hC?l.1lcJ'=.o .oC1__ __l~ "_
region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security,
water, refugee issues, environment, ecenomic development, and
ether subjects of mutual interest.
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held
at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel,
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians ~ill be invited and
attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegatien.
Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The
European Community will be a participant in the conference
alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and Vill be
represented by its Presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will
be invited te send its Secretary General to the conference as an
observer, and Gee member states will be invited to particlpate in
organizing the negotiatians on Multilateral issues. The United
Nations will be invited ta send an observer, representing the
Secretary General.
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the
parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no
authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability te
vote on issues or results. The conference can reconvene only
with the consent of aIl the parties. - 2 -
With respect to negotiations between Israel and
Palestinians who are part of the joint
30rdanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be
conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim
self-government arrangements. These talks will be
conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within
one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government
arrangements will last for a period of five years.
Beginning the third year of the period of interim
self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place
on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations,
and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states,
will take place on the hasis·of resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to
maxing this process succeed. It is their intention to
convene the conference and negotiations with those parties
who agree to attend.
The co-sponsors believe that this process off ers the
promise of endinq decades of confrontation and conflict and
the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope
that the parties will approach these negotiations in a
spirit of good will and mutual respect. In this way, the
peace process can begin te break down the mutual suspicions
and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the
parties to beg in _.to ...resol ve._ theit: ...di ff erences . Indeed,
only through such a ·precess can real peace and
reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel, and the
Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process
can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and
security they richly deserve. Annex 4
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreementon the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Annex 1 ANNEXI
PROTOCOL CONCERNING
REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS INDEX
ARTICLE) Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces and Transfer of
Responsibility ..... II......III.i.I.I.I.................IIII...........32........
ARTICLE fi Security Poliey for the Prevention of Terrorism and
Violence ...............,....,.................................1'l1li................
ARTICLE lU Coordination and Cooperation in Mutual Security
Matters.......".....~...............,....,.....................,...........4.......................
ARTICLE IV The Palestinian Police...................................................39.
ARTICLE V Security Arrangements in the West Bank...................... 42
ARTICLE VI Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip ...................... 46
ARTICLE VU Guidelines for Hebron ..................................................50.
ARTICLE VIII Passages....,......................'............. "........53
ARTICLE IX Movement Into, \Vithin and Outside the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.............................,....,..,.............................................5
ARTICLE X Safe Passage............................................................60...
....
ARTICLE XI Rules of Conduet in Mutual Security Matters ............... 62
ARTICLE XII Security Arrangements Concerning Planning, Building
and Zoning..........".....................,.....,....,.,....,..............5......................,......,...,...6
ARTICLE xm Security of the Airspace ................................................66
ARTICLE XIV Security along the Coastline to the Sea of Gaza ............. 68
APPENDIX 1 Redeployment of Israeli MiIitary Forces ........................ 73
APPENDIX 2 Deployment of Palestinian Policemen ............................. 75
APPENDIX 3 Palestinian Civil Police Stations and Posts ..................... 76
APPENDlX 4 Jewish Holy Sites .......................................................78....
APPENDIX 5 Protocol Regarding Arrangements with Respect to
Passages... i.....".'.................,.,.,.,.,.,.,..,.........111......79.
APPENDIX 6 List of Hamlets included in Area B................................. 103 ARTICLE 1
Redeployment of Israeli MilitaI)' Forces and Transfer of Responsibility
First Phase of Redeployment
1. The fi.rstphase of Israeli militaryforces redeployment will cover populated areas
in the West Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets, as shawn
on map No. 1. This redeployment will be effected in stages, as set out in the
schedule attached to tbis Annex as Appendix l, and will be completed prior to
the eve of the Palestinian elections, e.,22 days before the day of elections.
2. In order ta maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
as a single territorial unit, and ta promote their economic growth and the
demographic and geographical links between them, both sides shaH irnplement
the provisions of this Annex, while respecting and preserving without obstacles,
normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the West
Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
3. Any security arrangements and measures which become effective commensurate
with the redeployment of the Israeli military forces will not undermine the
importance of, nor willthey prejudice, the Palestinian development programs and
projects for reconstruction and development of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, as weil as the moral and physical dignity of the Palestinian people in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
4. After the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the unity and integrity of the
Pales.inian peo;Jle in !he West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be maintained and
respected. Ali PaJestinian people residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
will be accountable to the Palestinian Council only, unless otherwise provided in
this Agreement.
5. After the inauguration of the Palestinian Couneil, the israeli Civil Administration
will be dissolved and the Israeli militarygovernment will be withdrawn.
6. The Council will assume powers and responsibilities for civil affairs, as weil as
for publicorder and internai security, according to this Agreement.
7. Nothing in this Article shaH derogate from Israel's security powers and
responsibilitiesin accordance with this Agreement.
8. There will be a period of 10 days prior to each stage of redeployment according
to paragraph 1 of this Article, during which the commanders of the Israeli
rnilitary forces will acquaint the respective commanders of the different echelons
of the Palestinian Police with the respective area and its speeific problems.Further Redeployments Afterthe Inauguration of the Palestinian Council
9. The further redeployments of Israeli militaryforces to speeified military locations
will be gradually implemented in accordanee with the DOP in three phases, each
to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the
Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of
the Couneil.
10. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 of tbis
Agreement will be determined in the further redeployment phases within the
specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the
inauguration of the Couneil, and will be negotiated in the pennanent status
negotiations.
ARTICLE II
Security Policv for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence
1. The Palestinian security policy as defined by the Palestinian Authority on March
9, 1995, for the Gaza Strip and the Iericho Area will aIso be implemented in the
rest of the West Bank in areas which come under PaIestinian secunty
responsibilityas fallows:
a. The Palestinian Police is the ooly Palestinian security authority.
b. The Palestinian Police will act systematicaIly against all expressions of
violence and terror.
e. The Cauncil will issue permits in arder ta legalize the possession and
carrying of arms by civilians.Any illega! anns will be confiscated by the
Palestinian Police.
d. The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuais who are
suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terrar.
2. Bath sides will, in accardance with tbis Agreement, act ta ensure the immediate,
efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of
terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis.
Ta this end, they will coaperate in the exchange of information and coordinate
policies and activities. Each side shan immediately and effectively respond ta the
occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or
incitement and shaHtake ail necessary measures ta prevent such an occurrence.
3. With a view ta Împlementing the above, each side shaH,in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement, carry out the following functions in the areas under
its security responsibility: a. proteet aIl residents of, and ail other persons present in, these areas;
b. actively prevent incitement ta violence, including violence against the other
side or persans under the authority of the other side;
c. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persans
directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement;
and
d. prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm ta
infrastructure serving the other side, încluding, inter alia, roads, water,
electricity, telecommunications and sewage infrastructure.
4. Both sides undertake to deal with the issue of persans who are present in the
areas in violation of trus Agreement, and to take further measures in accordance
with procedures to be determined by the JSe.
ARTICLE III
Coordination and Cooperation ln Mutual Securitv Matters
1. Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee
a. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security
Purposes is hereby established (hereinafter "the JSC"). It will deal with ail
security matters of mutual concern regarding this Agreement in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip.
b. The JSC shal1:
(1) recommend security poliey guidelines for the approval of the Joint
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee and implement such approved
guidelines;
(2) deaI with security issues raised by either side;
(3) provide the proper channel for exchanging information between the
two sides, needed to solve security problems;
(4) provide directives for the Joint Regional Security Committees
(hereinafter "the RSCs") and for the Joint District Coordination
Offices (hereinafter "the DCOs"); and
(5) subject to the provisions of Article XXVI (the Joint Israeli
Palestinian Liaison Committee), and Article XXI (Settlement of
Differences and Disputes) of this Agreement, deal with alleged violations, as weil as differences relating to the application or
implementation of the security arrangements set out in this
Agreement.
c. The JSe shall comprise between live and seveD members iTom each side.
Decisions of the JSe win be reached by agreement between the two sides.
d. The Ise shaH determine itsrules of procedure. Meetings of the ISC shall
be held every two weeks. In the event that either side requests a special
meeting, it shaHbe convened within forty-eight (48) hours.
e. Unless otherwise agreed by the two sides, JSe meetings will be hosted by
each of the sides alternately.
f. The Jse shan develop a comprehensive plan ta ensure full coordination
between the Israeli military forces and the Palestinian Police during the
interim period, starting tram the date of signing of this Agreement.
g. This coordination will be implemented through the RSCs in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip and the DeOs, as mentioned hereafter in this Article.
h. The comprehensive plan will inc1ude a plan for the West B~ consisting
of arrangements for the entry of the PaIestinian Police and the introduction
of police arms, ammunition and equipment, as weIl as arrangements
intended to facilitate the smooth transfer of authority and assumption by
the Palestinian Police of its security responsibilities according ta this
Agreement.
1. The above mentioned comprehensive plan will aIso include two regional
plans that will include arrangements for coordination and cooperation in
security matters after the redeployment is effected.
J. These regional plans will be reviewed· every six months, or whenever
needed, by the JSC and the relevant RSC.
2. Regional Security Committees
a. Two RSCs are hereby established, one in the West Bank. and one in the
Gaza Strip.
b. Each RSC shaH:
(1) guide the relevant DCQs with security policy guidelines;
(2) deal with security issues referred to it by the DCOs;
(3) ensure proper transfer of information and guidelines to the relevant
DCOs; and (4) propose to the ISC security policy guidelines, and forward issues to
the ISe for deterrnination.
c. The Israeli side and the Palestinian side in the RSCs will maintain contact
with each other as follows:
(1) regular as weil as special meetings shaH be held between the
commander of the Israeli milifary forces and the commander of the
Palestinian Police in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, as
appropriate; and
(2) each side wi11operate a regional security coordination office 24
hours a day, with direct and constant communication links between
the two sides.
d. The RSCs shaHcommence operations immediately upon the signing of this
Agreement and shall determine by agreement their mode of procedure.
3. District Coordination Offices
a. DCOs are hereby established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as set
out below.
b. The location of the DCOs is as detailed on attached map Nos. 2 and 4.
c. Each DCa shaH:
(1) monitor and manage matters requiring coordination as detenruned by
the ISC and/or the relevant RSC, according to the policy and
guidelines establishedby either of them ;
(2) monitor and manage ail matters of ajoint nature within the respective
districtof the DCa, including the coordination of activities by one
side which may affect the other side;
(3) review, investigate and report ta the relevant RSC on the overall
situation within thDca' s respective district, with special regard to
specifie events, incidents and activities occurring indistr incdt~
(4) direct the Ioint Patrols and the Joint Mobile Units set up in
accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article and Article V,
paragraph 2.c below, operating within the DCQ's respective district.
d. The DCOs shall commence operations immediately upon the signing of this
Agreement.e. Each DCa will be continuously staffed by a team ofup ta six officers from
each side, comprising one commander and five duty officers.
f. The DCOs will be operated jointly by both sides, 24 hours a day. At least
one duty officer from each side, as well as the necessary number of
assistants, will be present during each eight-hour shift.
g. With a view ta preventing friction and ta enabling the !WO sides ta deal
with possible incidents, bath sides shaHensure that the relevant DCa shaH
immediately be notified of any of the following events:
(1) routine, scheduled or unscheduled activity or deplayment by the
Israeli military forces or the PaIestinian Police that directly affects the
security responsibility of the other side. This includes activity or
deployment in the proximity of Settlements or Palestinian populated
locaIities, as the case may be;
(2) events that pose a threat to public arder;
(3) activities that disturb the regular flow of traffic on the main roads,
including roadblocks and roadworks;
(4) incidents involving both Israelis and Palestinians, such as road
accidents, rescue of casualties or persans in morraI danger,
engagement steps or any incident inwhich a weapon is used~
(5) a terrorist action of any kind and from any source;
(6) infiltrations between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel; and
(7) aIl cases in which Israelis are hospitalized in the West Bank or the
Gaza Strip, or in wruch Palestinians of the West Bank or the Gaza
Strip are hospitalized in Israel.
h. Each DCa shall notify the relevant Israeli and Palestinian headquarters, as
weil as the Joint Patrois operating in the relevant district, of the occurrence
of any of the events listed in subparagraph g. above.
1. The JSe may modify the cootent of the list of events included 10
subparagraph g. above.
J. Any event involving injury ta Israelis, at any location within the West Bank
or the Gaza Strip, shaH be immediately reported to Israel through the
relevant DCO. Israel may employ any means necessary for the evacuation
and treatment of such injured persons, and will coordinate such activity
through the relevant DCO. k. The DCOs shaHbe equipped with the necessary means of communication
ta enable direct and immediate contact bath with the Joint Patrols and the
relevant RSC, as well as with each side's respective police or militaI)'
district headquarters.
4. Joint Patrols
a. The mission of the Joint Patrols shaH be to assist in ensuring free,
unimpeded and secure movement along the roads designated in Articles V
and VI below.
b. Unless the JSe decides otherwise, the Joint Patrols shaHeach he composed
of two 4-wheel drive vehicles, one Palestinian and one Israeli, equipped
with adequate communications systems. The vehicles shaHbe marked sa as
to be easily distinguishable from ail other vehicles in the area. In each
vehicle there will be an officer and three uniformed and anned guards.
c. The Joint Patrols will patrol 24 hours a day, in vehicles along their routes
of activity, or as directed by the relevant DCO. Joint Patrois on the Lateral
Roads in the Gaza Strip will aiso patrol on foot along their routes of
activity, and on the adjacent sides of the roads upon which the security of
the traffic along these roads is dependent.
d. On roads under Israeli security responsibility, the Israeli vehide will be the
leading vehicle. On roads under Palestinian security responsibility, the
Palestinian vehicle will be the leading vehicle. The Joint Patrols will be
under the direction of the relevant DCO.
e. The Joint Patrols shaHcontinuously monitor movement within their area of
operation and shall act ta prevent and deal with incidents that Maythreaten
or endanger persans using the roads. They shaHreport any such incident or
threat thereof, as weIl as any action taken, ta the relevant Dea, and to the
respective Israeli military and Palestinian police district headquarters.
f. On reaching the scene of an incident, the Joint Patroi will take aUmeasures
necessary ta deal with the incident, and provide assistance as necessary.
The Joint Patroi shaHverify that the appropriate measures have been taken
and report to the relevant DeO accordingly.
5. Joint Mobile Units
a. The mission of the Joint Mobile Units (hereinafter "IMUs") is to provide
rapid response in the event of incidents and emergency situations, in arder
ta ensure free, unimpeded and secure movement along their designated
routes of activity, or in their areas of activity.
b. The composition of the JMUs will be similar ta that of the Joint Patrois. c. In areas under Israeli security responsibility, the Israeli vehicle will be the
leading vehicle. [n areas under Palestinian security responsibility, the
Palestinian vehic1ewill be the leading vehicle. The Joint Mobile Units will
be under the direction of the relevant DCO.
d. The functionsofthe JMUs are:
(1) ta monitor movement along their designated routes of activity from
their stationary locations, from where they may patrol on agreed
roads as directed by the relevant DCO, in which case their duties will
be the same as those of the Joint Patrols;
(2) in the event of an incident involving both Israelis and Palestinians, to
reach the site of the incident in arder ta provide assistance and ta
investigate; and
(3) any other function determined by the relevant DCO.
6. Joint Liaison Bureaus
Joint Liaison Bureaus established by the two sides shaHoperate at crossing points and
at terminais as described in Articles V, VI and VIII ofthis Annex.
7. Gtber joint activities may be agreed upon in the JSC and/or the RSC.
ARTICLE IV
The Palestinian Police
1. Duties and Functions
As detailed in the Palestinian law, the Palestinian Police shaH carry out its duties and
functions in accordance with this Agreement as follows:
a. maintaining internai security and public order;
b protecting the public and aIl other persons present in the areas, as weil as
protecting their property, and acting to provide a feeling of security, safety
and stability;
c. adopting ail measures necessary for preventing crime in accordance with
the law;
d. prote::ting public installations, infrastructure and places of special
importance~
e. preventing acts ofharassment and retribution; f. combating terrorism and violence, and preventing incitement to violence;
and
g. performing any other normal police functions.
2. Structure and Composition
a. The P!lestinian Police shaHconsist of one integral unit under the control of
the Council. It shaHbe composed of six branches:
(1) Civil Police (Al Shurta);
(2) Public Security;
(3) Preventive Security;
(4) AmnAl Ri'asah;
(5) Intelligence; and
(G) Emergency Services and Rescue (Al Difa'a Al Madani).
In each district, ail members of the six Police branches shaHbe subordinate
to one central commando
b. The Palestinian Police shaH have a Palestinian Coastal Police unit ln
accordance with Article XIV of this Annex.
3. Deplayment
a. During the interim periad, the total number of policemen of the Palestinian
Police in all its branches in the West Bank.and the Gaza Strip will be no
more than 30,000 out ofwhich up to 12,000 policemen may be deployed in
the West Bank and up ta 18,000 policemen in the Gaza Strip. These
numbers may be changed by agreement, if necessary. The Palestinian side
will notify Israelof the oames of the policemen recruited to the Palestinian
Police inthe Gaza Strip.
b. In accordance with the stages of the first phase of redeployment of Israeli
forces in the West Bank, up ta 6,000 of the above-mentioned 12,000
Palestinian policemen may be deployed in the West Bank in Area A and, as
set out in paragraph 3 of Article V, in Area B, as detailed in Appendix 2.
c. The remaining 6,000 Palestinian policemen will be deployed in the West
Bank according to the phases of the further redeployments or as needed, as
agreed upon by the two Parties. d. The PalestinianPolice shall be deployed as shawn on attached map Nos. 3
and 5.
4. Recruitment
a. The PalestinianPolice shan consist of policemen recruited locally, and from
abroad (from among individuals holding Jordanian passparts or Palestinian
documents issued by Egypt). The number of Palestinian recruits fram
abroad shaHnat exceed 5,000 in the West Bank and 7,000 În the Gaza
Strip.
b. Palestinian policemen caming from abroad May be accompanied by their
spouse and sons and daughters.
c. The Palestinian policemen to be recruited pursuant to this Agreement shaH
be West Bank or Gaza Strip residents who will be duly trained ta perform
police funetions.
d. The Palestinian side will natify Israel of any candidate for recruitment to
the Palestinian Police. Should Israel abject to the recruitment of any such
candidate, that persan shaHnot be recruited.
e. In accordance with Palestinian law, the employment of policemen who
have been canvicted of serious crimes, or have been found to be actively
involved in terrorist activities subsequent ta their recruitment, will be
immediately terminated, and their weapons and police identification
documentation willbe confiscated.
5. Arms. Ammunitionand Eguipment
a. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, uniformed policemen May carry
arms, and plainclothes policemen on duty who hold special accreditation
May cany persona! light arms concealed in their c1othing, in accordance
with tbis Agreement.
b. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Police will possess the following arms
and equipment:
(1) up ta 4,000 rifles;
(2) up to 4,000 pistols;
(3) up to 120 machine guns of 0.3" or OS' caliber; and
(4) up to 15 light, unarmed riot vehicles of a type to be agreed on
between the two sides in the JSe. c. In the GazaStrip, the Palestinian Police will possess the following anns
and equipment:
(1) 7,000 light personal weapons;
(2) up to 120 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5" caliber; and
(3) up to 45 wheeled armored vehicles of a type to be agreed on
between the two sides, and of which 22 will be deployed in
protecting Council installations. The use ofwheeled annored vehicles
in the Security Perimeter, on the Lateral Roads and on their adjacent
sides, or in the vicinity of the Settlements shaHbe approved through
the relevant DCa. Movement of' such vehicles along the central
North-South road (Road No. 4) in the Gaza Strip may take place
only after providing notificationta the relevant DCO.
d. The number of arms or items of equipment specified in subparagraphs b.
and c. above may be increased subject to the agreement of both sides.
e. The Palestinian Police will maintainan updated register of ail weapons held
by its personnel.
f The Palestinian Police may possess conununication systems, subject to
Article 36 of Annex III, and distinctive uniforms, identification badges and
vehicle markings.
g. In this Annex, the term "weapons" includes fireanns, ammunition and
explosives of aIlkinds.
6. Introduction of Arros. Equipment and Foreign Assistance
a. Ali foreign contributions and other forms of assistance to the Palestinian
Police must comply with the provisions of tbis Agreement.
b. The introduction of arms, anununition or equipment intended for the
Palestinian Police shallbe coordinated through the ISC, in accordance with
its established practices.
7. Movement
Movement of Palestinian policemen between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
willbe conàucted in accordance with Article X of this Annex.--------------------------
ARTICLE V
Security Arrangements in the West Bank
1. Coordination and Cooperation in the West Bank
As shawn on map No. 4, eight DCOs will function in the West Bank, as follows:
a. a DCa for the Jenin District, located at the Quabatiya junction or in its
vicinity;
b. a DCa for the Nablus District, located at the Hawara Junction;
c. a DCa for the Tulkarm District, located at the Kaddouri Junction;
d. a DCa for the Qalqilya District located at Tsufin Junction;
e. a DCO for the Ramallah District, located at the Beth El junction or in its
vicin!ty;
f. a DCa for the Bethlehem District, located at the Panorama Hills in Beit
Jala;
g. a DCO for the Hehron District, located at Har Manoakh (Jabal Manoah);
and
h. a DCa for the Jericho District, located at Vered Yericho, that willmaintain
a subordinate Joint Liaison Bureau in the Allenby Terminal.
2. Area A
a. The Council 'VIl, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military
forces ;1each c1istrict,as set out in Appendix 1 to this Annex, assume the
powers and respo:1sibilities for internai security and public order in Area A
in that district.
b. Jewish Holy Sites
(1) The following provlslons will apply with respect ta the security
arrangements in Jewish holy sites in Area A which are listed in
Appendix 4 to this Annex:
(a) While the protection of these sites, as weIl as of persons
visit th~mn,will be under the responsibility of the Palestinian
Police, a JMU shaH function in the vicinity of, and on the
access rouks to, each such site, as directed by the relevant
DCD.:-----_.
(b) The functions of each such JMU shall he as follows:
(i) ta ensure free, unimpeded and secure access ta the
relevant Jewish holy site; and
(ü) ta ensure the peaceful use of such site, to prevent any
potential instances of disorder and ta respond ta any incident.
(c) Given the Jewish religious nature of such sites, IsraeIi
plainclothes guards may he present inside such sites.
(2) The present situation and the existing religious practices shall he
preserved.
c. Clarifications Conceming the lericho Area
With regard ta the definition of the lericho Area, as delineated on attached
map No. 1, itis hereby clarified that Route No. 90 crossing Auja from
South ta North and the East-West raad cannecting Route No. 90 with
Yitav, and their adjacent sides, shall remain under Israeli authority. For the
purpose of tbis Article, the width of each such road and its adjacent sides,
as shawn on attached map No. 1, shall extend at least 12 meters on each
side measured from its center.
3. Aleas Band C
a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area
B. Israel will transfer ta the Council and the Couneil will assume
responsibility for public arder for Palestinians. Israel shaH have the
overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis
and confronting the threat of terrorism.
b, ln Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public
arder for Palestinians and shaH be deployed in arder to accommodate the
Palestinian needs and requirements in the fallowing manner:
(JJ The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in
towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 3 ta tbis Annex
and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank. RSC may agree on
the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.
(2) The Palestinian Police shaHbe responsible for handling public arder
incidents in which only Palestînians are involved.
(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where
police stations and posts are located, as set Qut in paragraph b.l
above. (4) White the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B
outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will
be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the
relevant DCa, tbree months after the completion of redeployment
from Area B, the DeOs may decide that movement of Palestinian
policemen from the police stations in Area B ta Palestinian towns
and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian
trafficwilltake place after notifying the DCO.
(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior ta confirmation
through the relevant DCO shaH include a scheduled plan, including
the number of policemen, as welI as the type and number of weapons
and vehicles intended ta take part. It shaH also include details of
arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through
appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement ta·
the area of the planned operation, including the destination and
routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for retuming
to the police station or post.
The Israeli side of the DCa will provide the Palestinian side with its
response, foHowing a request for movement of policemen in
accordance with tms paragraph, in normal or routine cases within
one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.
(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct
joint security activities on the main roads as set out in this Annex.
(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names
of the policemen, nurnber plates of police vehicles and seriai numbers
of weapons, with respect ta each police station and post in Area B.
(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internai secUfity
responsibility ta the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be
carried out in three phases, each ta take place after an intelVai of six
months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the
Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and
of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.
(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six
months of the completion of the first phase of redeployrnent.
4. Joint Patrols
a. Joint Patrols led by a Palestinian vehicle will operate on each of the
following roads, as indicated on map No. 4:
(1) the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Jenin;
(2) the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Nablus; (3) the main east-west road (Route Nos. 57 and 60) crossing Nablus;
(4) the main east-west road (Route No. 57) crossing Tulkarm;
(5) the main east-west road (Route No. 55) crossing Qalqilya;
(6) the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Ramallah;
(7) the main east-west road (Route No. 3) crossing Ramallah;
(8) the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Bethlehem;
(9) the main east-west road crossing Beit Jala;
(10) the main north-south road (Route No. 90) crossing Jericho; and
(lI) the road crossing Hebron, as set out in Article VII (Bebron) be1ow.
The operation of the Joint Patrols in each district will commence after the
completion of redeployment in the respective district.
b. Each DCa win be allowed, within 3 months after the cornpletion of the
redeployrnent in its respective district, to decide that Joint Patrols will
function on roads crossing areas A, B and C.
5. Joint Mobile Units
a. Joint Mobile Units will operate in Area B and will be led by the Israeli
vehicle. Three such Joint Mobile Units shall be located at each DCa. One
will be on alert 24 hours a day. The two others will perform missions as
directed by the DCO during daylight hours.
b. A Joint Mobile Unit shaH be located at the Auja junction being the
intersection of Route No. 90 and the road to Yitav. This unit shan be led
by the Israeli vehic1e, and may be directed by the DCO to deal with certain
incidents occurring on the road between Auja and Jericho in which
Palestinians are involved.
c. A Joint Mobile Unit shall be located at the Nahal Elisha junction on the
road from Jericho to the Mousa Allami project.
6. Movement of Palestinian Policemen
Movement of uniformed policemen, whether armed or unarmed, as weIl as armed
on-duty plainc10thes policemen, in Area C, will be confirmed and coordinated by
the relevant DCO. Mcvement of such policemen between Area A and Area B
will be approved by the relevant DCa. 7. Rachel's Tomb
a. Without derogating from Palestinian security responsibility in the City of
Bethlehem, the two sides hereby agree on the foHowing security
arrangements regarding Rachel's Tomb which will be considered a special
case during the hterim Period:
(1) While the Tomb, as weil as the main road leading from Jerusalem to
the Tomb, as indicated on map No.l, willbe under the security
responsibilityof Israel, the free movement of Palestinians on the main
roadwillcontinue.
(2) For the purpose of protecting the Tomb, three Israeli guard posts
may be located in the Tomb, the roof of the Waqf building, and the
parking lot.
b. The present situation and existing practices in the Tomb shallbe preserved.
ARTICLE VI
Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip
1. The De~imit Linng
a. For the purpose of the present Agreement only, and without prejudice to
the permanent status negotiations on borders, the line delimiting the
northem and eastern edge of the Gaza Strip follows the fence on the
ground,as delineated on attached map No. 2 by an unbroken green line
(herei~ "the.Detiei!ngLine") and shaHhave no other effect.
b. The Pa!ties reaffifm that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security
fenee between the Gaza Strip and Israel'shaHrernain in place, and that the
tine demarcatedy the fence shaHbe authoritative only for the purpose of
this Agreement.
2. Security Perimeter
a. There will be a security perimeter along the Delimiting Line inside the
Gaza Strip as delineated on attached map No. 2 by a broken green line
(hereinafterthe Security Perimeter").
b. ln ac(;ordance with the provisions ofthis Agreement, the Palestinian Police
willbe r-:lsponsiblefor security in the Security Perimeter.
C. The Palestinian Police will enforce special security measures aimed at
preventing infiltrations across the Delimiting Line or the introduction into
the Security Perimeter of any arms, ammunition or related equipment,
1 except for the arms, ammunitions or equipment of the Palestinian Police,
authorized through the relevant DCO.
d. Activities of the Palestinian Police inside the Security Perimeter will be
coordinated through the relevant DCO. Security activities in Israel in the
vicinity of the Delimiting Line that directly affect the other side will be
coordinated with the Palestinian Police through the relevant DCO.
3. The Israeti Settlements
a. In accordance with the DOP, during the interim period, the Gush Katif and
Erez settlement areas, as weil as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as
delineated on attached map No. 2 by a blue line, will be under Israeli
authority.
b. Palestinians will be free to move along the coast road and along the road
from the Netzarim Junction to the seashore.
4. The Yellow Area
a. In the areas detineated by a broken red tine and shaded in yellow in
attached map No. 2 (hereinafter "the Yellow Area"), and without
derogating from Palesrinian atlthority, responsibility will be shared as
follows: the Israeli authorities will have the overriding responsibility and
powers for security, and the Council will have the responsibility and
powers for civil affairs, subject to this Agreement. In addition, with regard
to the Yellow Area, cooperation and coordination in security matters,
including Joint Patrols, as agreed, will be implemented.
b. Entryof Palestinian policemen into the Yellow Area and their activity
therein may take place as agreed upon through the relevant DCO.
c. Without derogating from the above, white the Palestinian side shall have
responsibility and powers for public order for Palestinians in the Mawasi
Area, Israel shaHretain the responsibility and powers for internai security.
Accordingly, the area shaHbe treated as Area B throughout the interim
period in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article V
above. For the purpose of exercising Palestinian public arder responsibility
and powers, Palestinian uniformed Civil Police (Al Shurta) policemen may
enter the Mawasi Area after coordination and confirmation of their
movement and activity through the relevant DCO.
5. The Mawasi Area
a. As shown on map No. 2, two Joint Patrals will operate in the Mawasi area,
the fishermen's wharves of Rafah and Khan Yunis and along the coast
road, led by the Israeli vehicle.b. Access of Palestinians ta the Mawasi area, as delineated on attached map .
No. 2, will be by the following roads:
(1) Rafah - Tel Sultan - Mawasi~
(2) Khan Yunis - El Bahr Village; and
(3) Deir El BaBah- along the beach to the Mawasi.
c. The Mawasi Beach
(1) Notwithstanding Israeli authority over the Gush Katif seulement
area, the Council may operate sections of the Mawasi beach
extending to the east up to the coast road, totaling, together with the
Rafah and Khan Yunis wharves, five (5)kilometers. Israel has notified
the Palestinian Authority of the locations ofthese sections.
(2) These sections may be used for the following purposes:
(a) sport and recreation, including boat hire facilities;
(b) operating food establishments;
(c) enlarging the wharves;
(d) expailding the facilities for fishermen, such as offices,
warehouses and cold storage facilities; and
(e) an hote!.
(3) In these sections, the Council, in exercising its civil authority, will be
able ta grant licenses for businesses, collect fees and taxes, set and
enforce public health standards and develop and manage the tourist
sector.
(4) In each of the fishermen's wharves, the Coundl may have an office
building which shaHbe protected.
(5) There will not be any construction by Israelis of new sites along the
beach.
(6) During a period ofthree months from the signing ofthis Agreement,
Israelmay consider, in light of the security situation, the use by the
Councit of additional beach sections.6. The Egyptian Border
The Military Installation Area along the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip, as
delineated on attached map No. 2by a blue line and shaded in pink, willbe under
Israeli authority.
The village of Dahaniya will remain part of the Military Installation Area pending
a declaration of a general amnesty for the residents of the village, and provision
having been made for their protection. Upon realization of the above amnesty
and protection, the viliage of Dahaniya will become pan of the Yellow Area.
7. Lateral Roads to the Settlements
a. Without derogating from Palestinian authority and in accordance with the
Declaration of Principies:
(1) On the three lateral roads connecting the Israeli settlements in the
Gaza Strip to Israel, namely: the Kissufim-Gush Katif road; the Sufa
Gush Katifroad; and the Karni-Netzarim road, as indicated by a Iight
blue line vn attached map No. 2, including the adjacent sides upon
which the security of traffic along these roads is dependent
(hereinafter "the Lateral Roads"), the Israeli authorities will have all
necessary responsibilities and powers in arder ta conduct
independent security activity, inc1udingIsraeli patrals.
(2) Joint Patrols will operate along the Lateral Roads. Such joint patrals
will be led by the Israeli vehicle.
(3) Where the Israeli authorities carry out engagement steps, they will do
sa with a view to transferring, at the earliest opportunity, the
continued handling of the incidents falling within the Palestinian
responsibility, to the Palestinian Police.
(4) Overpasses will be constructed on intersections between the Lateral
Roads and the central North- South raad (Raad No. 4).
b. Where the Lateral Roads overlap the Security Perimeter, the two sides, in
the exercise of their respective powers and responsibilities, will fully
coordinate their activity in arder to prevent friction.
8. The Central North-South Road (Road No. 4)
A Joint Patrol led by the Palestinian vehicle will be operated along the central
North-South road (Road No. 4) in the Gaza Strip between Kfar Darom and
Wadi Gaza.9. Joint Mobile Units
a. Joint Mobile Units willbe located at the following junctions:
(1) the Nissanit junction~
(2) the Netzarim junction;
(3) the Deir el-Ballah junction; and
(4) the Sufa-Morag junction.
b. At the Netzarim junction, the Israeli side of this Joint Mobile Unit will
check [sraeli vehicles, which will then be able ta continue their joumey
without interference. This Joint Mobile Unit will also operate as a Joint
Patral between the Netzarim junction and Wadi Gaza under the direction
of the relevant DCO.
10. Coordination and Cooperation in the Gaza Strip
Two DCOs will function in the Gaza Strip as follows:
a. A DCa for the Gaza district, located at the Erez crossing point with
subordinate Joint Liaison Bureaus at the Erez and Naha! Oz crassing
points.
b. A DCO for the Khan Yunis district, located at the Nuriya Camp with
subordinate Joint Liaison Bureaus at the Sufa crassing points and at the
Rafah Terminal.
ARTICLE VU
Guidelines for Bebron
1. a. There will be aredeployment of Israeli military forces in the city of Hebron
except for places and raads where arrangements are necessary for the
security and protection of Israelis and their movements. The areas of such
redeployment are detineated by red and blue tines and shaded in orange
stripes on a yellow background on attached map No. 9 (hereinafter "Area
H-I ").
b. This redeployment will be completed not later than six months after the
signing of this Agreement.
The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-l similar ta
2. a.
those in other cities in the West Bank. b. AlI civilpowers and responsibilities, set out in Annex: m of this
Agreement, will be transferred ta the Council inthe City of Hebron as in
the other cities in the West Bank.
c. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-l,
manned by a total of up ta 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and
anned with 200 pistais, and 100 rifles for the protection of thase stations.
d. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-I. Any activity or
mavement by it autside trus area will be carried out after coordination and
confirmation through the DCa established in paragraph 6 ofthis Article.
e. The Imara win be tumed over to the Palestinian side upon the completion
of th~ r~deploy m.ldn llbecome the headquarters of the Palestinian
Police in the city of Hebron.
3. According ta the DOP, Israel will continue ta carry the responsibility for overall
security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internai security and
public arder.
4. a. In the area of the city of Hebron from which Israel military forces will not
redeploy, as delineated by red and blue lines on attached map No. 9
(hereinafter "Area H-2"), Israel will retain aH powers and respansibilities
for ir.t.!fr.alsecurity and public arder.
b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred ta the
CounciL except f:)f thase relating ta Israelis and their property which shaH
continue ta be exercised by Israeli Military Government.
c. In Area H-2, plainclathes unarmed municipal inspectors will monitor and
enforce vis-a-vis Palestinians, compliance with the laws and regulations,
witrun the civil powers and responsibilities transferred ta the Council in
Hebron.
5. The municipality of Hebron willcontinue to provide all municipal services to aIl
parts of the city of Hebron.
6. a. A DCa will be located at Har Manoakh (Jabal Manoah).
b. Upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces,JMU will
operate throughout the city of Hebron, including in the Old City, jf
requiredta do sa by the abovementioned DCa.
C. A Joint Patrolwillfunction in Hebron on the road from Ras e-Jura ta the
narth of the Durajunction via E-Salaarn road and on Route No. 35.
d. Three months after the completion of the redeployment, the DCO will
consider the reassignmentof the Joint Patrol to other parts ofHebron. 7. Measures and procedures for normalizing life in the Old City and on the roads of
Hebron will be taken immediate1y after the signing ofthis Agreement, as follows:
a. opening of the wholesale market - Hasbahe, as a retail market;
b. removal of the barrier on the road leading from Abu Sneineh to Shuhada
Road in arder ta facilitate the movement on these roads;
c. reopening of the main entrance to the Islamic Conege~
d. replacement of the closed roadblock at the Ras e-Jura junction by a
normally open trafflc supervision system~
e. replacement of the readblock at the Harsinajunction by a regular position;
f. opening of the route from the Sa'air Shiukh road ta Hebron;
g. opening of the Tnuva Raad; and
h. removal of the two barriers in the vicinity of the Raranta School near the
North Dura junction.
8. A high level Joint Liaison Committee will be established in order ta deal with the
security situation in Hebren after completion of the redeployment.
9. a. Since the two sides are unable ta reach agreement regarding the Tomb of
the Patriarchs / Al Haram AI Ibrahimi, they have agreed to keep the
present situation as is.
b. Three months after the redeployment the high level Joint Liaison
Committee will review the situation.
10. There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides
will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members
and its area of operation.
11. Immediately after the completion of the redeployment, measures must be taken
to ensure a stable and secure situation throughout the Hebron area, free from
efforts to undermine this Agreement or the peace process.
12. Hebron will continue to be one city, and the division of security responsibili ty
will not divide the city. ARTICLE VIII
Passages
1. General
a. White Israel remains responsible during the interim period for external
security, including along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, border
crossing shaH take place according to the arrangements included in this
Article. These arrangements airn at creating a mechanism that facilitates the
entry and exit of people and goods, reflecting the new reality created by
the DOP, while providing full security for both sides.
b. The arrangements included in this Article shaH apply to the following
border crossings:
(1) the Allenby Bridge crossing; and
(2) the Rafah crossing.
c. A j.cint Israeli-Palestinian committee will decide on applying the
arra..'1gementsinc!uded in this Articleto the Damya Bridge crossing and, in
parailei,on alternatives.
d. The provisions of the Protocol Regarding Arrangements with Respect to
Passages, signed on October 3l, 1994 in Casablanca, as amended and
attached ta this Annex as Appendix 5 (hereinafter "Appendix 5"), will
continue to be applicable for the duration of this Agreement, unless
otherwise agreed upon. Immediate1y upon the signing of tbis Agreement,
the CAC shaH review the amended Protocol and, in this context, consider
the Palestinian request that with regard to the administration of the
passages, the Israel Airport Authority be replaced by the lsraeli military
government.
e. The same arrangements will be applied by the Parties, with the necessary
adjustments, to agreed seaports, airports or other international crossings,
such as the Abdullah bridge.
f. The two sides are determined to do their utmost ta maintain the dignity of
persans passing through the border crossings. Tc this end, the mechanism
created will rely heavily on brief and modem procedures.
g. In each border crossîng there will be one terminal, consisting oftwo wings.
The first wing will serve Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip and visitors to these areas (hereinafter "the Palestinian Wing").
The s'3cond wing will serve Israelis and others (hereinafter "the Israeli
Wing"). There will be a c10sed Israeli checking area and a closed
Palesti,1ian checking area, as set out below. h. Special arrangements applicable ta VIPs crossing through the Palestinian
Wing, are set out in Appendix 5.
2. Control and Management of the Passages
a. For the purpose ofthis Article, "passage" is defined to mean the area from
the crossing barrier at the Egyptian border or the Allenby Bridge, passing
through and including the terminal and:
(1) with regard ta the Allenby Bridge crossing, from the terminal up ta
the lericho Area; and
(2) with regard to the Rafah crossing, from the terminal up ta the outer
limit of the Israel military location aJong the Egyptian border.
b. (1 ) Israel will have the responsibility for seeurity throughou t the passage,
including for the terminal.
(2) An lsraeli difeetor-general will have the responsibility for the
management and security of the terminal.
(3) The director-generai will have two deputies who will report to him:
(a) an Israeli deputy who will be the manager of the Israeli Wing.
Israel win have exclusive responsibility for the management of
the Israeli Wing; and
(b) a Palestinian deputy, appointed by the Council, who will be the
manager of the Palestinian Wing.
(4) Each deputy will have an assistant for seeurity and an assista'.'t for
administration. The assignments of the Palestinian deputies for
security and administration are set out·in Appendix 5.
(5) The Palestînian deputy director-general at the Allenby Bridge
terminal will be able ta travel between this terminal and the 10rdanian
terminal for the purpose of exercising his functions.
(6) There will be maximum coordination between the two sides. Both
;sides will maintain cooperation and coordination on matters of
mu:ual concern.
(7) The director-general will continue to use Palestinian contractors to
provide bus services and other administrative and logistical services. (8) Palestinian policemen present at the terminal will be armed with
handguns. Their deployment is set out in Appendix 5. Other
Palestinian officiais present at the tenninal will be unarmed.
(9) The details of management and security including those relating ta
the Liaison Bureau referred ta in subparagraph 5 below, are set out
in Appendix 5.
(lQ) The two sides will work together in arder to seek ways for additional
arrangements in the Rafah terminal.
c. Except for aU the arrangements included in this Article, the CUITent
procedures and arrangements applicable outside the terminal shaH continue
ta apply throughout the passage.
d. (1) Once incoming passengers have crossed the terminal, they will
proceed ta the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, as appropriate, without
any Interference from Israeli authorities (safe passage).
(2) Outgoing passengers May proceed ta the tennioal without any
Interference from Israeli authorities after jojnt verification that such
passengers hold the necessary documentation for exiting the area to
Jordan or Egypt, as set out in this Agreement.
3. Arrangements for Entry from Egypt and Jordan Through the Palestinian Wing
a. At the entrance ta the PaIestinian Wing there will be a Palestinian
policeman and a raised Palestinian flag.
b. Before entering the Palestinian Wing, passengers will identify their
persona! luggage and itwill be placed on a conveyor belt. Each side will
be able ta inspect such tuggage inside its own checking area, using its own
personnel and, if necessary, rnay open the luggage for inspection in the
presence of the owner and a Palestinian policeman.
c. Persons entering the Palestinian Wing will pass through a magnetic gate.
An Israeli policeman and a Palestinian policeman will be posted on each
side of this gate. In the event of suspicion, each side will be entitled to
require a physical inspection ta be conducted in inspection booths ta be
located adjacent to the gate. Passengers will be inspected by a Palestinian
policeman in the presence of an Israeli policeman. Accompanying personal
belongings may aIso be inspected at trus point.
d. Having completed the above phase, persans entering the Palestinian Wing
will pass through one of two lanes for the purpose of identification and
document control, as follows: (1) The first lane will be used by Palestinian residents of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. These passengers will pass via a Palestinian
counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. Their
documents will be checked by an Israeli officer who will also check
their identity indirectlyn an invisiblemanner.
(2) The second lane will serve visitors to the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. These passengers will first pass via an Israeli counter, where
their documents and identity willbe checked. Then they will continue
via a Palestinian counter, where their documents and identity will be
checked. The two counters will be separated by tinted glass and a
revolving door.
e. In the event of suspicion regarding a passenger in any of the two lanes
described in subparagraph d. above, each side may question such
passengers in its closed checking area. Suspicion justifying questioning in
the closed checking area may be one of the following:
(1) the passenger was involved. directly or indirectly, in criminal or
planned criminal activity, or in terrorist or planned terrorist activity,
and is not a beneficiaryof the amnesty provisions of this Agreement;
(2) the passenger conceals arms, explosives or related equipment~
(3) the passenger holds forged or non-valid documentation or the details
included in the documentation are inconsistent with those included in
the population registry (in case of a resident) or in the data base (in
case of a visitor), except that questions relating to such inconsistency
will initially be raised at the counter and the passenger will be
questioned in the closed checking area ooly if the suspicion has not
been removed, or
(4) the passenger acts in an obviously suspicious behavior during the
passage via the terminal.
If, at the conclusion of this questioning, the suspicion has not been
removed, such passenger may be apprehended, after the other side bas
been notified. In case of a Palestinian suspect being apprehended by the
Israeli side, a Palestinian policeman will be asked to meet with the suspect.
Following notification to the Liaison Bureau, any further treatment of the
apprehended person willbe in accordance with Annex IV.
f In the Palestinian Wing, each side will have the authority ta deny the entry
ofpersons wh(l are not residents of the West Bank and tbe Gaza Strip.
For the purpose cf this Agreement, "residents of the West Bank and the
Gaza StrÎp" means persons who, on the date of entry into force of tbis
Agreement, are registered as residents of these afeas in the population registry maintained by the military government of the West Bank and the
GazaStrip and by the Council, as weIl as persons who have subsequently
obtained permanent residency in these areas with the approval of Israel, as
set out intbis Agreement.
g. Following the above procedure, the passengers will collect their luggage
and proceed to the customs area as described in Annex V, and as set out in
Appendix 5.
h. The Palestinian side will provide passengers whose entry is approved with
an entry permit stamped by the Palestinian side and attached to their
documents.
At the conclusion of the direct and indirect checking of the documents and
identity of passengers passing via the first lane and stamping their entry
permits, the Palestinian officer will provide the passenger with a white card
issued by the lsraeli officer. A Palestinian officialposted at the exit of the
Palestinian Wing will verify that the passenger holds such white card and
will collect the cards with indirect and invisible Israeli checking.
For passengers going through the second Jane, the Israeli officer will
provide the passengers with a blue card, after checking their documents
and identity, and verifying their entry permits. An Israeli and a Palestinian
official posted at the exit of the Palestinian Wing willverify and collect the
cards. White and blue cards eollected will be checked by lsraelî and
Palestinian officiais.
In cases where either side denies the entry of a non-resident passenger, that
passenger will be escorted out of the terminal and sent back to Jordan or
Egypt, as appropriate, after notifying the other side.
4. Arrangements for Exit to Egypt and Jordan Through the Palestinian Wing
Passengers exiting ta Egypt or Jordan through the Palestinian Wing will enter the
terminal without their luggage. Thereafter, the same procedures deseribed in
paragraph 3 above will apply to them, except that the order of passing via the
Israeli and Palestinian eounters will be reversed.
5. Joint Liaison Bureau
a. There will be a Joint Liaison Bureau at each crossing point in order to deal
with matters arising regarding passengers passing through the Palestinian
Wing, issues regarding coordination, and differences regarding the
implementation cf these arrangements. Without derogating from Israel's
responsibilityf'Jrsecurity, the bureau will also deal with incidents.
b. This bureau will be comprised of an equal number of representatives from
each side and will be loeated at a specified location inside each terminal. c. This bureau willbe subordinate to the relevant subcommittee of the CAC.
6. Miscellaneous
a. Special arrangements will be agreed upon by the two sides regarding the
passage of gaads, buses, trucks and privately-owned vehicles. Pending this
agreement, the current arrangements will continue ta apply. The above
mentioned arrangements will be agreed upon within six months from the
date of signing this Agreement.
b. In order ta cross through the border crossings into and out of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, residents of these areas will 'Usedocuments as
detailedin Annex III.
c. The Allenby Bridge terminal will operate from Sunday through Thursday,
between the hours of 08:00 and 24:00, and on Fridays and Saturdays,
between the hours of 08:00 and 15:00, except on Yom Kippur.
ARTICLE IX
Movement loto, Within and Outside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
1. General
a. Israel dedares that work ta relacate the Erez crossing point currently
within the Gaza Strip to a location within Israel adjacent to the Delimiting
Line, is underway. Israel will make every effort ta complete this work as
saon as possible. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee will decide, within
one month from the signing of this Agreement, the timeframe for
completing this work and ait related issues. Pending the completion of this
work, Israel shall retain control over this crossing point and operate it in
accordance with the provisions ofthis Article.
b. lsraelis entering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shaH carry Israeli
documentation (if they are above the age of 16) and, if driving a vehicle, a
driving license and vehicle registration documentation recognized in Israel.
Tourists to Israel entering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shan be
subject to Palestinian laws in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement, shall carry their passports and other relevant documentation,
and may be required by the Palestinian Police ta identif)r themselves by
presenting their passport or documentation, unless otherwise provided in
this Article.
c. Entry of persans from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel shan be
subject ta Israeli laws and procedures regulating entry into Israel, and
residents of these areas shall be required to carry the identity card as agreed lipon in this Agreement, as weil as documentation specified by
Israel and notified through the CAC to the Council.
d. The provisions of this Agreement shaH not prejudice Israel's right, for
security and safety considerations, to close the crossing points to Israel
and ta prohibit or timit the entry inta Israel of persons and of vehicles
from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In addition, the provisions of this
Agreement shaHnot prejudice the use of safe passage.
e. Tourists to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from countries having
diplomatie relations with Israel, who have passed through an international
crossing, will nJt be required to pass any additional entry control before
entry into Israel.
Passage within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel
a. Without derogating from Israel's security powers and responsibilities in
accordance with this Agreement, movement of people, vehicles and goods
in the West Bank, between cities, towns, villages and refugee camps, will
be free and normal, and shall not need to be effected through checkpoints
or roadblocks.
b. Movement between the West Bank and Israel shaH be governed by the
applicable laws, regulations and rules regulating the movernent of persans
and vehicles between the West Bank and Israel, while respecting the
importance of"the economic and social life, development programs and
projects, and emergency health care services of the Palestinian population.
c. The Palestinian Police shaHset up checkpoints in areas under its security
responsibility on roads connecting the West Bank and Israel, for the
purpose of inspection and identification of Palestinian vehicles and
passengers, in arder ta prevent illegal introduction ofweapons inta or from
IsraeL
J Passage between the Gaza Strip and Israel
a. Passage between the Gaza Strip and Israel will be via one or more of the
followicg crossing points:
(1) the Erez crossing point;
(2) the Nahal Oz crossing point;
(3) the Sufa crossing point; and
(4) the Kami (commercial) crossing point (for goods only). b. The Council may set up a checkpoint, within the Gaza Strip, on the road
leading ta the Erez crossÎng point and on the road leading to the Nahal Oz
crossing point, at locations ta be coordinated between the two sides, for
the purpose of inspection and identification of passengers and vehicles.
Israelis and tourists ta Israel passing through these checkpoints May be
only required to identify themselves by presenting Israeli documentation or
a passport, as set out in subparagraph 1.b above. The above requirements
shaHn'Jtapply to uniformed members of the Israeli military forces.
c. The Council May set up a checkpoint, within the Gaza Strip, on the road
leading ta the Sufa crossing point, at a location acceptable ta bath sides.
for the purpose of inspection and identification of Palestinian passengers
and vehicles. Israeli vehicles Maybypass this checkpoint unimpeded.
d. The Council will allow passage of Israelis and tourists to Israel between
the Gaza Strip and Israel, in addition, via the following crossing points:
(1) the Kami (non-commercial) crossing point;
(2) the Kisufim crossing point;
(3) the Kerem Shalom crossing point; and
(4) the Elei Sinaï crossing point.
e. Israelis, and tourists to Israel, who have passed through any of the above
crossing points ioto the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shaHnot be required
to undergo inspection, identification or other requirements in addition to
the stated provisions for entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
outlined in this Article.
f. Arrangements for the movement of goods between the Gaza Strip and
Israel through the crossing points are set out in Annex V.
g. A Palestinian liaison officer will be present at each of the crossing points·
on the Lateral Roads.
ARTICLE X
Sare Passage
1. General
a. There shall be a safe passage connecting the West Bank with the Gaza
Strip for movement of persans, vehicles and goods, as detaited in this
Article. b. Israel will ensure safe passage for persons and transportation during
daylight hours (from sunrise to sunset) or as otherwise agreed by the ISe,
but in any event not less than 10 hours a day.
c. Safe passage through Israel between the West Bank and the GazaStrip
will be effected via the following designated crossing points:
(I) the Erez crossing point (for persans and vehicles only);
(2) the Kami (commercial) crossing point (for goods on1y);
(3) the Tarkumya crossing point; and
(4) an additional crossing point around Mevo Horon.
d, Israel will make such passage available through the routes indicated on
attached map No. 6.
e. Consistent with Article XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Agreement, the
arrangements incJuded in tms Article are without prejudice to the
pennanent status negotiations.
2. Use cf Sare Passage
a. As detailed below, persons using the safe passage shaHcarry, in addition to
persona! and vehicle documentation, the following documents:
(1) a safe passage card; and
(2) (for drivers ooly) a vehicle safe passage permit.
Arrangements for the implementation of the safe passage usage, as weIl as
modalities for the issuance by Israel of safe passage cards and vehicle safe
passage permits, shall be discussed and agreed in the ISe, in consultation
with the CAC.
b. Residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in possession of a permit
enabling them to enter Israel will be able to use this permit as a safe
passage card.
c. Safe passage cards and vehicle safe passage permits shaH be stamped by
the Israeli autborities at the crossing point, with the time of departure from
the crossing point and the estimated time of arrival.
d. israel may deny the use of its territory for safe passage by persans who
have seriously or repeatedly violated the safe passage provisions detailed in
this Article, e. Persans who are denied entry into Israel will use safe passage by means of
shuttle buses which will be escorted by the Israel Police and which will
operate from 7:00 AM ta 2:00 PM on two days of every week. The exact
date and tirnes of such operation will be coordinated through the JSe.
Applications by persans denied entry ta Israel ta use safe passage must be
submitted ta, and agreed upon in, the relevant DCO at least five days prior
to the planned joumey.
f. Special arrangements will apply with respect to the passage of Palestinian
leaders, senior Council officiais, distinguished personalities and guests of
the Ra'ees of the Council. The CAC will define the scope and nature of the
special arrangements, in consultation with the JSe.
g. The movement of Palestinian policemen on duty through the safe passage
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be coordinated through the
JSe.
h. Any additianal matters relating ta the usage of safe passage will be
coordinated through the JSe.
3. M\Jde of Use ofSafe Passage
a. Persans and vehicles using safe passage under these arrangements shall
neither break their joumey nor depart from the designated routes, and shall
complete the passage within the designated time stamped on their safe
passage cards and permits, unless a delay is caused by a medical emergency
or a technical breakdown.
b. Persons using the safe passage through Israel shaHbe subject to Israeli Law.
c. Persans and vehicles using the safe passage shaH not carry explosives,
firearms or other weapons or ammunition, except for special cases that
may be agreed in the JSC.
4. General Provisions Regarding the Safe Passage Routes
a. The above arrangements shall in no way affect the status of the safe
passage and its routes.
b. The safe passage arrangements will not be available on Yom Kippur,
Israel's Memorial Day and Israel's Independence Day.
c. Israel may, for security or safety reasons, temporarily halt the operation of
a safe passage route or modify the passage arrangements while ensuring
that one of the routes is open for safe passage. Notice of such temporary
dosure or modification shaHbe given to the JSe. d. Israel shall notify the Counci! of incidents involving persons using safe
passage routes, through the ISe.
ARTICLE XI
Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters
1. Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Subject ta the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Police and the Israeli
military forces shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights and the
rule of law, and shaH be guided by the need ta protect the public, respect human
dignity and avoid harassment.
2. Weapons
a. Each side shaHenfarce upon civilians, Palestinians Of Israelis, in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with their security responsibility, a
prohibition on possession or carrying of weapons without a license.
b. The Palestinian Police may grant licenses to possess or carry pistols for
civilian use. The modalities for granting such licenses, as weIl as categories
of persons who may be granted sueh licenses, will be agreed upon in the
ISe.
c. Upon the assumption of security responsibility, and in accordance with the
Palestinian law, the Palestinian Police shall declare a period of grace of one
month, during whieh period holders of unlicensed weapons will be required
to declare that they hold sueh weapons and ta apply for licenses. The
Palestinian Police may grant sueh licenses in accordance with subparagraph
b. above, and will enforce the Palestinian security policy set out in Article
II, paragraph 1 of this Annex, against persons who hold unlîcensed
weapons.
d. Israelis may carry weapons licensed in accordance with subparagraph 3.
above.
e. The Palestinian Police will maintain an updated register of ail weapons
licensed by it.
f. The Palestinian Police will prevent the manufacture of weapons as weil as
the transfer of weapons ta persans not licensed to possess them.
g. The use of explosives in quarries and for other civilian purposes will be
only in accordance with modalities and procedures agreed upon in the ISe.3. Engagement Steps
a. For the purpose of this Article, "engagement" shaH mean an immediate
response to an act or an incidenteonstituting a danger to life or property
that is aimed at preventing or terminating such an aet or incident, or at
apprehending its perpetrators.
b. Within the territory under the seeurity responsibility of the Couneil, in
places where Israeli authorities exercise their security funetions in
aecordance with this Annex and in their immediate vieinities, the Israeli
authorities may carry out engagement steps in cases where an act or
incident requires sueh action. Insueh cases, the Israeli authoritieswill take
any measures necessary to bring to an end such an act or incident with a
view to transferring, at the earliest opportunity, the eontinued handling of
the incident falling within the Palestinian responsibility to the Palestinian
Police. The Palestinian Police will immediately be notified, through the
relevant DCO, of such engagement steps.
c. Engagement with the use of firearms in responding to such aets or
incidents shall oot be allowed, except as a last resort after ailattempts at
controlliog the act or the incident, such as warning the perpetrator or
shooting in the air, have failed, or are ioeffective or without any promise of
achieving the intended result in the circumstances. Use of firearms should
be aimed at deterring or apprehending, and not at killing, the perpetrator.
The use of firearms shaHcease once the danger is past.
d. Any activity involving the use of flrearms othèr than for immediate
operational purposes shall be subject to prior notification ta the relevant
DCO.
e. If a person is injured or otherwise in need of assistance, such assistance
win be provided by the side that first reaches the site. If such a person is
under the security responsibility of the other side, the assisting side shaH
notify the relevant DCO and appropriate arrangements shall be made,
pursuant to this Agreement, for treatment and hospitalization.
4. Rules of Conduct on Roads for Israelis
a. Israeli military forces and Israeli civilians may continue to use roads freely
within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
b. On the main roads that are jointly patrolled, vehicles bearing Israeli license
plates shaH not be stopped except for identification, which shall be.
condueted by a Joint Patrol, pursuant to the provisions of Article III ofthis
Annex. The Israeli side of such a patrol may carry out identity and vehicle
docu:nentation checks. In the event that a vehicle bearing a license plate
issued by either the Council or the Civil Administration is stopped, the Palestinian side of the Joint Patrol may carry out identity and vehicle
documentation checks.
C. On other roads, vehicles bearing lsraeli license plates shaHnot be stopped
by the Palestinian Police, except that such vehicles may be stopped in the
Gaza Strip, in Area A or in places in Area B where there is a police station
or post, for the purpose of identification checks of the above-mentioned
documentation.
d. lsraelis shaHunder no circumstances be apprehended or placed in custody
or prison by Palestinian authorities. However, where an lsraeli is susppcted
of having committed an offense, he or she may be detained in place by the
Palestinian Police while ensuring his or her protection, in accordance with
the provisions of Annex IV, until the arrivai of a Joint Patrol, called
immediately by the Palestinian Police, or of other lsraeli representatives
dispatched by the relevant DCa.
e. Israeli redestria,ls may be required ta produce identity documentation (if
above the age of sixteen). Thereafter, they shan be treated in accordance
with the provisions ofthis Article.
f Unifolmerl members of the Israeli military forces, as weil as vehicles of the
Israeli military forces, shall not be stopped by the Palestinian Police in any
circumstances, and shall not be subject to any identification requirements.
Without derogating from the above, in the event of suspicion regarding
such a person or vehicle, the Palestinian Police may notify the lsraeli
authorities through the relevant DCa, in order to request appropriate
assistance.
g. Velification, purslJant to this Article, of the identity of persons who claim
to be lsraelis but cannot present appropriate identification documentation,
will be confirmed by the Israeli side of a Joint Patrol, called by the
Palestinian Police, or by other Israeli representatives dispatched by the
relevant DCa,
ARTICLE XII
Security Arrangements Concerning Planning, Building and Zoning
1. General Provisions
a. Notwithstanding the p:-ovisions relating to planning, building and zoning
set out e1sewhere in this Agreement, the provisions of this Article shaH
apply with respect to the areas specified below.
b. These arrangements will be reviewed within a period of six months from
the signing of this Agreement, and, thereafter, every six months, with a view ta modifying them, with due consideration ta Palestinian plans for
establishing economic projects, and ta the security concerns ofboth sides.
c. The limitations set out below on the construction of buildings and
installations in specifie areas shaHnot require the demolition or removal of
existing buildings or installations.
2. Provisions regarding the West Bank
a. Buildings or installations shall not be constructed or erected and naturaI
and artificial culture shaIl not be altered, on either side of the roads
delineated in blue on map No. 7 up to a distance of 50 meters from the
center ofthese roads.
b. Bridges or other structures will not be built which may prevent the
movement on roads ofverucles afa height ofup to 5.25 meters.
c. In the areas sh::l.dedin pu:ple on map No. 7, construction will be limited ta
a height of 15 rneters.
d. Any buildings or installations constructed or erected contrary ta tbis
paragraph shall be dismantled.
3. Provisions regarding the Gaza Strip
a. The existing buildings, installations and natural and artificial culture in the
Gaza Strip witrun a distance of 100 meters from the Delimiting Line shall
remain as they are at present.
b. Withiri the next 500 meters cf the Security Perimeter, and within the
Yellow Area, buildings or installations may be constructed, provided that:
(1) one building or installation may be constructed on each plot, the size
ofwhich shall not be less than 25 duriams; and
(2) such building or installation shan not exceed two floors, of a sÎze not
exceeding 180 sq. meters per floor.
The Council shall maintain the predominantly agricultural character of the
remaining areas of the Security Perimeter.
c. Buildings or installations shaH not be constructed on either side of the
Lateral Roads up to a distance of 75 meters from the center of these
Roads.
d. For the purpose of enforcing tbis Article, the United States has provided
both sides with satellite photographs of the Gaza Strip ,depicting the buildings, installations and natural and artifieial culture existing at the time
of the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.
ARTICLE XIII
Security of the Airspace
1. Operation of airerait for the use of the Couneil in the West Bank and the Gaz.a
Strip shaHbe initially as follows:
a. Two (2) transport helicopters for VIP transportation within and between
the West Bank and the Gaz.a Strip_
b. Up to 3 helicopters for the purpose of transport missions to approved
landing pads.
e. 3 fixed-wing transport aireraft with up to 35 persons capacity, for
transporting persons between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. Changes in the number, type and capacity of aireraft may be diseussed and
agreed upon in a Joint Aviation Subcommittee of the JSC (hereinafter "the
JAC").
3. The Council may immediately establish and operate in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip provisional airstrÎps for the helicopters and fixed wing aireraft
referred to in paragraph 1 above, in accordance with arrangements and
modalities to be discussed and agreed upon in the JAC.
4. Ali aviation activity or use of the airspace by any aerial vehicIe in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip shalI require prior approval of Israel. It shaH be subjeet ta
Israeli air traffie control inc1uding, inter alia, monitoring and regulation of air
routes as well·as relevant regulations and requirements to be implemt~ il1t{:d
accordance with the Israel Aeronautical Information Publication, the relevant
parts ofwhlch will be issued after consultation with the Council.
5. Aircrlft taking off fmm, and landing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall
be registered and licensed in Israel or in other states members of International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Air crews of such aircraft shalll1e Iiccl1~,(!d
in Israel or in such other states, provided that such licenses have been approved
and recommended by the Council and validated by Israel.
6. Palestinian Civil Aviation and airline staff may be recruited locally and from
abroad. The number of Palestinians recruited from abroad shall not exceed 400.
This number may be changed by agrE';ement,if necessary.
7. Aircraft referred to in this Article shan not carry firearms, ammumtlOn,
explosives or weapons systems, unless otherwise approved by both sides Special arrangements for armed guardsescorting high ranking officiais, will be agreed
upon in the JAC.
8. The location of navigational aids and other aviation equipment will be approved
by Israel through theJAC.
9. a. The Council sha'Jensure that only the aviation activity in accordance with
this Agreement will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
b. Furth-er powers and responsibilities may be transferred ta the Council
through the JAC.
c. The Council may establish a Palestinian Civil Aviation Department to act
on its beha1fin accordance with the provisions in this Article and of this
Agreement.
10. a. Aviation activity by Israel will continue to be operated above the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the same limitations applicable in Israel
regarding civil and military flights over densely-populated areas.
b. Isra w illnatify the Council of emergency rescue operations, searches and
investigation of aerial accidents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Searches and investigations of civilian aircraft accidents in which
Palestinians or their property are involved, will be conducted by Israel with
the participation of the Council.
Il. Guided by the principle that the two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
a single territorial unit, as set out in Article IV of theDOP. and in order to
enable the smooth operation of flights between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip:
a. The JAC will agree on special arrangements to facilitate flights of the
Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. The Ra'ees and rus spouse, and family members of the
Ra'ees, his body guards and VIPs when accompanying the Ra'ees will fly
without prior inspection oftheir persan, personal belongings, and luggage.
b. The minimum time of notification of VIPs' flights will be four hours. The
notification will include the list of passengers.
c. Flights of other persans will be handled in accordance with the procedures
agreed in the lAC.
12. Flights between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be operated through the
Gaza-Tel Aviv (sea shore) corridor.
Monitoring and regulations ofthis air route will be discussed in the JAC.
1
1 13. Commercial, domestic and international air services to, from and between the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be operated by Palestinian, Israeli or foreign
operators approved by both sides, certified and Iicensed in Israel or in ICAO
member states maintaining bilateral aviation relations with Israel. Arrangements
for such air services, beginning with a service between Gaza and Cairo using two
(2) fixed-wing aircraz.ttwith capacity up to fifty passengers each, as weil as
arrangements regarding the establishment and operation of airports and air
terminais in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will be discussed and agreed
upon by the twa sides in the JAC.
Any such international commercial air services will be carried out in accordance
with Israel's bilateral aviation agreements.The implementation phase will be
discussed and agreed on in the JAC.
ARTICLE XIV
Security along the Coastline to the Sea of Gaza
1. Maritime Activity Zones
a. Extent of Maritime Activity Zones
The sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip will be divided into three Maritime
Activity Zones, K, L, and M as shawn on map No. 8 attached to tbis
Agreement, and as detailed below:
(1) Zones K and M
(a) Zone K extends ta 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast
in the northern part of the sea of Gaza and 1.5 nautical miles
wide southwards.
(~) Zone M extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast,
and one (1) nautical mile wide from the Egyptian waters.
Cc) Subject to the provisions of tbis paragraph, Zones K and M
will be cIosed areas,in which navigation will be restricted ta
activity of the Israel Navy.
(2) Zone L
Zone. L bounded to the south by Zone M and ta the north by
.' Zone K extends 20 nautical miles into the sea from the coast .
(b) Zone L will be open for fishing, recreation and economic
activities, accordance with the following provisions: will be notified of such actions, and the ensuing procedures will be
coordinated through the MC.
2. The Palestinian Coastal Police
a. The Palestinian Coastal police (hereinafter the "pep") may function in
Zone L, up ta a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast. In special
cases, it may alse exercise control over Palestinian fishing boats fishing in
Zone L in an additional area of 6 nautical miles, up ta the limit of· 12
nautical miles from the coastline, after clearance and coordination through
the MC.
b. The PCP shaHhave up to 10 baats, with a displacement of up ta 50 tons
and maximum speed ofup ta 25 knots.
c. The hoats shaHcarry weapons ofup ta a 7.62 mm.caliber.
d. Boats of the PCP shaH fly a Palestinian flag, have police identification
markings and shaHoperate identification Iights.
e. The two sides shall coaperate on aU sea matters, including mutuaI help at
sea, and pollution and environmental issues.
f The boats of the Palestinian Coastal Police will initially use the Gaza
Wharf
g. Boats belonging ta Israelis are solely subject ta the control, authority and
jurisdiction of Israel and the Israel Navy.
3. Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center
a. The MC shall function as part of the ISe, to coordinate civil maritime
activities and coastaI police affairs off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
b. The MC shaHfunction witrun the relevant DCO, and will determine its own
rules of procedure.
c. The MC shall function 24 hours a day.
d. The MC shaHbe staffed by members of the Israel Navy and the PCP, each
providing a liaison officer and an assistant liaison officer.
e. A direct radio telephone link (hot line) shaH be set up between the Israel
Navy vessels and the pep vessels.
f. The role of the MC is to coordinate: (1) assistance between the PCP and the Israel Navy as may be necessary
ta deal with incidents arising at sea;
(2) PCP training involving the use offirearms;
(3) joint activities between the PCP and the Israel Navy when pre
planning.is operationally necessary;
(4) radio contact between PCP and Israel Navy vessels in the event that
"hot (ine" communication between vessels of the two sides has not
been established;
(5) search and rescue operations; and
(6) maritime activities related to an agreed port, when established in the
Gaza Strip.
4. Gaza Strip Port
a. Plans for the establishment of a port in the Gaza Strip in accordance with
the DOP, its location, and related matters of mutual interest and concern,
as weil as licenses for vessels and crews sailing on international voyages
will be discussed and agreed upon between Israel and the Council taking
into consideration the provisions of Article XXX (Passages) of this
Agreement. Ta this end a special committee will be established by the two
sides.
b. The Gaza Sea Port Authority referred to in the DOP shall act on behalf of
the Council in accordance with the provisions ofthis Agreement.
c. Pending construction of a port, arrangements for entry and exit of vessels,
passengers and goods by sea, as weil as licenses for vessels and crews
sailing on intermtional voyages in transit ta the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip., shall be through Israeli ports in accordance with the relevant rules
and regulations applicable in Israel and in accordance with the provisions
of Annex V.
,. ,
,;
Written Statement of the United States of America