Counter-Memorial of the Government of Australia

INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE

EASTTiMOR
(PORTUGAL vAUSTRALIA)

COUNTER-MEMOR IAL
OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA

1 JUNE 1992 I

(TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Sectlon 1: Nature and scope of the dispute

A. The allegeddispute
B. The realdispute

SectlonII: Surnrnaryof argument

PARTl BACKGROUNDTOTHE CASE

CHAPTER1 FACTUALBACKGROUND

Section 1: The Portugueseinvolvernent ln East Timor
A. The situationin EastTimorbefore 1974
B. Major eventsof 1974-1975in EastTimor
C. ThePortugueseattitudeto EastTimorsince 1976

Section II: Intervention by Indonesla ln EastTimor

Section III: Australie's policytowards EastTimor

CHAPTER2 THEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNlTYANDTHE
QUESTIONOF EASTTIMOR

Section 1: Resolutions of the Security Counciland the General
Assernbly on the question of EastTimor
A. Security Council resolutionof42 December1975
B. Securly Council resolution389of 22 April 1976
C. GeneralAssemblyresolution3485(XXX)of 12December1975
D. GeneralAssemblyresolution31/53of 1December1976
E. GeneralAssembly resolution2i34of 28November 1977
F. GeneralAssemblyresolution33/39 of13December 1978
G. GeneralAssemblyresolution34/40of 21 November 1979
H. GeneralAssemblvresolution35/27of 11November1980
1. General~ssembli resolution36/50of 24 November1981
J. GeneralAssemblvresolution37/30of23 November 1982
K. Conclusion

Sectlon II: The continulng role of the United Nations
A. The Secretary-General'smediatingrole iscontinuing
B. TheCommitteeof Twenty-fourhaskeptthe questionof East
Timorunderconsideration
C. TheCommissionon HumanRightshasplayed a limitedrote Section III: Practice of States in relation to EastTimor
A. Voting behaviourinthe UnitedNations
B. Treaty arrangements involvingIndonesia andPortugal
1. Bilateraltreaties
2. Muhilateraltreaties
3. Portuguesesilenceinrelationto treatyaction
C. Other Statepracticeon acceptanceof incorporationof EastTimor
1. Statementsinthe UnitedNationsacceptingthe
incorporationof EastTimor
2. Diplomaticrelations

PARTII INADMlSSlBlLlTY

CHAPTER1 THE TRUE RESPONDENT IS NOTA PARTYTO
THESEPROCEEDINGS

Section 1: Anaiysis of the position of the partiin thls case

Section II: Thetrue parties to the dispute mustbe parties to the
proceedlngs
A. A challengeto a bilateraltreaty requiresthe consentof
bothparties
1. The issueof capacity
2. Conflicting obligations
B. The Court cannothearallegationsof breachesof rights
madeagainsta Statethatare consequentialon breachesof
duty by anotherState
C. Adjudicationofthe "consequential"responsibilityof a State
requiresthe consentofthe Statewithoriginal responsibility

Section III: The case at hand
A. Thetruedisputeis betweenPortugaland Indonesia
B. The internationalcommunityrecognizesthat lndonesiaand
Portugalarethe true partiesto the dispute
C. Portugalcannotchallengethe effectivenessofthe Timor Gap
TreatywithoutIndonesia'sconsent
D. Australia'spositionis consequentialonthe statusof Indonesia
in 1989
E. AnyAustralian responsibilitbeingderivedfromconclusion
of a bilateraltreatymustbesharedwiththe other partyto the
Treaty

Section IV:Summation

CHAPTER2 PORTUGAL HASNO RlGHTTOAN ADJUDICATION
OF ITS CLAIM

Section 1: Portugal cannot justltyltscialm toact on the basls
that itsown rights are in issue Section II: Portugal's rights are not identified with those of the
people of EastTimor
A. The peopleof EastTimorhaverejectedPortugalas
administeringPower
B. The internationalcommunityhasnotaccordedPortugaithe
rightto representthe peopleof East Timor
1. The United Nations
2. Statepractice

Section III: Portugalcannot justify its claim to bring this case
on the basisthat itis performing a "service public

international"

Section IV: Judgment for Portugal wouid benefit neither Portugai
nor the people of East Timor, and Portugal couid not
implementany such judgment by fulfilli~g the
responsibilitiesthat would arise therefrom

CHAPTER 3 JUDGMENTFORPORTUGALCANNOTFULFiLANY
LEGlTlMATEOBJECT

Sectlon 1: Judgment for Portugaiwould have no legltimate object
A. Judgmentfor Portugalwouldnot promotethe interestsailegedly
requiringprotection
B. The Courïcannotrequire Australia to breacvalidtreaty
obligationsowedto a third State
C. Judgment forPortugalwould denyAustralia'sabiiityo protect
its iong-assertedsovereign rights

Section II: The dispute over EastTimor is to besolved by
negoti&lon betweenthe parties dlrectiy concerned
A. Otheromansofthe United Nationshave assumedresponsibiiity
for nego'tiatinga settiementofthe EastTimorquestion
B. Thesubject-mattermakesthe caseunsuitablefor adjudication
bythe Courtin theseproceedings
C. TheCourtcannot makereliablefindingsof facton issuescentral
to the case
D. The case cannot be suitablefor adjudication ifthe Court's
decisioncouidnd contributeto the resoiutionofthe dispute
with which1 isconcerned

CHAPTER4 PORTUGALMISUSESTHEPROCESSES
OFTHECOURT

Section 1: Portugai invitesthe Court to decide Indonesia's

rights and responsibilities in its absence and
without its consent

Section II: Judgment for Portugal mayadvantage lndonesia to
the detriment of the people of East Timor Section IIIPortugalinvites the Courtto decidea non-justiciable
dispute 139

PART III THE SUBSTANCEOFTHE CASE

CHAPTER 1 THEUNITEDNATIONSHASMADENO
AUTHORITATIVE DETERMINATION OFA BREACH
AND HASIMPOSEDNO OBLIGATIONOF NON-
RECOGNITION ONTHIRDPARTIES 143

Sectlon 1: Questionsof the implementationof self-determination
in a given caseinvolve "a measureof discretion" on
the part of the competent UnitedNations bodies 143

Section II:TheSecurity Councii has madeno declslon bindlng on
MemberStateswhlch would preventAustralla from
dealingwlth Indonesla 147

Sectlon IIITheGeneralAssembiy has madenodecislon binding
on MemberStateswhich would haveDrevented
Australla from deallng wlth lndonesia 149

Sectlon IV:Theresolutlonsof the UnitedNations do not contain
any declsion which could giverlse to the o-ligation
whlch Portugal asserts agiiinst Australia 155

CHAPTER 2 AUSTRALIAWASENTITLEDTO DEALWITH
INDONESIAASTHESTATEINACTUALAND
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OFTHETERRITORY 157

Section 1: In prlnclple, a State1sentitled to recognizeanother
StateIn actual andeffective control of particular
territory as sovereign over that territory, and to deal
wlth ion that basls 157

Section II:There1sno Independentbaslsfor a duty of non -
recoanitionwhlchwouid Dreventthe conclusion
of thë Tlmor GapTreaty ' 161

Section IIITherehas beenno criticlsm by the international
communlty, or from competent UnitedNations
bodies,of States(including Australia) whlch have
recosnized or dealt with lndonesia in resDectof SectionIV:In concluding the Timor GapTreaty,Australia
impededneitherthe negotiation of the issueby
the "parties directiy concerned" nor any act of self-
determinationof the peopleof EastTimorthat might
result from such negotiations

SectionV: Inconcluding the Timor GapTreaty,Australia hasnot
contravenedthe principle of permanentsovereignty
over natural resources

CHAPTER 3 THE TIMOR GAPTREATYISAN EXERCISEOF
AUSTRALIA'SSOVEREIGN RIGHTSUNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sectlon1: Underthe Treaty,Australia protects and exercises
long-assertedsoverelgnrights

SectionII:TheTreaty1sa measureof practicalaction to secure
Australia's rights and interests under international iaw

SectionIIITheTreatygiveseffect to Australia's obligations at
international iaw

Section IV: Conciuding remarks

SUBMiSSlONS

APPENDICES

APPENDIXA UNITEDNATIONS RESOLUTIONS ONSELF-
DETERMINATION CALLINGFORACTIONBY
THlRDSTATES

APPENDIX B 1985GENERAL ASSEMBLYRESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
ON REPORT OFFOURTHCOMMlïTEE

APPENDIXC SOMEDOUBLETAXTREATIESCONCLUDED WlTH
INDONESIASlNCE 1976CONTAiNlNGA TERRITORIAL
CLAUSE

ANNEXESINTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

1. This Counter-Memonal is submitted in accordance with the Rules, and

the Ordei of the Court of 3 May 1991. In accordancewith Article 49 of those
Rules, it replies to the facts stated in thePortugueseMemorial; andit contains
observations concerningthe statement of law made by Portugal and answers
thereto. Certain observationsrelateto theadmissibiiityof the particularclairns

in the Portuguese Application and Memorial. The Government of Australia
considersthat the issuesof admissibiiityshouldbe heardand determinedwithin
the frameworkof the ments with whichin ihis casetheyare inextricablylinked
and the Counter-Memorialhas been preparedonthatbasis.

Section 1: Nature and scooe ofthe dis~ute

2. Portugal assertsthatit is in disputewithAustralia,a dispute whichit asks
the Court to resolve. But ifthere is a dispute, thereis disagreement asto what
that dispute is about. A determination of that issue is important for the
resolutionof this case.

3. Accordingto a widely accepted definition,a disputeis "a disagreementon
a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two

persons" (MavrommatisPalestine Concessions,PCU, Senes A, no.2, p.11; see
also e.g., Interpretationof PeaceTreatie~ICJ Reports 1950,p.74; Applicability
~f the Obli~ation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headaumrs Ameemt of 26 June 1947ICJ Reports 1988,p.27). The subject

matter of a dispute is ernbodiedin the submissionsof the claimant State; and
"real submissions" mustbe distinguishedfrom"propositions which, in the form
of definitions,pnnciples or rules, purport tojustify certain contentionsand do
not constitute a precise and direct statement of a claim" (Fishenes Case ICJ

Reports 1951, p.126). The latter "may be taken into account only insofar as
they would appear to be relevant for deciding the (...question in dispute"
(ibid.).

4. In the present case, Portugal seemsreluctantto articulatethe real basis for
its claims asshown by the very striking gap between what it calls "l'obiet du
différend"(Memonal, pp.73-76)and its submissions as they appear at the end of the Application aswell as of the Memonal. The reason wouldappearto be
thattherealdisputethat Portugal has inmindhas nothingtodo withthealleged

disputeithas submittedto theCourt.

A. The alleged dispute

5. According to Portugal's submissions thespecific activities of which

Portugalcomplainsare:

- the negotiationof an agreementby Australiawitha thirdState(Indonesia)
relating to the exploration forand exploitationof the continental shelf in

the areaof theTimorGap (i.e.thenegotiationoftheTimor Gap Treaty);

- the conclusion by Australia and Indonesiaof the Treaty (including its
signatureandratification);

-
the exclusionby Austraiia (and Indonesia)of Portugalfrom previousand
on-going negotiationson maritimeareasofdirect concem to EastTimor;

- the initiationof the performanceby Australiaand Indonesiaof the Treaty,

by the inaugural meeting on 9 February 1991of the Ministenal Council
establishedundertheTreaty;

- the enactment by the Australian Parliament of interna1 domestic
legislationto give effectto theTreaty; and

- the on-going negotiationby Austraiia with the third State (Indonesia)of
thedelimitation of the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap to
theexclusionof Portugal.

See Application, paragraphs 2, 3, 26 and 34(2)(3)(4) & (5)); Memorial,
Conclusions,pp..235-6.

6. This contradicts directly the Portuguese allegation that "la présente

instance ne concernepas laquestion de la validit6de 1'"Accord" (Memonal,
para.3.06, p.75). On the contrary, the Timor Gap Treaty is, indeed,the very
subject-matter of the alleged dispute. Portugal complains of - and only
complainsof:-
the negotiationof the treaty,

- the conclusionof the treaty,

- the applicationof the treaty,

and submitsthat Australia is,as a consequence inbreachof obligationsowed to
Portugaland to thepeople ofEastTimorand thus:

-
has incurred internationalresponsibiiitybecauseof thesebreaches arising
onlyout of theTreaty;

- owes reparationforthe so-calleddamagecausedby theTreaty;

- and must desistfromthebreaches involved inimplementingtheTreaty.

Indeed, Portugal warns that "La demande est une demande en responsabilité
internationale, rien d'autre" (Memorial, para.3.06, p.75). But only an

internationallywrongfulactof a Stateentailsinternationalresponsibiiity. There
is suchan act when:

"(a) conduct consistingof an actionoromission is attributableto
the Stateunderinternationallaw; and

(b) that conduct constitutesabreachof aninternationalobligation
of theState."(ILC DraftArticles,on State Responsibility,Part

1,Art.3,Yearbookof ILC, 1976,Vol.II,p.75)

The wrongful actwhich Portugal alleges isthe Australia-IndonesiaTimor Gap
Treaty.

7. Hence, it is clearly impossible for the Court to adjudicate this case
withoutdecidingon the "validité"(or "licéité" ...of theTreaty, thatis to sayof
an international act between two States, one of which is not a party to the

presentproceedings.

8. Although Portugal says that itis not challengingthe validityof the Timor Gap Treaty, a decision in its favour would rnake the Treaty inoperative. The

Treaty createsa frameworkfor petroleurnexplorationand exploitationby both
Australian and Indonesian interests. Central to this frarnework is the joint
venture zone (the Zoneof Co-operationin Article 2). This is under the joint
control of the two contracting States, lndonesia and Australia. Control is

dependenton the active participationof bothStates. As the Treaty'sprovisions
(especially Article 2) show, the rights and obligations which aise under the
Treatyare very clearlyreciprocal: therunningofthejoint venturedependsvery
rnuchon the rnutualCO-operation of bothStates.

9. Portugal requeststhe Court to enjoin Austraiia frorn"any act relatingto
the exploration and exploitation" of the continental shelf in the area of the
"Timor Gap" (Application, para.34(5)(b); Mernorial, Conclusion 5(b)). If

Portugal were successful,the Court's order would requireAustralia to abstain
frorn carrying out its obligations to Indonesia under the Treaty, thereby
rendering the Treaty ineffective. In reality, therefore, Portugales challenge
the effectivenessof the Treaty and theobligationsto whichit gives rise. if the

Court were to decide the rneritsof this case,it would necessarily be declaring
theentitlernentsofbothIndonesiaand AustraiiaundertheTreaty.

10. Certainly,it mustbe keptinrnindthatPortugalalsorequeststhe Court:

"(1)to adjudgeand declarethat,first, therights of the peopleof East
Timor to self-determination, to temtorial integrity and unity (as

defined in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the present Application) and to
permanent sovereignty over its wealthand natural resources and,
secondly, the duties, powers and rights of Portugal as the
administenng Powerof the Temtory of East Timor are opposableto

Australia,which is under an obligationnot to disregardthern, butto
respectthem" (Application,para34(1); Memonal,Conclusions(1))

But such a contentionis not a "subrnission"in the proper meaningof the terrn
but a mere "proposition"purportingto "justify"a contention (para.3above). In
Frenchit would be said tobe a "moyen" nota "conclusion". Ifthe Treaty were
void,it would be becauseit is contrary to these principles. But this wouldnot

change one iota the definition of the dispute which entirely and exclusively
revolves aroundtheTimor GapAgreementbetweenAustralia and Indonesia.11. Portugal'sclaimsare aisobased oncertainother assumptions:

(a) that it hasightsofits ownin EastTimor whichit is entitledto
protectby proceedingsof thiskind;and

(b) that it has thecapacitytobring suchproceedingson behalfof the
people ofEastTimor.

As Australia contestsbothof theseassumptions,its viewis that thereis no basis

uponwhichPortugal isentitledto presentthe mattersoutlined in its Application
and Memorial. SeefurtherPartII,Chapter 2below.

B. The real dispute

12. It falls to the Court to look behind misleadingappearances, to ascertain

the legalrealityof Portugal'sApplicationand Submissions. As the Courtnoted
in the NuclearTests Case(ICJReports 1974,p.262):

"Thus, it is the Court'sdutyto isolatethe realissuesin the caseand to

identify the object of thelaim. It has never been contested thatthe
Courtis entitled to interpretthe submissionsof the parties,and infact
is boundto do so: thisis one of the attributesofjudiciai functions."

In doing so, theCourt "mustascertain the true objectand purpose of the claim"
and, arnongstother things, "takeinto accountthe Application as awhole, [and]
the arguments of the Applicant before the Court" (ibid., p.263). See also
Intemretatlon of Peace Treaties. AdvisorvO~inion(ICJ Reports 1950,p.74);

Intemretauon of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egza
(ICJ Reports 1980, pp.98-9); continental Shelf (LibvaIMala Case (ICJ
Reports 1984,p.20).

13. In the presentcase its morethanlikelythat "the aue objectand purpose"
of the Portugueseclain if one considersthe Application and theMemorial as a
whole,is only to provide some semblanceof legitirnacyfor Portugal's position

regarding East Timor. Foran examinationof the Portuguese claim showsthatit
is not capable of adjudicationby the Court in these proceedings and relates to
Portugal's legalpositionvis hvis Indonesia,notAustralia. 14. Portugal kept silent during the first years of the Indonesian presence in

East Timor. It is only more recently that it seemsto be promoting its own
viewsof what isin thebestinterestsof thepeople ofEastTimor. Thelitigation
which Portugal has commenced against Australiamust be seen as part of a
policyof obtaining internationalapprovalfor Portugal's positionrather than as

a dispute overthe alleged nghts of thepeople ofEastTimor. Withregard to the
latter,the true situationis that theUnitedNations,actingprincipallythroughthe
General Assembly, assumed responsibility for finding a settlement by
consultation and negotiation between the parties directly concerned. The

United Nations has neverplaced Portugal ina positionwhichwouldentitle itto
an adjudicationof its claims inthiscase.

15. If the people of East Timor have been deprived of their right to self-

determination thiswould not be because of the facts listed in the Portuguese
subrnissions (referred to in para.5 above), but as a consequence of the past
failingsof Portuguese attitudesand policiesand of the subsequentconductof a
third State which isnot before the Court. Indeed, Australia is not accused of

any illegalityin relationto Indonesia's interventionin EastTimorin December
1975. Portugal accepts that Australiawas not in any sensea participantin that
event.

Instead, Portugal accuses Australia of illegality in concluding an
16.
agreement with Indonesia in relation to the Timor Gap in December 1989.
Portugal's case depends, and necessarily depends, on demonstrating that
Indonesian claimsof sovereignty over East Timor are unwarranted. Australia

contends that Portugal is using these proceedings as a means of having its
claims against Indonesia heard in this Court, because Australia, and not
Indonesia, has accepted the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the
Statuteof the Court. Inreality, Austraiia isno more than an occasional decoy.

The real dispute is between Portugal and Indonesia, and Australia stands
entirelyremovedfromthis dispute.

17. This leads to an inescapable consequence: whether one takes into

considerationthe alleged disputeor the realdispute, Portugal seeks to use this
case as a vehicle for presenting its claims against a third State which, unlike
Australia,has not acceptedthe Court'sjurisdictionunderArticle36(2). On the
first hypothesis (alleged dispute)the real problemis to determineif Indonesia(not Australia) has a legal capacity to conclude the Treaty. It is only if the

answer to this question is negative that the "validité"(or the "licéitéof the
Treaty can be contestedand this cannotbe decidedby the Court in theabsence
of Indonesia. The position is the same in relation to the real dispute: it is
entirely between Portugaland Indonesia.

Section II: Summarv ofargument

18. The Australian response to the Portuguese claims is sumrnarisedin the
following paragraphs. As the preceding discussionof the nature andscope of
the dispute indicates, Australia considers thatthe Portuguese claims against it
cannot be made in the absence of Indonesia. Moreover,in bringing its case

before the Court Portugal invites the Court to act in a way which would be
contrary to procedural and judicial propriety. Portugal cannot establish any
basis on which it can have the case adjudicated. Nor can it showthat thecase

hasany legitimate object.

19. When one examines the substance of the case, the facts show that
Australiaactedin wayswhichdidnot breachanyobligationincumbenton itnot

to deal with a State in control of the temtory of East Timor. The United
Nationshas neveradopted amle of non-recognitionof the consequencesof the
situationbrought aboutin 1975-6. There has been noresolutionof the Security
Council onthe situationsince 1976,and no resolutionof the GeneralAssembly

since 1982. Moreoverthe resolutions thatwere concludedin the period 1976-
82 revealed not only a complete lackof consensus on the issue, but also an
increasing level of international acceptance of the new situation. In these
circurnstancesAustraliawas entitled, whenit concludedthe Treaty in 1989,to

deal with the State in actual controlof the temtory. It was entitled to take the
steps it took to safeguardand exercise its long-asserted legal rights. In short,
the Portuguese claim is brought in the wrong fomm and against the wrong

Party-

20. The Court should, in the present case, refrain from deciding on the
substance of the Portuguese claimssince the application of Portugal is clearly

inadmissible. The claimant is engaged in an anempt to misuse the Court's
processes. There are no rights of its ownin issue,and it has no rights whichby
virtueof theirclose identificationwithrightsof the peopleof East Timorwouldsupport these proceedings. Moreover, Australiais the wrong target, the true
respondentto sucha case being Indonesia. Yet, as explainedabove,these bars

to theCourt's nght to hear the claim are, in this case, inextricably linkedwith
the rnerits so that it could be difficult to deal with them separately and to
establish that they possess an exclusively preliminary character. For this
reason, and in the interest of expedition, the present Counter-Mernonal will
tackle both the problerns of adrnissibility and of substance. But Australia

wishes tornakeclear that, in its view,the submissionson the rnents have only
a subsidiarycharacter.

21. The text of theCounter-Memonalis divided intothree Parts:

1 Backgroundto the case

II Inadrnissibility

III Substanceof the case.

The Counter-Mernonal concludes with Submissions. Attached toit are three

Appendices containingrnaterialrelevant to particularlegal issues and Annexes
containingrelevantdocuments. PART1

BACKGROUND TOTHECASE PART 1

BACKGROUND TOTHECASE

CHAPTER1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

22. The following three chapters outline the facts which are necessary to
appreciatethe casewhich Portugal bringsto the Court.traiiahas soughtto
avoidrepeatingthosematterswhichhave alreadybeen adequately dealtwithby
Portugal inits Memorial. Unlessherwiseindicated,the referencesinbrackets

are to paragraph numbersor Annexesofthe Portuguese Memorial.

Section1: ThePortu~ueseinvolvementinEastTimor

23. In 1960, by resolution 1542(XV), the General Assembly declared
Portuguese Timorto bea non-self-governingtemtory within ChaptXI of the
Charter. As Portugal admits (Memorial,para.l.09), it was not until 1974 that

Portugal recognized that this was in tmth the Territory's status. Further,
although Portugal's associationwith East Timor had been long, it was a poor
mode1of an administering Power. In that capacity, it failed to discharge
adequatelyitsresponsibiiitiesunderthe United Nations Charter.

24. Portugal's involvementin East Timor, especiallyafter 1974,showsthatit
failed completely to take steps forthe effective realisationof the right to self-

determinationof the Temtory's people. In particular,it failed to maintainlaw
and order, to prevent civil disorder,or to take steps to prevent the invasion of
theTemtory by Indonesia'sarmedforcesin December1975.

A. ThesituationinEast Timor before 1974

25. Portuguese involvement in Timor dates from the sixteenth century.
However, the actual boundaries of theterritory, including the enclave of

OéCusse,were theresult of agreementsbetween Portugal and the Netherlands
in 1859,1893and 1904. An arbitration concerningpartof the boundariestook
place in 1914. (Forext see (1915) 9 American Journal of International Law 240). The Dutch territory became part of the independent Indonesia. The

Portuguese temtory remained as a colonial anomaly. Following the last great
rebellion by the people of Portuguese Timor against Portugal in 1912,
Portuguese control was gradually extended inland over the territory.

Portuguese administration depended on the CO-operationof traditional local
rulers. Portugaldid not encourageeconomic investment. What little economic
developmentthere was centred on a small coffee industry controlledby a very
small non-indigenousChineseand Portuguese population. Schoolingwas very

much neglected and health services were virtually unknown, despite the
prevalenceof malaria and other diseases. Therewas littlepolitical activity,and
what little activity that did occur was severely limited by the political police

(PIDE).

26. In Timor: A People Betraved (1983), pp.20-21, James Dunn, Australian
Consulin Dilibetween 1962-64.wrote:

"On the eve of the outbreak of World War 1,Portuguese Timor was
undoubtedly the most economically backward colonyin South-east
Asia, its living conditionsoften a subject of derision to thefew who

ventured to it. With the basis of a temtonal administration, some
improvementsin agriculture,and relativepeace, East Timor seemed
ready to go, but in fact changes took place very slowly, and the

colony tended to drift into a torpid state, with its remoteness and
isolation shieldingit from the pressures of change that had begun to
build up elsewhere in South-east Asia. in the thirty years of peace
before Japan entered World War 2, the Portuguese returned to that

earlier languid and apathetic form of administration. There was, as
one observer put it, 'little administration and less development'
althoughthe 'offîcialsmanaged tokeepthemselves occupied'."

Dunn continued:

"The Depressionleft Portugal on the vergeof bankruptcyand by the
time a measure of recovery was in sight the disruptive effects of
World War 2 wer e .already being felt. During this period the
problems of Timor were disregarded or neglected. In the

perspectivesof the metropolitangovemment Timorbarelyregistered
its existence and, in any case, there were no funds available for its social or economic development. In Lisbon it was known for its
modestproductionof high-qualitycoffeeand as a safe, distant place

of exile for opponentsof the Salazar regime. Economically, itwas
considered as something of an embarrassment, for although the
coffeeexports enricheda few Portugueseand Chinesethe colonyof
Timor was a drain, albeit a small one, on Portugal's meagre

resources. In fact, the mothercountry's subsidywas so small that,
apart from some road constmction and other improvements in the
administration's infrastructure largely designedto make life a little
more cornfortablefor theexpatriatecornmunity,very little economic
development actually took place. On the eve of World War 2 the

capital,Dili,had noelectncity and no townwatersupply; therewere
no paved roads, no telephone services(other than to the houses and
officesof seniorofficials),and noteven a wharffor cargo handling."
(ibid.

27. World War II was disastrous for the colony's development. In Dum's
words, it "seemed to have taken the country back to the Stone Age" (p.27).
Nevertheless, in the twenty-nine years which followed, there was a little

progress -in such areas as health, educationand physical infrastructure. The
population increasedto around 650,000 and Dili wasrebuilt. More Timorese
entered thearmy, churchand public administration. The productionof mbber,
coffee, copra, grainandlivestockimproved, although theeconomicdependence

of the majority of inhabitants on subsistence agriculturedid not alter. The
export sector rernained within the control of a small non-indigenous group.
Despite the introduction of a Legislative Assembly, political expression
remainedlirnitedand thePIDEvigilant.

28. East Timor was seen at this time by Portugal as merely a drain on its
resources. EastTimor was "a poor, backwardtemtory with a very uncertain
future" (hm, op.cit. 37). The province was very seldom visited by top-

ranking officials and the visitin 1975,ofDr Almeida Santos, the responsible
Minister for overseas territones, had been preceded by only one other
Ministerial visit in 1952. Despite the dedicationof local officials,the central
governmentviewedthe temtory as no morethana liability. DUMconcluded:

"When the Portuguesewithdrew from Dili at the end of August 1975,it
was just over 200 years since GovernorMeneses had moved theseat of govemmenttherefromLifau inOecussi. Inthatlong periodof settlement
their achievementswere unimpressive,and theyleft the colonyas one of

the poorest and least-developed countriesin the Third World."(op.cit.
p.53)

29. In FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor (1987), the Timorese

leader,Jose Ramos-Horta describedhis impressionsof the pre-1974colony on
his retum fromtwoyears in Mozambiquein 1971and 1972as follows:

"1 found my beloved country much the sarne as 1 had left it. East
Timor, under the Portuguese, seemedto sit stillin history. Theclock

of development didn't tick there. For centuries the Portuguese
neglected the East Timorese. The colonywas only maintained as a
symbol of empire, for the Portuguese valued myths andsymbols."

(p.14)

B. Majorevents of 1974-1975 inEastTimor

30. In April 1974, a military coup in Portugal led by the Armed Forces

Movementresultedin the overthrowof the former Portuguese Govemment. In
the aftermath, the new Portuguese Govemment recognizedthe right of self-
determinationof the people of Portugal'scolonies (Memorial,para.l.10). The
Armed Forces Movement (AFM)and the successive governmentswhich held

power in Lisbonover the succeedingtwoyears focussed almost exclusively on
Africa. The two non-African territories Timor and Macau remained
afterthoughts.

31. During the later months of 1974,however, thePortuguese administration
in Timor was re-organised. A new Governor, Lt Col Lemos Pires, was
appointed in November. The number of soldiers coming from metropolitan
Portugal was progressively reduced. By mid 1975 the several thousand

membersof thearmedforcesin theTemtory werealmostentirelyTimorese.

32. Other steps to implement decolonization policies were taken. The
Portuguese administrationin Timor pennitted the formation of local political

parties. D,uringthe later months of 1974, the three principal part-eUDT,
FRETILIN and APODETI(Memorial,paras.1.21-1.23) - expandedin Dili and
up-country andsoughtassistancefromabroad. Then,on 22January 1975,afterweeksof negotiations,UDT andFRETILINsigneda coalitionagreement. This

had thesupportof the local Portuguese administration whichsaw itas assisting
the decolonizationprocess. On 18March 1975,UDT and FRETILINissued a
joint communiquein which they stated that "independence is the only possible
way for real liberation of the people from exploitation and oppression of any

form" (Annex 1 to this Counter-Memorial). They proposed a three point
programleadingtowards fullindependence. In late May,however,the coalition
wasunilaterallydissolvedby the UDT.

33. On 9 March 1975, Dr Almeida Santos, Portugal's Minister for
Interterritorial Co-ordination, and General Murtopo of Indonesia met in
London. At the meeting,DrSantosstated that Portugalwas preparedto accept
de iure independence for Timorafter a transitionalperiod of several years. It

was agreed that, as afirst step, the three mainTimorese political parties (UDT,
FRETILINand APODETI)shouldbe invited to a meetingwithrepresentatives
from Portugal tobe held later that year. The meetingwas subsequentlyheld in
Macau between 26-28 June 1975.although FRETILIN declined to attend. A

communique issued at the meeting's conclusion reaffirmed the right of the
people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination,and theprinciple that it was
up to thepeopleofTimor todefinethe politicalfutureof theTemtory (Amex 2
hereto).

34. At the Macau talks, a draft constitutional law on the decolonization of
PortugueseTimorwasalsoconsidered and laterapprovedby the Councilof the

Revolution in Lisbon. The Council published a law (7175of 17 July 1975,
reproduced inAmex II:13of Memorial)whichprovidedfor -

(a) a "deliberative"HighCornrnissioner'sCouncil. This was tobe headedby

a Portuguese High Commissioner who was tobe assisted by five "joint
secretaries"- three Timorese and two Portuguese nominees. The High
Commissionerwasto havea castingvote.

(b) a Consultative GovernrnentCouncil. Thiswas to consist of 38 members,
to be constituted by two representatives from each of thirteen regional
councilsandfour membersfrom each politicalassociation.

(c) a constituent Assembly to be elected in October 1976. The law further l
provided that Portuguese sovereignty would end in October 1978, although it containeda means for adjustingthat datein accordancewith
"thegenuinewishes ofthe peopleof Timor".

The law proved inoperative, however. In late July 1975, APODETI sent a
message to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on
Decolonizationwhich stated that the Portuguese Governrnent had shownitself

to be an "incompetent referee of political parties concerning the Timor
decoionizationprocess". Shortlyafter,on 10-11 August,the UDTattempteda
coup in East Timor. This was defeated within a few daysby a FRETILIN
counter-coup strongly supportedby Timorese troops, beingthe total rernnants

of thePortuguesearmywho madearmsavailabletoFRETILIN.

35. Portugal made little response. It did not attempt to send armed
reinforcements,nordidit instituteplornaticaction. Afterrepeated requestsby

the Governor for direction fromthe Portuguese Government in Lisbon, the
Portuguese administrationwas finally authonsed to move from Dili. (See the
accountby the Governoratthetime,M LemosPires,Descolonizac50deTimor;
Missao impossivel? (Lisbon, 1991), esp. pp.202-265). The Portuguese

Governor and his administrationwithdrew to the offshore island of Atauro,
23 kmsnorth of Dili, where they rernaineduntil December1975. Thus, from
August 1975, Portugal ceased to exerciseany effective power in the Temtory
(Memonal,para.1.25).

36. Between August and December 1975, tension increasedin and around
Timor. Whilst FRETILIN consolidated its control over the Temtory, attacks
were mounteddong the border by pro-Indonesianelementscomected with the

UDT and someminorparties. Dr Santospaid a second visitto the region,this
time designatedby PortugalasSpecialRepresentative,buthis effortsto mediate
betweenFRETILINandits opponentsfailed.

37. Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign Ministers met in Rome between 1-
2 November 1975. They agreed on the need for Portugal to meet the three
Timoresepartiesand on theneedtorestore peace andorderinTimor,beforethe
population coulddetermineitsfutur (eemonal, para.1.29). Portugaldid little

to give effect to the agreement. It is true that subsequently the Portuguese
DecolonizationCommitteecabled FRETILIN, UDT andAPODETIto propose
round-table talksin Australia ineNovember1975(Memonal,para.l.30), but
the talksdid noteventuate.38. On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN, in a unilateral declaration of
independence (UDI), proclaimedthe "Democratic Republic of East Timor".
Portugal, adrnitting it did not have theans to assure normalization of the
situation, brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations (UN
Doc.Sl11887). UDT and APODETI (and two smaller parties) issued a joint

declarationwhichcondemnedFRETILIN'SUDI andstated thatthe momenthad
come "to re-establish formally these strong ties with the Indonesian nation".
They statedthat:

"4. After having been forcibly separated from the strong links of
blood, identity,ethnicand moralculturewiththe peopleof Indonesia
by the colonialpowerof Portugalfor morethan 400 years, we deem
it is now the right moment forthe peopleof PortugueseTimorto re-

establishformally thesestrongtieswith theIndonesian nation.

(a) In the name of God the Almighty, we therefore solemnly
declare the independence and integration of the whole

former colonial Territory of Portuguese Timor with the
Republicof Indonesia,which is in accordancewith the real
wishesof theentirepeopleofPortugueseTimor.

We alsourgethe Indonesian Government and people totake
(b)
steps irnmediately to protect the lives of the people who
nowregard themselves asIndonesians,yet are stillsuffenng
due to the terror and fascist practices of the FRETILIN
gang,armedand supportedby the Portuguese Government."

(Fulltext in Amex 3 hereto.)

39. Also on 29 November 1975, the Portuguese National Decolonization
Committee issued a lengthy statement which condemned the respective

declarations ofFRETLIN and of UDTIAPODETI(Memorial, para.1.32and
Amex II.18).The lastthreeparagraphs stated:

"...Portugal, as adrninistering Power, cannot accept claims of

independence or of integration into third States, that are not in
accordance with the fundarnental pnnciple of the decolonization
process. ~ortu~al also cannot fail strongly to repudiate and condernn any

militaryinterventionin the Temtory of EastTimor,callingattention
to the grave consequencesthat may arise from that, not only with
respect to the violation of the right of the peopleof Timor freely to
exercise theirright to self-determinationbut also with respect to the

threatto internationalpeace andsecurity.

Facedwith the gravityof the situation,and inorder to safeguardthe
lives and rights of the peopleof EastTimor and internationalpeace

and security, Portugal will be obliged to resort to the competent
international bodies, in the hope that a peaceful solution to the
conflictcan be reached, and that conclusion of the decoionization
process can be achieved in harmony with the principles defined by
the UnitedNations."(UN Doc.SI11890)

40. Eighteen days earlier, on 11 November 1975, Indonesiahad stated, in a
Note to the United Nations Secretary-General, that it could not accept a
situation imposed by armed force on any party in East Timor. Then, on

4 December 1975, Indonesia issued a statement in which it recorded that
Indonesia regretted the FRETILIN UDI and sympathised with the desire of
UDTIAPODETIfor integration,and thatit stood readyto take whateveraction
was necessaryto protectthe Timoresepeopleand theprocessof decolonization

(UN Doc.AIC.41808 -Amex 3hereto).

41. On 7 December1975Indonesiamadeair and navallandingsin Dili. Over
the followingweeks and months,IndonesiaprogressivelyoccupiedEastTimor.

Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia on 7 December and
sought Security Council consideration (UN Doc.Sl11899). A day later it
withdrewits administrationfrom Atauro. Portugal did notmakeany attemptto
prevent or repel the Indonesian military intervention. The withdrawal of its

administration to Atauro in August 1975, its inaction while there, and its
departure from Atauro the day after the Indonesian interventionin December
1975 constituted a clear abandonment by Portugal of its responsibilities as
admi~stering Power. No actionscouldhave been morecalculatedtoencourage

outsideinterventionin theaffairsof EastTimor.

42. In a Statement of 8 December 1975,Australia wascritical of Indonesia'suse of force but noted the fact that successive Portuguese Governments had

been unable to exercise sufficientinfluencein PortugueseTimor eitherto carry
out the Macau agreement, or to prevent civil disorder (Annex 13). The
comment by Australia's Ambassador Woolcott referred to by Portugal
(para.2.02) did not represent Australian policy. That policy was contained in

the Australian statement of 8 December 1975, a statement critical of the
Indonesian action.

43. On 17 December 1975, the pro-Indonesian parties declared the

establishment of the Provisional Governmentof East Timor (PGET) (Annex 6
hereto). The United Nationsresponse is dealt with in Chapter 2 of this Part of
the Counter-Memonal.

C. The Portuguese attitude toEastTimorsince1976

44. Pnor to 1976, the Portuguese Constitution regarded East Timor, known
until thenas Portuguese Timor, as an "overseas province",just like any of the

provinces that made up continental Portugal. In 1976 Portugal amended its
Constitution so as no longerto treat Timor as apart of Portugal. Article 307of
the PortugueseConstitution,as arnendedin 1976,provided:

1. Portugal shall remain bound by its responsibility, in accordance
with international law, to promote and safeguard the right to

independenceof Timor Leste.

2. The President of the Republic, assisted by the Council of the
Revolution, and the govemment shall be competent to perforrn al1acts

necessary to achievement of the aims set forth in the foregoing
paragraph."

This provision now appears as Article 293 of the 1989 revision of the
Constitution. See Amex 8 of this Counter-Memonal.

45. After 1976 at least, the only stated interest of Portugal was topursue the

issue of self-determinationfor the people ofEastTimor. But it faced theeality
that it was no longer in control andthat it neverexpectedto bein control again. Since 1976,Portugal'sinterest in East Timor has fluctuated, dependingon the
attitudesof successivePresidentsand governrnents. The Portuguese Memorial

is in error in paragraph 1.06in clairning that the pre 1976 position continues
until the present. Since 1976, Timor has not been regarded by Portuguese
domesticlawas a territoryof Portugal.

46. Until 1980, Portugalmade no real effort to assist the United Nationsto
find a solution to the situation in East Timor. It relinquished responsibility
entirely to the international community. As the Portuguese Foreign Minister,
Freitas de Amaral, said in an interview with the weekly Lisbon journal
"Expresse"on 10May 1980(as translatedby the Australian Embassy,Lisbonat

the time):

"As to theefforts to find a solution,there hasbeen no initiative from
the Govemments whichpreceded us and1considerit aseriousmatter

that of the five constitutionalgovernrnentsbefore us, none took any
initiative toesolve this problem whosehumanand political aspects
are so delicateand so senous...(Amex 7)

Ramos-Horta, in FUNU, op.cit. pp.125-126, similarly criticised Portuguese
inaction. Hewrote "thatfrom 1976to 1982the Portuguese acted asif they had
accepted the fait accompli. Portuguese politicians, diplomats and officials
simplyshruggedwhen theywereapproachedonthe subjectof EastTimor".

47. Only after 1980 is there any evidence that Portugal was taking steps to
assist in resolving the East Timor situation. In 1980, Portugal undertook
diplomatic initiatives in the United Nations General Assembly (para.132

below). It extendedthese in later years to other internationalbodies, including
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the European Parliament,
the Non-Aligned Movement,the Inter-ParliamentaryConference. It has also
made bilateral representations to other Governments, includingAustralia. In

Portugal andeldwhere, PresidentsEanesandSoareshave spokenof the needto
find a solution to the East Timor problem. Portugal's current attitude is
considerably at oddswithits attitudein the years immediatelyafter Indonesia's
intervention. But while Portugalhas now attemptedto do something aboutits

past neglectit has notbeen ableto achieveanyfurtherconsiderationof theissue
in the United Nations.Section II: Intervention bv Indonesia in East Timor

48. The nub of these proceedingsis Indonesia's militaryinterventionin East
Timor in late 1975 and its continuing presence there. What follows is a bnef

account of the matters directlybearing on that intervention. Since Australia
playedno part inthe eventsof 1975,this accountmay wellbe incomplete. It is
drawn from published sources,and Australia is in no position to guarantee its
accuracy indetail.

49. In the penod betweenIndonesia's independencein 1949 and April 1974,
the Governmentin Jakarta showed very little officia1interest in the affairs of
East Timor. There was lirnited co-operation between Portuguese and
Indonesian officiaison Timor itself, but Indonesia was then largely pre-

occupied with nation-building, includingthe suppression of secessionist and
other rebellions, the absorption of West Irian and dealing with its other
neighboursin the region such as the newly-independentMalaysia. It was the
military coup of April 1974 in Portugal which led to changes in Indonesian

attitudes.

50. The coupin Portugalwas initiallyseenby Indonesia asa welcome event.
Thus,in a letterof17 June 1974 followinga meeting inJakartawith FRETILIN

Representative Ramos-Horta, Foreign Minister Malikstated that the coup
offered a "good oppomnity" to the people of Timor to accelerate the process
towards independence. In the same lener, Mr Malik denied any Indonesian
temtonal ambitions and sought to assure"whoeverwill governin Timor in the
future after independence ..that the Govemment of Indonesia will always

strive to maintaingoodrelations,fnendship and co-operation forthe benefit of
both countries". (The lener is reproducedin Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism
jindColorna . (1978),p.66.) However,in the face of disorderand following
the request of certain elements within East Timor, Indonesia decided to

intervene.

51. In November 1975, a group of pro-Indonesianparties collectivelyknown

as the "MAC" - the An.ti-Communist Movement - had proclaimed the
"integration of the whole former colonialTemtory of Portuguese Timor with
the Republic of Indonesia" (Annex 3). This had been preceded by the
FRETILIN UDI (para.38 above). Civil disorder broke out, with a number ofpersons fleeing into Indonesia. On 7 December 1975, Indonesian military

forces entered East Timor. This action was immediately subject to
considerationin the UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly andlaterin the Security
Council. The UnitedNations responseis described inChapter2 of this Partof
the Counter-Memonal.

52. On 14 December 1975,the Indonesian Government issueda statement
whichsoughtto explainits action. Thestatement assertedthat:

"the pending crisis in Portuguese Timor is the result of measures
taken by the Govemment of Portugal to maintain colonialismin its
main formin the temtory. Portugalhas made useof a localpolitical

faction, FRETILIN, to support the implementation of its colonial
plan inits newformwith theargumentofdecolonization."(Amex 4)

Indonesia referred to a number of events, including the withdrawal of the

Portuguese administration to Atauro, which it said demonstrated Portuguese
complicity with FRETILIN. Alsoin the statementof 14December,it descnbed
Indonesian "volunteers" as assisting their brothers in Portuguese Timor; it
dismissed resolution 3485(XXX) passed by the United Nations General

Assembly on 12 December 1975 as having no bearing on "the prevailing
conditions"; and it expressed disappointment"in the attitude of a number of
friendly countries, in particular those situated in the neighbourhood of the
temtory of Portuguese Timor which indeed gave their support to [the] said

resolutionor tookan indifferentattitude towardsit" (ibid.,para. 9).

53. On 17December 1975, the MAC declared the establishment of the

Provisional Governmentof East Timor (PGET) which then assumed nominal
control over the temtory. On 31 January 1976, the PGET announced the
dissolutionof ailpoliticalpartiesin EastTimorand the formationof a National
Front.

54. Itwas not until 31 May 1976 that a Popular Assembly, consisting of
thirty-sevenmembers,met in the EastTimorese capitalof Dili in the presence
of official obsewers from Indonesia,Malaysia,New Zealand, Thailand,India,

Saudi Arabia,Nigeriaand Iran. The United Nationsand Australiahad declined
invitations to attend. The PopularAssembly adopted a resolution petitioning
Indonesiafor integration(UN Doc.SI12097Annex II,reproducedas Annex5 tothis Counter-Memorial), Subsequently,on 24 June 1976,a fact-finding team

fromthe indonesianNationalParliament visitedDilito "verifythe wishesof the
people". It was accompanied by diplomatic observers from a number of
countries,although again none from the United Nations(UN.Doc.S/12104)nor
Australia. On 16July 1976, the Indonesian Parliament adopted a bill

incorporatingEastTimor into Indonesia. This was signedinto lawby President
Suharto the following day. Since that date, Indonesiahas remained in physical
control of the temtory which it describes as its twenty-seventh province and
adrninistersas anintegralpart of indonesia

55. On 5 November 1976,Mr Anwar Sani, the Indonesian Representativein
theFourthCornmittee,statedthe Indonesianpositionin the followingterms:

"Neither the Charter of the United Nations nor General Assembly
resolutions 1514(XV)and 1541(XV)prescribed processes which should
be blindly followed. Each case of decolonizationshouldbe understood in
the light of its own existing realities. Therehad been cases in the history

of decolonization where local circumstances had made popular
consultation through a plebiscite or a referendum unnecessary and cases
where other forms of consultation had been accepted, with or without
United Nationssupervisionor observation. What wasimportantwas that

the right of self-determinationshouldbe exercisedin accordancewith the
basic precepts of the Charter, which stipulated that the interests of the
inhabitantsof Non-Self-GovemingTemtories wereparamount. He could

not but wonder why some counmes far removed from the region should
arrogate to themselves the prerogative of deciding what was best for the
people of EastTimor. Thosecounmes, withoutany first-handknowledge
of the real situation, were now exerting pressure on the Committee to

adopt positions contrary to theexisting realities prevailingin EastTimor
and contrary to the expressed wishes of its people. In line with those
wishes, the Indonesian Parliament had passed a bill formalising the
integration of East Timor with Indonesia. That bill had become law on

17July 1976,and, as from that moment,the questionof decolonizationof
East Timor had ceased to exist. The integration of East Timor with
Indonesiahad been canied out on the basisof completeequality between
the population of East Timor and the people of indonesia. The people of

East Timor, being Indonesian people, had equal guarantees of
fundamentalrights andfreedomswithoutanydistinctionor discrimination and werenowconcentratingtheireffortson the taskofreconstnictionand
development.

His delegationsincerelyhopedthat the Cornmitteewouldbaseits attitude
on thereality of the situationrevailingin East Timor, namely,the fact
that the process of decolonizationin that Territoryhad beenconcluded."

(AlC.41311SR1 . 6,paras.34-35)

56. Bearingin mindIndonesia's controloverand attitudetowardsEastTimor,
Indonesia isclearly "directlyaffected"by United Nationsefforts to resolve the

East Timor situation (cf. UNGA.resolution 37/30 of 1982). This is true,
whether a resolution of the situation is sought through political or judicial
means. Accordingly,the Secretq-General continuesto discuss with Portugal
and Indonesiawaysin whichtoreconcilethe positionsof the two Governments

on thequestion (paras.146to 152below cf. Memorial, paras.1.54 -1.58). It is
not for Australia tojustify the actionsof another State whichis not before this
Court. But thepoint mustbe made thatthe completeabsenceof any Portuguese
presence in East Timor, and the continuous and effective exercise of

sovereigntyby Indonesiaoverthetemtory since 1976are factswhichcannot be
ignoredby the internationalcomrnunity,norindeedby the Court.

SectionIII: Australia's~olicvtowardsEastTimor

57. As early as 1961 Australia indicated that it was unable to support
Portugal's colonial policies.n that year it supported United NationsGeneral
Assembly resolution1699(XVI)of 19December 1961whichcreated a Special

Cornmittee on Portuguese Temtories. Portugal had, according to Australia,
obligationsto transmitinformationinrelationtoits coloniesunderArticle73of
the United Nations Charterand to prepare its coloniesfor the exercise, at an
appropriate time,of the right of self-determination. This attitude isreflectedin

Australia's support for General Assembly resolutions 2795(XXV),
2918(XXVII) and 3113(XXVIiI) in 1971-1973, each of which condemned
Portuguese colonialpolicies.

58. Although not a party to the dialogue over East Timorwhich developed
between Portugal and Indonesia during 1974-5, Australia had had bilateral
discussions on the subject with both Govemments and had participated in thedeliberationsof the UnitedNationsCommitteeof 24and theFourthCornmittee

during that period. PresidentSuhartoof Indonesiaand PrimeMinisterWhitlarn
of Australia had met in September 1974in Wonosobo, indonesia and again in
April 1975in Townsville,Australia. The viewsexpressedby Australia at these
meetingsWerelater conveyedto Portugal. There were also exchangesbetween
the Portuguese and Australian Foreign Ministersin New York in March 1975.

Dr Almeida Santos, Portugal's Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordinationand
later Special Representative,visited Canberra for talks in October 1974and in
September1975.

59. The Australian Foreign Minister made a statement to the Australian
Parliament on 30 October 1975 which referred to "Portugal's regrettable
inability to reassert its authority inthe temtory" and urged the resolutionof the
situation by peaceful means. The text appears as Annex 10 of the Counter-

Memorial. Australia did not recognize the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence made by FRETILIN at the end of November 1975. (See the
statement made by Australia's ForeignMinister on 29 November 1975,set out
in Amex 11hereto.)

60. Australia's response to Indonesia's intervention in East Timor on
7 December 1975 is contained in a number of statements issued by the
Australian Government as well as in debates in the United Nations, including

the SecurityCouncil. Portugal presentsa selectionof these in paragraphs 2.17-
2.24 of its Memorial. Whatfollowsis a morecompleteaccount.

61. There were six statements by the Australian Foreign Minister between
7 December and 29 December 1975. These are set out in Annexes 12 to 17

hereto. Inhis Ministerialstatementof7 December 1975,the then Minister for
Foreign Affairs,Mr AndrewPeacock, said that Australia "deeply regrettedthe
course which events in East Timorhad taken". The next day,8 December, the
Minister statedthat:

"indonesia's stated objective,was the restoration of law and order, a
task which Portugalhad beenunableto carry out,asa necessarypre-
condition to a proper expressionby theTimoresepeopleof their own

wishes regarding their political future. While this objective was
laudable,the meanschosenby Indonesiawas a rnatterfor deep regret
and concern on thepartof the Australian Government."Three days later, on 11December,the Ministernoted thatAustralia'sviews on

East Timor had beenconveyed to the Indonesian Government . He indicated
that Australia would seek to speak in the Security Council,in order to urge
involvement by the United Nations and in particular, that the
Secretary-General despatch a representative to the territory to report on

conditionsthere.

62. The following day,on 12December 1975,the Ministernoted theadoption

by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 3485(XXX) and
explainedAustralia's supportforit. He furtherobsewed that:

"[Hle understood the reasons why Indonesia had opposed the

resolution. To some extentAustralia sharedthosemisgivings.

Not least we understand Indonesia'sview that itis necessaryto have
peace and order in the temtory to facilitate the expression of the

views of the people of Timor of their own wishes for the future.
Neverthelesswe cannot agree that the use of force is an appropriate
meansof settlingtheproblemof East Timor ...9

63. Subsequently, in his statement of 23 December 1975, the Minister
welcomedtheunanimousadoptionby the Security Council,on 22December,of
resolution 384 and noted that it was arnatter of particular satisfactionthat the

Security Councilhad asked for the appointmentby the Secretary-Generalof a
Special Representativeto assessthe situationin EastTimor.

64. Meanwhile there were reports of renewed fighting in East Timor.

According to the Minister's statement of 29 December 1975,the Australian
Governmenthad rernindedthe Indonesian authorities ofAustralia's opposition
to the use of force in East Timor. This statement also urged the imrnediate
departureof the Secretary-General'srepresentative. The statementcontinued:

"..[A]llegationsthat the Australian Govemmenthad turnedits back
on the Timor situationwere unfounded. Australiahad indeed been

more active than any other country, in the region or outside it, in
trying to bring about a peaceful settlement in East Timor. This
applied to Portugalnominallythe adrninistenngpower. Mr Peacock recalled in this regard that, while Australia had no forma1
responsibilitiesfor EastTimor, ithad throughits successfulwork in

the United Nations, throughthe government's unequivocal calls for
the cessation of hostilities, and through our proposals for the
appointment of a United Nations special representative for East
Timor,playeda positiveand constructiverole in tryingto resolve the

present crisis. Australia had also been very positive in the
humanitarian area where Australia'sofficial contributions for relief
have far exceeded contributions forthcoming so farfrom any other
source."(Annex 17hereto)

65. Early the next year,on 19and 20 January 1976,Mr Peacockhad talksin
Jakarta with the Indonesian Foreign Minister,Mr Malik. He emphasized the
need for a cessation of hostilities, a resumptionof international humanitarian
aid, a withdrawal ofIndonesian forcesand a genuine actof self-determination.

This was repeated by him in a statement to the House of Representatives on
4 March 1976, wherehe also reiterated Australia's support forthe resolutions
passed by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council in

December 1975.The statementappearsasAnnex 18hereto. On 14Apnl 1976
before the Secunty Council, Australia again re-affirmed its support for the
United Nations resolutions, the sending of a special representative and the
exerciseof the right ofself-determination(Memorial,para.2.17).

66. Australia had declined to accept the invitations to attendthe meeting of
the Popular Assemblyin EastTimorin May 1976. On 1June 1976,the Foreign
Ministerinformedthe AustralianParliamentof the Governrnent'sreasonsfor so
doing. The ForeignMinister statedthatas "noindicationwasforthcomingfrom

the United Nations that it would be involved ..we accordingly decided that it
would be appropnate for us not to attend ...Some form of United Nations
participation and observation is essential." The text of the statement is at
Amex 19.

67. When Indonesia announcedthe integration into Indonesiaof East Timor
in July 1976and there was no immediate United Nations response, Australia
considered it necessary to review its policy on East Timor. Australia did not

endorse the 1976 plebiscite as a satisfactory exercise of the nght of self
detennination(Amex 20hereto). Nevertheless,it soughttodeal withIndonesia
in relation toEastTimor so as besttopromote theinterestsof thepeopleof EastTimor. in October1976,shortlyafterthe Australian Prime Ministerhad visited
Indonesia, Australia announced that it would make available $250,000 (in

addition to an earlier contribution of over $80,000) for humanitarianrelief
throughthe IndonesianRedCross.

68. Australian policy has done no morethan recognizethe continuingreality
of Indonesia's control of East Timor. This was the basis for the de facto
recognitionof indonesia'sincorporationof EastTimor in January 1978. As to
that recognition, the Australian Government stated that although it"remains

critical of the means by which integration was brought about it would be
unrealisticto refuse to recognizede facto that EastTimor is part of Indonesia."
In that same statement, the Governmentfurther noted that if Australia was to
assist in "the rehabilitation of Timor", it would "need to continue to deal

directly with theIndonesian Govemment asthe authorityin effectivecontrol".
(Thestatement is set outat Amex 21hereto.)

69. In December 1978, the Australian Government announced that

negotiations would commence with Indonesia in relation to the Timor Gap.
Negotiations commenced in February 1979 (Memorial, para.2.22 and
Annex IiI.37). The Australianview,as expressedby its ForeignMinister,was

that the start of negotiations would imply de iure recognition of Indonesian
incorporationof EastTimor. In his statementof 15December 1978(Memorial,
Amex III.37). the Australian Foreign Ministerrepeated that Australia'sentry
into these negotiationsdid not alterhis Govemment'soppositionto themanner

of Indonesia's incorporationof East Timor,but that Australia hadto "face the
realities". For practical reasons, including the planned development of the
resourcesof the sea bed,the Australian Governmenthad decidedto proceed.

70. in theinterveningyears between 1979and now,Australia hascontinued
to deal with Indonesia overEast Timor, by providing humanitarianand other
assistance. On a numberof occasions,it has conveyedits concem to Indonesia
about thehumanrights situationin EastTimor, most recentlyas a result of the

outbreakof violencein Diliat the end of 1991. Australia hasalso continuedto
encourage Portugal and Indonesia to consult one another,either directly or
under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with a view to resolving the

situationin EastTimor.71. Australia has taken the view that the implementationof the right to self-

determinationof the peopleof EastTimor is a matterfor the responsibleorgans
of the United Nations. Australiahas been and remains ready to accept and act
on any authoritative decision made by the competent organs of the United
Nations in the matter, or on any intemationally acceptable resolution of the

issue arrived atby the "parties directly concerned", ofwhom Australia is not
one. But, as thefollowing accountdemonstrates,the international community
has taken no action which might challenge continued Indonesian controlover
East Timor and indeed, since 1982,no actionat all, at the level of the Security

Councilor the GeneralAssembly. CHAPTER 2

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
ANDTHE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR

Section 1: Resolutions of the Securitv Council and the General
Assemblv on the auestion of East Timor

72. Since December 1975 the United Nations has assumed the principal
responsibility for resolving the dispute over East Timor. Resolutions on the
question of East Timor were passedby the Security Councilin 1975and 1976,
and by the GeneralAssembly between 1975and 1982. Neither body hasgiven

further consideration to thequestion. The text of the resolutions togetherwith
voting records is set out in Annexes25 and 26 of this Counter-Memorial. (The
resolutions also appearin Annex 1of Portugal's Application and Annexes1.1-
1.10 of Portugal's Memorial.) What follows is a brief account first, of the

resolutions of the Security Council and secondly, of the resolutions of the
General Assembly. In Part III of this Counter-Memorial,Australia examines
theapplicationof theseresolutionsto thefactsof thecase inmoredetail.

A. Security Council resolution384 of 22December 1975

73. On 22 December, twelve days after General Assembly resolution 3485
(discussed in para.98ff. below), and fifteen days after the Indonesian

intervention,the SecurityCouncilunanimouslyadopted resolution 384.

74. In the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, the Security Council
recognisedtheright of the people ofEastTimorto self-determination;notedthe

decision of the Generai Assemblyto request the Cornmitteeof Twenty-Fourto
send a fact-finding mission there; deplored, although withoutcondemning,the
military intervention by Indonesia in East Timor; and regretted "that the
Government of Portugal did not discharge fully its responsibiiities as

administering Power in the Temtory under Chapter XI of the Charter". The
SecurityCouncilthusbeganby recognising expresslythat Portugalhad failedto
fulfil its responsibiliaseadministering Power in theTemtory, by failing to
assistthe EastTimoresepeople towardsan orderlyactof self-determinationandby its disorderlywithdrawalfromtheTemtory.

75. In theoperativeparagraphsof resolution384,the Security Council"called
upon" al1Statesto respectthe temtorial integrityof EastTimorand the right of
the EastTimoresepeople toself-determination;called upon"theGovernrnent of

Indonesiato withdraw without delayal1its forces fromthe Temtory" and "the
Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-operate fully with the
UnitedNations so as to enable the peopleof EastTimor to exercisefreelytheir
rightto self-determination".

76. By operative paragraph 4, the resolution also stated that the Security
Council:

"Urges al1States and otherpartiesconcerned to co-operatefully with
the efforts of the United Nationsto achieve a peaceful solutionto the
existing situationand tofacilitatetheecolonizationof the Temtory."

77. Further,by operative paragraphs5 and 6, the Security Councilrequested
the Secretq-General to send a special representativeto the Temtory and, on
considering the representative's report, to submit recommendations to the

SecurityCouncil.

78. Resolution384 shows that the Security Council accepted thatthe United
Nations had the primary responsibility for finding a means of settling the

dispute which had arisen over East Timor. It also shows that the Security
Council chose not to make any findings which might have been conscniedas
attracting its enforcement powersunder Chapter W. It did not, for example,
make any finding of breach of the peace, or act of aggression on Indonesia's

part. Clearly the Security Council intended to actonlyunder Chapter VI and
not ChapterW. In keeping withthis, the terms of the resolutionwere purely
recommendatory. Theydid notcontainany specific findings conceming either

Indonesian occupation of the temtory, or the denial of the rights of the East
Timorese peopleto self-determination.There isno indicationin resolution384
that the Security Council intended tomake any decision binding on Member
StatesunderArticle 25 of the Charter,and no suchdecisionwasmade.

79. This understanding of resolution 384 is supported by many of the
statementsmade by Member Statesdunng the SecurityCouncil's discussionofthe EastTimor situatbn between 15and 22 December 1975.It shouldbe borne

in mind that MemberStateswereconsciousof their lackof reliable information
and of the apparent complexity of the problem. Explaining his delegation's
support for the resolution on 22 December 1975, the representative of Italy
stated:

"In the light of what we heard we could by and large realize the
complexity of the problem with which the United Nations is
confronted and the difficulties which the Council would have to
overcomein ordereffectivelyto fulfil the taskof restoringpeace and
order in that troubled temtory and ensure to its people the right to

decidefreely their owndestiny.

1must add in al1candour that the picture of the events, as we could
draw it in our minds, was far from clear, except in its tragichuman

comotations. ...

What we could however sum up from their statements is the
confirmation that a factional strife had been going on for some
months in the Territory causing heavy losses of life and undue

sufferings to the people, andthat that situation had led first to the
withdrawal of the administering authority and secondly to armed
interventionby a neighbouring country.

In the face of such a situation, it is the opinion of my delegationthat
the resolutionjust adoptedby the Counciltakesdue accountof what
has apparentlybeen going on in EastTimor and has chosen the most
realistic and proper course of action at this stage. ...[I]t tries to
make the presence of the United Nations felt at once in the

Temtory... .

That is why, in the opinion of my delegation, it is of the utmost
importance that the special representative to be appointed by the

Secretary-Generalshouldestablishcontactswith al1the Governments
and parties concernedin order to promote the cessation of factional
strifeas a first step toreconciliationamongthe fighters. At the same
time, he should collect al1relevant information for the Secretary-
General, whose following recommendations to the Council will guideour futuremostappropriateaction."(SIPV.1869,pp.32-3)

80. It was in thiscontext that most Statesrecognized thatit was not the task
of the Councilto allocateblame,and thatwhatwas needed waspractical action.
in endorsingthe resolution,the representativeof Francesaid:

"The missionof theCouncilin this caseis notto layblame,andeven

less to attributeit to a single oneof the parties involved. We know
that historiesituations arerarely simple enoughfor goodand evil to
be discemed from a singlevantage point. Timor is no exceptionto
thatmle. A seriesofcircumstanceshasplungedtheTemtory of East

Timor into a war, bothcivil and foreign. The administeringPower,
despite its obvious goodwill and the sincerity of its cornrnitrnents,
has certainlybeenunableto devoteal1due attentionand diligenceto
the decolonizationof that far-offisland." (SIPV.1869,pp.34-5,36)

81. The representativeof the United Republicof Cameroon alsocomrnented
that:

"[Tlhe Council, as the outcome of the lengthy and difficult
consultationswhichit has canied out in recentdays,has, in the final

analysis, we believe, taken a balanced decision of a more or less
conciliatory nature which will be likely to reduce tension and to
promote conditionsfor a calmand normalevolutionof eventsin East
Timor,at the sametime safeguardinginternationalpeaceand security

in the area

It was,in fact, deliberately- that is, in a spirit of realis-that the
Council finally did not feel it should energetically condemn the
interventionof Indonesian armedforcesin thatTemtory. ...

It can be said that responsibilityfor this tragedyis largelyshared. At
the origin of these events is undoubtedlythe characteristic natureof
Portuguesecolonialhistory,aggravatedby the uncertaintiesof power

in Lisbon. ...
...
The mandate which the Council has in this case entrusted to the
Secretary-Generalis in the contextof its role as a body to safeguard international peace and security in general and particularly in this
region .., itbeingperfectly understood thatthe GeneralAssemblyof
the UnitedNations,throughits organs,is the only competentbodyto

deal with the decolonization of Timor, a question of which it is
alreadyseized."(SPV. 1869,pp.8, 11)

82. The representativeof Costa Ricaalso notedthat the SecurityCouncilhad

only "scanty information"(SPV.1869, p.18)andobservedthat:

"my delegation [cm] find [no]justification for Portugal's weakness
as the administering Power. Portugal, at the final stage of its
mandate, lost control over the domestic situation in East Timor."

(SPV. 1869,p.21)

In explaining Japan's vote for the resolution on 22 December 1975, the
representative of Japan commended the Security Council for taking "practical

action to disposeof the situationin East Timor," inthe form of a request to the
Secretary-General to send a special representative to the Territory to make an
on-the-spotassessmentof the existingsituation(SPV. 1869,p.17).

83. It should, however, also be noted that, even at this stage, there were

States which did lay the blame on Portugal. On 15 December 1975, the
representative of Malaysia (which had been granted permission to speak
althoughnot a memberof theCouncil)stated:

"In evacuating almostal1of the Portuguesein PortugueseTimor,the
colonial Power abdicated the solemn responsibilitiesit had assumed
as the administenng Powerunder the United Nations Charterand the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
andPeoples. Furthermore,having removed itself physicallyfromthe

Temtory, the Portuguese Govemment alsolost any leverageit might
have hadfor influencingthecourseof eventsin PortugueseTimor.
..
It can be seen,therefore,that the Portuguese Govemmenthad neither

the ability nor the means to restore peace and order in the Temtory
and assist its people in the process of decolonization. In fact, the
Portuguese Government admitted as much in its letter to the
Secretary-Generalof 28 November,in which itstated that it did not have the means to ensure normalizationof the situation in Timor."
(SPV. 1864,pp.66-7)

84. Beforethe Security Council, Indonesiahad stated:

"As a result of the bloody fighUngin Portuguese Timor, Indonesia

was ..confrontedwithextremelyserious difficulties."(SPV. 1864,
p.37)

"Indonesia totally and emphatically rejects the sanctimonious
contention of Portugal ..that Indonesia has committed a military

aggression in Timor. It is Portugal that should be charged with
criminal negligence ..of its responsibilities towards the people of
East Timor." (SPV. 1864,pp.42-3)

"Indonesia is vitally interested in peace and stability in Timo...

Indonesia will continue to participate in every bona fide effort to
restore peaceful conditions to the temtory in order to enable the
people freely and democratically to exercise its right to self-
determination. The future political status of East Timor must be

based on the outcome of such an exercise of the right to self-
determination by the entire people. Indonesia is prepared to co-
operate with the United Nations and countries of the region to
achieve thatpurpose." (SIPV.1864,p.43)

B. Security Council resolution 389 of22April1976

85. The Secunty Councilnextconsideredthe questionof East Timorbetween
12and 22 Apnl 1976,after the visitto the Territoryof the Secretary-General's

Special Representative (Mr Winspeare Guicciardi). On 22 April 1976, the
Security Council adopted resolution 389,by 12 votes to nil. Japan and the
United States abstained and Benin did not participate in the voting. Although
more than 5months had elapsed since Indonesia's occupationof the temtory,
the second Security Council resolutionwas substantially the sarne as its first.

By its preambular paragraphs, the resolution again cornmenced by
"[rleaffirming" the nght of the peopleof East Timor to self-determination;by
"[nloting that the question of EastTimor is before theAssembly";and stating
thatit was: "Consciou osthe urgent need to bring to an end the continued

situationof tensionin East Timor."

86. By its operative paragraphs,the Security Council again "called upon" al1
Statestorespectthe territorialintegnty of EastTimorand therightof its people

to self-determination; calledupon the government of Indonesia to withdraw;
and called upon:

"al1States and other parties concerned to CO-operate fully with the
United Nationstoachieveapeaceful solutionto the existingsituation

and tofacilitatethe decoionizationof theTemtory."

87. Two other operativeparagraphs requestedthe Secretary-Generaito have
his SpecialRepresentativecontinuetheassignmentand tosubmitareportto the

Security Council. The terms of resolution 389 indicate that the Security
Councilwasobviously concernedtobe better informedof the facts.

88. Likeresolution384, resolution389expressedthe SecurityCouncil'sview

that the United Nationsthroughits variousorgansshouldassumeresponsibility
for finding a peaceful solution to the East Timor situation, through the
processes of consultation and negotiation. Its terms, likethose of resolution
384, were entirely recommendatory. It"called upon", but did not "demand,

"insist", or "order" Indonesia to withdraw from the Temtory. It should be
borne in mindthatin SecurityCouncilusage, generallyspeaking,the ascending
orderof peremptorinessof languageis "recommend","request", "appeal",''cal1
upon", "urge", "demand", "insist", "order": see Goodrich, Hambro and

Simmons,Charterof the UnitedNations(3rded, 1969), p.307. The resolution
again omitted any specific finding that Indonesia had committedan act of
aggression, or engaged in unlawful use of force. There is nothing in the
language of resolution 389 to invoke anyof the Security Council's powers

under Chapter VII, and it recorded no decision which could be construed as
giving rise to an obligation on the part of Member States to abstain from
enteringinto dealingswithIndonesiainrelationtoEast Timor.

89. Again this understanding of the resolution is reflected in the statements
madeby States concerningEastTimor. Membersof the Councilexpressedthe
view that, in theparticular circumstancesof East Timor, a solution shouldbesought through negotiation under the auspices of the United Nations. On
20 April 1976,the representative of Italy again noted that the situation was a
complexone and stated:

"When theCouncilmetin December last to considerthe questionof
EastTimor therewasgeneral agreement arnongits membersthat out
knowledge of the local situationwas not comprehensive enough to
enable this body to take proper action under the responsibilities
bestowed uponit by theCharter.

...
The situationprevailingin EastTimor is certainly not a simple one,
as can be clearly seen from the report of the Special Representative,
and the taskofthe Council is noteasy.
..

We were ...favourably impressed by the conclusions drawn by the
Special representative in his report - namely, that al1 the parties
concerned concurred in principle that any agreement on the
settlementof the problem should be subrnittedto the people of East
Timor and approvedby them. It is true that ..opinions Varyabout

who should takepart in the negotiating process which mightproduce
such a settlement,and how popular approval should be sought. Our
main task at this stage cannotbe other than to tryto reconcilethese
differences.
..

We therefore sharethe view of the Secretary-General,now that the
existence of some essential elementsof a possible solutionhas been
ascertained, that the Council should recommendthe promotion of
further contacts betweenthe Special Representativeand the parties
concerned. The final objectiveof these contacts shouldbe to bring

the parties together and work out a solution on thebasis of some
fundamental guidelines to be established by this Council."
(SPV. 1912,pp.31-33)

90. The representative of the USSR also remarked that the situation in the

Temtory rernained"complex, tense andunsettled" and agreed thatthere wasa
need for a further report from the Secretary-General'sSpecial Representative
(SlPV.1915, pp.12-13). See also the statement by the United Kingdom
representative,whocommented: "A majordifficulty willbetheabsenceof anypriorpreparation inthe

Territory for the use of democratic processes. In our view,
procedures suited to the local circumstances should be used."
(SPV.1915, p.18)

91. Membersof the Security Council remainedof the view that it was, in the

circumstances, inappropriateto allocate blame. Thus, when therepresentative
of Pakistanspokebeforethe Councilon 22April1976, he said:

"The proximate causeof the crisisin EastTimorwas theoutbreakof
dissension and civil strife between various political and ideological

factionsin the Temtory. ...It is no longermaterialto discuss which
act was the cause and which the consequence; undoubtedly the
vacuum created by Portugal's abruptand unceremonious departure
from the scene had much to do with these developments. In the

circumstances it is difficult to accept Portugal as having in any
practical sense any further responsibilities as the Adrninistering
Authority..." (SPV. 1914,p.36)

He added:

"[We] hope ...that the Special Representative will receive the
continued backing of the Council in his difficult and delicate task.
We are pleased to see that the resolution now adopted has avoided

fault-finding andrecrirninationand airnsat finding a solution which
would be acceptable to al1and would promote the welfare of the
peopleconcemed." (SPV. 1914,p.38-40)

92. A similarviewwasentertainedby France,whoserepresentativesaid:

"Like resolution 384 (1975), adopted on 22 December last by the
Council ,the one just adopted today ...seems to us a substantial
improvement over resolution 3485(XXX), which the General

Assembly hadadopted 10daysearlier.
...
Indeed,rather than unilaterally placing responsibilityfor the situation
on one of the parties to the conflict it takes into account the various pointsof viewand thefactsof life. ...

My delegationfully approvesof continuingthe assignmententrusted
to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Rather than
dwellingon thepast and apportioningblarnehere or there, it is to the
future that we must now look. The future of East Timor must be

characterizedby national reconciliation....

Even though some encouraging signs in this respect have already
been reported,it is not to be expectedthat this reconciliationwill be
without its vicissitudesor without long and labonous negotiations;

thereforeit wouldbe desirable for such negotiationsto beheld, or at
leaststarted,underthe United Nationsauspicesand,initially,through
the good officesof the Secretaq-General's Special Representative."
(SIPV.191522 April, 1976,pp.11-12)

93. It should also be noted that, appearing before the Security Council on
14April 1976, the representative of Indonesia again maintained that "the
Indonesian presencein East Timor was upon the specific requestof the large

majorityof the people" (SIPV.1909,pp.8-10). He saidfurtherthat:

"As far as the peopleof East Timorare concerned, in theirview they
have already formally decided to become independent through

complete integration with the Republic of Indonesia. They now
consider themselves as much Indonesian as any other Indonesian
from any other part of Indonesia and their temtory asmuch part of
Indonesia asany otherprovinceofIndonesia.

...
It is because of its respect for the right to self-determination that
Indonesia has stated time and again that, though the Indonesian
people welcomethe decisionfor integrationwith Indonesiamade by

the people of East Timor, we should like to see, however, whether
that decision, proclaimed on 30November 1975, will subsequently
be confirmed by the people in the exercise of their right to self-
determination. The IndonesianGovernmentwill alsohave toconsult

the Indonesian Parliament as to whetherit accepts the decision for
integrationof thepeopleof EastTimor." (SPV. 1909,pp.11-12) 94. Indonesia's stance was supported by certain States which, althoughnot
members of the Council, spoke before the Council. On 20 April 1976, the
representativeof Malaysia (whichhad beengranted permissionto speak)stated:

"Our delegationparticipatedin the deliberationsof the Councilwhen
it met last year to consider the question of Timor for the first time.
At that time, we were faced with a situation which was markedly
different fromthe oneexistinginTimortoday ...

...
We have ...been told that preparations for the establishment of a
People'sAssemblywill be completedin two or three months. Such
an achievement by the Provisional Government cannot be
underestimated, considering that, during the long occupation by

Portuguese colonialpower, no effort had been made to develop any
indigenouspolitical systemin theTemtory ...
...
[W]e are pleased to note that the Provisional Government is
cornmitted to the principle of self-determinationand has agreed to

invite the United Nations to witness the implementation of its
decision ...
...
As to the form and rnannerof the act of self-determination,this, as
we al1 know, varies from place to place, depending upon the
particularcircurnstancesexistingin the respectiveTemtories. In the

case of East Timor, given the fact that over 90 per cent of the
people areilliterate,and giventhe difficultiesofcommunications,the
MalaysianGovernent acceptsandsupportsthe rnannerin which the
people of East Timor have exercised their right to self-

determination."(SPV. 1911,pp.11-5)

95. On 14April 1976,a sirnilarview wasexpressedby the representativeof
the Philippineswhostated:

"It is relevant to recall that Indonesia entered EastTimor at the
request of those parties representing the majority of the East
Timorese, and did so only after efforts tofïnd a peaceful solutionto
the shife in theTemtory had failed. ...Mydelegationcannotfail to
note that the people of East Timor have expressedthe wish through four parties- APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista - to be

integratedwithIndonesia,andthat Indonesiahas refusedto accedeto
their request exceptin so faras the peopleof EastTimor themselves
shall have expressed their wishes in a forma1 act of self-
detemination." (SlPV.1909,p.26) ,

96. When the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed the Council on
15April 1976,he wasopenly criticalof Portugal's conductand stated:

"So if the Indonesiansmovedat one time it was not in order to lord

it over the EastTimorese. It was in order to see what could be done
so that public order couldbe maintainedwhen theso-called vacuum
was created by the withdrawal of Portugal. Therefore, there is no
reasonto molestor criticizeIndonesia."(SIPV.1910,pp.8-10)

97. No other resolutionwith respect to EastTimor has since been considered
by the Security Council, even though the General Assembly called on the
Security Councilto considerthe rnatterfurtherin its resolutions onEast Timor

of 1976,1977 and 1978.

C. General Assembly resolution 3485(XXX)of 12December 1975

98. On 12 December 1975, 5 days after the Indonesian armed forces had
entered the East Timorese capital of Dili, the General Assembly passed
resolution3485(XM<). The votes in favournumbered 72,including Australia.
10States voted againstthe resolution;43 abstained;and 19States were absent

whenthe votewastaken.

99. The focusof the resolutionis expressedin operativeparagraph 3in which
the Assembly:

"Appeaisto al1the partiesin PortugueseTimor to respond positively
to efforts toind a peaceful solutionthrough talksbetween them and
the Governmentof Portugalin the hope thatsuch talks will bring an

end to the strifein the Temtory and lead towardthe orderly exercise
of the right to self-determination by the people of Portuguese
Timor." 100. The resolution also declared in operative paragraphs 4-6 that the
Assembly:

"4. Stronglydeplores themiiitaryinterventionof thearmedforcesof
Indonesiain Portuguese Timor;

5. Calls upon the Governmentof Indonesia to desist from further
violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to
withdraw withoutdelay its armed forces from the Temtory in order
to enable the people of the Temtory freely to exercise theirright to

self-deterrninationandindependence;

6. Draws the attention of the Security Council,in conformity with
Article 11, paragraph3, of the Charter, to thecriticalsituationin the
Temtory of Portuguese Timor and recommends that ittake urgent
action to protectthe territorialintegrityof PortugueseTimor and the

inaiienableright ofits people toself-determination."

101. Paragraph 4 was voted on separately. The vote was 59:11:55
(APV.2439, 12 December 1975). Operative paragraph 5 contains the only
reference by any organ of the United Nations to Indonesian action as a

"violationof the temtorial integrityof PortugueseTimor". Thedescriptionwas
not adoptedby the Security Council,nor repeatedby the GeneralAssemblyon
any other occasion.

102. By relying on Article ll(3) of the Charter to draw the matter to the
Security Council's attention,the GeneralAssemblyindicatedthat the Assembly
regarded the situation as one "likely to endanger international peace and
security" and thus falling within Article 33 of the Charter. Whilst Article 33

attractsthe recommendatorypowers of the Security Councilunder ChapterVI,
it does not attract its decision-making powersunder Chapter VII. Indeed the
Assembly omitted from the terms of the resolution any language whichwas
capable of forming a basis for action by the Security Council under

Chapter VU. Had it so wished the Assembly could have used the word
"condemn", rather than "deplore", or "aggression" rather than "military
intervention". It has used those words on other occasions. See, for instance,resolutions 40152and 40153(1985) set out in Appendix B hereto; resolution

39/146B(1984)"stronglycondemning"hrael for fading to comply withearlier
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning Israel's
occupation of the Golan Heights (para.1); resolution 2383(XXIII) (1968)
"conde-ng" the failure of the United Kingdom, as administering Power, to

take effective measuresto end the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia(para.3)
and "condemning" theillegal interventionof South Afncan forcesin Southern
Rhodesia (para.10); also General Assembly resolution 498(V) (1951)
concerningthe "aggression"in Korea.

103. This understandingof resolution3485(XXX)is reflected in the statements
made by States in the Fourth Cornmittee when thedraft resolution was under
consideration. On 8 December 1975,the representativeof Sn Lanka described

the generalunderstandingof Statesof the situation in EastTimor. Hestated:

"What was essentialwas that Indonesiashouldbe urged to withdraw
its troops and that an administration should be established in

Portuguese Timor which would be able to maintain order until
conditions in the Temtory permitted the people to exercise freely
their right to self-determination. The interested parties should
therefore undertake consultations to that end. It appeared, however,

that Portugal was not in a position to deal with the situation alone.
The best course, therefore, would be for Portugal and the United
Nations to ensure the administration of the Temtory until the
aforementionedfavourableconditionswereestabiished.

He did not beiieve that any purpose would be servedin condemning
the action taken by Indonesia, which was nevertheless most

regrettable."(AlC.4lSR.2185)

104. States emphasised the need for a negotiated settlement. Thus, the
representativeofJapan stated:

"Hisdelegation still believed that talks between Portugal and al1the
political parties in Portuguese Timor offered the best basis for
achieving a negotiated settlement, ending the armed conflict, and

bringing about the peaceful and orderly decolonization of the
Temtory. ...
His delegation hoped that the United Nations would play an

appropriate role in overcoming the current difficulties, in co-
operation with the administeringPower, and thatal1MemberStates
would help to achieve a peaceful solutionand thedecolonizationof
PortugueseTimor." (AlC.4llSR.2180,3 December1975)

The representativeof Indiaexpressedsimilarviews(ibid.).

105. The representativeofindonesiastated inhiscountry's defencethat:

"He would remind those who criticized Indonesia's actionin Timor
thatthe courseof eventsin theTemtory wouldhave takena different
turn if only Portugal had not been criminally negligent in the

dischargeofits obligationsas administering Power.
...
He wished to repeat mostemphatically that Indonesia's presencein
Timor was not intendedto impose a political solution on itspeople.

Indonesia's sole aim was to promote a solution which would be
consistent with General Assembly resolutions 1514(XV) and
1541(XV). Indonesia,far fromwishingto confrontthe world witha
fait accompli, would welcome appropriate United Nations
participationinorder toensure that thepeople'swill wasrespected."

(AlC.4lSR.2187)

106. Some States expressed sympathy for Indonesia's position. Thus, the
representativeof Fiji:

"expressedregret that theadministeringPower, Portugal,had proved
to be not only impotent but also grossly negligent in Portuguese
Timor, where for several months there had been a reign of terror,

bloodshedand totallackof lawand order. The concem expressedby
Indonesia,a neighbouringcountrywhich hadhad an influxof40,000
refugees from the Territory, was therefore entirely legitimate and
understandable. However,his delegationwasof the viewthata state

of anarchydid notin any waydiminishthe right of the peoplesof al1
colonial Temtories to self-determination and independence. It
accepted Indonesia's explanationof the reasons for its intervention, but such interventioncould notjustify any infringementof the right

of the peoples of Portuguese Timor to self-determinationor of the
principle that no State had the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly,inthe interna1orexternalaffairsof anyother State.
...
His delegation in no way condoned such intervention, but, being

realistic, it recognized that the Indonesian military forces were
currently in occupation ofmuch of Portuguese Timor and that the
presence of the administering Power was nowhere to be seen."
(AlC.4lSR.2187)

A similarview wasexpressedby SaudiArabiawhoserepresentativesaid:

"The responsibility for the situation currently prevailing in

PortugueseTimorlay in rnanyrespects with Portugal,which wasfar
from the scene of conflict, whereas Indonesia,which had attempted
to put outthe fire,wascloseby." (A/C.4lSR.2187)

The representativeofJapan stated:

"Portugal'ssymbolicpresence and its limitedauthorityhad led to the
escalation ofarmed shife and tension in the Temtory. Portugal's
failuretotakeappropriatemeasurestorestorepeaceandorder,which

were essential to theree exercise of the rightto self-determination,
and its failure to honour its cornmitmeas administenng Power had
created a vacuum. The resulting escalation of the armed struggle
between the rival parties in the Territory had caused bloodshed and

sufferingand indonesia'sintervention shouldbe viewed against that
background." (A/C.4lSR.2189,11December 1975)

107. In the Fourth Committee, as in the Security Council, States recognized

that they had insufficient information to enable them to judge what had
occurredin theTemtory. Thus,therepresentativeof the Philippinessaid:

"The events thathad occurredin Portuguese Timor couldnot fail to

be of interest to the Philippines,which wasin the same region. His
delegation did not feel it was appropriate to condemn Indonesia
before the Committeehad clear and first-handinformationregarding the real situation in Portuguese Timor." (A/C.4/SR.2188, 11
December 1975)

In theFourthCommittee,therepresentativeof Malaysia supportedtheproposal
that "the United Nations should participatein the decolonization process by
sendinga visitingmission",obsewingthat

"Such a mission wouldmake it possible to ascertain the actual situation
prevailing in the area and wouldhelp to lay to rest the conflicting
reportswhich had corneto theattentionof the intemationalcornrnunity."

(A/C.4/SR.2180,3 December1975)

D. General Assembly resolution 31/53of 1December 1976

108. The GeneralAssemblydid not againconsiderthe questionof EastTimor
until 1 December 1976. Under the Portuguese Constitution adoptedin April
1976, East Timor was no longer defined as territory under Portuguese
sovereignty. The Provisional Government of East Timor had convened a

"Popular Assembly" in Dili on 31 May 1976 to vote on a proposa1 for
integration of the territory with Indonesia. The Special United Nations
Committee on Decolonizationhad declined the invitation of the Provisional
Govemment to observethe proceedings, although similarinvitations had been

accepted by theGovernmentsof India, Iran, Malaysia,New Zealand, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia,andThailand. nie Government of Indonesiahad later(on 7 June
1976)issued its own invitations tothe Special Comminee and to the Security
Council to observe afact-finding mission of the Indonesian Parliament tothe
Temtory which was designedto assess theresolutionof the PopularAssembly

infavourof integrationwith Indonesiaand to"venfy the wishesof thepeople".
Againthoseinvitationsweredeclinedby the United Nations bodies,but similar
invitations were accepted by a number of countries. On 12 August 1976

Indonesia reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the
Indonesian Parliament had decided to accept the petition by the East Timor
Popular Assembly for integration with Indonesia, and that a forma1 act of
integration had been passed by the Parliament on 17 July 1976 (UN

Doc.Sl12174). Seeparagraph54above.

109. After debating these developments, the General Assembly adopted
resolution 31/53 on 1 December 1976. In its preambular paragraphs, theGeneral Assembly reiterated thatitremained:

"Deeplyconcernedat the criticalsituation resultingfromthe military
interventionof the armedforcesof Indonesia inEast Timor."

110. In its operative paragraphs, the Assembly re-affirmed its previous

resolution, togetherwiththoseof the Secwity Council,and statedthatit:

"Strongly deplores the persistent refusal of the Government of
Indonesia to comply with the provisions of General Assembly

resolutionof3485(XXX)and Security Council resolution384(1975)
and 389(1976);

Rejects the claimthat EastTimorhas been integrated into Indonesia,
inasmuch as the people of the Temtory have not been able to

exercise freelytheirightto self-determination andindependence;

Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw al1its forces
fromthe Temtory."

111. Again refemng to Article ll(3) of the Charter, the Assembly sought to

draw the Security Council's attention to what it descnbed as "the critical
situation in the Temtory of East Timor" and recornmended that the Security
Council take "al1 effective steps" for the implementation of its earlier
resolutions. The Assembly also requested the United Nations Special

Committee on Decolonization "to despatch to the Territory as soon as is
possiblea visitingmission ". Thatmissionwasnotsent.

112. in this, and subsequentresolutions, the Assemblyno longerreferredtothe

Temtory as Portuguese Timor, but as East Timor. In this as in earlier
resolutionsthe Assembly'slanguagewasrecommendatory. It made no finding
against Indonesiawhichmight have ledit to engagethe attentionof the Security
Council under Chapter ViI. On the contrary, the Assembly confirmed its

previous position that the Security Council should act under Chapter VI. Despitethe recommendation forfurtheraction by the Security Councilin the
Generai Assembly'sresolution31/53, however, no such item retumedto the

agendaof theSecurityCouncil.

113. The vote on resolution 31/53was 68 in favour,20 against,49 (including
Australia)abstaining,and 9 absent. Thedebateon theresolutionin the plenary
sessionof the Assemblywas not extensive. Indeed,Portugal didnot speakat

all, althoughit had spoken in support of the draft resolutionin the preceding
debate intheUnited NationsFourthCommittee.

114. Before the Fourth Cornmittee on 17 November1976, Indonesia had

defendeditselfby declaringthat:

"his delegationwouldcategoncallyreject any resolutionwhich did
not respect the legitimate decision already taken by the people of
East Timor to beindependentthroughintegrationwithIndonesiaand

whichdidnot takeintoaccounttheprevailingrealitiesin EastTimor.
..
The exercise of the nght to self-determinationhad taken place in
freedom in accordance with the customary practice of the people
concemed. Indonesia respected the wish of the people of the

Territory and accepted their decision to be independent through
integrationwithIndonesia."(AlC.41311SR.27)

It repeatedthisin Plenarysessionon 1December1976(Al31PV.85).

115. Some States accepted that there had in fact been a valid act of self-
determination in May 1976. See the statements made by the Philippines,
A/C.4/3llSR.16, 5 November1976;M31PV.85, 1December1976;Malaysia,
A/C.4/3llSR.27, 17November1976; IranA/C.4/31/SR.16, 5 November 1976;

Morocco, AlC.41311SR. 16, 5 November 1976; Oman, AlC.41311SR.16,
5 November 1976 and Al31lPV.85, 1 December 1976; and India,
A/C.41311SR.13,2 November 1976.116. Most States urged a CO-operativesolution. Thus, the representative of
Japan said:

"while the decolonizationof East Timorhad ken carried out in the
normal way until April 1974, the sudden collapse of the
administeringPower at that time had createdutter chaos throughout

the Territory. Armed conflicts had eventually broken out between
the various political groups and it was regrettable, as stated in
Security Council resolution 384 (1975), that the Govemment of
Portugal had notfully dischargedits responsibilities under Chapter

XI ofthe Charter.
...
In May 1976, the Provisional Governmenthad submitted a forma1
requestto theIndonesian Governmentfor integrationwith Indonesia,

so that it could become independent as an integral part of that
country. Indonesiahad accepted that request in July 1976, and that
washowthe situationnowstood.
...
His delegation hoped that an atmosphere of reconcilia.tionwould

soon prevail arnong al1 parties involved in the dispute, and he
welcomed the statement by the representative of Portugal that the
Portuguese Govemment would accept a consensus of the United
Nations on that matter, in the knowledge that it would be in

accordance with the principles that had always guided the United
Nations." (A/C.4/31/SR.16, 5 November 1976. See also
NC.4131lSR.27,17November1976.)

SaudiArabiaagreed,obsewing:

"Indonesia was a polyethnic nation and had legitimate interestsin
protectingpeaceand securityon the islandof Timor. Hewas pained

to see Indonesia, an early leader in the anti-colonialist struggle,
maligned by people who were themselves far from perfect and
should know better. The temptation to create a mountain out of a
molehillcould onlylead to troublefor StatesMembersof the United

Nations."(NC.4131lSR.13,2 November1976) E. General Assembly resolution 32/34 of28 November 1W7

117. The question of East Timor was considered again by the General
Assembly at its next annual session. Resolution 32/34of 28 November 1977
was almost identical in terms to resolution 31/53. Again it expressed the
Assembly's "deep concem" for the situation in the Territory, "resulting from

the persistentrefusalon thepart of the Governrnentof indonesiato complywith
the provisions of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council". Again, by operative paragraph6, the Assembly sought to draw the
Security Council's attentionto thematter, in conforrnitywith Article 1l(3) of

the Charter.

118. Operative paragraph 5 did, however, introducea new request -that the
Secretary-General send urgentlya special representative toEast Timor with a

view to making "a thorough, on-the-spot assessmentof the existing situationin
the Territory and of establishing contact with the representatives of
[FRETILIN]and the Governmentof Indonesia,as well as the Govemments of
other States concerned,in order to prepare the ground for a visiting missionof

the SpecialCornmittee...". (Thatvisiting missionhad been mandatedby earlier
resolutions.)

119. This new element showed the Assembly's concern that therebe some

reliable fact-finding undertaken in the Temtory, and that the processes of
settlement be appropnately pursued between the parties directly concerned,
specifically FRETILIN and Indonesia. In this connection, Portugal was not
narned, although it no doubt fell into the general category of "other States

concerned. in keepingwith this approach to Portugal'slimitedrole, neither in
this resolution (norndeed in resolution 31/53 and Security Council resolution
389)was thereany specificreferencetoPortugal as adrninistenngPower.

120. Resolution 32/34 was adopted by the General Assemblyby 67 votes in
favour, 26 against,47 (includingAustralia)abstainingand 9absent. Beforethe
vote was taken, only two statements were made - by Indonesia and the
Philippinesboth speaking againstthe resolution. Portugaldid notpeak.121. In the GeneralAssembly,Indonesiareiteratedthat:

"the people of East Timor have exercised their right to self-
determinationin accordancewith their own traditional practices;the
territory has become independent as an inseparable part of the

sovereignRepublicof Indonesia." (N32PV.83.28 November1977)

The Philippinesaddedthat:

"It is our conviction,basedon thects,thatthepeopleof EastTimor
have already exercised[their right to self-determination]freely, in
accordance with General Asçembly resolution 1514(XV) and
resolution 1541(XV). The internationalcommunityand the United

Nations shouldnow respect that expressionof will." (N32PV.83,
28 November 1977.See alsoNC.4132lSR.21,10November 1977.)

122. In the FourthCornmittee,otherStatesindicated that they sharedthe view

of the Philippines. See India, NC.4/32/SR.21, 10November 1977;Malaysia,
A/C.4/3USR.13,2 November 1977; Iran,A/C.4/32/SR.15,4 November 1977.
The representative of the Netherlands, on the other hand, opposed the draft

resolutionbecause:

"the draft resolution which had just been adopted did not make a
positive contribution tothe solutionof the problems of East Timor,

although he recognized thatpast developmentsin theTemtory had
left some questionsunanswered,in particularwith regard tothe role
that the United Nations shouldhavebeen allowedto playin shaping
its destiny. His country was deeply concemed about the current

situation of the people of East Timor and believed that the
Government of Indonesia had a moral obligation to satisfy the
internationalommunity'sneedfor informationregardingthe stateof

affairsin theTemtory. Hisdelegationtherefore supported theappeal
to the Governrnentof Indonesia thatit should facilitatethe entry into
East Timor of the International Cornmittee of the Red Cross and
other relief organizations in order to assist the people of the

Temtory." (NC.413USR.21,10November1977) At the same meeting, the representative of Australia also expressed the view
that the draft resolution "was neither realistic nor constructive"
(A/C.4/32lSR.21).

F. General Assembly resolution 33/39of 13December1978

123. On 13 December 1978,the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/39

on the question of EastTimor. Thisresolutionwasessentially the sameas that
of the previousyear. Voting support, however,had significantlydeclinedto 59
in favour, 31 against,44 abstaining,and 16absent. For the first time, Australia
joined those votingagainstthe resolution.

124. The debate was not extensive in either the Fourth Committee or the
plenary Assembly. Portugal spoke at neither meeting. In the Fourth
Committee, more States recognized that East Timor had become part of

Indonesia. See statements made on behalf of Canada, A/C.4/33/SR.33,
5 December 1978 and Saudi Arabia, A/C.14/33/SR.21, 20 November 1978.
Cfalso PapuaNew Guinea,A/33/PV.11,7 September1978. The representative
of France expressed the view that the draft resolution "did not seem to take

account of the real situation in East Timor" (A/C.4/33/SR.33, 5 December
1978).

G. General Assembly resolution 34/40 of21 November1979

125. On 21 November 1979,the General Assemblyadopted resolution 34/40;
by 62 votes in favour, 31 (including Australia) against,45 abstaining, and 14

absent. The resolution of 1979markeda substantialchange in the approachof
the Assembly to the question of East Timor. The change carried with it
important legal consequences. Whilstthe preamblereaffirmedthe right toself-
determinationof al1peoples,it no longerreferredto Article2(4) of the Charter

(and theprohibition on the use of force), as earlier resolutions had. The
operative paragiaphs of the resolution did not reaffirm any of the previous
resolutions dealing with the question of East Timor. Nor did they repeat the
Assembly's reference to Article ll(3) of the Charter, nor the requests

previouslyaddressedto theSecunty Council. Operativeparagraph 1 reaffimed
the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, but paragrap2
declared,in terms notpreviously used inresolutionsonEastTimor, that: "the peopleof East Timormust be enabled freelyto determine their
own future, under the auspices of the United Nations." (Emphasis

added.)

The remaining paragraphs concernedthe humanitarianaspects of the situation
in EastTimor.

126. By choosing not to reaffirm previous United Nations resolutions, the
GeneralAssemblyindicatedthat theearlier resolutionsdealing specificallywith
EastTimor were no longerto be regarded asoperative. It also indicated that,as

the political organ responsiblefor decolonization,it had withdrawnitsjudgment
that East Timor had not in fact been integrated into Indonesia. The basic
proposition forwhich this andsubsequentresolutions standis lirnitedto that in
operative paragraph 2 that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to

determinetheirown future under the auspicesof the United Nations.

127. The debates on resolution 34/40 were more extensive than in previous
years, both in theFourth Committee and in the General Assembly. Portugal

spoke in the Fourth Committee, althoughnot in the General Assembly. In the
Fourth Cornmittee and in the General Assembly, Indonesia reiterated its
position.i affirmedthat:

"Each case of decoionization should be understood in the light of its
own existing realities. There had been cases in the history of
decolonization where local circumstances had made popular
consultationthrough a plebiscitor areferendumunnecessaryand cases

where other forms of consultation had been accepted, with or without
United Nations supervision or observation. Whatwas important was
that the right of self-determination shoulbe exercised in accordance
with basic preceptsof the Charter, which stipulated thatthe interests of

the inhabitantsof Non-Self-GovemingTemtories were paramount.
..
The integration of East Timor with Indonesia had beencanied out on
the basisof complete equality betweenthe populationof East Timorand

the people of Indonesia. The people of East Timor, being Indonesian
people, had equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms
without any distinction or discrimination andwere now concentrating
their efforts on reconstructionand development. His delegation sincerelyhoped that the Committee would baseits

attitude on the reality of the situation prevailing in East Timor,
namely, the fact that the process ofcolonizationin that Territory
had beenconcluded."(NC.41311SR1 . 6,24 October 1979)

128. A numberof Statesagainexpressedthe viewthat therehad in factbeena
valid act of self-deterrninationin East Timor. See the statements made by
India, A134lPV.75,21 November 1979, AlC.4134lSR.15,24 October 1979;
Bangladesh, AlC.4134lSR.17,25 October 1979; Thailand, AlC.4134lSR.17,

25 October 1979; Papua New Guinea, Al34PV.75, 21 November 1979;
Suriname, AlC.4134lSR.13,22 October 1979; Singapore, AlC.4134lSR.15,
24 October 1979; and Malaysia, Japan and the Philippines, al1 in
AlC.4134lSR.16,24 October 1979. For this reason,the representativeof India

statedthat:

"we are at a loss to understand why this question should now
continuetoengagethe timeandattentionof theUnited Nations.

We arefirmlyof theviewthat the seriousefforts beingmadeby the
Indonesian Govemmentto rehabilitate the economy of East Timor
throughresettlement andotherprogrammesdeservethesupportof al1

counmes and thatthe constant raisingof polemical clouds servesno
usefulpurpose."(Al34/PV.75,21November1979)

129. In theFourthCornmittee,therepresentativeof Swedensaid:

"Sweden recognized that there wasin East Timortoday a de facto
situation towhichtherewas norealisticalternative. Itsvotefor draft
res'olutionAlC.4/34/L.3/Rev.l should therefore beseen solelasan

expressionof supportfor its humanitarianaspects."(AlC.4134lSR.23,
2 November1979)

130. There were still States, though their number was dwindling, which

expressed viewssirnilartothose of the representativeof Mexicoin theFourth
~ordtke, who stated: "It was clear that the population of the Territory had national
characteristicsof its own, includingaarateculture,and that itwas

inspired by a national spirit. On the other hand, there was no
trustworthy evidence that it had ever been given a clear and
unequivocalopportunitytoexpressitself freelyon its politicalfuture.

In that connexion, the delegation of Mexico considered that the
people of East Timor should be allowed to determine their own
future, as for example through a plebiscite under United Nations
auspices;it thereforeaddressedan urgent and friendly appealin that

sense to Indonesia. Until such a solution had been reached, the
General Assembly and the Fourth Cornmittee must continue their
consideration of the questionhich, in the light of the principles of
the Charter, represented a solemn and unavoidable duty."

(AiC.41341SR .6,24 October 1979)

See also the statements made by Senegal NC.4134lSR.17, 25 October 1979;
Haiti, AlC.4134lSR.13, 22 October 1979; and Belgium, AiC.4134lSR.23,

2 November 1979.

H. GeneralAssemblyresolution35/27of 11November1980

131. Until 1980no PortugueseGovemment had actively sought to resolvethe
East Timor problem. It was not until 1980 that Portugal announced that it
wouldseek to resolvethe situationthroughdiplornaticmeans (cf para.46).

132. Portugal's new activity was reflected in the General Assembly's
resolution 35/27 adopted on11 November 1980,by 58 votes to 35 (including
Australia), with 46 abstaining and15 absent. The Assembly referred in the
resolution's preamble to "the diplomatic initiativetaken by the Governmentof

Portugal"and added,in operativeparagraph3, thatit:

"Welcomes the diplomatic initiative taken by the Government of
Portugal as afirst step towardsthe free exerciseby thepeople of East

Timor of their rightto self-determination and independence, and
urges al1parties directly concerned to CO-opereully with a view to
creating the conditions necessary for the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) [the Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
(1960)l."

133. Save forthis, however,resolution35/27was muchthe sarneas resolution

34/40 of the previous year. Like resolution 34/40,itomitted any referenceto
past resolutions on East Timor and refrained from passing judgment on
Indonesia's actions. The characterisatioof thematterfurtheraltered,however,

so that the situation in East Timor was described in the 1980 resolution as
simply a "problem" for whicha "comprehensive solution"was to be soughtby
the United Nations. The resolution did not indicate what rnight be an
appropriate solution, leaving open the range of possibilities recognized in

United Nations practice.

134. In the Fourth Committee, the representative of Papua New Guinea
reiteratedthat:

"His country considered East Timor to be an integral part of
Indonesia and, as such, no longer a dependent Territory. The

circurnstances thathad led to Indonesian interventionin EastTimor
should be judged in the light of the situation as it had been at the
time. The administeringPowerhad then no longerbeen in effective
control of the Temtory and had left the indigenous people to attend

to their own affairs,which they hadbeen unprepared to do after 200
years of Portugueserule." (A/C.4/35/SR.13,21October 1980)

There were other States too which accepted Indonesia's views. See the

statements for Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines,
A/C.4/35/SR.11,17October 1980. TherepresentativeofThailandaddedthat:

"Consideration of the item by the Fourth Comrnittee clearly
constituted interference in matters which were essentially within
Indonesia's domestic jurisdiction." (A/C.4/35/SR.ll, 17 October
1980)

The representative of Japan again drew attention to the fact that "the Temtory
was king effectively govemed by Indonesia" (A/C.4/35/SR.11, 17 October

1980). See also the statements by Singaporeand Malaysia, ibid. The generalview was expressed by the representativeof the Federal Republicof Germany
who "was happy to note" theIndonesian Government'sefforts to co-operate

with humanitarian organizations and to promote East Timor's economic
development. He added:

"As to theproposalmadeby the Councilof Ministersof Portugal,he

welcomedthe idea of negotiationsbetween theAdministenng Power
and Indonesia,which would, he hoped, lead to positive progress on
the humanitarian, cultural and political level." (A/C.4/35/SR.23,
3 November1980)

1. General Assembly resolution 36/50 of24 November 1981

135: General Assembly resolution 36/50was adopted on 24 November 1981

by 54 votes in favour, 42 (including Australia) agains46 abstaining, and 15
absent. It was very much the same in purpose and effect as the resolutions of
the two previous years. It did not reaffm previous resolutionson East Timor
and did not passjudgment on Indonesia's conduct. It did, however,again note

the diplornaticinitiativeskenby Portugalin the previousyearand invited itto
"continue its efforts with a view to ensuringthe proper exerciseof the right to
self-determination and independenceby the peopleof EastTimor". Further,by
operativeparagraph 3,the Assembly statedthat it:

"Calls upon al1 interested parties, namely Portugal, as the
administenng Power, and the representativesof the East Timorese
people, as well as Indonesia,to co-operateully with UnitedNations

with a view to guaranteeing the full exercise of the right toself-
determinationby thepeopleof EastTimor."

136. States sought to encourage Indonesia and Portugal to negotiate on

economic, cultural and political matterswith a view toinding a solutionto the
problem. See for example statements on behalf of the Federal Republic of
Germany and Haiti in the Fourth Comrnittee, A/C.4/36/SR.21, 9 November
1981. However, Indonesiarejectedthe resolutionfor thereasons that:

"First, there is no question of East Timor, as the people of East
Timor themselves,in the exerciseof their rightto self-determination,
decided as long ago as 1976 to become independent through integrationwith theRepublicof Indonesia. Secondly,the resolution
constitutesinterferencein theinterna1affairsof a sovereignMernber

States,thus violatingArticle2, paragraph7, of the Charter. Thirdly,
this resolution servesno purpose as it has nothing to do with the
realities and actual conditions in that province." (N36PV.70, 24

November1981)

The representativeof Indonesiaadded:

"Furthermore, continuingto refer to Portugal as the adrninistering
Power is tantamountto reintroducing colonialism in that temtory.
That is clearly unacceptable and should be so to al1anti-colonial
forces. Portugal deliberately and definitively abdicated its

responsibilities by running away from the territory in December
1975,abandoningthe East Timoresepeople intheirhourof need."

Indeed, a nurnber of States again affirmed their view that East Timor had
becorneintegratedwith Indonesia,in accordancewith thewishes of the people
of EastTimor. Seestatementsfor Malaysia,A/C.4136ISR.17,30October 1981;
Thailand, Al36PV.70, 24 Novernber 1981;NC.4136lSR.9, 19October 1981;

Japan,AIC.41361SR 1.0,20 October 1981;Oman,AIC.41361SR.21,9 Novernber
1981; Singapore, AlC.4136lSR.12, 22 October 1981; Philippines,
NC.4136lSR.12, 23 October 1981; and India, A/C.4/36/SR.10, 29 October
1981.

Speakingin the FourthCommittee,Indiaadded:

"For the Committee to keepthe questionof EastTimor onits agenda
was an attemptto negaterealityand interferein the intemal affairs of
a sovereign MemberState."(AlC.4136lSR.10)

J. GeneralAssemblyresolution37/30of23 November1982

137. The eighth and last United Nations General Assembly resolution

conce~ng East Timor W.. adopted on23 November 1982. Resolution 37/30
was passed by the narrow margin of 50 in favour, 46 (including Australia)against,50 abstainingand 11absent. In iight of subsequent indications tothe
Secretariatby two absent delegationsthatthey hadintendedto voteagainstthe

resolution,thetruevote wasevennarrowerat 50:48:50.

138. For the most partthe preambularparagraphsof the resolution resemble

those of previous resolutions, save that for the first time since 1978, there
appears a referencetoal1theAssembly's resolutionsonEastTimorsince 1975.
Instead of the word "recalling",however, the Assembly used the expression
"bearingin rnind"to refer to the resolutions. Further,unlike the resolutionsin

1976, 1977 and 1978, there is no corresponding reaffirmation of the past
resolutionsin any operative paragraph. Thus, it cannot be said that the 1982
resolutionre-institutedearlierappraisalsof the situationin EastTimor.

139. Therewere onlythreeoperativeparagraphs?he first requested the United
Nations Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with al1parties directly
concerned, with a view to exploring avenuesfor achieving a comprehensive
settlement of the problem". The second requested United NationsSpecial

Committee on Decolonization to "keep the situation in the Temtory under
active considerationand to renderal1assistance tothe Secretary-Generai".The
third calledupon the humanitarianagenciesof the United Nations to assistthe

peopleof East Timor"in close consultationwithPortugal, asthe administering
Power".

140. In the debatesin the FourthCommittee,some Statesagain affirmedthat,

in theirjudgment,the peopleof East Timorhad alreadyexercised theirright to
self-determination. See Iraq, A/C.4/37/SR.14,8 November 1982;Singapore,
A/C.4/37/SR.13, 5 November 1982;Thailand, A/C.4/37/SR.11, 1November
1982; Jordan, A/C.4/37/SR.22, 12 November 1982; Bangladesh,

A/C.4/37/SR.18, 10 November 1982; and Malaysia, A/C.4/37/SR.18,
10November 1982.Other Statesemphasisedthe needfor consultationbetween
the Portuguese and IndonesianGovemments,under United Nations auspices.

Thus,therepresentativeof theFederalRepublicof Gerrnanystated:

"Thereportshadconvincedit thattheliving conditionsin EastTimor
had not deteriorated and that, on the contrary, the process of

stabilizationwascontinuing. Hisdelegation nevertheless hoped that
thatprocesscould be furtheraccelerated. The criticismsvoiced inthe debate on thequestionmight be reduced

in future if complete informationon the Territory could be obtained
and be made freely accessible. His delegation believed that the co-
operation of international bodies and the Indonesian Government
should be encouraged and that every effort to improve living

conditions in the Territory should be made. It was also essential to
promote dialoguebetweenthe IndonesianGovernent and theother
parties in order to overcome the remaining obstacles. The request,
made to the Secretary-General in the draft resolution, to initiate

consultations with al1 parties directly concemed was a positive
element." (AlC.4137lSR.23,15November 1982)

The representativeof Italyalso said:

"his delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolutionon
East Timor. It believed that itwas preferable not to take a position

on the substance of a question which could be more easily resolved
through direct dialogue between the parties concerned. His
delegation was nevertheless convinced that the good offices of the
Secretary-General could be effective when they were requested for

thepurposeof settlinga controversialquestion." (AlC.4/37/SR.23)

The representative of Guatemala made a statement to the same effect
(AIC.4137lSR.23).After thevotein the GeneralAssemblyIndonesianoted:

"only 50 countries voted in favour of the draft resolution. This
number representsless thanone-third of the totalmembershipof the

Organization. Only about 30 per cent of al1members continue to
question East Timor's integration with Indonesia. As the record
further shows, the numberof members supporting Indonesia onthis
question has, year after year, shown a steady increase. This year's

tally shows 46 countries voting against the resolution. Conversely,
the number of members supporting the resolution has steadily
diminished. Thus,the differencebetweenthe "yes" and "no" votesis

nowonly 4, ascompyed to 12last year. Moreover,the large number
of counmes abstainingthis yearis undoubtedlyan indication thatan
overwhelmingmajonty of States questionthe relevanceof continued
consideration of this item. Indeed, what is the value of a resolution which has the supportof only a third of the membership - support
which, 1may add, continuesto decline. This trend, which has been

apparent for several years now, is viewed by my delegation as
gratifying indeed. We are confident that support for Indonesia's
positionwillcontinuedto grow."(A/37PV.77,23 November 1981)

141. Following resolution 37/30the United Nations Secretary-Generalbegan
his mediation role in direct talks between Indonesiaand Portugal. These talks
are continuing. (Seepara.146 -152 below.) This has ken the path chosen by
the United Nations to seek a fnendly settlementto the dispute overEastTimor.

Since 1982ithas been theonlypath.

K. Conclusion

142. The record of debates in the Security Council and in the General
Assembly on the question of East Timor from 1975 to 1982 shows that no
delegate adverted to the possible implications for third States, or to effects
opposable erpa omnes, flowing from the undetennined status of East Timor.

No delegation suggested atany time the insertion of a paragraphcallingfor the
non-recognition of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. This can be
contrasted with the position in resolutions dealingwith other situations (as to
whichsee AppendixA).

143. The tems of the Secunty Council's resolutions show that the Security
Councildid not seek to bind Statesunder Articl25 by any decisionconcerning
the situationin East Timor. Nordidit makeany findingof breach, eitherof the

Charter or of general international law, which could have given rise to an
obligation opposable to third States. There is nothing in the terms of the
resolutions of the General Assembly which constitute a collective decision
giving nse to obligations for third States not to recognize, or to deal with

Indonesia in relation to East Timor. The Assembly has not maintained its
rejectionof Indonesia's incorporationof East Timor after 1978.

144. Moreover, as far as Portugal's positionas applicant is concemed, thereis

no supportfor itsclaimto be entitledto commencethese proceedings onbehalf
of itself,or the peopleof East Timor.Section II:

145. As the previoussectionshows,the SecurityCouncil'sconsiderationof the
situation in East Timor ended after its adoption of resolution 389 of 22 April
1976. In the case of the General Assembly, its last resolution on the question

was resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982, although the question of East
Timor has been included in the Assembly's provisional agenda for each year
since 1982. When the General Cornmittee of the Assembly has come to the
item, it has on each occasion recomrnended that the Plenary Session of the

Assembly defer consideration of it for the time being. Every year since 1982,
the General Assembly has followed the General Cornmittee'srecommendation
and deferred consideration of the question of East Timor to its next session.

(See General Assembly decisions 381402, 391402, 401402, 421402,431402and
also Al41lPV.3, Al44lPV.3 and Al45lPV.3.) As resolution 37130
contemplated, the task of finding an intemationally acceptable solution to the
problem of East Timor has been actively undertaken by the United Nations

Secretary-General,assistedby the Cornmitteeof Twenty-four.

A. TheSecretary-General's mediatinr goleis continuing ;

146. The United NationsSecretary-General's direct involvementin EastTimor
began in December 1975, when the Security Council requested him to send a
Special Representative to East Timorto make an on-the-spotassessment of the
situation and to establish contact with al1the parties in the Temtory and the

States concemed (Security Council resolution 384 (1975)). As already noted,
the Secretary-General appointed Mr Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi as his
Special Representative. After his visit to East Timor in 1976, Mr Guicciardi

reported that he "was able to establish useful contacts with the parties and
States concerned regarding implementation of resolution 384 (1975)". (See
Report by the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution
384 (1975), SI12011, 12March 1976, Annex, p.9, para.38.) The Special

Representativereported that:

"[tlhe Government of Indonesia pointed out that the presence of

Indonesian volunteers in East Timor was upon the request of
APODETI, UDT, KOTA and Trabalhista and later of the
'Provisional Governmentof East Timor', in which the four parties
were represented ...in order to give whatever assistance was necessarytorestorepeace andorderin theTemtory, as a prerequisite

for the proper exercise of the right of self-determination by the
people of East Timor. Consequently, the termination of their
presence in, and their withdrawal from the Territory should be
carried out upon therequestof the 'Provisional Government of East

Timor." (Annexpp.9-10, para.39)

It was in this context that the Secretary-General wrote in his report of
29 February1976that:

"[AIS the parties concerned have expressed their readiness to
continue consultationswith my special representative,1suggest that
these consultations should be continuedfor the time being on the

understanding that any developments will be reported to the
Council."(Report,para.8, SI12011, 12March 1976)

147. The Security Council accepted the Secretary-General's suggestioa nnd,
subsequently,the Special Representative consultedwith representativesof the
Provisional Governmentof East Timor, as wellas Indonesiaand Portugal. He
also made contact with FRETILM. (See Security Council resolution 389

(1976) and Report of the Secretary-Generalin pursuanceof Security Council
resolution389 (1976).S112106.) However,the SecurityCouncil has given no
furtherconsiderationto the matter,despitecallsby the GeneralAssemblyto do
so in 1977and 1978. As a result,the GeneralAssembly in1979itself directly

"request[edl the Secretary-General to followthe implernentationof [resolution
34/40 of 21 November 19791and to report thereon tothe General Assembly".
In 1982 it went further and, in resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982,
requested the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with al1 parties

concerned, witha view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive
sealernentof theproblem.

148. Thus, since 1982,the Secretary-Generalhas hadmuch more than a fact-
findingrole and has actedunder the mandate given himby General Assembly
resolution 37/30. In accordance with that resolution, theSecretary-General
has, since 1983, kept theGenera1 Assernbly apprised of developments in

exercising his good offices. Every year since 1984, he hassubmitted a brief
progress report. (See ,41381352,N391361, N401622, N41/602, N421539,
N431588,and Ai441529.) 149. The Secretary-General's firstprogressreport of 25 July 1984(Al391361)

did little more than record the commencement of consultations between
Portugal and Indonesia and the participation of Under Secretary-General
Ahmed in the consultative process. Itdid, however, emphasisethe Secretary-
General's concern that Indonesia facilitate the activities of international

humanitarian organisations, includingthe UnitedNations Children's Fund and
the International Cornmitteeof the RedCross. In his report of the following
year,the Secretary-Generalnotedthat:

"As a result of ...exchanges, it was decided that Indonesia and
Portugal would begin substantive talksunder the auspices of the
United Nations in November 1984. It was agreed that these talks
would commencewith considerationsof humanitarian issues,on the

understanding thatthey wouldultimatelydeal with thequestion in a
comprehensive way, thus facilitating an internationally acceptable
settlement of the question of East Timor." (Al401622 of
11September 1985,para.6)

According to the Secretary-General's report, talks centred on questions of
repatriationfor Portuguesecivil servantsin EastTimorandfor EastTimoresein
Portugal,theprotectionof the culturalheritageof the EastTimoresepeople, and

economic and social conditions in East Timor. It was the Secretary-General's
stated opinion that"the substantivetalks between Indonesiaand Portugal have
proceededin a constructiveatmosphere" (para.25).

150. Although the Secretary-General, in his report of 8 September 1987,
expressed his "deep regret" that talksbetween Indonesiaand Portugal had not
yet resultedin sealementof the questionofEast Timor,he didobservethat:

"None the less, the talks haveenabledboth sidesto establish auseful
dialogue and to make a serious attempt to bridgéthe differences in
their respective position. In this connection, the two sides are
considering the possibility of a PortugueseParliarnentarydelegation

undertaking a visit to East Timor,with a view toobtainingfirst-hand
informationon the situation."(A/42i539,8 September 1987,para.16)151. In his reports sincethen, the Secretary-Generalhas maintaineda degreeof
cautiousoptimism. In his progress report of13September 1988(A/43/588),the

Secretary-Generalnoted that agreement inprinciple to the visitof a Portuguese
Parliamentary delegation had been reached between Indonesia and Portugal;
and that the repatriation programme for former Portuguese civil servants and
their dependants had very nearly ken completed. In his progress report of

14September 1989 (A/44/524), paragraph 2, the Secretary-General explained
thathe had:

"obtained there-affirmation fromboth sides of their cornmitment to

achieving a comprehensiveand intemationally acceptable solutionto
thequestion of East Timor."

He addedthat:

"1 am confident that progress can continue to be made through the
substantive talks. While it may be regrettable that the Pace of
progress has not been constant, 1am encouraged by the increased
frequency of discussions between the two sides in recent months.

These talks are being conducted in a constructive atmosphereand in
a seriousrnanner."(id.,para.4)

The Secretary-General has not had cause to resile from this view. In his most

recent report(Al46145 13September 1991),the Secretary-Generalstated:

"In the course of...consultations, both sides have reiterated their

determinationto seeka comprehensiveand intemationally acceptable
solutionthroughcontinuingdialogueand negotiation." (id.para.2)

152. The Secretary-General is thus playing a central role in facilitating

consultations between Portugal and Indonesia and in promoting the processes
which the United Nations has chosen as most appropriatefor the settlement of
theproblem of East Timor. He has not suggestedthatother States act or refrain
from acting in any manner in order to assist these processes. It is clear from al1

this that the United Nations,doesnot see any role for Portugal other than that of
participatingin the process of consultationand negotiation. B. The Cornrnittee of Twenty-four has kept the question of East Timor
under consideration

153. Inits lastresolutionon thernatter,resolution37/30of 23 November1982,
the General Assembly, as in certain previous resolutions,also requested the
Special Committeeon the Situationwith Regardto theirnplementationof the

Declarationon theGrantingof IndependencetoColonialCounmes and Peoples
("the Cornrnittee of Twenty-four") toinvoive itself in the question of East
Timor. On this occasion,it requestedthe Cornmittee"to keep the situationin
the Temtory under active consideration and to render al1assistance to the

Secretary-General".

154. In accordance with theAssembly'srequest, the Committee of Twenty-
four has reviewed the situationin East Timor each yearsince 1983. On each

occasion, it has decided to continue considerationof the question at its next
session, subject to any directionfrom the GeneralAssembly. The Cornmittee
has been well informed. In the course of its annual deliberations, the
Cornmitteehas heard statements from Member States as well as petitioners,

such as Amnesty Intemationaland FRETLIN, concerning the,situationin the
Territory. The Committee has also been provided with carefully written
working papers prepared by the United Nations Secretariat. (See
MAC.l09/715, NAC.109n47, MAC.109fl83, AIAC.1091836N , AC. 1091871,

MAC.1091919,NAC. 1091961, NAC.10911001,MAC.10911072.)

155. Between 1984 and 1986, each working paper contained a succinct
descriptionof UnitedNationsactionsin relation toEastTimor,the militaryand

human nghts situation, and economicand social conditions. After 1987,the
Secretariat also gave attentionto the politicalelopmentsin the Temtory.
Thus,in its rep01tor3 August 1987(NAC.1091919),theSecretariatnotedthat
the East Timorese had, by virtue of Indonesian Law 7/76, promulgated on

17July 1976,participatedin the Indonesiangeneralelectionson 24 April 1987
for the national House of Representatives and the People's Consultative
Assembly(para.11). The followingyear, theSecretdat noted that Indonesian
Law 7/76 also provided for "the establishment of a 'RegionalGovemment'

consisting of a 'Regional Secretariat' and a 'Regional House of
Representatives"' and that"[mlost of the posts in these bodies were filledby
localinhabitants"(MAC.1091961,26July 1988,para.17).156. The working papers prepared by the Secretariatfor the assistance of the
Cornmitteeof Twenty-four are typically compiled from avariety of sources -

pressreports, informationgatheredby MemberStates (includingIndonesia)and
international organisations. In its most recent reportA1AC.10911072of 24
July 1991), the Secretariat based its description of the economic and social
conditions in the Territory largely on Indonesian publications, accepting that

these were the most reliable sources of information on such matters. (The
Secretariat's account shows significantimprovemenitn communications,health
andeducationin EastTimor.)

157. The Secretariat's working papers are not compiled from information
given by Portugal, a fact noted in the Secretariat's report of 26 July 1988
(AlAC.1091961) and in subsequent reports. Portugal has not provided
information under Article73(e) of the Charterfor more than a decade. In reply

to a request dated20 December 1976for informationunder Article 73(e) of the
Charter, Portugal had responded, by note verbale dated 20 April 1977, to the
Secretary-Generalas follows:

"1. Effective exercise of Portuguese sovereignty on theTemtory
of Timor ceasedin August 1975when,owingto the violentincidents
which tookplace at the timein the Tenitory, the Governorof Timor
was compelledto leave and to withdraw, together with his principal

civil and military collaborators, to the Island of Atauro. The
Governor and the other agents of the Portuguese administration
subsequentlyleftthe islandand neverretumed toTimor.

(a) In December 1975,armedforcesof the indonesian Republic
attacked and occupiedthe Temtory of Timor, facts which
the General Assemblyand the Secunty Council were duly
informedof by the PortugueseGovemment. ...

(b) Under these circumstances, and refemng to the year 1975,
the only information that could be transrnitted would
concernthe firstmonthsof that year, a period during which

the Portuguese Government feelsno significant changes or
reforms took place in the Temtory which could justify
additional information to that transmittedon 5 June 1975
with reference to 1974. As regards facts of a political and constitutionalnatureiis alsofeltthat theUnitedNationsis
fully informed on the subject and that the transmittal of

informationthereonwouldtherefore beunnecessary.

(c) Asregardsthe year 1976,theaforementionedcircumstances
impeding the Portuguese Governrnent from exercisingthe
effective administration of the Territory, namely, the

presence thereon of armed forces of the Republic of
Indonesia, have continued to prevail. The Portuguese
Government is thereby de fact~ prevented from
transmitting, concerning Timor, any information under

Article73(e)of theCharter."(N32/73,28 April 1977)

158. In reply to a subsequent requestfor informationer Article73(e), the
Portuguese Governmentreplied by a note of 6 April 1979 (N341311) that

conditions prevailing in East Timor prevented it from assuming its
responsibility for the administration of the Territory and it regretted being
unabletoprovidetheinformationrequested. Eachyear, in replyto a request for
information underArticle73(e)of the Charter,the Portuguese Governrnenhas

reiterated thatit has had nothing to add tothat note. (See A/AC.109#15,
NAC. 109fl47, NAC. 1091783,AIAC.1091836M , AC.1091871, MAC.1091919,
AIAC.1091961, NAC.10911001,NAC. 10911072.)

C. The Commissionon Human Rights has played a limited role

159. In cornparison with the Secretary-General's activities and the
deliberations of the Committee of Twenty-four, the Commission on Human

Rights has played a minor role in relation to East Timor. Itis tme that in
resolution 198318of 16 February 1983,it affirmed the right of the people of
East Timor to self-determination (by16 votes to 14 with 10 abstentions and
with one representative notarticipating in the vote). See Mernorial,Annex

II.7 5ol.IV, p.136. There was, however, no further consideration of the
questionuntilFebruary 1985when theCommission consideredthe questionof
EastTimorin closed session,in accordancewith its confidentialprocedure. On
5 March 1985, the Chairman announcedin open session thatthe situation in

East Timor was no longer under consideration (E/CN.411985ISR41lAdd.1).
Subsequently, eventsin Dili in November1991prompted theChairmanof the
Commission tomake a statementon the humanrights situationin East Timor.AIthough his statement of 4 March 1992, agreed by consensus by the
Commission, indicated thatthe Commission "strongly deplore[d] the violent
incident in Dili", it contained no reference to any unexercised rightof the

people of East Timor to self-determination. The statement is set out in
Amex 27of thisCounter-Mernorial.

160. The Sub-Commissiononthe Preventionof Discriminationand Protection

of Minontieshas also consideredthe situationin EastTimor, a factreflected in
its resolutions 1982120of 8 September 1982, 1983126of 6 September 1983,
1984124of 29 August 1984and 1987113 of2 September 1987 concerningthe
situationin EastTimor. The Sub-Commission has mainlysoughtto re-enforce

the Secretary-General'srole as well as the activities of certain humanitarian
organisations. Thus, by operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1987113
(Memonal,Amex 11.97,vol. N, p.23), theSub-Commission:

"Request[ed] the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to
encourage al1parties concerned...to CO-operatto achieve a durable
solution taking into full considerationthe rights and wishesof the
peopleofeastTimor; [and]Request[ed] theIndonesian authorities to

facilitate without restrictions the activities of humanitarian
organisationsin EastTimor."

161. A year later,on 1September 1988,the Sub-Commission(by 10votesto 9

with 5 abstentions) decided notto takeany action on a furtherdraftresolution.
See EJCN.41Sub.Ul988L.26and pressreleaseHR.3361. A yearlateragain,on
31 August 1989, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 198917(by secret
ballot by 12 votes to 9 with 3 abstentions) by which the Sub-Commission

recommendedthatthe Commissionof HumanRightsconsiderthe humannghts
situation in East Timor at its next session (E1CN.41Sub.211989158-
WCN.4/1990/2,in Annex11.100,vol. N, p.241). The Commissiondid not act
on this recommendation. Asimilarresolution (Memonal, Amex II. 102,vol.

N, p.248) was adoptedby the Sub-Commission on30 August 1990(by secret
ballotby 14votesto 9 with 1abstention) butagain the Commissionof Human
Rightsdidnottake anyactionin response.SectionIII: S

162. The Court can infer from the statements and behaviour of States that a

significantnumber has acceptedthe incorporationof EastTimor into Indonesia.
The practiceof States,includingthatof Portugal,showswidespread acceptance
of the reality of Indonesian controlof East Timor, and of the need todeal with
Indonesiain relation to East Timor. The practicereflected in the statements

of States whichecognize Indonesian controas well as in votingbehaviourin
the UnitedNationsand inthe rnanytreaties concludedby Stateswith Indonesia.
Portugalitself has failed to register any protestin relation to multilateraltreaty
actionby Indonesiawhichextendsto East Timor.

A. Voting behaviourin theUnited Nations

163. The General Assembly hasconsidered the EastTimor questionten times

between 1975and 1982. The texts of the resolutionswhich it has adopted are
setout inAmex 26 of this Counter-Memonaltogetherwith thevotingpositions
of individual counmes. (See also Memonal, Vol.11,Annexes 1.3-1.10 and
Application, Annex 1.) The voting patternseveal that over this period the

number of Statessupportingthe resolutionshas declined, whilst the numberof
States voting against the resolutions has increased (morethan four-fold). The
numberof Statesabstaininghasrernained moreor lesssteady. The statisticsare
asfollows:

RESOLUTION FOR AGAINST ABSTAINING ABSENTAlthough notdeterminative,these trends indicatethe growth over time in the
number of States which are prepared, for a variety of reasons, to accept the

situationin EastTimor asthey findit.

B. Treaty arrangements involvingIndonesia and Portugal

164. Since 1976, a number of States have concluded bilateral treaties with
Indonesia which contain a provision definingthe temtory of the Republic of

Indonesia. Generally, the provision provides that Indonesia be defined in
accordance with its own laws and in accordance with the United Nations
Convention onthe Lawof the Sea, 1982. UnderIndonesianlaw effectivefrom
17 July 1976, East Timoris part of Indonesia. WhereStates have accepted a

provision definingthe Temtory of Indonesiain a way whichincorporates East
TimorintoIndonesia,they mustbe takento haveaccepted that incorporation as
a fact. Australiaknows of no treatyconcludedwith Indonesiasince 1976 that
containsanyreservationor definitionwhichwouldexcludethe temtory of East

Timor from the operation of the treaties. This has been confirmedby the
Departmentof ForeignAffairsof theRepublicof Indonesia. See Annex 24 to
thisCounter-Memorial.

165. Since July 1976 Indonesia has entered into bilateral double tax treaties
with some31 States, a list of which also appearsin Annex 24. Most of them
contain a territorial application clause which necessarily incorporates the
temtory of East Timor as part of Indonesia. The following provisions are

typical.

(a) Agreementbetween the Govenunent of theRe~ublicof Indonesiaand the
f ive Avoidance of Doubl

Taxation and the Preventionof Fiscal Evasion with respect toTaxes on
Incomeand Capital.signedat Viema on 24 Julv 1986. Article3(l)(a)(i)
provides:
"the term 'Indonesia' comprisestht eemtory of the Republicof

Indonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacent areas over
which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the United
NationsConventionon the Lawof the Sea. 1982." (b) Convention between Canada and the Republic of Indonesia for the
Av i nce f D u leTax ti n
resDectto Taxeson Incomeand Caoital.siened at Jakarta on 16January

1979 A.rticle3(l)(a)(ii) provides:

"the term 'Indonesia' compriseshetemtory of the Republicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and parts of the continental

shelf and adjacentseas, over whichthe Republicof indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereign rights or other riin accordance
withinternationallaw."

The relevanttextsof other agreementswhich containa definitionof Indonesian
Temtory are containedin AppendixC.

166. The numerous double tax treaties provide excellent examples of State
practicesinceJuly 1976. A significantnumberof Stateshaveentered intosuch

treaties with Indonesia and have accepted a definition of Indonesia which
clearlyextends the temtorial applicationof the treaty to EastTimor. So far as
Australiais aware,Portugalhas not lodgeda protestwithany of the Contracting
States.

2. Multilateral treath

167. Since 17 July 1976 (when Indonesiaformally incorporated East Timor
into Indonesia), Indonesia has ratified or acceded to a numbrf multilateral

treaties. State parties which have not recognized the incorporation of East
Timormighthavebeenexpected to lodge aformalobjectionwith thedepositary
of the treaty to the effect that Indonesia's adhesion isinvalid in so far as it
purportsto include EastTimor in the area of temtorial application. Failureto

do soraisesa strong inference that Statesaccthe statusquo.

168. A study of the conventions contained in the current list, UN
Doc.ST/LEEG/SER.E/9 - Multilateral Treaties Depositedwith the Secretary-

General, Status as at 31 December 1990 -yields the following examples of
treatieswhichIndonesia hi ratifiedor accededto afterDecember1975:- The Viema ConventiononDiplomatic Relations, 1961. Portuga alcceded
on 11 September 1968. Indonesia accededon 4 June 1982. Neither

Portugalnor anyother country haslodged a declaration tothe effect that
Indonesia's accession shouldnot be regarded as applyingthe Convention
to EastTimor;

- The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963. Portugal acceded

on 13September1972. Indonesiaaccededon4 June 1982. Againneither
Portugalnor anyother countryhas lodged a declaration that Indonesia's
accession should not be regarded as applying the Convention to East

Timor;

- The.Convention on the Elimination of al1 Forms of Discrimination
AgainstWomen, 1979.Portugal signedon 24 April 1980and ratifiedon
30 July 1980. Indonesia signed on 29 July 1980 and ratified on 13

September 1984. There has been no response by Portugal or any other
State party;

- The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. Portugal signed on

26 January 1990andratifiedon 21 September 1990.indonesiasignedon
26 January 1990and ratified on 5 September 1990. There has been no
responseby Portugal or anyother StateParty;

-
The Single Conventionon Narcotic Drugs, 1961. Indonesia signedand
ratified on 28 July 196and 3 September 1976,respectively . There has
beenno responseby any Stateparty.

A more extensive list of multilateral treaties which Indonesiahas adhered to
since 1976 is contained in Annex 24 hereto. No State has lodged objections
againstindonesia'sadherence to the41 treatiestherenarned.

3. Porturnesesilencein relation totreatvaction

169. From time to time, States have considered that treaty action by other
States has called for someformal declaration, objection,or protest in order to

maintain their ownparticular legal position. The failure to take such action where it is appropriate can indicate that a Statedoes not seriously hold to its
supposed legal position. Portugalhas remained silent in circumstances which

apparentlycalled forit toindicate its position onEastTimor.

170. Had Portugal been anxious to preserve its position in relation to East
Timor,it rnightreasonablyhave beenexpectedto make some communicationto

the United Nationsof the type madeto the UnitedNationsSecretary-Generalby
Uganda and Portugal following Portugal's ratification, on30 December 1971,
of the Single Convention onNarcotichgs (NewYork: 30 March 1961). The
noteof that communicationwasin the following terms:

"In a communication received by the Secretary-General on
15 February 1972, the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Republic of
Uganda tothe United Nations informedhim of the following:

'Its the understanding of the Republic of Uganda that in
ratifying the said Convention,the Governrnentof Portugal
did notpurportto acton behalfof Angola, Mozambique and

Guinea-Bissau which are distinct and separate political
entities for which Portugal lacks any legal, moral or
political capacitytorepresent.'

In a communication receivedby the Secretary-General on25 April
1972, the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United
Nations informedhim as followswithrespect tothe abovementioned
communication:

'The Government of Portugal is surprised that
communicationscontainingmeaninglessstatementssuch as
that from the Charge d'Affaires of Uganda should be

circulated, since they showclear ignorance of the fact that
Portiigal was admitted to the membership of the United
Nations with the temtonal composition that it has today,
and including Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese

Guinea. "'

171. When Indonesiaaccepted obligationsand nghts undermultilateraltreaties
extending to EastTimor as part of its temtory, Portugal mightreasonablyhavebeen expected to protest, perhaps in terms similar to those contained in the
protestmadeby a numberof Eastern EuropeanStatesupon the extensionby the

Federal Republic of Germany of application of the Vienna Convention on
DiplornaticRelations (1961)to LandBerlin. The protestread:

"The Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, the Byelomssian SSR,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics have informed the
Secretary-Generalthat they considerthe abovementioned statement as
having no legal force onthe groundthat West Berlinis not, andnever

has been,a Stateterritoryof the FederalRepublic ofGermany and that
consequently,the Govemment of the Federal Republicof Germany is
in no way competent to assume anyobligations in respect of West
Berlin or toextend to it the application of international agreements,

includingthe Conventionin question."

172. The protest of Romania againstthe acceptanceby the Republic of Korea
of certain amendmentsto the Constitutionof the World Health Organisation is

also illustrative. It stated:

"In a communication received by the Secretary-General on
24 Febmary 1972with reference to the abovementioned acceptance,

the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations
stated that his Government considers that the said acceptance
constitutes an illegal act, inasmuch as the South Korean authorities
can, in no case, act onbehalfof Korea."

173. States have made declarationsto maintaintheir own claims, ordeny those
assertedby othersonrnanyother occasions. Examplesinclude:

-
Spain on accedingto the four Geneva Conventions onthe Law ofthe Sea,
1958,on25Febmary 1971:

"Spain'saccession is not tobe interpreteasrecognitionof any

rights or situations in connexion with the watersof Gibraltar
other than those referred to in Article 10 of the Treaty of
Utrecht, of 13July 1713, between the Crowns of Spain and
Great Britain."-
Argentina on signing and ratifying the Vienna Convention for the
Protection ofthe Ozone Layer, doneon 22 March 1985,andthe Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Depletethe Ozone Layer, on 16September
1987:

"The Argentine Republic rejects the ratification of the
abovementioned Conventionby the Governrnentof the United
Kingdomof Great Britainand NorthernIrelandwith respect to
the Malvinas, South Georgiaand South Sandwich Islands, and

reaffirms its sovereigntyover those Islands, which form a part
of its nationaltemtory....,

174. Study of the conventions referred to in paragraph 168above shows that
thereare a numberof treaties towhichIndonesiaand Portugal are partiesand to
which ratification or accession was given by one or both of them after
December 1975. Australiahas found no occasionon which Portugalhas made

any declaration regarding the status of East Timor under these or any other
treaties; nor has Portugalmade any protest against Indonesia's treaty actions
since 1975 even though they have implied that Indonesiahas assumed a
capacity to act on behalf of East Timor as part of Indonesian territory.

Opportunities to do so have been ignored by Portugal. Portugal has thus not
challenged Indonesia's assertionof competence,nor rnaintainedits claim to be
the lawful adrninistering Power in this most important arena of international
relations.

C. OtherStatepracticeonacceptance of incorporation ofEastTimor

1. Statementsin the UnitedNationsacce~tin~the incornorationof East
Timor

175. The following is a summary of statements made by States in debates in

the Fourth Comrnittee, or in the General Assembly in respect of various
resolutions on East Timor between 1975and 1982, in which theyaccepted the
incorporationof EastTimor.Australia

On 2 Novernber 1979,in the Fourth Committee,Australia statedthat the draft
resolution onthequestionof EastTimorwhichwasthenunderdiscussion:

"ignoredEastTimor's incorporationinto Indonesia , hich was afact
and the reality on which any considerationof the rnatter hadto be
based.
..

It followedthatAustraiiabeiieved thequestionof the decolonization
of EastTimorto have been resolved."(NC.4134lSR.23)

Bangladesh

On25 October 1979,in theFourthCommittee,therepresentativeof Bangladesh
stated:

"in the case of East Timor, the people had regained their
independence when the colonial power had voluntarily .withdrawn
from the Territory and the inhabitants had voluntarily chosen to

become a part of Indonesia. Consequently, his delegation sawno
justification forthequestion tobe the subjectof furtherdiscussionin
the Cornmittee."(AlC.41341SR 1.7)

Bangladesh has since repeated this view: see AIC.4137lSR1 .8, 10 November
1982.

Canada

On 5 December1978,in the FourthCommittee,Canada:

"...recognizedthe de facto integrationof EastTimor with indonesia
even through theway in which that integration hadtaken place had
by no rneans done justice to the principle of self-determination."
(NC.4133lSR.33)India

On 2 November 1976,in the Fourth Cornmittee,the representative of India
stated:

"...the poiitical partiesin East Timor had struggledfor supremacy
until the party which favoured the Territory's integration into
Indonesia had emergedvictorious. Constitutional steps had then
beentaken,includingsomeforrnof popularconsultation,afterwhich

EastTimorhad beenintegratedintoIndonesia." (NC.4131lSR.13)

India has repeated this view ona numberof occasions: seeAlC.4132lSR.21,
10November 1977; Al34lPV.75, 21 November 1979; NC.4134lSR.15,

24 October 1979;and NC.41361SR.10,29October1982.

Iran

On 5 November 1976,in the Fourth Cornmittee, the representative of Iran
stated:

"After it had been ascertained that the great majority of the
population did, in fact, want integration with Indonesia, the
Indonesian Parliamenthad approvedthe statuteof integration. This
delegationbelieved,therefore,thatthe processof decolonizationhad

been concluded, thatthe people of East Timorhad exercised their
right to self-determination, and that the provisions of resolution
1514(XV)had therefore been implemented.( "NC.41311SR1 .6)

Iranhas sincerepeatedthis view: seeNC.413USR.15.4 November 1977.

On 8 November1982,therepresentativeof iraq stated that:

"As faras EastTimorwas concemed,hisdelegationbelievedthatthe

people of that former temtory had already exercised their right to
self-determination in July 1976 when they had decided to join
Indonesia."(AtC.4l37lSR.14)Japan

On 20 October 1981,therepresentativeofJapan:

"reviewedthe events thathad occurredin EastTimor fromthe time
when a coalition of diverse political groups, excluding the
FRETILIN, had declared independence in 1974 up to the formal
request for independenceandintegrationwithindonesia presentedby

the provisionalGovernmentin 1976. Indonesia,which hadbecome
deeply involvedin the decolonizationof East Timor, with whichit
shared closeethnicandgeographicalties,had acceptedthatrequest."
(NC.4136lSR.10)

Hehad saidas muchin earlieryears: seeNC.4134/SR.16,24October 1979and
NC.413SlSR. 11,17October1980.

Jordan

On 12November 1982,in the Fourth Cornmittee,the representativeof Jordan

stated:

"In the view of his delegation, the people of East Timor had
exercised their rightto self-determinationwhen they hadkedto be

reunited with Indonesia. That had occurred immediately after the
termination of Portuguese colonial rule and, with it, thetemtorial
integrityof Indonesiahad beenrestored."(AlC.4137lSR.22)

Malaysia

On 17 November 1976, the representative of Malaysia stated in the Fourth

Cornmitteethat::

"his delegationas satisfied that the process of self-determination
had been carried out by the elected representativesof the people of

Timor, whohad expressed themselvesin favour of integrationwith
Indonesia."(NC.41311SR.27)Malaysia has repeated this view on a number of occasions: see

A/C.4/32/SR.13, 2 November 1977; A/C.4/34/SR.16, 24 October 1979;
A/C.4/35/SR.ll, 17 October 1980; A/C.4/36/SR.17, 30 October 1980; and
A/C.4/37/SR.18,10November1982.

Mauritania

On 17November 1976,the representativeof Mauritaniastatedthat:

"Each Territory had special features which make it unique. The
political developments which had taken place in East Timor were
incontrovertible and should be recognized by the Cornmittee."
(A/C.4/31/SR.27;A/C.4/31/SR/15,4November 1976)

Morocco

On 5 November 1976, the representative of Morocco stated in the Fourth
Cornmitteethat:

"..each Temtory had different features requiring different solutions.

...[AISEast Timorha4 in both its pre-colonial and colonialpenod,
had closehistoricallinkswith Indonesia, theislandofTimor, and the
whole of Indonesia should constitute a single national entity. The
uniformity which characterisedboth their comrnonhistory and their

cornrnondestiny weighedin favour of a global solution which met
the interestsofal1the people.

The political parties which had existed dunng the period of East

Timor's occupation had reflected the desire of the majority of the
people of East Timor for such a global solution, and it was for that
reason that, following independence, the majority party had freely

expressed a wish to integrate the Territory with the Republic of
Indonesia." (AlC.413 1ISR1. 6)Oman

On 1December1976,therepresentativeof Omanstated:

"The entirepeopleof Timor,andin factof Indonesia as awhole,are

relatedby ethnic,cultural, linguisticand geographical affinities. The
delegation of Oman, therefore, considers that the United Nations
should not interferewith a free decisionof the Indonesian people or
of anyotherpeopleto strengthentheirunityand thenationalintegrity

of their temtory and to workas a united peoplefor nationalprogress
andprospenty."(N31PV.85)

Earlier on5 November 1976,in the Fourth Cornmittee,the representative of
Omanhad said:

"EastTimorwasnota standardcaseof an entirenationsûugglingfor
self-determinationand independence, thatTemtory was ethnically,
culturally and geographically part of Timor and therefore an

indivisible part of the Republic of Indonesia. The people of both
parts of Timorhad stmggled for their liberationfor many years and
had finally achieved their objectives through armed struggle; he
hoped that they would now commit themselves to the cause of

Indonesia's economicand nationaldevelopment."(NC.4131ISR.16)

Omanhas sincerepeatedthis view: seeA/C.4/36/SR.21,9November1981.

PapuaNewGuinea

On 21 November 1979,in the General Assembly,the representativeof Papua
NewGuineastated:

"..my Govemmentis of the view that there isno need foranything
further in the decolonization processin that Territory and that the

realityof the simationis that EastTimoris nowan integratedpart of
the Republicof Indonesia."An4PV.75)

SeealsoNC.4.4/35/SR.13,21 October1980.Philippines

On 5 November 1976,the representative of the Philippines said in the Fourth
Cornmittee:

"his delegation had closely obsemed developments in East Timor

and was satisfied that the principles of decolonization set outin the
Charter and the relevant General Assembly resolutions had been
compliedwith.
...

After peace and order had been restored in East Timor, the people
had exercised their right to self-determination on 31 May 1976
through a representative assembly. Having decided at that timeon
full integration with Indonesia, the people of East Timor had

declared thatthey hadexercised theirright of self-determinationand
had concluded the process of decolonization in the Territory."
(A/C.4/31/SR.16)

Later, on 1 December 1976,the representative of the Philippines said, in the
GeneralAssembly that:

"My delegationwill voteagainst draftresolutionIX, on the question

of East Timor for the following reasons. First, my delegation
believes that the process of self-determination in the Temtory has
taken place in a mannerconsonantwith the wishesexpressedby the
people of East Timor. The draft resolution does not, therefore,

conform to the present situation in East Timor. Secondly, the
People's Assemblyof East Timor, on 31 May 1976,exercised the
right of self-determinationand opted to becomeindependentthrough
integration with the Republicof Indonesia. Thirdly, the Indonesian

Government accepted integration in accordance with resolutions
1514(XV)and 1541(XV)of the General Assembly,in whichthere is
a provision allowingcolonialTemtories, by the expressedwill of the
people, to be integrated into any other country. Forthese reasons,

and in view of the fact that theprinciplesof decolonizationstipulated
in the United Nations Charter and the relevant General Assembly
resolutionshave been complied with,my delegationbelievesthat the
questionof EastTimorhas beensettledaccordingly." (Al31PV.85) "In the case of East Timor, the Thai delegation holdsthe view that
the people of East Timor have exercised their right to self-
determination. Thepeopleof that formerTemtory have madea clear

decision to end their dependent status through integration with
Indonesia. Also,that decisionhas been legally acceptedby both the
Indonesian National Assembly and the Indonesian Government,
which on 17 July 1976integrated EastTimor into the Republic of

Indonesia as the twenty-seventh province of that country. The
process ofdecolonizationin EastTimor was therefore terminatedin
accordancewith General Assemblyresolution 1514(XV)and other
relevantresolutions."A/36/PV.70)

Thailand has reaffirmed its position on a number of other occasions: see
A/C.4/35/SR.11, 17 October 1980; Al36lPV.70, 24 November 1981;
A/C.4/36/SR.9,19October 1981;and A/C.4/37ISR.11,1November 1982.

2. Di~lomaticrelations

176. Australia understands that no State that has diplornatic or consular

relationswith Indonesiahasqualifiedthe termsof its diplomatic recognitionin
any way to take account of the dispute between Portugal and Indonesia over
East Timor (Indonesian Note, Annex 24). This includes former Portuguese
colonies, such as Mozambique. Diplornaticmissions accredited to Indonesia

performtheir functionsin relation to East Timorin theordinaryway. PART II

INADMISSIBILITY PART II

INADMISSIBILITY

CHAPTER 1

THE TRUE RESPONDENT IS NOT A PARTY TO THESE
PROCEEDINGS

Section 1: Analvsis ofthe ~ositionof the parties in this case

177. The analysis of the facts surrounding this case (Part 1) shows that

Austraiia is not the me respondent to these proceedings. Although Austraiia
has consented to the jurisdiction of the Court through its declarationder
Article36(2) of the Statute of the Court, this is not sufficient for the Court to
proceedto determinethe case broughtby Portugal. This chapter will show that

the Courtcannotdeterminethe case in theabsenceas a party to the proceedings
ofa thirdState,Indonesia.

178 Portugal has pointed to various bases upon which it might claim rights

deseming of protectionin thiscase. It has allegedbeoentitled to claim on its
own behalfas well asonbehalfof the people ofEastTimor. Furthemore, in an
attempt to bolster its position, it has asserted that the rights in question arise
erea omnesand thatit isan appropriateparty toenforcethoserights.

179. Whatever the basis of theparticular right in issue, there are limits on the
scope of the Court's jurisdiction where a third State, not a party to the
proceedings,is involvedin the breachesof theright. Three situations&se:

(a) A claimant State alleges breach of rights omnes committed by
another Stateand bringsa claimsolelyagainst thatState;

(b) A claimantState allegesbreachofrightserPaomnescommittedjointly by
more than one State although it does not bring its claim against all, but
only one (orsome)of thoseStates;and (c) A claimant State allegesbreach of rights erpa omnes comrnittedby one
Statebutbrings its claiminrespectof that breachagainst another State.

180. The first situation does not apply here. Rather, the actions of which
Portugal complains constitute an alleged breach of rights by either Indonesia
alone, or Indonesia and Australia jointly. In so far as the Portuguese claim

challenges the making of the Timor Gap Treaty, Australiaand Indonesia have
actedjointly. On this view,the case is an example of the secondsituation. At
bottom, however, the Portuguese claimgoes further than this and, eventhough
Portugal does not expressly purport to seek a ruling on Indonesia's actionsin

East Timor, it in fact challenges the legality of Indonesia's claim to have
sovereignty over East Timor. On this view, the Portuguese claimfalls within
the third situationeferredto in the preceding paragraph. Whichever analysisis
preferred, the fact remains that the Court cannot proceed to determine

Portugal's claimin theabsenceof Indonesia asa party to the proceedings. The
followingsection showswhy thisis so asa matterof law.

Thetrueoartiesto thedisoutemustbe~artiesto the
Sectionïï:
Q-s

181. One State cannot invokethe Court's jurisdiction againstanother State as
the basis for the adjudication of a dispute which itas with a third State not

consenting tothe Court's jurisdiction.Where the legal interestsof a third State
are put in issue in proceedings to which it is na party,the Court cannot rule
on the matter, and the Court is thereby preventedfrom deciding the case, even

as between the parties to the litigation. In other words, unless a State has
consented tothe Court'sadjudicationof the matter, the Court cannot determine
the rightsand obligations,competenceandresponsibilityof that State. It cannot
do so in proceedings towhich the State is a party-a fortiori it cannotdo so in

proceedings to whichit is not a party.

182. This isa fundamentalprincipleof internationaladjudication, supportedby
both the Permanent Courtof International Justiceand the present Court. In the

Status of Eastern Carelia, PCU, Series B, No. 5, 1923, p.27, the Permanent
Court statedthat: "It is wellestablishedin internationallaw that no State cm, without
its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with otherStates
either to mediation or to arbitration, orto any otherind of pacific

settlement."

See also Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, JudgmentNo. 2, -1924,
PCU, Series A, No. 2, p.16, Rights of Minoritiesin Upper Silesia, PCU,

Senes A, No. 15, 1928,p.22and Facto? at Chorzow, Merits,PCU,Series
A,No. 17, 1928,pp.37-8.

A. A challengetoa bilateraltreatyrequiresthe consentof bothparties

183. In situation (b) outlined above (para.179), even if the respondentState
(Australia) consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court, the Court
could not proceedto adjudicate a claim against it unlessthe other State alleged

jointly to have comrnitted the breach(Indonesia) was also a party to the
proceedings. This is because a challenge to actions under a bilateral treaty
requires the consent of both partiesbefore the Court can adjudicate on those
actions. Sucha challengein thiscasecould beonly on oneof twogrounds:

(a) that one (or both) of the parties lacked capacityto enter into the Timor
GapTreaty;or

(b) that performance of the obligations due under the Treaty could be
prevented if their performance amounted to a breachof an obligation
owed tothe claimantState.

1. The Issueof Ca~w

184. There can be no doubt as toAustralia's capacity, as a coastal State, to

enterinto a treatydealingwith the explorationand exploitationof the maritime
areas adjacent to its coast. This is, from its perspective, what theTimor Gap
Treaty is about. There is no issue about Austraiia'statusas a coastal Statein
relationto the area,or aboutitsrecognizedinternationalcapacityto represent its

people. Accordingly, Portugal's challenge to the TimorGapTreaty, ifdirected
to the capacity of theparties to concludeit, must be on the basis of a lack of
capacity on the part of Indonesia to enter into a treaty with regard to the
maritime areas adjacent to EastTimor. To do this is to put in issue not thecapacity of Australia,but the capacity of Indonesia, a third party which isnot
before the Court. This is not therefore a matter upon which the Court can

adjudicate.

185. The implementation of a treaty may be prohibited by having the treaty
declared invalid. Portugal, however, seeksto have performance of the Timor
Gap Treaty enjoinedwithouthaving itdeclaredinvalid. The basisof Portugal's
contention is that Australia acted wrongfully in entering into the Treaty, by

creating rights and duties between Australia and Indonesia which are
inconsistentwithdutiesowedby Australia, andby Indonesia,to Portugal.

186. Australia has two responses. In the first place, assurning that Portugal

could satisfythe Court that Australiais subjectto obligations owedto Portugal,
which conflict with obligations owedto Indonesia under the Treaty, that does
notentitle Portugal to enjoin performanceof the Treaty. For,in principle,there
is no hierarchyof obligations.

187. The matter rnight be different if Portugal were alleging that the Treaty
was invalid. In that event, Portugal couldask, with some semblanceof logic,
that Australiaberestrained from performing its obligations (or exercisingits

rights) under an invalid Treaty. But Portugaldoes not take that position (nor
could it do so, since the Court'sjudgment on the validity of the Treaty would
directly and irnrnediatelyinvolve therights of Indonesia). Portugal treatsthe
Treaty as valid, but argues that Australia acted illegallyin concluding it, and

would act illegallyin performingit.

188. In the second place,and more fundamentally,whetherPortugalis seeking
to enjoin performance of the Treaty, or to obtain reparations if Australia and

Indonesia carry out their obligations under the Treaty, the Court would be
called upon to adjudicate the nghts of the other party to the Treaty, Indonesia,
withoutits consent,contraryto theMonetarvGoldprinciple.

189. The application of the principle of consent in this contextas expressly
recognizedby the Central AmericanCourt of Justicein Costa Rica vNicaragua
(1916), text in (1917) 11Americ an Journal of International Law 181, and
Salvador v Nicaragua (1917), text in (1917) 11 American Journal ofInternationalLaw674. In the CostaRicacase (atp.228) the Court explained:

"Tojudge of the validityor invalidityof the actsof a contractingparty
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court; to make findings
respecting its conduct and rendera decisionwhich wouldcompletely
and definitelyembraceit -a party that hadno sharein the iitigation,or

legal occasion to be heard - is not the mission of the Court, which,
conscious ofits high duty, desiresto confineitseIfwithin the scopeof
its particularpowers."

Substantially the same issue was raised in El Salvador v Nicaragua, in which
the Court held (at p.695) that it could not enjoid Nicaragua to abstain from
fulfillingthe Bryan-ChamorroTreaty, onthe ground thatone party tothe Treaty
(theUnitedStates)was notsubjecttothejurisdictionof the Court.

190. In thjs case, Portugal contends that its rights are dependent upon certain
multilateral treatieswhich it claims that Australiahas breached. In Australia's
view this makes no difference to the underlying situation. The dispute with
which this case is concerned is aboutthe lawfulnessof the Timor Gap Treaty

and the bilateral obligations between Austraiia and Indonesiato which it gives
rise. Portugal relieson particularmultilateraltreatiesonly to assistits argument
that Australia has unlawfully concludedthe Timor Gap Treaty and, for that
reason,it is entitled toanrder enjoiningAustralia fromperformingacts which

the Treaty requires Australia toperfonn (Application,para.34(5)). Thus, by its
Application, Portugalin fact seeks the adjudication of a dispute conceming a
bilateral treaty,althoughone of the parties to that treatyis not before theCourt.

To challenge the existence or legalityof Australia's duty toperform the Treaty
is, necessarily,to challengethe existence or legalityof Indonesia'sright to have
the Treaty perfonned.

The Courtcannothearallegationsof breachesof rightsmadeagainst
B.
a Statethatareconsequentialonbreachesofdutybyanother State

191. Altematively, Indonesia isthe real and only (andthus, essential) party to

this dispute. Australia is the wrong Party entirely. The legal interests of
Indonesia and not those of Australia form the very subject - matter of the
dispute. This is situation (c) outlined in paragraph 179 above. The Court
cannot adjudicatein such a situation withoutthe consent of the State which isalleged to have cornmitted the breach (Indonesia). This is because the Court

cannot decide whether the right of self-determination of the people of East
Timorhas been infringedwithoutfirstdecidingIndonesia's claimthatit hadthe
authorityin 1989to rnakethe Timor GapTreatybecauseit thenhad sovereignty
over East Timor. This is the inevitable resultif the Court were to accept that

the real dispute does not concern the Timor Gap Treaty assuch but the claim
based on the nght to self-determination. Even on this basis the Monetarv Gold
case (ICJReports 1954,p.19)also applies,just as in situation(b).

192. The Courtwill recall that in theMonetaryGold casepart of the monetary
gold,removedfrom Romein 1943,wasclaimedby both Albaniaand Italy. An
arbitrator found that the goldbelonged to Albania. Subsequently, a Tripartite
Commission decidedto allocate the goldto the United Kingdom,not Albania,

in partial satisfactionof the award made against Albaniain the Corfu Channel
case (ICJ Reports 1949,p.4). Italy disputedthe allocation,arguing that it was
entitled to priority overthe UnitedKingdom. Italy's claim to priority depended

upon whether Italy was entitled to compensation for the expropriation of the
Bank of Albania,most of the sharesin which wereheld by the ItalianState. In
making its claim to pnority, Italy called into question the lawfulness of
Albania'sacts in relation to Italy, so that to decide the merits of the case would

have required the Court first to decide a dispute between Italy and Albania,
even thoughAlbaniawasnota partyto theproceedings. As the Courtsaid:

"The Court is not merely called upon to Saywhether the goId should

be delivered to Italy or to the United Kingdom. It is requested to
determine first certain legal questions upon the solution of which
depends the delivery of the gold. In order, therefore, to determine
whether Italy is entitled to receive the gold, it is necessary to

determine whether Albania has comrnitted anyinternational wrong
against Italy, and whether she is under an obligation to pay
compensation to her; and, if so, to determine also the arnount of

compensation."(ICJReports 1954,pp.31-2)TheCourt concluded:

"...Albania'slegal interestswouldnot only be affectedby a decision,
but would form the very subject-matter of the decision. In such a
case, theStatute cannot be regarded, by implication, as authorizing

proceedings to be continued inthe absence of Albania." (ICJ Reports
1954,p.32)

193. In this circumsqe, the Court declinedto decidethe dispute, observing

"Where, as in the present case, the vital issue be settled concerns
the international responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot,
without the consent of that third State, give acision on that issue

binding upon any State, either the third State, or any of the parties
before it.

Even if the ultimate matter for the Court to decide was the priorasy,

between the UnitedKingdomand Italy,of the claims to the gold,that
question could not be decided, because it depended on the Court's
ruling on a prelirninary issue, arising solely between Italy and

Albania."(MonetaryGoldCase,ICJ Reports 1954,p.33)

194. Portugal contends thatas the right to self-determinationof the people of
East Timor gives rise to an obligation grPa omnes to promote that right, its

claimis opposable to Australia,irrespectiveof thepositionof other States. This
fails to take account of the fact that the direct violation of the right to self-
determination whichPortugal's claim against Australiaassumes must, on the
facts relied on by Portugal, be attributable solely to Indonesia. Any other

(indirect)violationcan onlybe consequentialonIndonesia'swrongdoing. Even
if there ian obligation=%aomnesto promotethe right of the EastTimoreseto
self-determination, the alleged violation of that right by Australia lies in

Australia'streaty relationswith Indonesia. So the substanceof the allegationis
that Australiawas not entitled totreatwith Indonesiabecause Indonesiadid not
lawfully represent the people of East Timor. The whole allegation depends
upon the legality of Indonesia'sclairnas sovereign, to representthe people of

the temtory. The claim thus contravenes the principle of consent which bars
the adjudication of the legal responsibilityof Indonesia withoutits agreement.
Australia contends that the Monetary Gold Cm is directly applicable to the case now brought by Portugal, because the Court cannot decide this case
withoutdeciding:

-
the international responsibility of Indonesia for any wrongdoing in
relationto thepeopleof EastTimor;

- the resultingrights and obligationsof indonesiain respect of the temtory

of EastTimor;and

- the entitlementof Indonesiain 1989to negotiateand concludethe Timor
Gap Treaty.

195. This is not to say that the Court's jurisdiction always depends on the
consent of every State whose interests may be affected by the decision. The
MonetarvGold Case recognizes thatthere is a distinction to be drawn between

legal interests which form "the very subject-matter of the decision" and legal
interests which are likely to beno more than consequentially affectedby the
decision. This distinctionis the bais of a numberof the Court's decisions,as
for examplethe ContinentalShelf(LibvaiMalta)Case(ICJReports 1984,p.25);

Maritime Frontier Case (ICJ Reports 1990, pp.115-6); and Militarv and
ParamilitarvActivities InandAgainstNicarama (ICJReports 1984,p.431).

196. The decision of the Court in pil' P

âgainst Nicaragua(ICJReports 1984,p.215)is notauthorityto thecontrary. In
that case, Nicaragua alleged thatUnited States support for the insurrectionary
forces known as the "contras" constituted an unlawful use of armed force and
an unlawful intervention in Nicaragua's intemal affairs. The United States

responded that Nicaraguawas supporting insurgencies in neighbouring States
and that supportfor the "contras" was in exerciseof the right of collectiveself-
defence. The United States contended that Nicaragua'sclaim against it was

inadmissible, because the adjudication of it would necessarily implicate the
rights and obligations of other States(ICJ Reports 1984,pp.430-1). The latter
contention failed, not because the Court rejected the validityof the Monetary
Q&j case, but because it was satisfied, in the circumstances of the case, that

Nicaragua's applicationwould not necessarily require the Court to make any
findings as to the individual right of self-defenceof third States. Not even the
strength of the United States' pleaofjustifiable self-defence could ariseunless
the Court found there was sufficient evidence for a finding that the UnitedStates had in fact used force against Nicaragua. At most, the position of third
States would only have beenaffected by implications which might have been

drawn against them, asa consequence of the Court's rejection of the United
States' defence. Contrast the claim which Portugal ..ings in this case: a
findingof Indonesia's legal responsibilitis a preconditionto any consideration
of Ausaalia's position. In this situation, Australiais simplythe wrongparty for
Portugal to sue. The real cause of action is against Indonesia. Australia's

positionis mereiyconsequential.

197. That this is the correct characterisationof the situation is evident if one
considers the situation that would arise if both Portugal and Indonesia had

consentedto theCourt's jurisdictionfor resolvinga dispute betweenthem as to
the issue of self-determination for East Timor. In such a situation Austraiia
could noteven successfullyintenene on the issueof self-determination. Thatis
an issue between theformer colonialpowerand the Statein actual controlof the

temtory. Australia's legal interests would not be directly en cause. Yet
Portugalcontendsthat the sameissuecan bedeterminedin a suitbetween itand
Australia in the absence of Indonesia. This clearly cannot be correct.
Portugal's argumentsin thisregard come down to a question of the capacity of

Indonesia. It is only because Portugal says that Indonesia lacks capacity to
represent the people of EastTimor through making a treaty in relation to their
temtory that it says that the Treaty is tainted by unlawfulness (illicéité).
Portugal's arguments in relation to self-determination and permanent

sovereignty al1relate to, and depend upon, this alleged lackof capacity on the
part of Indonesia- thatison its legal positionas the State unlawfully occupying
EastTimor. What it attacksis the abilityof Australiato negotiate andconclude
the Treaty, and that is a mere consequence of the (asserted) incapacity of

Indonesia. The (asserted) incapacity of Indonesia arises, whether or not the
Timor Gap Treaty exists. If Austraiia is not entitled to act in relation to the
maritime area in question, this can only be as a consequence of the general
incapacity of another State (Indonesia or Portugal) to deal with the area in

question. The competing interests of these two States cm, however, only be
resolvedby determiningthe legal interestsof Indonesia. 198. To determinethis case, the Court has todeterminethe rightsof the people
of East Timor to self-determination and, faced with asserted Indonesian
sovereignty, this also requires the Court to determine the legal interests of

Indonesia. The situation in this case, however characterised, falls directly
withinthe Monetarv Goldprinciple.

C. Adjudication of the bbconsequential"responsibility of a State requires

the consent of the State with original responsibility

199. The essenceof Portugal's complaint is notthattheTreaty - in terms
of its substantive provision- is a violation of the rights of Portugal,but rather
that the violation arises fromthe fact that Australia negotiated and concluded

the Treaty with Indonesia. It is thus Indonesia's capacityto act, in the place of
Portugal,whichis the coreof the complaint.

200. But even if it is accepted, for the purposes of argument, that Indonesia

acted unlawfully in replacing Portugal as the coastal state, competent to
conclude this treaty, it would follow that the original,primary responsibility
would rest with Indonesia. The responsibility of Australia, for joining with
Indonesiain concludingthis treaty, would beessentiallyconsequential, andthe
illegaiity of Australia's conduct could arise only asa consequenceof the prior

illegaiity of Indonesia. Hence itfollowsthat, asa preconditionfor any finding
of illegality by Australia, the Court would be bound to establish the prior,
illegal actof Indonesia. Withoutthe consentof Indonesia,that cannotbedone.

201. Portugal seeks to avoid this conclusion by, in effect, arguing that the
obligations of Ausaaiia relate to the rights of Portugalerea ornnes,and on this
basis assumes thatAustraiiaowes obligationsquite independentlyof any owed
by Indonesia -so that Australia's responsibiiity would be "original", and not

"consequentiai". But thisignoresthe factsthat:

- any duty owed by Australia would arise as a direct consequence of the
prior breach by Indonesia (viz the alleged unlawful occupationof East
Timor);and

- such duty would be in the nature of a collective responseto Indonesia's
unlawful act, andwould arise as a consequenceof the collectivedecision
of a competentUnited Nationsorgan.202. The references to the right of the people of East Timor to self-

determinationin Portugal's Applicationand Mernonalinevitablyraise the issue
of which State is prirnarily responsible for the.alleged breach of the right.
However this situation is analysed, the only Statewhich could be responsible
for, or guilty of, that alleged wrong is Indonesia. In relation to Portugal's

clairns, Australia is in the position of a third State. Austraiia isnot the State
against which the "injured" State - Portugal, or a separate East Timor entity
representedby Portugal -rnaylegitirnatelyproceed. Australiais sirnplya third
State which has responded to a situation brought aboutby two other States -

Portugal and Indonesia - in order to protect its own long-asserted rights and
interests. In 1989, Australia dealtwith this new situationby rnakingthe Timor
Gap Treaty, but Australia's dealings in this regard did not give rise to
internationallegal responsibility.

203. A third statecan incur a consequential responsibility onlyin exceptional
circurnstances; and only as a legal consequence of the wrongdoing of the
prirnary State& of the collective decision of other States. This collective

decisionrnay be takenby the appropriatepoliticalorgansof the United Nations.
It was not, however, taken in this case. See Part 1, Chapter 2; Part III,
Chapter 1. There is thereforeno groundfor any PortugueseclairnthatAustralia
was itself under an erea omnes obligationwhich it failed to observe. Ithad no

obligation to abstain frommakingthe Timor Gap Treatyin December 1989and
hasincurredno internationalresponsibilityby so doing.

204. If the me relationshipof Portugalto Australiais not that of "injured" and

"wrongdoer" State, but that of "injured" and third State, the Portuguese case
against Australia depends on establishing that a primary wrong has been
committed (by Indonesia) and that the wrong has been the subject of a
collectivedecisionrequiring States, including Australia,to act, or abstain frorn

acting in a particular way. Thus, to decide the merits of this case, the Court
cannot attribute any consequential responsibility to Australia, without first
decidingthe "wrongdoing"of anotherState and whether that "wrongdoing"has
been confirmedby a collectivedecisionof the relevantkind. These findingsare

the prerequisites for any finding of Australian responsibility. It followsfrorn
this that the Court cannot, consistentlywith theprinciple of consent,decide this
case in the absence of an allegedly "wrongdoing" State, which could only be
Indonesia. Moreover, Portugal insists thatits only interestin the present case is its interest in ensuring the application of the principle of self-determinationto
EastTimor. The Court cannotdeterminethatthe pnnciple of self-determination

has been violated, or that that principle has specified consequences for third
parties,in a casein whichIndonesiaisnota party.

SectionIII: The caseathand

205. This section turns to examine in more detail the application of the legal
principlesoutlinedin theprecedingsectionto thefactsof this case.

A. Thetruedisputeis betweenPortugalandIndonesia

206. Portugal contends that Australia hasbreached obligations owedto it and

to the people of EastTimor, by failing to respect its position as adrninistering
Power of the temtory of East Timor, andby failing to observe therights of the
people of East Timor to self-determination,temtorial integrity and permanent
sovereigntyover naturalresources.

207. As Portugal itself concedes, the origin of any dispute conceming East
Timor which it rnayhave withany other State is the invasion of East Timor by
indonesia,afterPortugal'sflightfromthe temtory in 1975. Portugalaccepts,as
it must, that Australia didnot participate, either directly or indirectly, in any

initial illegality which Indonesia may have then comrnitted (cf Memorial,
para.2.17). Portugal further concedes that the basis of any dispute over East
Timoris the condemnationof the indonesianinterventionby the United Nations
General Assembly,in resolution 3485(XXX)on 12December 1975and by the

Security Council, in resolution 384 on 22 Decernber 1975; the continued
occupation of East Timor by Indonesia; and the reference by the Security
Council,in resolution 384,to Portugal as adrninisteringPower of the temtory.
(Application, para 10,pp.7-9). What is more, Portugal accepts thatit has only

one interest in the temtory- that of securing compliance with the pnnciple of
self-determination (Memorial, para3.08). Accordingly, Portugaldoes not lay
claim to any continuing legal entitlement or beneficial interest of its own,
relatingto theterritory.208. Having regardto these matters,the Court can only deal with this dispute
in proceedingsto which Indonesia is a party. The Courtcannotjudge this case

without first deciding the rights and obligations, or status and competenceof
Indonesiain EastTimor. As Indonesiais not a party to these proceedings,this
case is indistinguishablefromthe MonetarvGoldCase.

209. Portugal calls on the Court to decide if Australia, by entering into the
Timor Gap Treaty of 11 December 1989, has failed to respect Portugal's
position as administering Power,or the rights of the East Timorese people to
self-determination. Before theCourt canundertakethistask, it mustfirst decide

which of two States, Portugalor Indonesia, was at the relevant time -the date
the Treaty was concluded - the competent State to deal, by treaty, with the
maritime territory of East Timor. Moreover, it is not enough to say that
Portugal has some legal interestin relation tothe temtory -such as the interest

to ensure the application of the principle of self-determination tothe temtory.
It is necessary to decide that Indonesia has no legal interest. But,quite apart
from Indonesia's ownwidely recognizedclaim to sovereigntyoverthe temtory,
the international community clearly accepts that Indonesiais necessarily and

essentially involved in the issue of self-determination. See paras.214-219
below,also Part 1,Chapter2, Section1.

210. Before the Court can decide any matter relating to the rights and

obligations ofAustraiia,it wouldbe necessaryfor it todecide whetherPortugal,
rather than Indonesia, has the legal capacity tomake a treaty of the kind which
is in issue here. Forit is Indonesia,not Austraiia,which hastaken the place of
Portugal as the State claiming competenceto make a treaty for EastTimor, and

itis Indonesia, not Australia,which hasthereby committed(if the substanceof
Portugal's allegationsare accepted by the Court) the primary wrong against
Portugal, by failing to respect its position as adrninistering Power. Thus, the
primary question is not whether Australia has, in some way, incurred

international responsibility,but whetheror not Indonesia islawfullypresentin,
and has sovereigntyover, East Timor; or whether Indonesia hasinfringed the
position of Portugal as administeringPower,and deniedthe right of the people
of EastTimor to self-determination.

211. If Portugal failed to satisfythe Court as to anyof these matters, its case
against Australiawould necessarily fail. Forthere is no other basis for Portugal
to argue that the making of the Timor Gap Treaty constituted a breach of internationallaw on Austraiia'spart. Nor could Portugalput forwardany other
groundto support its requestthat theCourtenjoin Austraiiafromperformingits

obligationsundertheTreaty.

212. Thus, the primary disputeis between indonesia and Portugal. It directly
concerns the legal status of the Indonesian administrationof East Timor at and

since 11December 1989,Le.,at the time of and since the makingof the Timor
Gap Treaty. The question on which this case inevitably turns is whether
Indonesia'sclaimto sovereigntyisjustified. Adecisionon indonesia's claimto
sovereignty is, therefore, a prerequisite to any finding of Australian

responsibiiity.

213. Indonesiaand some other Stateshaveregarded certain actsin EastTimor,
as for example the consultationof 1976 (para.54 above), as tantamount to the

exercise of the right to self-determinationby the peopleof EastTimor. But the
question hereis not whether such acts are tbe so regarded. Theywereacts of
indonesiaon whichindonesianowrelies to substantiateits claimwith respectto
East Timor. The point is that the Court cannot decide these matters without

Indonesia's presence or consent,because if it is to rule in favour of Portugal's
claim, itmus4 ineuitably, decide these issues adverselyto Indonesia,and must
do soin a way which willinevitablyimpingeon thelegalright whichindonesia
wouldotherwisepossessto have theTreaty performed.

B. The internationalcommunityrecognizesthatIndonesiaand Portugal
are thetme partiesto the dispute

214. The circumstances of the dispute clearly show that the me parties are
Portugal andIndonesia, notAustralia. This is,indeed,the understandingof the
international community, asexpressed through the United Nations. Thus, in
resolution 36/50of 24 November1981,the GeneralAssemblycalledupon:

"..al1interestedparties, namely[àsavoir] Portugal,asadministering
Power, and the representativesof the East Timorese people,as well
as Indonesia, to cooperatefully with the United Nations witha view

to guaranteeingthe full exercise of the right to self-determinationof
the peopleof EastTimor."215. The resolution exhaustively identifiedthe interested States. Again, by
resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982,the General Assembly requestedthe

Secretary-General to initiate consultations for settlement "with al1 parties
directly concerned",refemng thereby to Portugal andIndonesia,as well as the
peopleof EastTimor. There was no suggestionthen or at any other timeon the
part of the United Nationsorgansthat Australiawas one of the "partiesdirectly

concerned". On the other hand, resolution 37/30 constituted an express
international recognition of Indonesian involvement in the dispute, an
involvementwhich Portugalhas in fact accepted. For Portugalinsists that itis
pursuant to this resolution thatit has cooperated with the Secretary-General.

See paragraphs 146 to 152 above conceming negotiations between Indonesia
and Pomgal. What holds for non-legal ways of settlement holds for an
adjudication, for as the Permanent Court stated, the latter "is simply an
alternative to the direct and friendly settlementof a dispute" (Free Zones of
UpperSavovand theDistrictof Gex, PCU,SeriesA, No.22,1929, p.13).

216. Australia is neither"an interestedparty" nor a party "directlyconcerned
in the disputeover East Timor, eitherin relationto thequestionsof sovereignty,
or of self-determination. It cannot be held responsible for the outcome of the

dispute: that is aatter for Portugal, Indonesia,the people of East Timor and
the United Nations. Thus, Australia could not challenge either directly or
through an intervention an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal,under
the auspicesof the Secretary-General,to theeffect thatthepeople of EastTimor

had alreadyvoluntarilyacceptedintegrationinto Indonesia.

217. On the other hand, had Indonesia chosen to intervene in these
proceedings, it would, practically speaking, have become the sole respondent.

As the basic issues give rise to a dispute between it and Portugal, Portugal
would scarcely have needed to amend its Application. Although Portugal's
claims purport to beopposable to Australia only, itsfocus is on Indonesia. To

achieve what Portugalconcedes is the purpose of this case - the vindicationof
the principle of self-determination(Memorial,para 3.08) -Indonesia is both a
necessary and sufficient party. For the legal and practical responsibility for
complying with that principle rests with Indonesia. Onlyif Indonesia were a

party could Portugal,assuming that it had a right to bring such proceedings on
its ownbehalfor on the behalfof thepeopleof EastTimor, wineffective relief. 218. Furthermore, as Indonesia is in effective control ofEast Timor, territory
over which itclaims sovereignty,its legalinterestin theoutcomeof thedispute

isactual. It is notmerelya possiblebeneficiaryof any act of self-determination
occumng on temtory underthecontrolof another State.

219. The conclusion is unavoidable: the Courtcannotdecideif the principleof

self-determinationhas ken violated,withconsequencesforthirdparties,unless
indonesiais a party to theproceedings. For there tobe any basiswhatsoever for
Portugal's claim against Australia, Portugal must provethe unlawfulness of
Indonesia's claim to sovereignty. It follows that Indonesia'slegal interests

would not justbe affectedby a decisionin this case, thequestion of indonesian
sovereignty would form an essential part of "the very subject-matter" of the
proceedings as did the interest of Albania in the Monetary Gold Case. The
internationalcomrnunityitself recognizes thatthisis now the case.

C. Portugal cannot challenge the effectiveness of the Timor Gap Treaty
without Indonesia's consent

220. There is a furtherreason whythe principleof consentprecludesthe Court
fromdecidingthe ments of this case. Portugalapparentlyconcedes(Mernorial,
para 3.06) thatthe Court cannotrule on the vaiidity ofa bilateraltreaty, without

the consent of both parties to the treaty. The reason is clear: a decision
conceming the entitlements of one party to the treaty will also arnount to a
decision as to the entitlements of the other party to the treaty. This has been
explained above (paras.183 to 190). Ifthe Court were to decide the meritsof

this case, it would beruling not only on the entitlements of Australia, but also
on those of Indonesia. A judgment of the Court is not a mere voeu: it has
binding effect. Ajudgmentof the Courtthat State A cannotlawfully give effect
to a bilateral treaty withState B is a judgment that State B has no right that

State A give effect to the aeaty. The relief whichPortugal seeks shows that a
mling in relation to the responsibilityof Australia would apply directlyand of
its own forcetoindonesia.

221. Portugalasserts(Memonal, para. 3.06)that this casedoes not concem the
validity of the Treaty, but onlythe legalityof Australia's conductin relation to
it. According to Portuga1,'thisis the only matter which the Court is asked to

decide. Even if this weretrue, a findingof wrongdoingby Australia would,in
the circurnstancesof this case,require apnor findingof wrongdoing onthe partof Indonesia. In tmth, however, the distinction which Portugal seeksto make
between validityand legalityis completelywithout substance. See paragraphs

7 to 9 above.

222. For if the Court were to decide in favour of Portugal, and Australia did
not fulfilits treatyobligationstoIndonesia,Indonesiawould nodoubtcornplain
that this involved abreach of the Treaty. Given thatcomplaint, there are two

possibilities. The first possibility is that Indonesia, which is a party to the
Statuteof the Court, wouldbe boundto accept that Australiawas obligedby the
Court's order not to give effect to the Treaty. The second possibility is that
Indonesia, which isnot a party to the proceedings and which is entitled to rely

on Article59 of the Statute,wouldbe entitled to ignorethe effect of the Court's
order so far as it impinged on its owntreatynghts. If the first alternative is the
correct one, then the Court's order would effectively bind Indonesia, which it
cannot do. If the second alternative isthe correct one,then the Court wouldbe
imposing inconsistent obligations onAustralia, and wouldnsk makingan order

which wascontradictoryin its legaleffect. Indeed it is nottoo muchto saythat
in such a case the Court would in effect be inducing a breach of treaty by
Australia. This too it cannot, orat the veryastshouldnot,do..

223. This argument shows, as clearly as anything can, that the Portuguese
claim and submissions logicallyentail a challenge to the validity of the Timor
Gap Treaty, whetherthat challengeis based on the proposition that the right of
self-determinationgives risetoan obligationereagum~~ or a ruleofm.
Essentially,Portugal's contentionisthatthe Treatydoes not deal with the rights

of Indonesia,but withits own rights asadministering Power,or the rights of an
entity representingthepeople of EastTimor. A treatybetween States A andB
about the rightsof State C is void inasmuchas it is legally inoperative toaffect
those rights. What is more, if the Court were to accept Portugal's invitationto

declare that, besides creating an obligation -a omnes, the right of self-
determination gives rise to a rule of copens, or a peremptory norm, and if
the Court were then to find that Australiahad contravened thatnorm in making
the Treaty, the Treaty wouldbevoid for that reason aswell. This follows from

Article 53 of the ViennaConventionon Treaties. If the treaty were voidin this
respect, then how could Portugal sayit is not questioning the validity of the
treaty? If it is void, then the rights of third parties are clearlyin issue and this
musttngger theMonetarvGoldprinciple.D. Australia's position is consequential on the status of Indonesia in 1989

224. As it has now been seen, Portugal's claims against Australia concerning
the rightto self-determinationarise from an assumption that Indonesiadenied
that right in the period 1975-6. To succeedin its claim, however, Portugalhas
to go further still. It has also to show that Indonesia is infringing that right

today, some 16years after it first incorporated the temtory of East Timor into
Indonesia. Portugal's claim dependsupon showing anexistinginfringementof
the right to self-determination-at and since the time of the conclusion of the
Treaty. It has also to demonstrate that Indonesiais not today in a position to

exercise lawfullythe attributesof acoastal state so asto concludean agreement
with another State on maritime matters exclusively affecting the temtories
undertheir control.

225. This cmcial inter-temporal aspect of the case is completely, indeed
wilfully, ignored in the Portuguese Application and even in its Memorial.
Portugal merely assertsthatit:

"has never abandoned and can never abandon its status as the
administering Power of the Temtory, and the duties attendantupon that
status. It considers itself still to be the repository of the rights of the
peopleof EastTimor." (Application,p.9)

Seealso Memorial,paras.8.13-8.14.

226. It is onlyby calling intoquestionthe statusandnghts of Indonesiaasthey

currently exist that Portugal can establish the consequential responsibilityof
Australia for its acts in relation to the Timor Gap Treaty. For if Indonesia's
claims to sovereigntyoverthe Temtory and tobe the Statenow lawfullyable to
enter into dealings with other States on behalf of EastTimor are sound, then

Portugal's claim must fail. Portugal must show that Indonesia's assertions
concerningthe Temtory and its entitlementto rnakethe Treaty were false when
the Treaty was made -i.e., in December1989.

E. Any Australian responsibility being derived from conclusion of a
bilateral treaty mustbe shared with the other party tothe Treaty

227. If, contrary to Australia's pnmary contention, Australia bears any legalresponsibilityto Portugal,resultingfrom the makingof the Timor Gap Treaty,
that responsibility is shared by itequally and conjointly with Indonesia. The
Portuguese Memonal asserts that Portugal's claim concerns onlythe individual

responsibility of Australia (Memorial, para 3.05). on the basis that Portugal
challenges only the legality of Australia's acts, not the validity of the Treaty
itself (Memonal, para 3.06). As previously shown,this purported distinctionis
misleading and fails to have regard to thefocus of Portugal's Application. In

fact, Portugal'sclairnsconcem either the individual responsibilityof Indonesia
alone, orthejoint responsibilityof Australia andIndonesia.

228. In rnakingtheTimor GapTreaty, Australiaand Indonesiaengagedinjoint

action directed to acornmonpurpose -the creationof a provisional arrangement
for the exploration and exploitationofpetroleumresourcesin the Timor Gap. If
Portugal's case is sustainable,this actionconstitutedidentical violationsby both
States of identical obligations resultingin identical darnage. This follows from

the nature of the acts (essentially, the making and performing of the Treaty)
which Portugal alleges to be wrongful. For in negotiating, concluding and
initiatingthe performanceof the Treaty, Australia and Indonesia actedtogether.
BothStates shared responsibilityfor those acts, and for any international wrong

to which they gave rise. Iis irnmatenalwhether thisresponsibilityis descnbed
as "joint" or "concurrent". For whether "joint" or "concurrent", the Court
cannot declare Australia's responsibility,without also condemning Indonesia.
The Court cannot,therefore,judge this casein the absenceof Indonesia.

229. Even entering into the Treaty involved the joint act of Australia and
Indonesia. By this act, thetwo States gaveand acceptednghts and obligations.
Moreover, as has already been mentioned, by establishing the Zone of

Cooperation under the joint control of both States (Article 2). Indonesia and
Australia created a regime which requires reciprocity of obligation and
mutuality of performance. The successful operation of the regime depends

entirely onthe CO-operative participationofboth States.230. Furthermore, if, as Portugal requests (Application, paras2& 34(4)),
Australia were found liable to make reparation for legal, moral or material

damage to Portugal, or to thepeople of East Timor, then Indonesiawouldalso
be liable. For if themaking of the Treaty constituted a wrong resulting in
liability for reparations, Austraiiaand Indonesia wouldointly liable as co-
principals.

231. Althoughnota partyto theseproceedings, IndonesiashareswithAustralia
any responsibility for the Timor Gap Treaty. On Portugal's statementof its
case, thisorms the very subject matterof the proceedings. Hence,there is yet

another ground forfindingthat the Court cannotdecide this case: for it cannot
decidethe liabilityof Austraiiawithoutalso decidingthe iiabiiityof Indonesia.

Section IV: S

232. The preceding sections of this Chapter have shown that, however the
Portuguese claims are characterised, they inevitably require the Court to

adjudicate on the legal responsibiiityof a third State without its consent. The
principle of theonetarv Gold case applies. This is so whether the claims of
Portugal against Australare regardedas involving a challengeto the validity
of a bilaterai treatyasrdependent on establishing a claim against Australia

that is consequentiai on a breach of obligation by a third State. Section
indicated the theoretical possibiiities in this regard. Sectiiidiscussed
applicationsof the Monetay GoU principle. SectionII Ippiied the law to the
facts of this case.hose facts show that the central and essential elementsin

this case as formulated by Portugal require the Court to detennine as a
necessaryprecondition todetennining the responsibilityof Australia the "legal
interests" of Indonesia. Those interests, and not those of Australia, fonn the
very subject-matterof the decisionin thiscase. CHAPTER 2

PORTUGALHASNORIGHTTO

ANADJUDICATIONOFITSCLAIM

233. Portugalclaims that Australia has,by its conduct, breachedobligationsowed
to it, in itspacity as administering Power, andto the people of East Timor. In

substance,it alleges that Australiaowedobligations:

- to respectits poweranddutiesas theadministering Power;

-
to observe the rightof the peopleof East Timor to self-determination andthe
related rights (including the right to territorial integrity and unity and to
permanent sovereignty overits naturalwealthandresources);

- to observe Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and Security Council

resolutions384and389;and

- to negotiate with the competent State in matters of common interest and
therefore to negotiate withPortugal on maritime areas of direct concern to

East Timor.

SeeApplication,paragraphs2,3,27,30 and 31.

234. By thesebreaches, Australiahas, Portugalasserts, occasionedit and the people

of East Timor "particularly serious legal and moral damage" (Application,
paragraph 26;Memorial, paragraph 9.03). Portugal contends that Australia will
cause material darnage should it proceed to the exploitation of petroleum in the
TimorGap.

235. To establish its right to bring this claim, Portugal would needto demonstrate
that it has a "sufficientlegalinterest" in the claim. Simplyto identify itself as the
"administering Power" -so recognised by the General Assembly -is not enough. On closer analysis, to establish its rightto bring the claim, Portugalwould need to

establishthe following:

(a) that Portugal's own rights are in issue, and that Australia's conduct has
contravened thosenghts;

that Portugal'srightsare so closely identifiedwith those of ihe peopleof East
(b)
Timor that Portugal derivesits right tobring theseproceedings fromthat very
identification;

and

(c) that judgment in Portugal's favour will benefit Portugalin a legally relevant
way, by directlypromoting and protecting therightsof Portugal;

and

(d) that Portugal is in a position to fulfil any judgment, and to respond to any

counter-claims and demands thatarise from or may be consequential on the
Court'sjudgment.

236. As this chapter shows, Portugal cannot satisfythese requirements. Its

own rights are not in issue. Even if Portugal claims that its rights are so
identified with those of the people of East Timor that it is entitled tobring this
claim, such identification is not accepted by the people of East Timor
themselvesand the United Nations has noticeablyfailed to authorizeor require

Portugal to representthe peopleof EastTimor before the Court in proceedings
such as these. Indeed, the United Nationshas failed to take other more direct
action that couldhave beenavailableto it, for exarnple,by requesting fromthe
Court an advisory opinion on the legal status of East Timor. In apparent

acknowledgementof these difficulties,Portugalalso seeks to support its claim
that it is entitled to act on the basis that it iserforming a "service public
international". Section III shows that there is no basis in law for this

contention.Section 1: 1 s
own riphts are in issue

237. With its departure from East Timor in 1975, Portugal broughtto an end any
capacity it had to act as a coastal State in relation to the temtory. Since then,

Portugal has not beenin a position to fulfil the obligations, or enjoy the rightsaof
coastalStatein relation toEast Timor. Evenif Portugal's conductin 1975did not in
law constitute abandonment,its adoption of a new constitution in 1976 which no
longer included East Timor as a temtory under Portuguese sovereignty or

administration, constituted clear relinquishment of any territorial claim to East
Timor (para.44 above). Hence, Portugal cannotjustify its claim to act on the basis
thatits rights asa coastal State arein issue.

238. Nor can Portugal rely on any alleged interest as administering Power in
relation to East Timor. Its departure from the temtory and the subsequent
Indonesian occupation demonstrated the extent to which Portugal failed to fulfil its
responsibilities as administeringPower.Sincethen,it has not beenable to rnakeany

effective arrangementsfor East Timor.

239. The proposition that, because Portugal failed to discharge its
responsibilitiesas administeringPower,it cannotnowcal1on the Courttojudge

its claimis in keeping with the remarks of the Court in the Namibia Advisorv
-. Speakingof a mandatesituation,but in words whichapply equallyto
the relationshipof an administeringPowerto a non-self-govemingtemtory, the

Court wrote:
"One of the fundamental principles governing the international
relationship thus established is that a party which disowns or does not
fulfil its obligations cannot be recognized asretaining the rights which it

claimsto derivefromthe relationship.?'(ICJReports 1971,p.46)

240. Having lost control over East Timor, having failed to discharge its
responsibilities there and having formally relinquished al1sovereign powers

over the Temtory, Portugal cannot now assertan entitlement tohave this claim
decided by the Court. The circumstances of the case are very different from
thosein theUS NationalsIn Morocco Case(ICJ Reports 1952, p.176)in which

this Court recognizedthe right of the colonial power still in control to bring a
claim in respect of the colonial temtory. The basic difference is that in that
case the colonial power could cany out the judgment of the Court effectively.Portugal could not implement judgment in its favour in the present case.

Effectivenessmust, as in other areas of the law, remain the dominant principle
if the Courtis to avoidcreatinganimpossibleconflictbetween law and fact.

241. Finally, no right which Portugal claims to represent the people and

temitoryof East Timor before therelevant organsof the UnitedNations could
have been contravened by Australia. For nothing that Australia has done
preventssuchrepresentation,and nothing inajudgment of the Court favourable
to Portugal would affect Portugal's status as administering Power. In any

event, as paragraphs243 - 257belowshow,Portugaldoes nothave even such a
iimited rightofrepresentation.

SectionII: Portugal'sri~htsare notidentifiedwiththoseof the~eo~leof
EastTimor

A. Thepeopleof East Timor have rejected Portugaa ls administering

Power

242. Portugalcan point to no basis on whichits positioncan be identifiedwith that
of the people of East Timor. Its alleged sovereignty has not been accepted by the
East Timorese people. Indeed,it was very shortlyafter Portugal's withdrawalthat

Portuguese sovereigntywas repudiated by poiitical groups in East Timor. At the
end of November 1975, in the vacuum created by the withdrawal, FRETILIN
proclaimed the independence of the "Democratic Republic of East Timor" and
declared itselfthe Government. In response,the otherpolitical partiesalso declared

the independence of the territory, and declared themselves the "Provisional
Government of East Timor", as a step on the way to integration with Indonesia
(paras.38 and 43 above). Even following rnilitary intervention by Indonesia in
December 1975, neitherside of the political divisionin the temtory acknowledged

any role for Portugal. Mr Horta (FRETILIN)said in the debate in the Security
Councilon 12April 1976,thathis organisation:

"reject[s] any suggestion of East Timor's being a colony. Further,

any suggestion by the United Nations that Porhigal was still "the
administeringPower" is a blatant contradictionofal1United Nations
principles... The Central Committee of FRETILIN no longer
recognize Portuguese sovereignty over East Timorbut is willing to establishbilateral dialogueas between Government and Government,
Stateand State."(SP. 1908,p.21)

On this point, theattitude of the "ProvisionalGovemment of East Timor" was
similar. Referring to the fact that the Portuguese administration had been
withdrawnfrom East Timor, its spokesman pointedout in the sarnedebate that

asfar asthe Provisional Government was concerned:

"the questionof Timor has alreadybeen solvedby the EastTimorese
themselves. There was no PortugueseAdministeringAuthority any

more in Dili or in Atauro. It has deliberately abandoned the
Territory."(SPV. 1908,p.81)

B. The international community hasnot accorded Portugal the
rightto representthepeople of EastTimor

1. The UnitedNations

243. In instituting these proceedings, Portugal exceeds whatever limited
authority the United Nations has given it with respect to East Timor. The
United Nations has referred to Portugal as administering Power for limited

purposesonly, and has notthereby accordedit the nght to representitself or the
people ofEastTimorin proceedingsin this Court.

244. As early as 1973,the General Assemblyhad withdrawnany generalright

of Portugal to represent its various overseas territories in the United Nations.
(See resolution 3181 (XXVIiI) of 17 December 1973 and resolution 3113
(XXVIII) of 12 December 1973.) There was no attempt to resile from that
decision prior to December 1975 when the issue of East Timor was raised

before the Security Counciland the GeneralAssembly. This is consistent with
the fact that the Security Council, in resolution 384 (1975) of 22 December
1975, referred to Portugal's positionin the past tense ("Re~retting that the
Government of Portugal did not discharge fully its responsibilities as

administeringPowerin the Temtory ...").245. In the operative part of resolution 384, the Security Council defined
Portugal's roleas administeringPowerwithin thenarrowestcompass. It was "to

CO-operatefully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East
Timor to exercise freely their right of self-determination". As the resolution
recognized, the key role in finding a solution was to be played by the United
Nations.

246. In the GeneralAssemblyas well,the authorityof the administeringPower
was similarly narrowlyprescribed. In resolution 3485(XXX)of 12December

1975the GeneralAssemblystatedthatit:

"Calls upon the administering Power to continue to make every
effort to find a solutionby peaceful meansthrough talks between the

Government of Portugal and the political parties representing the
people of PortugueseTimor."

In addition,the Assembly,in the sarneresolution:

"Requeststhe Governrnent of Portugal to continue its CO-operation
with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the
Implementation of the Declarationon the Granting of Independence

to ColonialCountriesand Peoples."

247. Zndeedso little importance was attached to the description of Portugal as

administeringPowerthat the Secunty Councilfailedto use it at al1in resolution
389(1976). Similarly,in noneof resolutions31/53of 1December 1976, 32/34
of 28 November 1977, or 33/39 of 13 December 1978 did the General
Assemblyrefer to Portugal asthe administeringPower.

248. References to Portugal as the administering Power in later resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly do not indicate that the Assembly then
intended to confer any additional authority on Portugal to represent, or act on

behalf of, the people of East Timor, either in the settlement processes, or
elsewhere. The only substantivepartof any of these resolutionswhichrequires
or authorises action specifically by Portugal appears in resolution 36/50 of

24November 1981. Operativeparagraph3: "Calls upon al1 interested parties, namely Portugal, as the

administering Power, and the representatives of the East Timorese
people, as well as Indonesia, to CO-operatefully with the United
Nations with a view toguaranteeing the full exercise of the right to
self-determinationby thepeopleof EastTimor."

249. The role identified for Portugal in this resolution was simply to "CO-
operate fully with the UnitedNations", specificallythe Special Comrnitteeon
Decolonization. Portugalwas not in any way invitedby the GeneralAssembly

to act on behalf of the people of East Timor. The representatives of the East
Timorese people were named as a distinct Party. The resolutions recognized
too that the United Nations had assumed the chief responsibility for, and the

predominant role in, the settlement processes. The resolutions contained no
direction that Portugal shouldunilaterally take al1possible action, whetherby
instituting proceedingsin this Courtagainst a third State not directly concerned
in thernatter,or othenvise. Indeed, such a directionwouldhave been contrary

to the decision, expressedin this and other resolutions, that the United Nations
assumethe responsibilityfor finding a settlementtothe disputeby consultation
and negotiationbetween theparties directly concerned. Neitherat that time nor
since has the United Nationsplaced Portugalin the position whereit is entitled

to an adjudicationof the claims it brings againstAustraliain this case. Whatis
more, the General Assembly has not reaffirmed any rolefor Portugal since
1982.

250. One can contrastthe absenceof any authorisationfor Portugaltobring the
present proceedings with the specific authorisations granted to the United
Kingdom as an absent administering Power totake certain actionin relation to

Southern Rhodesia. Examples of such specific authorizations include the
following:

- Resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 in which the Security

Council expressedits deep concern:

"with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, considering thatthe

illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia have proclaimed
independenceand that the Govemmentof the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering
Power, looks upon this asan act of rebellion and called upon the Governmentof the UnitedKingdomto quel1this rebellion

of theracistrninority."

- Resolution 221 (1966)of 9 April 1966in which,following news that oil
was being pumped to Rhodesiathrough the Portugueseport of Beira, the
Council calledupon

"the Governent of the UnitedKingdomof Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to prevent, by the use of force if necessary,
the arriva1 at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be

canying oil destinedfor SouthemRhodesia, andempowersthe
United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the
Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil
cargois dischargedthere."

- Resolution 328 (1973) of 10March 1973in which the Security Council
referredto the UnitedKingdomin the followingtem:

"Bearingin mind that the Governmentof the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland,as the administering Power,has
the primary responsibility for putting an end to the illegal racist
minorityregimeand for transfemng effectivepowerto the peopleof

Zimbabweonthe basis oftheprincipleof majonty rule:
...
(a) Urges the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem
Ireland to convene as soon as possible a national constitutional

conferencewhere genuinerepresentativesof thepeopleof Zimbabwe
would be able to work out a settlementrelating to the future of the
temtory ; ...

(b) Calls uponthe Governent of the United Kingdomto take al1
effective measures tobring about the conditionsnecessaryto enable
the people of Zimbabwe to exercise freely and fully their right to
self-determinationand independence."

251. The contrast between this case andthe case of Rhodesia,particularlythe
difference between the actions of the Security Council in relation to each
matter, supportsthe conclusion thatwhilstthe appropriateorgansof the UnitedNations may continue to refer to a State as administering Power,though it no
longer has control over the territory in question, its rights in that capacity
entirely depend on the authority specifically conferred on itby the United
Nations. The scopeof the authoritygrantedto the United Kingdomin relation
to Rhodesia was much more extensive than the very iimited authority given to

Portugal in relation to East Timor. Portugal along with the other directly
concernedpartieswasonly called uponto "CO-operate" with theUnited Nations
in the consultationand negotiationprocesses.

252. Yet Portugal ignores thisneedforUnited Nations involvementand asserts
that it is incumbent on it as the administering Power to set up "moyens
juridiques adéquats, éventuellement avec la coopératio ensous la supervision
des NationsUnies" (Memorial,para.8.03). But this is a mistakenview and the

situation is exactly the reverse. An administering Power with the recordof
Portugal could not be left to decide on its own the terms of an eventual
consultation asto thewishes of the people of East Timor. The United Nations
resolutions do not contemplate that Portugal would assume the role now

claimed by it in relation to the right of self-determination. Rather, they
envisage Portugal acting at al1tirnesin CO-operationwith the UnitedNations -
not takingits ownextraneousinitiatives.

2. State ~ractice

253. In theabsenceof United Nationsauthonzation tobnng theseproceedings,
Portugal's capacityas an administeringPowerto act on behalf of the peopleof

East Timor cannot be established by acts of recognition, cognition and
acquiescence. Itis clearthatthe evidence availablefailsto satisfythe necessary
standardof proof.

254. The voting patterns in the General Assembly have shown mounting
ambivalence on the part of the international community towards even the
limitedrole envisaged for Portugalin the settlementprocess (Part1,Chapter2).
Indeed, an increasing number of States have disregarded Portugal's clairns in

relation to East Timor, and have givenexpress or implicit recognition to the
incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia (Part1, Chapter 2, Section III).
Even the large number of unexplained votes or abstentions which have not
supportedthe General Assembly's resolutionson East Timor must,to an extent, be regarded as derogating from Portugal's claimed status. In such
circumstances,Portugal simplyhas no internationallyrecognizedstatusto bnng

theseproceedings.

255. Nor, inAustralia's view,has Portugaltakenthe actionnecessaryto assert

this status. It goes without saying thatlegal rights deniedby other States can
only be preservedby adequateand persistentprotestsby the State whose rights
are being denied(Anelo-NorwegianFisheriesCase, ICJReports 1951,p.116 at
p.138). With regard to States other than Australia, there is no record of any

forma1protestsby Portugalat the express or implied recognitionof Indonesia's
annexationof EastTimor.

256. Even with regard to Australia, Portugal's positionhas been equivocal.

Australia recognized de facto Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in
January 1978. Towards the end of that year, Australia announcedthat the
opening of the Timor Gap negotiations, scheduled for March 1979, would
constitute dejure recognition of Indonesia's position. At those stages al1that

Portugal did was to express "surprise" at Australia's actions (para.370 below),
despite the fact that Australia's actionswere in confiict with -d in complete
contradictionto the position Portugalassertsin theseproceedings. It was 1985

beforeany forma1Portugueseprotestto Australiawasmade.

257. In order to excuse or justify its apparent silence over the period 1978-
1985, Portugal has relied upon the most extraordinary proposition that

"la protestation [Portuguese]étaitdéjà implicite dans l'attitude constante du
Portugal" (Memonal, paragraph 2.13). Australiacontendsthat this assertionis
wrong in law and in fact. Faced with the substantial derogations that were
occumng from the position now maintainedby Portugal, it could only protect

its position by unequivocal protest and statements of its views: there were
none. As to the factual reasons for this neglect, they do not lie in any
Portuguesebeliefthat the low keyroleit wasplayingin the United Nationswas

sufficient of itself toeservethe position Portugalnow maintains. Rather the
explanation forits earlier failure lies in the long-established Portuguesepolicy
of total neglect of East Timor and its people which led the General Assembly
from 1973onwards to deny any significantrole for Portugal in relation to the

temtory. The sudden reawakeningof interestin EastTimor within Portugalin
1985 with the protest to Australia is hardly adequate toestablish Portugal's
statusas claimantin this case.SectionIII: Portuoalcannot iustifvits claim tobrin2this caseon the
2'

258. Portugal also asserts thatit has a right to act on behalf of the people of
East Timor by reason of what it calls its nght to perform a " service public
international".Australiadeniesthatsucha rightexists.

259. There is no principleof generalinternationallaw whichgives Portugalthe
nght to bring this case. To have a right to bring a claim to the Court for
decision, a State must be able to show thatit has a legalnterest in thesubject
matter. The absence of just such an interest led to the failure of Belgium's

claim in the Barcelona Traction Case(ICJ Reports1970,pp.50-1)as well asto
the failure of the applications brought by Ethiopia and Liberia in the South
West AfricaCases (ICJ Reports 1966,p.51). Evenjudges who dissentedin the
South West Africa Cases accepted thatit was necessmy for the applicants to

show a right to bring the application in theirst place. See, e.g., ICJ Reports
1966, pp.387-8 (JudgeJessup); p.443 (Judge Padilla Nerva); p.478 (Judge
Forster). For a recent review of the general subject of legal interest, see

M'Baye, "L'intérét pour agir devanlta cour internationale de justice" 209
Hague Recueil(1988,II),pp.227-341.

260. There is no principle of general international law which would support

Portugal's contention that, in bringing this case, it iserforrning a "service
publicinternational"(Application,paras.1, 14,Memonal,paras.5.42,5.46). The
United Nations has not granted Portugal anyauthonty to act on behalf of East
Timor, much less the international cornrnunity. See paragraphs 243 - 257

above; cf. NuclearTests Case(ICJ Reports 1974,p.390), dissentingopinionof
Judge de Castro.

261. Portugal cannot bring these proceedings as a kind of -$,
whether pursuant to a "service public international"or otherwise, unless it can
show that an entitlement to do so arises from the erea omnes character of the
obligationswhichit asserts. Portugalpointsto noother basis onwhichit could

rely. The Court has rejected the contention that, in accepting the Court's
jurisdiction under Article 36(2)of the Court'sStatute,a State acquires the legalright to bring a claim on any subject of its choosing against any other State
which has also accepted the Court'sjurisdiction (South West Africa case ICJ

Reports 1966,p.42).

262. Even wherea broad viewof mattersof this kind hasbeen admitted, it has
been said that "[tlhere is no generally established "actio popularis" in
international law" (South West Africa ICJ Reports 1966, pp.387-8 (Judge

Jessup)). Even if it be assumedthat the rightof self-determinationgivesrise to
obligationserga omnes,Australiacontendsthat Portugalcannotestablisha right
to bring proceedings in the nature of an actio DoDularis. The Court's
observationsin the BarcelonaTractionCase (ICJReports 1970,p.32) arenot to

the contrary. What the Court theresaidwas that "an essential distinctionshould
be drawn between the obligations of t%State towards the international
community as a whole [obligations GrFaomnesl, and those arising vis-à-vis
another Statein the field of diplomaticprotection". In that case, the Court was

concerned only with obligationsin the latter category. It did, however, make
the comment that in relation to obligations in the first category, being
obligationserga omnes, "Islome of the correspondingrights of protection have
entered into the body of general international law...;others are conferred by
international instrumentsof a universalor quasi-universalcharacter" (emphasis

added). The Court did not Saythat every obligationerga would support
proceedingsin the natureof an actio pouularis. The mattersto which reference
was specifically made are essentially different from the right to self-
determinationwhichPortugalseeksto vindicate.

263. The right to self-determinationgivesrise to consequential obligationsfor
third States only where there hasbeen a collectivedecisionby the international
communityto thateffect. To allowStatesto proceed - assuminga locus standi -
in the absence of a collective .decision would lead to action of a highly

subjective character, and such action might not always take the form of
initiatingproceedings before the International Court. Thus, the result would be
practically chaotic and self-serving. There has been no collective decision
which could have given rise to an obligationof the kind whichPortugalalleges

in this case. See Part III, Chapter 1, Sections II - IV. Portugal cannot,
therefore, rely on any obligation arising from the right to self-determinationto
bring theseparticularproceedings.264. It is true that in their dissenting opinionv,n the
Judges JessupandTanaka adopteda wider view than did the Court of the right
of a State to bnng atterbeforeit. Bothjudges reliedon thespecialnatureof

particulartreatiesto provide a State's entitlement tobnng a matterto the Court.
(See ICJ Reports 1962,pp.425ff.(separateopinion, Judge Jessup); ICJ Reports
1966, p.386 (dissenting opinion, Judge Jessup); ICJ Reports 1966, p.252
(dissenting opinion, Judgenaka.)). But there is no treaty confemng such a
nght in the present case.

265. As already shown (paras.200-203), Australia has not breached any
obligationogê omnes. Such a breach, if any, was committed by Indonesia.
There simplywas no relevantlegalconstraintpreventingAustraiiafrom deaiing

withIndonesiainrelation toEastTimor,by enteringinto the Timor Gap Treaty.
SeefurtherPart IIIChapter2.

Section IV: Jgd~mentfor PortugalwouldbenefitneitherPortugalnor
t t t

arisetherefrom

266. Judgment in Portugal's favourwould benefit Portugalin any legally
relevant way. The judgment which Portugal seeks is in fact designed by
Portugal to disadvantageIndonesia.hese rnattersare discussedin detail in the
following two Chapters, especially paragraphs 271-278, 309-314. It would

confer no benefit directly on Portugal (nor the people of East Timor).
Portugal's status as administering Power within the United Nations would
remainwholly unaffected.

267. Further, since Portugalis not in possession or contEastfTimor, and

has no authority over the maritime areas offshore, it simply cannot fulfil any
judgment, or respond to any counter-claims or other demands which may be
madein consequenceof the Court'sjudgment. It is explicitin Portugal's case
in the very terms of its Applicat-that Australia wouldhave to negotiate a

new treatywithPortugal,as coastal State. But ifAustralia calledon Portugalto
fulfil its duty, as a coastal State, to negotiatein good faith a maritimeboundary
treaty,Portugal couldnotrespond. Forit wouldbetotallyincapableof carrying
out the obligations of a coastal Statewhich wouldflow from such a treaty. In particular, it could not guarantee to Austraiia any of the rights which such a

treaty might accord, including lack of interferencein areas which, pursuant to
the treaty, were attributed to Australiaas aatter of international law. These
rnatters tooare discussedin moredetailin the nextChapter.

268. The purpose of Portugal's Application is clear: Portugal brings these
proceedings against Australia to provide a basis for the adjudication of its
dispute with Indonesia which has not submitted to theCourt's jurisdiction.
Australia ismerelya surrogate. Portugal apparentlyseeksto depriveIndonesia

of the benefits of its annexation of East Timor, by bringing ta an end the
arrangementwhich it has madewith Austraiia. It does so not because there is
anything wrong with the terms of the Treaty as such, but because the Treaty

applies to an area which Indonesia claims by reason of its control over East
Timor. The assumption is that a judgment in favour of Portugal would
indirectly depnve Indonesia of the fruits of its alleged wrongdoing. But the
actual effect of ajudgment adverse to Australia in the presentcase is likely to

be the reverse. The respondent State, which Portugal concedes had no
involvement or complicityin the annexation of East Timor, would be legally
disabled from giving effect to the Treaty, in respect of an area of continental
shelf it has consistently claimed asits own. By contrastIndonesiawould notbe

bound byany suchjudgment andwouldpresurnablybefree to reassert its view
that it has exclusive rightsto the greater part of theea. Quite apart from the
potential discord this could create, the only possible beneficiary of such a
situation would be Indonesia. And there is no reason to suppose that the

benefits of this situation would flow, equitably orat al], to the people of East
Timor. Hence, evenif Portugalcouldestabiisha sufficientlegalinterest,which
Australia denies, it still could not establish a right to an adjudication of its

claim. CHAPTER 3

JUDGMENT FOR PORTUGAL CANNOT
FULFIL ANYLEGITIMATE OBJECT

269. It is well established that there areherent limitations on the judicial

function. These limitations have been recognized and accepted by both this
Court and the Permanent Courtof InternationalJustice in amberof different
contexts. (Seee.g., Free Zones of UD-r Savov and the District of Gex, PCIJ,
Series AB, No. 46, 1932, p.161; Status of Eastern Carelig, PCU, Series B,
No.5, 1923, p.29; Nuclear Tests Case, ICJ Reports 1974, p.271; Northern

ICJ Reports 1963, p.30.) The Court has acceptedthat it, not
the parties before it, is "the guardianof itsjudicial integrity"and that even if a
party invites it to do othenvise, the Court has a duty to confine itself to its
judicial purpose (Northern Cameroons Case, ICJ Reports 1963,p.29, Western

SaharaCase, ICJReports 1975,p.21).

270. Portugal, by its Application, invites the Court to travel well beyond the
Court'sproper roleand todeliverajudgment whichcannotserveany legitirnate
object. Thus, even if the Court is satisfiedthat it hasjurisdiction over the case,

and that it would be othenvise admissible there are the strongest reasons of
judicial proprietywhythe Court shouldnotdecideit.

Section 1: Js a

A. Judgment for Portugal would not promote theinterests allegedly
requiringprotection

271. It is essentiaifor the properdischargeof theCourt'sjudicial functionthat
thejudgments whichit givesservereal objectsandare capableof practicallegal
effect. It is not a part of the judicial function to give decisions which are
"devoid of object or purpose".(cfWestern Sahara Case, 1CJReports 1975, at

p.37 and Northern Cameroons Case, ICJ Reports 1963, at p.38.) The Court
would exceed its judicial function if it were to decide this case, as its decision
could not bring about a resolution of the underlying dispute around which the
casecentres. The Courthas in thepast indicated thatit would decline"to allow

the continuance of proceedings which it knows are bound to be fruitless" (NuclearTests Case,ICJ Reports 1974,p.271).

272. It was for just such a reason that the Court declined to give judgmentin

the NorthernCameroo (InJsReports 1963,p.15). The Republic of
Cameroon had made applicationto the Court for a declaration thatthe United
Kingdom had breached obligations owedby it as trustee under the Northern
Cameroons Trusteeship Agreement. The Agreement had previously been

terminatedby resolution of the UnitedNations General Assembly, followinga
plebiscite in which the people of Northern Cameroon had voted to join the
Republic of Nigeria rather than the Applicant Republic. The Repubiic of
Cameroondidnot,however,ask the Courttoreview the decisionof the General

Assembly; it didnot challengethe validity of the plebiscite; anddid not ask
the Court to find any causalmection between thealleged wrongdoingof the
UnitedKingdomand theoutcomeofthe plebiscite. Asa result,the Courtfound
thatit was "relegatedto an issueremotefromreality". It said:

"If the Court were to proceed and were to hold that the Applicant's
contentionswere al1soundon the merits, it would stillbe impossible
for the Court torenderajudgment capableofeffectiveapplication....
The United Kingdom would have no right or authorityto take any

action with a view to satisfying the underlying desires of the
Republicof Cameroon." (ICJReports 1963,p.33)

As the UnitedKingdomwouldnothavebeen able togiveany practical effectto
ajudgment in the Applicant'sfavour,the Courtdeclinedtodecidethecase.

273. The right to self-determination would not in fact be vindicated by a
judgment in Portugal's favour. Portugal asks the Court to make certain
declarations, tothe effect.that,by enteringinto the Timor Gap Treaty,Australia

breachedits obligations to respect Portugal'sstatusas adrninisteringPower and
the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination (Application,paras.
341-(3)). Yet even if made, such declarations would be devoid of practical
effect: they would neither bind Indonesia, nor improve the position of the

people of East Timor. These considerations also apply to the claim based on
the principle of permanent sovereignty overnatural resources. The underlying
issue cannot be resolved; no judgment in Portugal's favour could settle that
issue, letalone enable Portugal to enhance any principle of permanent
sovereignty by denying the effectiveness of the Timor Gap Treaty. It is truethat Portugal also seeks reparation, although it alleges no material damage

(Application, para. 34(4)). But even if an order for reparation were made, it
would not in any way remedy the wrong whichsuch an order would assume.
Nor, given its lack of control of the temtory, could Portugal ensure that any
reparation was applied to the benefit of the people of East Timor. Even an

order enjoining Australia from performing its obligations under the Treaty
would notavail the people of East Timor (cf Application,para.34(5)). On the
contrary, by bringing the Timor Gap Treaty to an end, such an order rnight
enhance the positionof the alleged wrongdoer(Indonesia),even krhaps to the

detrimentof the people ofEastTimor. (See paras.309-314 below.)

274. Examination of the declarations which Portugal seeks shows that they
would be without practical object and would tend to promote, rather than
diminish,internationaldisagreement. "Whilejudicial settlementmay providea

path to international harmony in circumstances of conflict, it is none the less
true that the needlesscontinuanceof litigationis an obstacle to such harmony"
(NuclearTests Case, ICJ Reports 1974,p.271).

275. The clairnsmadeby PortugalagainstAustraliaassumethatthé underlying
issue -the right to self-determinationof the East Timorese people - could be
resolved by the settlement of differences between Portugal and Ausualia,
whether by negotiation or adjudication. This assumption is clearly false. The

resolution of the fundamental issue can be effected only by the participationof
al1 parties concerned - the representatives of East Timor, Indonesia, and
Portugal, actingwith the United Nations. Thisis also the understandingof the
international community, as shown in United Nations General Assembly

resolutions 36/50of 24 November 1981and 37/30of 23 November1982. See
also paras.288-297 below.

276. The implicationsfor thepresentcase areclear. Australiacould not,in any

practicalsense,satisfy theobjectiveswhichPortugal saysare fundamentalto its
case. Portugalaffirmsthat its soleinterestin theseproceedingsis to defendthe
right of the people of East Timor to self-determination (Memorial,para 3.08).
But even with ajudgment in its favour, Portugal could not achieve its desired

end. This couldbe doneonly if Indonesia werea party to the proceedings. As
the State in effective control of the temtory, Indonesia bears the practical
responsibilityfor the well-king of the peopleof EastTimor. 277. Because Indonesia is absent from the proceedings, no judgment in
Portugal's favour would be capable of effective legal application. In the

absence of Indonesia, the Court simply cannot give any judgment against
Australiawhichwouldsettleorhelpto settletheissueof self-determination;nor
can it, consistently with thepnnciple of consent, annul the Timor Gap Treaty.
For this reason alone,it wouldbe contrary tojudicial propriety for theCourt to

decidethis case.

278. Unless Portugal can show that ajudgment in its favour would be capable
of effectivelegal operationand, forthereasonsgiven,it cannotdo so, the Court

cannot, consistently with its judicial function,decide the case. As Judge
Fitzmaunce saidin the NorthernCarneroonsCase:

"Evidently a judgment of the Court, evenif not capable of effective

application, could have other uses. It could afford a moral
satisfaction. Itcouldact asnassuranceto thepublic opinionof one
or other of the parties that something had been done or at least
attempted. There might also be political uses to which it could be

put. Are theseobjectsof a kindwhichajudgment of the Court ought
to serve? The answer must,1think,bein the negative,if they are the
only objects which wouldbe semed -that is, if thejudgment neither
would or could have any effective sphereof le_ga -pplication." (ICJ
Reports 1963, p.107)

This observationhas applicationtothis case.

B. The Courtcannotrequire Australiato breachvalidtreaty obligations

owedto athirdState

279. Althoughjudgment in Pomigal'sfavour wouldnot vindicatethe rights of
the people of East Timor, it would adversely affectAustralia's own position,

particularlyin relation to Indonesia. First,judgment in Portugal's favourwould
expose Australia to inconsistent, though binding, obligations. Secondly, it
would depnve Australia of the ability to protect its sovereign rights in the
Timor Gap (paras.283-286.below). As to the first matter, Portugal seeks to

prevent Australia from meeting its obligations to Indonesia under the Timor
Gap Treaty,by asking the Courtto bar Australiafrom carrying out exploration
and exploitation activities in the Timor Gap (Application,para 34(5)). If theCourt were to enjoin Australia, as Portugal requests, Australia would be

prevented from undertaking the very activities which its obligations under the
joint venture arrangement created by the Treaty require. Yet, according to
Portugal,the validity of the Treaty is not challenged. If the Treatys valid, the
Court cannot by order terminate or annul it. Even withjudgment in Portugal's

favour, the Treaty would continue to bind Australia. Thus, to comply with an
order enjoining exploration and exploitation, Australia would be compelled to
breach theobligationswhichit owesto Indonesiaunder the Treaty.

280. The Court cannot provide a solution to this dilernrna. It is prevented by
Article59 of the Statutefrom makinganyconsequentialorder against Indonesia
as a non-party. It is true that Australia could seek Indonesia's agreement to
terrninate the Treaty, but this possibility only emphasise'sthat Australiaalone

could not give effect to ajudgment in Portugal's favour, without breaching its
treaty obligationsto Indonesia.

281. A similar situation also arosein the Case of Free Zones of UD-r Savoy

and the Dismct of Gex. There the Permanent Court declined to give judgment
on tariffexemptions,becausenojudgment onthe mattercould havetakeneffect
without the subsequent approval of the parties before the Court. The Court

said:

"After mature consideration, the Court maintains its opinion that it
would be incompatible with the Statute, and with its position as a

Court of Justice to giveajudgment which would be dependentfor its
validity on the subsequent approval of the Parties." (PCU, Series
AB, No.46, 1932,p.161)

282. In the present case, the full force and effect of any judgment against
Australiawould dependon the subsequentapprovalof Indonesia,which is not a
party to the proceedings. The Court should, as a matter of judicial propriety,
declineto decide this case on the groundthat if Australia were to comply with a

judgment against it, it would be compelled to breach binding obligations to
Indonesia, unless it could obtain Indonesia's agreement to release Australia
fromîhem. C. Judgment for Portugal would denyAustralia's ability to protect its
long-assertedsovereignrights

283. Further, if Portugal's application and requests were granted, Australia
would be deprived of the ability to protect and enjoy its sovereign rights over

maritime areas of the Timor Gap. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1 for an
outline of those rights.) It is self-evident that,as a practical matter, to protect
and enjoy its rightsin theTimor Gap, Australiamust have the agreementof the
State which in fact controlsthe northem area of the Gap adjacentto Australian

maritimetemtory. Sinceits withdrawalfromEastTimorin 1975,Portugalhas
not had such control and has notbeen in a position to negotiate an effective
arrangement with Australia. Certainly, Portugal would not have been in a
positionto perfonn any agreementwhichit rnighthave madewithrespect tothe

resources of the Timor Gap. There is no reason to believe that Portugal's
position will alter in the foreseeable future. To continue to regard it as a State
havinganyeffective controlin thearea is toignorereality.

284. In this regard, the artificiality of Portugal's case against Australia is
manifest. IfPortugal'sclaim were granted,Australiawould bepreventedfrom
rnakingany agreement onthe matterwith theStatewhichis in fact in controlof
the neighbouring maritime area. Australia wouldlose its ability effectivelyto

protect and utilise its own rights and resourcesin its own temtory, as it would
be pointless for Australia instead,as Portugal seems to require,to enter into a
similarTimorGap TreatywiththatState.

285. Prior to December 1989when theTreaty was made, the United Nations
had done nothing through its political organs to preclude any State from
entering into an agreement with Indonesia with respect to East Timor. Since

then, it has taken no steps to censure the action of States in entering into, and
implementing, arrangementswithIndonesiainvolvingthattemtory. Therewas
no indication in 1989, then or in the foreseeable future, that the international
community would act so asto alter the practical reality of the East Timorese

situation.

286. At the time the Treatywas made, Australiabelieved it was necessary to

protect and make arrangements to utilise its rights and resources in the Timor
Gap. Having regard tothe conduct of the international community, Australia
had every reasontobelieveit was entitledto do so. The Court has traditionallyrefused to rule on the "subjective appreciation" of an organ of a State, even
though the dispute had its origins in that organ's beliefs (Asvlum Case

(Colombia v Peru), ICJ Reports 1950, p.287). Given the absence of any
relevant decision by the United Nations, it would be contrary to judicial
propriety for the Court to rule on the question whether the Australian
Government was justified in its assessment. In these circumstances too, it

would also be contrary tojudicial propriety toentenain a claim which seeks to
deprive Australia ofthe ability to protect and enjoy its own valuableresources.
Portugalmisusesthe Court's processesin invitingthe Courtto entertainsuchan
application.

SectionII: Thedis~uteoverEast Timoristobe solvedbvnegotiation
betweentheoartiesdirectlv concemed
1

287. Australiacontends that the underlying disputein this case is to be solved
by consultation and negotiation between the parties directly concerned
(Indonesia,the representativesof the EastTimoresepeople and Portugal)nder
the auspicesof the United Nations. These processesare quite distinct from,and

bear no relationship to, the present proceedings, which are accordingly
misconceived.

A. Other organs ofthe United Nationshave assumed responsibility for

negotiating a settlemenof theEastTimorquestion

288. According to Portugal, this case is essentially about the rights of the
people of East Timor to self-determination. Australia contends, however, that

when thepolitical organsof the United Nations assumed responsibilityfor this
matter, they decided thatthe dispute should be resolved through the processes
of conciliation, consultationand negotiationbetween Indonesia, representatives
of East Timor and Portugal. Portugal's Application and submissions are

inconsistentwith thisdecision.

289. Portugal's withdrawal from East Timor in 1975 and the subsequent
Indonesian occupation of the territory provide the strongest evidence of

Portugal's failure tolfilits basicduty to takeeffectivemeasuresto protectthe territorial integrityof the non-self-governingtemtory. Theseevents also show

other breaches by Portugal of itsprimary obligations under Article 73 of the
United NationsCharter.

290. As noted already, as early as 1973the GeneralAssembly hadwithdrawn

any general rightof Portugal to represent its overseastemtories in the United
Nations (resolution 3181(XXVIII), 17 December 1973 and resolution
31 13(XXVEI),12December 1973).AndPortugal'sdefaultsin East Timorand
inability to remedy them were clearly recognized by the international

cornmunityin 1975. The Security Councilvoiced its regret, in resolution 384.
of 22 December 1975,that Portugal"did not dischargefully its responsibilities
as adrninisteringPower in the Territory under Chapter XI of the Charter". At
the same time, the United Nations, through the Security Council and the

GeneralAssembly,assumed responsibility forthe situation to which Portugal's
defaults gave rise, including the matter of self-detennination for the people of
EastTimor. In viewof Portugal's lossof controlin EastTimor, thisassumption
of responsibility was desirable and indeed, necessary. It was and remains

appropriate that responsibility forthe resolution of the situationin East Timor
shouldhave beentakenup by the politicalorgansof the United Nations.

291. By its Charter, the United Nations has a special jurisdiction over
decolonization (andthe right to self-determination). Under Article l(2) of the
Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[tlo develop friendly
relations arnong nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and

self-detemination of peoples". Thispurposeis furtherdevelopedin Articles 55
and 56 of the Charterwhich have "direct andparticularrelevance fornon-self-
governing temtories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter"
(Western SaharaCase,ICJReports 1975,p.31).

292. In the context of decolonization, there isa specialjurisdiction possessed
by the political organs of the United Nations. Of course, the Court may be

asked to seek an Advisory Opinion onan issue of decolonization to assistthe
Assembly in "the proper exerciseof its functions" (Western Sahara Case,ICJ
Reports 1975,p.27). Indeed, it is still open to the Assembly to request the
Court's opinion onlegal aspectsof the situationin EastTimor. Whether ornot

this special jurisdiction over decolonization will be exclusive to the political
organsof theUnited Nationsin theparticularcasedependson the issues raised,
the nature of the proceedings contemplated,andthe entire context. Obviously,difficulties can arise when an individual State brings before the Court one

aspect of a multilateral dispute concerning the future status of a territory.
Portugal brings such a controversy before the Court in these proceedings,
without theconsent and in the absenceof the State most directly concernedin
the outcome. Australia contends that, in these circumstances, there is no

occasion for the Court to interfere with the exercise of the responsibility
assumed by the political organs of the United Nations with respect to East
Timor.

293. The record, which has alreadyken reviewedin detail, discloses that the
United Nations has in fact decided that this particular multilateral dispute
should be resolved by consultation, conciliation and negotiation between
Portugal andparties otherthan Australia. In the first place, at the behest of the

Security Council, the Secretary-Generalappointeda SpecialRepresentative"for
thepurposeof makingan on-the-spotassessrnentof theexistingsituationand of
establishing contactwith the parties in theTemtory and al1States concemed".
(See Security Councilresolution 384of 22 December 1975;also resolution 389

of 22 April 1976 and General Assembly resolution 32/34 of 28 November
1977.) The General Assembly sought the active involvement of the Special
Cornmittee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the

Declar-on on the Grantingof Independenceto ColonialCountriesand Peoples
(the Cornmitteeof 24). (Seeresolutions 31/53of 1December 1976,32/34
of 28 November 1977, 33/39 of 13 December 1978, 36/50 of 24 November
1981, and 37/30 of 23 November 1982.) Later, the Assembly specifically

requested the Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with al1 parties
directly concerned" for "a comprehensive settlement" of the matter. (See
resolution37/30of 23November 1982.)

294. Under the Secretary-General'sauspices,consultationsbetween Indonesia
and Portugal are continuing. (Seeparas.146-152above.) Thus, in his reportof
17September 1990(A/45/507),the Secretary-Generalwrote:

"Both Governments (Portugal and Indonesia) have given me
assurances of their continued cornmitment to achieving a
comprehensive and,internationally acceptable solution to the

question [of East Timor]. 1 hope, therefore, that it proves possible
throughcontinued consultation and negotiationto attainthatgoal." 295. SincePortugal'swithdrawalfromEastTimorin 1975,the resolutionsand
actionsof the United Nations indicate that it has assumed responsibilityfor
seeking a solutionto the EastTimor situationand in particular, responsibility
for the promotion of the processesof consultationand negotiationbetween the

parties directly concerned -Indonesia, the representatives of East Timor and
Portugal. Since 1975, Portugal's role hasbeen strictly lirnited. The United
Nations has only authorised Portugal to co-operate in the consultation and
negotiation process. (See paras.243-252 above; also Security Council

resolutions 384 of 22 December 1975 and 389 22 April 1976; General
Assembly resolutions 3485(XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 36/50 of 24
November 1981.) The sarne record shows that the United Nations took the
view that collective measuresof the kind referred toin Article of the Charter

werenot appropriatein relation toEastTimor;and thatthe situationdidnot cal1
for sanctions against Indonesiaof a kind whichwouldhave preventedAustralia
from concludingtheTimorGapTreaty.

296. These were "decisions" which it was open to the political organs of the
United Nationsto make. Australiacontendsthat if theCourt were to entertain
Portugal's clairnsit would be called upon to passan adverse judgment onthe

consistent courseof actionofthe political organsof the United Nationsas to the
means to be employed to resolve the dispute between Portugal and Indonesia
concerning East Timor. There is no bilateral dispute between Portugal and
Australia which can be detached from the United Nations discussions onthe

East Timor question, or from the United Nations decisions concerning the
meansof its resolution.

297. To decidethe casein Portugal's favourwouldrequirethe Court,in effect,

to take decisions thatthe competentpolitical organsof the UnitedNationshave
alreadyrefrainedfromtaking. Theyhavedoneso,it mustbe presumed,notout
of negligence or neglect but asa matter of deliberatepoliticaljudgment. It is

not the function of the Court to take political decisions that thecompetent
organsof the United Nations havedeliberatelyrefrainedfromtaking.

B. The subject-mattermakes thecase unsuitablefor adjudicationby the

Courtintheseproceedings

298. There is much that is complex about issuesof decolonization.In the case
of East Timor, the international cornmunityis not yet agreed even as to basicmatters, including the extent to which Indonesia's sovereignty shouldnow be
recognized (paras. 1l5ff., 162-168, 175-176above). In these circumstances

Australia contends that the subject-matterof these proceedings makes the case
unsuitablefor adjudicationby the Court.

299. The primarydisputeoverEastTimorwhichlies at the heart of this case is

one which is suitable for settlementonly by the political organs of the United
Nations. It is one of thosedisputeswhichcannot be resolvedby adjudicationin
bilateral judicial proceedings between the present parties (cf Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports 1978, p.52 (separate opinion, Judge

Lachs)). This is not simply because the dispute is concurrently before the
political organs of the United Nations, for this alone would not make an
adjudication by this Court inappropriate (NicaraguaCase, ICJ Reports 1984,
p.433; US Diplomaticand Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports 1980,pp.21-

2). It is because adjudication,in these proceedings,could not be dispositiveof
the underlying dispute. The primary issue in this case - the legal status of
Indonesia's administrationof EastTimor -dependson complex political, social
and economic factorswhich, in the absenceof Indonesia,the Court has neither

the ability to ascertain, northe powerto affect. In the absenceof Indonesia,the
Court cannotrnakeany declarations concemingIndonesia's claims, or directing
any consequentialactionby Indonesiato disposeof the dispute.

300. Furthemore, the underlying issues in this case concern the political
relations of many States, of which Australia is but one. In the absence of a
collective decision, thisis particularlytrue of the individual decisionsof States
to recognize Indonesian sovereignty overthe temtory, or to enter into treaties

and other arrangements with Indonesia in relation to East Timor. These
considerations further support Australia's contention that it is not appropriate
for the Court to attempt todeal with the EastTimor questionin proceedingsof
thiskind. See also Jennings, The Acauisitionof Temtow in InternationalLaw

(1963)p.63.

C. The Courtcannot make reliablefindingsof fact on issues centralto
the case

301. Australia contends further that, in the absence of Indonesia, the Court is
not in a position tomake the factual findingson which the outcomeof the case
depends. In this regard, the present proceedingsdiffer in important respects from the Nicaragua Case. In that case, the Court held that the evidential
difficulties occasionedby the absenceof certain otherCentralAmericanStates

could beovercomeby the properallocationof the burdenof proof (ICJ Reports
1984,p.437). But in its 1986decision in that case (ICJ Reports 1986,p.25.),
the Courtsaid:

"As to the facts of the case, in principle the Court is not bound to
confine its considerationto the matenal fomally submitted to it by
the parties... Nevertheless, the Court cannot by its own enquiries
entirely make up for the absence of one of the Parties; that absence,
in a case of this kind involving extensive questions of fact, must

necessarily limit the extent to which the Court is informed of the
facts. It would furthemore be an over-simplification to conclude
that the only demmental consequenceof the absenceof a partyis the
lack of opportunityto submit argumentandevidencein supportof its

own case. The absent party also forfeits the opportunity to counter
the factualallegationsofits opponent."

Because of the particular matters at issue and theinseparable involvement of

Indonesia in their resolution, the approach of allocating the burden of proof
cannotprovidean answerin this case.

302. It has already been demonstrated that the Court could not, in this case,

avoidruling directlyon Indonesia's claimto sovereigntyover the temtory. But
neither Portugal nor Australia can be expected to have in their possession al1
those facts on which Indonesia basesits claim. For example,neither party can
be expected to have details of the consultation of 1976(para.54 above). Nor

can either State be expected to have access to the geographical, social and
political data relevant to. the issue of self-determination. These would
presumably bein Indonesia's possession.Yet the Courtceot escapedeciding
these issues if it proceeds to hear the merits. Certainly, it must determine

whetheror not Indonesia'sclaim to sovereignty isjustified before any question
of Australia'sresponsibilitycan arise(paras.210-213above).

303. The positionin this casecontrastssharplywiththat inthe Western Sahara

-. ThereSpaincontendedthatbecausethere wereno parties in
advisoryproceedingswho were obligedto furnish the necessaryevidence, and
that questions involving"the attributionof territorial sovereignty" requiredan"exhaustive determination of facts". It followed that "the Court [could] not
fulfil the requirements of good administration of justice as regards the

determination of the facts" (ICJReports 1975,p.28). The Court rejected this
contention only because "Mauritania,Morocco and Spain[had] fumished very
extensive documentaryevidence of the facts whichthey considered relevant ...
and each of these countries, as well asAlgeria andZaire, [hadl presented their

viewson thesefacts and on the observationsof the others". Aswell, the United
Nations Secretary-Generalhad "furnisheda dossier"ofrelevant documents(ICJ
Reports 1975,p.29). There is no comparablebody of information availableto
assist the Courtin this case. Instead,much of the factual data relevantto the

central issues of sovereignty and self-determination can be expected to lie
withinthe knowledgeof a Statewhichis not before theCourt.

304. Given thatthe Court has avery iimited abiiityto acquire facts and has no

authority to compel evidence from non-parties, the conclusion is virtually
inescapable thatthe Courtis not in a position eitherto assess Indonesia'slaim
to sovereignty over East Timor, or the issues of self-determination which
Portugal says lie at the heart of its claims. Thus, the Court cannot decide the

veryissues on whichPortugal's case depends,includingwhetherIndonesiawas
legally competent to enter into the Timor Gap Treaty with Australia. If it
cannot decide this, the Court cannot decide whether Austraiia for its part has
cornrnittedany wrong.

D. The casecannot be suitable for adjudicationif the Court'sdecision
could not contributeto the resolutionof the disputewith which it is
concerned

305. The present proceedings differfrom the Nicara~ua Case in yet another
respect. h the latter case, it was open to the Court to find that "a clarification
of the law [could]producepositiveresults"and the "action of the Court [might]

well assist the deiiberationsof the other organs and intermediaries concerned"
(cf.Nicaragua% ICJ Reports 1986,p.167 (separate opinion, Judge Lachs)).
Giventhe complete absenceof the party mostdirectly concerned,the Court can
make no such contributionby decidingthe meritsof this case asagainst a third

State not directly concemed in the underlying dispute (cf.PartII, Chapter 1).
The Court cannot assist other organs of the United Nations without a full
canvassingof the central issuesbased on adequate access tothe relevant factual
data. Such a thorough examination is not possible here,because Indonesia isnotbefore theCourt. The Court'sjudgment cannot bindIndonesiaand it cannot

assist the people of East Timor by vindicatingtheir right to self-determination
(cf.paras.271-278,299). PortugalinvitestheCourt to depnve a State which has
no direct concem in the matter of the ability to protect its sovereign rights. It
seeksa result which would requireAusualia to fail to fulfil its treatyobligations

to Indonesia. Indeed, judgment in Portugal's favour rnight benefit the real
wrongdoer, Indonesia, to the detriment of the peopleof East Timor. In these
circumstances the case which Portugal brings to this Court is one which the

Court cannotdecideif it is to confineitself to itsjudicial function. CHAPTER4

PORTUGALMISUSESTHEPROCESSESOFTHE COURT

306. There are further reasonsofjudicial proprietywhy the Court should not
decide this case. Portugal misuses the processes of the Court, by bringing
proceedings against Australia to pursue a claim which in fact lies against

Indonesia; and by bringing proceedings which maybe contrary to the real
interestsof the peopleof East Timor.

Section 1: PortugalinvitestheCourt todecideIndonesia'sri~htsand
p

307. AlthoughPortugalin termscornplains onlyof Austraiia's conduct, itsreal
disputeis with Indonesia (paras.206-213bove). Despiteappearances,Portugal

is in fact asking the Court to decide whether Portugal or Indonesiawas legally
competent to enterinto the Timor Gap Treaty in December 1989. This in tum
depends on whether ornot Indonesia's claim to sovereignty overEast Timor is
justified. In the absenceof Indonesia,the Court cannotcide thesequestions,

either for the reasons givenin Chapter 1of this Part, or because it would be
contrary tojudicial propriety toallow Portugal to press claims against Australia
whichrelatemoredirectlyto Indonesia's responsibility.

308. Furthermore, although Portugal asserts that itdoes not challenge the
validity of the Timor Gap Treaty, Portugal clearlyseeks to bar Australia from
giving effect to it. Portugal apparently accepts that the Court cannot,
consistently with the principleof consent,rule on the validity of a bilateral

treaty without the agreement of both contracting parties. (See paras.183-190,
220-223 above; also Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (1916), in (1917) 11 AJIL 181
and El Salvador v. Nicaragua (1917) 11 AJiL 674.) But this principle also
appiies so as to preclude the Court from entertaining an application to enjoin

performance of bilateral treaty obligationsby one party in the absence of the
other party, particularly wherethe grounds relied on relate primarily, oreven
exclusively, tothe wrongful conductof the absent party. In this case, Portugal

asks the Court to enjoin Australia from performing its obligations under the
Timor Gap Treaty, in the absence of Indonesia, on grounds which relate
primarily, oreven exclusively tothe wrongful conductof Indonesia. Heretoo,
Australia contends that it would be contrary tojudicial propriety forthe Court to entertain Portugal'sApplication. Given that theCourt has nojurisdiction to
declare the Treaty invalid in Indonesia's absence, Australiasubmits that it

would be contrary to judicial propriety to entertain proceedings which are
designed,practicallyspeaking,to achievethe sarneobject - tobring the treatyto
an effective end, even though Indonesia is not before the Court. Australia
contends that, in seeking to impugn the Treaty in the absence of Indonesia,

Portugal misusestheCourt'sprocesses.

Section Ik Jud~mentforPortugal mavadvantapeIndonesiatoth?

309. Australia has shown (paras.271-278above) that Portugal cannot, in the
absence of Indonesia, vindicatethe right to self-determinationof the people of
East Timor by proceedings in this Court against Australia. It is true that

Portugalapparently seeksto depriveIndonesiaof the benefitof the performance
by Australia of Australia's obligationsunder the Timor Gap Treaty. Certainly,
Australia could not comply with the orders which Portugal seeks and atthe
same time meet its obligations to Indonesia. It seems likely, in al1 the

circumstances, that this is Portugal's real object in pursuing this case. The
orders which Portugal seeks against Australia would apparently deprive
Indonesia of a benefit flowing from what Portugal regards as the unlawful
annexationof EastTimor.

310. Butif this is indeed Portugal'saim, it has no regard to the realities of the
situation. For Indonesiamay well be the only party to the underlying dispute
which wouldin fact benefit fromajudgment in Portugal'sfavour. If the treaty
were to terminate on Australia's failure to fulfil its obligations under it, it is

possible that Indonesiawouldclaimunilaterallythe right to explore and exploit
the resources of the Timor Gap without regard to Australia's long-asserted
clairns. Moreover, Australiawouldbe inhibitedfrom attemptingto renegotiate
another arrangement with Indonesia. In effect, Indonesiawould be at large to
pursue its own interests, unencumbered by any agreement with the

neighbouringState.

31 1. Worse still, it may wellbe that the orderswhichPortugal seeks are notin
factin the interestsof the peopleof East Timor.In this comection, it shouldbe

noted that the Timor Gap Treaty is not intended permanently to delimitthecontinental shelf (Article 2(3)). It is intended instead to effect an essentially
practicalarrangementfor the commercialutilisationof the petroleum resources
of the Timor Gap (Article 2). The joint venture zone and its attendant

arrangements can reasonably be expected to work to the advantage of both
Contracting States. These advantages would be lost if each State were to
proceed unilaterally. Althoughthe benefitsof the Treaty now fa11to indonesia,
it does not follow that it is in the interests of the people of East Timor to take

themawayin thernannerwhichPortugalseeksto do.

312. It is open to Indonesia to ensure that the people of East Timor enjoy an
equitable share of the Treaty's benefitsby passing on to them an appropriate

shareof therevenuewhichIndonesiaderives. It is not for Australia unilaterally
to require Indonesia to make such an allocation. Rather, it is for the United
Nations, especially the General Assembly, to take measures to ensure that
Indonesia makes appropriate arrangements forthe people of East Timor. The

Court is obliged to act on the assumption that the Assembly will faithfully
discharge the responsibility which it has assumed towards the people of East
Timor.

313. If Portugal's requests were granted, however, the peopleof East Timor
wouldlose any prospectof benefit from the Treaty. Portugalis not the relevant
coastal State with authority over the temtory and is not in any position to
concludea similararrangementwith Australia. in light of this, it seemsthat not

only would judgment for Portugal fail to promote the interests of the East
Timorese people,it rnightwork against their interests. In these circumstances,
it is possible that the interestsof the people of East Timorwould bestbe served
by refusing, rather than granting Portugal's Application. Thisis a possibility

whichthe Court musttakeinto account.

314. Pursuantto ChapterXI ofthe Charter,and especiallyArticle73, Portugal
bears the burdenof satisfying theCourt thatit is in the interestsof the people of

EastTimorthatits requestsbe granted. If it cannot doso, thenthe Court cannot
consistently with its function as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations grant its application. This is an inherent limitation on the judicial
functionof the Court. Australiacontendsthat theforegoing examinationshows

that Portugal cannot, in thecircumstances of the case, satisfy the Court of this
fact and that, for this reason alone, the Court must, as a matter of judicial
propriety, decline toentertain Portugal'sclaim further. At the very least, anexaminationof Portugal'sclaim showsthat Portugalcannotfulfilany legitimate

purpose by these proceedings. It rnisuses the processes of the Court in a
misconceived attempt to punish Indonesia, to the possible detriment of those
whichit wishes to protect, andto thecertain detrimentof Australia,a third State
with nospecificresponsibiiityfor the temtory.

SectionIII: Portugal invitestheCourttodecide a non-iusticiabledis~ute

315. Finally, Australia contends that, in essence, the case which Portugal

brings to the Court is a non-justiciable one. In principle, a case is justiciable
only if thejurisdiction of the Court haa basis inlaw and the merits of the case
can be decided in accordance with law. A case is non-justiciable if, for any

reason, it cannot be decided according to law.The line betweenjusticiable and
non-justiciablecasescan be very difficultto draw,but it is accepted nonetheless
that such a line must be drawn. (cf.Miiitaryand Paramilitarv Activitiesin and
êeainstNicaragua, ICJ Reports 1986,p.168 (separate opinionof Judge Lachs);
p.240 (dissentingopinionof Judge Oda).)

316. Australiacontendsthatexaminationof Portugal'scase shows thatthe case
is not ajusticiable one. Thisis becausethe resolutionof the disputerequiresthe
participation of al1parties directly concemed (and Australia is not one); the

underlying dispute is only suitable for resolution by negotiation, not by
adjudication in these proceedings; the Court is not in a position to make the
factualfindingswhichPortugal'sclaimswouldrequire;and the Courtcannot, in
the circumstances, make any real contribution to the resolution of the

fundamentalmatters atthe hem of the case. PARTIII

THESUBSTANCEOFTHE CASE THE SUBSTANCEOFTHE CASE

317. In this Part, Australia deals withthe substance of the Pomiguese claim.

Evenif, contrary tothe argumentsin PartII, it is open to theCourt to deal with
the substance of that claim in these proceedings, it is submitted that Australia
acted consistently with its international obligations in entering into and
implementing the Timor Gap Treaty. The international community, acting

throughthe competentorgansof the United Nations,has at no stageimposed on
Member States, including Australia,any obligation of non-recognition of the
situation brought about by the events of 1975-6 (Chapter 1). Nor has that
comrnunityimposed on States any obligation not todealwith Indonesia as the

State in effective control of East Timor. The mannerin which the competent
organs of the UnitedNations have dealt with thesituation andthe responsesof
the international community are inconsistent with theexistence of any such
obligation. There exists no rule of general or customary law which obliged
Australia to refrain fromassertingits own legal rights overthe area coveredby

the Treaty. On the contrary, in the absence of any duty of non-recognition
imposed at the international level, Australiawas entitled to recognizeanddeal
with Indonesia as the State in fact governing the temtory (Chapter 2). The
Treaty relates to a subject of direct and vitalconcernto Australia andinvolves

the exercise of sovereign rights asserted by Australia under international law
wellbefore 1975(Chapter 3). CHAPTER1

THE UNITEDNATIONSHASMADENOAUTHORITATIVE

DETERMINATIONOFA BREACH AND HAS IMPOSED NO
OBLIGATIONOFNON-RECOGNITIONON THIRD PARTIES

Section1: QQ
given caseinvolve"ameasureofdiscretion"on the d arof
thecornDetentUnitedNations bodies

318. Both the political and the judicial organs of the United Nations have
recognized that the exercise of the right of self-determinationmay have more
than one outcome. Possible outcomes include emergence as a sovereign
independentState,free association, and integrationwith an independent State.

SeeGeneral Assemblyresolution 1541(XV);also GeneralAssemblyresolution
2625 (XXV). For examplein relation to integration,pnnciXlof resolution
1541(XV)declaresthat:

"The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes
of the territory'speoplesactingwith full knowledgeof the changein
their status, their wishes having been expressedugh informed
and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on

universaladult suffrage. The United Nationscould,whenit deemsit
necessary,supervisetheseprocesses."

The processes to be followedepend on the circumstances of the particular

case. As the words "could, when it deems it necessary" indicate, United
Nations supervisionmay.be necessary in some,althoughnot all, cases. United
Nations approval of the processes will, however, be necessary in every case.
The general pnnciples provide guidance, but it is the task of the competent

UnitedNations organs,and especiallythe GeneralAssembly,to set thecific
policies, to make the findings of fact, the determinations and the
recornrnendationswhichare to govem the particular situation. Indeed,Portugal
does not deny this (Memonal, paras. 4.11-4.12; and cf: Memonal, chapter V,

especiallyparas.5.38and 5.58).319. In the Western Sahara Case, which particularly concerned the right to

self-determination,the Courtconfirmed thatthe wayin whichthat right is tobe
exercisedin the particularcase dependsupon thedirections givenby the United
NationsGeneralAssembly. The Court said:

"The right of self-determination leaves the General Assembly a
measure of discretionwith respectto forms and proceduresby which
that nghtis to berealised.

An advisory opinionof the Court onthe legalstatusof theterritoryat
the time of Spanish colonization and on the nature of any ties then
existingwithMoroccoandwith theMauritanianentity mayassistthe
General Assemblyin the future decisionswhich it is called upon to

take ...As to the future action of the General Assembly, various
possibiiities exist, for instancewith regardto consultations between
the interested States, andthe proceduresand guaranteesrequired for
ensuring a free and genuine expressionof the will of the people ..,.

(ICJReports 1975,p. 36-37)

320. In a SeparateOpinionJudgePetrenstated:

"[Tlhe wide variety of geographical and otherdata which must be
taken into account in questions of decolonization have not yet
allowed of the establishment of a sufficiently developed body of
niles and practice to coveral1the situations which may give rise to

problems. In other words, although its guiding principles have
emerged, the law of decolonization does not yet constitute a
complete body of doctrine and practice. It is thus natural that
political forcesshouldbe constantlyat work rendenng more precise

and complete the content of that law in specific cases like that of
Western Sahara. Thus the General Assembly has resemed to itself
the task of determining the methods to be adopted for the
decolonization of the temtory in accordance with the principles of

resolution 1514(XV)."(ICJReports 1975,p. 110)

321. The element of discretion and judgment inherent in these often highly
charged issues is underlinedby the close connection that exists between the

right of a people to self-determination and the maintenance of international peace and security. For this reason alone,it is necessary that the competent

organs of the United Nations shoulddecide whether or not Member States
should be under specific obligationsto take or refrain from taking steps with
regard toparticularsituationsin which theright to self-determinationarises. In
rnanysuch circumstances,Article 14of the Charterwillbe applicable,pursuant
to which the General Assembly may "recommend measures for the peaceful

adjustment of any situation ..which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations amongnations",providingthe Security Council is
not exercisingan yf its functions with respect to the situation. The primas,
functionsof theSecurityCouncilincludethe maintenanceofinternationalpeace

and security (Article24).

322. To summarize,the rightto self-detexminationis peculiarly dependent on
the decisionsof the UnitedNations. The reason forthis wasexplainedby Hans
Blix, whowrote thatthe rightto self-determination:

"isan exarnpleof a rule which,for its proper application to concrete
cases, requires international institutions. Which peoplentitled to
self-determination? If, on theone hand, dangerous fragmentationof

Statesis to be avoided, and,on the other,the rule is tohave practical
significance, there needs tbe a third party to assess the concrete
cases and apply the mle. While a political organlike the General
Assembly rnay not be ideal in this role, it seems to be the only one
which hasassumedit for the timebeing."

(H Blix,Sovereienu~~ression andNeutrality(l970), pp.13-14)

In this observation, Blix referred,by way ofample,to the identification
of peoples as entitled to self-determination. Of course, what he said

appiies with equalforce to other aspectsof the self-detexminationprocess,
suchas howa choiceis to be madeby a people.

323. The United Nations has discharged its responsibility in this regard by
deciding such matters as whether or not a temtory is a non-self-goveming

temtory to which theright of self-determinationapplies,what wouldconstitute
a valid exercise of the rightin the particularterritory, andwhat specific action,
if any, should be taken by States, especially by the adrninistering Power or
occupying State, to promote the exercise of the right. The key role of the

UnitedNationsin this contextwas highlightedthroughoutthe study,The Ri~ht10Self-Determination, preparedby Aureliu Cristescu as special rapporteur of
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of

Minorities (E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/ UrNesalls;number E.80.XIV.3). See
especially paragraph 116. Forexample, the General Assembly has assumed
responsibility for deciding whether or not the arrangements proposed by an
administering or occupying Power for ascertaining the people's will would

constitute aalid act of self-determination. UnitedNations practice shows that
it cannot be assumed that a plebiscite or referendum will be required or
accepted as an act of self-determinationin every situation. See, forple,
resolution2353(XXII)of 19December1967on Gibraltarand resolution3217of

1November 1977on Mayotte. Asone writer has said:

"After 1965a changein the GeneralAssembly's policyhas occurred
and it has openly endorsed or disapprovedof plebiscites conducted

by the administeringStatesthemselves,or it has fixed theconditions
under which a plebiscite will be considered appropriate for the
purposes of the exercise of the right of self-determination by the
people of the temtory concemed." (A RigoSureda,The Evolutionof

the Rightof Self-Determination(1973, p.73)

324. The United Nationshas also been called upon todecide whether or not
States otherhan the administeringor occupying Powershould take (or refrain

fromtaking)certain actionin consequenceof the failureof that Power (orof the
people themselves) to achieve aalid act of self-determinationin a particular
temtory. These occasions are outlinedin Appendix A. In practice, the United
Nations has called on other Statestotake stepsof this kindin only a few special

cases. Ithas not givenStates sucha directionas a generalrulInthe absence
of a specific direction, United Nations practice contemplates thatStates are
under no more than the general obligation to"respect" the right of a particular
people to self-determination. Thisdoesnotmeanthat States arepreventedfrom

dealing with the administering or occupying Powerin relation to the territory,
even thoughthe latteraybe in defaultof its obligationstothe temtory. These
propositions areborneoutin the followingbrief studyof the resolutionson self-
determinationwhichwere adoptedby the GeneralAssemblyin 1985,after they

had beenconsideredby theFourth Cornmittee. These resolutions are contained
in Appendix B. 325. In virtually al1 the resolutions in 1985, the General Assembly has

reaffirmed the right of the people of the territory to self-determination, has
reaffirmed the responsibility of the administering Power to promote the
economic and social development of the territory, and has reiterated the
responsibility of the administering Power to create such conditions as will

enablethe peopleof thetemtory toexercisethe righttoself-determination. The
resolutions do not, as a generalule, limit the dealingswhich other States may
have with theadministenng Power before self-determination. Even where the
General Assemblyhas expressed its concemthat a dispute over the futureof a

territorybe broughtto anend, it hasnot necessarilyprohibitedother Statesfrom
dealing with the State in control of the territory. See, for example, resolution
40150 of2 December 1985 on the question of Western Sahara, contained in

AppendixB.

326. It was only in the two resolutionsconcerningNarnibia(resolutions40152
and 40153)that the GeneralAssembly in1985calledon Statesand international

organisations to take (or refrain from taking) specific action. This maybe
contrasted with the general calls made by the Assemblyin relation to colonial
peoples in other territories which did not contemplate any prohibition on
dealingswith the Statein controlofthe temtory, eventhoughthereremainedan

unexercisedright of self-determinationin the people ofthe temtory.

327. The practice of the United Nations, as recorded, for example, in the
General Assembly's resolutionsof 1985,indicatesthat if States are not to deal

with theadministering or occupying Powerin relation to a non-self-governing
territory, the General Assembly will make that decision in clear and
unambiguous terms. Other resolutions too support the proposition that the

existence of the right to self-determinationof articular people does not of
itself prevent States.from dealing with the administeringPower or occupying
State. For this, there must be some specific direction to that effect by the
United Nations. SeeSection IVbelowand Appendix A.

Section II: TheSecuritvCouncilhasmadenodecisionbindingon
MemberStateswhichwould~reventAustraliafrom dealing

withIndonesia

328. The Security Council adopted onlytwo resolutions with respect to EastTimor -resolution 384 (1975)on 22 December1975and resolution 389 (1976)
on 22 April 1976. The questionwhethera resolutionof the Security Councilis
intended to give rise to binding obligations, under Article 25 of the Charter,

dependson "the termsof theresolutiontobeinterpreted,the discussion leading
to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, al1circumstances that
might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the
Security Council" (NarnibiaAdvisorvOpinion,ICJ Reports, 1971,p. 53).

329. In resolution 384, the Security Council commenced by "deploring",
although not condemning,the militaryinterventionby Indonesiain East Timor
and in both Security Council resolutions it called on "the Govemment of

Indonesia to withdrawwithout delay al1its forcesfrom the Temtory". Neither
resolution contained a findingof a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
on Indonesia's part, or any other findingwhich mighthave been construed as

involving an exercise of the Security Council's enforcement powers under
Chapter VI1 of the Charter. The terms of resolutions 384 and 389 were
consistent with the Secunty Council's intention to act onlyunder Chapter VI.
The Secunty Council's resolutions onEastTimor contain nothing which could

have ken construed as a decisionbindingon Member Statesunder Article 25
of the Charter, andno decisionopposablein law toother States was made. (cf.
Sonnenfield, Resolutionsof the United Nations Security Council (1988), ch.
IV; Suy, "Article25" in J-P Cot andA Pellet, La Charte desNationsUnies (2nd
ed, 1991),pp.471-8.)

330. It is true that, by both resolutions 384 and 389, the Security Council
recognized the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and
"called upon"Statesto respect that right. What theSecurity Council did not do

was cal1 upon States to take specefic action in respect of that right. See
para.348. The terms of the resolutions were entirely recommendatory. There
was no decision, a prerequisite forthe applicationof Article 25, to which there

was in any event no reference. The two resolutions contained no positive
finding that the right to self-determinationhad been denied the people of East
Timor and gaveno indication that the Security Councilwas contemplating any
measure to restore Portugal to its former position in the territory. They

contained no guidance as to the behaviour expected - even less imposed -on
third States. Instead, resolution384 recorded the Security Council's "regret"
that "the Govemment of Portugal did not discharge fullyits responsibilities as
administering Powerin the Temtory under Chapter XI of the Charter". It wasapparent that Portugal had failed to assist the people of East Timor towardsan
orderly actof self-determination,espiteits specialresponsibilitiestowards the
temtory and peopleof EastTimor.

331. Whilst the Security Council's two resolutions expressed its concem to
uphold theprinciple of self-determination, it also expressed its concem to be
better informed of the facts in East Timor. In both, the Secretary-Generalwas
requested to have a specialrepresenta~ve go to the temtory. In giving their

affirmative vote to resolution 389, most States indicated that whilst they
supported the generalpnnciple of self-determination.theyrecognized the need
to avoid a prematurejudgment andthey expressed the hope thatconsultation,
brokeredby the United Nations Secretary-General,wouldachievea solution.

SectionIII: TheGeneralAssemblv hasmadeno decisionbindineon
p

dealingwithIndonesia

332. Between 12 December 1975 and 23 November 1982 the General
Assembly considered the situationof East Timor on eight occasions. None of

the resulting resolutions gave rise to an obligation of the kind which Portugal
asserts against Australia. As already noted (para.102 above), the preambular
paragraphsof General Assemblyresolution3485 (XXX) of 12December 1975

didnotexpresslycondemn Indonesia's action.The onlyreferenceby any organ
of the United Nations to Indonesia's actionas a "violation of the territorial
integrity of Portuguese Timor" was that containedin operative paragraph 5 of
that resolution. The resolutionitself was subject to a significant measure of

doubt (72for; 10against;and 43 abstaining),and its descriptionof the situation
was not adopted by the Security Council, nor repeated by the General
Assembly.333. By relying upon Article ll(3) of the Charter in this and in later

resolutions(31153of 1December 1976,32134of 28 November 1977 and33/39
of 13 December 1978), the General Assembly indicated that it regarded the
situation as one "likely tondanger international peace and security", thereby
falling within Article 33 of the Charter. The Assembly thus indicated that it

sought only to engage the recornmendatory powersof the Security Council. It
didnot seek to attractits decision-rnakingpowersunderChapterVII. The main
objectof resolution3485(XXX)wasexpressedin the "appeai" whichit made to
"al1 parties in Portuguese Timor to respond ...to find a peaceful solution
through talks between them and the Government of Portugal in the hope that

such talks will ...lead towards the orderly exercise of the right to self-
determinationby thepeople ofPortugueseTimor".

334. As noted earlier (para.98above),resolution3485mXX) was not adopted

without significant dissenting votes, abstentions and absences. There were
relativelyfew Stateswhichexplainedtheirvote (or abstention). Amongstthose
that did the view was expressed that the situation in East Timor was not
sufficiently clear to warrant express findingsof fact. See in this regard the

observations of the delegates of India, Japan, the Philippines,.Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia,Fiji and Sri Lankareferredto in Part 1,Chapter2.

335. The General Assemblydid not again considerthe situationin East Timor

until afterthe meetingof the PopularAssemblyin Dili on 31May 1976and the
enactment of the indonesian law of 17July 1976,purporting to integrate East
Timor into Indonesia. By resolution 31153 of 1December 1976,the General
Assembly rejected this integration on the ground that "the people of the

Temtory have not beenable to exercise freely their right to self-determination
and independence". The Assembly again sought (thistime unsuccessfully)to
enlist the Security Council's assistancender Article 1l(3) of the Charter and
requestedthe United NationsSpecialCornmitteeon Decolonizationto dispatch

a visiting mission to the territory as soon as possible. The terms of the
resolution were recommendatory and the General Assembly confirmed its
position that the Security Council should act under Chapter VI, rather than
Chapter Vil of theCharter.

336. As already noted (Part 1,Chapter 2). the debate on resolution 31153was
not lengthy. Of the 20 members who voted against the draft, a number
indicatedthat thefacts were insufficientlyclear toeterminewhether therehad in fact been a valid act of self-deterrnination resulting in integration with

Indonesia. Forexample,the delegateofJapan expressedthe opinionthat:

"whether or not the peopleof East Timorhad exercisedtheirright of
self-determination might still be said to be open to argument."

(AlC.413 1ISR.16,s November1976)

The delegate of the United States stated that the draft was "unrealistic in the
present circumstances prevailing in the Territory and was therefore not

constructive"(AlC.4l31lSR.27,17November1976).

337. As previouslynoted (Part1,Chapter 2), resolutions32/34of 28 November
1977 and 33/39 of 13December 1978 did no more than reaffirm the General

Assembly's position. Save that resolution 32/34 requested the Secretary-
General to send a special representative to make an on-the-spot assessmentof
the situation in East Timor and to contact FRETILINand the Govemment of

Indonesia (as well as the Governments of other States), the resolution was in
terms almost identical to resolution3115of 1976. India, Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines al1made explanations of their vote against on the ground
that self-determination had been exercised (A/C.4/32/SR.21, 10 November

1977). By the following year (1978) voting support for resolution 33/39was
even less than support for the resolutions of previous years:there were 50 in
favour, 31 against,44 abstaining,and 16 absent. In the Fourth Committee,the
delegateof Canadahadannounced that Canada:

"recognized thede facto integration of East Timor with Indonesia
even thoughthe way in whichthatintegrationhad takenplace had by
no means done justice to the principle of self-determination."

(A/C.4/33/SR.33,5 December1978)

338. The next year, by resolution 34/40 of 12 November 1979, the General

Assembly withdrewitsjudgment that EastTimorhad notin factbeenintegrated
into Indonesia. Although the preamble reaffirmed the right of al1peoples to
self-determination, it no longer referred to the prohibition on the use of force
contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter. More importantly, resolution 34/40

did not reaffirm the General Assembly's previous resolutions or repeat its
requests to the Security Council. By this means the General Assembly
indicatedthat theearlierresolutions wereno longertobe regardedas operative.The basicpropositionfor whichresolution 34/40stood - thoughimportant -was
a limited one. It was that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to

determine their own future under the auspices of the United Nations(operative
paragraph2).

339. The debates on resolution 34/40in 1979were more extensivethan those

of previous years concemingEastTimor. See Part 1,Chapter2. The delegates
of Bangladesh (A/C.4/34/SR.17), India (SR.15), Malaysia (SR.16), the
Philippines (SR.16) andThailand (SR.17) supportedIndonesia's claimthat a
valid act of self-determination had taken place in 1976, when the Popular

Assembly hadvoted in favour of integration with Indonesia. Other delegates
also spoke against the draft resolution although they did not go so far as to
endorseIndonesia's claims. In the debates on the draft resolutionin the Fourth
Committee,the delegateof Canadasaid:

"that his delegation had strong doubts aboutthe value of the futile
and repetitious debatewhichhad taken place on the rnatterin recent
years. The integration of Timor was an accomplished and

irreversible fact and anannual succession of Committee resolutions
would not change the situation ..While the evolution of events in
East Timor had not ailowed for an expression of self-determination
that would perfectly satisfyal1standards, it must be clear that the

simplistic statements in the draft resolution did not reflect the
complexitiesof events in Timor: for instance,his delegationdid not
agree with the descriptionof Portugal as administering Power. The
draft resolution focused on general principle at the expense of

practicalrelevanceand realities,and its prospectsfor effective action
were nil."(A/C.4/34/SR.24,5 November 1979)

340. Australia described the draft resolution as "unrealistic" and stated that

"[ilt ignored East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia, which was a fact"
(A/C.4/34/SR.23). The delegate of France stated that the draft resolution
appeared "to ignore the reality of the situation in East Timor". He added that
France would abstain, ratherthan vote against the resolution, "solely because

the draft resolution refemed to the humanitarian aspects of the problem"
(A/C.4/34/SR.23). The delegateof Sweden statedthat Sweden: "recognizedthatthere wasin EastTimortodaya de facto situationto

which there was no realistic alternative. Its vote for [the] draft
resolutionshould thereforebe seensolelyas an expressionof support
for its humanitarianaspects."(A/C.4/34/SR.23)

341. The delegate of Japan statedthatJapan would voteagainst the resolution
because:

"The process of decolonization varied according to circumstances

prevailingin any givenarea. What wasreally importantwas, notthat
each and every case of decolonization should comply with an
absuact standard, but that the will and desire of the majonty of the
people should be respected. ...[Tlhe Governmentof Indonesia was

governing the Territory effectively, and [Japan] had urged the
[Fourth]Cornmitteeto take due account ofthat fact. His delegation
continued to believe that onlyin that way could theinterests of the
people beadvanced."(A/C.4/34/SR.16)

342. The delegateof PapuaNew Guinea statedthat"in this particularcase,my
Govemment is of the view that there is no need for anything further in that
decolonizationprocessin theTemtory and thattherealityof the situationisthat
EastTimor is nowan integralpartof the Republicof Indonesia"(Al341PV.75).

343. Save for encouraging Portugal'snew diplomatic initiatives, the General
Assembly did no morethan confirm its position with respect to East Timor in
resolutions 35/27of 11November 1980and 36/50 of 24 November 1981. In

neither did the Assembly refer to its past resolutions on East Timor and it
refrained from judging Indonesia's actions - let alone imposing a legal
obligation on third States consequentuponan adversejudgment on Indonesia's
position.

344. Apart from Indonesia itself, the delegates of Japan (A/C.4/35/SR.ll),
Malaysia (SR.1l), Papua New Guinea (SR.13), the Philippines (SR.1l),
Singapore (SR.11) and Thailand (SR.ll) opposed resolution 35/27 (1980)in

terrnssirnilarto those of the previousyear. Swedenannouncedthat it no longer
intended to support resolutionson East Timor. Instead, it had determined to
abstainfor the reason that "the world had been faced with a defacto situation"(NC.4135lSR.23,3 November 1980). The delegateof France announced that,

as previously, France too would abstain. The delegate for France gave the
followingexplanation:

"[Mlany countries in the region of East Timorhad taken note of the

situationprevailing in the Temtory, as France was inclined to do.
[But] the draft resolutionmentioned therecent initiativeof Portugal,
an ally of France. The opening of a dialogue between the
adrninisteringPower andIndonesiawouldbe a step forwardtowards

settlement between the interested parties, butit would deprive the
United Nations of any power to decide with respect to East Timor.
Therefore, desirousofleavingal1optionsopen, Francewouldabstain

in the vote." (NC.4/35/SR.23,3 November1980)

345. In thefollowing year (1981),the five MemberStatesof the Associationof
South -EastAsian Nations (ASEAN),as well as India and Japan repeated their

oppositionto draft resolution 36/50. In theourthCommittee,the delegate for
Oman also agreed that "continued consideration by the Committee of the so-
called question was intervention in the interna1 affairs of [Indonesia]"
(A/C.4/36/SR.21,9 November1981).

346. As notedin Part1,Chapter2, theeighth and lastresolutionof the General
Assembly concerning East Timor was passed by the narrowest of margins

(50for; 46 against); and two States which were absent later notified the
Secretariat they had intended to vote against. Although resolution 37/30 of
23 November 1982differedfromits irnmediatepredecessorsby refemng to the
Assembly's pastresolutions, it did not reaffirm them and certainly it didnot

reinstatethe Assembly'searlier appraisalof the situationin East Timor. Two of
the three operative paragraphs were directed tothe settlement of the problem,
especiallythroughthe Secretary-General'smediation. The third wasdirectedto
humanitarianrelief. In the plenarysessionof the General Assembly, therewas

no debateon the resolution. A statementwasmadeby the delegateof Indonesia
after the vote had been taken, expressing satisfaction atthe narrowness of the
vote which, he said, reflected the fact that "only about 30 per cent of al1

Members continue to question East Timor's integration with Indonesia"
(N37PV.77, 23 November 1982). There was no challenge to that assessment
of the position. SectionIV:

decisionwhichcouldeive riseto the obligation which

p

347. The resolutionsof the UnitedNationsfail to support Portugal's contentionthat
Australiawas undera legalobligationnottodeal with hdonesia withrespectto East

Timorat the timethe Timor Gap Treatywasmade. Australia submitsthat this alone
defeats Portugal's case. Having regard to the doubts and disagreements which

attended the issue, it was for the relevant organs of the United Nations to decide
what measures, if any, should be taken to implement the principle of self-

determination. In particular,it was a matter for the General Assembly which after
1976 alone had the carriage of the issue. But there has been no decision by the

GeneralAssembly whichdirectsthat States shouldnot havedealingswithIndonesia
with respect to East Timor. The history of the General Assembly's proceedings

confirms that there was no decision of the United Nations operative in December
1989whichprecluded Australiafrom makingtheTimor Gap TreatywithIndonesia.

348. This is the fundamental differencebetween the approach taken by the United

Nations with respect to East Timor andits actions on other occasionswhere a duty
has been imposed on Member States not to recognize or have dealings with the

occupying State. Thus, such duties were expressly imposedon Member States by
the Security Councilin relation to the racist regimein hod de si ahe,SouthAffican

administration in ~amibia2, the "so called independent ~ranskei"3, the Turkish
Republic of cyprus4, Iraq's annexationof ~uwaits and Israel's claim to the whole

'In Resolution 216(1965)theSecurityCouncii"deciderdltocal1uponal1Irecognizethisillegal
racistminorityregimein SouRhodesiaandtorefrain fmmrenderinganyassistancetothisillegai
regime". InResolution277(1970)theSeciintyCwncii "decide[dlthat MemberStatesshallrefrainfrom
recognizingthi iilegalrorfromrenderingany assistancetoit".

21nvokingARicle25 othCharter,theSecurityCounciiinresolution269(1969) calalltate"to
refrainflal leaiiigs withtheGovemmentof South Africapurportingtoacton behalfof theTenitory of
Namibii". InResolution276 (1970). theyCounciicalledupal lîates"trefrafm any
deùiigs withtheGovemmentof South Africawareinmnsistentwithoperativeparagaph 2of the
presentresolution. Paragraph2declaredîhat"thecontinuedpresenceof theSouth Africanauthoritiesin
Namibiiis iUeg...InResolution 283 (1970)theSecurityCouncilrequestedal1Sutes "torefrainfmm
anyrelationsiplornatic,consorotherwise-withSouthAhicaimplyingrecognitionof theauthoriiyof
theovernmenrof SouthAfricaovertheTemwry of Namibia".
3~y Resolutions402 (1976)and407(1977),theSecurity CouncilendorsedtheGeneralAssembly'scailupon
"al1Govemmentstodenyanyfom ofrecognition tosecalled independentTranskeiandto refrainfmm

havinganydealingswiththe-cailedindependentTranskei or otherbantustans".
41nResolution54(1983 )heSecurityCouncded upn "dl StatesntorecognizeanyCypriotStateother
thantheRepublicofCypms". Itreitethical1inResolution550(1984).
Resolution62 (19901,theSecurityCouncildecidedthatthe"annexationof Iraqunderanyfom
andwhateverpretehasno legalvalidity,andis considerednuIlaandcaileuponalSltates"not tocity of ~emsaiem.6 Similarly,the GeneralAssembly hasexpressed itself equally as
directly when seeking to prevent States from recognizing or dealing with an

occupying State,or other authority.7 SeealsoJ Dugard,Recognitionand the United
Nations (1987),pp.90-111 and AppendixA.

349. No resolutions comparable to any of those refemed to have been made with
respect to East Timor. No express cal1has been made in any resolution on East

Timor that States refrain from recognising, or dealing with Indonesia. The
resolutions contain no declaration of a situation of illegality analogous to that made

in relation to Narnibia. In these circumstances,Portugal cannot show any basis for
its contention that the resolutions of the United Nations with respect to East Timor

gave rise to an obligation opposable e-omnes which made it unlawful for

AustraliatoconcludetheTimor Gap Treatywith Indonesiain December 1989.

recognitha innexation,andtorefrainhm any acordealintha iightbe inierpretedasindirect
recognitionofthe annexation".
6~nResolution478(1980).theSecurityCouncildecided"not torecognisethe 'basicLaw'andsucbotheractions
byIsraelthasa resultof ibisseektoaiterlhecharacterandstatusof Jeniandcaiieupon
"(a)all MemberStatestoacceptthis dec(bthoseStatesthathaveestablisheddiplomaticmissionsat
Jerusalemto withdraw.sucbmissionsfrom theHolyCity".

7~efening totheArabtemtoriesoccupiedby IsraelinReso3005(XXVn)of 1972,forexample,the
Generalsmbly caiieuponStates"not to recogni@opeme with,orassistinanyrnannerin, any
measuresundertakenby the occupying Powerto exploittheresourcesof theoccup...".mtories
Similarly,forexample.inResolution 3341lD(XXX)(1975)relatingtothe "bantustans"in SouthAfnca,the
GeneralAssemblycalledupon"ailGovemmentsandorganizationtodealwith anyinstitutionsor
authoritiesof thebantustansor to accordanyecognition tothem". CHAPTER2

AUSTRALIAWAS ENTITLED TODEAL WITH INDONESIA ASTHE
STATE INACTUALANDEFFECTIVECONTROLOFTHE
TERRITORY

Section1: In rin i e
actualandeffective control of~articularterritorvas

$

350. There is widespread acceptanceamong the international communityand
in the literature that recognition is essentially a political act. By an act of

recognition, one State acknowledges that another State or govemments in
effectivecontrol of the temtory concemed and,at the sarne time,it indicates a
willingnessto enterintoealingswiththatStateor govemmentinrespect ofthe
temtory. Of its nature, recognition is a discretionary matter for each State,

provided that it does not contravene any international legal obligation
incumbent onit.

351. This is the accepted view of recognition. The 1936 resolution of the

Institute for International Law described recognition as "a free act" of
individual States. The former Judge of the Permanent Courtand ChiefJustice
of the UnitedStates SupremeCourt, CharlesEvansHughes,commentedthat:

"the question of the recognition of a foreign govemmentis purely a
domestic one for the United States." (Hackworth, Di~est of
InternationalLaw,Vol.1,p.161)

The political nature of an act of recognition is refetoby J Dugard in
Recognitionandthe United Nations(1987),whonotesthatrecognition-

"occurs when a State indicates its willingness toenter into political

relations with another State,h as by the exchange of diplornatic
relations and the conclusion of treaties. This is 'an act which lies
within the arbitrary decision of the recognising State'." (p.45,
quoting Kelsen)352. This conformswith the viewof D P O'Connell,whowrote:

"recognition is a political action whereby the recognising State
indicates a willingness to acknowledgethe factual situation to
bring about certain legal consequences of that acknowledgment."

(InternationalLaw (2nd ed,1970),Vol.1,pp.127-8)

See also Nguyen Quoc, Daillier and Pellet, (3rd ed
1987). p.366; Ch.Rousseau, Droit international public, III, p.528; and

J. Verhoeven, La reconnaissance internationale dansla pratique contemporaine
(1975),pp.576-583. Verhoevenrefers, at p. 617, to the discretionary character
of recognition as"uneréalitéincontestable".

353. Under traditional international law,a State could look tothe sovereignin
actualpossession withoutthe need toenquire intothe legalityof its possession:
H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947). p. 101, quoting
Vattel. Although this propositionis now subject to the law of the Charter, it

remains tme that recognition is,in principle,an acknowledgmentof the reality
of a situation. Generally speaking, the competence of an entity on the
internationalplane is lirnitedby the degree of effective controlwhichit in fact
exercisesover thetemtory concerned. See JTouscoz, Le ~rinciped' effectivité

dans (1964),pp.200-205. As Chensays:

"It is a matter of general agreement among international lawyers
including proponents of the constitutive doctrine, that recognition

cannot be divorced from fact." (The International Law of
Recovnition(1951),p.54)

354. Australia's decisionto concludethe Timor Gap Treatywith Indonesiain

December 1989was a consequenceof a decisiontorecognizethe factual reality
of the situation in East Timor. By its act of recognition, Australia
acknowledged the practical realityin East Timor, and sought to negotiateand
conclude a treaty to protect its long asserted legal rights. Without this

acknowledgment, Australia would not have been in a position to make the
arrangementscontainedin theTreaty. As a practical matter,Australia couldnot
have avoidedthe decisionto recognize Indonesia,and to negotiate with aview
to making a treaty with it on the Timor Gap, if it was to secure and enjoy its

sovereign rights there. There was no other State with which it could haveobligationuruealin itselfandnot reflectiveof the consideredviewsof States. It
does not mandate concerted actions when the consensus that such action

requiresis completelylacking.

357. As one writer commented,dealingwith the prohibitionof theacquisition
of temtory by unlawfuluse of force:

"It seems a reasonable corollary to hold that the international
comrnunity may, in the alternative, eventually signify assent to the
new position and thus by recognition createa title. This possibility

in no way contradicts the main proposition that force does not of
itself create a title, becausethe international communitywould from
thispoint of viewbe exercisinga quasi-legislativefunction."
(R Y Jennings, The Acquisition of Temto~ in International Law

(CambridgeUniversity Press,1963),p.60)

The samewnter goeson to commentthat:

"non-recognition alone is an attitude which in any case is often
maintainable only for a limited period ... It seems reasonable,
therefore, to suggest thatin this matter the international comrnunity
should be left freedom to employ the traditional, deiicateand highly

flexible machinery of recognition; the next step along the road of
advance would be some sort of collectivisation of the process,
possiblythroughthe United Nations itself ...

We have thoughtso far in terms of recognitionpure and simple;but
it is not to be expected that anything in the nature of a forma1
recognition of a. title to .territory will necessarily be thought
appropriate by governments in this kind of case. What is rather in

point is the variousfactors of approbation and acceptance that goto
make a consolidation of title. Consolidation is an appropriate
concept here, because what is required is not only, or even mainly,
the acquiescence of the victim of the agression for an apparent

acquiescence isthe iikely resultof the useof force anyway ...what is
in pointis the acquiescenceandapprobationof third States generally.
If, on the other hand, States generally make it clear by non- recognition that the position is not considered acceptableitwould

seemthatconditionsfor ordinaryprescriptionare notfulfilled."(ibid.
pp.61-2, footnotesomitted)

See also C.de Visscher, Les effectivitésdu droit international ~ublic, (1967)

pp.22-23. As Rousseau notes: "Reconnaitre unesituation, ce n'est pas
nécessairement l'approuver. La reconnaissancn e'estqu'uneconstatation, non
un jugement de valeur" (Ch. Rousseau, Droit international public (1977), III,

p.526).

358. The Treaty which is the subject of these proceedings was concluded 14
years after the controversial events had occurred, 13 years after the last

consideration of the issue by the Security Council, and 7 years after the last
considerationof the issueby the General Assembly. In 1982the Assemblyhad
doneno more thancal1on the Statesdirectlyconcernedto negotiatewitha view
to settlingthe problem - in a resolutionwhich attractedthe supportof no more

than a thirdof the membersof the United Nations.

359. If the Portugueseclairnsinrelationtothe scopeand gravityof Indonesia's
wrong-doing are correct (and it is, of course, not a matter for the Court to

determinethat intheseproceedings),whydid the Assemblyin 1982merelycal1
on the parties to negotiate: why did it not cal1 on Indonesia to withdraw
immediately and unconditionally? The answer must be that a majorityof the
Assembly thought thatsuch an outcome was neither credible nor required by

the exigencies of the situation. If that was the casein 1982,it must havebeen
even more the case in 1989. Given the views of a majority of the General
Assembly in 1982, and the failure of Portugal or any other State to bringthe

matter before the General Assembly or the Security Council in subsequent
years, the position had become clear: no restitution of the pre-1975 position
could be contemplated. That being so, it was open to Australia to reach
agreement with the only State which was in a position to giveeffect to that

agreement, vit.Indonesia.

SectionII.

which wouldDreventtheconclusionoftheTimorG~DTreaty

360. Despite the limited and cautious response of the United Nations,addressed to the "parties directly concerned", Portugal argues thatthere was an
independent legal obligation on third States such as Australia not to deal with
~ndonesiain relation to East Timor. This argument is apparently put in two
ways.

361. First, it seems to be argued that, because Indonesia's occupation of the
territory violated internationallaw and, in particular, rules of international law
which are valid erga omnes, no third State could thereafter deal with Indonesia

in its capacity as goveming authority over East Timor without being equally
guilty of such a violation.

362. The initial point to be made in response is that there was no binding

decision by a competent United Nations authonty that Indonesia's occupation
of the temtory at the relevanttime was unlawful. The facts were indisputeand
unclear. The passage of time since 1976 itself raised senous questions about

whether the United Nationshad not concluded that the new situation shouldbe
accepted as in confonnity with international order, especially having regard to
the widely shared views of countries in the region (in particular, the ASEAN
countries).

363. In addition, as Australiahas already argued,it is not open to the Court to
adopt the essentialfirst step in the Portuguese argument, and to hold either that
Indonesia's actions in the penod 1975-76 were unlawful, or that its claims to

goveming status in East Timor amounted to nothing even in 1989, when the
Treaty was concluded. Neither of these findings is possible in these
proceedings because under the Monetary Gold principle, they could only be
made consistently with the requirements of thejudicial process in proceedings

to whichIndonesiawas a Party.

364. But in any event, Portugal seeks to equate the State initially implicatedin

the alleged wrong-doing and third parties, admittedly not so implicated, but
which subsequently find it necessary to deal with that State. Such an equation
is simplistic, and cannot be accepted. If there has been any default, it was that
of Indonesiawhich hadbrought about the situationin East Timor. By virtueof

that fact the obligation to promote the right of a people to self-determination
must rest primarily with it. That there is a difference between the source of
Indonesia's obligation and that of other States is supported by the Court's

Advisory Opinion in the Narnibia Case. In that case, the Court distinguished the source of South Africa's obligation from that of Member States of the

United Nations. The Court statedthat:

"South Africa,beingresponsiblefor havingcreatedand maintaineda
situationwhich theCourthas foundto havebeen validlydeclaredto

be illegal, has theobligationto put an end to it. It is thereforer
obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory of
Namibia ...Physical control of a temtory, and not sovereignty or
legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting

otherStates." (ICJ Reports 1971,p.54)

365. The legal obligationsof other States did not arise per se from the illegal
situation which South Africa had brought about, but from the Security

Council's specific resolutionswhichwere declaredto be binding on States (id.
pp.53-54). But there has been no comparable United Nations resolutionwith
respect to East Timor,and therefore there has been no resulting obligation on
other States to take or refrain from taking specific action. There can be no

obligation on otherStates to respond in a panicular way to an illegal situation
brought about by another State unless therehas been a collective decision to
thateffect. Asthe Courtalso saidin the Namibiqcase:

"The precise determinationof the acts permitted or allowed - what
measures are available and practicable, whichof them should be
selected,what scope they shouldbegivenand by whom they should
be applied - is a matter which lies within the competence of the

appropriate political organsof the United Nationsacting within their
authorityunderthe Charter."(ICJReports 1971,p.55)

The need for a collectivedecisionbeforea third State can incur a dutyto act or

refrain from acting in response to the wrongdoing of another State is also
reflected in the draft Articles on the subject of State responsibility which
Riphagen recornrnended in the International Law Commission. See in
particular, Articles 11-14andcomrnentarythereto in Yearbook of iLC, 1985,

voi.n, pp.12-14.

366. The second form which the Portuguese argument takes (cf. para.399
above)is to treatAustraliaashavingan independentandparticularobligationto

East Timor. Portugal relies repeatedly on the existence of an Australianobligation to promote (favoriser) respect forthe principle of equal nghts and

self-determinationof peoples, relying in particular on the terms of resolution
2625(XXV). But that obligationis not unlimited. It does not mean that third
States are to be equated with the States principally involved, on whom the
primary obligationfalls to implementthe principle of self-determinationof the

peopleundertheir control. Portugal,havingsignallyfaileditselfto promotethe
principleof self-determinationin relation toEastTimor, relies onthirdStatesto
step into its breach. But Australia was never an administering authorityof the
territory. Its obligation is to respect the outcome of any act of self-

determination of the people of the territory, and to CO-operatewith the
competent organs of the United Nations to that end. Thus, in resolution
2625(XXV) under the heading "the principle of equal rights and self-

determinationof peoples", theduty of every State to promote the realisation of
that pnnciple throughjoint and separate action is linked to the duty to "render
assistance tothe United Nations in carryingout the responsibilitiesentnisted to
it by the Charterregardingthe implementationof the principle".

367. Al1this Australia has done. But as we have seen, the United Nationsin
the exercise of the responsibilities referredto in resolution 2625(XXV)has not
achieved, and apparentlyno longer seeks,the withdrawaiof Indonesiafrom the

temtory. Instead, it regards the matter as one to be resolved by negotiation
between the parties directly concerned. Australiaisnot such a party. It will, as
far as it cm, facilitate those negotiations and will respect and recognize any

internationally acceptable outcome of them. But it is not a colonial
administrator of East Timor. Itis a third party withits own legitimateclaims
and interests to uphold and with responsibilities forthe economic development
of its own people. The obligationsto promoterespect for self-determination,in

a situationnot of its own making, go nofurther than as statedin paragraph366
above. SectionIII: S.
or fromcom~etentUnitedNations bodies.of States(including

g
resDectof East Timor

368. Thepracticeof Statessince 1976shows thatthey havenot beenconscious

of any restrictions in their dealings with Indonesia in relation to East Timor,
whether these restrictions might flowfrom United Nationsresolutions or from
general international law. Since 1976 Indonesia has maintainedu~estricted
diplomaticand consularrelationswith a largenumberof Statesand has become

party to numerous bilateral treatieswhich apply to East Timor (P1,Chapter
2). A large numberof States, includingal1StatesneighbouringIndonesia,have
expressly recognizedthe incorporationof East Timor within Indonesia. Many
other States have dealt with Indonesia onuch the same basis, althoughthey

have notfound it necessarytornakesuchexpressstatements (Part1,Chapter2).

369. Nor have there been any cornplaints by States other than Portugal in
relation to the conclusion by Australia of the Timor Gap Treaty. In other

words, no State except Portugalhas considered Australia's actions asrequiring
a protestor anyotherkindofresponse.

370. Portugal itself has been weak and erratic in its own response to the
negotiation and conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty. Australiaamounced in

1978 that it would commence negotiations with Indonesia in relation to the
Timor Gap. Negotiations commencedin Febmary 1979,but Portugal made no
forma1objection, by note or minute, to their commencement,though Portugal
had earlier expressed ''surprise"(in January andDecember1978)at Australia's

recognition de facto and then de iure of Indonesia's sovereignty over East
Timor (Annexes 22 and 23). On the subject of the -TimorGap negotiations,
however,there wasat thattimecompletesilence.

371. Morethan sevenyears passed beforePortugaltookany furtherdiplomatic
or other initiativesin relation to the Timor Gap negotiations. In August 1985
the Portuguese Foreign Ministry issued a communique following remarksby
the Australian PrimeMinister, Mr Hawke, in aninterview and in Parliament,

indicating that therehad been no change in Australian policy concerning East
Timor, andthat negotiationswithIndonesia onthe TimorGap were continuing.
(TheStatement is reproduced asAmex II1.27in Vol.V,p.218 of the PortugueseMemorial.) It was not until September 1985(whenthe negotiations for ajoint
development zone were announced) that Portugal made forma1 protest
concerning the Timor Gap negotiations, a fact which Portugal itself
acknowledges. There were furtherPortuguese noteson 9 and 31 October 1988,

30 October and 13 December 1989 and 11 February 1991, also protesting
against Australia's continuednegotiationwithIndonesiain relationto theTimor
Gap. The Notes aresetoutin Annex 4 to thePomiguese Applicationinstituting
theseproceedings. TheNotes werethe lirnitof Portugueseresponse. The issue

was not raised in the United Nations although Portugal could havedone so at
any time after 1982.

372. Australia replied to the note of 31 October 1988 on 2 November 1988
(Memonal, Annex 111.25,Vol.V, p.210-215) and to the Note of 13 December
1989, in January 1990 (Annex III.26). In each response, Australia rejected
Portugal's assertions that it was acting contrary to international law in

negotiatingwith Indonesia. As itstressedin its replies, Australia's recognition
of Indonesia as sovereigndid not condonethe manner in which Indonesiahad
originally acquired East Timor. Nordid Australiaconsiderits actionprejudicial
to the nghts of the people of East Timor. Australiareferred to its efforts to

further theinterestsof thepeopleof EastTimorthroughhumanitarianand other
assistance. Australiastated clearly that it supported international initiatives to
resolvethe East Timor situation. Itmadeno concession,however, that Portugal
wasentitledto bnng itsclairnsagainstAustraliato thisCourt.

SectionIV: In concludin~the TimorGapTreatv. Australiaim~eded

neither thenegotiationoftheissuebvthe"~artiesdirectlv
çoncerned"noranv actofself-determinationof the~eo~leof
EastTimorthat mightresultfromsuchne~otiations

373. In concluding the Timor Gap Treaty, Australia in no way impeded the
negotiation of the issue by the parties directly concerned. As noted in Part 1,
Chapter 2, paragraphs 146-152, negotiations under the auspices of the
Secretary-Generalare continuingbetween Indonesia and Portugal. Nor would

the conclusionand implementationof the Treaty impede that processwhich in
any event has Australia'sfirm support. 374. Nor wouldthe conclusionand implementation of the Timor Gap Treaty
hinder any act of self-determination of the people of East Timor that might
result from the negotiations. As has been pointed out above (Chapter 3,

para.318),an act of self-determinationbringsthe choiceof a numberof possible
options, including independence or integration (as with Indonesia). (cj.
resolution 1541(XV).) Whateverthe choice made, the conclusionof the Treaty
cannot prevent that choicefrom being effective. The Treaty does not prevent

the exercise at somelater date of the right of the peopleof EastTimor freelyto
choose their futurepolitical status, in accordance with arrangements approved
by the United Nations.

375. A State can only breach theobligation to respectthe right of a people to
self-determinationif its conduct preventsor hinders the exercise by the people
of a non-self-governingtemtory of their right freely to determine their future
political status. The principle of self-determination isnot concerned with the

validityof exercisesof sovereigntyprior to self-determination.What Australia
has done is make an agreement (on the resources of the Timor Gap) with the
Statewhich at the timethat agreementwas madewas ina positionto giveeffect
to it. Australia contends that in pursuing such a course, it has not failed to

observe any obligation to Portugal or the peopleof EastTimor. By concluding
the Timor Gap TreatywithIndonesia, Austraiiadid nothing to affect the ability
of the peopleof EastTimor to rnakea futureact of self-determination.

SectionV:
c g r
naturalresources

376. Portugal asserts that by concluding the 1989 Treaty Australia has
contravened the right of the people of East Timor to permanent sovereignty
over their natural resources (Memorial, paras.8.15-8.21). According to

Portugal, these resources extend to the median line dividing the offshore area
between Ausîralia and East Timor: But Australia has never accepted these
claims conceming the maritime entitlementsof East Timor. Indeed, Australia
has consistently asserted claimsof its own to thearea in question. Giventhat

there has been no agreementon the question, the extent of the maritime rights
appurtenant toEastTimorremainsuncertain. It certainly cannotbe deterrnined
in these proceedings (as Portugal expressly concedes: Memorial, ChapterVII,

paras.7.03, 7.07 -7.08). To do so would directly cal1into question the legalrights and claims of a third State, Indonesia, which is not a party tothese

proceedings. In these circumstances, Portugal cannotassert that a particular
portionof the maritimearea was "its own", and it cannot therefore demonstrate
that the people of East Timor have been deprived of part of their territory or
naturalresources.

377. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a
corollaryof the principle of self-determination. Ithas alreadybeen shown that
the principle of self-determination didnot prevent Australia from concluding

and implementing the 1989Treaty, thereby givingeffect to its own sovereign
rights. The same must be true of the corollary principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources: to rely on that principle is simply to
reiteratethe issuein anotherform.

378. According to Portugal,the conclusionby Australia and indonesia of the
Timor Gap Treaty "has infringed and is infringing thenght of the people of
East Timor to self-deterrnination. to territorial integrity and unity and its
permanentsovereigntyoverits natural wealth andresources,and is in breachof

the obligation not to disregard, but to respect thatnght, that integrity and that
sovereignty" (Application,p.19).

379. As shownin this andthe previouschapter,theTreatyin disputein no way

infringes the rights of the people of East Timor. Moreover, itis indeed very
difficultto seein what mannerthis Treatycouldbe detrimental tothose people,
even assuming thatin exercising theirnght to self-determinationthey do in the
futurebecomean independentState.

380. If that situation did arise, it would be up to the new State to decide
whetherto acceptor torejectthe Treaty. Asthe ArbitrationTribunalrecalled in
the disputebetweenGuinea-Bissauand Senegal:

"A State born of a process of national liberation has the right to
accept or to reject any treaties concludedby the colonial Stateafter
the initiation of the process. ln this field, the newly independent

State enjoys a total and absolute freedom ...((1989) 83 ILR 1, 26,
para.44)This statement is in conforrnitywith thegeneralrule enunciated in Articles 16

and 24 of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties of 1978. (The Timor Gap Treaty is not, for the reasons referred to in
paragraph385,a treaty whichrelates to a boundaryor theregime of a boundary
within the meaningof Article 11of that Convention.) But itcannotbe assumed

that, even if East Timor were tobecomean independent State, itspeople would
wishto repudiate theTreaty. CHAPTER3

THETIMORGAPTREATY IS ANEXERCISEOFAUSTRALIA'S

SOVEREIGN RIGHTSUNDERINTERNATIONALLAW

381. In this Chapter, it is arguedthat Australia'sdecisionto concludethe 1989
Treaty constituted ameasureof legitirnatepractical actionch gave effect to

Australia'sseabedrightsin internationallaw. RatherhanQing to persuadethe
comptent organsof the UnitedNations to reconsider theirattitudéwithrespect
to East Timor, Portugaleeksto limit Australia's rights toprotect and enjoyits
naturalresources.

Section 1: Underthe Treatv. Australiaurotectsandexerciseslong-
assertedsovereignrighfs

382. Australia has long asserted sovereign rights over the area of seabed
coveredby the Treaty. Australiafirst assertedjurisdiction over its appurtenant
continental shelf by Proclamation in 1953. Following that,the PearlFisheries
-ct (No.2) 1953definedthe continentalshelffor thepurposesof the Act as "the

submarine areas contiguous to the coasts of Australia to a depth of not more
than 100fathoms"(approximately200metres). The 200metres isobathwasthe
minimum depth incorporatedin the definition of the continental shelf in the
1958 Continental Shelf Convention. In the mid 1950s and 1960s various

petroleum permits were issuedby Australia over the seabed in the Timor Gap
area. A sumrnaryof the various assertions by Australia ofjurisdiction beyond
the medianlinein the Timor Gap areais set outin a diplornaticnoteto Portugal
of 21 November 1974. This note was sent in response to Portugal's grantof a

concessionin thearea of the Timor Gap. TheNote is reproducedas AnnexIV-
11in the Portuguese Memorial (Vol.V.p.327-331).

383. As shown on the chart reproduced in Portugal's Memorial (facing

page 52), the 200 metres isobathextends almost to the straight-line closure of
the delimitation agreed with Indonesia in 1971-72. It lieswell north of a
median line based on distance between Australia and Indonesia. Beyondthe
200 metres isobath, the'seabed suddenly drops off into the Timor Trough.

Australia's view has always been that this was the limit of thegeomorphologicalcontinentalshelf. Thisview was thebasis of its negotiations
with Indonesia over sea-bed delimitation,both in 1971-2and more recently in
relationto EastTimor.

384. After Australiaconcludedthe seabed boundaryagreementswithIndonesia
in 1971-2,it soughtto negotiatewith Portugalon theemainingarea. Australia
met with no suggestion that a line drawn along the 200 metre isobath would
somehow violate the principle of self-determination. Butit proved difficult to

interest the then Portuguese Administration in the issue (given its general
indifference toEastTimor -seeparas.28-29above),and the boundary remained
unresolved until Portugal's withdrawal from the territory in 1975. (See
Memonal, para. 7.04; also Lumb,"The Delimitationof Maritime Boundariesin
the Timor Sea" (1981)7 A s tr li Y 72.) After

1975,Indonesia alsomade claims to the area,whichconflictedwith Australia's
own claim and its understanding of the relevantlaw. As a result of these
competing claims,no exploration of the area could, as a practical matter, take
place.

385. Portugalconcedes that this case does not concern the delimitationof the
continental shelf. The Treaty is not a maritime delimitation agreementwhich
establishes permanent maritime boundaries (cf..Article 2(3)). It is an
agreement on a Zone of Cooperation in an area between East Timor and
Northern Australia. Itdeals solely with exploration for and exploitation of

petroleum resources. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the coastline of
Australia in the relevant area is considerably longerthan that appurtenant to
East Timor and that for reasons of history, geomorphology and geography,
Australia regardsthe area coveredby the Zone of Cooperationasing an area
over which it has sovereign rights in accordance with the relevantles of

international law. (The text of the Treaty is in Annex 2 of Portugal's
Applicationand Annex m.9 of Portugal'sMemorial. The historyleadingto the
negotiationof the Treatyis setout in Memorial, paragraphs. -2.12. Foran
analysis of the Treaty, see Burmester, "The Timor Gap Treaty" [1990]
0 233-

247,a copyof whichhas been lodgedwith theCourt.)

386. The Zone of Co-operation consistsof three areas. Area A is expressedto
besubjectto: "..joint controlby the Contracting Statesof the exploration forand

exploitation of petroleum resources, aimed atachieving optimum
commercial utilisation thereof and equal sharing between the two
Contracting States of the benefits of the exploitation of petroleum
resources ...(Article2(2))

387. The form of joint control established under the Treaty is relatively
straightfonvard. In Area A, control is exercised by a Ministerial Council
consistingof anequal numberof ministersdesignatedby each State,and a Joint

Authority responsible to the Council. The Ministerial Council has overall
responsibility for matters relating to petroleum exploration and exploitation
(Article 6). Its decisions are made by consensus (Article 5(5)). The Joint
Authority is responsible for the management of activities including the

supervisionof contracting corporationsin the Area(Article 8). Areas B and C
fa11withinAustralianand Indonesian administrationrespectively. In relation to
them, there is provision for a sharing of tax revenues. This reflects the
Contracting Parties' understanding that there should be an equal sharing of

benefits.

388. In making the Treaty, Australia exercised long-asserted rights overareas
of the Timor Sea which it considered to be its own. Nonetheless, the Treaty

establishesa CO-operative regimewhich Australia considersto be conducive to
international order, and the interests of the people of the region. There is no
basis for Portugal's assertion that negotiationswith the people of East Timor
would not haveled to a resultas favourableto Australia(Memorial,para. 2.03).

On the contrary, the Treaty was concluded by parties at arms length, and
represents a reasonable compromise of conflicting claims. It is intended to
ensure that petroleum exploration and exploitation in the Timor Sea be
conducted ona basis that achieves"optimumcommercialutilisationthereof and

equal sharing between the two Contracting States of the benefits ..."(Article
2(2)(a)). As Portugal itself acknowledges (Memorial, para. 2.02), the Timor
Gap is not without possible economic potential. The Timor Gap agreement is,
in Australia's view,a mode1of how disputes over maritimetemtory should be

resolvedby provisional arrangementsof a practical nature. SectionII: T s h
Australia'srightsand interestsunderinternationallaw

389. In negotiating and concluding the Treaty, Australia evidently soughtto

secure the enjoyment of those rights over her natural resources which
internationallaw confers. The prearnbleStatesthat theparties entered intothe
Treaty :

"Conscious of the need to encourage and promote developmentof
thepetroleumresourcesof thearea;[and]
Desiring that exploration for and exploitation of these resources
proceedwithoutdelay ....

400. Australia, like al1States, has a right to enjoy its own natural resources.
Australia had no practical alternative but to enter into negotiation with
Indonesia to secure some agreement with respect to theTimor Gap, so asto

enable Australia to exercise its rightsin those areas of the Timor Sea which it
claimed.

401. By its Application and submissions, Portugal seeks to prevent Australia
from performingits agreementwith a neighbouring Stateconceming maritime
areas which belong to Australia, eventhough Australia cannot,as a practical
matter,exerciseitsrights there withoutsuchan agreement. OnlyIndonesiaisin

a position to give effect to such an agreement (ct. Application, para.9;
PortugueseConstitutionof 2 April 1976,as revisedin 1989 -Art.293,Amex 8
hereto). There has been no State other than Indonesia with whom Australia
could have negotiated a practicableresolutionof the competingclaims over the

seabedin the Timor Sea,so as to allowexplorationtoproceed.

402. International law does not deny States the ability to take practical action,
as Australia has done, to protect their economic interests,even though there

may be doubt or disagreementas to the precise legal position. Indeed,such
action has been quite cornmon: some occasions are referred toby Lauterpacht
in bo~nition in International Law, (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 389-90; also

pp.121-2,346-8, 377-8. The Timor GapTreaty constituted a practicalmeasure
of resolving a disputebetween Indonesia and Australia,so that Australia could
protectitsrights and enjoythe resourceswhich belonged toit.403. Co-operativearrangementsof this kindexist for the utilisationof offshore
petroleumin other parts of the world. For exarnple,a similar arrangementwas

adopted under the Frigg Field agreement between the United Kingdom and
Norway designed to facilitate exploitation of petroleum deposits overlapping
the existing delimitation linein the NorthSea. See H Burmester, "The Timor
Gap Treaty" [1990] AMPLA Year Book 233, 234; H Fox et.al.,Joint
-ofOffshore (1989). pp. 3-5, 53-114; P C Reid,

"Petroleum Developmentin Areas of InternationalSeabed BoundaryDispute -
Means for Resolution", [1985] AMPLA Year Book 544. The Timor Gap
Treatyrecallsaspectsof theseotherarrangements.

SectionIII: The TreatvgiveseffecttoAustralia'sobli~ationsat
internationallaw

404. In concludingthe Treaty Australia acted in conformitywith its obligation

under Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
pursuant to which States sharing the same continental shelf undertake to
determine the boundary line by agreement between them. It should also be
noted that Article 83(3) of the 1982Law of the Sea Convention contemplates

that when agreement cannot be reached on appropriate maritime delirnitation,
the relevantStates:

"shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangementsof a

practical natureand,during this transitionalpenod, not tojeopardise
or harnper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements
shall be without prejudiceto the final delimitation."

See alsoArticle74.

405. Consistentlywith its provisional nature, theTreaty provides for an initial

term of operation of 40 years with provision for extension for successive 20
year penods (Article 33) and the ContractingStatesundertaketo continuetheir
efforts to reach agreement on a permanent continentalshelf delimitationin the
Zone of Co-operation(Article 2(4)). The Timor Gap Treatyis a clear example

ofjust the kindof practical arrangementto whichArticle 83(3)refers. Further,
given its provisional nature and its incorporation of the "sovereigntyeutral"
pnnciple, the agreement cannot be regarded as adverse to the interests of any
State (orthe people ofEast Timor). 406. Having regardto al1the circumstances,includingthe lackof any direction
from the United Nationsto the contrary, it was incumbent on countriesin the
region to determine for themselves whether the promotion of CO-operative
arrangements of the kind represented by the Treaty was desirable, because

likely to contribute to the peace and secunty of the region and ultimately the
observance of international law. Australia took full account of these
considerationsin makingthe Timor Gap Treaty. By the prearnbleto theTreaty,
Australiaand IndonesiaaffirmedtheyenteredtheTreaty:

"Fullycomrnittedto rnaintaining,renewingandfurther strengthening
the mutual respect, friendship and cooperation between their two
countries through existing agreementsand arrangements, as well as

their poiicies of promoting constructive neighbourly cooperation;...
[andl

Believing thatthe establishmentofjoint arrangements to permitthe
exploration for and exploitation ofpetroleum resources in the area

will further augment the range of contact and cooperation between
the Governrnentsof the twocounmes andbenefit the developmentof
contactsbetweentheirpeoples".

These expressions of intent are entirely consistent with Australia's earlier
agreementswithIndonesiain 1971and 1972.

SectionIV: Concludingremarks

407. Portugal challenges the exercise by Australia of its sovereign right to
decidewhethertoenter into negotiationswitha neighbour, andif so, when, and

subjectto what conditions. This isa discretionordinarilyenjoyedby al1States.
Portugal does so without the benefit of any direction of the General Assembly
or Security Council,and withouttakingsteps(whichwould havebeenopentoit
at any time) to bnng the matter before the General Assembly or the Security

Council for debate and decision. If Portugal's Application was granted,
Australia would be prevented from perforrning an agreement with a
neighbouring State which protects its rights and interests in those maritime
areaswhichit regards as itsown. obligationsunder the Timor Gap Treaty in goodfaith, and there is no basis for
the Court to interferein the dueperformanceby Australiaof thoseobligations.

410. If, despite this, the Court were to grant Portugalthe remedy it seeks, the

practicalconsequenceswouldbe highlyinjuriousto therights of Australia asa
coastal State. Itwould become practicallyimpossible for Australia to exercise
its rights and enjoy its natural resources there. Portugal invitesthe Court to
direct that Australia onlynegotiatewith Pomgal on these rnatters,even though

Portugal is incapable of performing any undertakings which it might givein
relationto theregion. Suchnegotiations wouldbe futile. By invitingthe Court
toenjoin Australiafromperformingthe agreementwithIndonesia (Application,
para.34(5)),Portugal invitesthe Court to suspend indefinitely Australia's rights

over resources which belong to it, contrary to the interests of the people of
Australia. This outcome is not in keepingwith thebasic tenets of international
law.

411. Portugal, it will be recalled, did not decide to decolonise its overseas
territoriesuntil after the coup in Portugal in April 1974. This resulted in
widespread chaosand civil conflictin its former colonies. In the case of East

Timor, the territory was "completely unprepared for self-governance".
Speaking before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Cornmittee on
6 March 1992,the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
PacificAffairs,Mr KennethM Quinn,stated:

"When the world turned its attention to East Timor in the mid-
1970's,self-determination was not a realistic option. ...In 1974,
after four centuries of colonial nile, East Timor had 47 elementary

schools, 2 rniddle schools, 1high school, and no colleges. Now it
has 574elementaryschools,99rniddleschools, 14high schools, and
3 colleges.In 1974,EastTimorhad 2hospitalsand 14healthclinics.
Now it has 10hospitals and197villagehealthcentres. In 1974,East

Timorhad 100churches. Todayit has 518. In 1974,EastTimorhad
20 kilometres of surfaced roads, al1 within Dili. Now it has
428kilometres throughout the province. In 1974,East Timor was

plagued with endemic poverty. Todaypoverty remains a problem ,
as it does elsewhere in that part of Indonesia, but starvation is
extremely rare. The missing economic element is sufficient
employment to fulfil rising expectations of newly educated youth. But new business investors insist on a peaceful environment. And

that remainsproblematicuntil the EastTimor issueis fully resolved"
(Amex 9, pp.13-14, 17-18).

412. Pnor to 1980,Portugaltookfew or no stepsto resolvethe problemin East

Timor, and its activity since then has been partial and erratic. Portugal cannot
now load the burden of its defaults ont0 a third State which is in no way
responsible for the situation. Although Australiavoted in favour of the early
resolution of the situationin East Timor in the UnitedNations, today Australia,

with rnanyother countries,has acceptedtherealityof Indonesia'sauthorityover
East Timor. Australia'sentry into the Timor GapTreaty with Indonesia was a
lawfulresponse to the situationthat had developed. By entering into the Treaty

in December 1989, Australia did not contravene any direction of the United
Nations with respect to East Timor, for none had been made. Australia
continues to endorse the efforts of the Secretary-General to negotiate a
resolution of the situation. As the international comrnunity has recognized,

these negotiations primarily concem Portugal and Indonesia. Portugal and
Indonesia, with the mediation of the Secretary-General, continue to seek a
solution to the problem. Australiahas also sought to promote the humanitarian
treatmentof the people of EastTimor, and hasben generousin the aid whichit

has directed to East Timor, especially through the RedCross. If Portugal and
Indonesia reach an agreement over East Timor and that agreement is approved
by the United Nations,Australiawill respect andrecognizeits outcome. It will

abide by any authoritative decision which the United Nations may make with
respect to East Timor. Australia's entry into the Timor Gap Treaty is not
inconsistent with this. Any new State in East Timor is free to accept, to reject,
or to seek to renegotiate the Treaty. In themeantime Australia is fully entitled

to enter into arrangements with a State in order to protect and utilise its own
resources.SUBMISSIONS

413. The Governmentof Australiasubmitsthat the Court should adjudgeand

declarethat the Portuguese applicatbedisrnissedon the groundstha:

the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide on the Portuguese claims, or the

claims are inadmissible;

, altematively, the actionsof Australia invokedby Portugaldo not giverise
to anybreach of rights appertainingto Portugalunder internationallaw on

the partof Australia.

GAVANGRIFFITH

Agentof the Govemmentof Australia

HENRYBURMESTER

Co-Agentof the Govemmentof Australia

WARWICKWEEMAES

Co-Agentof the GovernmentofAustralia
1June 1992 APPENDICES

A. United Nations resolutionson self-determinationcalling
for actionby thirdState........................................182......................

B. 1985GeneralAssembly resolutions adoptedon report
of FourthCornmittee ...........................................195..........................

C. Some DoubleTax TreatiesconcludedwithIndonesia
since 1976containing a temtorial clause.........................213............ APPENDIX A

UNITEDNATIONS RESOLUTIONS ONSELF-DETERMINATION
CALLING FOR ACTION BYTHIRDSTATES

SOUTHERNRHODESIA

1. On 11 November 1965, the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia
unilaterallydeclaredindependencefromthe UnitedKingdom. The illegalityof
the regime was repeatedly emphasized in later resolutions of the Security

Council and General Assembly. See Security Council resolutions216 (1965),
217 (1965), 221 (1966), 232 (1966), 253 (1968), 277 (1970), 288 (1970), 320
(1972), 333 (1973), 409 (1977), 423 (1978), 437 (1978), 445 (1979), 448
(1979); also General Assembly resolutions 2508(XXIV) (1969); 2383(XXIIi)

(1968). The Security Council regarded the unilateral declaration of
independence as having "no legal validity" (resolution 217 (1965), pct,.3
resolution288(1970),para.l).

2. The reason for the illegalityof this minority regimewas that its existence
was incompatiblewith the right to self-determination. In resolution2022(XX)
(1965), which predated theunilateral declaration of independence by several

days, the General Assembly indicated that the intended declaration "would
continue the denial to the African majority of their fundamental rights to
freedomand independence". The GeneralAssemblyalso reaffirmed "the right
of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and

recognise[d]the legitimacyof their strugglefor the enjoymentof their rights as
setforth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and.. .resolution 1514(XV)" (at para.2). This wording was
subsequentlyrepeatedin numerousresolutionsof the GeneralAssemblyand the

Security Council. See General Assembly resolutions 2508(XXIV) (1969),
para.1; 2383(XXIII)(1968);311154A(1976); Security Council resolutions253
(1968); 227 (1970); 318 (1972); 328 (1973); 403 (1977); 424 (1978); 445

(1979); 448 (1979),460 (1979),463 (1980). In resolution2138(XXI) (1966),
the General Assembly condemned "any arrangement reached between the
adrninistering Power [the United Kingdom] and the illegal racist minority
régime which will not recognise the inalienable rights of the people of

Zimbabwe to self-determinationand independencein accordancewith General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)" and reaffirmed "the obligation of the
administeringPower to transferpower to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis
of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with the principle 'one man, one
vote"' (paras. 1-2). See also General Assembly resolutions 2383(XXIII)

(1968),para.6;and 311154A(1976).

3. In resolution 216 (1965),para.2, the Security Council decided to cal1on
States"not torecognize thisillegal racistminorityregimein SouthernRhodesia

and to refrain from rendering any assistance" to it. In resolution7'(1965),
para.6, the Security Council again called upon States "not to recognize this
illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relationswith it".

In resolution277 (1970),para.9 (a),it decided thatMember States shall "sever
al1diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations that they may have
with the illegal regime in SouthernRhodesia,and terminate anyrepresentation
that they maintain in the Territory". See also General Assembly resolution

2508(XXIV) (1968), para.9. In resolution 328 (1973), para.7, the Security
Council called upon al1Govemments "to continue to treat the racist minority
régimein Southem Rhodesia as wholly illegal" whilst theGeneral Assembly
called on al1Governments "to discontinue any action which might confer a

semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime" (resolution 311154B(1976),
para.4 (c)).

4. The SecurityCouncil alsocalledon Statesto take other specific measures

against Southern Rhodesia, principally involvingthe implementation of trade
embargoes, e.g., resolutions 217 (1965); 232 (1966); 253 (1968); 277 (1970);
333 (1973); 409 (1977). Adoption of these measures by States was in many

cases mandatory, and the Security Council on several occasions specifically
invoked Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, e.g., resolutions 232
(1966),para.6;253 (1968),paras. 11-12;288 (1970),para.4;314(1972),para.2;
318 (1972);320 (1972). On severaloccasions,the Security Councilnoted that

certain States (including Portugal) had acted in violation of the Charter by
continuing to offer assistance to the regime in Southern Rhodesia. See
resolutions 277 (1970), para.6; 320 (1972); 333 (1973); General Assembly
resolution2383(XXIII),para.4.

5. When the political leadersin SouthemRhodesia purportedto conclude an
''interna] settlement" in March 1978, the Security Council responded by
declaring"illegal and unacceptableany intemal settlementconcludedunder theauspices of the illegal régimeand [calling] upon al1States not to accord any
recognitionto such a settlement" (resolution423 (1978);also 424 (1978)).

NAMIBIA

6. In resolution2145(XXI) (1966), the General Assemblyreaffirmed "that
the provisionsof GeneralAssemblyresolution 1514(XV)are fully applicableto
the people of the Mandated Territoryof SouthWest Africa and that, therefore,

the peopleof SouthWest Africa havethe inalienablerightto self-detemination,
freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations" (para.1);declaredthat "South Africahad failedto fulfil its obligations
in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory" (para.3); and

decided that the Mandate was terrninatedand that "South Africa has no other
right to administerthe temtory and thathenceforth South West Africa comes
under the direct responsibilityof the United Nations" (para.4). By resolution
2248 (S-V) (1967), the General Assembly established a "United Nations

Council for South West Africa" (Namibia) to administer the Territory until
independence.

7. The General Assembly and the Security Council later reaffirmed the
inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence,in
conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV). See General
Assembly resolutions 2517(XXIV) (1969) and 2678(XXV) (1970); Security

Councilresolutions246(1968);264 (1969);276(1970);283 (1970).

8. In resolution 2641969),the SecurityCouncilrecognised thatthe General
Assembly had terrninated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and

considered that "the continued presenceof South Africa in Namibia is illegal
and contrary to the principles of the Charter and the previous decisionsof the
UnitedNations" (para.2). In resolution 269(1969),the Security Counciladded

that the continuing South African occupation of Namibia "constitute[d] an
aggressive encroachment onthe authorityof the United Nations, a violation of
the temtorial integrity and a denial of the political sovereigntyof the people of
Namibia"(para.3). 9. In its earliest resolutions on Namibia, the Security Council merely

"invitetdl al1States to exert their influencein order to induce the Government
of South Africa to comply withits resolutions (resolutions 245 (1968),para.3;
264 (1969), para.7; cf. also resolution 246 (1968), paras. 3-4). However, in
resolution 269 (1969), the Security Council called upon"al1States to refrain

from al1dealings with the Governmentof South Africa purporting toact on
behalf of the Territory of Namibia" (para.7). This cal1 was substantially
repeated in resolution 276 (1970) in which theSecurity Councilalso declared
that "the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is

illegal and that consequentlyal1acts taken by the Governmentof South Africa
on behalf of or conceming Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are
illegal and invalid (para.2). In resolution 283 (1970), the Security Council
outlinedin greater detailthe measuresof non-recognitionto be taken by States,

requesting "al1States to refrain from any relations - diplomatic, consular or
otherwise - with South Africa implying recognition of the authority of the
Governmentof SouthAfrica overtheTemtory of Namibia"(paras. 1-3);calling
upon "al1States to ensure that companiesand other commercialand industrial

enterprises owned by, or under direct control of, the State cease al1dealings
withrespect to commercial or industrialenterprisesor concessionsin Namibia"
(paras. 4-7); and requesting "al1States to undertake without delaya detailed
study and review ofal1bilateral treaties between themselves and South Africa
in so far asthesetreatiescontainprovisionsby which theyapply tothe Temtory

of Namibia (para.8).

10. As SouthAfnca contestedthe validityandbinding forceof resolution276
(1970). the Security Council decided in resolution 284 (1970) to requestan

advisory opinionof theInternationalCourt ofJustice onthe question,"whatare
the legal consequencesfor States of the continued presenceof South Africa in
Namibia, notwithstandingresolution276(1970)?"The Court concludedthatthe
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, and that "the

member States of the United Nations are ...under obligation to recognize the
illegalityand invalidityof SouthAfrica'scontinuedpresencein Namibia. They
are also under obligation to refrain from lending any support or any formof
assistance to South Africa with respect to its occupation of Namibia" (Legal

Consequencesfor Statesof the Continued PresenceofSouthAfrica inNamibia
(South WestAfrica) Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)
[1971]ICJ Reports 17,p.54, at para.119). The Court concluded thatbecauseof
Security Council resolution 276 (1970), "member States [were] underobligationto abstainfromenteringbilateraltreatyrelationswithSouth Africain
al1cases inwhich the Govemmentof South Africapurports to act on behalf of
or concerningNamibia",to abstainfrom sendingdiplomaticor specialmissions
to SouthAfrica including intheirjurisdictionthe Temtory of Namibia;to make

it clear that the maintenance of diplomatic or consular relations with South
Africa [did] not imply recognitionof its authoritywith regard to Namibia; and
to abstain from entering into econornic and other forms of relationship or
dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may

entrench its authority over the Territory (paras. 121-124).These obligations
arosefor the reason that Security Councilresolution 276 (1970)"was adopted
in conforrnitywith the purposesand principlesof the Charter andin accordance

with its Articles24 and 25" (paras. 115,119). The Court didnot find that there
would have been any duty of non-recognition in the absence of any Security
Council resolution.

11. In resolution 301 (1971), the Security Councilexpressly agreed with the
Court's opinion(para.6) and specificallycalledupon al1States to "abstain from
entering into treaty relations with South Africa in al1 cases in which the
Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning

Namibia" and to "abstain from entering into economic and other forms of
relationship or dealingswith South Africa on behalf of or concerningNamibia
which may entrench its authority" over Namibia. See further para.11. In
numerous subsequent resolutions, both the Security Council and the General

Assembly

reaffirmed "the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of

Namibia to self-determination and independence" (Security Council
resolutions 309 (1972); 310 (1972); 319 (1972);323 (1972) and General
Assembly resolutions 311146 (1976). para.1; S-912 (1978), para.2;
331182A(1978),para.3);

declared the continued presence of South Africa in the Territory to be
illegal (Security Council resolutions 310 (1972), para.2; 366 (1974),
para.1; 385 (1976), para.1; 435 (1978), para.2; and 532 (1983), para.1;

539 (1983), para.1; 566 (1985), para.1; 601 (1987), para.1 and General
Assembly resolutions 311146 (1976), para.8; S-912 (1978), para.4;
331182A(1978),para.5); declaredthat actions takenby South Africawith respectto Narnibiawere
''nul1and void" (Security Council resolution 435 (1978), para.6; 566
(1985), para.4; cfGeneral Assembly resolution 331182A(1978), para.9
(the decision of South Africa to annex Walvis Bay is "illegal, nul1and

void"). In resolution 439 (1978). the Security Council declared that
electionsheld by SouthAfricain Narnibiawerenul1and voidand that "no
recognitionwill beaccordedeitherby the UnitedNationsor any Member
States to any representativesor organestablishedby that process (para.3,
cf. esolution 566 (1985), para.4 General Assembly resolutions 311146

(1976),para.13;331182B(1979),para.3;331206(1979),para.5).

THESOUTHAFRICAN"HOMELANDS"

12. In a number of resolutions, the General Assembly condemned the
establishment of "bantustans" by the regime in South Africa (resolutions
2775E(XXVI) (1971); 341lD(XXX) (1975)), as "designed to consolidate the

inhumanpolicies of apartheid, to perpetuatewhite rninoritydominationand to
dispossessthe African people ofSouth Africaof theirinalienablerights in their
country", including the nght to self-determination (resolutions 341lD(XXX)
(1975),para.l; 3116A(1976),para.l; 3U105N(1977),para.l).

13. The General Assembly has called upon "al1 Governments and
organizationsnot to dealwithany institutionsor authoritiesof the bantustansor
to accord any form of recognition to them" (resolutions 341lD(XXX) (1975),

para.3; 3116A(1976).para.3; 3U105N (1977),para.5; 37169A(1982),para.14).
It has also requested States "to take effective measures to prohibit al1
individuals, corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction from
having any dealings with the so-called independent...bantustans" (resolution

3116A(1976), para.4; 321105N(1977), para.6). In resolution 402 (1976), the
SecurityCouncil endorsedGeneralAssemblyresolution3116Aand calledon al1
States "to deny anyform of recognition to theso-called independent Transkei
and torefrainfromhavinganydeaiingswiththe so-called independent Transkei

or other bantustans" (para.]). This endorsement was reaffirmed in resolution
407 (1977). (See also the statement by the President of the Security Council,
SI13549of 21 September1979.)TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

14. In resolution 1542(XV) (1960), the General Assembly declared the
Territories under Portuguese administration to be Non-Self Governing
Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United

Nations. In resolution 180(1963), the Security Council urgently calledupon
Portugalto implement"the immediaterecognitionof the right of the peoplesof
the Temtories underits administrationto self-determinationand independence"
(para.5 (a)) and affirmed that "the policies of Portugal in claiming the

Temtories under its administrationas 'overseastemtories' and as integralparts
of metropolitan Portugal are contraryto the pnnciples of the Charter and the
relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council"
(para.2). See also resolutions183(1963),para.3; 218(1965),paras. 2.4 and 5.

In resolution 312(1972),the Security Councilreaffirmed "the inalienable right
of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) to self-
determinationand independence, as recognizedby the General Assemblyin its
resolution 1514(XV) ...,and recognises the legitimacy of their struggle to

achieve thatright" (para.1). Seealso resolution 322(1972),para.l; and General
Assemblyresolutions2270(XXII)(1967),para.1;2507(XXIV)(1969),paras. 1-
2; 2395m) (1968),paras. 1-2.

15. In resolution 180(1963), the Security Council requested that"al1States
should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any
assistancewhichwouldenableit to continue its repressionof the peoplesof the
Temtories under its administration, and take al1measures to prevent the sale

and supply of ms and miiitary equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese
Government" (para.6). Similar requests and calls were made in Security
Council resolution 218 (1965), para.6; and 312 (1972), para.6; and General
Assembly resolutions2507(XXIV)(1969)2270(XXII)(1967)and 23950(Xm)

(1968). In resolution 250 (XXIV) (1969) the General Assembly further called
uponal1States, speciaiisedagenciesandinternationalorganisationsto "increase
...their moral and material assistance to the peoples of the Temtories under
Portuguese dominationwhoare strugglingfor their freedom and independence"

(para.11). However, neitherthe SecurityCouncilor the GeneralAssemblyever
called on States to refuse recognition tothe Portuguese administrationofose
Temtories or torefrainfromdealingwith Portugalin relation tothem. 16. In November 1983, the Turkish community in Cyprus purported to
declare an independent Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus. The Security

Council declared this declaration "invalid, on the grounds that it was
incompatiblewith the 1960Treatyconcerningtheestablishmentof the Repubiic
of Cyprus andthe 1960Treaty of Guarantee (resolution 541(1983)). It called
upon al1States "not to recognise anyCypnot State other than the Republic of

Cypms" (para.7). In resolution 550 (1984), the Security Council again
condemned al1 secessionist actions as "illegal and invalid" (para.2), and
reiterated itsal1upon al1States not to recognise the purported State of the
TurkishRepublicof NorthemCyprus(para.3).

INVASIONOF KUWAITBYIRAQ

17. The invasion of Kuwait by iraq in 1990 did not raise the issue of self-
determination,butdidinvolvethe acquisitionoftemtory of anotherStateby the
use of force. In resolution 661 (1990), the Security Council calledupon "al1
States" not to recognise any regime set up by the occupying Power" (para.9

(b)). In resolution 662 (1990), which followed the declaration by Iraq of a
"comprehensiveand etemal merger" withKuwait, the Security Councilcalled
upon "al1States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognise that annexation, andto refrain fromany action or dealing that rnight

be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation" (para.2). In
resolution664 (1990), the Security Council reaffirmed thatthe annexation of
Kuwaitby Iraq is "nul1and void" (para.3).

ARABTERRITORIES OCCUPIED BYISRAEL

18. In 1967,as aresult of the Six-DayWar, Israelenteredinto occupationof
severalArab temtories. They were the Golan Heights(partof Syria);the West
Bank of Jordan (including East Jerusalem); and the Gaza Strip and the Sinai
Peninsula (parts of Egypt). Parts of the Egyptian temtory under Israeli

occupation were restored to Egyptian controlpursuant to the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty, which came into force on 25 April 1979. Otherwise, Israel
continuesto occupythesetemtories.19. Since 1968,Israelhas pursueda policy of estabiishing Israeli settlements
in these occupied temtories. Additionally,in 1967Israel placed thewhole of
Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem, under a comrnoncivil administration. In
1980,the Knesset(the Israeli Parliament) enacted a"basic law" of the State of

Israel, which declared "Jerusalem united in its entirety" to be the capital of
Israel, and part of the PrimeMinister's cabinet was moved to East Jerusalem.
The followingyear,the Knessetenacted a law imposingIsraeli law,jurisdiction

and administrationon the Golan Heights.

20. In resolution 252 (1968), the Security Council considered "that al1
legislative and administrative measures and actionstaken by Israei, including

expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal
status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status" (para.2). The
Security Council confirmed this in resolutions 267 (1969), para.4 and 298
(1971),para.3. The GeneralAssemblyalso considered"that these measures are

invalid" (resolution 2253 (ES-V)(1967),para.1). Following the enactment by
the Knessetof the basic Statelaw in 1980,the Security Council reaffirmed that
legislative and administrative measuresand actionsby Israel "which purport to

alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal
vaiidity" (resolution476 (1980), para.3), and "are null and void" (para.4; also
resolution478 (1980),para.3).

21. In resolution446 (1979),the Security Councildetermined"that the poiicy
and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other
Arab temtories occupied since 1967have no legalvalidity" (para.1). This was
repeatedin the prearnbleto resolution452 (1979). In resolution 465(1980),the

Security Council determined"that al1measures taken by Israel to change the
physical character, demographic composition,institutional structure or statusof
the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including

Jenisalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity"(para.5). These words
were reaffirmed in resolution 471 (1980). The General Assembly also
reaffirmed that such measures "are null and void" (e.g., resolution 33/113C,
para.6).

22. In resolution 497 (1981), the Security Council decided "that the Israeli
decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied
Syrian Golan heights is nul1and void and without international legal effect" (para.1). The GeneralAssemblyalso declared that "Israel'sdecisionto impose
its laws,jurisdiction and administrationon the occupied Syrian GolanHeights
is nul1and void and has no legal validity andlor effect whatsoever" (e.g.,
resolution371123A(1982),para.3; resolution391146B(1984),para.3).

23. In resolutions affirming the invalidity of Israeli laws and measures, the
SecurityCouncil emphasized"the inadmissibilityof the acquisitionof temtory

by war and the need to workfor ajust and lastingpeacein whichevery Statein
the area can livein security"and that "MemberStatesin theiracceptanceof the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a comrnitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter: preamble to resolution 242 (1967).

See also resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969), 298 (1971), 476
(1980), 478 (1980). 497 (1981) and General Assembly resolutions 34/70
(1979), ES 712 (1980), 36/120E, 371123A (1982), 391146A (1984). The
Security Council and Ge'neralAssembly have ais0 repeatedly expressed the

view that the Fourth Geneva Convention relativeto the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 1949is applicable to the Israeli occupationof the
Arab territories (Security Council resolutions 271 (1969), 446 (1979), 452
(1979), 465 (1980), 469 (1980), 471 (1980), 478 (1980), 592 (1986), 605

(1987), 607 (1988) and General Assembly resolutions3005(XXVII) (1972),
361120E (198l), 391146A(1984)). In resolution 465 (1980), the Security
Councilexpresslydetermined that "Israel'spolicyand practicesof settlingparts
of its populationand newimmigrantsin those [occupied]temtones constitutea

flagrantviolationof the FourthGeneva Convention" (para 5).

24. A furtherreason thathas been advanced for theillegalityand invalidityof

the Israeli lawsand measures is that theIsraeli occupationof these temtories is
inconsistent with the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. In
1974, in resolution 3236(XXIX), the General Assembly reaffirmed "the
inalienable right"of the Palestinian peopleto self-determination (para.1). In

resolution 391146A(1984), the General Assembly declared that peace in the
MiddleEast mustbebasedon a solutionwhichensuresthe withdrawalof Israel
from the occupied territories and which "enables the Palestinian people,under
the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, to exercise its

inalienable rights, including the right to return and the right to self-
determination, national independenceand theestablishmentof its independentsovereign State in Palestine" (para.3). However, a rightof the Palestinian
people to self-determination has not been acknowledged by the Security
Council.

25. The Security Councilhas called on Israel "to rescind al1such measures

alreadytaken and to desistforthwith fromtakingany furtheractionwhichtends
to changethe status of Jenisalem": resolutions 252 (1968),para.3; 267(1969),
para.5; 271 (1969),para 3; 298 (1971),para.4;446 (1979),para.3; 452 (1979),
para.3; 465 (1980), para.6. It has also called on Israel "as the occupying

Power" "to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the
legal statusand geographicalnature, andmaterially affectingthe demographic
compositionof the Arabtemtories occupiedsince 1967 ...and, in particular,not
to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab

temtories" (resolution476 (1980),para.3;478 (1983),para.3. Seealso General
Assernblyresolutions 2253 (ES-V) (1967),para.1;2254 (ES-V)(1967),para.2;
and 3005(XXVII)(1972),para.2.

26. The Security Council also calledon States to take certain otherrneasures
in response, such as the cal1upon al1States "not to provide Israel with any
assistance tobe used specificallyin connexionwith settlementsin the occupied
temtories" (resolution465 (1980),para.7;also resolution 471(1980), para.5).

27. Additionally, resolution 478 (1980), para.5, provides that the Security
Council:

"Decidesnot to recognise the basic law and such other actions
by Israel thatas a result of this law, seekto alter the character
and statusofJerusalemand callsupon:

(a) Al1Member States to acceptthis decision;
(b) Those States that have establisheddiplomatie missions at
Jenisalem to withdrawsuchmissionsfrornthe Holy City"

The GeneralAssembly inresolution331113C(1978) called uponal1States"not
to recognise any changescarried out by Israelin the occupied temtories and to
avoid actions,includingthose in the field of aid, whichmight be used by Israel

in its pursuitof thepoliciesof annexationand colonization"(para.8). Similarly,
in resolution371123A(1982),the GeneralAssemblydeclaredthat actionstakenby Israel inrespectof the GolanHeights"are illegalandinvalidand shallnot be
recognized (para.5). This declaration was repeated in resolution 391146B
(1984),para.5.

28. More particularly, in resolution 3005(XXVII) (1972), the General
Assembly affirmed "the pnnciple of the sovereignty of the population of the
occupied territories over their national wealth and resources" (para.4), and
called upon"al1States, international organisationsand specializedagenciesnot

to recognize or CO-operate with, or assist in any rnanner in, any measures
undertaken by the occupying Powerto exploit the resources of the occupied
territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or

geographiccharacter orinstitutionalstructureofthoseterritories"(para.5). This
resolutionwas recalledin resolution3336WXiX) (1974),in whichthe General
Assembly reaffirmed that "al1 measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the
human, natural and ail other resources, and wealth of the occupied Arab

temtones are illegal" (para.2). Seealsoresolution175(XXVIIi)(1973) APPENDIX B

1985GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED

ON REPORT OF FOURTH COMMITTEE

RESOLUTIONSADOPTEDON THE REPORTSOF THEFOUKfH COMMIlTEEi

CONTENTS

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1960.mnuini~~ Deçlurtion on the Gan- of Inde- A m of thwed armmnuim of the -phial
FadniΠIOColond CouVia md Peopla. inddl oiher bauon and roooomic coad~diooolftbcT~IOV. and
molutions uid decision, of the Unitcd Nations IOLUabcinniin mind ihcoeaw<rv ofdivernfviiu and smmhih-
Amencui SMO.. indudinain iumolution 39/ ening her iu roonornyaii muer oipiionry in oidcr
31 o5 Deîcmbcl 1984. IOpmmoie cmnornic nability.
Taking infowwni the rutemat of the rep-uuve Raallililthedu~luhin 198ola UniledNationsviril-
of ihe adminir~a Pom 10Amuian Lm-'
Comiow of the nadIOpmmoie pr- tod the Mindjd tut Umed N~IIOOI n11wa mutons pmwdc
full implemcnution of the Dcçhntion in mpm of m etTecure memr of rranunuit Ihcsiiuruou inthe
Amena Suna. smdl Temlonn and eipresnna iu YIII~NOO ai the

a'FX.8.6.m~m!l=rnarofi~r~ovndcamminqn
Iradid& Glrm -. FmaA b SID*MU
W 0 INIOIIJLP.P II. IV .06 Xnla C-ed hmblr- .Faniah Scnk

uillingncu of the adminiriering Powcr io -ivviriting 10. Conruirrsthii the wsibility of wndina funhcr
misions in be Temioncl underits adminisualion. viiiting missio10Amena &ma= should bekepi undcr
1 A~prolel the CMPlCrof ine rcpn of iteSpcid ~vicw
Coliinittce on the Situiini" wprd io thc Irnplemen- II. Requ~fs the Spcial Commiiice io continuc ihc
uiion of the Dcclaniion on ihcGranitni of lndrwndcnce examinaiion ofthir ouestio11 iis ncxi xrrion. includiii.
ta Colonid Countrics and Pcoples ml2inglo me ri un the possible disrutch ofa funhcr viiiiing missionio
Samoa:' Amcnan Samoa in coniuluiion wrh the &micrrzenc8
2. Reajirm the indicnible righi of the people of POMI. uLlng inio rccounL inpan:culaf. the wshei al ic
Amcrian Samoa 10xtfdercmination md indcpndence mole of the Temian. ma io rcwn thcman io ne Gcn.
in mnfomity viih the Dulamiion on the Gnnting of
Indcpcndcna 10 Colonial Counuies and Pmpln con-

uincd in ûeneni Auemblv resolutian 1514(XV):
3 Rnrrrun the nev inir iuch facto3% icrntonal
rz. g-phical louinon. sue of population ana Iimiud âûl42. Question of CYM
airumi mourrn shovld inno vlv delw the SDeedvclef.
ci uvth; Go~lc of the Tcniiorv8fthcinlliinabie ri& The Genrral Aurmbly.
to uUdci;rminaiion and ind&ndcnce in confo~ty Hovinzconriderd ihe qucsiion of Gwm.
ulth the DcclrnUoii. which hlly applicr to Amencan
samm Having cuimind the relevant chaccn of ihc rcpon of
4. Caiùumnthe Govcmment of the Unilcd Suto of thc Spnal Commiiire an theSituiion Win regardio inc
Amena u the Jdminiitenng Poun.10uke al1nncuuy Implemcnuuon of the Derlaniion on ihe Granting of
seps .ting in10aaouni the ngnu anternu and wshn Indcmdmoc 1~~olonial Couniner and Praoln
of the woolc ofAmman %mol u emd (reelvui Rualling iu resolvtion 1514 (XV) of 14 kember
conditions.loding to malxlf-dcminauon, 10udic 1964.CO~Uhinlthe Dccluaiian on the Gnnting of lnde-
thc pmsnr of desoloniution of the Tcrntorj in accord-pndcnce 10Colonial Counuies and Peoplei.and al!olher
ance ulth the mlevmt provirions of the Chlner of the molutionr and decisioni of the Uniicd Nations rclaiingto
Unitcd Nations and the Lkclantion. and ruûirms the Guam. including in panicular iis rnolution 39132of 5
impoma of foileringanawness &mon8the poplc of Dcscmber 1984.
Amuian %mol of ihe pomibilitin open 10hem in the
uemk of their nghui~U-detmioition and Uidepcn- Havins heud the ruumenl of the rcpreunuuve of the
den-. adminisuring Pom rchiing to Guam.'
Nolin8 virh opprccinrionthe continucd anivc panicipa-
5. Takm noirof ihe clmrons held on 6 Novcmber tioa of thc adminiricrini Pwrin thcwrk of the Soecial
1984 mxi of thehm Uut ibe mly clcctcdGovcmor hw CommiiiŒ in mard ioûuam. thcmbyembling il 1; con-
sutcd lus inuniion10recommrnd Icushiion aubluhm dun a more infornicd and mnninpful examination of the
daily the pown mi duuo of the-vinow governmmi uiuuon uithcTcmioy win i virw io accelcnting the
-.mu,h orda 10avoidmnflinrofutharity andta omau of dccolonuauon iovucis the fuU ana s.dv .
ennu. suffiami budpury conwl;' hplnnmutioo of the Delaration,
6. Rt&m thc mmnsibility of thetdminirminr Ruailiw ihit a Guam Commissionon Self-Delemina-
Pow. un&< the Qmn. m pmmou theesonomic and lion ru appointcd in Fcbw 1984 10dd ulth the ru-
socut dcvclopmcnt of Amman Samoa. and aih upoo lui q&on in ammner acceptableiothe pople of ihc
the idminuentu Powr 10 inirnufy tu cKom 10 Temtory.
sutrmiien iod dirmtfy the esonomy of the Tcrnlory and
ui nukc il more whle inordn 10duce nu ha? ana T&w mrtofthe rutemcnl bythe mprewnuiive ofthc
rmcand 6nioorl depnde~cc on the UnitedSu= and to idminirtsM< Powr thai the Depanment of Dcfenx hid
aou ernDloymmtmuniun for ihpopk of theTer- authorircdthe ceicrv of romc 2.W hccures of !and prc
nww. nourly undm iu wnwl.
Nolin8 the put poimiial ofcrcd for divenifying and
7. Exprrr<n rk hor ihit the dcvclopmmi planntng developina the hconomy of the Temiorj. for clample.
pmc+u rniuitcdhY thchni hve-yeu developmmi plan mmmcd hrbi nnd culture.
mü be mnunued. md una ihc idmiaumm Pom. in Tahg me of the uken by I+ lemlorial Govern-
ewpntioa 4th III-umwriai ~ovetÜmcnt, .io ment, mth the suppon of the idminisicring Powcr. io
mmghm md otcnd the rcrpoiuibilitiathc üwelop dcvclop and pmmou the hnguap and culiure of the
mt Plraniw omq Clumomi poplc. who ue the indigenour pople of the
TmiWrv.
ulr clme cehuons and Œ-opnuon bel- the popla . .
of iheTvniory and the n@éounry ibd communtua Awe of thcrpeculnrrumsunm of the gcouaphiul
and bemn the icmuid Govcrnmmt and the mon-i~ ~- lmuon and esonomis condiuonr of Gum. 2nd bunng
iiutiiutio~ in orda iomhinccMC~ thc&anomic and in mind the nncuniv of dnventhnr and strcnrihcnini
100. 1 lfm of the pople of Amman Samoa:
9. Urp the adminisfmiw Pom. inewpcntion mth mots mnomic suhility.
the territorial GovcrnmenL 10 vfetwrd the inalinubie Rudlin8ibedupi~d1 in 1979ofa Univd Nations virii-
rightof the pople of Amcrian %m& 10the mjoyment of ing missioIO theTerritorj.
kir natuni raourm by uiing cfimivc musurta IO Afindfdthrt Unitcd Nations ~iiiiing mjuiops provide
mrure thcir rilht io own and diswx of ihox rerources an eRenivc mcinr of asanasning ihc iziution in the

and lonubluh and mainuin conwl oftheir futuredcvel. rmdl Territorin. and expressing iu satisfaction ai the
opmeni ulth a view10NUng conditions for a balancd mlli of the adminiruring POM~ lomire visiiina
acd viahicesonomy. miuionr inthe Tmitorin under iu rdrninisition.
6Ibd. Na IIINW211 .Nm Il. IV. Lnd XVII.
Ibd. Fanh Yu- F-6 Comiwrin. I7-0' 04- $3-31. nt. Raolid0,a id0.tdo. Ibr

1. Approvesthe chaptcr of thc mpan of the Spcial by uieUnited Suln Govsrnmcnt from 1944 io ,965..I
Cammittcc on IheSituation4th -d to the Implemen king thenpht ofinaividual chimanu notiopsn,c:paie<n
ution olthc Cedarationan theGnnting of lndcpndena thasutriement andconui.uc IOcmu :>rtrnvn cirom<
to Colonial Counmcr and Pmplesmhting 10 Guam:' 12. Reiterarer81cal1"pantheadrninistcnngPoa IO
2. Rcalhrms the inalienrblc rightof the poplc of ruppn mcuurn, by the temtorul Gavcmmeniaimed it
Guam 10 wlfdctcnnination and indcpendma in con- removins mni1r;ilntr io yo-hin iheuui ofagiculturc
fonnily with the kbntion on theGrantingof Indepn- and commercial dshingand to ensurclheir develapmcnt
dencc to Colonial Countrin and Pmpla. conuined in w the fullnt exunt:
Gencd Asumblv molution 1514 (XW.
3 Vrrcr the adminiriering Poucr. in co-apcntion
3 Rtofwms qtr cocvici~onthat such brton astem. wih thelenilotial cîovcrnment. to continueto ucKec
tonal sizc.;eoardphiul louuon. sizrof population and uvc mcuum 10nfcgurd and guaranteithe righi 01ihc
Iimltcd natwl mourrn snauld ~n no vav dcliv the peopleofûuam IOthcir ~lunl mum and 10nublish
implcmenution of the Declrntion. which Iidy rppfi10 and mainuin conml orer thcir future developmen~and
Guam: rsqueru thc administering Power IO uke a11n-ry
4. Rcofims the imvonrna of fonering in iwennr stem to pmlst the PmpenYriphts of the peopleof the
amongthe pcoplc of Guam of the possibilitin opcn to Tcrritorv:
thcm with wrd 10their riphi to xlldetermiartion. and 14 Rea@r>~< the imponancc of funbcr etlonrby the
calb upon theadministcrin~Povcr, in u~pcntion mth temional Governmcnt. wth tne suoponof rne adminss-
the territorial Govemmmt. to exMite the proas of unon Power. to devetooand cromote the lan-~-~--....-
dcmloni~tion srrictly in accordana vith the expW cuiiuk of the ~l~?morri ~~pie. who are the indigcnous
wishn of the pople of the Territorr. poplc of the Terntory;

5. Tolus nolcof thesuumeol bythercprrvnuUve of 15. Conridm Ihat the pouibility of wnding a Mer
the administeringPovcr lhit the Guam Commiuioa oa nsi* miuion w Guamal anappropriru timr rhouldbe
Self-Detcrminalion. vhichuni appointcd in Febnvry !ceplun& rcview:
1984 IOdealvith thesutw quenionin a muuier -t- 16. Rquns the S@al Commiirei 10continue the
iblc to the pmplc of the Thtory for rubmiuion10 the euminrlion of thil quntion al iuncx?session.including
Con(rln of the Uniicd Sutn of Ameria for ippmvsl. thepossibledismich ofr funher visitingmissio10Gwm
hopo to hold a lcd refcmndumbcforcthead 01198%' atrn aonm~riru lime andin consullatianwith!heidmin-
6. Talvs noteof thesulemml of the rrprarnutive of utcnnp'Po-ucr. and to mpon thereon to the ûcnenl
the United Sum afinning Ihat hu Govariment mpcnr Aucmbly riiu fony-ont insion.
themsh 01theGuanuniuu IOmnml thcir oamdntiny
bathmliticlllv andcmnomidv.'

1 Rmfirm iu nrong ronnnton Ihai the prrwncr 01
miliuy bun andinsulhuons in theTemloy muld con-
sututea miar obnrcle 10theimnlcmrnuuoo of the k- 4/43. Qnestion of &rmndi
lanuon an; thai iit&e hepnlbility of themiminisur- The GeneraiAssembly.
in6 Powr 10cnsm thatrliuirtena of such brvr and
hubtionr doa no1hinder the popdation of Ihe Terri- Havin8comidcredthequestional Bmnuda
tory hm exemsing iu nahi 10 xlfdeumiinrwn ind H4ti.w uomiiud the relcnni cha~tm of the rcmn of
indepndma inmnfonnity vith thep- and Md- IheS d Cammilue on lheSiiuuon onlh rcgud 10 the
vla 01lheCnanerof the United Nations; lmplemmuuon of the klintion on theGranun; oi
8. Uga the adminiserin( Po- w mtinuc to uke ldc~&80cc 10 Colonul Counuin andPm~les.'~
aüucceaaaw mcIIum no1Io involve lheTerriton in inv ~kdling iu molution 1514 (XV) of 1; Drccmbrl
oüauivc am or intcnemŒ -51 any otiteSuvr ind 1960.conuinrna VieCkchuon on VieGnnuna of Inde.
mdniΠloColonul Couninn andPmnb. uid al1othcr
10mrnply mlly wth lhc purpose and pnnapla of the blutions anddsisionr of the United ~ationi relatingto
Cbar7crt.he Cechuo~.~~~t-emol~uom iad -dauom Bermud..including in pini& iu rrrolution 39/33of 5
of heGA Anemblr rrhh to miliurr &WU~ ind
Dsamba 1984,
. --- -... Noiin~ the surcd pirition of the admininering Powcr
9. &&mu the mwnaibilily of the admininminc ihrt it vill furapn the vishn of the pople of Ber-
Pm. vDda the Cbuur. for tbcrconome ind d mudain deumiinina thefuturc constitutiod sutusofthc
dcrrh-t olGuun. an4 inIh» mnnmwn dia upon Tfmtoiy.
the idminuunru Pom 10 utc dl nnnvrv sua IO Comdmu of thc nd to ensurc theluiland spedy
st~nh~ uid dirmify the economy01 the'~&tory. implcmaution of the Dcchntion in rapm of theTerri-
rith a wer w reduci,,'the Tmitory's rconomzcdepn- tory.
dm on therdmininmns Pom: We1comi.wthe continucd CO-pntion of theadminii-
10. Reilrran the virr thai oneabnrcle 10cmnomic
dnclopmen~ pnioiluly in Ih iiriniliunMor. nmr Mng Pwr in the work of the SpecialCommiltec in
w buda. which contribuin ta inlomcd consid-
fmm the fart Ihat lqvicu of iandue hcld bythc fcd- mm ofanditioru m theTerntory mth a nrr 10rml-
cnl luihoritin. andallr uponthe adminisering Powcr. mtiq ihcpmau of dcmlonization for thepurpav of thc
1"mopntion vith theId ruthoritin. to mntinue the Mi imnLmmutian of ihe Dechntion.
tnnrfer of hnd10thepcopleofa Territory: A- of the specialcimimiunces of ihc ymphicrl
II. Notes that r settlcmeni wu mchcd ia 1984 Imtioo. sud ccswmic conditions of Bermuda, andbai-
h n mpr~nutivn of fomcr Guam- iandownm Uu in mird thc risccuin of divenilying andsvcnlthcnins
andthendministeringPm undmwhich the former di Wa iu cmnomy u ;matter of prio6ty in ord10 pr&
$39.5million in mmpnvtion for Iind ukm over mou cn>wmic subiliiy.

'lu.rash ha*. Sd- .va2J(UiMJL b XVlL 'olM-- Na 2J(NUY2JL-~~II:IV-VI md XIX.
'M. M 9.261 <I~ -DI7 -Forrieth Saibn

Mindfd thai Unitcd Nations viiitinn misions Drovidein progammes of rgricuiiure. fortriand 6rhcricr. and
an cKeciirrmeanr of awcrunning i& siruaiion in the urger the rpecializcd agencand ailooicerarganizaiiani
small Tcmionei. and exprnsinp iu uuri2ci.on si ihc of ihe Unitcd Nations syrtein io continue ia pay seal
wihmnr of inc idmuurlennfi Power tmcive ririr"nn aiicnttonIOthe dcvclopmcni netdi ai Bcrmuk.
miui&s in the Tmimrin und& iu ~dminiruition. II. UrgCS the admiaisicring Povctaconiinuc. iCO-
1. Approws the chpur of the repon of the SWd opraiion with ihc icmtorial Goremmeni. the assistance
Cammim on the Situation wircgxd io the Implemcn- neceuuy rot the cinplaymcnt ai the local wpulation in
ution of the kLuiuoa on the Gmting of Indcpnidena the civil umce. prnicuiarly ai seniorIcvclr:
IO Colad Couauin and Pffipla mlating IOBermudr."
12. Ernphari;tx the dninbiüiy of sending a viriiing
2. ReoMrnu the indiciable ripht of the mvle of &r- mirrian io ihc Tenitory ai the carlin1 wsriblc opponu-
muda io xlfdetmnioation and ;depnden& in conforni- niiy:
ity with the Dechiion on the GranLingof lndepndence 13. Rouesrs the Suecial Cornmittee 10continue the
w ColonixlCovnuia and Peopln. conuincd in Ctnrm examinaiion of ihii quisiion iunexi rioo o. includinn
Aucmblr .ol~ ~on 1514 1.0... .the porsabledirpluh of a wsatuig-:sri:O huaa ai
3. Reirnares the vicw thn ruch fmon asierriiorial an appropnaie limeand m consulU:ios nih ibe admims-
&. gewaphid lmtion. Nc of popukaiioaand limiuù 1enna Po-cr. and io =Don incrmn io!teGcncnl Assem.
natunl mo- lhould in no wy delaythe ipedy exer- bly u iu fony6rri u&ian.
ciubythe pcoplcofthc Temwy of theirindiemhle nghi - 99rhplennrymming
Io xU4etenninrIian and indepndcnce in conformiiy 2 Decrmbrr1985
*th the Declmtios which My rpplin io Bermuda.
4 Urgesthe United Kingdom of Grui Briuin and
Nonhem lrellnd, u th: adminisming Po-. uking into 40144. Quncion of the British Vidn Islmdr
acmunt the righir inlcrnu and Pisha of the people of ThcGtnrrnl Assernbly.
Benn+ expmxd tiuly in mnditions ludina io ml self-
detcmimtion. IOcontinue Io Uke dl n- sieps io Haring conriderrd the quniion of ihc BriDsh Virpin
msw the full and spedy implmcnution of molution Islands.
1514RVI: Hnvingexaminrd ihc relevant cbpien of the repon of
5 the SWal Commiiiec on the Situiiian'withregrrdta the
Retinorn ih.1iiis the oblipuon of the idminlrtcr.lmplementation of the klantion an the Gnnting of
ma Poxn w -te such conditionm Bennuda as WU Indcprndena IO Colonid Counuin and Pmpln.'l
rmùk the henk of Lui Tern~orvto czcmx frulv rnd R~nliing iu molution IJ 14 (XV) of 14 December
1960.conuilung the khtion on the Gnnting of Inde-
mtim ana ind-dmu in amrd.n& rith rcsolution pndmce w Colonial Counuin and Pmpln. and ail other
1514(XVL. and. in ih.1 mnncction. rrainmis the impor-mluuom and dccisionsof thUniiedNations rehtinl to
tuia of fa- m ivucneu amon: <hcpeople of &r- the British Virpin Ishdsindudin8 inp.niorlu iu -
m& of the pouibiliticr om to thm in the ex& of lution 39/34 of J December 1984.
mit nghç
6. Rm&m ih.~inaccu- aith iherelevant pro. Noring the suicd position of iheadmiaisicring Power
niions of thChurerof rbe Uniud Nations and the Dtc. ih.1it +i hillmpm the mshn ofthe pple ofthe Brit-
Iuatim mnuincd in molution IJ 14(XV). itU vltimaWy UhViwn Ish& in delenninina the fut-politid sutus
(OTibe mpk of Bermudaihemrelva w dcterminc their of thcTemioy.
om fum mlitid NIUS Conviovt of the need Io ensurtehe fdl and sWy
7 ~m& tuanw mnvtniontut the -ce of implcmenution of the Dcch~on in rnpm of the Tmi-
du17 buerwi inrulliuons m Bermudamuid mnsu- .--.
N1C a m4.n obxk Io tbCmplnnau~o~ of the kli- Noiingwirhapprcciaion the mnuriucd adve prnicim-
rutoD and ih.1itu ibcraponnb~I~tyof theidmuusienn( uon of the admuusunru Powr in me workof theS m
Pmr IOccau~ ih.theeWMΠofsuchtpvr and miW. Comrnitut ra rqvd io the 3niish Vqzn Idan&. thercby
hoooi dca mi h& thepcpuliuon of the Tcmiory eniblinn il ro condm a mom mJarmed and mednindul
bom ncmsM iu nlht xlfdeurmmuon and ind~ ~ euminition of the situation in the Tmiroy vith<n,
pem&mu in &ormi-v kth ibc p- and ptincipln IOiccelcnm the pmccu of decolonization for th: pur.
dtb+~. pou of theM implcmenuuon of the khtion.
8. urfflthe ad- Pow IOmnMuc to tatc Rmprning the raponsibility of the admininhg
Pom to promote thcemaomic and IoMl developmmt
odcnsivey~cumof inienmuw dinad e te Temoibcr Suvry of the Temitory.

and Iommply Wiy *ith rbepurpowi andpnMpln of the Noiingwirhcorn tut durina thpen'odunder renru
Q.M. tbe Dcduition mdthe rcsolutioar anddeguonr the inicmariod nonomic misir auvd tourism and iu
of theGesml APcmbly mhtiw u, miüy,icuviuo and ruppodve dus. the &Uy of the emnomy. io slow
unnpmpnu by colonialPo- m Tmwna undcr their dom. and utin: noie hi consvunion adritin
ldminiStRt-0-. in- and &ut the territonil Governmnt in iu mu-
9. UrgeaonceagaIn the idminuurin# Poxn. in co. tinucd eiioru 10brmden the bax of theemnomy. vrr re-
o<muon wth the tcrntorul GovcmmrnL Io maunue io eumining iu indusuulùltion pm<nmme,
ukc U eErmvc murum in iuumtcc the npht af the Awe of the rpecid ammruncn of the geopphid
Iwlion and ~cowmic mndiuonr of rke British Virain
rcsourar and IOaub.ish rnd muouui mnml ovcr theu Islan&. andb- in mind thc nneuity of diversiffa
funutdcrrlopmmt wth a nw w mun( mndiuoos for and nrrn~eniq Mer iu emnomy u a miur of pnor-
a biLoud and ni-lc emnomv.,. ity in ordnIOprnmoie emnomb rubüity,
10. Wtlcomn the rnlkii phyed in the TemitOq by Welcoming the mnuibuuon 10the derelopment of the
theUmwd Nations Dcvclopment Ro<Rmmc. speci6ay Territoy by the United Nations Dcvclopmeni Pro.

" !M..Ch..XIX. I~IM.-01 IIIV.vuidXX. nt. Rool&.. .d0OL'dW lb. of ibFmb Cmmine 263

mamme.the United Nations Fund for PopulationActiv- mrourccs and to erublirh and mainuin control ai the*
iun. the UntlM Nations Chlldrcn's Fund. inc United fulum devclopment:
Nationr InoJ~tnalDevclopme~tOrganiultan. spna.ucd 8 L'rgrrtherpcc'a1.r-Ç rpcnc.and olnerow>nu.
azcnnn and othcr orplnux~oni of the United Nationr lions of Ihr Untied NattonsnricrIOinlcnr8rmoim
syl<cmopenring in tic Tenitory. and notimgthe con- 10 acaferalc progrein inewxiil andrconomicltfof the
tinuid panicipauon of the Tenitory in the Cànbbcan T~~torv.
Croup for Codpntion in EconomicDevelopment. as 9 Rei:rrores ils dupan ~ncrdminilicnnpPovcr to
vell asin eooal orgrniuuonr.includin8 in panicuhr facillute the funncr panicipaiian of lhc BnurVan
the Cuibkui Developmcnthnk. Islandsin vanou inIrmaiional androponil opm;!ons
Wclcoming oLr ohe pmicipation of theTenitory asan md m other orguiutions of thUniiM Kaliansi>rum:
date memkrin thevork of theUnited NationsEdu. 10. Conridm !ha1the possibilit) oi xnai2bhcr
utional. Scimu6c and Cultml Organization.the Gono. visiuw misszon IOthe BnLsh Virpn lsll~& aiuiappm
mic Commission for Latin Amcrica and the Clribbcan pnale cimeshouldbckcpt und'r rrnw
andiu subridiary %y. the&be Devclapmcnland
Co-ornnuoa Comm!ltrr. asvell 3slnvuiour othertntcr-
nationalandeonal oqmizations,
Realling thedispLchin 1976ofa Uniicd Nationsnsil- thc pouiblc dispalch ofa viriting missionio iric ci si
ing missionto the Temtory. Virp Islandsal an ippmpnalc !,me andio convduuoo
mth theadminisenna Po-cr. and IO rcpar.themn IOinc
Mindm hi United Nations vidzing misions pmvide ûnid Aucmolv sr iu ïonv.6ni !mion
anciTeive munr of uocnwiini the situation in the
mJl Tmtoner. and cxp-8w;u nusfacuon al the
nlliapew of the dm8nutmog Pover 10roccsvensitinl
misions in theTemtonn unan tuidminisuruon.
1. Approrn the duper of the mon of the SFCCUI 4/43. Qliation of the Ciymui 1s-
Cnmmlim on theSiiwuon 4th n%ard IOthe Imphmcn. TheG~~nrrA olÿrmbly.
uuon of theDesluruon on thcCnnuna oflndeaendena
w Colonid Counuin and mhG& to ;bc~riwh Harinz co~rdrrcd the quntion of theCaman Islands.
Hm'ng uiimiiud the relevantchapm of the mpn of
2. Rmjhw the iaaiinublW! of +e peopleof the theSpnal bmminec on theSituationmth regardto the
Briwh Vim Ishds 10ulf-deternuiruon and tndcpcn- lmplcmenution of the Deslanuon on the Cnnuag of
dma in confonnity mth theDeskation ontheCran- Iadcpmdena IOColonlalGuntrin andPmpln.''
of lndepcndena in Colonial Gunuin md Pmple* con- Rwlling iu raolution 1514 O(V) of 14 Deamkr
&cd in Gcoml Arvmblv molvuon 1514 .<YI.. 1960.ma- ihc khlion on ihcCmting of Inde-
3. Reunnia the new th.1 ruchLaon u &tonil pendena m Colo~,Counvin andPeople*andal1othcr
h. mphial lcation. siu of popuktion and limited roolution, md dmrionr of theUnilcd Nitioer mWhs to
<uttualrru>umr shouldin no waydehy the specd yx-- the Cimm Ihds includinginpniculu iu miution
M bythepople of theTenitory of ihcir inrlimahk ri@l 39/35of 5 kmber 1984.
m rU4eurniinition and indepndrna in confomty
witb the Daluruon. rhich fully amha to the British Nmrng the suied priuon of the ~dminislrnng Powr
vii Ida"& 1b.1ilWU Tullympcn thewihn of thepople of tte CAY-
mrn lsh& indcunnimn: Ihe luiwc poliW rulw of
4. Reirnoia th.1il u tbrrrponribilin of the United the Tenitory.
Kinadom of Great Bnuia and Nonhem IreW. u the Conscioui of thenced 10 enrun ihe luil and sprrdy
adm-inisuriruPOW. m arc luchcondition, in ih Berit- impicmmuuon of the klurtion in mm of theTemi-
ub Vup I&& u mü enabletbepople of theTmtory m-.,.
m racrPo kly andmibout inderma thnr irillc~ble Na8ngth.i aliboughinc man won of theeoonomyof
Nbl IO ~lf-dc~rrrm~uon ml indmmdence in mord- the C.yw Islands ipci6dly taunsm. ~ntmtiond
- md rd marc. mnuued 10swutn somedeplce

S. Rm$iwnsth.1 il ù ultwtely for thepople of ihc
WtUh vii Unds ihmulva m delenninethcir fvtw Avnn of the rpsiil ciwmsuna of the ~nrpphial
poli<iIA Nuu in rerirdtna withthe relcwt pmviswn,
dihc Q.M ofthe Unied Nationsuidthe Dcci.nuoa. loaiioo andoconomiccondiuonsof theCam Ishb.
and.in th.1conneoion.m5mm theimmrunce of forer- and karing in mind the ncŒsrity of dirmifying and
ma w arumar mo<y r)upropk of rbeTemtory of the ords Io mmote economicrubilitv.maltn ofprionty in
pouibù~ua opn IOthmi in the ucrnu of iheu nUI1 10
nlfdC<m~ ~~ - -- Nciing mrh appmïoiion ihc conilnucdmnvibution of
6. Norn the conliuuin:ommilment of the timlod the United Nations Devclopmmt Ptugmnme io the
Govmimnit m the goaiof aonomic dirmifiauon. pu- devdovmcnl of theTmitory.
ocululv in the .rcrr of midture. 6shena uid smlll Rdli~tfthedispruh in 1977ofa Unilcd Nationsviril.
icdu~na. and reiuntcr ib di "pin ibe administmiU ingmprim Io the Temiiory.
Paver .ncwpntim with rbeimimnil GovemmenI. to Mindfulhl Unitcd Nilion, risiting missionsprondc
inlcnrify iu cRoa in thm. in Sadive ms of IY+naininl the situation in thC
sm.ll Tenitorin. and exprnring iu satirbaion rl the
7. Urgathe admininnin:Pom. in m-opntion witb dihgneu of the admininering Pom 10-ive risiha
tbcteniIorial Govmmeiit in safvrd the idicnable mUMDI in the Temitorin undmiu admininriaion.
*l of the peopleor the BritisViMn Irh& 10 the
mloymcnt of thetr nitunl rnourcn by uking cfective 1. Appmw, the chapter of the rcpn of Ihe S&ll
mures to ensuretheir riIOovn anddiipau of [ho* Commilvc on lhe Silualion vith r& Io theImplcmcn-
- 'l (Mchp.XX. 1IhL ch.p IIIV.v"d XXL. -F.rn'*,bSNim

talion ofihe &laraiion on the Cnnlingof lndcpendcncc 12. CONiderxihai the pouibility of undini runher
io Colonial Couni"csand P:oples rrlaii10 ihc Oyman viriiing miuion10 the Cayman Islandsaian appropriate
isluidr:" timc should k kcpt undcrreview:

2. Re~~%mrthe inalicnablc eghi of the peopleof the 13. Reqyfsrs ihc Special Cornmiticeio coni~nucthe
Gymm Irli.ids la xlfdeieminaiion and indcpendcncc crrminaiion of ihir quaiion ai iu nexi -ionincluding
in wnfomtiv wiih ihc Detlrraiion on the Granlin. of ihc porriblc dirwich ofa viriiing miuiIO ihc Cayman
lndcpadcn& io Colonial Counuics and Pmplcs. con- Islandsai an approririau lime and in roniuluiion wiih ihc
uined in Gcneralhxmbly -luiion 1514 WV): rdminirtcnng Power.and io repon ibe:conta ihe Gencnl
3. .Pnternin the viciv that such facion as territorialrwmbly ai iu fony-fini xssion. :
U2e.popriptid laation. suc of population md limiied
caluni rnourcn ihould inco vay dchy Ihcspcedycxcr
nu by ibc poptc ofthe Tcrr.ion of ibcu inaiicnaolengbi
io xlfdr:cm.naiioo and indeandenu YI confonniiv
with the klaraiion. which fuuy applin io the ~ymaB 40146. Question of 3lonwnnt
Islands: Tk GeneraIAuembly.
4. Nora wt:h opprcia:~on the panicipaùon of the
Uniied KUiadomof Gmai Briuin and Nonhem Imlmd. Havingconriderd thc qucsiion of Monmrnt.
u the admkiric~g Power. in the vork of the Spnd Hnving cxominrd the relevantchavten of ihc mwn of
~mmiikc in regard Io the Gpm Island% themby the Spnal Commiiuc an ihr Stlwiion nin rcgara io the
mabling il IOcondun a more iofnrmed and meaninfl Implcmcnuiion of the klaraiion on inc Cnniing of
eumination of the situaiion in the TerriIori. mth r vimLndcandencc io C~ ~ ~dCo~ninn ma Pemi~..-....'
io iccelmriq the pmau of decoloninuon for the pur- RuaIllin# tu rwluuon 1514 (X\? of 1.1Detemkr
pou of he full implcmcnuiion of the Declurtion: 1960.wnuinu the Dechniion on cc Gnniing of Inac.
andmcr IO Colonui Countnn ana P~-ln.~-n. -. ..~..~
S. Rti:craicr that it ir the mwnsibilit~ of the adminkluuons and dmsionr of the L'niicdSaiions rchiinIO
vnn: Povcr io mu such coodiuons in the Gymn MonuernL including in puuculu lu rrxiluiion 39/16 of
Ihds +r u?Ucnablc the poplr of the Tcmrory IOrrn- 5Deamkr 1984.
~e fmlv andwiboui inidema theu inrli-bk niht
w x~dld;imnt~auo~ and ~ndmde~>u YI ~M~&-cc Noting the surcd pornuon oi ihc ~dminirtcnng Poucr
nth rnoluuan I J14 O<V).u sic0u dlothn relcvinr cc,. thai il WU mm thc wshn of mr peopleof ,Uoniumi
oluuons of the ûcncnl Auembly. ID demmmg the fuiurr poUIial ruiu of the Tcrnicry.
6. Reab%nuthai it is ultimiely for the pople of the Nofin8thc vicu of ihc Governmrni of .Uonixrni ihai
Capan Ishnds themxlva IO devnnme iku Aiim mdepndenΠuns mcvluble ma kinbic and.~n thii
polual st;ius m acmrdura mth the rrlewi pmviSON wnnrnioo. hi thc mional Gorernmcni wuid preparc
of the Chinn of the Uuud Nmons and the -uon pmglmmn of wlaual eduauoa 01 vhlch 10lnmcax
and in wnnmion. reaMms the immrinna of ihcpople's a+nnr of the knefiu'of indcpendcncc.
in<an avuennr amow the pople of the Tmmq ofihe Noring wih mm thnidu- the priod under nviw
pouibiliin open io thcm m the r- of ibeu rwi IO the inumnuoii.l mnomic msis coniinued to have an
~Udeumisluan andmdmndmor. advm eUm on the vmional MDomy uid reruired ia
7. Reafim the rcrpcnsibilw of the .dmsiustmn: m mwih in the gmu Comnuc prodm and a redunion
Pom Io promole the nonomic wd locul Mopmeni m the nie of -wh of em. .vmr~ ~ ~d -~ ~.~~.
of the Tcmion and unn ii.m uFoDernuonmth the m.
ri104 Govemmen~ 10-rrnde~wn&uin< support. & ihe Welcomng the fan ihnt m inausing numkr of po~lc
hileri exient pauible. 10the devclopmmi of pmgrmmu fmm Uic Tcrntoy m kin: empiow Inthe oviixmiu.
ofesonomic divmiktion which 4 bene61the mpic ominhlv ai the hirber Œhelon. ~ncludintthe anmini-
of the Tmitoiv: mm1of a~u0ii.l u-mcf Mcdicil Offior.;nd noiini the
rrsommm&tions for r.lir i-y mdc bythe &Grin
8 T& noir of the sulement of the idmmirtcn~ Commision on public KMCC vLrin and condiiionr.
Pour IO the cUm ihirdnpiic the pmr qdw ofthemil Welcoming ab the coouibutioa io the dcvelopmcntof
mihe Temlorr. a rmdv mnduEvd bv thcmionil Cov- Mooiurnt by the Unsud Niinons Devcloprncnt Pto.
ernment in 19& mvdk rome &ibiliùu in the fieldof sramme. thcUiuicd Nauom Childnn's Funa. swialued
muitrj. auiniltuni and pr>ü)ni ~irmii+ amau and othcr orvnunuons of the Uniicd Nations
9. Uqesthe admioistahg Powcr.incwpntion with sfnem opmti- in ihe Temtoly. &?d noiing the wn-
ibcIcniiorid Govmunmi. Io degud the +lienable tinved pniciprtion of the Temiory in thc Cuibhn
-1 of the pople of the Temitory to the mjoymmt of Group for Cwpntion in Econcmic Developmcni. as
ihei rriurl -umr by uking cUmive muiurn IO weU u in mional orvnizaùons such u the Cm'bbun
ensure thcir rilhi io om md dis- of thcw wuna Communiw ;nd iU a&iated insuiuuons. includin: the
Caribtan Dcvclopmm: üani
opnimg Awe of the sonil circumruncn of the ~mara~hical
10. Callr won the spciilized qcncia Md othcr locauon and ecooomic mndiuuns of Mohue"~ and
orpnirntioos of the Uniicd Nations spiem. u rell u in mmd the n-w ofdirrnifyin:and sirenoh.
miorul instiiutions such as the Grihbcln Omlopmmt mini fvnhn nu nonom* as a matin of ononir ~norder
kt w wounuc io ukc dl neccsarj maruru w -1- 10phmole nonomic subility, ~. .
aie p- in the ranil and nonomic lire of Ibe Cay-
Rmdling the dùpvh in 1975 and 1982 of Uniicd
min Island% Natioar visiting missions to the Tcrriiory.
II. Notn viih nppreciaiionthe continucd wnuibution MicdfuI <hic visitin: mission, pmvidc an eUmivc
of the Unitcd Nations Developmmt Pmmmme Io the mcam of axenaining the situation in the small Terri-
derelopmeni of the Tcrritory. tories and expressing iu uùsfacIion al the willingneu of

"/M.. S&m Na 23W'O/I>). chi* 11.Ivind XXII. AIXX PY.AI 'I3d"l''lliOt,VI.O,8Y.Y'ldJ"Wl;;

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'h!l!qnra!wouon aiow
-ad 01 I~DJOui riuoudIOmiru rcc rwouoaa ni ami
autu~@uaiir pu. hdjIua~ip JOIilcsaxu aqi pmw ui
lwmq pu. 'qmlw JOruonrpum aiwouon Pueuonml

ltxqdtdaal aqiJO cnunrui~as Irds aqiJO uay :vwr~ ma!- pur qml aqi JOvaau
rrmid uoiirnuolaup am >un iuamdola*ap am oi oo!ionir lr!aaüs id or anu!ium 4
-uqme JO huis pro amJ0 d e SIuintA1 NOn-N 7- iwwdola~~ uwqqw am n suo!imnru! puo.
paiion ayi JO cuonrnu&o ut uaqwaui n- n qmt n llam n. "iilaliln10nrN pai!un aqi JO roon
ouoiwa~ JO uoiirduwrd am irqi mu amSuilu~rlu# -nu&o iawo pur sqaua% pmpWr sqi WB,"
'6
'9861.2861
poud aqi aoj awwu8oa.i aqi rq q~!nsw JOJpaqn~qmw am qat6 wnunx mouu io~ pim ¶mq mu
aansgBu!uoqd a*!lm!pu! ar!lulsnll!aluvdx aqi lu!iou SIPWI am iay, pu.mq a4i 4 PIDIA pw atnJOmon
por 'ell!ndw u! lu!~uaüo wai& suo!ir~ pa!un aqi .madm am asho IMU~ aaldwm m *ou ~naimiorm
JO suo!imrnsro aamopur avualc pa?X~r!xQs'~wuiul
-0Jd iuaudolanaa SUO!lrN W!Un ail1 Aq fiol~al
aqi JOinawdo~a~apam 01uo!inqu~um am 8Ytwo~a.~
. ~. ....
psraaam mininolp pu. c+r
-P 'P861SVP u31(1Y3Pm3110JWYOdFm =!AIX IF!¶
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?me.ionqpaU!trnli rll!nloJO Ph61
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iw~o(w ayi 01aldoadaqJo i@u alqrwqru! ;unma
'fi0lunl nn JO vu. Wirmml tucn&in 01Zvunrl roam Durnin iam
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lu?ais!u!upe aqi JO Ai!l!q!ruodui aqi S~!w@w
~uollY11aw a.U10 "O"

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-wog pd's a;ii'jo von ai; uiiamoa ~liwii!u!riptiql pur a!wnuon amJOiuawdola~apam aiaqmi ol
JOuonvdvnred pmium aql uomuuddn q1.mOu!io,q wp~o m wwu1mjo ainwrdol6 n! pindu pm Lpmu!
oiqnannd m 'purvuilr~ smm pur ml amJOrnam
'fi01 -do(a~ap ppn pur nuiouor am aiowoid 01umnalu
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'uoiuaal aqiJO min' ~nnilod miy aqi Bunuiuiap Dm Allwn~~ooo~ uuolul~l IYDDW~~D nt duia~aD
01 ~llrn8w JOaldoxi aqiJOUUSU, au1dul IIU,IIleql
ianod Puu~ir!uiwp~291 JO uonirod vins aql Su!roh.

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iaqio 11;pur .wldoad pur uuiuno2 p!uolog oi aaua~uad Jlam woaaapaiuI inoqiw pur Alai) xuaa.3 oi i.toirua1
.auul JO8uiiuei3>a uo ooiiuelw ylqiBututnum '0961
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am u! suoii~ouo~u>ns aiuu oi 'iano~ BuuairtuluiD*
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aa 01plch qilm uoilrnlt~ 2400aauiuu02 le!Yds 2.0
JO UO4a ~UI. .adc4a iurnaia .u1 ..WYI.IDX, ~UY>A.. :rpuelrl smm
pur aqi 01qddr AllnJqa!qn'UO!IQ.I~~~ 341qlp
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2qi anu!iuo> ai aaii!uuioFWS aqi rlrnbi~ .ZI Qin1 aql 018ullrlai raldoad pur uuiunog Irruolo3 01
:rn~in>irpun id27 3 ppoqr auiii >ieuoo~ddr ~JU~DU~~DUI IOBUIIUUQau1uo~otiu~nm ~UI 10uolin
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uatv vrrwj- rep~ 01<h. Fo~b Co-nn 167

.%fird/uihat Uniicd Naiianr viiiiing mirrioor providcComnrirrion for hiin .\mcnw and rhe Oribknn and iu
an effective mcanr of awewining ihc siiwuon in Vic rubsidiarybody. the Cinhbc3n Dcvclaomcnt and Co-
rmall Terriiones. and expressing ils sarisfaction ai thaperaiion Cornmiilce. and in other organiuiion: of the
willinrnerr of the adminisicnna Powerta -ive viiit-nu United Nations sysiem. inriuding ihe Gribknn Group
mirrions in11icTerniones undk ils admir.iruaiian. for Co-opention in Econamii Develo~neni:
1. .4pprO.e-ihe chapter ofihe won ofthe Spciai 12. CONI~CB zha!the ponib~iiiyofwnding s funhm
Commiile~ on ihe Siiuaiian with ceprd ia the Implcmeo-visiiingmission!O.Anguillaai an rppropniie iimc should
iriiao of the Declantion on the Gnniing aï Iodepcndcna k kepi undcr revim,
io Colonial Counina and Pmplci nlarinp ta Anyilku
13. Rlpur,~, ihc Specinl Conrniiiec io coniinue the
2. Rea5nm the inalienable nshi of The pcople of examinaiion of this gvniian ai ils nert session. including
~~gwüa ioxIf-<leieminauon ana uiaepcodcne tncon. the possible displich of a funher viriting mission io
fomiiy nin Vie Declaralionan inr Gnnunp aï lndepco. Anguillaai anappmpnaic lime Md in conrultatiuo w'ih
ncxc 80 Colon~al Counuin and Pmclo. containrd .n ihc admirtirtering Power. 2nd Io rcpon ihcreaIO the
Gencml Auembly 11itr fony.6nt sesiion.
3. Retitrrun the vicw that such facion ir terriional 991.5pltnas mtefinq
rile. xmprariticll loatiosUc of wnulaiion and limiied 2 Drcembrr 195s
osru.& rrro~rms modd in nova;dclay the smy eicr.
"Y by ine wptc oithe Tcrniory oithcu imicnablc nsli
to ulfdcicnnioaiion and tndcpcndencr inconfamxiy 40149. Qontion of the United Sure Virgin bh&
nib me Declaralion. -nich huly appiin io An@k
-: Reirrratrr ihii sithe mponubility of the United The Gerv.01hsembly.
IOodaom oï Grrai Bnuin and Nonhem Inland. aime Having conriderd the qucrlion of ihc United Soies
adminiricnnu Poun. io mu suchCOO&UO ta AD& Vi IlluidS.
as wiU aabie iu paple 10erercix fmly and wiihout
ioierfercnce. ïrom a wcll-infonncd sundpoiou io the Having e.rnminrd the relevant chapierr of the npon of
avaiiable options. tiicirituiienablc rishi Io ulfdemha-theSM Cornmittrran Lie Sivation wiibrgud IOibe
tioo and indcocndeoa in accordana mth wlutioo ISI4 Implemcnutiom of ihc Declrnrioo on the Gnnting of
lndepndena 10ColonialCounine and Pmpla."
(XV). asweu'u dlothn nlennt molutions of the h- Rlcalling iU wluiion 1514 C<V! of 14 kccmk
era l rumbly. 1960.coouining the kianùon oo the Gnnùng of Inde-
5. ReaBvmr &ut it k ultimatelv for the mode of pndaa w ColonialCounina and Pmpla. and rUothn
hguill. tirnulva io detemine th& htm poiitid ru- nsoluùons and decirionsof lhc UIKilcdNations nhring io
iw in rmir%a with therelevantpmvkiooi oftheChu- the United Suln Vi- Irhds. includinginputiculu iu
ter of the Unrted Nations and the ùŒhntion. and.,in &ut-lulion 39/38 of S Dnemkr 1984.
mnnmioo. rrrfnmis the impNDce of forteMa an Nain# nlh appuiarion the mntinued activŒnicipr-
amna> unoq the peopleof the Teniioy of the poni- uon of the adminisicrion Pown and the mrexnuuurire of
bilities op0 w thcm in the erecciu of thcir right Io wuthe urniorui Gavm&ni in the work of the Sp4
d~tion md indcandcrm Committec in rr@ io the U~icd Suia Vupri Idan&.
6 Cdh upon the dmiiustmq Pow io mounue. in mmb ~,emblras $110coniun r ma-~ -fo~mnl ana mm-
-nuon -th the umrod CovmrnenL w mdd wminr&n ofih;~ituation in the ~enito4th a
sucnnha the rcooarnr of Andia and ro mrrav au viëw IOlcalcnMI the pmccn oïdecoloniuuo~ for the
nuis&Π10pm-ma of di&ificatioo; p- ofthe lvll implemmuiioo of the klaniion.

7. Nota &ut, althouab theTenitory w oo low in Takinr imo mount the sutemeni of the rc~revnuùvc
need ofa mt from the adminisrnios Powr 10 Uce of the idminisicrin8 Pown that the ~eniiory of the
ils raumnt bu- for 1984. the ûovemmmi of the uosud Sutn vuwnislu.&eo,op a lup rneum ofx~f-
United Kingdomrgced topmvide irpcnil mi 10cleu ~ovemrnrnt thmuah tu elecud rcpnxnuiive+ Mrnely.
the dehcit ~unulated bemm 1977and1983: the Govcmor. mcmkn of the Lçprliiurc and the Tn-
S. Urk~ theadmininahg Pwr w vire eiïcnivc ritoty'aon-v&ing delepie 10thc Üniied Suta Haw of
masura. in swpntioo rith theuniionil ûovm. ReOramutivn and notinpthe meni gcncnl elmians in
mmL w YTquirQ -ta d num the righu of the theTeniiory.
people of bilh w om md dispou of thnr aitunl Nging wiih mnctriiibt the economy of the Territory
rrwmr 4 w anbhb and ndwDvim noud ovn their anr u d-bed by the ûovernor. "temponrily
fum derelopmai: dep-d". pinicularly in the iouris~ mnswunion aod
9. Urgn the idminirtmiq Po-r la umiiauc. in co- indiiruul~M~n. u weU asin the dclivcn of govcmmai
opmuon with the mriwnil Governmm~ the irrisuna s&ica and aouna thii the Teniiory's hdwvial devcl-
0- for the in- employmmt of the I d popu- opmcot prnyuornë would ruRn a viback u a mult of
~auooin the civi-a. mnilulv a &or levcll: the uuounccd >lm of Mmui Muiciu Alurnina. Inc. for
10. Reiierain ifs wvcn w the idmininetins Pown. thcclmm ofnu aluminium nhnt in the Ternior? in1985,

in the light of the obvrvationr mociuioos md mm- Welmmm# ibc conunued pmiopruon of tbc Uoiicd
mcodaiions of ibe Unitcd Naiioiu Viitiog Mission io Suln Vvpn lshds. u m iuoorlc mrmbn. inthe work
Anplla. 1984P.10 aoUnue w e&t + hunΠofthe of ibrEmnomic Cammurton for Laun Ammca and ibe
WmIizcd ymoa and oiba orpniuuom ofthe Up<cd Gbbao md iu svbsidiw bodies inclcdina the Cuib
Nations systcm.u WU u other eod and intcrnatiod kan Dcvelopmai md Co-apniioo Cornminec. and
bodies. in the development and suniphmimg of the ccon- oouq the puunpluon of a mprrunuiivc of the Temlory
omy of bgui~k, u i mcmkr of the ~CINUOD of the zdmtntslenoa PoIQ
II. Cd13 vpon the idminisi- Pom 10continueO
faciliule the panicipati.-n of Anyuiih in the Economic
-
l'~~c.~~~~XXw;. IV. Yclang Milnlor.rj2cioIhesulcmrnt oftCr aon~nirlcr. In@Inomcr Iocnrurc ihaithepcoplc oilnc Uniim Suln
in# Pobrr :ha;ilenccncd the wliq thaireprcwnuii~n V~rpinIrlrndr uere fuihlu~ic oi !ne:rnp<icalionrof the
cf theTc-.ion rncu.d pan>c:wie in!ommr ln*hm the
Tem~ar, warlhe subjni of diuunion. vanous ruiur oo:lonrb. inctune of inc rcirr~~~.rn.:'
9. Urgesihc adminirtenng Pawer.incodpntion vith
Awrt of the spcriai cimurnruncn of the gcographiul thc ternional Governmcnt. io ruenphen ihe cconornyof
locrlion and economic condirisnt of the United Suies ihc Temitoryby &ng raditianrl mearumsofdirmi6u-
Viain Irlnndr.and kanng inrnind the ncczssiryofdircr- lion in al1heldr and developingan adcqwtc infrastmnum
rihng and simnghening funhcr iu cconorny a%a matter viW a vie* <O mducing th.econornicdcpndcncc of the
of prioniy in ardcIOprornaie cconornicrtability. Tcmrary an the rdminirtcnng Poxcr.
R~cnllingthcdispalchin 1977of= United Nationsvisit- 10. Rcadvmr the mrponribility of the adminirlcnng
in&murion to the Temitor,. Pawer undm the Chancr IO promoic the manornic and
Minfil that Uniicd Nations viriiing missions provide -ai developrnenl of the UnitedSutcr Viwn Islands:
an cUe=tivcrnercs of awcruining the situation in the II. tirfrs the administrnng Powcr. in CO-operation
rmlll Tcnitocin, and erpmrring ils wtirfiction nt the 4th the Gaveniment of the United Slaies VirginIslands.
mllingnnr of the adrninirtcnng Pover Io mire visiting to rifcswrd the inalienable riphioflhc people ofthe Ter-
misions in the Territocin under iu adminirtntion. ritoryIOthe enjoyment of their naruralmowcn byuking
cUmive measumr Io gvaranie their riphtio ovn and dis-
1. Appmvn the chnptcr of the repon of ihe Sped paw ofihaw mwium and to nublirh and mainuin con-
Commitlrr on the Situa"0n withrcgîrdIo the Irnplemen-
Ution oftbe Dechcationon the Gruiting of Independence uol of theif futwe dcveloprncni:
10ColonW Couniries md Pcopln mlating m ibc United 12. Urges the admilistcring Power10uekin the Gr-
Sutu Virgin Islandzl' ibbean Group for C~opention in Economic Dcvclop-
1. Rm@nu the inlliciilblc ribt of the pcople of the mmtr sutus forthe IeCritOMlGovemmcnisirniiar IO hi
United Sutn Vimn Ihds 10 xlf-dctcmiination and ofother depndent Temitorin within the Group:
independencc in mnfomiiy wth the Dccianiion on the 13. Cdb uponihe adrninistenng Powtr 10 ûdiuie
Gmtins of lndcmdencc io Colonul Counmn and hrnhcrthe mninpation of the United Suies Vin
Pmpln. conuined in ûencni Asvmbly moluiion lS14 Islands in vlrioiir regional inierpovcmrnenul bodies and
WV. orpniutio<u. Wcuiarty in thtir mtnl orgins. and in
3 Rei:nrun the viev tlut such frctonu bmironil other orpuiiutionr of the United Nations svricm:
*le. gephiai lcation. suc of population and limivd 14.
natuni moium *iodd in no -y dclay the spedy un- al1n- UrgestmarumminiIo cornply fully4th the purpora
tileby the peopleaf theTemiory of thcir inllimtblc rat
tovlfdcteminruoa wd indcPadma in mnfomiiy md printiples of the Chiner. ihc Dcclmtian md thc =le-
vantrcrolutions and dechions of the Genml Asxmbly
4Ih the helantion. ubich niUramlin to the United mliting Io miliur, advilin and mangemenu bycolonial
sules Yi h&, Powm in Temirorin under their administration:
4. ~"rirrna hi ilY the raponsibility of theidminis- 1J. Coaidrrr that ihe pwbbility of =dm a hinbcr
vriu Pom to -le suchconditionsin the Uni- Sutn muuns mirrion io the UnsiedSuin Vcp Islandsai an
Yi Irlin&u rill eniile the peoplcOftTantor, to im~.pN~e umc should k te01 undn mnw.
cxuciw hely md vithoni intdmce thcu ~ie~le 16. Rntiusrs the Spcill Commiitee IO continue the
mi mxlf4iumiinrtion and independena in mnfom- aunination of Ihiraunuon ai iu nexi session.includinc
iIyrith molution 1514(XV. u WU u di othu mlcvmi ih+ posible dispich of i funhcr visitini mtsrion to th;
molutions of the Gcnml Auembly. Unlud Sula Viwn Irknds ai m appropniu urne and in
S. thai iY u~tim.wli for the people of the mnsuluuon wih the idrninirienng Povn. and IO mpon
Unitcd Suta VirninIrkndi thcmxlva Iodetermine their tkmn IOthe end Awernblvai tu fonr-6nt mion.
hitur. poliurrl ruiwi.aaordura mmtbe rclemt pro-
ririons oftbe Cbrm of theUnmà Nauonr and the Dec-
huoa. and ini~ ~ ~a~cucn ~.in~s~ ~~~~ ~ ~rncr
or taic;Wlm a.,.-,, mou tbe peopleO( thcT&-
tory of the pouibilitia opento thm in the ucmv of a/%. Ouarion of Watem Sihrn
lkir ri& w ulfdetaminrtion:
The Cemal Aslembly.
6. Nora ht tbe SelectCommittŒ.nublished by the Hanw conridercd in dcpih the question of Wnurn
kbish~~r of tbe United Sutn Virgi.1Islandsin 1983IO Lhin.
uanrinthenerr of iheppk of tbeT&toq or.thcir
hrmrr sutw and tonukemrnmmdations in that regard. Rualfing the inrlicnablc ri*[ of al1 popln to xlï-
wndwed public bains fmm Mmb Io Auput 1984 dttmnination and independence. in aanrdtiia 4th the
and Iubmiiird iu Epon iothe Siximih Leg~siaiurein printiples xt fonh in the Chncr of the Unitcd Nations
J~tnry 1981:" and in Gcncnl Aucmbly molution 1514 (XV of 14
7. AISOMra ht the Lqishtum endoncd the mpon. tkŒmbcr 1960conuining the Declrnrian on the Gnnt-
*ch includd. intn dia i roçommmdation thit a rrfer- in#of Independencc w Colonial Counuin and Pmpln.
mdum on ihe mtw inve should be hdd on 4 Normkr R~allin~ iu molution 39/40 of 5 Dcamber 1984on
1986. in conjunnion 4th thc next smcd eldoa. for ih question of Wntem Sahan.
people of the United Sutn Virgin Islands 10 ch- Hannt euiminrd the mlcrant clupta of thc mpon of
beneen i vuiety of auiw options includinl indcpn- tbeS~ul Cornmitla on the Situation 4trqud 10 the
dace, suuhood. lrc exiation. incorpontcd territw. Implcmmuiion of the Dechnuon on the (inntin~ of
nafur w or a mmm of fedeni rcia~ions:~' Independena to Colonial Countrin and Pmpla."
8. Funhmnotexihit the Lqidaum decidedtn appoint
a neu cornmitve LOcontinue the- of public hur- Taking norc of the rrpon of the Smctary-Gend on
tbequestion of WesternSahan."
=!M.. chioXXV
1' IM.M IO. Vlt.Rsolmdoes ido~doath.ne 4 the Femb Comm!nn U9

Rcc<illinf resolution AHGIRn.lO4 (XIon Wcitem 4/51. Infontution from NonSziiCovcrning Teni-
ihan.nado~tcd by theAsxmbly of Hcids of Suic +d tories Umsmined ïnder Mcle 73 r of rhc
Govcmment of ihc Organiution of Afriw Unity ai tu Chiner of the United Nations
ninetcenthordinaryuuion. hcld ai Addis Ababafmm 6 The GrneraiA~rrmblv.
io Illune 1983. Havinxrxaminedthc chnpicrof-ic rcpon ofrhc Spccirl
1. Rea5m thai ihc questionWmm Wur u a ~ommitlcc onthe Situatio%+A regardro ihe lmplcmcn-
questionofdccolonizatiari whicbmains to bewmpleicd uÿon of Ihc ûcclantion on theGmung of Indcpcndenu
on ibc basis of ihe exnu by the pople of Wnum io Colonial Counuin andPcoplcrxlaiing to theinforma-
Snhur of Iheir inilieariai to ulfdeinmimtianuid tion fmm Non-Self-ûovemins Temionn tnnsmitted
indcpndcnu: mer Miclc 73 r of the Chancr of ihc üniicd
Nauonr" and Ihc raion ukcn by tnc Commince in
2. RtoW .&O thai the solution of the auniion mm o~ ~hii~~ ~~.-.t~.n.
WesternSinan Iin inthe implcmcnutiono~~uuon ~~nx ais0 curminrd ihe npon of the Secnury-
AHGlRn.104 (XIX) of ibe Asumbly of Hads of Siau Genml on the qumion."
and Gavemrneoi of thc OruntuUon of Nriun Uain. Reailinz iu mlutian 1970(XVIII) of 16 kmber
~hichnublirhcs any and marisforajun anddehniti;~ 1963. in which il nqucrted the Spcial Cammiitce ta
politid solutioInthe Wnlcm Sahar waofin: stvdy the information transmittdin thc Secrcury-
3. Anain rrwm. 10that end. tIWO dn to Ihe Gama1 inaaorduice with hicle73e of theChmer and
coofirrihe Kingdomof Moroccouid the FrcniePop& touirelxh infomatioo fvlly inio accauntin eumining
pam la L~?RDo de.%u cl.Hamrr y dc RlodOro.w Ihc ririution with regardto the implemcnulainthc
undcrukc dum ninouauonr inthe shonni mniblc Declvition on thCruillnl of lndepndcncc to Colookl
ume. nth a vicw io-b-r amut a cou-6t-eIOcrute Gunuin and Pmpln. wnuined in Gcnenl Asreably
tbcnezcsarywo&uon. forapicchi and Lu rcfcmdum mlution 1514O<V)of 14Oeamber 1960.
for uifdldcumuoluon of the mole of Watem Sahara, RIFnl11ng& iu molvuon 39141of 5 kmkr 1984.
&fcrendum mihout uiy adminiiuitive or miliuyc&- m *tuch 1requavd IhcSvil Cammiiiceto continu10
suliiiu. undcrtheawpica of theOrpnultiou of Mian &%barge the funnom muusmi IO itunder nsoluiaan
Unir/ uid thc Unired Natiow; 1970(XWli).

4 W&m theeEomofthe cumnt Chrinnin ofthe Commttcc on theSiiuuon wIh trtyrdto me Implrmrn-al
Aucmbly of Hu& of Sute and Governmmt of Ihe uwa of Ihc hebuoa onIhrGnnunp of Indepodcnu
of the Univd Nations ro prnmote a jun uid dcünitiveIOColod Counuin andPmplc. rrhiing to the informa.
ilu utnf theqdon of Wnm S.hYI; Uoo hm Non.SelfCovcnung Terniones mnsmiiim
uodr r ruclc 73 r of&Cbuici of ihe Uwid Nnuon+
5. Innln the cwcnt (aunnia 01the Asembly of
Hd of Suu md Gonmmeni of useOrvwsuon of üenaalmAuembly ~uclfthai a Non-Self-üovcnungTcrn.
Nrisui Unir* and the SscrrurvCÇocnlof the Uwtrd tory hu atuuied a full masure of %If-~avcmmni ia
Nauoo, Inuai evcrycEon m pmvdc thern> puua In umil of CYoin XI of Ibc Cbmrr. the adminisiennn
& cmhn theth&m of Momm mi ibe Fmie Pop Pma mnc&ed shouidmuinwiueio uansmii;nfarmatio~
ulii~hLbnn6ndeSi<uud-HunnydeRlode uodaAnide 75r of Ihhe~huinmth mpm to thntTerri-
Om. IO nqowu. inthc p~~lbk mc and m an- m.
f~murynth duuonAHG/RslMOand ibcw i. Reqzmu the uimt~uiunng Posrcn conccmcd io
mi raoluuon thehc ofiocue-6m iadthc modalias ImwnlL or wnunuc in mtmiL 10'htSecreury-ûcneni
thcInfornuon prrvnbcd m Anirlc73 r af:hc Ctuncr.
6. RmBom< th dcumuiuuon of Ihc Umicd Nanon. u WU u the Nlat wbk iofonauon on politid and
Inowpmu my rnth theOlpoinooo 0fAfnsui Uwty somutuuod developmau inthe7emtonn wnaed.
nIb a virrIOimplcmrn~ tbcrehi dconon. of thai wtbin a muunum pmod ofstimonh followng the
orpninnoa m puculu moiuuon AHG/RalM uprnuon of ibeuimilwuiuvr yeu inthov Tcrnionn.
(xog: 4. Rqun< tbeSpcul Commiiisc io wniinuc to dis-
chw the huicuon. envwicd tiyidn ûcnenl Arum.
1 Rrpvau the SpenilCommituc on the Sotwuno bl~ mluuon 1970 WVlln. in ascordanu mth nub-
nlh rrprd m ihc Impkmaiuunn of theacknuon on LUhc prmd- uid to&n themonio thc Asumbly
tbeGnnung of lu&pmdQa IO61od Cnuntna uid ai iu f0ny.h Mion.
%(a m msunuc m comdcr ihcsxiiuuoai.Wtnrm
Sihuiuimiticrofpnontyandwrrponthmoniothe 99rhplrmry mminx
Gmeril AumrMyai iu fm-üm woq. 2 DKembrr 1985
8. Invita theSecmuyM of iheOlpnintionof
~Uaitywu>therhcwGenrriloftbeUDivd 4/52. Adrida of f~reip economicmd othcr inter-
Nation. infonned of t-e ichiewd in theimple- ao rhlcb ue lmpdin the implemenution
mmution of the deciion. of IACwuon ofAfrian of the Dcdindon on c%eGmnting of Inde
Uaity ~hùng to Wnm U, pend- Io Colonial Corntria ,ad, Pmpla
n Ndbh andin dl orhcr Temtonn undcr
9. Invita theSmc~-GcnÇnlio foibw ihcSituation colonid domimdon and ciïoru Io climiiute
in Wmcm SihYr douly mth a view10the implemenu- coloniillrm. Wkid md raciadirimina-
lion of lhc prncnr mlaicand10mwn lhmon In the don in mothem Nria
hml Aucmbly ai iu fony-hm vuioa Tk Genrrd A.ssewlily.

Hnving romidnd the item miiiled "Activiiies of for.
eia economicind othn intercru which arc impcdlngthe
12WW619.conunue Io ru%r hom a.orsoflaod ouncnhip asa mu11 ihc Gnniing oi lnocpcnaeccc :O Comon.~;.o.~.nrr and
of ihe hllurr of ihc adminliicnng Poven concerncd io Pmpicr COFontnue 10mcn,:or couli
rcruin ihcu.c oi lin0Io iorcigncn. deipiic ircpaini icnJiring caloni~iTcrnionrr roIr .O r..$d:,JI111cco.

ening and divcnifying !kir economicrin ihr inrcrnl; oi
Conrciow of the mntinuinn ncedio mobilie world
publicopinion againsi the involvement of foreipnecono- the indigcnous peaplei.41pramoitng ihe cconomic and
mic.banrial ana oihrr !numu inihe cxploiutioa of na!- hnancial nability of ihou Tcmiatier 221rpcding their
d and human remurc~. which impedn thc indepen- acctrsion Io indcyndcnce. and. in thai cannectian.
droce of colonid Tcrniann and the elim8aruon of rcqueiis Ihe adminisicring Povcrs concemcd io enrurc
racirm. prlicululy in roulhern Afria. and cmphasiiw thai ihc people5of the Trmioticr mdcr ihc:r administn-
ihe imporunce ofacuon byloul iuinonua Mae unsons. tionire no1cxploiicdfor politiol. miiiiand orhcrpur-
religourWn. Imdcmic inruiutionr mau medu. soli. poses dcuimentd io their istcresü:
dmw movcmenu and olhcr noo.covcrnmcnW or~anua- 8. Srronelv cocdemnr ihow Wesiern and 111oihcr
countrin. &&u as III: umrnaiional corpantiom. which
innsnationd corporrtions 10refrainbm Gy invnuneni continue lheir invcrincnts in. andluppl" of amamcntr
or adviry in ihe Temiory of Namibia. in encouaaing a and oil and nuclear iechaologyIO. ihr nciri rigime of
mlicy of sysicmniicdivn1mmt of any hancul or oihn South Africa. ihus butvesriilir.d awrating the ihrc.1
interni in corwntions doins busineu mih South Afria ro world puce:
and in couni&ning a11fonüs of miùboniion with ihc 9. Cnllr upon &IISuies. in panicular cemir. Western
oocvpationrtgimc in Namibi Suin. Io lakc urgcni. cfmivc mcrswcs 10tcminaie all
collabonuon wilh ihe nciri RginicofSauih hirica in the
1. Rt&mc the inaliembk riaht of ihc aoliln of poliiiul. diplomruc. econamic. iradc. aiiiury and
dcyode<T<mionn io ulfdctc~uuuon and idepco nuclcar fieldsand ia~refnin fromentcnng inia aiher rela.
dence lad 10 lhc cri]oymnii of ihc nitunl mo- of
ikez Tcmtone* u wII u lhar n-hi 10&u.ou ~ ~ hou tions viih charrtpime in violational ihc relevant rcralu-
&owon in iheir bai intanu: tions 06the Uniicd Nations and ai thc Organiiaiian of
2. RtiIerOIes lhat any adminisiering Or ocrupying African Unity:
Po-r ibrt dcnrivn the colonial moles of iheex& of 10. Cd& oncr oaain unona!l Govcrnnentr thithave
their lc$ilimaLeri&= over ihcir &th w- or sub na1yet done w, IOikc legklaiive.adminiriniivor ather
ordam ihc ri&u and ininlemuof ihov people io for- meum in rcspc~ of ihcir nauonals and tbodiescor
eia mnomic and bancial in- vioiaintbe mkmn potaie under lheirjurisdiaiori ihat oun and oxraie entcr-
obürruoar il éIrvrwcd undn che ic orthe Uniied prirer in colonial Tcmioricr. panicul3rlyin Africa.which
am% uc dcuimenial tothe inlemil ai inr innabiucu of ihox
3. ReaBumr tha~ by their depletive uploiurion of Terniones. .ncrder 10oui an ena10 s~chcnicrpnin and
nrrunl muror. ihe conùnuedrmunuLtion and rmaui- ID ~reveni neu invertmenu ihii Nn courterIOine intcr
ilion of huge pmhu and the ux of ihou prof~ufir the c& of the inbbiunu of ihou Tcmtorin:
innchmcnt of fom xnim and the perpiuation ofml* II. Cal& vpon nllSu:= 10icrminait. or aux io haie
niai domimuon and Rnai dkuhinrtion in the Tb- teminated. any invnrmenu in Namibia or loans 10 ihe
nOs1 minoriry &me of Iuutb Afria and Io~rrain irom
tories. ihc acünun of fomm ceonomic. hnrmcUlmd anywumenuor musurn 10 promoieindr or otheruc-
oiher inmu ornuni a1k t inthecolonidTem- nomic relations viih ihat rtpimr:
iofia. p.nicuùririnu>uh Ahtca onuutuk i mqa
obsucle to poliud independena and rml eguililyu 12. Requsts ail Sutel ihahave na1yctdone wi 10ukc
re(lu IOihc cnaonncnt ofthemiunl wuira of ihov eiimive mcasum 10end lhc rupply OChndr 2nd oiher
Teniioria by th ;ndigenousinbabilmu: foms of assistana. includini miliury ruppliesand cquiw
4. Condemrn ihe adritin of fomm mnomic and ment. IOthe ncisi minoriiy rtpirnc ofSouih Afriw. which
other inicmu in ihc colontai Tmitoria im~cdim ihe such assisuncc io mp~ the people01Nnmibu and
implcmcnuuon of ihe Duiantion on the G'nnti~Üof their nauonai libcntion movcmenl:
lodrpeodcna io Colonul Gunmn .nd Roplu an- 13. Strongly condernnrSouih Alria for iu continucd
uuied m ûend AssmMyraoluuon 1514 WVJ. uid tbe uploiuuon and plundering of the natunl mums of
eEm IO elwk aloaulum. a@mhid and Mi1 du- Nmibir Iwding IO ihe npid depletionolsuchrrwiumr.
anunauon. in complere dismrd of the !cgiumatc ifiierestr of the
5. Codemm ihe polian of Govcmmcnu ih.1 con- Namibian people. for Ihe crwtion in the Temrory of an
ùnuc in support or collibonic viih iho1- eson* mnomic simaure dependeninuniially upon iu minenl
mic wà oihcr inincru cnwcd in uploitiw the 1~14 mmes and for iu ilIcaalextensionof ihe icmtorxal
and hurmn raowon ofthe Temtoriu i,udinl. in par- andiu proclamation of an economiczoneORthe Coastof
tiorlu. ill*.Lly uploiùng Nimibus mwc wumr. Namibu:

nohiin< the politid. ceonomic uid socid Mu ?ad 14. Delares ihai al1 acriviiier of forcign economic
mlcmu of ihc indigmow pcopla uid thui obnnvuqg intcrnu in Namibia arcilld undcrinsrnriional Iawand
ihc fvll andsWy implcmcnuuon of ihc Rduition m th;t conwgucntly Sovih Afrio 2nd ai1ihc foreigclonc-
mm of ihac Tmitoric mic inlemu opmting in Namibia am liable !Opay dam-
6. Strontly medemu the allusion of the Govm- a- io the future lawiul Govcrnmcnr of an tndcpiident
mmu of ccnrin Wnirrn md oiher counino mih ihe Nimibia;
non minonty -me of Sou* Akia in ihe nnudes6reld. 5 Calh upon thow oil-grducini and oil.yxponing
and ollr umn ihou and al1olhn Govcmmcnu IOrchin ..-ntrin ih-t h-ve no1vct done$010 Ukccfutive mcas-
*m suppiyin8 ihat ~mc. disy or indi&rÏy. m1h urn againil Ihc omkpnies conccmcd M as IO I~ml.
8nnilhtions thil miJi1 mabli~IOpmduΠunnium. plu- nie the rupply ofcnid0812nd pcrolcum piMurts Io the
tonium and oiher nuclur matcriab. rcacion or miliw nciri rtpirnr of Souih Afno.
muipmmt: If. Rcitnmrr that the er~loiution and plundmng of
7 Rtqurstxihr Sporl Commiitee on the Siiwiion the marine and oiher naiunl rclciucei of Namibb by
Wih Wud to ihc lmplmcnuuon of ihe Dxlarauon on South Afrian and othcr ioreigncconamicinternis. inciu-272 Garil MImDIy- -Fo"i*<Soriom

ding ihe activitin of thow mrnational carpontions 24. Requcsts the Smrraiy-Gtncnl 10 undenaie.
which are cngapcd in ihe cr~loiuiion and erwn of the 1hrour.hCheDeoanmcni ofhblic Informauan of thc M-
Tcmior('r &um oresmdoiher -W. & violation remnit. a sus&ncd and bmrd ampaign uith a vicw 10
of ihc rclcvani moluiioas of the Gencral Asxmbly and informina vorld public opinionof the faas concerningtne
the SecuriiyCounçil and of Dccm No. I for the Rotec- pillaKingof oatunl mou- in colonial Tenitarin and
lion of the Naturrl Rmunn ofNamibii. am üid. con- the C~oloiutionofLhci"disenous ~opulationsby forekg
uibulc10 the miintcnuia of the illc@lo&paticÜ rtgimc monoblies and. in rnpt 5f Namibu. the support thgy
and am a gravethrrat Io the inwtand prorprity of an render to the rinit minoriiy emof South Alricl:
indcpendcnt Namibu, 25. ADD~& io mas media. irade unionsand other
17. Condcmnr the plunder of Nunibirn unniurn. and nooqo~mmeod organiuuons.as vcll asmaviodi. 10
cwrdmtr and inunsify hrtr <RomIomobilue goirrm.
=Us uwn the Governmenu of rU Suin. panicululy iionil nublic ooinion apliortwlin of thenoonh~id
milm8 or rnnchmmi of.or infocoIn.h'imibtan unnium.he rtzime'ofSou& Afnn Gd 10workforihe enfo&ment of
IO ~ke al1appropnalc mcasum in compluna wth the economtc and other wcuonr i~st thai iwme and for
encotmgq a plicy ofsyslcmauc avriuncni in corpora-
provisionsof Dcarr No I for rbc Roimon of the Naiu- uoiu domg bwuicu m South &a.
in8negattveŒn16cdin of ongm.r10tprobbii and preveoi 26. Rtqwnr the Spd Cammttte on the Siiuuon
Suie-omcd iod other corponuonr iwethcr wth thetr wth wd Io the Implemeouuon of the Occlvruon on
subidiann. hm dcuing rn Nmibian umium and fmm
enaamoarn unniumomrpcuna INnliCS in Nimibu theCiraun& of lndrpendmce 10Cotond Counuin and
-- - .. - Peooln 10conuoue 10exunme misounuan and to remn
18. Requsrs IheCh'mmmu of IheFedcni Republic
of Cicmany. the Netherlinds and the United Kingdom of
Grcal Briuin and Nonhm Ireluid. which opmie the
Umw unnium enrichmeni plant, IO have Namibian
unnium spxi6aüy exduded from the Trcaty of
Aimclo," vhich rcnJlta the acüvitia of Umco: 40153. Impfemenution of the Declrntion on the
19. Rtwsu rll ula Io uke lc&i&uve, aùminirm- Cnntirq of Independencc ln Colonid
tive md other msuum. u appmpriaic. in ordee&- Coiuiuia and People. by the spcciilircd
tivcly 10 isolate South Min poiitiniiy. cconomidly. igenaa and the intemtiod imtitodacu
mililzily and niltuiJly.in .pord.nΠ4th Gmenl uroeiired mtb the United Natiocu
Auembly molutions BU2 of 14 Septemba 1981. 361 The GrncmlAwmbly.
121 Bof 10 Deamba 1981. 37/233 A of 20 kmba Havingcomid~redthc item eotitled"lmplcmmution of
1982. 38/36 A of I Descmber 1983 and 39/50 A of 12 theklurtion on the Gnntiog oflodependmce to Col*
Dcamkr 1984: nialCouvia md Pmpln by the tpeirlusd llcncia and
the internationalstitutions davd viih the United
20. Cak oncew'n wn diSuta to discontinue ail Natiom-.
aonomic. hcirl and Inde irliùoiu 4th the n"st
minorin M e of South Mia conamin< Nimibù and Rrrnlliy the LXcluruolioo the Gnouu of Indepn-
to refnio hm akng in10iny rehuoni 4th South dace m Colonial Cnuuin md Pmpln. coouiiied uiau
Nunibu. whichmy lad sumion w 10iu continuedillw reaoluuoo 1514(Xv) of 14 Deamber 1960.and thc Plan
of Acuon for the Full lmplcmrnuuon of the Dcduiuori.
azuption of ùut Terri- conuuicd tnthe mca 10 iu moluuon 351I16 of II
21. Invifesal1Gommmu and omDintionr of the bxmber 1980.u WU asal1other relcnnr molvuoos
United Nations wicm. lu+ rgud totbe rrkvuitpm- adovlcd byUie Gad Aucmbly on <hi% iub)a+.toclu-
visions othe Dcduium on h beblilbmat of a New diniin mm& moluuon 39/43 of Jkrnk 1984.
Inicrnationil Economic Orda. sonuined io Ccnd ~oviip enminai the reportstubmitted on the item by
Apcmbiy reaolution 3201 (SW of l May 1974. and of the Semury.Gmer4" the Esonomic andSoc4 Cou-
the Qura of Esowmic Ri&u and Dutia of Suln con- cil4and the Socciai Committcc on the Situation 4Ih
uiDed inAIumbly molUrion 3281 O(X1X)of 12Deam- -rd m the 1i;iplemcnution of the tkclantioon the
ba 1974. m casut, inpMNlu. ùut thepmnincni sov- Gnnting of bdepcndcnce io Colonial Counvia and
of Ihe colopul Tcrritnria over thcir mtunl Psop(esY
reao~~RiU~~indnf~ - Rwlliw &O iu molutions ES-8f2of 14 Septcmbcr
22 Um-3 thcadminlltcnr~P04 cooctmed 10 uke 1981 and 39/50 of 12 Descmber 1984 onihe qumion of
rlTccri*mrr>ura lo dciwrd Md -Lee the inalien- Nunibù.
able nb!Itothe poopla of fhecolonialT+iori,a10their Taking inio oami<nithe relevantprovisionsof the Puis
ai4 raoumr ami m aubiith and munuin ccnml tkcluition oa Namibu and the Rmmme of Adon on
ovcr their hituri devdopmarmi muau the adminir- Nunibi&'' adopmi at the International Conferma in
icriw PO- m tak aii nectiprl$teps u,pmrcct the Suppon of the Svugle of the Namibian Peoplefor Inde-
pmpmy riJiu of the ppla of thox Temmricr: pcirdcox+d tbe DccIintion and t'mmrnme of Anion
conuined in the Fuul Dwment adopted by the United
23. Cal& wn Ihe idminu~ Porm con-cd io Nations Coud for Namibu a iu cxurordioqplenaq
ibolUh rldixriminuory md unjw wgc systerns and matinm held ai Vienna fmm 3 107 Iunc 1985.
worting conditions pvailing in the Tenitories under --
thcir idminisuatioo and io applushnTcnitory a uni- Bmnnp in m~nd the dcnni provisions of thePoliucrl
discrimination:vi<s 10 dl Ihe inhabiunu mihout iny DedY.iion idopted bythe Scvrnth Cnaferrnce of Hads
ofSute or Gonmmcni of Non-*ligi>cdCounum. held il
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'91vo pl6opiioopnl-8 .ILInr ~d mb~,. -Fo"kibs-%.h

Io &Ionid &unvin and Peaples rriati10 the qun- 10. Urgn onceogarniheerccuiire hwds ofthe Warld
tion;" Bankand the International Monew Fund Iodnw the
2. Reafirm that the sWalircd agennes and ather paniculu aitrntion of iheir governingMies io the pm-
ornimiions and innifutions ihcUniied Nauons In- mmmes knehcial ia theevopl lnof the coloniTc*--
& sbauld mnunuc to k ~rded by the rc~evuAU- tories. paniculiriy Namibia:
uans of Ihc UniYd Piaiiointheu <Romio mnvibutc.
nlhln thcir sphem ofmmpirna. Io the fulland %&y 11 Rtwslr theSPCI~U~ agcncCIanaothcro%~i~.
imolemmuiion of ihc Dechuon on the ûnniina of uuonr afme Uniim Nsuonr s)sicmIorrnacr orconiinur
lndcpndcna IO col&ul ~cun&cs and Pcapln, :an- r.rcnder. ur mailo oï uncnci.al! ~ossiblcmaml 2nd
Uincd inGmd Alumbly rnolutioo IJ 1(XV); maimal uriruncc io ibe ci.oniai pcoplci iiru<glinglor
3. Rafinu obo Uul the mwirion by fhc Geqeni Iiknuon fram colonial nlr. bcrnninmind ihai suçn
hucmhh. the Scariiv Counciland 0th- United Nauons .-~~runce should"ai onlr meri iClir.mmmnwse bu1
oqans oi the l+unu& ofihcrm&c ofcolonialpmpln also aute mnditionr for devclapmeni lRcr ihey have
ta ercrciu thtir ri@t to selfdamnination and Lima- crerrised thcir rut ta ulï-deleminauon and indepn-
dcnŒenuil* ala mm~. the eimsion by the sdl- deou;
ùcd ascncia and other oruniutions of ~c United II. R-ns onn oh ihc ~wiaiizcd agencitsand
~atio6 sptem of al1the n&sry moral and maicrial othet O-intionr of the Uniicd Nations sysiccon-
urirunŒ tothow people md chnrmuonai libenuon unuc io$ronde ailmon1 uid malena autrunçe io !ne
movemcnu: acwly indrpndcnt and cmcrgirg Suur soasio cnable
4. Exp- irrppmia.fion tllyserpmilucd .8en- thm i~ ~chievc-cenunc mnomic rndcocndcnu.
sio and oiberorpintionsofthe UnitedNations systcm 13. Rciltrorcii~rrcommrndoi~othai ihc rpmdired
whicb have mntinucd to cc-apcntc iWns dc~eer -na and oihcr owumiionr of the Unitcd Nauoo,
with the Uaitcd Nationsmd the OrpainLion of AhiPn qmm ihould mswtc or bmidcn conocu d m-opri
Unityin the implemenution of Gmenl Arrcmblywlu- -~nwt~ ~ ~mloniaionioln uid mrir nauonlIibcnuon
tiw 1514 (XV)md other denni rnolutionr of the moremenu dircctly2. Lhcrr appropriatc. lhrough the
United Natiow.ad urge IIIthespa%üd eau and Orppninuon of Afri~ Unity.and rcviev. and inducc
oiberarp.sinuonr ofibc UnitedNationsmem 10-1- gcrw kxibility in. thcir pmadum mth mm to the
mir the IÜUandrpcdy implcmmution of the rcht formuhtion and prcvantian of assisuncc prgr;immo
pmvisionr of thov raolutioo* md pmjenr sou ta k ablIOertend thacsnvry +pin-
- without &liyIO belp the colonid peopkr and theV
5. Ezpmsa iu CO? ht the wisuncz cxvnded nationailibentioo movcmenuin ihcnnigpleiocrcrcise
thurlubYQlt.i.r~dmdo1hQomnY1- ch& idieiuble nghi io ulfdeicmination and indcrxn-
~OIU oftheunitedN~UOM plrinnIOus alod p;Ople~ dena in uwrdana wth ûenml Aucmbly molution
muon mavnncor. th SouthWa Aûio Pmple'rOrppn-ltib- 1514(XV):

inlion.isCirhm aùcniuir in rrlinon ibeMual lIQdl 4 Rcmmmmdtthai a scpantc iirm on auisuna 10
rutional likntion movemenu mcunizedhy the ûr@-
6 R~ùi~rpoae,mdoiberorpnrn- uiiai of Alrion Uniiyshouldbe includedin am&
tionr and bodioof thUuted Nauom mm uirsord- offutm hi@-tevd m&tingsbeween thekd &u-
uiocnth Ibc rcle*mtduuoru ofth Gmed Avembly rut of lhe Orp.niration of AfUity and thexmu-
andtheScnmtyCouoal.wPtC.O~m~~lumU) ruu of theUnitcd Nationsmd othn ormintions of the
nthhobî hm ibe hc ofSouih A~IO MY form United Nations mtcm 4th a nrr to strrndteninhu-
0f OWPCROOD md tPUUDO uith aVMmIC, ihu Ibc rumw mcuwu of cc-ardiruuon of mion io
~aiudolbcrhM,andwdumo~uca11urppcnw ensumthe kn uu of amiable rnowcn forsrruna IO
thil rCpm mu1the popk of Nwb bvc acrPvd ihe peopla of Ihealonmi Terniones.
hiiiytheu d k nbbt w sdf~uon. mcdom lS. Uw the spcuLucd agtnnn and 0th- orguiiu
and muoui indcpadcaa in a uniud Nmibu anduoul uons of the Umicd NauonssyilerUur have001drpdy
ibeinhuman ~ym of auanhnd h.rbeea towiv endi- done uiw dude inme ymda ofihc reauiamceungsof
0- thmgor- bodlu 1wpantc itcmon the thq
7. FAmma iu mmidion hi therPOJYc idpncia brc made in the implmcnuuon of Gcnml hwembly
iid aibeamaintica>ud bodka oftheUniud Nations rmluum IJ 14(X9 md the0th- rrlenni rcmlut~o~sof
.racmrbaiidrrfninbomuhaamyurioarhichmi~hi the UnitedNationr.
imr>i-tira ofa ni- for. ihe Legtinuq of the 16. Unn the roeçuü2edatncin and 0th-O&-
dŒamsurnof IbCTeniton af Nimial br the mis1 tions and-i~~titutionsof the Üniw Natio$cm 10
exicnd u i mam of prioriiy.subruntid maIrrialusirt-
ma IOlhe Conmmmu of the front-lineSutn in order
to miMe !hemIO ruppon moreeffeNvelythe ruufgie of
the peopleof Nimibii formedom ad independena and
Waiion of SoutA& inth at ofbath ipnaa. m wn the violalion of thtir territorial integiry by the
do~IbCvu*<hilIbCbc-Youldpilm -cd fora of the nciri rtg,of bulh Ahio @y
codwiU~withibcMnft@mc or. asin An~olimd Monmhaue. Uuouab wm mtor
9. Slrongiy condrm~ ihe pnincni mlliboniion
bctmn the Inicnutid Monnuy Fund and South 17 Nora vlrhuiuf~ton ihc 1mngemmU mdr bY
Ahio in 4hgd of mtai rmlutionr tathemny wail spcnilued wnna and other orpnuauo~l of the
bythe&nI -My, uni olb uponIbeInmnauorul UmtedPiauon, mum rhich cmhlem~ncnu0vn ofthe
M m Fund IOputm ad w ruch mbbon~on and muonil bbmi8on mo*mcnu mogiucd hytheOrpuil-
no1IOpzat rny nru loam IOIbcmUi rhime of South uiion of Alrion Unstyio paninpic lullyrs obwrinn
Ack ihc pmacdin@ rcliiin~ Io mrllcn conrrrningthcir

IM.W. VII. npom .(th-F d Cou-
- ns
rerpctive counirin. and calls upon ihor asencies and orqanizauons.a rcwn on the anion taken in impiemenu-
ogrniutionr ihat have noi yet done so Io follov L.is uon of the relcvanirryiluuons. includingthe pt-i
elample and 10 makc thenmllry unngcmenu mthout luiion. rince the cimlation of his previou repon;
dtlay.
21. Rqruris the Loaomic and Çxial Guncil io con.
18. Ur8~3 Itiipeciilized agencierandothcownh- iinueIOmnridcr, in consulmuan vltb IhcSpecial Cam.
tions md instituuons of the Uniied Nations sysum io miriceon the Situationvith regardIothe Implemenuiion
assis: in acalmting pr-s in LU-on of the nailuorul of IheDcclantion on the GnnimI of lndcpndrncc to
lireof colonialTcniiarin. paninilulythe development ColonialCouvia and Pcoplci.appropriniemcarwes for
.f -heir economim cwrdinhn of the polinu andactivitier of ihc spccial-
19 R-11 me spc~dl~cdqcgcnner IOabide bySecu- ued agcnciu and othn or$anmuonr of the United
niy Counnl moluuon 366 (1983) of 19 lune 1983. in Narions stsrem in implcmmung the relevani rcroluiianr
wbicb me &und condemned Ihenos1 enme ofSli-b~ of rhe Clenml Auembly;
AT>Ü for iu insu~;tion of a so-%lCd in&m Ciovcrn. 26. Rcpu~u the spnLlued wencin io rewn sriod.
ment in Namibia and dccM thit anionIObe illeyl and idly to the Secreuryfinenl of the Uniied Narions an
nuü and void their implemenuuon of ihe p-nt nsoiuiion:
20. Raomnvndr thai al1Govemmmu should intcn- 27. Requrm the SpeOal Commiitce IO continue io
rify theircffaruin the rpculired agcncin aod other examineihirqueruon and io mpon thcreonio the GLnml
O-uons of the Unnm Naiioos syriem of *h~h ihey Auembly a1iu fony-hm sesrion.
uc mcmk 10 msurc ihrLI and cfeciwe ~mplemcnu-
uoo of ûend Auemblv mluuon 1514(XY) aod othcr 99th pirmry meeting
relewt molutions of ihe Uniied Nations id. in bat 2 kcmbrr 1985
codon. sbould =rd prioriiy to the qumion of pro-
vib ducc onm emqency basil io ihe people of 40154. United Nations Edncational and Tdninp
thecolonialTemiorin and their nauorul iikntion more- Prme for Southeru Ahici
mmu:
ThrGeml .41ymbIy,
21. Reiieram ifs~rouosal. under article I~ ~o~ ~ ~ Rhdfing tu dtn rcroiuuons on the Uniicd Nsuons
h&I & Ùnirsd Nziioas and the<nierni- Eduouod and Truning mmmc forSouthem Mn=.
tional Monew Fund, "or the urgent inclusion in thein mculu moluuon 39/44 of 3 Drccmher 1984.
.yod. of ihe Baud of ûovcrnon of the Fvnd ofnn iem
ddin( mih the rchtioruhip beimn the Fund and South Havingconridtrd thc npn of the Sencury-Gencmi"
Mica and Ma reivnvr iu ~romul hL in nwu- conuininy an rsmunt of theworlrof ihc Adviuiry Com-
anse of mde II of thcA@ummt. the relevant o&u of mince on the United Nations Edualiod and Tnining
ihe Umud Nauons dould mnpe m my mcnui: of Ropnmme for Southm Afrio and ihe adminimtion of
thcBaud ofûovcmon dkd bvmc Fund foribe .-p... the Prosamme for the pncd fmm I Onokr 1984Io 15
of diruuinr the ium. and ur& the und to-ducus iu OnObCr1985.
mhtionlbip~mib Sou& Afria ai lu annual meclin' in Rtcoxninng the niuable luininse rend& by the
cornphrice with the above-menùonnr *cameni. and IO hognmmc m the wpla of South Aiririraand Namibia.
rcpon 10 ihcSsrrtuyCenrni îf the Umud Nations on Noring wilhiUUf~i0n ;hrt edwtional and technial
thc adon ukm: assisuncc for southcm Airiahu kscme a pmwingcon-
22 Drain rk afrrnt:on of the iwed ma and oxn of the inumitional communiw.
olher orpnrniio:~ of thcUmud Nations ipem IO ihc
Ph of Acuoofar ihe Fulllmvkmmuuoo ofthc Dech-
uoo on ihr Gnnuw of Indepodmce to Colonul southcm Afno 10pmvi& cduauod opponustier and
Counuin andPeopla.conuined inthe Mnea ro Gencnl counullin: 10a pcatnoumkr of sludent refuge¶ in a
Asnnbly moluum 3511II.inpuu& m thou vmvi- mde vanm of ~mfunonil culid and Iinruirucdi=-
IMnsaüuu uom th - and O-nom 10rmder plins. ass.el) opponuniua for vmuo&and &-
dl ,amibit-mon alnd&wl ds&a IO thcpeoplerof ol tmnq and fo&id sNdin ai-due and poli-
ibecnbmid Terri- and to their rutional libmùon pdwe level,inthcpnonry 6eldsof srudy.
morrmcntc Slronglyrnnwwd hi ihecoounuauon and expansion
23. Uw tbe accuove heid>of ihe spculircd of ihc Ropnmme u eaniwl w O& Iomer the inrxu-
aer ando<hearpninuons of the Unitrd Niuons mm. rn(demrnd for eduoud and uunial uwunce :Osiu.
hanna w ibe -om of-oh% Ilmd 22 dmu fmm Soutb Ama and Nanubu.
ab06 w-formuliw, mth the anive cwpntion~ ~~--of the 1. Endorsa ihs cepon of thScnruyCtnd on the
Omnbtion oTMiao Uniw whm appropriate. andm Ueiud Nauom Eduatiod and Tnuung Rvgnmrnc for
wbmii. u aminer of @"W. w their 6owmiq md la- Southrni Mi=
ihtive O- co~acv pmWs for tthAlimpluamu- 2. Commrndr the SmtuyCenenl and ihc Adwsory
tion of thrckwt United Nations dmsions. in oulimhr
rpcihc pm-mrna of dsunce IO the piopin oiihe Commim on ihc Unitrd Nauom Eduauod and Tnln.
mlod Terrimria and their national likntionmove- elfontmbe pmmoic lenemur mnuibuiions to the Ro-nued
mmp
inirnavemmrnulinΠciadpnunan*ovcmmendmend. urocics
24. Rquem the Secmury-ûtnd IO continue to -- ---
uusl the spnillcd wencia and other orptnintio&? of involvcdin dcotiond and Wch~lol ru= for-~)uth-
ihe Uniicd Nations syrem in vorl;in$ out apprnpnite
mc11um for implmicnUnl the rrlcvwt moluuons of rtie 3. Erprcun iloppmimion to LUhou hi have suP
Uniud Nations andIo prrw forsubmiuion Io Ihercle- ponrd the Roglmn;e bypmvidin: contributions. rhol-
vant bodia. with the assisunce of thoie wmcia and inhia or ph in their cduoùonal insuiutions:
-
."dIliI*-drnubmAmr iE-u~rd"nmpu,U.<inl HiuoWpi,.,
-Na VF'6I.X.ILp.61. 4 ~poealr 10al1Suter. insututloni.oryniuuoni md 2 Exprnstx tir opprrciaiionta mox Memkr Suter
ina .idais 10 oKciyaicr finannaland oiner rvppn io thai bvr madcuholurnip irliiaDle!o thc inhabaunuof
lhc Pio&-rnrne in ararrIO YCU~C itsconunuaiion and Non-Sclf-ûovcmint Tcmtonn.

3 lnrrrnail Sula 0 mate ~rconlrnueio mrte sner-
ous oKm ofstudy and vunrns lanl~iierto theinhabiunu
irlhn- .-.n.nn thai havenot vctaiwncd ulf-rovcm-
ment or indcpendcnŒand. vhcmrcr puiblc. to provide
travel luna<10pmspciivc studenu:
40i55. Oflcn by Mrmbr Suln of rnidy uid min- 4
inglicilitinfor inbabiunu 01Son&U&oi- Urgn Lhc idmrnutrnns Poum io Uc ellecuve
ernina Tenitorin mniurn Io Cnrm ihc wdesprud and conunuous dir-
TheGtneralAssmrbly. umiruuon uiiheTmionn undcr thcirrdmiiwviuon of
~nformauonmhuw io ofen of itudv and irrining hdi-
Rccallingin-molution 19/45of 5 Lkccrnbcr1984, lin madc by Sula and m prondc ail ihc n- fznli-
Havingconriderrd ihe mpon of the Scacuyûmcr~l lin IOable nudcnu to and thmulvn of iuch ofcti
on oKcnby MembcrSuin ofstudyand tnining facilitin 5. Rqun!.~the Sx-rcqGrnerrl ioxpon to them-
for inhibiunis of Non-ScIf.GooerningTemt0rin.m prc. ml Auembly ai i~foq-kt xuion on the impicmmu-
pred punuinf~to Ceneni Auembly molvuon 845 (IX) t.on.. the7--- -luiion:
of 11 Novembcr 1954.
Conridering thai moce uholanhipr rhould be madc 6 Drowr iheoittuion ofiheSpçul Commitisr on thc
available10the inhabiunu of Non-SclfZmvemin~Teni- Situluon mLh rcDudio ihe lmplcmcnuuon of ihc Ded..
tories in al1pans of the world and ihai riep. rhodd b nuon on ihc Gnnuw 01 lndcpnaenΠio Colond
Ukcn to encounp rppliationr from riudents in ihou Counuia rnd Pmpln IO the p-nt rnoluuan
Tmiioria.
I. ~nknnoteof the mpn of the scmury~menl:

~A,UYIII. APPENDIX C

SOMEDOUBLE TAX TREATIES CONCLUDED WITH INDONESIA

SiNCE 1976CONTAINING A TERRITORIALCLAUSE

(il A)
Gov rnment of th
~. n income

md Cauital.22A~nl 1992. Article3(l)(a)(i) prov-des

"theterm 'indonesia'meansthetemtory underthe sovereignty
of the Republicof Indonesiaandchparts of the continental
shelf and the adjacent seas over which the Republic of

Indonesiahas sovereignty, sovereignnghas well as other
nghts in accordancewiththe 1982UnitedNationsConvention
on theLawof theSea."

(ii) A m etwe n
êndthe Government ofthe Re~ublicof Austriafor the Avoidanceof Double

T v t on income
a n d & & 1986. Article3(l)(a)(i) prov-des

"theterm 'indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of the Repubiicof
hdonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacent areas over

which the Repubiic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordancewith the provisions of the United
Nations Conventionon theLaw oftheSea,982."

ent betweenthe uom of Belgiumand theRe~ublicof
(iii)
indonesW the Avoidanceof Dod
Evasionwith resuect to %es on Incçgn& on Ca~kl. 13November1973.
Article3(l((b) provi-es

"theterm 'Indonesia'comprises thetemtory of the Repubiicof

Indonesia andthe parts of the sea bed andsub-soi1under the
adjacent seas, over which the Republic of Indonesia has
sovereignrightsin accordancewithinternationallaw."(iv) c e

Av
resDectto Taxes on Income and Ca~ital. 16Januarv 1979. Article 3(l)(a)(ii)
provides -

"the term 'Indonesia' comprisethe territoryof the Republicof

Indonesia as defined inits laws and parts of the continental
shelf andadjacent seas, over whichthe Republic of Indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereign rightsor other rightsin accordance
withinternationallaw."

(v) Convention betweenthe Govemment of the Kingdom of Denmark
and the Govenunent of the Re~ublic of Indonesiafor the Avoidanceof Doubig
Taxation andthe Preventionof Fiscal Evasionwithresuectto Taxeson Income.

28 December1985. Article3(l)(c) provides -

"the term 'Indonesia' comprisethe temtory of the Republicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and such parts of the

continentalshelfand adjacentseas,over whichthe Republicof
Indonesia has sovereignty, sovereign rights or other rightsin
accordancewithinternationallaw."

(vi) t between the Reoublicof In-d the Reoublicof
Fin1andforon and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with res~ect to Taxes on Income. 15 October 1987. Article 3(l)(a)
provides -

"the terrn 'Indonesia' compristhe temtory of the Republicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacent areas over
which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the United

NationsConventiononthe Lawofthe Sea.1982."

(vii) Çonvention between the Govenunent of the French Re~ubiicand
lhe Govemment of the R eo-ce 1
v Of Double
tion and the Prevwn of Fiscal EvasionwithresDectto Taxes on Income
and Caoital. 14Seoted 1979. Article3(l)(c) provides-
'.. "theterm 'Indonesia'comprisesthe territoryof the Repubiicof

Indonesiaas defined in its laws and parts of the continental
shelf andadjacentseas, over which theRepublicof Indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereignrights or other rightsin accordance
with internationallaw."

(viii)
Aereement between the Federal Revublic of Germanv and the
Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with resaet~
D. Article3(1)(b)provide-

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of the Republicof

Indonesiaas defined in its laws and parts of the continental
shelf and adjacenteas, over which theRepubiicof Indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereignnghts or other rightsin accordance
withinternationallaw."

(ix) AA lic of
India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
sv wi r A 1987. Article 3(l)(a)
provides-

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe territoryof the Repubiicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacenteas over
which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereignty, sovereign
rights orjurisdiction in accordance with International Law,
particularly the provisions of the United NationsConvention

onthe Law of the Sea, 1982."

(x) -&ban and the Re~ublic of Indonesia for the
Avoi-oftion and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion wiQ

ct to Taxeson incorne.3March 1982.Article3(l)(a) provide-

"the term 'Indonesia' comprisshe temtory of the Repubiicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and parts of the continental
shelf and adjacentseas, over which theRepublicof Indonesia

has sovereignty, sovereign rights or other rightsin accordance
withinternationallaw."(xi> Anreementbetweenthe Revublicof Indonesiaand the Re~ublicof
Korea for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal

Evasion with resDectto Taxes on Income.signed at Jakarta on 10 November
m. Article3(l)(a)(i) provid-s

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe territoryof the Republicof
Indonesia as definedinits laws and parts of the continental

shelf andadjacentseas, over which the Republicof Indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereignghts or otherrights in accordance
withinternationallaw."

(xii) A m n e

R li of Preve tion
~f Fiscal Evasionwithres-ct to Taxes on Incomeand Capital.5March 1971.
Article3(l)(c) provide-

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe territory of the Republicof
Indonesia and the parts of the seabed andub-soi1under the

adjacent seas, over which the Republic of Indonesia has
sovereignrightsin accordancewithinternationallaw."

(xiü) BgLeemantbetween the Governrnentof the Ruic of Indonesiê
and the Govenunentof NewZealandfor the Avoidanceof Double Tax& 'on
and
the Prevention of FiscaEvasion with respect to Taxes on Income25 March
m. Article3(l)(a)(ii) provi-es

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of theRepublicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacentas over

which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the United
NationsConventionon theLawof the Sea,1982."

(xiv) Converltlgnbetween theReoublic of Indonesia and the Kinedomof
Norwav for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with resoect to Taxes on Incomeand Ca-oital. 19Julv 1988. Article
3(l)(a) provide- "theterm 'Indonesia' comprisethetemtos, of the Republicof
Indonesia as definedin its laws and the adjacent areas over
which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations ConventionontheLawof the Sea, 1982."

(xv) Ayreement between the Government of the Re~ublic of the
mines andthe Govemmentof theRe~ublicof Indonesiafor the Avoidance
pf DO ube Taxation and the Preventionof Fiscal Evasion1'th
res~ecttOTaxes
pn hcome. 18June 198L Article3(l)(ii) provides-

"theterm 'Indonesia' comprisetshe temtos, of theRepubiicof

Indonesia as defined in its laws and such parts of the
continentalshelfandadjacentseas,overwhichthe Repubiicof
Indonesiahas sovereignty, sovereign rightsor other rightsin
accordancewithinternationallaw."

(xvi) Convention betweenthe Governmentof the Kingdomof Sweden
lmd the Governmentof the Re~ubiicof Indonesiafor the Avoidance Of Double

28 Februarv1989. Article3(l)(a)(i) provide-

"theterm 'Indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of the Republicof
Indonesia as defined ints laws and the adjacentareas over

which the Repubiic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations ConventionontheLaw oftheSea, 1982."

(xvÜ) ent between the Swiss confederdand the Re~ublicof
1 wi Taxes on
Incorne.29.8upust 1989. Article3(l)(a) provid-s

"theterm 'Indonesia'comprisesthetemtory of the Repubiicof
Indonesia as defined in its laws and the adjacent areas over
which the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign rights or
jurisdictionin accordancewithinternationallaw."(xviii) A~eement between the Governmentof the Reoublic of Indonesia
and the Governmentof the Kingdomof Thailandfor theAvoidance O f Double

Taxationand thePreventionof Fiscal Evasionwith resDectto Taxes on Incorne
onCul. sienedat Baneokon25 March 1981_.Article3(l)(a) provides -

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of the Republicof

Indonesia as defined in its laws and parts of the continental
shelf andadjacent seas, over whichthe Republic of Indonesia
has sovereignty, sovereignnghts or othernghts in accordance

withinternationallaw."

(xix) Agre ement between the Government Of the United Ki n~dom of
Great Bntain and Northem Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia for the Avoidanceof Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
1v ' 1 r T ital. 1 h 1974. Article
3(l)(b) provides-

"the term 'indonesia' means the temtory of the Republic of

Indonesia and the parts of theseabed and subsoil under the
adjacent seas over which the Republic of Indonesia has
sovereignnghts in accordancewithinternationallaw."

(xx)
and the Governrnent of the Re~ublic of Indonesia for the
Avoidançeof Doublen and the Preventionof Fiscal Evasionwith
ct toTaxeson Income.11 1988. Article3(l)(a) provides-

"the term 'Indonesia'comprisesthe temtory of the Republicof
Indonesia and the adjacent seas which the Republic of

indonesia has sovereignty, sovereignnghts or jurisdictions in
accordance with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations
Conventiononthe Law ofthe Sea." ANNEXES

JointCommunique,18March1975UDT -FretilinCoalition
(reproducedfromJolliffeEastTimor: Nationalismand
Colonialism (1978p.339).....................................l............

SummaryofoutcomeofMacautalks,26-28June1975,
(reproducedfrom(1975) 46AFAR413) ..................................

LetterfromIndonesianPermanentRepresentativeto the
Secretary-General,ncludingProclamation,30November
1975by UDTAPODETIandotherPartiesfollowing
FretiliUDI -UNDoc.AIC.41808a ,ndCorr.1.........................
Press Release,Embassy ofIndonesia,Canberra,
14December1975 ..........................................1...............
..

Documents concerningtheRegionalPopularAssembly,
Dili, 31May 1976andPetitionto Indonesia-UNDoc.SI12097 ...A12

DeclarationonEstablishmentofa Provisional Governmeno tf
East Timor,17December1975 -UNDoc.AB1142 ................26..

CablefromAustralianEmbassy,Lisboncontainingtranslation
of partofinterviewbyPortugueseForeign Ministergiven
to-, 10May 1980 ..................................A.2................

PortugueseConstitutions1976,Art.307and 1989,Art.293 .......A31.

Statementby Ke~eth Quim.UnitedStatesDeputyAssistant
Foreign RelationsCornmitte..................................3.............

Statementby Ministerfor ForeignAffairs,30October 1975.....A57.

Statementby MinisterforForeignAffairs,29November1975 ...A59

Statementby Minister for ForeiAffairs,7 December 1975 ....A60.13. Statementby Minister for ForeignAffairs,8 December1975 .....A61

14. Statementby MinisterforForeign Affairs, 11December 1975 ....A62

15. Statementby MinisterforForeignAffairs, 12December1975 ....A63
16. Statementby Minister for Foreign Affairs, 23 December 197....A64

17. Statementby MinisterforForeign Affairs,29December1975 ....A65

18. Statementby Ministerfor Foreign Affairs, 4March 1976
(extractfrom statementto Parliamenton foreignpolicymatters..A66

19. Answerto Questionin Parliamentby Ministerfor Foreign
Affairs,1June 1976 .............................................................

20. StatementbyMinister for ForeignAffairs,20July 1976 ............8

21. Statementby Ministerfor Foreign Affairs,20January 1978........69

C. Po- ese~eactions

22. CablefromAustralianEmbassy,Lisbon,24January 1978
reportingconversationwithSrVillas-Boas .....................A..........

23. CablefromAustralian Embassy,Lisbon,20December 1978
reportingconversationwithSrVillas-Boas ..............................

24. NoteVerbale by DepartmentofForeignAffairsof
listof Multilateral DoubleTaxationAgreementsentered
into by Indonesiasince 1976.................................................

E. UnitedNationsResolutions

25. SecurityCouncilResolutions .................................A.................

384 (22December1975) Unanimous
389 (22Apnl1976) 12:0:2 (US,Japan)26. GeneralAssemblyResolutions .................................8..........

3485(XXX)(12Decernber1975) 72(Austraiia)10:43
31/53 (1December1976) 68:20:49(Australia)
32/34 28November1977) 67:26:47(Austraiia)
33/39 (13December1978 59:3l(Austraiia):44
34/40 (21Novernber1979) 62:3l(Austraiia):45
35/27 (11November1980) 58:35(Austraiia):46
36/50 (24November1981) 54:42(Austraiia):46
37/30 (23Novernber1982) 50:46(Austraiia):5O

27. Statementby Chainnan ,ommissionon Human Rights,
48thSession, 1992............................................8.............
.. Annex1 Al

JointCommunique.18March1975 UDT - FretilinCoalition(reproducedfrom
Jolliffe. (1978)p.339)

Communique fmn the FRETiLiN-UDT Wtion

JOINT COMMUNIQUE. ISSUED BYTHE COALITION

REVOLUTIONARY FRONT OF INDEPENDENT EAST
TIMOR AND TIMORESE DEMOCRATIC UNION

The Revolurio~~y FronOf Independent East Timo(FRETILIN)
and che Timoree Demmric Union (UDT)are che le@timau
reprcscnuriva of tpeopk ofkt Timor. becaux of our inuan-
sigent ddence of the right of the people Conational independence.
We inrist rhat independenceis the only possiblewayfor rai libera.
uon of the people fmm aploioùonand opprasion of any fom.

nrnuri andUDTarc iniqreting theWIIofthe ovcwhelming ma-
iority of the Peopleof EastTimor for National Indeonidence. th~
-&c réjeetstrongiy any otha fom of dominaru;dour posiuon
UNDEPENDENCE OR DEATH!
rmuN andum du, rjm any quarioning of the right of rhe
le w independena im lied in a rcfcrmdum. a xr-dled "act of
echoia": nobody &aufhod a slaveif he mu to befm! This
mcuu riutrhepirion of the rmlicion Yuruhaicable and weSM)
fighiw the61rh forMUO~U~ independence. the legicimaterigL of
di rvtionain the worid.
Duc m theecommic and politidlimitations and with a dep
-of raiitie* ùx dirionh proposcd rhc foliowingprogrun
mwds full independence:
i. A puaitiorvlgovanment w be fomed by a High Commk-
siona. -ung rhe Pddmt of rhePonuguae Republicand to
mmU< 3 quai rcpr-tion of <hcPomtguae Covrnunent,
nmtm and um. DiPingrhis priod a rcform of al1ind ad-
miniunrivc ud poliMl suu- wiU uke place.
a.The minimum periodof the mnritiond gowmment will be
die pn; rhipaiod an k aŒnded if rhis is detemtned by the

circwnmnm.
3. Cenaai decaons for a Consut'uiod Auembly wiaL place
dta the p- of decolonkarion has bem cornpleted.

The vwiriooal govemmcncwillbcraponsible for iheirnplemen-
uuon of the prognm of Reconrrruction and.Development of the
counay.
The transirional govemmcni will endeavour CO promote
fricndship,goodwilland cmpcnrion withailcountrin of theworld.
but panicululy wirh Ausmlu and Indonau for rhe peace and
searirp of rhewhole region.
Dili. 18March 1975.-
Cend Commi~ of nrnun.
Francisc%ria do Amanl
-Pmident-
' Cenrnl Committce ofUDT.
FranciscLope daCruz

-Prnidcni- Annex2

Su-ary ofoutcorneof blacau talks,26-28June 1975.(reproducedfrom
(1975) 46 AFAR 413)

Portuguese Timor: Macao meeting

On IOjuly, folloivingtalksin&Jacao
from 26 to 28 lune,the Portuguese
Councilof Revolutionapproved a
constitutionallawwhichoutlined the
decolonlrritionprocessto befolloived

inPortugueseTimor.

Portuguew Minisien and otTiciaisand (a) n'deliberative'HighCommiwioner's
repmentativu ofta.0of thlhrrr Councilto be headedbya Ponuguae
Pomiguue Tirnorue politicaiusochtiom HighCommisioner assisrcdby five
met in Macao from 26 to 28June to discm 'joint secretarin'-th~Timorue
the decolonisationof Ponuguce Timor. (perhaps one from eachof the political
The Ponugueie delegationwu ledby associations) andtwo Ponuguere
Dr Aimeida Santos.Ministerfor nominea. The HighCommissioner
Inter-Territorial Cpordination, and included. wouid havea castingvote:
amongothen. MajorVitor Aiva. Ministerof
Statewithout Ponfoiio. Oftt h political
3uociations inPonuguev Timor. AWDETI (b) a consultativeGovernmentCouocil
([avouringintegntion withIndonain) and consislingof tworepraeotativu
UDT (pro-independence)rttendcd. nominatedby eachof thethineen
FRETIiiN (proindependense)boycottcd regionalcouncils(yet ko
the ta&% atnblishcd) andfourmemkn to k
nominatedby eachpolitical
A communiqueiuued ai the endof the association,38 membersin all:
ulks rc-uïirmcthe right of the pople of
Ponuguae Timor to wlfdstermination and (c) electionsfor a Popular Asscmblyin
the p~ciple tht it wu up theppmpleoi October 1976:
Tunor to de6nethe politicalfutureof the
territoiy. The meetingdi<cua dnft (d) the terminationof Ponugucse
constitutionailawon the decolonkationof sovereigntyinOctokr 1978.but with
Ponuguue Timor. TIW wu approvedby the provisionfordjustingth&date to
Council of the Revolutioninbanon accordwiththe'genuinewhhu of the
10July. Theawprovidu for the following: peopleof Timor'. Annex3

includingProclamation.30November 197bysUDTatAPODETIecandotherPanies.
followingFretilinUD-UN Doc.NC.4/808. andCon.1

A/C. ii/Bo8
ASSEMBLY LD.cebter 1975
ORIGIBAL: ENCLISH

Thirtibth aession
mmm COrnTPEE
Aecndsitem 23 ad 88

I.~~~ATIOEI OF THE DFCLARATIO OBNTRE GRANTIN C3
INDEPENDENC ME COLONIAL COüiiTRIESAND PEOPLES

QuEsrron Or TIMOR

Latter dited !,December 1975 from the Perm~cnt Reprmsentrtive of
Indoruria rddnrred to the Seeretw-Gemral

1have the hanou? to enclore herevitü the atatensnt vbich hu baen fsaued In
Sauta on 4 ùcaniber 1975 by th Indaneaian Minimter of Inioznution on bahslf of
the Oowrmmnt of Indomria onthe lataet demlopments in Portueueee Timor. The
joint proclamation by tour political putier in Portuguere Tliser, UODETI, UDT,
KOTA and the Partido Trabalbirta, on the intesration of Portuguere Timor lnto the
Rspublic of Indoneria issuâ at Batugade (Portugwae Tinmr) on 30 Hovaber 1975
lr almo encloaed.

1 vould h. aaremly qatahil if Yow ExceUencp vould baveIt ro diacted
thatthirletter and both eneloaurea ue cireuibted M docwmntr oi the United
Nations General Asrambly hder itm 88 of the' agenda ofits thirtleth regular
rrseion. -tstencnt of the Covern~ant of Indonesia on the
c-urent develocnents an Pcrtu-ras Tincr*

1. 'Ine Covernmcnt of Indoneria wishoa in-regsrd to the current developenta in
Pofiugusa Tinor, to miterate ite position of conûiatently supportfng the
decolonirrtion policy of the Portuguero Govertment, whieh should ba couducted in ra
appropriata, orderly and ~eaeeful niariner. The implensntation or the decolocization
procesr in auch a maMar, aput tr0m constitucing a generaily acceptable prinsipls.
vil1 al80 ens~-e thâ ?~.intenance 0: the nntiond itability of Indoneria - vhich
ir cloaely linked vith the Territory by cornMnbordam - uid the gerrerrl atability
of the South-Eut Asian region.

2. A pmper, orderly and poacehil procers of decolonization vould saaura that hi1
sepnta of the population of Portugucse Timorcould voice, vitbout preeruzb La MV
form vhsteoever, their aspirationa vith regard to their ou8 futuro.

3. It ahould dao bo smpharirod thkt the Iiid~naii~ Gomtri~nt ii fiay roiolved
to eurciae ita logitimatb rlght to datond itr torritoiial intagrity, i~reimty
sud %ta right to protect tke abcuritp of th. life rrid prap.rty of iti citlmna.

b. AB long M the procorr of daeoiûoiration hu aot Mon coqleted, the
Indonariha aovwnaont nrp.ctr the rigbta sac\obUgatiom of thaPortuguasr
Govermunt u the role uithority in tha Territory.
Tho Qovrrrmmt ot Indoneriri bure upon the daei~ntionad conri&rationr.
oxpreares its wilUngaear - if rad whrn ro requutad tgraïJ putioi concerrud -
to puticiprtr in andaavoua te -th thm procerr of dacolord5.tior1 in th.
Tbrritory. Tâoro conii&rrtioiir ha- rlro md tha ûovemment of Indanaria to
hilly ruppo- tha reaultr of the Hacur meeting .ad t& ra&ntrnding riiloctad
in the "W tb~ruidina". j/

6. In the manfila, the bcold~atioa pmcear in the Territory hu takm a vew
critical turn. Act8 of tarror. tortun mi brutrlity have been cdtted tn the
fient. Rkvelucl4~a Ti- brk In,&pendente (PRETILiB) againrt other gmupr in
Portuguorr Timor, vho entartdn diSuont view vith regard to thair future. Thoae
othar proupi hava t&k~ up rtpv te bfond the~~alter wrinrt the use or aimsdforce
bp Ibrrr davalopmant8 acour in the fur of Portugrl'r inespuity to
nrtora paaae.od @nad mbr radtoprroarpr th. fundamental ri&ta ot the people
in the uma. .

7. It rhould ba ncU tut thr Oovrrmnant of Indnnaaia ha# oncr offcmd ita
good oiflcar to uriot t5r Portuguaar Oovornmmt inromtering racurity and gentrd ordar in the Tasritory of Portuguese Tissr, vith a viev to enabling the proceas of
decolonization to be conducted in an appropriata, orderly and peaceiul muinsr.

8. It ahould fUrthem+Or* be racalled that since the uae of armed force by FRFTTIIX
against other groupa of the people of Portug~aae Timor, there hm been a great
influx of tenu of thousanda of refugece froa arear afllicted by great. dirtur3ance

and suiferingr, into the bcraering territorier of Indcnesia. Moved by humanituian
consideratione, the Govermunt and people of Indoneaia have provided tteae ref-~geee
wi-h protection, eheltor, food, clothing and health cars.

9. It rhould nirthermere be noted thht the Covernmtnt of 1ndon;eia ud its
130 million people have exercired great rertrlint ir the frce of mortu attackr
directed sgainat Indoncrian territor/, incurriona into Indonesion terri tory, robbery
in Indonesian territary snd other kinds of aerioua provocationr codtted by
FRETILIN, rerulting in the sacrifice of countlerr livea and property cf our
population. Such a situation, aggravated by the preeanca of tans cf tbeuannde of
rehigeaa. hm gravely âirturbed the national stability sod endan~ered the aacua-ity
of Indoneeia.

10. The procear of decolonizrtion in thnt Territory, vhich since the bginaing han
proceeded in nn inappropriate, disordarly ad unpeaceful maMer, her culminated in
th. ao-calld "independence declaration" by PRGFILïN. This unilatard ut by
FRFPILIiP hu rendered difficult the imementation or the "Rom Meauorandumin" v,hereae
tha Portuguerr Goverment. vhich ir rarpomible for th. Territom of Timor rnd tha
aitution tharein, ha8 atatad at the United Iationr thrt it ir net capable of
overcdng the situation in Pertuguese 'Enor.

11. Tùa Indoaerinn Oomrnmnt CUI therefore fuUy underatand and coneider normal
the proclmation madeaubrequently, on XI Iovombar 1975 by the othr politicu

putirr in tke Territory vir. the lhib Democr6tica da Timor (ml, the I\rsoci~~ao
Populat Democr6bica 'Pimorenie (AFQDETI),KOTA rad the Pei& Trabdhistr (Labour
Party)vbich jointly, on hhbV or the people of Portugucse Timor, fmed themolver
from colonisliam by intisritiw air Territorg into the State of Indonoria
(set enclosure ) .

12. In viev of thaae developmanta ia Portwee Timor the Govermant of Indoneria
wirher to mke the rdloving drcluation:

(r) It &eply met8 the uni1ater.l action of FRETILIR vhich ha declared the
iadependeaca of Portuguaae Timor vithout due resard to the virhes of the othar
palitical putiea in the Territoy vhieb dao repreaent tho voice of the people.

(b) It nrpcctr tho right of th. peoph to aympathiae vith, and. ha8 a profound
understanding of the dcclarntia of UDT, APODETI, KOTAnad the Putido Trabalhiath
vhich. on behalf of the peopla in Portuguese Timor. havo proelaimed thamelver M
integrated vith Indanaaia. (c) It calla upon ail the pattiea concerned in Ponuwre Timor to undenalce
serious efforts for the attainincnt or the impleineatation of dacolonizition in
Ponuguese Timor in a normal, orderiy ad peaceful mer.

(dl It dl1 take the nccoruy meuures to enrute tba saiety of ita nstiond
territory, ta defend the aovereignty of the State and to protact the population
Prom eXternal harasment. On tbe buis of the principler of uti-colonirlirm and
imperirlism and the priaciple or hunaaitarianism, the InQneri~ Covernni.ot aad
people have tho mord obiigatioa to protcct the people in the Territory of Timr 80
thbt the procerr of decoloaization cm ka realired in bccordaace vith the aopirations
md viehei of the entire people of POrtUguese Timor.

(e) It calla upon the entirr Indonesian people in ganeral and thore living
in the areae borderine Portugursr 'Plmor in pbrticular to incre~e their vigilance. PROCLAMATION

After hsving carafully rtuàied the unilateral action by FXTILM in iaauing
itr 80-called "Proclrnation of Inde?endence", of Portuguear Timor and the rttitxde
of the Portuguese Gowumant concarning it, vhich cleuly coatradfcta the real
vish of the people of Pottugueae Timor to exerciaa an act of aelf..deternination on
the hiturc of Portuyesc Timor, ve the peoplcs of Portugueae Timor re?rcsented in
APODITI, IJDT, KOTA and the Partido Trabdhists, hcreby rtata the .follwlng:

1. We are stmngly against the unil~teral action byFRGPILIS M it clearly
violatar the principlrn of decoloniz~tioa agreed upon by the Portuguase Gaverment
md the thnc politicd putier of Portugueae naor.

2. It haa been avident ro far that FRETILIN hm not ahown r ganuinr derire
for r peaeoiul solution of th. problcm of Portuguese Thar. For example. FRETILIN
refuaed io participate in the wau mceting. Procise4 rt this rtage, during vhich
dl peace,.loving putier ue &in& their bat to bring about the holdin~ of
nagotistions ruch ai the Rom meeting betwen Portugal snd Indoneair Mcantly vhich
pmduced A Maraudun of Underrtuidia, the resdinrrr of the Auatr8ï.i.w PoverriPicnt
to pmvidr a venue for the taka rubaequently, effort6 by the Indonarian Gavaramant
to rend rpecially ita Porrign Miniater, Wr. Mm Wik, to Atmbu vithin the
îra~~york of implaenting the rpirit of the RorPm aatin&, uid our ntitenent to the
Portugusre Covernmint, al1 thra* wd eftortr hrve agdn ben aabot.ged by FRETILiX
vith itn unilateral action. 'Il?i8 iU-intentionad rttit* cmthe pmt of FP3TILTY
har foroed ua, the p.ople of Portuguaa lïmor, to rat.

3. The nbv dtuation cmated üy tàe unilateral ution of lrRETILIi'ihm
excluded the porribility of finding r viy out throu& r p..cefui rolutioa to
determina the of P~rt~re -r in ucordurcr vith the red viahan of
Portugueao Timor.
b. Atter hbving been forcibiy repuated fram the rtr- linlrr ofblood,
identity, ethnie arrdmil culturr vith thepeople of indonesir by the colonid
powr of Portugal for m thm Li00yearr, w &a it ir nov the right momnt tor
the peopie of Portuguirr Timor CO re-artabüsb fo-y thrse stmng tics vith the
Indoneriaa rution.

5. In tho amm of bodtheAhi&ty, ve therrrori rolrdy beclare the
indqwndeace and intemtion of th.vhole fo-r colonid Torritory of Partuguese
Timor via tho Ropublic of Indonesis, vàich ir in rocorduico trith the rsrl dshra
of the antire p.op& of Portuguere Timar. 6. We alro urgethe Indonarien Oove-nt uid people to taka atepa
immdiatalv to protect the livaa of the peopla vho nov regard thamelver u
Indonerictna, yet are itill aufiering duo to the terra? and farciat practicar of
the FRITILIB gang. amed rrid rupported hy the Ponuguse Gaveramant.

Donc rt Dalibo,30 Rovraber 1973

Signed b~ the iolloving paraons:

On behrlf oi MT:

Ouilherma Maris WNCALES Prbucieco X. Lepar da CIIUZ

Alaxandrino BORROMeLi kdago de OWVEIM [ :., u 1.,,,
1 : \90EC! '975
UNITED NATIONS . .

GENERAL
GENERAL
~/C.L/@08/C3rr.l

ASSEMBLY 9 Decmber 1975

OIG : 3iGLISK

'I?.irtiethsession
F0UnTl-iCOIMITTZZ
Agenda iters 23 and 88

LWLEMENTATION 37 THE DECLARATION ON TE GPANTIXGOP
INDEPENDEXCE TO COLONIALCOUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTIONOF TERRITORIES UNDER PORTüGLiESE ADi"IINISTRATIO?I

QUESTIONOF TBOR

Letter dated 4 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of

Indonesia addressed to the Secretary-General

On the last uaae cf the docrunect. the signatures snould reet

Où behzlf of IIDT: On behalf of QC)DET:

Francisco X. Lopes da CRUZ Guilherme Maria GONCALVES

Domingo de OLIVEIRA fiexandrino tOnftC:.I,'U
On behalf of KOTA: On behalf of Partiiic TraCalhista:

Jose :.lMTINS Domingos C. PERZIIIA PressRelexse.EmbassyofIndonesia.Canberra. 14 December1975

PF!Ess RE-SE

The 'fo1io~~:ing is an unofficial transla.ttor, of the statment of
the Government of In5onesia on the question of East Tinor as
issued in Jakarta on Dece~ber 14, 1975.
1. The pending crisis in Portuguese Ticor is the result of
measmes taken by the govcrnncnt of Portugal to naintain colonialisn ;
in its new forn in the tcrritory. Portuqal has made ucc of a local
political faction, Frctilin, to sir;i~ort the inple~entation of its
colonial plan in its nea fosn ViLh the arquzcnt of àeco.lonisat<o?,
For this purpose, the cntire coloiiial nilitsr y strei-igth in P3r tcq~ese
Tinor(Topaz), unimpaired and incli~ding al1 provisions anc! \var
equipaents, have been put at the disposal of Fretilln in order to
terrorise its political enemies.

2. The colonial. scheme o'f Portuqal has been proven Sy various'
events and successive happenings as follor9rs :
A. At the timc when P~rtugal issued invitations to al2
political parties in Portuguese Tinor to attend the Flacao Co~ferznce
on June 26-28, 1975, Fretilin has intentionally refused to attenci.
Nevertheless, the goverment of POL tugal has not trkcn anv neasureâ
\vhatsocver, a fact chich is cor.';rjry to'-its ov:n statc-rent that
Portugal !vil1 take scvcrc actions ngainst any group absent at the
conference, thus considered hapcring the proccss of decolonisation.

B. As a follow-up of the provocsticn9 touards UDT to
stage the coup'd'etat on Augi-.st 11, 1075, the colonial qovcrnxent in
Portugucse Timor has prcparcd the ncccssary stcps to pave the ;ray
for Fretilin to control the entire Ccrritory of Portugucsc Tinor by
force with the use of the colonial troops rrhosc stipend ~vcrc.sFi.ll pa
by the colonial governnent of Portugrzsc Tinor together with al1
their replcnishent, provisions and military cquipncnts.
C. In the turbulent conditions vihicli ensued, thc govcrrmcn

thePorterritory, Tbutr steppednot asidcrt to thcf islandstoof Atziuro. secuDesidcs, of
Fretilin has many tirnes violstcd the sovereignty of the Republic

of Indonesia with assaults and attacks v~hich rcsultcd in victimâ
of people and properties of thc population.
D. lii al1 its constil2ations cith Indoncsi.3, Pox'iitoal has
bccn protruding al1 the tinz nl';h the nin of strcnqthening the
position of Fretilin. This fuct has bîcn cvidcnccd by the i:ii~sion
of [X. Alneida Santos or. Aur,i?s^, 29 to Scptcnber 1, 1975 aiid on
scptcnbcr 11, 1975 in Jakarta, thus intcnlioi~ally Lailing to rcnch
anrccncnt bccausc of the sinister plas of Portugzl to hand cvcr ?O!:'
in the tcrritory of Portuguese îinor to Frctilin.

E. Portugal has supportcd the unilatcyal dcclaration of
inflcpendcnce by Frgtilin as convcycd by i4inZsîer Victor Crcspo tc
tlic Indoncsian h.b~çsado-.in Lj.sbon, :.:r3cn b:.m~rcnqsay, on the S2:?
da!f of Novcabcr 20, 1975, a fact v~hich aas l~tcr dcnied by the
govcrnncnt of Portugal.
3- Thc.tcrrorisn donc hy Frctilin toxards the pcoplebof Port-,
ilnor in >l~u!,i.sr.c, ;~insro, ?ail:,co and otlicr rireas, constitutcs
tYP1cal aspects of coloninlis;, to n::lyjuq;,tc thi' pcoplc 1s rcsir;';?.ii=e
such AS the slauohtcrinq of ,nû:e tlirn 500 pco;,ic! by th? crilc-i:il
.,...m..<+,,
jn Portu~uesc îL~r,r in Che 'uea of Viqucquc in 1959. Gnbcrro, A.C.T.
Al1

4. The- resistmcc of people, led by Apodcti, bTT, ihta z?.d
Trabalista, is consequently not more than the struggLc against
coIonialisn and isnot to resist any force in the territory 7:;Sich
desires indcpencience .
5, The vol~mteers vihn at the request of Apcdeti, LDT, Kota
aïid Trabalista are assisting their.brothers in PortL~scse Linor,
can not possibly Sc hindcred by th? noverrcent considerin? the
various violations, thc malintentions and the mcasurcs takcn by
Portugal as well as Fretilin to intcntionally iaposc their vtill
by force on the people. The accusalio;is launched ty scme quarters z:
if the governnent of the Republic of Indonesia has intervened
militarily in the territory of Portuguese Tinor ore r:hatcoever
wZthout any foizndation. The goverment of the Rcpublic of Ind3nesi'z
5s mt in theposition to involvo its armd forces in s2id territ~r::
due to the existence of pre-rec,üirezcntâ and firn procedees ~Çer
ihe stipulations of the 1945 Constitution of the Rcpublic of
Lrdonesia.
6. The demand of the supporters of the U.N. resolution to
withdraw what they cal1 "Indoncsian troops" has no bcar5.r.g at al1
with the prevailing conditions. Thc.United Nations should considcr
the voice and aspirations of the people to fight colonialica
in Portugucçe Timor instcad of stirring into cocnotion the
accusations of the socalled "military intcrventionl'.

7. With the .be'inning of the restoration of seccrity and orle;
in Portugucse Timor by the joint forces of Apodcti, LDT, Kota and
Trabalista, the attention of the U.N. should bo evcn ained at the
question of the inplementation of the right of self-determination
of the people in Portuguese Tinor.
8. In conncction with the resolution on the question of Portïg.2
Timor as submitted by >lozambiquc, Guinea Bissau CS in the U.V.,
Indoncsia is of the opinion that said resolution is ill-aderessed or
miscarricd in the event Indonesia is referreâ to it.

9. Indonesia appreciates the attitude taken by countries r~hlch
are ableita recognisc the point of viea as put by Indonesia and
raise in.confornity mith Indonesia in facing said resolution. On
thc othcr hand, Indonesia fcels vcry disappointcd in the attitule
of a nunbcr of fricadly countrics, iii particular those situated
in thc neighbouthood of the territory of Portuguese Tinor iihich
indceù gave their support to said resolution or toolc an indiffcrent
attitude tolvards it.
The above staCement has bccn announccd by Mr. Mashuri, :,iinistcr
of Information of the Rcpublic of Indonesia, on Deccmber 14, 1375
in Jakarta.

Canberra, Dcccmber 16, 1973, Annex5

Documents conceming the Regional Popular Assembly, Dili. 31 May 1976 and
Petition to Indonesia-UN Doc.SI12097

ORIGINAL: ENGUSS

GNERAL ASSCKBLY
Thirty-first session
Iten 24 of the preliminary list*
IMPEI,mITATICIi OF DECLARATION ON
THE GRAiiTINGOF I?IDEPENPLHCE TO
COLONIALCOEITFIILSANDPZOPLZS

Letter dated-15 June 1976 from the De~utY Permanent
FIevresentative of Indonesia to the United llations
addressed to the Secretary-General

1 bave the honour to enclose herevith the textd of the folloving commnications
concerning developments in East Timor:

1. Cahle dated 1 June 1976 sent by the Provisional Goverment of East T1mr
to the Secretary-Ceneral of the United Nations, the Chairman of the
Special Coamittee on Cecclonization, and Mr. Vittorio Yinspeare Guiccisrdi,
the Special &voy of the Secretary-General (annex 1);

2. Cable derted 7 June 1976 sent by the Provisional Government of East Tizor

t0 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman of the
Special Cornmittee OU Decolonization, and Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi,
the Special hvoy of the Secretary-Generd (auraex II);

3. Cables dated 8 June 1976 sent by the Pmvisional Governlrert of East Ti~or
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman of the
Special Coamittee on ~ccolonization, and ,Hr. Vittorio Winspeare Cuicciardi,

the Special Envoy of the Secretary-Ceneral (annex III);

. Statemnt msde by Mr. Amaldo dos Reis Araujo, Cnief Zxecutive of the
Provisional Covernment of East Timor, on 7 June 1976 on the occasion of
presenting to Przsident Suharto the petition of the people of Sast Timor
addresse6 to the Covernment and people of the Republic of Indonesia
(annex IV) ;

5. Statement nide by H.E. President Suharto on 7 June 1976 in response to
the address presented by the deleqation of the Provisional Covenment of
East Tinor (annex V). A/31 /lm
J/12097
E7&.i$h
hex 1
Page 1

Cable date6 1 Uue 1976 sent Sy the Provisional Goverment of East Timr
to the Secre?ary-ûenerel of the L'nited Nations. t5e Chairman Of the
Scecial Codttee on Cecolonization, and .+. Vittorio 'diasueare Cuicciardi.
the Swcial Envoy of the Secretarf-General

1. On 31 MW 1976, on behalf of tne people of East Timor. the PopiSar
Representative Assembly democraticdly expressed its viw on their Future, an
occasion to whicn we had extended Your ExceUency ou. invitation to
H.E. Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Cuicciardi, the Special Coimittee of 2b, and the
Security Coumil, orally as Well as by cable.

2. The OCC~S~O~ vas witnessed by the representatives of foreign Covernments t0
Indonesia and 40 foreign Journalists from Jakarta, including Indonesian
journalists .

3. On the basis of existing regulations in East Timor, the Popular Representative
Assembly consists of 37 members properly elected so as to represent the vishes of

the people of East Timor in accordance vith living realities in the couutry as weU
as vith the identity and cultural traditions of the people. The process of
electian vas dunocratic and free from any fora of pressure.

4. The decision of the Popular Representative Assembly tdrcs the iorm of a
petition directed to the Government and people of the Republic of Indonesia for the

latter to accept East Timor as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia.

5. The petition has been msde vith complete free vil1 and vith fuU awwcness of
the future of East Timor vithout any form of coercion from outside.

6. We request your good offices to persuade the Govvnmcnt of the Republic of
Indonesia to accept imcdiately ou. pctition for integration so as to ensure the

future of the people of East Timor, uhich has been uncertain for quite some time.
and to alleviate their sufferings.

7. Me also request your assistance in transmitting this petition to Members of
tke United Fbtions and to appropriate agencies of the United nations.

8. Your advice concerning the successful implementation of self-determination b~

the people of East Timor twards integration vith the Republic of Indonesia vil1 bc
highly appreciated. ; vould Se arateful if Your Excellency vodd arrange for these communicaticr.~
5e puùliahed as an official docunent of the C-enoral Assembly under item 2b of
th= prelixinqr list of items to be included in the prorisional agenda of tho

t.i'vt:/-first sessicn, and of the Security Council.

(çigned) Au~ust E.A?PP.IMC

Ambassaéor
leputy Pernanent P,ebresentati'~e IVll/lO9
s/u097
Engiish

Anaex II
Page 1

Cable dated 7 June 1976 sent by the Provisional Covernnent of ?ast Timor
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. the Chai- of the
Soecial Coumittee on Deeolonization. and t4r. Vittorio Vinsceare Guicciardi.
the S~ecial Envoy of the Secretary-Cenerai

Excellency .

With reference to previous.cable of the Provisional Government of East Timor
relating to the decision taken by the open and plenary session of the Popular
Representative Assembly on 31 May 1976, 1 have the honour to inform you that a
44-member delegation consisting of members of the Popular Representative Assembly

and high functionaries of the Provisional Government of East Timor today, Monday,
7 June 1976. submitted to H.E. Mr. suh,-.=to, the Resident of the Republic of
Indonesia, at his palace in Jakarta the decision of the Popular Representative
ksembly taken at its session on 31 May 1976. This decision, vhich takes the
fom of a petition, reads as follova :

"Petition

With the hlessing of Cod Codghty, va. on behalf of the entire people of
East Tirmr, in vitness of the resolution passed by the open and plenary
session of the Popular Representative Assembly of the Territory of East Timor
on Y MW 1976 in Dili, vhich in fact constitutes a realization of the
aspiration of the people of East Timor M inscribed in the Roclemation of
integration of East Timor on 30 Nwember 1975 in the tom of Balib6, do hereby

resolve to urge the Governmcnt of the Republic of Indonesia to accept, in the
shortwt possible time, and to undertaka constitutional mensures for the hrU
integration or the people and territory of East Timor into the unitary state
of the Republic of Indoncsia vithout any referendum.

Done at the city of Dili on the

31st day of MSY 1976

The Chief Exeeutive of the Provisional
Gover~ient of East Timor

(Signcd) Arnaldo dos Reis kaujo (Signed) Cui fienne M. Ccn~slves
Chai- of the Popular

Accept, Excellency, our highest coasideration.

Mario CarrascaltIo
Head of Liaison Office of the Provisional

CovermŒnt of East Timor. Jakarta" A/31/109
S/120gl
Fnglish
Annu II?
?sge 1

L'??!EX III

Cables %ted 8 June 1976 sent jy the ??a~risict?21 Cover?~ent~ast Tizcr
to the 3ecretary-General of the rjnited Xatlons. the Chairman of the
Suecial Committee on Decolonization, and Ur. Vittorio Winsrelre Snicciardi,

the Scecisl Fnvoy of the Secretar'r-General

"L'nited 2iations Secretary-Venera1 :i.E. Kurt I.laldheim and. Chaimas Unizei :!atiîns

Special Committee on 3ec~lrini=?.ti$n

Heving informed you on the proceedings of and decision adogted by the
Popular Representative Asseslbly in Dili on 31 May 1976 in my previous csble,
1 regret very much that no positive reply tas been given to my invitation to
attend the said session.

Hcvever, ve vouïd like to draw to vour attention that the Covernment of
Indocesia is sendinq a mission to Zast Timor on 2L June to utake an on-the-spot
assessment.

This vil1 provide another opportunity for you or a mission of the Special

Conmittee onYoc3lcnjzsticr. to come to Dili to see for yourseives the firm
detemination of OUI people to be reunited with Indonesia. The Provisional
Government of East Timor for its part vil1 render its full CO-operation in this
regard. \.le are avare and ve are appreciative of the fact that the Committoe on
i~ccl3nizati~r. is considering sending a mission to East Timor in the near
future.
It is our earnest hope that this is also the position of the Secretary-
Ceneral of the United Nations.

Aighest consideration.

Arnaldo dos leis .L-ari!,o
C/O Liaison Cffice of the
Provisional Government of
Tast Timor in Jakarta" Enaiah
Anna III

"Following yesterdsy's csble, 1 have the honour to inform you that today,
Tuesdav, 8 June, the delegation of Zast Timor p8id 3 cal1 on the leadership of
the People's Consultative Assembly, the Rouse of Fepresentatives and that cf
the five factions. in his statement before the session of the Indonesian Souse
of Representatives, :ir. ArnaLao dos Reis ArJ-luJo, Chief Executive of the

Provisional Government of Zast Timor, inter alia, resorted that on 7 June the
delegation submitted to President Soeliarto a petition representing thetotal
vil1 and ospiration of the people of East Timor to be integrated with the
Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible. Se said it vas for the same resson
that bis delegation appeared before the session of the House of S'epresentatives

to convey the sincere vishes of the people of East Timor to the people of
Indonesia through the members of this important body. Mt. Araujo further
elaborated on the process of the adoption of the petition by the Popular
Representative Assembly of East Timor durinq its first session. The wish to be
integrated vith their brothers in Indonesia vas not a new phenomenon, he added,
but it has been kindling in the heart of each and every son of East Timor. The

biggest uprising broke out in 1959 in Viqueque, where the people demanded to be
integrated vith the territory of Indonesia. However, this uprising vas cnished
by the Portuguese colonialists and any aspiration for integration with Indonesia
vas aiways smothered. Everythinn akin to Indonesia and knovledge of Indonesia had
to be abandaned. Part of the people of East Timor previously thought that

Indonesia vas the western part of Timor; however, they have since realized that
they and the +ople of Indonesia were one big family vho inhabited the thousands
of islands in the archipelaeo. He said further: 'We the people of East Timor
are ready for integration vitb Indonesia; everyone can see and sense how impatient
we get avaitin~ that historic reunion. We have invited the United Rations
Special Connnittee on Decolonization, foreign mbassies and journalists in Jakarta

to corne to Dili and see for themselves hov determined we are to be reunited vith
our brothers. With the same objective in mind, ve extend Our invitation to the
distinguished members of this house to cane to Sast Timor to observe the fini
determinaticn of our people to be reunited in the big family of Indonesia.'
Concluding his statement, Mr. Araujo requested the House to convey to the
Indonesian Government and people that the people of Timor were becoming impatient

from vaiting for the Indonesian decision with regard to the question of integration
and cailed upon them to accept the petition without nirther delay in order to
accelerate the process of complete integration.

Accept, Excellency. our hichest consideration.

Mario Viesa. Cal-~.ascalSo
Liaison Office of the
Provisional Government of
East l'imr" ...--.--,
SI12097
aglish

Annex IV
Page 1

resident Suharto the petition of the peoole of East Tiwr
addressed to the Goverment and people of the Reuublic of Indonesia

Your Ixcellency, President of the Republic of Indonesia,
Honouraole members of the Parliament,

Distinguished Ministers,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for us, the representatives of the people of East
Timor, to be here, since today for us marks a &y of happiness and joyfulness.
This is a happy occasion for us because not only are ve able to meet each other

but zlso ve have the chance to knov al1 of the officials of the Indonesian
Government. Moreover, the greatest pleasure for the representatives of East Timor
is to meet Your Excellency. President Suharto. in your capacity as the Chief
Fxecutive of the Republic of Indonesia, and also the opportunity for us to visit
Jakarta, the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, a chance for vhich ve have
been vaiting for many years.

The main purpose of our visit is to express the vill and the vish of the
people of East Timor. It is our intention. as the representatives of the people
of East Tbr, to present our petition for integration of East Timor vith Indonesia.
We are firmly detemined to maintain our subaequent future development together
vith the rest of the Indonesian people. On this very occasion. 1 hereby submit
the petition to Your Brcellency. the President and the Chief becutive of Che

Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

Excellency,

The vish to integrste vith Indonesia has long been alive in the hearts of
the people of East Tiunr.
The long stnggle of the people of East Timor against
colonial rule is the reality of the inner desire and the vish and the vil1 of the
people in the Territory. Our struggle vas inspired by the similarity of ethnic and
cultural backgrounds ensting betveen the East Tiunrese and Indonesian people,
particularly those vho are geographically located on the eastern prt of Indonesia.
The challenge of the various obstacles faced by the East Threse people did not

veaken this desire. but on the contrary, it strengttened their vishes until the
day came when al1 the political parties, for example, UDT, APODEi'I. KOTA and
TRAEALHISTA consolidated themselves and vere able to control the majority of the
territory and to proclaim the intewation vith Indonesia on 30 Aovember 1975. This
signified that the people of East Timor vere in consensus to integrate vith the
country and the people of Indonesia.Excellency,

The people of East Timor elected their representatives democrstically, base.?
on the various socio-cultual ciistoms among the people. On 31 May 1976 those
elected representatives c~nvened a meeting in Dili and decided to reiterate
the desire of the &st Timorese people to reunite vith the country and the people
of Indonesia. 'de, the representatives of the people of East Timr vho are piese::
on this occasion, have been authcrized bg al1 the Timorese people to submit the
petition to integrate vith Indonesia.

Excellency.

On this special occasion ve earnestly tiope that Your Excellency ;riil have no:
the slightest doubt that our petition to integrate vith Indonesia is the
realization of our deepest desire to become Indonesians. For this reason, ue, as

the representatives of the people of East Timr. request that the Indonesian
Goverarent under the guidance of Your ErceUency. and also dl the Indonesian
people, take the nccessary steps in order to accomplish the petition, vhich is as
follovs:

Petition

With the blessing of Cod Wghty. ve, on behalf of the entire people of
Eaat Timor, in vitness of the resolution passe3 by the open and plenary
session of the Popular Representative Assaubly of the Territory of East Timor
on 31 Hay 1976 in Dili, uûich in fact constitutes a realization of the
aspiration of the pe0p.l.a of %st Timor as inscribed in the Proclamation of
integration of bat Timr on 30 90mmber 1975 in the tom of Balib6, do hereby
resolve to urga the Goverameut of the Republic of Indonesia to accept. in

the shortest possible th, and to unâertake constitutional masures for the
full integration of the people and the territory of East Timr into the
uaitary state of th* Rrpublic of Indonenia vithout any referendum.

Donc at the city of Dili
on the 31st day of May 1976

Chief Recutive of the Chairman of the Popular
Provisionrl Gaverment Representative As3aably
of East Timor of East Timor

(Simedl ArnalQ dos Reis (Simed) Cuilherme Maria ConçdveU We, the representatives of East Timor, humbly request that Your Excellency
and the people of Indonesia take this petition into the necessary consideration
with the hope that it can be implemented within as short a time as possible. On

this occasi~n ve also appeal to the international cormnunity to acknovledge the
important events vtiich have occurred in EastTinor. The people of East Timor
have determined their ovn future through their representatives in Dili on
31 May 1976.

We are ofiicially submitting the petition of the Timorese people to Your
Excellency, so that we, and the entire people of bat Timor, are able to extend
the invitation immediately to al1 the officiais and the members of the Indonesian
Parliament to visit East Timor in order to make on-the-spot assesment of the real

vishes 02 the people on the territory.

In conclusion, Your Ekcelleacy Mr. President. honourable members of
Parliament, other distin-isheà Ministers. ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of
the entire people of East Timor, ve express ou. sincere thanks and great
appreciation to al1 of gou for this opportunity to submit this petition.

Thank you. Statenent rade by H.E. President S.Jharto on 7 June 1976 in
resoonse to the address presented by tk? deleqation of the
Trovisional Government of East Tiaor

Distinguished Mr. Araaldo dos Reis Araujo, Chie? Executive of the Government of
East Timor,

K-y de= Brother;, members of the delegation of the people of East Timor,

First of all, 1 vould like to convey nr/ varnest welco=e to the capital of the
Republic of Indonesia to ail my dear brothers, delegates of the people of
East Timor.

Your arrivd in Jakarta nov not only constitutes an importaut event, but alsn
a historic occasion in our nationhood.

You have corn here to carry out the task of the vhole people of East Timor,
nsmely to submit the firm deternnnation of the people of East Timor to reintegrate
themelves vith their half-bmthers in the State of the Republic of Indonesia -&O
aiready bec- independerit three decades ago.

I do not feel as though 1 am greeting strangers todey. 1 feel that 1 am
neeting n(y OM brothers again, vho vere separated for a long timt.
Wevere
separated for hundreds of years by the artiticial barriers of the colonial
Govenimtnts. We vere separated by force vithin ou. ow. backyards, separated
against Our vil1 from our own brothers.

We vere forced to be separated by iU rate.

But ve uill nov be together again thaalrs to ou? strugele; ve are no* stronkly
determincd to stay togethar bo~d by moral ties that vill not be affected by
hundreds of ycan of separation.

A similar fate in the past, similar ideals and a commonresolve to build
These
jointly a better tomrrou are the fundamental elements of a nation.
essentiai elements of the vil1 to live together form the boads of unity aa a
nation, uiidisturbed by other factors such as differences in laaguage, colour or
religious beliefs. Many of the wdern nations vhicb are stmng and advanced
nauadays. too, as a matter of tact. originatrd frcm nations located far avay from
their oresent homeland. On the contrary, there are nations vhich vere once United
but have now becomt divided into tvo or wre perts. Tnis clearly shOM that the
villand the ability to stay United are the only factor in building a nation. --, tco, the Indonesian nation with a popdation of 130 aillion, have Our
riiffercncss: ve liv. on snall islandz vilh different local Ciaiects, ve 361?er?
tc Cir?e-e_t CILS~O~S, ve have colo~lrful and beautiful locd cultures, and :?et 'Je
sziil rerzir o::*er Cifferences u ..ell. But vo are, nevertheless, determinec0
bccome cne Indsresian nation and will rorîin so for the rest of our long fature
histor,'.
l
;:chave n3 intention of rencving those differences, because such an effsr:
would be e-aizst ?,;te: useless and futile.
..
.e cnce Yere ~pli~tered intc communal erc-5 irhich not only felt hisuni:ei,
t.ut in -&.y instances even perpetuated ùisunity. Xe had dso been iivided ilto
ditferont kin~dorns. Al1 of this vas mereiy the result of foreip colonial
po!.itics m.c? in:erests. ?Jithout divicine us, they would no- be able to dozLir.ate
tlis vast ar.d iensely populatrd archipelao.

mis archi-elano was once uaited, vith 8n area approximately the sHistorythe
nresent territory of the unitary State of the ?epiiblicof Indonesia.
noteC tCe famus SriviJaha 'rin~dom, ss well as the well-irnm HaJapabit Kingdcc. 1
3ut I?istory should also take note of an inglorioïs chapter and a misfortune
taat befell us. For three and a hdf centuries ve vere a colonialized nation,
car sou1 va oporossei and our body exploited. As 1 have mentioned earlier, .Je
were separateci h'om our ovn bmthers, we were splintered into sd groU?S. But
the hericscye of sharing one c-n destiny had never disappeared. The spirit to
beco~e inde'endent haà never been quenched.

Durine. t'ne entire pcriod ot colonial domination, the Indonesian nation had
&deys fomt against foreign colonialists and vanted to become a me, independez
and honoürable nation again. Our history is fiuil of bi~ and sd heroes as well
as thousands of ninor and Wnovn heroes. 9.e tiistoly of Indonesia registered the
stru~gles ?O be free from foreign domination thro*~@?out rhis entire vast
archi?elago. :lehave our herainc: Cut Plyak Gi:Lec, and other heroes: Teuku Uiiar,
Ixam Bonjol, Diponemro, Hasanudin , Pattii-ura ad nac:z others . They fought
îgainst iorlipn calonialists to liberote and to sdvance their societies. we also
have heroines in other fields wiio shared the sac objective of their struczle:
Bu Kartid. Dewi Sartika and so forth.
1
If the previous struwes were for the nost part manifosted through armed
conflicts acd carried out sepnrately, later an at the Seqinning of this century
the stwle of the Indonesian peo-le began to search for nore nationdistic and
for new nethoda, namely moàernor~anizational means. the Bud. Utoz0 vas
established in 1908, which is nar hcwn as the national i?a-daicening dw. Since
then wy Indonesian organizations began to enerze and vere folloved by politic&
parties, vhich have actually one identical aim: inùependence. 1

In 1328 tSe netionalistic platfom beceme even stronger vith the
of the youths' solecm oath. The InConesian - -mli- vas iirnly detemined to have
one nation, one fatherland and one language. Indozesiar.. he struegle
independence of Indonesia vas expandinq and becme =ore clear. I.

.. The vhole series 3f StNgeles d.uing those hmdreds of years finaily reachod
its climax during the indspendence var in 191i5. 'vle~ained sur independence
through armed StrUggle and we defended it heroi-ally throu~b hearl sacr-fic-s and

hardships, and some of its bittemess resulting from those struggles can still be
found up to now.

We proclaimed the independence of Indonesia es our own responsibility and as
result of Our ovn struggle et that time not one single country recomized our
independence. But independence is not solely a question of recognition by others,
and also not by the international community. Independence is grimarily E question
of detemination and decision; if ve can show that ve vat independence. then the

world - even though late - vil1 eventually recognize it.

3ut the struggle of Indonesia was far from finished. In the foiloving Years
after the recognition of ind=?endence, we vere still splintered. Thus emerged
several Federal States created by the colonial governent which, at that verY
moment, still tried to maintain its domination in this land. Furthemore, the
question of West irian wes also delayed and only in 1969 did it come back into

the fold of the Republic of Indonesia.

Such history clesrly demonstrates that the Indonesian nation had stntggled
hard tovards its national independence vhich is unified and intact, and in this
history. Indonesia cm cldm to be the pioncez of national independence struggles
in the muion Of South-East Asia. Xe hsd already started our struggle long before
the dcuninated African nations were awake and gained their indeper;dence such as

t0day.

'7hex-e is not the slightest doubt that Indonesia is anti-colonialist.
Lndanesia sttonga supports the stniggle of evtry colonialized people to determine
its ovn mure. The first sentence of our Constitution clearly stipulates:
"~hat in reality, independence is the right of every nation and, therefore,

colonialism in this vorld must be abolished because it is not in conformity vith
humanity and Justice."

Three hundred and fifty yean under iomign domination made us one of the
nations vtiich fUily understands the simificance of misery. Emdreds of years of
hard struggies md ariother five years during the independence var have made us e
nation which deeply comprehends and highly respects the meaning of independence.

It is true that the principal trait of the present tventieth century is that
this is the centurp of in6ependence for all nations and during these coming years
ve vil1 witness the draving to a close of colonidism, which is nov fast decaying.

But certainly Indonesia, which is anti-colonialist, wiïl not commit the ssme
bad mistakes as the colonialists. 'rle do not have sny territorial ambition and

we do not have the inclination to dominate other people. But our stsnd on the
question of self-deteminetion is clear: ve vil1 help those peoples who vant to
determine their OM destiny and hiture.A/ 311109
SI12097
Tnelish
Annex V

Page ii

Thus vhen the Portuguese Goverment announced its decolonization p01icY
tovards East Timor ve quickly supported it vithout eny hesitation. It depends
entirely on the asuirations of the pecple of East Thor for their ovn future

But the act of self-detemination also has a clear objective: namely, t0 1

promote and to distribute equally people's velfare. Frogress and prosperity vil1
not materialize if from the early stages there exist armed conflicts betveen
groups in the society. Anned struggles alvays bring about spiritual and material
suffering, and create fear and suppression. In such an atmosphere it would be
impossible for the people to expross their vill quietly, in conformity vith their
inner feelicgs,
i

Indonesia vill alvays support and help every pmcess of decoloaization and
self-determination vhich is fair and orderly, not only in East Timor but ais0
in other parts of the world.

we vere therefore deeply concerned vhen the process of decolonization and
self-detednation for the people of East Timor vas compelled to go thmugh armed
conflicts amDngst the people of East Timor themselves. We vere equally vorried

when the FRCPILIn used force to sugpress and termrize other groups vhich differ
in their views regarùing the future of East Timor.

Nw we -gin to feel relieved because the armcd confïicts have ceased. Thus
the people of East Tinor CM properly contemplate and decide on their own hitme,
vithout fear and carcion. This is what actually constitutes a propcr process
of decolonization and self-determination, orderly and peaceiully, enabling the

accommodation of al1 viewa aad desires of the whole people of East Timor.

Wevil1 highiy honour and sincerely accept any decision vhatever made throub
such a process by our bruthen, the people of East Timor.

We luiw nw the decision pou have made.

In an atmsphere of peace and order, you have reconfirmcd the proclamation
of integration of East Timor into Indonesia vhich vas officidly announced in
Balib6 on last Bovember 30th.

1 hemiith accept the petition for such integration.

We accept it with our mst sincere gratitude for the confidence vhich the

people of East Timor conrerred upon Indonesia. We also accept it vith a sense OF
humanitarian responsibility, responsibility tov6rda history, twards our
independence, principles and ideals, and twards out imer self.

This is indeed a historic montent: historic for the people of East Timor,
historic for the people of Indonesia.

The decision we make; therefore, mut be the right one. Pancasils and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia affin8 that
Indonesia is a State based on the sovereignty of the people. Wtiatewr ou action
is should be vith the knovledge and the concurrence of the entire people. The
problem of integration is a very iqortant matter and of great historical
significance. The people of Indonesia, therefore, must nw Se certain and
approve it.

It is for this particuiar reason that before the integration of East Timor
into the unitary State of the Republic of Indo*..esia becomes official. allov us,
disthguished Chief Executive of the Provisional Goverment of East Tinor, the
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, to permit the Indonesian people once
again to ascertain the vishes of the people of East Timor. With the consent of
Our brothers in East Timor, ve vould like to send a team consisting of several
personalities of the Goverment of the Republic of Indonesia and the House of
People's Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, and also representatives
of various public organizations.

This does not signify that ve do not have faith in the proclarration of
Balib6; neither does it mean that ve are not convinced by the petition that 1 have
just received today, nor that ve are doubtm about you. al3 the heroic leaders
of the people vhom ve admire, but only to allov the sovereign Indonesian people
to see for themselvcs and to have iraait and open talks vith their wn brothers
there. Thus a quick and ffm decision can then be taken on the integration.

Distinguished Chairmsn and delegates of the people of East Enor,

The people of East nm~r is opening a new chapter in history. after
suffering for htmdreds of years under the yoke of foreign colonialism. The people
of East Timor vil1 Join their ovn brothen in the mitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia vfio have also fought for hmdreda of yean for its independence and
vfio have beea independent for 30 para.

WeviU accept you ss vhat ve arenw, vith dl our Joy and sorrw; vith all
out dcvelopmtnt efforts in vhich we are nov busily engaged ve are convinced that
you vill join ua in our present condition. Indonesia has made Pancasila its

State principle and philosophy of life, a philosophy of life vhich actuaUy
existed alreaQ for centuries in the soi1 and min& of Indonesia. Indonesia also
ha the 1945 Constitution, vhich is based on Pancasila. and on the fact that it
is a unit- State.

Themiore, after the official integration, ve vil1 ~skal1 of you to strive
shoulder-to-shoulder in Jointly building our ccmmen destiny, a destiny that vill
bring progress, prwperity and social justice for the vhole Indonesian people,
vithin a unitary State based on Pancasila and the 19h5 Constitution nrntioned
earlier. Annex 6

Declaration on Establishment of a Rovisional Government of East Timor.
17 December 1975 - UN Doc..4/31/42

A/31/L2*
ASSEMBLY COUNCIL 20i~ejemoer 1975

G~Xlr-kI, ,,Ssz.gr<
Thirzy-firs: session
Ili?L3iZ:!OATIOEl Of ?I.:Z 3?CI3.3P.TIO?TOF THP
G?:..i!TI:iC OP I?[DP?'!DFI!CS TO CCILO?IAL
COL"ITF.IX A::DPTOPES
.,TLSTIO>IOF T???iTOFIIZS UIiDLRFOETUGUESE

4.2;LI?!IST.?ATIO?!

Letter dated 22 Ceceeber 1975 from the Perxanent Ee?resenrative
of Indonesia to the United nations addressed to the Secretaryr-
General

1 kçve t;ie honour to enclose herewith a Ceclaration on the Zsts3lisbnent of z
Provisional C-vernment of the Territoxy of East Tinor w;iich was prcmulgzte4 -..
four political ?arties In the Territory, APODETI,UCT, KGTAand TTiABAX2IS7. cn4,
17 Cecember 1975.

1 shoulà be zrateful if Your Zxcellency vouïd direct that this letter ad
the enclosure be circulated a9 a docunent of the General ksembly, under the izeas
entitled "hplementetion of the Declaration on the Granting of Inclepenàence to
Coloniai Countries and Peoples:' and "Question of Territories under ?ortaauese
abinistrstion", and of tSe Security Council.

(Simed) Ch. Ei?TA?3211
4nbassaaor
Pernanex Bepresenzat iïo

* For inf~mation concernin3 the new systen of nmbering C-ezerzl .:.ss~r.tly
âocwents , see A/31/I;F/l. Lècisration on the Zstablishnent of a Prcvisional Covernnent

cf :?.e Territor{ of East Thor

Cocsor.r?: :zith tke resolute deternination of the 3eople of East .Timor
expresseri ir!the Proclamation issued oy the pcliticai oarties of P?OCETI, UCT,
?.C'?Aand T?>3AL+ISTA on 30 ?ovemter 1975.

In .iiev of the fûct that tne capitai of Zast Timor and 3ractically the el;ire

territorf Cr' :as: 7iu.or ?as been liberated from terrorist infl~ence:

Fürther in view of tne fact that there exists a vacuum of auth0rit.j i~ iast
Tinor due ts the incapacity and irresponsibility of Portusal:

!.le, or, cebzlf of the people of East Timor, declare the establishment of a
provisional joverment of the Territory of East Timor to ensure the maintenance

of uovernnent and the administration of law and order, so as to restore nomal
life to th? people of East Timor.

Cone et Dili, 17 *cez!ber 1975

--igned) Arnaldo de Araujo ~igned) Domingus Pareira

(Sirncd) F. S. hpes da cniz (Si~ned) Januario dos ?eis Crte Annex7

CablefromAustraliErnbassy, isboncontainingtransof panof

interview PonugueseFonign MinistergiventoExuress~,10May1980

O. LB3939 DBKE
TOR 0157 13.05.80
O.LB3939 1300 12.5.80 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRI/3948

RP.
RR JAKARTA/iOl UN NEW YORK/406

FM. LISBON / FILE 202/1

UNCLASSIFIED

TIMOR

FOLLOUING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF PART OF INTERVIEW GIVEN BY
FOREIGN HINISTER FREITAS DO AMARAL TO WEEKLY NEUSPAPER EXPRESSO
(UNDERLINE ONE) ON 10 MAY:

BUOTE

EXPRESSO: EIST TIMOR IS AFRAID THIT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENTWILL
ESTIBLISH CONTICTS UITH THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES UITH A VIEW TO
IGREEING TO THAT TERRITORY'S INTE6RATION INTO INDONESIA.

FREITIS DO AMARAL: UE CANNOT DO THAT. 1 UlLL BE61N BY SAYING
THAT UE ARE PARTICULARLY AUARE OF THE PROBLEM OF EAST TIMOR BOTH

IN ITS HUMAN ASPECTS AND IT POLITICAL ASPECTS. WE ALSO HAVE A
VERY CLEIR REFERENCE TO THIS MATTER IN THE A.D.'S ELECTORAL PROGRAM.

AS TO THE EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION, THERE HAS BEEN NO
INITIATIVE FROU THE 60VERNMENTS UHICH PRECEDED US AND 1 CONSIDER
IT A SERIOUS HATTER THAT OF THE FIVE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNUENTS
BEFORE US, NONE TOOK ANY INITIATIVE TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEH WHOSE

HUMAN AND POLITICAL ASPECTS ARE SO DELICATE AND 50 SERIOUS. WE HAVE
DECIDED TO DO SOMETHINI3 AND THE FIRST QUESTION UHICH WE FACE IS THIS:
THERE ARE IN TIMOR HUUANITARIAN PROBLEMS WHICH OBLIGE US TO TAKE A
DECISION, TO TRY TO SOLVE THEW AND THIS WILL IN ANY CASE OBLIGE US
TO GET IN TOUCH UITH THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES.

EXPRESSO: YOU ARE REFERRING TO THE CASE OF THE THREE THOUSAND
FAUILIES ABOUT UHOM INDONESIA HAS ASKED HOLLAND T0 MAKE AN APPROACH
10 THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT FOR THEM TO BE ACCEPTED INTO PORTUGAL.

FREITLiS DO 6MARAL: THAT'IS ONE EXAMPLE. SIMILARLY THERE ARE
OTHER PORTUGUESE OR FORMER PORTUGUESE WHO ARE THERE AND UHO ALSO
UANT TO COME TO PORTUGAL. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PEOPLE IN A CRITICAL

PHYSICAL SITUATION. UE CANNOT RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS WITHOUT ',.
ENTERING INTO CONTACT UITH THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES. BUT AT THESAME TIME, WE DO NOT WISH TO ESTABLISH ANY CONTACT WHICH COULD BE
INTERPRETED EITHER BY INDONESIA OR BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AS RECOGNITION - EVEN THOUGH ONLY DE FACTO - OF INDONESIA AS

THE LEGITIMATE HOLDER OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY OF EAST
TIMOR. SO A PROBLEfl WHICH AT THE OUTSET IS HUHANITARIAN, CHANGES
INTO A PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER.

MOREOVER, THERE IS ARTICLE 307 Of THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH WE
RESPECT AND WHICH REFERS TO THE PROMOTION OF ACTS AND EFFORTS
TOWARDS GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION AND

INDEPENDENCE OF EAST TIMOR. AS TO THIS OTHER ASPECT, THE
CONSTITUTION ATTRIBUTES RESPONSIBILITY JOINTLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC AND TO THE GOVERNMENT. CONSEQUENTLY THE GOVERNMENT
CANNOT ACT ALONE AND WILL HAVE TO HAVE A COflUON LINE OF CONDUCT
UITH THE PRESIDENT. FOR ALL THESE REASONS AND GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY
AND DELICACY OF THE QUESTION, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT A COHflITTEE BE

NOffINATED UITH TU0 DELEGATES FROM THE PRESIOENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
AN0 TU0 FROfl THE 60VERNHENT TO STUDY THE POLITICAL PROBLEHS
INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND TO AOVISE THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNflENT.
THIS IDEA HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AND THE PEOPLE WHO WILL
HAKE UP THIS COflHITTEE HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPOINTED.

EXPRESSO: BUT THE COHHITTEE IS STILL NOT FUNCTIONING.

FREITAS DO AMARAL: IT U4S NECESSIRY TO NOMINATE THE POPLE AND
ONLY AFTER THIS HA0 BEEN FORHALISED UILL IT BEIN6 TO OPERATE.
UE UANT IT TO ACT BUICKLY SO THAT UE CAN BE INFORHED SOON ONTHE
LINE OF ACTION TO FOLLOU.

HOREOVER, UE NEED FOR DIPLOflATIC REASONS TO TAKE URGENT
INITIATIVES. THE SITUATION OF PORTUGAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON
THE SUBJECT OF EAST TIMOR OETERIORATED SOMEUH4T IN 1979. UHAT
HAPPENED IN THE GENLRAL ASSEflBLY IN SEPTEflBER OF LAST YEAR UAS
SYMPTOHATIC. THERE UERE INDICATIONS OF d LIRGE HOVEUENT AWAY

FROM VOTING UITH PORTUGAL ON ITS CLAlM FOR RESPONSIBILITY WITH
RE64RD TO EAST TIflOR. THIS HOVEUENT IS TOUARDS SUPPORTING
INDONESI& nNo CONSIDERING THE CASE CLOSED. AT THE TIHE, PORTUGAL
UNDERTOOK A SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVE IN ORDER THAT THIS SHOULD NOT
HAPPEN BUT MOST OF THE COUNTRIES WHO AGREED TO VOTE A6AIN WITH
PORTUGAL GAVE US TO UNDERSTAND THbT IT UOULD BE THE LAST TIHE THEY
UOULD DO SO IF, IN THE HEANTIME, PORTUGAL DID NOT TAKE SOHE NEW

INITIATIVE. WE THEREFORE HAVE TO GO TO THE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY
IN A POSITION WHERE, NATURALLY NOT HAVING RESOLVED THE UHOLE
PROBLEM, UE CAN, HOUEVER, SHOW THE INTERNATIONAL COHHUNITY THAT
UE ARE INTERESTED IN RESOLVING IT AND THAT UE ARE TAKING CONCRETE
STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION.

1 WOULD ADDTHAT THE SERIES OF REPORTS THAT HAVE BEEN
PUBLISWED, ACCORDING TO UHICH A HEETING IS PLANNED BETUEEN THE 1NPLrARD CAB LEG R.AL1

MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PORTUG4L AND INDONESIh, ARE
COMPLETELY FALSE.

EXPRESSO: ARE YOU REFERRING TO THE flEETING WHICH THE PRESS
ANNOUNCED WOULD BE ON 19TH OF THIS flONTH IN PARIS?

FREITAS DO AMARIL: THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THAT. WE HAVE NO1 MADE
ANY APPROACH IN THAT DIRECTION NOR U4S ANY APPRO4CH flADE T0 US
BY INDONESIA.

EXPRESSO: BUT UHAT ARE THE CONCRETE STEPS, IN YOUR OPINION.

FREITAS DO AflAR4L: 4s THESE STEPS H4VE TO BE AGREED WITH THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, IT UOULD NOT BE CORRECT TO REVEAL THEM
AT THE tiOiiENT.

UNBUOTE.

ACTION: DEP FOREI6N QFFaIRS

PRIUE UINISTER
FOREIGN UINISTER
tiIN+DEPDEFENCE
DEP P U AND CABINET

ONA
JI0 Anne8
PomiguConstitu1976.k.3an1989.h.293

of the PORTUGUESE

REPUBLIC

./

SECilETARY OF STATE FOR MASS COMMUNICATION
OIRECTORAÏE GENEFiAL FOR ihFCRMATION AND OlFiUSlON On 25 April 1974 the Armed Forces Movement. setting
the seal on the Portuguese people's long resistance and
interpreting its deep-seated feelings. overthrew the
Faszist Régine.

The liberation of Portugal from dictatorship. oppres-
sion and colonialism representrd a revolutionary change
and an historic new beginning in Portuguese society.

The Revolution restored fundamentai rights and freed-
oms to the peop!e of Portiigal. in the exercise of those
rights and freedoms, the people's legifimate represen-
tatives have met to draw up a Constitution chat meets
the country's aspirations.

The Constituent Assembly affirms the Fortuquese
people's decision to defend their national indcpendence.
safeguard the fundamentai rights of citizens. establish

the basic principles of democracy, secure the primacy
of the rule of law in a democratic state and open the
kvay to a socialist society. respecting the will of the
Portuguese people and keeping in view the building of
a freer. more just and more fraternal country.

The Constituent Assembly. meeting in plenary session
on 2 April 1976. aljproves and decrees the following
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. ARTICLE 307

Indapendence of rimoi

1. Portugal shall remain bound by its responsibili-
îy. in accordance with internationai law. to promote and
safeguard the right to independence of Timor Leste.
2. The President of the Republic, assisted by the
Council Of the Revolution. and the Sovernrnent shall be
cornpetent to perform al1acts necessav to achievemenf
of the aims set forth in the foregoing paragraph.CONSTITUTIONS

OF THE
COUNTRIES

OF THE
WORLD

ALBERTP. BLAUST&IGISBERT H. FLANZ

PORTUGAL
GISBEH.FLANZ

lssOclober 1991
Oceana Publications, Inc.
Dobbs FerNewYork Constitution

of the

Portuguese Republic

DIRECÇAO-GEDACOMUNICAÇÀO SOCIAL 1. Ponugd mniinua WIculado+çrnponsabilidades
quetheinnimbem. de hmonia com O direiio inicrna-
cionalde piornover guaniirO diraià iuiodeie:mi-
na@o e independènciade Timor Lare.
2. Compeic ao Pruidente da Rcptiblicao Co-
verno praticu rodososanos necainos i rcalirasjo
dos objcctivosexpressosno numcroanierior.

S.ndetsrmination and indeoendenceof EastTimw

1. Portugalshallrernainboundby herresponsibilities

underintemational law to prornote andsafeguard thengnt
to selfdeterminatioi? and independenceoi Last Timor.

2. The President of the Republic andtheGovemment

shall have the powen to perform al1acts necessary for
achieving theaimssetforthinthe preceding paragraph.Stat6March1992,to UnitedStatesSenateForeignRelationsCornmittee State,

-ASTTIMOR, INDCNESIAND U.S. POLICY

STATEMENT

BY

KENNETHW. QUINN

DEPUTY ASSISTANTSECRETAROYF STATE

FOR

EASTASIANANDPACIFICAFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

SENATEFOREIGNRELATIONSCOMMITTEE

MARCH6, 1992 MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERSOF THE COMMITTEE, 1 APPRECIATE THIS

OPPORTUNITYTO PRESENTOUR VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR

AND U.S. POLICY REGARDINGTHE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HCSNDLING

OF THE VIOLENT INCIDENT IN DILI LAST NOVEMBER.

THE ?!LI AFFAIR

NE ARE HERE TODAY PRINCIPALLY OUT OF CONCERNOVEZ THE

TRAGIC EVENT IN DILI LAST NOVEMBER 12. ON THAT DAY, INDONESIAN

ARMY AND POLICE UNITS FIRED ON UNARMEDCIVILIANS ENGAGEDIN A

POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION,KILLING AND WOUNDINGSCORESOF PEOPLE.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME NTS LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT

THE HUMANRIGHTS SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR. OFFICERS FROMOUR

EMBASS YN JAKARTA HAVE GONE THERE FREQUENTLYOVER THEYEARS.

BOTH AMBASSADOR MONJOAND FORMERAMBASSADORWOLFOWITZHAVE

VISITED EAST TIMOR. FOUR EMBASSYTEAMS HAVE BEEN THERE SINCE

NOVEMBER 12: THE MOST RECENT VISITATION WAS IN MID FEBRUARY.

OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ABOUE TAST

TIMOR IS LONGSTANDINGAND HAS FREQUENTLYBEEN AT THE HIGHEST

LEVELS. SHORTLYAFTER THE NOVEMBER 12 INCIDENT, BOTH

INDONESIAN FOREIGNMINISTER ALATAS AND SECRETARY BAKERWERE IN

SEOUL ATTENDING AN APEC MINISTERIAL MEETING. BOTH THE

SECRETAR AND ASSISTANT SECRETARYSOLOMONIMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED PRELIMINARYREPORTSOF THE INCIDENT DIRECTLY WITH THE MINISTER;
AND SECRETARYBAKER SENT MINISTER ALATAS A LETTER OF CONCERN

SHORTLYTHEREAFTER.

THE UNITED STATES HAS PUBLICLY CONDEMNEDTHE DILI

INCIDENT. NO PROVOCATIONCOULD HAVE WARRANTED SUCH A WANTON

MILITARY REACTION: THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCEWASUNJUSTIFIED

AND REPREHENSIBLE. WE IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR A COMPLETEAND

CREDIBLE INVESTIGATION LEADING TO APPROPRIATEPUNISHMENTSFOR

THOSEWHORESCRTEDTO OR CONDONED SUCHDEADLYUSE OF FORCE. WE

CLEARLYCONVEYED OUR VIEWS AT HIGH LEVELS IN BOTH JAKARTAAND

WASHINGTON.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE SHARE THECONGRES S'EP CONCERN AND

DISAPPROVALOF THE VIOLENCE OF NOVEMBER 12, AS WELL AS THE

DESIRE TO SEE THAT THOSE ACCOUNTABLEFORTHE MASSACRE ARE

PUNISHED, THATJUSTICE IS DONE, AND THAT STEPS ARE TAKENl'O

ENSURETHAT NO SUCH INCIDENT RECURS.

THE ISSUES NOWREQUIRING U.S. POLICY JUDGMENTS ARE THESE:

HOWCAN THE U.S.BEST HELP 10 ENSURETHAT OURGOALSOF

ACCOUNTABILITYAND A JUST RESOLUTIONOF THE INCIDENT ARE

REALIZED, AND THAT THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLEOF EAST TIMOR

IS IMPROVED? ME HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGEDBY THE FACT THAT THE INDOl.lESIAN

GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO CHARACTERIZEDTHE INCIDENT ASA TRAGEDY.

SENIOR LEADERS ARE WELL AWARETHAT THE WORLD IS WATCHING. THEY

UNDERSTANDTHAT THEIR POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL REPUTATICN, CF

WHICH THEY ARE PROUD,IS ON THE LINE. OUR HOPE AND EXPECTkTION

HAS BEEN THAT INDONESIA WOULD MOVEVIGOROUSLY TO FIND THE

FACTS, ASSESS RESPONSIBILITY,APPR03RIATELY PUNISH THOSE

RESPCNSIBLE, AND TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH AN EVENT FROM

OCCURING AGAIN.

AS OF TODAY, OUR EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY

FULFILLED. PRESIDENTSOEHART OROMPTLYFORMEDA NATIONAL

INVESTIGATORY COMMISSIONWHICH DELIVERED A PRELIMINARY REPORT

ON DECEMBER 26. THE REPORTCLEARLYANSWERED TWO KEYGUESTIONS

IN THE AFFIRMATIVE:1) WAS EXCESSIVE FORCE USED?; AND2) SHOULD

THE MILITARY PERSONNELINVOLVED BE PUNISHED? WHILE WE LOOK

FORWARD TO THE FINAL REPORTTO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAIL,WE

AND MOST OTHER CONCERNEDFOREIGN OBSERVERS - INCLUDING

AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND THEEC - HAVE JUDGED THE PRELIMINARY

REPORTTO BE A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT

OF INDONESIA. THE REPORTCONFRONTSTHE TOUGHEST ISSUES, AND

DIRECTLY REFUTES HANY OF THE INITIALASSERTIONS ABOUT THE EVENT

PUT FORWARD BY THE INDONESIANARMEDFORCES:

-- IT RAISES THE OFFICIALCASUALTY TOTALS TO REALISTIC

LEVELS, FLATLY CONTRADICTING FIGURES ANNOUNCEDEARLIER

BY THE INDONESIANARMEDFORCES. -- ITMAKESTHE KEYDETERMINATIOTHATEXCESSIVE FORCE

WFSUSEDANDTHAT SOME TROO WERE CLEARL"GUTOF

CONTROL"
-- ITFLSOFINDS THAT THIISCIDENT WANOTTHERESULT OF

GGVE~NMENTOLICY.
-- ANDITASSERTSTHATTHOSEWHOVIOLATED THE.iAIMUSTBE

PROSECUTED.

WE HAVE ALSEOEENENCOURAGEDY PRESIDENSOEHARTO'S
FOLLOW-UAPCTIONS:

- ON RECEIVINTGHEPRELIMINARFYINDINGWHICH WERE

CRITICALOF HISARMY, THE PRESIDEIMTMEDIATEMADE

THEREPORT PUBLICANDEXTENDED HIDEE?APOLOGYTO THE
FAMILIEOSF INNOCENTICTIMS. HE HASPUBLICLY

APOLOGIZEODN THREE OCCASIONS.
-- THEPRESIDENRTELIEVEDOF THEIRDUTIESTWOGENERAL

OFFICERS- THEREGIONALANDPROVINCIAMLILITARY
COMMANDERS. LOWER-LEVELFICERSINTHECHAIN OF

COMMANDHAVEALSOBEENREPLACED.
- HE ORDERED FORMATIONAO FILITAR"COUNCILOF HONCR"

TO RECOMMENDRMYPUNISHMENT SNDREFORMS,WITHTHE

INTENTIONHATSUCHAN INCIDENT MUSNEVERHAPPEN
AGAININ INDONESIA.ON FEBRUARY27THE INDONESIAN

ARMYANNOUNCEDTHAT SIXSENIOROFFICERSWILLBE
DISCIPLINEDWITHTHREEOF THEMDISMISSEDFROMTHE SERVICE: EIGHT OTHEROFFICERSAND ENLISTED MENWILL BL

COURT-MARTIALED:AND FIVE MOREREMAIN UNDER

INVESTIGATION.

-- PRESIDENT SOEHARTO ORDERED ARMEDFORCESCOMMANDER

GENERALTRY SUTRISNOTO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING 2ERSONS.

-- AND HE ORDEREDINCREASEDEFFORTSTO IMPROVETHE

WELL-BEING OF THE TIMORESEPEOPLE.

WE HAVE MONITOREDTHE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR CLOSELYSINCE

NOVEMBER 12. FOURTEAMSFROMEMBASSYJAKARTA HAVE VISITED THE
PROVINCE SINCE THE INCIDENT. THE MOSTRECENTVISIT, IN MID

FEBRUARY .EAFFIRMEDTHE FINDINGS OF EARLIER TEAMSTHAT THERE

IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATEALLEGATIONSOF ADDITIONAL

KILLINGS SINCE NOVEMBER 12. THE TEAMALSO CONFIRMEDEARLIER

REPORTSTHAT, WHILE TENSIONS IN DILI CONTINUE, THEY HAVE EASED

FROMNOVEMBER. ECONOMICAND SOCIAL LIFE HAVE RETURNED TO

NORMAL:HOWEVER,SECURITY IS TIGHT, REPORTEDLY BECAUSEOF

CONCERNS THAT A GROUPOF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS IS EN ROUTEDILI

ON A PORTUGUESE SHIP.

AS OF MID FEBRUARY, FOURTEENCIVILIANS REMAINED

HOSPITALIZED AS A RESULT OF WOUNDS RECEIVED: 77 OTHERS HAD

RECOVERED SUFFICIENTLY TO BE RELEASED. TWENTY-FOURCIVILIANS
WHOWEREIN DETENTION IN DILI IN MID FEBRUARYON CHARGES

RELATEDTO THE DEMONSTRATION HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN RELEASEDIN

RECENTDAYS. EIGHT OTHERSREMAIN IN DETENTION IN DILI AND WlLL BE TRiED ON CRIMINAL CHARGES. SOM€DETAINEES WEREABUSEDIN

THE DAYS IMMEDÏATECYAFTER NOVEMBER12. WE UNDERSTAND THAT
SUCHMISTREATNENTHAS CEASED.

SOMEHAVECRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT OVER

THE MATTEROF PROVOCATION. EYEWITNESSESDIFFERED GREATLYON

THIS ISSUE. THE REPORTSAYS THAT SOMEWITNESSESDENIED THERE

WASANY PROVOCATIONS: OTHEALLEGE THAT SIGNIFICANT

PROVOCATIONS OF THE MILITARY DID OCCUR. THE REPORTCONCLUDES

THAT FROVOCATIOD NID OCCUR, BUT ITDOESMAKE THE CRITICAL POINT

THAT, REGARDLESS,THE RESPONSO EF THE MILITARY WASEXCESSIVE

AND'UNJUSTIFIASLE. WE HAVE BEEN APPALLED AT CALLOUS AND

INAPPROPRIATE "BLAMETHE VICTIM" COMMENTS BY SOME IN THE .

INDONESIANMILITARY. BUT1 SHOULDSAY AGAIN THAT, LIKE THE
INCIDENT ITSELF, SUCHCOMMENTS - IN OURESTIMATION - DO NOT

REFLECTTHE POLICY OR APPROACH OF THE SENIOR LEADERSOF THE

INDONESIANGOVERNMENT.

THE PUNISHMENTPHASE IS NOWBEGINNING. WE WILL CLOSELY

MONITORTHE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ESFORTSTO FOLLOWTHROUGH

ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION'SJUDGMENTSOF RESPONSIBILITY: AND

WE WILL CONTINUETO WATCHTHE HUMANRIGHTS SITUATION IN EAST

TIMOR WITH CARE. 1MUSTADD THAT, IN OUR VIEW, THE INTERESTOF

TRUTHAND OFAMELIORATIONOF THESITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IS

BEST SERVEDBY A POCICYOF MORE, NOT LESS, ACCESS.EAST TIMOR: HUMANRIGHTS

HUMANRIGHTS ISSUES HAVE BEEN, AND WILL REMAIN, AN

IMPORTANT ELEMENT 3F OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE AND BGODWORKING

RELATIONS WITH THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. AS OUR ANNUAL H~MAN

RIGHTS REPORTMAKES CLEAR, INDONESIA'S RECORDIS MIXED: BUT,

PRIOR TO LAST FALL, THE TRENDIN EAST TIMOR IN RECENT YEARS HAD

BECN POSITIVE.

LOOKING BACK, THE FIRST YEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER PORTUGAL'S

1974 DECISION TO DECOLONIZE EASTTIMOR WERETRAUMATIC. A

BLOODYCIVIL WAR ERUPTEDAS SEVERAL TIMORESE FACTIONS COMPETED

TO GAIN CONTROLOF THE AREA. WHENTHE MARXIST FRETILIN (EAST

TIMOR NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) FACTION GAINED THE ASCENDANCY,

INDONESIA INVADED TO KEEP EAST TIMOR OUT OF MARXIST HANDS.

MANY INNOCENT CIVILIANS WEREUNDOUBTEDLYCAUGHT IN THE

CROSSFIRC DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND LATER, AS THE INDONESIAN

ARMY ATTEMPTEDTO CRUSHTHE WELL-ARMEDAND WELL-ORGANIZED

FRETILIN INSURGENTS. AS THEINSURGENCYCONTINUED INTO THE

1980S, SO DID HUMANRIGHTS VIOLATIONS, ALTHOUGHAT A REDUCED

RATE. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO REPORTSIN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, OF

INCIDENTS ON THE SCALE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE ON NOVEMBER 12.

ONE OF THE REAL TRAGEDIES OF LAST FALL'S EVENTS IS THE

SETBACK THEY GAVE TO RECENT PROGRESS. FORTUNATELY, THE

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT APPEARSSET TO RESUMEA POSITIVE COURSE. AS ALREADYNOTED, PRESIDENTSOEHARTG HAS PUBLICLY APOLOGIZEDTO

THE FAMILIES OF INNOCENTVICTIMS. HE HAS INSTRUCTEDTHAT CIVIC

HAS ORDERED TH ERMYT0 FUNISH THOSEAT FAULT AND TO INSTITUTE

REFORMS SO THAT SUCHA TRAGEDYCAN NOT HAPPENAGAIN. THE

PUNISHMENTSHAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

FOLLOWINGTHE ARRIVAL IN LATE 1989OF A NEWMICITARY
COMMANDER FOR EAST TIMOR, GENERALWAROUW,WE NOTICED AMARKED

DECLINE IN HUMANRIGHTS ABUSES. GENERALWAROUW DEVELOPED A

COOPERATIVERELATIONSHIP WITHEAST TIMOR EOVERNOR CARRASCALAO

AND WITH BISHOP BELO OF THECATHOLICCHURCH. HE BEGANTO

EMPHASIZE"TERRITORIAL OPERATIONS" - THAT IS, CIVIC ACTION

EFFORTS IN THE VILLAGES- RATHERTHAN COMBATOPERATIONS. AT

ABOUTTHE SAMETIME, EAST TIMORWASOPENEDTO OUTSIDE VISITORS.

THE IMPROVINGATMOSPHERE CHANGEDLAST FALL, HOWEVER, WHEN
DISCUSSIONS BETWEENINDONESIA AND PORTUGA LNDERTHE U.N.

SECRETARYGENERAL'S AUSPICESBROUGHTTENTATIVE AGREEMENT FOR A

VISIT T0 EAST TIMOR EY A PORTUGUESPARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION.

THAT NEWSRAISED THE HOPESOF ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST ELEMENTS. IT

ALSO LED TO INCREASEDINDONESIAN SECURITY OPERATIONS. THAT

COMBINATIONOF FACTORSHEIGHTENEDTENSIONS. WHENPORTUGAL

CANCELLEDTHE VISIT AT THE LAST MINUTE BECAUSEOF A DISPUTE

OVERTHE CREDENTIALSOF A FOREIGN JOURNALIST, FRUSTRATIONS

AMONGANTI-INTEGRATIONISTS IN EAST TIMOR HEIGHTENED. THOSEFRUSTRATIONSFOUNDEXPRESSIONON NOVEMEE R2, DURIP4G

THE VISIT OFA U.N. OFFICIAL TO DILIWHICH COINCIDEDWiTH A

COMMEMORATIO SERVICE FOR THE DEATHTWOWEEKSEARLIEE OF AN

4NTi- INTEGRATIONISTWHODIED AS A RESULTOF A CONFRONTATION

WITH PRO-INTEGRATIONISTFORCES. DURING A MARCHTHROUGn CITY

STREETS, ANTI-INDONESIA DEMONSTRATORSEREVOCALAND A FEWWERL

VIOLENT. AN ARMYMAJORWASSTABBED. IT APPEARSTHAT LOCAL

MILITARY UNITS THEN TOOKREVENGE. THE INDONESIANGOVERNMENT

COMMISSIONHAS JUDGEDTHAT THE REACTIONOF SOME TROOPS

"EXCEEDEDACCEPTABLENORMS," AND THEIR ACTIONS HAVEBEENWIDELY

CONDEMNED- BY OURSELVESAND BY THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY.
MORERECENTLY, WE, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AND MANY OTHER

GOVERNMENTHSAVE BEEN ENCOURAGEDBY THE INDONESIANEFFORTS TO

DIRECTLY ADDRESSTHIS SITUATION. THE EC, CURRENTLYUNDERTHE

LEADERSHIPOF PORTUGAL,STATED ON FEBRUARY 13 THAT IT IS

ENCOURAGEBDY THEPRELIMINARY REPORTAND THE ACTIONS TAKENBY

JAKARTA. THESE EFFORTSARE CLEARLY THOSEOF A GOVERNMEN THAT

IS SEEKINGTO BE RESPONSIVETO HUMANRIGHTS CONCERNS. THOSE

FEWNATIONS WHICHSUSPENDED AID PROGRAMSHAVE EITHER LIFTED THE

SUSPENSIONSOR ARE CONSIDERINGDOING SO.

1 RECOGNIZETHAT SOMEPEOPLE BELIEVE JAKARTA'S RESPONSETO

THESE EVENTSHAS BEEN INADEQUATEAND THAT DIPLOMATIC SUASION !S

INSUFFICIENT. THEY URGETHAT WE CUT U.S. SECURITY OR ECONOMIC

ASSISTANCETO INDONESIA. SUCH A COURSE, IN OURVIEW, WOULDNOT

PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTSWHICH WE ALL SEEK AND COULDHAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCESF:OR U.S-INDONESIA RELATIONS; FOR OUR

LIMITED INFLUENCE IN !NDONESIA: AND MOSTIMPORTANTLY,FOR THE

PEOPLEOF EAST TIMOR.

IT IS IMPORTANTTO ENCOURAGE, NOSCOURAGE,CONSTRUCTiVE
TRENDSIN THE HUMANRIGHTS SITUATION IN INDONESIA. SOME

ELEMENTSWITHIN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNME NITIALLY RESISTED

PRESIDENTSOEHARTO'SRESPONSETO NOVEMBER 12. THEY WANTEDT0

CONFRONT INTERNATIONALOPINION BY WHITEWASHINGTHE DILI

EPISODE. THOSERECALCITRANTFORCESWOULDLIKELY BE REINFORCED

BY A RESPONSE ON OUR PART WHICHDENIGRATEDPRESIDENTSOEHARTO'S

EFFORTS.

ALSO, T0 TUT OFF PROGRAMSSUCHAS IMET TRAINING, WHICHHELP
TO PROMGTE DEMOCRATICVALUESAND RESPECTFOR HUMANRIGHTS,

WOULDNOT FOSTERSUCHGOALS, BUT RATHERWOULDMARKEDLYREDUCE

OUR INFLUENCEAND ROLE AS AN INTERLOCUTOR.

OURWELCOME ACCESSTO SENIOR OFFICIALS IN JAKARTA IS

PARTICULARLY IMPORTANTWHENIT COMESTO LOBBYING EFFECTIVELY ON

IMPORTANTHUMANRIGHTS ISSUES SUCHAS EAST TIMOR. MORE

BROADLY, OUR ENGAGEMENTWITH INDONESIANEEDST0 BE SUSTAINED,
NOT HINDERED. INDONESIA IS THE WORLD'S FOURTH-LARGENSATION;

IT IS THE WORLD'SLARGESTISLAMIC COMMUNITY. 1 WOULDNOTETHAT

AT A TIME OF RESURGENCEOF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM- WHICH

SEEKSTO EXCLUDEWESTERNINFLUENCEFROMTHE MIDDLE EAST - THE~NDONESIAGOVERNMEN TN,DRAMATICONTRAST,ISFIRMLY
COMMITTEDO RELIGIOUSOLERANCFEORTHECOUNTRY'SBUDDHIST,

HINDU,ANDCHRISTIAMNINORITIES.

AN INDONESIAGOVERNMENT THWETHAVEBEENABLETOWORK

WITHPRODUCTIVELON ABROAD RANGOF ISSUESISNOWASSUMING
CHAIRMANSHIPF THENON-ALIGNEDOVEMENTAND INDONESIISA

LEADINGMEMBEROF THEASSOCIATIOF SOUTHEASASIANNATIONS
(ASEAN). INDONESIAN IMPORTANTEGIONALPOWER. JAKARTA'S

ACTIVISMANDCOOPERATIONEREESSENTIAILNOUREFFORTSTO
RESOLVE THCONFLICTINCAMBODIA:ND ITSSUPPORTFORU.N.

RESOLUTIONANDSANCTIONASGAINSIRAQDURINGDESERTSTORM WERE

SIGNIFICANT- ESPECIALLYNVIEWOF IRAQ'SEFFORTSTO GAIN
SUPPORTININDONESIA FRMOMSLIMFUNDAMENTALISTS.URECONOMIC

RELATIONSITHINDONESIAAREIMPORTANATNDGROWING:INDONESIA'S
PROGRESSINDEREGULATINITSECONOMYANDSUSTAININGGROWTH HAVE

FACILITATED EXPANTDED-WATRADE(NOW$6 BILLION)ANDU.S.

ANDINVESTMEN T$2.5BILLION).OURTRADE WITHINDONESIASNOW
GREATERTHANTHATWITHALL OFEASTERNEUROPE.

SUCH POLITICALNDECONOMICINTERESTS NOTWITHSTAND ING,

INDONESIWAEREA HUMANRIGHTPARIAHWHICHHAD ORDEREAD
MASSACREANDDISREGARDEDORLDOPINION,1COULDBETTER

UNDERSTANDN ARGUMENFORDEMONSTRATINOUROPPROBRIUBMY

CUTTINGOFFSECURITYANDECONOMICASSISTANCE.BUTTHE
GOVERNME OFTINDONESIAASACCEPTEDTHATTHENOVEMBER INCIDENT WAS A TRAGEDY, HAS TAKEN RESPCNSIBILITYFOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS

TROOPS, HAS ALREADYANNCUNCEDPUNISHMENTSFOR SOMESENIOR

MILITARY OFFICERS, 15 PREPARING TO BRING OTHE2 WRONGDOERTSO

TRIPL, AND IS WORKINGTO ENSURETHAT SUCH VIOLENT USE OFFORCE

BY ITS TROOPS DOES NOT RECUR. IT SEEXS EVIDENT THAT CONTINUING

COOPERATIVEENGAGEMENT, NOTETRIBUTION, BEST SERVES THE HUMAN

RIGHTS GOALS WE ALL SEEK.

ONE WAY WE CAN HELP IN THIS PROCES3 IS THROUGHOUR IMET

PROGRAM,THE ONLYSECURITY ASSISTANCE WE PLAN TO PROVIDE

INDONESIA IN FISCAL YEAR 1992. AMONG IMET'S GOALS ARE TO

INCREASE MILITARY PROFESSIONPLISM AND TO EXPOSE STUDENTSTO

UNIVERSAL STANDARDS OF HUMANRIGHTS. 1 SHOULD NOTE THAT A

RECENT GAO INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS OF LAST NOVEMBERFOUND

THAT NO IMET TRAINEES WERE INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT- WHILE

SEVERAL HAVE BEEN PROMINENT IN THE ONGOINGCORRECTIVEEFFORTS.

THE U.N. HUMANRIGHTS COMMISSION SPECIAL RAPPORTEURWHOWAS IN

DILI AT THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 12 TRAGEDYLATER HIGHLIGHTED

TO US THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FOR INCREASING

HUMANRIGHTS SENSITIVITY AMONGTHE INDONESIAN MILITARY. YET

SOME WOULD CUT OUR IMET PROGRAM. OUR EXPRESSIONS OF GRAVE

CONCERNWEREAPPROPRIATE IN NOVEMBERAND WERE NOT IGNGRED.

WHAT IS NEEDEDNOWIS ENCOURAGEMENT FOR FURTHER REFORM.EAST TIMOR: HISTORY ANDSTATUS

THE UNDERLYINGISSUE IN THE NOVEMBER 12 INCIDENT IS THE

STATUSOF EAST TIMOR, A CHRISTIAN ENCLAVEOF 750,000. AS THIS

HEARING IS INTENDEDTO DEAL WITH ALL ASPECTSOF EAST TiHûR.

INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES'RESPONSETO INDONESIA'S INVASION

IN 1975 AND INCORPORATIONOF THE PROVINCE IN 1976, LET ME

MENTIONA FEWRELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD.

AFTER THE APRIL 1974 LEFTIST COUP IN PORTUGAL,LISBON

DECIDED TO RAPIDLY DECOLONIZEITS OVERSEASEMPIRE. THIS
RESULTEDIN WIDESPREAD CHAOS, CIVIL CONFLICT AND FOREIGN

INTERVENTIGNIN PORTUGAL'SFORMERCOLONIES. ANGOLAAND

MOZAMBIQUE ENDUREDSEVENTEEN YEARS OM FARXIST RULE ANDBRUTAL

CIVIL WARTHAT HAS ONLY ENDEDWITHIN THE PAST YEAR.

EAST TIMOR COULDHAVE SUFFEREDA SIMILIAR FATE. WHENTHE

NEWPORTUGUESE GOVERNMENTIN 1974 DECIDED TO DECOLONIZE, EAST

TIMOR WASCOMPLETELYUNPREPARED FOR SELF-GOVERNANCE, FOUR

CENTURIESOF COLONIALISM HAD LEFT EAST TIMOR WITH ONE HIGH

SCHOOL, FEWER THANTEN COLLEGEGRADUATES,AND A LITERACY RATE

UNDER 10 PERCENT. PORTUGAAND INDONESIA HELD DISCUSSIONS

ABOUT THE COLONY'SFUTURE, BUT A CIVIL WARERUPTEDTHEREBEFORE

ANY AGREEMENT WASREACHED. THE COMBATANTS WERE: FRETILIN,

WHICH SOUGHTIMMEDIATE CREATIONOF AN INDEPENDENTMARXIST

STATE: ANOTHERGROUPTHAT ADVOCATEDIMMEDIATE INTEGRATIONINTO INDONESIA; ANDA THIRD, WHICH PREFERREDA GRADUAL

DECOLONIZATIONPROCESS.

PORTUGAL'S LEFTIST GOVERNMENT ABRUPTLY WITHDREWIN AUGUST

1975, HANDINGOVER TO FRETILIN WEAPONS WHICHWERETHENUSE9 TO

GAIN THE UPPERHAND. IN THE FACE OFA FRETILIN MILITARY
VICTORY AND THE DECLARATIONOF AN INDEPENDENTMARXIST STATE,

INDONESIA INVADED IN DECEMBER OF 1975-- AND INDICATED IT DID

SO AT THE REQUESTOF THE EAST TIMORESEFACTIONS OPPOSEDTO

FRETILIN.

WHENTHE WORLDTURNEDITS ATTENTIONTO EAST TIMOR IN THE

MID-19705,SELF-DETERMINATION WASNOT AREALISTIC OPTION. THE

CHOICEWASMARXIST'RULE BY FRETILIN OR ACTION BY INDONESIA.

NEITHER HAD A MANDATEFROMTHE BALLOT BOX.

IT IS IMPORTANTTO RECALL THAT, SINCE PRESIDENTSOEHARTO

ROSE TOPOWERIN THE MID-1960S, INDONESIA HAS NOT HAD AN
EXPANSIONISTAGENDA: EAST TIMOR IS THE ONLY ADDITION TO WHAT

WAS ONCEDUTCHCOLONIAL TERRITORY. INDONESIA CONSIDERSTHAT

ITS TAKEOVER OF EAST TIMOR WASFORCED ON IT BY THE THREATOF A

MARXIST INSURGENCY. THE POLITICAL CONTEXTHERE IS

SIGNIFICANT: THE ANNEXATIONOF EAST TIMOR OCURRED AMIDST

ACTIVE COMMUNISTINSURGENCIES INMUCHOF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS THE

U*S. DEPARTEDFROMVIETNAM, AND WITH MEMORIESOF AN ATTEMPTED

1965 COMMUNIST TAKEOVERIN INDONES IA STILL FRES. IN THE MINES OF INDONESIANLEADERS, WHOSEBEDROCKPRINCIPLE

IS THE UNITY OF THEIRARCHIPELAGICCOUNTRY,ONCE EAST TIMOR HPD

BEEN INCORPORATED,ITS STANDINGEECAME A SYMBOLOF THE

INTEGRITY OF THE NATION. THOSELEADERSLOOK AT THE HGNDREDS OF

DISTINCT ETHNIC GROUPSAND LANGUAGES WITHIN INDONESIA, AND AT

THE PRESENCEOF SEVERALMAJORRELIGIONS. THEY RECALL REGiONAL

REBELLIONS FROMTHE 1950s;AND THEY FEAR THAT LOOSENING EVEN

ONE THREADOF THE NATIONAL FABRIC COULDSTIMULATE OTHER

SUCCESSIONISTTHREATS.

EVEN BEFOREINDEPENDENCE, INDONESIAN LEADERS HAD BEGUN
WEAVINGTHAT UNIFYING FABRIC. THEY CHOSEMALAY, A MINOR

TRADING LANGUAGE,RATHERTHAN MAJORITY JAVANESE TO BE THE

NATIONAL LANGUAGE. THEY PROMOTED RELIGIOUS FREEDOMFOR

CHRISTIAN, HINDU, AND BUDDHISTPOPULATIONSSCATTEREDTHROUGHOUT

THE ARCHIPELAGO, DESPITE A MUSLIM MAJORITY. 10 THIS DAY,

INDONESIAN LEADERSSTRONGLYRESIST ANY ADVOCACY OF AN ISLAMIC

STATE. A NUMBEROF RADICAL MUSLIMSHAVE BEEN PROSECUTED OVER

THE YEARS FOR PROMOTING SUCHA COURSE. INDONESIA'S LEADERS

HAVE STRESSEDUNITY BECAUSEOF THEIR NATION'S IMMENSE

DIVERSITY. THEY CONTINUETO INSIST ON IT TODAY.

IN 1976, U.S. POLICY-MAKERSDECIDED TO ACCEPT INDONESIA'S

INCORPORATIONOF EAST TIMOR AS AN ACCOMPLISHE'DFACT. THEY

JUDGEDTHAT NOTHINGTHE UNITED STATES OR THE WORLDWASPREPARED

TO DO COULD CHANGT EHAT FACT. THUS, TO OPPOSEINDONESIA'S

INCORPORATIONWOULDHAVE HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION. WITHSUCHREALITYINMIND,PREVIOUSADMINISTRATIONS
FASHIONED POLICWHICHHASBEENFOLLOWEDCONSISTENTLON A

BIPARTISA NASIS:

-- WEACCEPTINDONESIA'INCORPORATIOON EASTiMOR,

WITHOUT MAINTAINTINGTA VALIDACTOF
SELF-DETERMINATHIONTAKENPLACE.

CLEARLY, DEMOCRATICROCESOF SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD

HAVEBEENMORECONSISTENWTITHOURVALUES:BUTTHEREALiTiE SF
1975DIDNOTINCLUDE THATALTERNATIVEACCEPTINTGHE

ABSORPTIOOF EASTTIMORINTO INDONESWIASTHEONLY REALISTIC
OPTION.

SINCTHEN,WE HAVEMAINTAINED CONSTRUCTIVDIALOGUEITH
THE INDONESIGNOVERNMENTESIGNETO PROMOTTHEWELL-BEIN GF

THEPEOPLEOF EASTTIMOR. INCLUDEIN THIS HABEENAN
ON-GOINGHUMANRIGHTS DIALOGUE.HATDIALOGUISGENERALLY

PRIVATEANDISCONDUCTEADT HIGHLEVELSIT ISTHOSE
CHARACTERISTITHATHAVE MADEITEFFECTIVE.

POLITICALLYWE SUPPORT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEONNESAND
PORTUGALNDERTHEAUSPICEOSF THEU.N.SECRETA RYNERALAS

WEREMANDATEDBY THU.N. GENERAASSEMBLYIN1982.WE BELIEVE
SUCHA DIALOGUE CONTINUTOBE THEMOSTPROMISINAGVENUFOR

RESOLVING THEASTTIMO RSSUE.WE AREPLEASED THASUCHADIALOGUE BETWEENINDONESIA AND PORTUGAL AT THE U.N. HUYAN

RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETINGS, WHICH JUST CCNCLUDEDIN GENEVA, LED
TO ACONSTRUCTIVE AND EALANCFDCHAIRMAN'SSTATEMENTCONCERNING

HUMANRIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR.

ECONOMICALLY,OURCONSTRUCTIVERELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA

HAS ALLOWEDUS Tû EXTENDASSISTANCETO ALL INDONESIANS, WHICH

ESPECIALLY BENEFITS THE EAST TIMORESE. ON A PERCAPITA BASIS,

WE HAVE PROVIDEDMORETHAN TWICE AS MANYA.I.D. PROJECTDOLLARS

TO EAST TIMOR SINCE1988 AS TO THEREST OF INDONESIA.

ADDITIONALLY, INDONESIAHAS, ON A PERCAPITA BASIS,
FUNNELLEDOVERSIX TIMES AS MUCHOF ITS OWNECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT BUDGE TTO EAST TIMOR AS T0 ANY OTHER PROVINCE.

IN 1991, EAST TIMORRECEIVEDABOUT $170 MILLION IN INDONESIAN

GOVERNMENG TRANTS. THE $170 MILLION, ONE MIGHT NOTE, IS, IN

NOMINALTERMS, ALMOSETXACTLY100 TIMES THE AVERAGEYEARLY

DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITUREFOR EAST TIMOR IN THE LAST DAYSOF

COLONIAL RULE, ALL OF WHICH WAS IN THE FORMOF REPAYABLELOANS.

THE RESULTSOF SUCHRECENTINVESTMENTARE STRIKING:

- IN 1974, AFTER FOURCENTURIESOF COLONIAL RULE, EAST TIMOR
HAD 47 ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS,2 MIDDLE SCHOOLS, 1 HIGH SCHOOL, AND

NO COLLEGES. NOWIT HAS 574 ELEMENTARYSCHOOLS, 99 MIDDLE

SCHOOLS, 14 HIGH SCHOOLS, AND3 COLLEGES.-- IN 1974, 'EAST TIMOR HAE 2 HOSPITALSAND 14 HEALTHCLIEIICS.

NOWIT HAS 10 HOSPITALS AND 197 VILLAGE HEALTH CENTERS.

-- IN 1974,EAST TIMOR HAD 100 CHURCHES. TODAT HAS 518.

-- IN 1974, EAST TlMOR HAD 20 KILOMETERSOF SURFACEDROADS, ALL

WITHIN DILI. NOWIT HAS 428 KILOMETERSTHROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE.

-- IN 1974, EAST TIMOR WASPLAGUEDWITH ENDEMIC POVERTY.

TODAY, POVERTYREMAINSA PROBLEM,AS IT DOES ELSEWHEREIN THA7

PART OF INDONESIA, BUT STARVATIONIS EXTREMELYRARE.

THE MISSING ECONOMICELEMENTIS SUFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT TO

FULFILL RISING,EXPECTATIONS OF NEWLYEDUCATED YOUTH. BUT NEW

BUSINESS INVESTORSINSIST ON A PEACEFUL ENVIRONMENT.AND THAT

REMAINSPROBLEMATICUNTIL THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE IS FULLY
RESOLVED.

CONCIUSION

IN CONCLUSION, HR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME REITERATE OURMAJOR

POLICIES FOR DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR:

1) WE INTEND TO WORKCOOPERATIVELYWITH THE INDONESIAN

GOVERNME TOTPROMOTE DEVELOPMENT AND RESPECTFOR HUMANRIGHTS
IN THE PROVINCE: AND SuternentbyMinisterforForeig M nfain, 30 Oclober 1975 A57

POKTl.'CCI:SETI\IOR'
Senaior \VI!.!.I'SEE-\Ir PreriÜc!ir!..nuwiil
rcwll ihaidurin:;quçstionumcSznaiorC'icize!t
30 Octobcr 1975 SENATE IGG:

askolme aquestionand 1iniirnaredrhai.on rhFiver. bu1ii vasveq'muchweakncs; (ooc:.
gcneralityof the question hewas askingme.1pose on the pan of the Ponu$uïzùrn:msi:r.
had prepzrcd romc noies.Thcyarc fairlylongtion whichaliowedihc UDT'showof b:;:'::
noies.and SenatorGie~zei ccd lhat 1should eariyAU~JSI io developinr3 probab::uni-,.
uuwer thequestionaitheend ofquesuontime. iended coup and ihus nrovoked ihc Fr::::::
~h~ G~~~~~~~~ bas .,ieWcd~i,h conCern counter.coup.1xems thai Tinior.liAr.;;i.~.
vidcspread reponi thai Indonesiaisinvolvedins becomcp2nof ~hedcbns of il:e Pozu;::~:
maitay inrervcn~on ponu3uese ne Caeiano regimcin Lisbonaiid iheSU:~È~U:P:
polirianof ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~loi~~mcnt icdeZr.
we dcploreihe fightiin borderare;is. decson ofihcPor.u;uese!crhrd ihcb::.xjcls
believeih,r a w>~uiion [hepmb. hopcd ihai ihc decolmisauor:p:occ>, in PI:.
lems in Ponugueic 7imor should be "Sue% Timor CouiJ procc:d in an order!!.
ihroug, peaccful means and fret of extemalrashionwhichallou-cdthe propicof:Sc icrriror:..
inrcrven<ion.jndonniabarbec,, told of IOdcade iheu oun iuiure.wc hai hoc<:::II:;
hews in $hi< and uqed punue ber PonugaI would remainin c~n:rolfor27cr:r.:
intemu [hrough~i,,l~~;~~i~ if [here longcnoughfortheplitical mnsciousne~:'ii:
one ofhop in a gloomyfiruation,il [he FoPle 10dcvelop10thePini ~hereihfx was
sibiliiy IJI~;II\ ai lasi gel unway. substantialmcasurcof ayeemeni rc,oar&in.:
Ee indon-,, ~~~~i~~~i&~~h~ * Pçrced
mm withhk Ponugueremunierpan inEurope
ibiweel Frcùlin2nd UDThave ah siocincd The needfororderlyprogrrsshadaii~hecnof
in rcocntdays lhcirwillingn10holdSeparate panmouni imponanccin viewoi the inicrcoi'
ulbeih thePonupueu. U'ehopthal Apoderi ihc couacries of the reeion. par::cuiar!y
dl ri% agreeIowlh wiihthe PO~U~UCa Kn.d Indoneriabui ais0Aumalia and other rc;icn2i
halai1 thre panin wilimconsidertheifpfc%nn.@unirin. inensurinsih~tiheirm.ou.:!c:noi
=rd IOUI~ IOelch orher. I cmege in a whch wvuldhavean uii,c:i~rng
Tbc AurcnlianGo-mminn>n@ysuppom effm On lhc region. These hqxs u'hich rhe
-lu& of& mnnK< i,,onugvne xmor by Govcmmcni hnd workcd hard io sec :eaii~;d
pcraful Shi& & ofhc have unhappiiynoi ken twmr nui. Po;;ug:ii's
pop* 41 k Wc numer. iMbiily, OrrelusrancIorcizinconiro!oytcc-?
air rcpmnuiionr lo <hir w the par. the way IO a srrug$lefor rupremaq aic.cna
m(psc, w Indon- md u>& ~p-- aumkc of eucnuaüy imm~i~re. rird yol!:~c~!
u- ,$ Fi& have &-lis 1 R&n% From thir sirdggle!hc Frctiiir.iruu?.
vcl)-uUy -d iheAmun Am- todP0riu$une arm emerged as'oeinyzironscr
b&o iaLUbonaa 1.k- to w
the FbmIpae ad kidoacrii. Govcrnmam Ch- m -1%
OPT dni icpe lhrt ulh bcmcm ~~ wo TbzAusualianGovemmenihadstillhopcd-
60-u Iawrthil wetfmalt ina Puve and aacd acardin~lv-hat igrcemcni on i.ie
~~vcoul~ine. Wmdl the Pa-lo rut, of iernio+cou!d.~:vLccer.rcJcxa
* k * üovmimml wuid be P~PJR~ 10 bynqoUation betrecu Ponuoai and ihc min
* ~~ formuud-uble ialb wnmding ianions. But;hc nicecingsçhciüicd
-&*tlurioa inPomi~ fimorhasmme for 20 Scptcmbcrdid nui iakc p.~3:n:;iriin
a-b -1 Pas a.OfQufSC. for decP pan kauu of ihe intrresiçcnc31 Frs:i;ir..
rrgs k rrllmr. above III. the immaturiNorwhich his ioniinued to ilaiita ;?c (:ii;çi
-. . Thar' a UPinng Poliu Icaden. Whoin '(alions and ihc world in ycecral ;ii>ii:i
&ghr=n monthl have succcededin only rurhenli; and Icoiiim>ie~oicc of Por-
e Ponu?al's d~lon~uon Pm?a iuoune Timor.Freuiin nas sinccaerced ih:i
rbuptyWn? pli*al *pi~on$ihrou- the ,II $.al: ioihe~onu~ucte-SUCfiocy=:. r)::
hW>.. and finallyplungag the tereto~ inw pan,ci.sobas c~)T:but CET. ioo:snou
*identcivirar. The pas<18manihs havetuf- atiempiingIo laydoWnpiccon,jii;on~,,hiic
out gnmard of 311 eartierone stase in thci, ap?:oach io i11l;sihc .n.errid-
hopi thaithe TimorescpoIiti~a~nprc~nun! in! conam ofthe Ponu-ue~ wcmcdioSc .*.::n
a undl \Vcucm-educ~iid elite. would shelvethe fatc of ihe POnuy~esepn,oncrs kr!AE:;
thccdiIIciencesfor the wkc or iemtory at UDT. F~~& ha% ccrainlvnuu.,.id Co:;-
!- hun w mognise ~onu~uercwve:e;gr.iy~nd
Plofcan the Ponugucv escapeiheir shareofthe ri@( of P*nUgai 10 prcside uvcr the
the rnponsibiliiy. Ponugal is ihc adminisicringnisauonprocesS. 1604 SENATE 30 October 1975

1: is in this situation of drift. of Freulin'repeat. should no1bc scitled by rorcTi; .- us.

ihing further Io coninbute io ihe decolonisation whai the pcuplc of Ponuguese Tizs: want.cw
proccss.and of Poriu:ll's re~rett~bleinabiiiryto au[
we do wsnt [hemIo have the opponuniiu io $1'
reassen itsauthoniy inthe ierritoy. tnai u.eviewhat iheywani.Theneedinoiirvicw.is !OSC:zil
the various policy pronouncements. newspsper the panies round thc table for !~lksThe ;iss.
reports and the likc from Jakana and Timor iralian Gov::nm:ni isdoin: *na! :r 2.r!c k:!?
iuelf. \\'erc ihcre subitvncI/I'SSrepons. inc suchtalkson iiieiru.ay.
AustralianGovcrnrncniwould bc estremctydis- Senaror COTTOS 1.Yciv5oq:;h LJ;a!?s)-!.Ir
appoinred. and WC have so informed the Prcsidcnt,1seekleaveto movea moucn thar <ne
Indonesian authorities. The Australian Govern- Scnlte take noieofthe pper.
rncnt has urged rhai indoncria pursue her
inieresü through diplomaiic means. We have The PRESIDEST-Ls ieave pran!ed? Thc:e
iold the Indonesiansth21we reniain opposcd10 bcing noobjection.lciveÜ ;rantca.
the useofarmcd force.Wehavealsosaid ihaiwe
arefirmintheviewinai the peopleof Ponuquese Senaior COTTOS-I move:
Timorshould beallowed IOoctermine ineirown ThaithcSenatcirtnoicolih?ipor.
future.\Vehave urgcdiheIndoncsi~n3utnocues
w reafirm iheir own ~ub:iccomrnirmeni IOthe This is an inierestinç statcrneat abou3 \.eV
seriousmatter. IÜ the A:std:5ictivc siate;-.cii:
that the Scnaic has received frnm the Xlii!ii;cr
for Foreign AKairs(Scnaior Uiliescel on :.i:s
Indoneria cm. ofmurse. pint io the prexnce subjea. 11seemsto me IOemph;sije once axain
ofover 40 000 relueces in hcr territory-jome7 the vcry subrtanti~i necd for soiidLr'baieuc
per ant of Ponugucx Timor's eniire popu- ihisissueand on thetotal forrien aii3i:s ?clic:;of
lation. Shecan mnccily claim that Freiilin ha dùrGovernment. Accordingiy.1 scek Icave IO
uublihed ir, prexnt positionoTsupremacybc- continuemy remarkslaicr.
awe ii mntrollcd tnc army and not nccessarily
because it had ovc~heimin~ popular suppon Lcavegantcd; debateadjourned,
Indonuia 'cm argue. as indeed a.e ounelves
have bcen inclined to argue. ihat beforc the re-
cent iroublcs UDT wu vyingwiih. and possibly
uceeding. Fretiliin terms of popular suppon
Al1this u not to excuse Indoncria's reponcd
actions but perhaps goes mmc way iowards

explaining ihem. We should noi lose sieht of
Indonesia'sconcem aboui order and srabiliivin
Ponuguese Timor.rhich ISlocatedinihe miool:
of the Indoncsiao arciupclapo. li ISnecessary
thatwe. the Ponugucse ind t8c parues in Tim&
should rccognise ihe importance of the
Indonesian interest in ihe terniory. just as oiher
countncr inthe rcgiondo.

No more than Indonesia. canAusiillia accept
any one pany's claim io be the only truc
reprcxniative of Ponccucse Timor. Frctilinmay
have prcvailed over iu-n\.als in ihc iniual round
offighiine and siumuhtne. butitnasestabli~hed
no nghi iiierebyIOspeal TorailTimorese.Thcse
mailers sliould noi be wiilcd by force of arms.
What if tlie Tinorese army had deïided msidr
wiih the L'DT.or with Apoderi.or had sragcda
purelymili:av coup?Ofcourse.nor cm L'DTor
Apodcti claim io speak for the people of Por-
tuguese Timor simpty because ihey are nor
aiiempiing [o.rlemonsiraic some miliiary ca-
paaty in conflictwiih Fretilin. Thesc niaites1 A59
Annex 11

Statemen ty Ministerfor ForeignAffairs.29 November 1975

NO DATE

El82 29 November 1975

EAST TI?!OR: LTIL:\TER.\L DECLI\R.ITIOS OF I?;DFPC.\'DC';-CS

The Australian Government does not recognise the
unilateral dcclaration of indcpendence for East Timor made by
FRETIT21Slcadcrs in Dili on 28 Xovember. Commenting on tlie
declaration, the Foreign Hinister, the Hon. .indrew Peacock, sâid
today that the Australian Governnent vas bound to continue to
recognise Portuguese sovereignty in Portuguese Timor.

The Government strongly supported the resolution of the
conflict in Timor by peaceful means through vhich the vil1 of the
people could be expressed.

The Australian Govcrnment's viev remained that talks
betireen the Timorese parties and Portugal offered the Sest hcpe
of bringing an end to the continuing bloodshcd in Timor and of
restoring an orderly process of decolonisation in the tcrritory,
which vould enablc the people of the tcrritory to deciae their
own future. It vas in the hope of facilitating thcse tal!ts thnt
the Australian Government had reccntly reiterated the offer of an
Australian venue for them. Hr Pcacocl; regrctted that, becausc of
differences of approach aaong the Timorese parties, it had not so
far been possible to arrange these tallcs.

The.Australian Government could not'acccpt clains by an),
one of the three main Timorcse parties to be the only truc rcprescat-
atiyes of Portuguese Timor. In tlie Gavernment's viev tlie other
Tinorese parties could ccrtainly not be cxpcctcd to recognisc the
FRETILIX declarntion of 28 Yovember, which vould only serve to
sharpen divisions vithin thc territory and thus to incrcase tbc
sufferings of thc people. Annex 12

Statement by Ministerfor ForeignAffairs, 7 December 1975

The ><ir.isterfor Foreign .+ffairsin the
carctaker Government. >Ir .A. S. Peacock. raid
on i Dccember ihat the Austr3lian
Governmeni derpl!. regreited the course
uhich evenrs in East Timor had laken.
.Ir is tragic for-the Timorcse and a
maiter iar serious concern to the couniries of
ihe region rhat ihe decolonisaiion process
has broken down so compieiely.' he raid.
'Whilethe i\ustraiian Gove:nment full?

appreciates the gravit? of the problemsPOSC~
for tne Indonesian Government by the
breakdown of administration in East Timor.
the coniiniiation of fighring by the compering
parties. and the movemeni oi 40.000 reiuge:~
in10 ils territory, we had hoped-and have
pressed-~hat there would no1be a reCOUrS1 e0
the use of force by our neighbour. ASrecently
asA December our Ambassador in Jakarta
again m-de it clear that this was Our view.
.The prcsent Liberal and National CountIY

pans Government inherired the Timor crisis
at the eleventh hour. We believe-and it is a
ntatter of record. not of hindsight-thata
more positive role by Ausrralia in the earlier

stages-a strong regional initiative, for
example-was possible. desirable. and might
have had vew bencficialresults.
'Sincecoming ro officeWC have co-sponsorcd
and vigorousiy supponed a draft resolution in
the United Kations reaffirming the right of
selfdtterrnination of the Timorese. urging
the netd for a paccful settlement. calling for
a rcvival of talks amoag the conflicring
panies. and proposing that the Government

of Ponuoal should request a United Nations
visiring mission ro East Timor.
'Whilewe appreciate the strains which
cvenü impose on the Fretilin spokcsman.
,MrHona. we mus1reject an). suggestion that
Austrdia has "betrayed the Timorcse. or is
responsible in any u.ay for the prescnt re-.oune
to force. II is the Pomgueic who are the
colonial power. Ponugal's own intemal
dir~rray has been a major contriburing facror.
'In the absence ofans attempt to %certain
the will of the East Timorese. the equaring of

Fretilin's wuse with that of the East
Timorese people cannot be accepred. Funher.
the Austraiian Government believes thar
Fretilin's earlier refusal to panicipate in talks
with rhe other panier and iu unilateral
dcclaration of iedepcndencc on 28 November

have not helped cither the peaceful
rnolution of the crisis or iü own cause.

'It is obviour that the initiatives opn to !!te
.%ustralianGovernment arc limited. The
oations have closcd almost to va~hing PO:
We shall, howcver. continue our enorfi io
gain suppon for the Uniied Nations rnolution.
We shall be ready to rnume humanitarian
aid as soon as pacticablc. We shall continue
to consult clo~ly with counaiea of the
region to explore other possible regional
initiatives. But there is unfortunarely no ray
of recovering the opponunities that were

allowed to slip awa? months ago.' Mr Pea. .:li
added. Annex13

StatementbyMinisterfor ForeignAffairs.8 December 1975

East Timor: Call for
The .Australian Governmenr. >Ir Peacock
ceasefire continiied. tad jus1Iearzed :har Portÿgal
The Slinister icr Forcigii .ifTzirs in the intended :O cornplain to the Se:uriry Council
oi the Cnirsd 'iations abou: Indonesia'saction
caretaker Covernmenr. hLr .i. S. Peacock.
said an S Decernber that the Government \vas aver East Timor. The Cuvenment
coniinuall~ .n-arciing the dsre!opmenr ai :neers:ood:ha1 rh.- Strun~). Councrl u.ùj
evexs in East Timor. :kcly10 mett durino :Se rîi!rse oi ;his .xeti;
!O discussthe question. The .AustraIian
'Ir Pt3:oci. rezailed thai the tragcdy r.!
East Timor had really be-n ivirh t5c Governmeni would reek to be re?resenred
intenre ~olitical dificulries uhiciii';:: when the Securily Council met !O: this
had esperienced over recent month>. 7:s~.i1.J purpose. Ils represenrative Fhere,wouid ;rress
ior a cal1bu the Secÿrity C~uncil ;sr an
led Io the iact that successivePonugiic~c immedi~te cease-fire--as indced ,xe do no^..
Governrnents had betn iinable 10 eser::br
sufficient influence in East Timor u'iih 11srepresenlative .would alss express rhe
the result that the Lfacau program ior xtrong view rhat the Timorese geople should
Ive the opporrunir~ to cercise rheir riqhr of
decolonisation had broken d0u.n. This had In :If-determinaiion. Australia w.ouid support
turn precipitated a situation of disorder in
the rerriior).. lesding. among other ihin!.. ,;" ihe desparch of United Ya;ior.s observers 10
the flignt of SOme40.000 reiugees a::,.'.' ::'- East Timor 10 sec thar an appropriate
processof self-deterrn~nationlook place.
border into Indonesian Timor. This y:. .+ristralia would elpecr rhar if Jndonesia
and large intïus of reiugees had :aiir-.. -:,-
Indonesian Government great difficulliC>. appeared beiore the Security Council.
Confliu between the various palitical !roi'P' Indonesin would respond to rhe international
in rhc territory had begun simultaneoii~l! :ln* conccrn which had bcen aroused o.ver the fare
of the people in the terriroy and would
fightinq had gone on iniermittenrly cver
part few weeks. This had led 10 the reCCnt .;plain clearly her motives and intentions.
unilarerai declaration of independence b).lhC >Ir Peacock said thal :he Australian
Fretilin Party, a declantion which had (;overnment ~0uld be asking ils Ambarrador
in Jakann to explain to the Indonesian
followed by a declaration by other p0li1icJ1 ~urhorities the views which .iustralia would
groups that East Timor wu a pan 0;
Indonesia. The whule situation had c~jn":!~'" rack to present to the Security Council. The
in the attack upon and capture of DlIi .+mbassadorwould also be insrm:ted IO tell
the Indonesian Government once aqain rhar
Indonesia's stated objective. '.Ir pcacock
continued. was the renoration oi laW and the useof force in East Timor was not
order. a task which Ponugal had been cnablc an appropriate wa? 10solve the problems of
IO catry orit.Y a nuessary p~-condi[icn " :':e temrory.
In the midst of the tragedy of East
a proper expressionby the Timorne ~eop''' "' itmor. &Ir Pe~cock continued. Australia
rheir wxn wishes regarding rheir politicai

funire. While this obicctive wu laudable. the stood ready to provide aid as soon as the
means chosen bv Indonesia to achieve itWU a situation on the ground per~niitcd. '\Ve are
rnatter tor deep reyrer and concern on the approaching the Indonesian Government in
pan oi the Australiün Government. On a thissensewith a request ior assurancesabout
the sccuriry of Australian personnel thal
numher oi occasions in the pst. the
.iustraiian Ambasador in lakana had been would be involved'. he raid.
instnicted to point out ta the Indonesian ALinister concluded bv saying that
Government th1 the iise of force was not an when the Fourth Cornmirtee of rhc Cnited
appropriate means IO sertie the probiem of Narions General Assembiy resumed ils

Est Timor. The IYt occvion on discussion of East Timor that night
which the Ambaswdor had made this point !O the Australian represenrativewould rtpeat
rhe Indonoian authorities had been on Ausrralia's cal1 for an immediate ceasefireand
2 December 1975. The .+usrralian Govcrnmcnt wish :Osee t processof self-deternina!ion

Jid not condone :he attack upon Dili whi:h applied undcr proper Cnired 'iations
had jusr taken place. .We do nor regard the supervision.
uss of iorce as an appropriare mcans of
jaiving international problems'. hc raid. Annex 14

Statementby Ministerfor ForeignAffairs, 11December 1975

situation in East Timor had been und:.
East Timor: Talks review ior the last ten dsys.
He rccalled in this regard th:! .\iistraiia.
in Jakarta along wiih eighr orher cjuntries of oui rt:i.,n.
.\uslraiia was pursuing several vigorous
initiativesIO restcre peace in East Timor. the had becn CO-s~onsoring a resolutionin the
Fourth ~om&ittee 1as;week ,*.hichthe
>!iniste: far Fore:gn .+fiairs in the caretaker Government had hopcd '*.ouidBe 3 posiiivr
Governmenr. >Lr .A.S. Peacock. announced contrtburion in the risrch ior a pca:ciui
on 11 December. settlement in East Timor. In the cvent.
.\lr Pexock said thar in Jakana on the resolutioncculd nor bebrought IO iici~ic
10 December the .\usrraiian hmbassador. mainly be:ause oi prorrac!ed dis;ussi(oi. .i
Sir R. .A. Woolcoit. had called on the orhcr irems and ihe effor:s of 2 niim'r. :
Indonesian Foreign hlinistcr. >Ir A. 4lslik. Io
inform him ot the .AustralianGovcrnmcnt's orher 3eie~xions of countries outsioc i::~
reqion IOpress ior amendments.
views on the problcm of East Timor. blr Pcacock raid that the .+ustraiian
Government had much rcgre!ied ihis
The Ambassadorhad told LIr 41alikttat the deveiupmenr. The regional test Sad bccr,
Australian Governmenr was strongly opposed over:aken bu events of the weekend.Tnere
.xere now iwo new draft resolutions beivre
to the use of force in Timor and chat force the Committee. one of %.hichreflected :hr
was not the appropriate way to solve the
problems of the lerritory. viewsof states which were criiicsl oi !Y:' >!lc\lL
On instructions. Mr Woolcott had also and another drair CO-sponsored by a :: :L"
raised with Mr Malik the question of Asian states. which did not seck 10
humanirarian assistance to East Timor. apportion blame.
ashlr Peacock had foreshadowed in his .\Ir Peacock noted. however. that the J~I":
riatement of S December. The Indonesian of both rcsolutioos would be Io bring >hou'
a resroration of conditions in East Tinior
Foreign Minister was infornicd that Austraiia ahich would allow the withdrawalof
was cager IOreriumchumanitarian aid and
that Australia hoped that the International Indonesian forces and permit the proccssai
Red Cross operations wouldstan again as self-determination IO rcsume. Discussion Ji
soon as possible. the two dratt resolutions would conlin::?
Mr .Malik'sresponse was cncouraging and romorrow.
Mr Peacock nid thal the Australian >leanwhile. outside the Fourth Corr..:.:lte'.
consultations have bcgun among membefi O'
authoritics would be following the question
up with Indonesia. The Govcrnmenl's hope the Security Council concerning Portugal's
was that Aujualian aid would continue to be rcqunt for a Security Council meeting to
bc provided through the ICRC (International -
Committee for the Red Cros). >Ir Pcacock diGu the Timor iuue.
said thar there was clearly an urgent need The Awmliao requesr to appear before
for aid activities in East Timar to resume. the Secun- Coiincil had been lodged wirh the
He rcpcatcd chat the Govcmment would Cnitcd Kingdom. which occ~piesihc
Prcsidency of the Security Council this month.
adopi a generous approach 10the problcm of The Minister raid that in ils approach ro
rcfugea [rom Est Timor. should il the Secunry Council .+ustraiia woiildbc
anse. This would accord withthe attitude
tradiuonally adopted by Liberal-National urging on the Council the nced IO move
Country Pany GovernmenO. quiclily Io hring about United Nations
hlr Peacock also rcferrcd Io the active involvementin the problem si Est Tinior
role which theAustralian delcgation was 1s soon u possible.
playing in the United Nations Founh While .+usrraliaheld no fised vieivson
what fom this involvementmight take. the
(Decolonisation) Committcc. where the Government felt thst the easiesr and qiiickest
Coursewould bc Io despaich a rcpresenrative

of the Secretary-~eneril IO the t&ito. to
rcpon back on conditions there and IOmake
recomrncndations for funhcr action bv the
Securitv Council. hc said.
Slr Peacock ùdded thst Australi~ would
ils0 beurging that the Coiincil provide ior
Ln immcdistc end IO hostilitics and the

establishment oi conditions for a wiihCrawai
oE Indonc~-an forces and a resumztion~ ~t-~
proces3of xlf-detennination. 'sith appropriate
United Nations participation. StatementbyMinisterforForeign Affairs,12December1975

Aiis:raiia had supportcd the resolution
becaiiseithad 2 numoer of posiri,;e ieatures.
(\hich had bern absorbed irom an eariier
drait resoirition :ha[ rhe .-\usrralian de!e:arion
had 20-sponsoredand wiici reraine"_keir
iorcz lna validity.

Foremost among rhose positive ieatures
was an appel1 ri,tt.e parties in East
Timor ro join in tllks to end the striie in ihe
terrirorv and Ie2Lrcwards the urderly eser?lsc
~i !ne rientoi seli-determinarion by the
Tiinorese people.
The reioluticn ais0 çalled upon Indonesla

10 ,.i.ithdr=wils ïrrned iorces. iirgrd the right
io: the people of East Timor free!v ro
exercise their right ro self.derermination and
indepcndence. and rzquested the Special
Comrnirree oi Twenry-four on Derolonisariun
Io rend a iac:-inding mission to the territory
as soon ls possïole.

?.Ir Peacotk said that he undcrstood rhe
reasons n'hy Indonesia had opposed the
resolution. To sorne extent Australiï shared
those misgivinqs.
'Sot least ive undentand Indonesia's view
that it is necessary to have peace and order in

the territory to iaciliratc the expression oi rhe
views of the people oi Timor oi their own
wishn for the iurure. Yevenhe!ess we cannor
agrce that the use of force is an appropriate
means of sertlins the problem of East
Timor.' he said.-
EastTimor: U.N. The sporlighr ~ould now turn lo the
resolution
Sdcuriry Council. The Council. as the Cnitcd
The Minister for Foreign Mairs in the Xations body chnrged with prima?
saretaker Goveniment. Slr A. S. Peacock. said responsibiliryior the maintenance oi
on 12 December ir was hoptd that the inrern3tional peacc and security. would have
an inportant responsibiliryto work for a
passageof a rnolution on Eut Timor in the resumprion of the process of peaceful and
Fourrh Cornmitteeof the United Nations agreed decolonisarion in Elsr Timor.
Genenl Assemblywould help to lend the way For this purpose rhe active co-operation oi al1
:nck to peaceful merhods of wlvinq the panies to the dispute. and of al1members of
>roblems of that re+.tory.
Mr Peacock.said chat the raolution. if the Council. would be necessary.
conhmied hv the General Awmbly iuelf. >Ir Peacock recalled thar Ausrralia.
would open the way for considermion of the ïithough no[ a rnember oc the Council.
question of Timor in the Security Council. would be secking the right to take pan in the
which had been markina time pending the debate therc.

outcome of ducussion in the Asscmbly. The delegation'sinsrrucrions would be to
hlr Peacock notcd thar the Founh continue the edom ithad been pressing in the
Cornmirteehad approved the resolution the Founh Cùrnmirtee to bring about a ccasefirc
?revious day by a vote of sixynine statn and a rcsumprionoi the proceu of peaceiul
iincluding Australia) in favour. e!evcn States decolonisarion-wirh appropriate United
iincluding Indonnia! ayainst. with ihiny-eight Yations involvemcnt-leading towards the
abstentions. exercise oi the riqht of selfdetermination.

713 Annex16

Statementby Ministerfor ForeignAffairs,23December 1975

The Ministcr :ccalled that ithad been 2
consistent objectiveoi .Australianpoiic!. .:,
expresscd b? him and by the .+ustraiiar
deiegation in Scw York. chat the Coun.
should ask for the appointment of a spe;,:~
representalive.

Ir was thercfore a mattcr of particular
satisfaction Io him that ihe Couricil had
now done this.
It was more than ever imponant thal ~5x1,
in the direction of a peaceful solutionrhould
be punued encrgeticall~.he said.
The next move lay with the
Secretary-General of the United Natio:. ..~h,,

would now be prcparin~ to appoint a 8pc:::l
reprcsenlative. bLrPeacock said he hoped ihai,
it would be possible for this penon. once
appointed. to leave for East Timor as soon
as possible.
It was also essendal rhat. to enable him iu
discharge his responsibilities-which involved
questions of concem to the countrics oi ihc
Arian region-the special representati~
EastTimor: U.N. should have the CO-operation of the pc: .;:l

decision welcomed parties in East Timor and of the Portuyt:;?
and ladonesian au~horities.
The Minister for Foreign Main, Mr A. S. II was encouraging. he said. that the
Peacock. welcomed on 23 December the reprercntauves of Indonesia and Portugal had
action of the United Nations Security Council alrcady made statemenu in the Securiry
in approving. by a unanimous üftecn votes in Council giving assurances of co-operation.
favour. a compromise resolution on East Ifthe Timorese political parties foilowed
Timor. suit. as he hoped thcy would. the pr0sFe:tS
Mr Peacock said that the Council's move
was a step in the riaht direction-a return to for progteu would improve.
On the basis of the special ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c',
peaceful processesin the decolanisation of reporr. the Secret.-General would b:
East Timor. making recommendauons to the Council i*r
Its unanimous agreement on the molution funher action. This wu a most useful
was particularly welcome. in view of eulier provision. the blinister said. btcaucit mean;
fcan that diKerence3between some mcmber that when the Council resumed considerl~ion
states of the United Nations might be hard of the Timor problem itwould have a
10 resolve. finr-hand report on which to base ils
He idenuhed the miin fc~tures of the
resolutionrl: dizcussions.

i a cal1for mpct for the territorial
integrity of the tenitory and the right of
its people to selfdeterminaiion:
8 a cal1 upon lndoncsia to withdraw iis
forces;
a cal1 upon Portugal for CO-operation with
the United Nations to enable the people of
the territory to exercise their nght to
selfdetermination: and

8 a request to the Secretary-General to rend
a special reprcsentative to the tetritory to
arseu the situation and estabbh wntact with
nll the panies and al1statcs coccerned. Statement by blinister for ForeignAffairs.29 Decernber 1975

East Timor: Use of

force opposed
The Xlinisrer ior Foreign .+flairs.2:: .\.5
Peac~ck.s~idon 29 Decembe: :bat t5e

Ausrrntian Covcrnment had noted the
broadcasts from Fretilin rourcs ovcr
the weekend reporiing rznewed tighrin~ i;i
East Timor. T:aesereports appexrd ;.::.:':
rc:eivcd confirmation in press re30r!~ :l
Indonesia. The .+ustralian Covernmrs: ..:J
reminded the Indonesian ~urhoritiesoi

\ustrslia's opposition to the use of force in
East Timor.
blr Peacock noted rhat the reports oi
renewed fighiing had corne within a ferv davs
oi the adoption by the Lnited iiations
Secïritv Council ol a resolution which

expressed the Council's concern about the
contiict in East Timor and in which rhe
Securitv Csuncil had agreed ro the
:ppointrnent of a specinl iepresenrative of
le Secretaq-General CO proceed to the
.::ritor/ Io mess the situation there. The
.AusrralianGovernrnent had wclcomed this
decision bv the Sccuritv Council which had
accordcd with proposals thnt Australia inelf
had made in the stuem:nt dclivered by ils

rcpresentativeto the Council on 16 Yovember.
The Aunralian delegation in New York had
worked hard for the dop prionof a constructive
decision by the Securitv Counci:: ithad ben
:anicularly qratiiyinp that the resolution hnd
::een pmed unanimously by the Council.
Australia wu thercfore dOappoinied a1the
the lerritoq' as soon as possïole. It u.ns in ihis
repon that the new authorities in Dili had area thnt Australin'sdiplomatic cffon would
requcsted the Secrenry-Gencral to postpone continue to be concenrrated.
the planned visit of his rcpmcnnuve. fie The Minister concluded that allegarionsthx
Ausvalian Government's position is clcar: the Autralian Governmtnt had rurned its
it believcd that the Secrerary-GenenL's bask on the Timor situation 'wereunfoundcd.
representative should leave for Eut Timor Austra!ia had indecd been more acrive than
forthwith and rhat he should be admitted
xirhout delay or prevarication. any other country, in the regioa or oulside il.
...trvinn .- -....-----r~~.aenccftil--...-erner.c
>Ir Peacock added chat the Autralim in EYI Timor. This applied IO Ponugil.
Government was also amiou that the nominally the adminis&ing power. <!r
International Red Cross Teanu should be Peacock recalled in this regard that. while
permitied to return to East Timor to rnumc Australia had no formsl rcsponsibiliiics for
their humanitarian relief programs. The East Timor. ithzd through iu successiul work
Alutrslian Government had made several in the United Nations. through the
appmachu to the Indonuian authorities in Goverrimeni'sunequivocal calls fcr thc
rhis regard.
cessation oi hoailities. and through our
It was imprative ihat oIIparties should proposa13for the sppoinimenr oi a United
:rovide immediatel! the gunnntus necessary Yarions special representaiive for East Timor.
io cnable rhe International Red Cross to played a positive and constructive role in
rcsume iu operations in Est Timor. The twinp to resolve the present crisis. Ausrrslia
Australian Government was vep, keen 10 haa alro hcen verj positive in thc
resume and step up iu own conrributionr to humanitanan ana whcre Australia's offiCi21
the relief eïfon. and. u before. would cont?:butions for relief have far cxceeded
Channel iü assistance rhrouphthe Intcrnation~l coniributions fonhcoming so fnr from lny

Red Cross. other source.
The Minister recolled that. in regardIO FinaIl?. the Government wu endeavouring
Timorese reiugees. he had already made c!cu 10press Indonnian authorities. and througn
.5at rhe Government would wish to adopt a them Apodeti and UDT. Io allow the
jenerous attitude should a reiuqce situation recommencemeni of al1relief eïfons
arix. The problems facing wssible refug:es beginniag with ihc immediate rcsurnption of
funher underlincd rhe necd for the the progruns administered by thc taternotional

lnternntional Red C:os Teams to return to Red Cross. Annex 18
Sutement by Ministerfor ForeignAffain. 4 March 1976(crmt hem

Statementto Parhamentonforeip gonlicyrnatten)

Tumine IO Easi Timor.the siiuauoTnTimor
has been a matter of deep conccrn IO ihe
secure a pcauful settlemcnr. II is a natter for
regretthai evcnishave noi movcd morequickly
towards thai end. The Govcmmeni came IO
officesomeumcaftcrevenü had came IOa head
in Timor.Despite thÿ.and despite the preiiour
Covemmeni'sinacuon.wehaveiakena numoer
oi imÿauves and put ourselvcsven firml! on
remrd in iermsof what we believeshould nap-
peninTimor.Wehavemade iciearrharwecan.
not candone the Indonesian resonIOiorce and
we have careiully avoided favounng an! oi the
panier inTimor orendoning thcirciaims.

In shon. iheCovernmcnr belicvesthar rhere
should be a ussauon of hosuliues.thus puiiing
an end IO the bloodshcd:a resumpiionofinrcr.
nauonal humanitanan aid. prcferably ihroush
the reiurn IOEast Timor of the Iniem~iional
Commitiee of the Red Cross Soueiy: a uith.
draval or lndonesian iorces:and a senuine aci
of selfdeicrminaiion. 1 underiincd the imoor.
unu which theGovemmentanaches IO ailthere
poins durine myialkswithMr Malikinlaland
on 19and 26lanuan. Funhermorc. inIineuith
ihis poliq. the Governmeni hrs supporitd
resclutions adopred du~g December by the
Cmied hiauons General Assemblvand die Se-
Counal. We have nronay rupponed
sendinga Uniied Nauons specialreprescnuuve
:O EasiTimor. Wewclcomed hiçvisiIO Dawin.
We deeply rcgretted fhai hisstay in Darwindid
noi lead IOtw bcing able to visit Fretilin held
arcas in Timor. The Governmeni did whai it
could to assisi. including the procion Au-
iralian Telecommuniuuonr Commissionfaali-
iiesIOsupplemenifhe radio faaliues of the Por-
iuguese uirvenei. It is to be noied that Mr
w;nspezrc wu able IO have discussionswiih
Fretilin represeniaiives in Darwin. The
SccretayGenenl of the United Nauons has
told w chatthe missioncan be rcacrivatedinihe
evenithat FrculiDfindsirrelfaIOemakesccurc
amngemenu fora funhervisit IOTimor.

The Govemment now lwks forward IO fhe
resumed Secun. Counal debate in which We
shall again be reeking IO participaie. The
Governmenck avare thar then is a feeling in
wme qunen in Aurualia hi we should iak
our opposiuon IOIndoneuan anion in Timor IO
ihc lengih of a brczch of the relauonshipwhich
hasdevelopedbewcen the 2countriu. Inrcply1
ny fhai the Governmcnt willmntinue10put iK
viewson Timor most finnly IOthe Indoneaian
Governmen~The Government believn that fhe
relaiions beiween th1 counuies are suchasIO
allowa frankluinoofviewsand theexistena of
quite seriow diRerenm. but me have no inten-
iion of allowinga bnakdown in relationsb
would noi help ihe Timorw. and il would no1
help Australil. Indnd. 1shouluy thai 1RgKt
ihat Timor hu bemme a mancr aimost of
idmlogical dispute. genenting wmc umuon-
able demandr and some umaliruc pmpodr
rather ihaau it shouldbea mancr demrnding
a consvuoive and humanii~ appmach di-
recied towards the problem of Timorese
suiTering -Answer toQuestionin Parliament by Ministerfor ForeignAffairs,1June 1976

QuerrionsWirhour:Voricc 1 June1976 REPRESEYTATIVES liOi

EASTTIMOR: SELF DETfR%liNATION
Dr J. F. CAiRNS-1 ask the Minisre:for
Foreign.Arf~s: Does the .4usrrslianClovem.
mentinrendIOproresIO lndonesiaandIOihe
u'nioa 'iauonsai theobviousandpiannedTau.
ure0i the Clovenimeniai lnd~nesiaIO be
arsociatedwithan! actoiseir Jeterminauonior
the peopleof EastTimor.and againstwhai in

fac!ISche olatant Jenioi :binshr rs ihe
peopieofEasiTimor.'
Mr PEACOCK-TheGtivernmcnt'srcurd ij
wellinown.Sinccthii G~~ct:nmr'*'aciected
-again in rnarked contrasi io Our predeces-
sors-se have been protesune.and nor merel:
protesuneveroallybu[ making:cpresentauons
bornto the IndonesianGovenimeniand tsriicr
ro Ponugucseauthonties. H'e have ilm long
heldandhaveconstantl'srztcd.bothhereandin
theUnitcdNationssincewecameinrooRce.our
policyon Tunor relatiIOself determinauon.
the withdrawalof forcesand theresumpuonof
humanirarianaid.Wehavealsc said.and again
in the Unid Nations.that obrc~atkOC the
proau of self deunnrnaaoaui Est Timor
shouidbatbcwmed out bv theUnitedYaaou.
Intheevent rcgrrmbly ao.indicauonwasfonh-
wming fmmtheUnitedNauousthat itwouidbe
involvedin yaterday's meetingin East Timor.
WdateforusnotIOaruad. Somefonn of United
ka.wm p&Apawn andobxrvarion. Ibelieve.
u evenrUlmd wewouidwelmme ihidevelop
ment.in accordanwiththe linewehavetaken
sinabeingel& toGovemmenr Lnpardcular.
we arrhopcfuihi the Uniud Narionsspmai
rcptcscncaaw WUwon be able to vkiEast
Tir. anin inaccordaria wirhhismandato
rcaueo&e nniawn inthetemtoy . ehopehe
wdibe abltoundenaktihu -ment noioniy
inthelighof the outmme~fynterdav's meci-
mg inDdi butais a itha vietoat%uog aü
shida of opinion in thetenitop. But wihout
that UniiedNahm paraÊi awn. rhir Govem-
mentdid aocklieve itmuJiend iu pmence m
what mk place asa funher an in thiua@c
flair. Annex20

Statcrnentby Ministerfor ForeignJul1976,20

THE HON. ANDREW PEACOCI< M.P.

20 July 1976

EAST TIMOR

.The Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr Andrew
Peacock, said today that the Governmenthad longheld the
view thatthe process of decolonisatioi nn East Timor
shouldbe based ona proper act of self-determination,
preferablycarried out withthe observationand participation
of the UnitedNations.

"In the case of the consultative acts carriedout
in East Timor on 31 May and 24 June there must stillbe
uncertaintyabout how extensiveand representativethe
exercise of self-determination ha been," he said.

Mr Peacock recalledthat Indonesiahad invited
the UnitedNations to send its representativeto East Timor
and had renewedthe invitationon severaloccasions. In
doing so, Indonesiaand the PGETgave assurancesof freedom
of movement in al1 thirteendistrictsof the territory.

"We ourselvesmade repeated representations to
Guiccaardi,"he said. "We encouragedother governmentstopeare-
make similar representations."

"We informedthe Secretary-General that if FRETILII
were ableto name an accessible venue in East Timorfor a
meeting with Mr Winspeare-Guicciardi and if al1 parties had
given satisfactory assurances of safety,Australiawould
have been prepared to considera request from the United
Nations forhelp with transport. "

The Minister said that theGovernmentregretted,
in al1 these circumstances,that further efforts were not
made by the United Nations to play a more decisiverole.

"Thepresent situation is that Indonesia has
moved, without United Nations.involvement, to integrate East
Timor as its twenty-seventhprovince,"he said. "But in
the circumstancesAustralia cannot regard thebroad
requirements fora satisfactoryprocess of decolonisation
as having beenmet."

ALSSJ I~~c~re~~Qffa1rs J Cori f 1, . n3 srsren,i;is-iro?

1te11,I:>.j/lc,1
P tLi--1 A69
Statement by MinisretforForeignXffairs,20January 1978
20Januaq 1978-The Mimer forFomp Mm.
ihcHon.AndrcwPcacuck.amounad wdaythai thc
GovcrnmcnrhasdcodcdIOamcpiEastTimoraspan
of Indoncria.Mr Pcacod; uid bat. likc moctAu-
udans. theGovcmmcnidceplyrrpiud thatcvcnu
inEasTimor sineAumsi 1975hadoucd somu&
humansuffenng.Hd:

ben andrcmwiedamajormnam ofrhcCovcmmcnr
Thened IOdircaemcrpenassuna: o rhcpopleof
EutTimorIcdtheCavcrnmcniin1976Idvcn fundi
throughmeInaoncsianRCmii forrriicfvinEut
Timor.Thisf3lioCheb~akdownof ne ouawns for
auru Iihciernio-bythehicrnauonal!.amminccof
ihc RcdCross.TheConmmcniha du,druliucdu-
rangemenuwiihthe IndoneuanCovcmcni for rbc
Aus~raiia. ihc~Ianui~esof Timorerercfup~ in

Mr Pcacocksaid ihai in poiiuul urms ihc cvenu
whichculmaicd in ihc IndonesianGovemmcni's
dewion in late 19IOinicrvcncin EasiTunor had
ucatcd a mosi difficuliand compicxprobiem. He

norcd ih.1 Ibe situiuon by tben hid &ady
developcdow i priod.Inrrfcniatothe fiau
tky fi& rheGov~mclit whenitsime Ipwn in
DŒemkr197s. Mr PusDc led the woZvvd
mlirid situationiPomd in 1974rnd th.1the
bomyicu Gwemmmt hd mmmid irscif w
kcnloddnlv inadmtnLrcrrd and thcrrrourŒ~
quued hadit'd ~iecban bcpnd rhPomgucu
Govunment's muscand mlve Themqucnocr
ofihcfülmofb &inEwTmorhrd ban
aqpe ïk aaempccdm& by th UDT. th sut-

uo~tumcd~bYFrrciLnmdrhemtuing
indo-yrnd&amonJmIOmtervmcaThekLnvPr =à.

lbt de-n andtbeewuDthrtfoUovcdmnhuc it-
tma~borhbmindo-Tbowirruauc
indad verml rndbivcnevxban rurocpabeomdy
Idution
Tbc AwmtLn Covcrnmmt hid depiod th-
devclopmcnu. ibove 111 tbc w of force by
In~hirPuoxkuid:
TheChunmeni bu madec*u blidvtuopponowo
tkInbdootrv~orrrrrotum.odk:midetbukwoo..om
-h.l---aman -.r--mm- .-rrNowmbu 1975-hc
~ommeai imma& cverdon toszcki
uoi>ooftbcp-Intbunimopow$"ZZi
ambioooiofMY pMaJv ErnTrmorrvpohal mon-
mmrmr thc puama ofLk &~OMUD Govanmar
Ud*cmmNimm oruMMI mumaervhu~lrmru byihc
rcquucdsu- Suux N-ber 1975ihecz
iiwamm h.>mncinurdw enmd iu admmuanm
onrml ovu tbe of kn Tmr Thumm1 u
dm Md - d -]OridminumLIVCEUOU ofrhc
urricoy.
in mnduaion h(l Pu& wtcd th.[ the fum
gr^ of fimily muion and trriubiution of
Km wm imm-t -0 inamacncai mn-

w wnm& todd d&Iy ntb the indonaun
Govcniment u the rurhonin ebmvc wnmL He
uid:

Thu u IrrrLnnth whuh rc mut mmc w rem. Ac.
rrmvol mdheGof ihmunru byrbickinlegiwnvu11
bu#i aboutIwouldk unrrilu Iucnunucwrcfw
w -pue defiaotbitn Tir v panoflndoaeau. CablefromAusnalianEmbassy.Lisbon.24 January 1978reponing
conversationwithSr Villas-Boas

O.LB1949 JS2/TC-
TOR 0605 25. l78
Q.LB1949 1630 24. 1,78CLA

FI!* LISBON/ FILE 202/1 REF O.CH625361

CONFIDENT IAL

VILLAS-BOAS, DIRECTORGENERALIN FOREIGNMINISTRY,
CALLEDME IN TODAYTO DISCUSS MINISTER'S STATEMENT.

2. HE BEGANBY REFERRINGTO REPORTS IN LISBON PRESS AT WEEKEND
THAT OURMINISTER HADANNOUNCED DE FACTORECOGNITIONOF
IFDONESIA'S INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR. HE SAID THATHIS
GOVERNMENT WAS 'SURPRISED ' AT THESE REPORTSANDASKED,FOR
CLARIFICATION. 1 SAID THATTHE MINISTERHAD ISSUED A
STATENENTON 20 JANUARYAND, SINCE THIS WASPUBLICLY AVAILPBLE,
I ASSUMEDTHAT HIS EMBASSYIN AUSTRALIAWOULDHAVETRANSMITT~D
THE TEXT. VILLAS-BOAS SAID THAT HIS EMBASSYHAD FORWARDED
WHATAPPEAREDTO BE EXCERPTSFROM A STATEMENT. 1 OFFERED
HIE A COPYOF THE FULL TEXT WHICH HE READ.

3. VILLAS-BOAS SAID THAT HIS GOVERNBENT'S SURPRISE AT THE
STATEMENT AROSEFROMTHE FACT THAT PORTUGAL WAS THE ADNINISTERING
PPWERANDTHE U.N. RECOGNISEDTHIS STATUS. HE ADDEDTHAT THE .
AUSTPALIANSTATEMENT APPEARED I TONORETHIS POSITION.
(AT NO POINT DID HE ALLUDETO THE REFERENCESTO PORTUGAL'S
R@LEIN THE MINISTER'S STATEMENT). HE SAID THAT HE HADPEEN
i!!STRUCTEDTO REGISTER HIS GOVERNMEN T 'SURPRISE' ANDASKED
THAT IT BE CONVEYED TO THEAUSTRALIANGOVERNMENT. 1 UNDERTOOK
Tc! DO THIS.

4. 1 SAID THAT 1 HADNOTRECEIVED ANYSPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS
FFQM MYGOVERNMENB TUT WOUDLIKE TO MAKETWOPERSONAL
O@SERVATIONS. FIPSTLY THE AUSTRALIANGOVERNMENH TAD
C@FiSISTEN?LYDEPLOREDTHE USE OF FORCE IN THE SITUATION.
SECONDLY THE GOVERNMENA TNDPEOPLE HADBEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED
WITH HUMAYITARIAN ISSUES ANDTHE ONLYPRACTICAL WAY IN WHICH
SUFFERINGCOULD BE RELIEVEDWASBY DEALINGWITH THE AUTHORITY
WHICHHADEFFECTIVE COYTROL. VILLAS-BOAS INTERPOSFDAT THIS
SPGE WITH THEINFORMALCOMMENT THAT HE PERSONALLYWASAWAREOF
THE IMPORTANCE WHIC HE PLACEDON RELATIONSWITH INDONESIA.
1 TOOKTHIS OPWRTUNITYTO DRAWON THE MINISTER'S STATEFENTOF
13 OCTOBER(YOURO.CH625361) ANDEARLIER REFERENCES TO THE SHARED
NEED FOR PEACE ANDSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

CRS fil838LForelgn fiffsirs]Corr f~les. m.n.s cvttem 1948-199u INWARD CABLEGRAkl

5. VILLAS-BOAS STILL SPEAKING PERSONALLYCONCEDEDTHAT
PORTUGALDID NOT HAVETHE RESOURCESTO RESTORE ITS SOVEREIFNTY
IN TIMOR ANDTHAT THE U.N. WAS UNLIKELYTO TAKE ANY EFFECTIVE
ACTION. HOWEVER,HIS GOVERNMENT FELT STRONGLYTHAT THE
INDONESIAN VOTING'EXERCISE' WAS COMPLETELY INADEQUAT END
THAT THE TIMORESE SHOULDBE GIVEN A PROPER O?PORTUNITY TO
EXERCISE THEIRRIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION.

6. IN CONVEYINGHIS GOVERNMENT'S'SURPRISE' 1 HAD THE IPPREÇSION
If THERELIS-ANY NEED TO RESPONDAT THIS STAGE. AND SUBJECT DOUBT
TQ YOUR~VIW EW OK DOT PROPOSE ANYFURTHER ACTIG UNLESS
THE PORTUGUESEFOLLOWTHE NATTER UP.

SELLARS

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FQREIGN MINISTER
MI! + DEP DEFENCE
ONP P M AND CABINET
JI@

SEC DEPSECS EX MC0 FAS(SEP1 FA5(NSA) FASCWES) $
FASOEF) DP DC FAS( NUC) FASCIOC) IO FAS(PCR1 INF ...\,:.
FAS(ECO1 FAS(LT1 FAS(MFS) FAREP(S M P1
PPNGKOK HONGKONG KUALALUMPUR MANILA PORT MORESBY ->,:
RANGOON SINGAPORE WASHINGTON MOSCOU NEWYORKUN <~.'
>.. Cablefrorn AusaalianErnbassy.20December1978reponing
conversationwith Sr Vilias-Boas

R?.
RR JAKARTA/559 NEU YORKUN/345

FM. LISBON / FILE 202/1 REF 0.LB2752

TlMOR - FORMALRECOGNITIONOF INCORPORATION

VILLAS-BOAS , DIRECTORGENERALOF POLITICAL AFFAIZS IN THE.
FORElGN MINIST2Y CALLEOME IN 20 DECEMBER TO DISCUSS MINISTER'S
REPORTED STATEME~T ON FORMALRECOGNITIONOF EAST TIMOR INCORPORA TON
IN INWNESIA.

2. VILLAS-BOAS SA1 D THAT HE HA- ---N INS-XU--E- - - -RES--- H IS
GOVERNMENT*S ~URPRISE THAT ÏT HAD NOT BEEN ADVISED IN ADVANCE ABOUT
THE APPARENTDE JURE RECOGNITIONBY AUSTRALIA OF INWNESIA'S INCOR-
PORATIONOF EAST TIMOR. HE SAlD THAT OUR TWOCOUNTRIESWERE IN
FRIENDLY RFLATIONS AND THAT SUCH ADVANCEINFORMATIONMIGHT HAVE BEEN
EXPECTED.

3. 1 kESPONDEDTHAT, WHENAUSTRALIA HAD ANNOUNCEDITS DE FACTO
RECOGNITIONLAST JANUARY, IT HAD NOT AT THAT TIME FOREWARNE THE
PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT. I ADDEDTHAT THE MlNiSTER AT HIS PRESS
CONFERENCO EN 15 DECEM~ER ,AD INDICATED THAT AUS~RALIA MAS PREPARED
TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONSWlTH lNDONESlA TO DEFINE THE SEABED
BOUNDARY IN THOSE AREASWHICH REMAINEDUNDEFINED. THE MINISTER HA0

INCORPORATIONOF EAST TIMOR HADNOTRMALaEEN SPEClFlCALLY DISCUSSEDWlTH
THE INDONESI4N FOREIGN MINISTER. I ADDE3THAT AUSTRALIA HAD NOT YET
ACCOnDEDDE JURERECOGNITIONTO INWNESIAN INCORPORATIOIJBUT 1T
WOULDFgLLOV FROMTHE COMMENCEMEN OTF NEGOTIATIONSWlTH INWNESIA ON
THE SEABEDBOUNDARYADJACENT TEAST TIMOR THAT AUSTRALIA WASPRE-

PARE0 TO GlVE DE JURE RECOGNlTlON TO THE INCOaPORATION.
4. 1STRESSEDTO VILLAS-BOAS THE MINISTER'S COMMENT THAT CUR
EXPRESSCD iilLLlNGNESS TO ENTERLNTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SEABEO'AOUN-
DARYDI0 NOT ALTER IN ANY XAY THE OPPOSITION 'WHICHTHE GOVEJNMENT
HAS CONSISTENTLYEXPRESSEDABOUT THE MANNE2OF INXIiESIA'S INCOR-
PORATIONOF EAST TIMOR.5. VfLLAS-BOAS ASSERTEDWlTH SCMEYAXMTHTHAT PORTUGALREF41XED
THE "FORMAL ACMINISTZATING Po'MEaH IN EAST TIWCR. HE ADCED T~AT,
FOR REASONSWHlCH WE2E WELL UNDERSTOOD P,ORTUGALCOUL3 NOT AC9IE'IEA
SOLUTION TO THE PRESENTSITUATION \FiEAST TlYOH AN;)HAD ÏU!??iED THE
PROBLEMOVERTO THE U.N. HE ADDED THAT PORTUGALCOUL9 YOT A33iCATE
ITS RESPONSlalL ITY FOR ITS TERRITORY. HE~CUOTED TS~G ËRTICLC 337-
OF THE PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTIOK NHlCH STATED THAT "PORTUGAL SHALL
REMAIN BOUND ... TO PROMOTEAND SAFEGUARD THE 2IGHT T0 INYEPiNDENCE
OF EAST TIMOR". HE SAlD THAT THEPORTUGUESE GOVEZNMENT VOULD
"PATIENTLY AND CONFIDENTLY" PURSUE ACOURSEDESIGhEC TO ;Ciil EVE
THlS OBJECTIVE.

5. VILLAS-BOAS 'WENTON TO SAY THAT PORTUGAL31D NOT HAVE A CLOSED
MlND ABOUTDlSCUSSlNG THE MATTERWlTH INDONESIA. HE REITERATEDWHAT
HE HAD MENTIONED IN AN EARLlER DISCUSSION (OUR TELEGaAMO.La2604 OF
26 OCTOBER 1978) THkT DURINGTHE GENERALASSEMàLY IN SiPTEMaER THE
INDONESIAN DELEGATIONHAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SEEKING AMEETING
BETWEENDR MOCHTARAND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER GAGO. UNFORTUNATELY THE
PROGRAMS OF THE TWOFOREIGN MI'NISTERS UERE SUCHTHAT IT WASNOT
POSSIBLE TO ARRANGEA MEETING. VILLAS-BOAS ADDEDTHAT IF A MEETlNG
WERE ARRANGED, THE DISCUSSIONSWOULD,IN THE F IRST INS~ANCE, BE
INFORMALAND EXPLORATORY. ITRlED TO DRAWHIM OUT ON WHATTHE
PORTUGUESE WOULDSEEK TO ACHIEVE AT SUCHDISCUSSIONS BUT HE WOULD
NOT GO BEYOND SAYING THAT THE PEOPLEOF EAST TIMOR MUSTBE GlVEN AN
OPPORTUNITYTO FREELY CHOOSETHEIR FUTURE DESTINY.

7. 1 HAD THE IMPRESSIONFROMTHIS DISCUSSION AND FROMPREVIOUS
TALKS Y~ITHVILLAS-BOAS THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENW T ILL NOT
READILY 2ELINQUISH ITS CLAlM TO EAST TlMOR UNTlL THEY ARE SATISFIED
THAT THE ASPIZATIONS OF THE EASTTIMORESEHAVE BEEN FREELY
EXPRESSED. AS LONG AS FRETILIN CONTINUESTO BE ACTIVE IN THE FORMER ,
PORTUGUESE COLONIES, I THlNK IT LIKELY THAT ATTEMPTSWILL BE MADETO .'k:
CONTINUET0 KEEP THE TIMOR ITEM BEFORETHE U.N. /-,
Y
8. VILLAS-BOAS SA13 THAT HIS GOVEFlNMENM TAS ALSO CONCERIIEDASOUT
THE PLIGHT OF EAST TIMORREFUGEES. HE NOTEDTHAT THlS QüESTION 'MAS
COMPLETELYSEPARATEF3OMTHE POLITICAL ISSUE OF EAST TIMORAND HIS
GOVERNMENT VAS PLANNING TO LOOKINTO IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
VILLAS-BOAS' COblMENT3ON THlS ARE IN FOLLOUING CABLE.

... SELLARS Note Verbaleby DeparUnentof ForeignAffairsofIndonesiaon Diplornatic
andConsularAccreditation,and listof Multilateraland Double Taxation Agreements
entered intoy Indonesiasince 1976

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS
AECUBUC OPINDONlSlA

NOTE VERBALE
Number : 217/92/29

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republ ic of

Indonesia preseflts its compliments to whom it may concerned and
has the honour to confirm that no state which is accredited to

Indonesia ha8 qua1 if ied the terms of either its diplornatic or
consular accreditation, in any way, particularly in respect of

East Timor and the fact of East Timor's integration into the
state of the Republic of Indooesia.

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Indonesia avails itsolf of,this opportunity to renew to th06.3

concerned the assurances of its highest consideration.

Jakarta, May 1992OCPARTEMENLUAR NEGERI
RCPVBLIKINOQNESIA

Jakarta, & Asii 1 1992

Dear Ms . Pead.,

With rafnranta to your letter dated 3 March r992 regarding

your reqüest for information in ordar preparation of your defence
to tha action initiatad by Purtugai against Austra:ia in the

Intornaticnal Court of Justice concerning the Timor ûap Treaty,
plûaee find enclosad the fo7:owing materia7s:

a. A list of Multilatarai Treaties whfch Indonesia has adhored

into sinco 1â75. and

b. A lists of Bilateral Double Taxation Agreement entarad into by
Indonesia since 1976.

Furthermore, 1 am also plaased to infcrm you that, thnra 13

no single country 80 far that hao gualiflad its diplornatic or
consular accreditation ta exclude East Timor.

1 hope this Information will be of some aesistanca to you.

Ms. J. Pead
A/g Ministar,
Australian Embassy,
AAKA~~TARPR 13 '?2 21:JQ FRcm fiUSTEMB JSK~RÏA ÏO a01 a A76

~ist of )hiltileraï T-ties Cs il 16 1 7
Indonair haJadhcrcd to saxe 1976

. . ----.---p..-- - - .-- ..
;No. i Data 1 C~nvention status
... -.-., . - - .. *-. --
j ! j
i 1 ./ C3 Spti"i&i. 1776 13inqid Cüiiv+nti~il cri ;idr.:=ric Cc-utii, iî6i . . &:i?icdtiü*;
j Pi.o?~~i AnetndLngthe jin~la .?ci;ieniicn on i Siynatüia: --- I
! i : Narc3tic Ûïüg5. i76i I 25 narch L

i 2.)j 23 :4samkei- 1976 1 5;nia,<ü;îts9: t~ie_toi:v+n:iüii0,~1itie. Irtcrna-iô, ,,;i<+=:aiicc
j tionai Hai.~tl~s u~~anizat~cn, 1377. !
1 _i
: a.: û y 9 j futlmIiPof the*,-,ffir;dnealth <ûïgaiiization.e ~1973.-j ! Rccs~ta~~cc
1 :
1 4.1 18 Februdry 1377 i i.rwmen< e~tdbiii~i~ the IntemitlMdi FiJiid i Signature
! i foi sriculturai, 1376. I
I 5.1 Il ;.nwry 1977 [ Con,<üntion on a Cde O? Cüiiû~t :or Liner 2aiatificaticn
! 1 Ccniere~hws.
j . i 20 septeaber iiïi / iiiter~tionai sügcï Agi.6aümnt. 1973. j *captaFe
i ReSOlütihl S0.i.
:! I i i 18 Jcne i776
Zû 3ecembor 1977 j Eltonsion of the 1t1ttaïration.l Supar &reemdn;,j 1 Rccaotdncc
f 7.1 1973. !
1 i !
1 8.; 28 OaesMùï i377 ) Inîer~ti-i Svgdr ciqreiwnt. i377- i Signature
i P.! 24 MY 1978 i nmondirnta to articirs 24 and 25 of th CO~U-!~ Fcccptancs
i ! ! tütiün et the üorld HsaÀth Organizatlül. i7i6. !
.. I ! :
i 3; Auguet 197ô ' [I Frowtion Esta=.eceiatlm, iTi. Intsi-i-etiondi ica j Ciatificdtion
I ' i
, 11.1 11 Zaniiary 1978 ' &rn- EsCaàÀishin. th OIth nia iin , hti:isa:ion
I Warch and De~iq~nt antre. 1977.
I 12.1 28 u>t+mter 1979 Cumtitution a tni üniteii kti- iridüstria~ j tignatrre
i I j Rve:cgmrnt Organization. 1779. 1
1 13.1 17 ilarch i98G [ interndtionaÀ Natural Rubbcr kgi.~mûm. 1779. 1 Signature

' ' 24 Frbrwry 1781 / Caanl Fundfor Coauditi~. i9â0. i zignature
! i !i
( 15.1 04 June 1982 Viennd ConventiCfi GY iiiiploodtic mldti~6. 196i( nccession

I : ! Qtiü~ia: Protocol to ths Visnna Wverrtim on \
\ i ) Ndtiwtaiiti..Rel1761.s eoncsrning aauirition of
i l
! i 1 Vienna Comcntion crnCunsü;ar %la:ioiu. 1765 i
i ! 1 Cgtional Prcfwol to t:,e Yirnm Cyvtnfiün
! i Conouior. alations concei-n:ng Xuülsstlon of
! i i Nationdlztji, i363. !
1 [ / Ganvrntian on Specia; Hluisns. 1969. i

1 6. C: Cctar i981 : Convent$~n an rhe Rcccqnitio, ard Edorcesent ! %cù~s:~87
i 1 i of Forragn firbrtral WdrGS. !
i ' C3 *tsar 1782. j Extension at ttw intrrnrtiona~ Cattae ~3rsaiPeni~ i acceptant-
) 1976. .>
1 ' \
ti: l1 Wu.< 19.2 Counisr Uiti,ng ConCurremy,for 1329.he Suwrrssisn of,! Qtificarion
!! 1 i
1 19.j CS +YI,..Ir047 n~~rnd~~ntto tQ Title di* âiibtantive Provi- . a.:csotinca
i \ \ naritinsf Crganiration.on i9i7.he interndtiarai i
1 .. , i j
\ CV.~ 23 ;üiy i?S3 i ArdrNnarit tü th3 Cünventi2n on th~.lEtCl'M- i î;ca~ta~XP
j si-l .. .i'itjei Ûi:grni*atiw ----.--.. ...tkdi i
i LL.; i: ?i~?dai)di l?O: ,;Stataîdà of .th~.isiisrndticnai Can<,-9 foi. I ~ly~~atilré
I i ûinaïic 5iijil~erl.q dl,= Ziütechnoicqy, ;?as. ;
j ,14.i 50 ;~nè i9ô3 1 lntainafiona; Co:?rz Pgr+mànt, l;ô2. 1 ?;gnc;üï+
i ;
; 4. ~7 januaïy 1923 1 A5idil ami 3aci:ic Ce*eiwwnt centre, i78i. i îiyiiaiüre
: '5.1 1; Septamûsr 1984 j C3nventieil ÜÏ the istablishins üf al1 %:.as of i nG'.:f:ca^;iuc
i Oiscriffii~tion agai~mt Mmii. 1977. [ ïigc$:dr*.
i i i ; ‘7 ;il:j i?8:
1 !
i 26.;i Si August iFa4 i Fïidihis.ti~:iî62.Ggreiiitant on Juta and Juis \ ;iisssion
l

j 27.1i 23 Cetcbcr lfôj ' Convdntim dgainat Tortüi.3 and othèi. Sriral. i Si~natüïs
L ; Inhuman or Oegïadi~ TrsdtMnî or Puiiishirncnt, j
i i i34.
) 5.7.) 29 sril 1983 censtirution ot the &id-Pdcitis Ïalccommirniij j &cession
i !
; 1. i6 May 1386 j internatimal C~nveflti~n agafint Apdrthaid in i :ig,~a?ure
( i i SwïG, 1955. j
1 32.1i V3 Fcbïuary 1385 United Hati- Csnvrntion on th* Law ot thc %a'! &atificzïiisa
i j i i987. !

1 55.1 î6 Jdnuaïy 1987 2 ~NirtrdtionticriotCoShi*,ion 1986.n Cwditforib for i Slç,nat.~r~
i i ! !
4. 06 Juiy i7aS i Llscndwnts Co articles 24 and 25 of the ! acccgia,~ce
C-titution of ttn Vorld Haalth Çrg.ànization, j
! I 1976. 1
j 3;./' 21 JUli 1388 i ~ r t s ~ ?rotocol al 3thta~e9 tht Otliaia \ ~igr;,stur-$
i I 1 th OZ- idysr, lqal.

1 7. ii Ot;cller 1783 CWW Convention on the Intsïnstional f accç~à:üii
i i j Ïraruport of Goads Uniar Covcr ü? i?R Cornai ,
! i ? (;;a convention;, 1975. i

j 39.; î3 îate-r i989 j Sxtdnsiq vith Xo3ifiiatioru O? the j kâoiuti~ï NO. 5.i:
* 1 i iiitbro~t~ondi &?tee &grsement, i383.
1 40.1 16 zanijary 1930 1 ;onvcntian on the fiighto of Children, i369.

: NO 9tdti paTtic? kava LIdptd &jeetionso~ainst 1i-de-a)ia9s acihrer~a tu t?,a abova
ùsntaoncd tïedties. -. lk
Q'U
.........-. -.......................................-..............:.lll":::::::==:::::::::::::>
t.
f .....................,..... ......_.._.......__........ ............................................
n tllr Guv~i~bwiit of Ll~e nqw4,lic of Iiidoiwbia and tlw &~ci~iiwiit c
L'S Repvtuliç for tlr Avoidaiwa cf Wle 'lakatio~i ai-d the Prev~i~Lici
51ect Lc. 1axes ml 11wüln3. '<
Jakaita Awust 7. 1781
"Alaxatiÿci and tten Preveiitiuijliof +Fiscal1~Evasiai aiuitlie Respectic to TaxesxliaifoIi~cné.<!anc

.Jahniba I:ebi.uaiy la, 1?9U "Agveewnt hçtwecn tk GoGeriment of tlie Repklic of IiwloiNsia and .the Qeveiiiunt o
I Rephlic for tle hvoijance of,,Dc&le iamatlwi with bswct to Taxer on IrKow aid
1 Prevelitioii of Fiscal Evasion.
1 lla~li 3, 1982 "hai.eement betuoen the kphlic of Ii~bia and Japan for tlw, Avoidancn of Double
aid the Pravent.icii1 of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taïes Incua.
I I
\~ak<i-ta Ibverber 10. 1908 "Agreewnt between tll~ Republic of 11-ia ainl tlie Republic of Korea fur tlie rivol
I 1 Ocible Tautlai ad tir Prerntim of Fisu1 ivariai with Wct to taxa3 cn Iiico
tblaysia Kuala Lumpur Septebkr "tîgreenent ktmn the Oovcrntieiit of the
11. 1931 for the Avoitbnce of Ooikle laxatim aidVltc Prrvçiitiondunofi+Fiscall EvasioneriwltlitWbu
j Taxes on 1-e.."

iktlwrlainic \l:uala iiint,iiJvly 22 1931 "Protwol knçndiw tt# hreeiont hetween th Republic of Jndociosia rird tle Kiiiyc;or
((ve~ikes Agi-eeheiit of L973 Hetlierlands f~r tlie Avo~dance of Wle Taxation aid the Prevçnticfli of Fiscal €vas
I I W~pact to laïes on Ihce aixl on Caijital uith Frol.wol. signed at Jakarta ai 5 Ha
~IL-I?~l~llh; i~lliwtvn ~iai-s~i25. 1967 "~rewiit ht-n the Qovernnein of the ~ep~b~ic <f II-ia ami tb myeriimenl. c.
iaelard for the Avoidaiice O! tle üable Taxatioii an1 the Preventisni ut Frscdl Evas
LI,' I I Respect to laites ün Jricae.
F '1 ,,; I:OIway
1-,I Jakai-1.a July 19. IV88 1 "Oaklentiolaxaticnwn aiitltten;Preventionof ofdof.ir.calaEvasic.i~ witli IbawectHorto laxes ùii~IK.c.#
II> l
1 ! I Wvi ln1 .
'hgrecwnt betycii the i3overiibent üt tlr Repltslic of Jnlotesia anrl Ue Rowiiiicnl. t::
Islaiijc Hcpbllc csf Pakistaii for the Avoidar~e itf Lkulilc larcaticiiiaid the P~.eveiitS
Fiscal Evasiini witti G6spect te Taxes cn IWW.
"Wree~en!. betirctri the Govei.incnt of the W4~tblic: of I~iLk~m?siaaiid the C~~vei-~iwr~ t~
l1hilllp(~~nes fc~r the kvoida!~ cf Dothle taxation aixl the Prcvention of Fiscal tv.1
IIcs)>ioct te laxct. on firüm.

"Euenotion 9Ftwrcxes tland ~ustuts oDuticsKLon Clie ktivitiesiiie<lcbf Air ivaiibpwtrabfi1twpi.i~e
tw C\xnit,rirs.

n tlw Rqndjljc of Indmia aid the Rzphlic of $ingap>re fo. hw>i
and tlm Praveiition of Fiacal Evasiün rith Wct to Taxes wi Iim-,~,
............... - "

CI.
<1. SecurityCouncilResolutions384(1975)of22 December1975

and389(1976) of 22 Apnl 1976

SECCRITYCOCYClL RESOLL'IIOSS

Rrsolurion38.1i:35',01.2:December 193

ne Ser~r~ryCouncii.
Hcviilg noredthe contents of Ihe letter of the Pennancnt Representativeof
Portugal(S/I I899),

Having heard the sutemenü of the rcprcsentativesof Portugal and Indo-
ncsia.
Havingheard rcpresentativesof the people of EastTimor.
Recognizingtheinalienablerightofthe peopleofEast Timortoself-detenni-
nation and independencein accordancewirhthe principles of the Charter of

theL'nitedilarions and the Declarationon the Granting of lndependence !O
Colonial Countriesand Peopln. contained in Gcncral Assernblyresolution
1514(XV)of 14 December1960.
No'orinhat GeneralAssemblyresolution3485 (XXX) of 12December1975.
inrcr aliarequested the Special Comminee on the Situation with regard to
the Imp1emcn:ationof the Declarationon theGranting of Independenceto
ColonialCountfiesand Peoplesto send a fawfinding missionto East Timor.
Gravelyconccmcd at the deteriorationof thesituation in Eastrimor.

Gravclvconccmedaiso at thelorsof lifeand consciousof the urgentneedIo
avoidfurrherbloodshed in EastTimor.
Dcploringthe intenenuon of the armed forcesof Indonesia in EastTimor,

Regniting ?bat the Govemment of Porrugai did not discharge fully iü
responsibilitieas administering Powerin the Territory under Chapter XI of
rheCharter,
1. Cal& uwn al1Statesto res~ccrthe territorial inteaiw of East Xmor as
weUasthe iaiienable nght of iu people 10 self-detemieatton in accordance
wth GencralAuembly tnolution 1514(XV.
2.CalL uwn theGovemmentof Indonesia 10withdrawwiihoutdeloval1 irs
fo~~u from~ ~~~~~ritorv:
3.CUIL upon the~~~vcmmentof Pomgal asadministering Powerto co-
onente fuliywiththe United Nationsso asto cnablethe wo~ie of East Timor
. .
ta exercisefreeivtheirrinht to reif-detennination:
4. (Igu al1 tat taeniorher parues concemedio co-operate fullywtlhthe
effonr ofthe Umtcd Zlationstoachreveawaceful soluuontotheeusuna !!tua-
tion and to facilitatethe decolonkation of theTerrirory:

5. Repuuthe Semwy.Geneni tosendurgcntlyaspeciaircpresentauveto
Eprt Timorforthepurposeof makinganon-the-spotassasment oftheexisting
situationandofntabluhing contactmth ailthe panin intheTerritoryar.dail
Statu wnamcd in order to msurc the implemeatationof the presentraolu-
tion:
6. Fuirherrcauuirtht Sennarv-Generalto followtheim~lemcntationofthe
pruenr moiuuon and .ku>gintoacrount thereportof hicspeciaircprnenta-
uve. to submt recommendauonsto the SecurityCounnl acsoon u possible.
7. Decides to remainseizedof thesituation. Resolurio389(:976 )f? April19-6

ne Ser~rizyCoun~l.
Rtcnllingin resoluti384 (1975)of22 Decembc: 1975.

Havingconsidercdthe report of the Secrcrary-Gcntral12 March 1976 1,
Having henrdthe sraremenu of the representativesof Portugal and Indo-
nesia.
Hnving henrdthe statementsof representatives ofthe peopleof EastTimor,
Reaffirmingtheinalienableright ofthe peopleof EastTimIOself-detemi.
nation and independencein accordancewiththe principlcs of the Charter of
the UnitedNations and the Declaracionon the Granting of Independenceto
Colonial Countries and Pcîples. conrained in Gencral Asscmblyresolution
1514(XV) of 14Decembcr1960,

Belimngthat al1effons should bcmadetocreateconditionsthat willenable
the peopleof EastTimorto exernse freclythcirright toself-detemination.
Noringthat the quesuonof EastTimorisbeforetheGcneral Arsernbly.
Consciovrof the urgentneed to bring to an end the wnunued rituauon of
tensionin Eastrimor.

Tnkingnordofthe statementbythe reprcscntativeof Indoncsia
1. Cnllruponal1Statesto mpecr the tenitoriai integrityof EastTimoas
wellasthe inalienable rightof its people to self-d«emination in accordance
withGcnenl Arsernblymolution 1514(XV):
2. GILr upnn the Governmcnr of Indonesia to withdraw without funher
delay11 tr foreefmm theTemtoy:
3. Repvcststhe Seercw-Gcneral to have his Spmal Representativecon-
tinue the wignrnent entrustcd to himuuder paragra5hof Senirity Council
moluùon 384 (1975)and punue consultviotuvith the parties wncemed;
4. Furrhnnquests theScnctziy-Gcneral tofollowtheimplementationof the
piment molution and submita repart to thSecunry Councilassoon as pos-
sible:

S. Cnllrvponail Sut* and othcr parties concmed to co-operalelullywith
cheUnitedNariotu toachwe 3p~~cefulsolu~onto the ewung situationand
to faalitate the decolanizatiouofthe Temtorv:
6. Dendu to rcmainKizedof thesinration:

' OTi Rd of theSrcuriv bundl.771inVpinYrear.Supplmmi forJnm-
W. Febwly andMamh1976. documentS/liOl1.
Ibid.?%wry-/Zm au.19% meeting GeneralAssemblyResoluuons

(12 Decernber 1975) 7?(Australia):10:43
( 1December 1976) 58:20:49(Ausuaiia)

(28November 1977) 67:26:47(Ausualia)
(13 Decernber 1978 593 l(Ausuaiia):JJ
(21 November 1979) 62:3l(Ausualia):45
(11November 1980)
58:35(Austraiia):46
(24 Novernber1981) 54:42(.4usualia~:46
(23 November 1982) 50:46(.4usuaiia):50

3. A P ~ Io dlthe pima in Ponugicw Timorto
rcrpo4dpuvely efforu m dndr pcchrl solution
kugh <ah bciwec~tlhemd theGovemmeot of
Pm@ in thehop Ut suchuih di hg M ad
Io the%aileinthatTaritor, ~d lcad mardiae
dcily cxc& of the right of dfdcurminlibyn
LhPeOpl cfPomrmoc Tmoc
6. Swntl~ &p&u the militaqinrervenrtheof
med for- of Indonail in P-niimac Tmor:
5. Ca& upon *e Gwcmmat of IndoneUa Io
deah hom huthu.nol.m of the territorid intepry
PoRf2pao %or md tomrbdnw maout dclayiu
umcd fosu km mi TTantoryidu ta enabthe
Hminr hd the ruIcmcna othe Ull-dctuminitiMdmyiodcpodw;nYc thcir rial io
of Pom& o tbe &miaisleMg Pm, cmiamiiig
drvelopmmtlin Pomyoc Timcrrndtheimp1eWu- 6. Drms rh munrWi oitheMry Counni.in
uoo 4tb regarm U) TTcni oi thedevlDt IO(the airial situinitheEmrl 3,of Pompese
*ont cathe~hutp am^theLon. n A% Thor and mmmmads tbat it take urgent acuIO
15Dacmber1960,Alumbly dodon 1541 (XV) oi pots the tcmto+ iatcgnty of PompeseTior
Bm'n8 inmind fhhc+bilir>. of the hc- d theinilico.ble nght of iu pople ta xlf-ieumii-
ingPa~mm undmae cam3 0 mie candi* maon;
mibliagthe poDpLof Paoip- ri ta auan
&-ŒillheUnpht m xUwP Lrredommd 7. Cab upoa aii Sutm the uiùty and
Md m dcreiminoihcifmlio poli'ial mntonii inlcgrityof ~anirvpoTD1;
8. R~llvuu thcOoiPnniat oiPorm(pl IOcno-
thcsimitimprith mtU,the implemaulion of the
order. -.Ibn onthsz. Mg of Indepalden10Cd*

taiaodmtriadiidmg miriitaT ~ari1.q asuxmea
ble.m ~tJti~ mth Lho paüw pma
2P" p"Se rh ~d ~he~-t of PO~~L
ntbtbspupŒmdpim"p*,oimcQuur. 2439th@awy m.&#
II Decmiin 1975

Ind- in Pmrriaaom. FOR 72 AGAlHST IO
ABSTAINED 0 ABSENT

COUNTRY COUNTRY 3. APm rbe principln sutinihiptutd tbc
Politicai Deduouon adopted theFti?Ghmf-
Th Genwd Auemôly. of Hcada of Staic orGDvemmcn~olNmNipA
Counuiu rriUia Igtbcqueirioofo Tm,
Recogni~ngthe inalimablC @tOf dlpcopla m 4. Swwb depbnr thcpnir15al ol tbc
wlfdere~m andindepndcnainacc0rdac.xaith Govanme~t of i&araia ia mpiy th pmw-
ofrbeüccimfion on the GnnriacdIndepadenccm Yomai Grnerai Auemblg molution 3485(XXX)ird
Coloriai CounlM md Peoplu cnnuinaiioiu mo- Smviy Couusil molutiom 384 (1973) and 389
luuon1314(XV) of 14 Dccrmbcr1960. (1976);
5. Reiccuthcd.im thitEprtTm01 bu km b
Recuitiin molution 3485 (XXX) of 12!km- Wgntcd in10indonah inasmuchu ihepeoplol .&
kr 1975and Enviiy Couocilraolutiont 384 (1975) Terri- bave wt bŒnable to cxer& bsJy th&
of22 Decembu 1975 md 389 (1976) of 22 April rightm reü-dcwtioo and indgndencc;
1976, 6. Caib wontbeGovccmuentolIndomsiaIOwith
Hovint LIIunLvth chpy of thcrepm d tha dna diin 10- Lmm the Tcrriloq;
SpcciaiCoCommiton rbe Emmm withre rrdm the 7.
ImpiemcoLuimoi the -rion on tbe80nriiig .ai contormilwith hcounriod cbt Scwiv fz.,uUciin
ingIOthe Taxitory."klCounuiuand PeoplP=LI- of thcUnited Nuiom, t.rhc crihisiwcion in &
Tmibiy d Eut Tmor md rreommnid th it Wd
Bearingin minthatp.R of the PolitiDcd.rr UtcaD~~aneploitkimmcduicim
.&a adoptedbytheF& Codertase of Hudc oSU<c rioncdin rao1ii6om 384 (1973) ami38s ("91") "'-
or Govunmmt of Na-Aligcd Counuis. held u mth8rLirm~rhotii[lex&bytbcpeqb
quauon ofEut1runor,''ug~~11976, tothc alE+.i Tma d rhir m rclldetedm~n md
~ ~ D S C ;
Hming kmd the sutcmcnd thereprsaiutiw d 8. *N IbeSpC& c4mmiUet 00theSiluab
PonnpllU rith rcsudm thc ïmplcmmutim oioi üaiantion
on theGMW of independen tocolonirlCounuia
and PcopIcato kpthesimition rbcTcnitoy under
dvc cornideruion, m toüwihcimpiementmiod
Mindfui thu 10SUltr shd4 ia cododty ritb tk pmnu miution, m dirpauh m the Territuq
Anicle 2. purmh 4. oftbeCh.Nr of theUnimi won u porubb. via- muiioniai*a viw 10 th.
N~~oDI.rclnin intheuintunirionil rcli<Impi hd and r@y implemenrationof rbe Osclarationand
ththreat oiud forceapb1 th territDrlnugnq Io repon to the Guicrai Aunnblyiuthirry-rcoad
dwS<ita.=inmY* sasim.
9. Daide~to klu& inthe provisida& of
N.tion5 in thixcond sessioanitem mtitled "Quution oi
Eut Timor".
85th pienaq merling
I December1976

'a Ibid.. Mhas.
.ro&i<l8;rnrdatthe GrntAurmbir, ThirwiSu-
un. Fowrh Comniirl3lb mceU4.PW l-%
4.1bid.. p-7.13.FOR fa ACAINST s
ABSTAINED b9 ABSENT 9

1 I ! !cl I 32/34. QMILom ofEu< %or

The Grnerd A~~cmbly. 5. RrqucN (bekmaiy4crrcnl in cansuiuhn
airhQ Q.umia d th Spa4 Commicec. i.tk
Rtcopwrnp the srLeiubk @il of dl mplu EutwTme uforeQd purpovralmakq r &orou&. on.O
d-dercrmrnauon &namepicdence tnacm&xc mth LX -en1 oftbcemtuie rituriointbeTer-
Ibepnnnplu of theCbuvr of theUmudNiuou rnd nIoq d 4 aublUbin8 an- ipùbrheqruena.
.. -hcDeduruoa o.--~e -~anm~ of Indciu~rëëlu-o tmrid Ik Frmit RcroI~cnLia & Trm Lne
~o~oniaic0wncs and~coplu. c&ai~~cd IiKkPmdeotc and the Gonmmcst at&don&. u
tion 1514(XV) of 14 Defember 1960. '"CM Ik G<Ncmmmti d olher sutccmce,,,cdin
Having exMuncd the chaprcr of the report of Ibe O* IOPrrpM Omtmd ~OIa vishg missionof
Specsi Cornmitteeon the SimaLimth rcgud u,the SW" -,
Im~lementatioooi the Decluuion on die Gran*of SpŒid CummiROC; w mon rbereon u,th
lndependeocc10Colorlid CouDvja andPeoplarelu-
hg to die Tcmtoy,+' 6. Driva th.anmn9nof the wv Gd. in
ad ami^ airhAnide 11.puaenph 3.of thC+ta
Havinq hemd be sutemenu of the qrewnutiva ai theUnid Nationa. IO theaihi siamdon m the
of Pomgai" andIodonuia." TerAtoty olEast Tmor and ma mu^^& bt u
Hoving&O hcmd tbasutemenu of rhecepmenu- ihouldrik ailcdcuive%cps for theiaplnnenullon
tivei oi the Fiente Revolucioniria de TiLeOs d i0 iualwioai 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) with
Independente." i~wto~tbC~~~by~pc~pleai
EmT~dtheP~~~&tc~on~dhdr-
Mindlvlbat 41 States shoulin COdOformiSln* pndcnsc;
imcrnatiod relationsfmm the threat or use of fotu 7. Cnllr upo. Q Ga.et-!almtai Indcaenalad
agliw the tenitonintcgtior nationaiindcFemknce Q lcrdmhip ai th Fmtc RNolucionki. de Tl
Lac Indeplrklc to friliute iharry iiitoLn
- fmM d Q In- Cqmminc. of the Red
~~&RLiei~hord.rwuùn
rh popb of tho Tm.
Dnpfr c~nad u IIJammmq dhi mw~o
in ibeTuritoly. dnng hm the prnmrot rd!&
onIbeanoitkGovtmnrmdIa~mmmah

Recoilly iu mluMm 34â5 (m) ai 12 De-
amber 1975 ind 31/53 ofl Dscmba 1976 and
sawirg CouDRilcrolutiau384 (1975) of 22 Db
amber 1915 sui389 (1976) O(22 Apd 1976.
+' Ofii.RIFD?&01 ,hC.n.rnIAurinbbThliim.ncond
Sa'lbid.Thim.$rcod3Seinen.FowihComninee.b1:- X
mouin(. ir P-'.o.
**lbid19th-Uo& p.^ *!I.
"lbid.Ilihmioh pu-. 13S,IS5. i201b mraio.
puir 101-130. FOR67 AGAINSTib
ABSTAINEu ABSENT 9
$1/ ICIi
$12~I1
1CoiJNTRY 1-))~II zii~OUNTRY -u<l<I<I '2o=?L rn
uosrano.. palinua mai! api no!~y-+p n!
.&8e PUOISIAOJ~aqr u! apnpu01rap!sq .L
!nopas
mi[uigl a! ir dlqunrrv luauq am or mnnq~
or pueuo!iniouJ ruau~daqJOnop~ioma1dq
q moiloi01 IuauapbeiaJq aw rrrrniwn .9

:mmna>ii!iuej jo usdnd 101buno> Iaqiour 1ojJAW(
rnio qdod aq~oi aaoeir!m alq!rrod11..aauardmoa
p ~ppg a~srdw iuglugiw 'iapuai or saaâqaa ioj

wn$ r.uarPeq3 mo!~r~^pimn aw rrnniww -1.soi
- -
71om~inijo a~d& atqioamaptynap a.i.wp m mmi~ mmn am io proamd am
~wooi pn )op ponmaimp Loiwa~ ap oim Laru
m airi!lt>ri or paumnd p uoam qq .*

n'lOmil 1- 01 81m1l~ '8L61

-DONOJOqgyZ"'onâ!a~od101smqriunojo nwrapo3
am JO uopurpyl ow JOurd aw p.w II>u.mag

Pm03 ~PJ? agiPm Llqm=v panag
agl jo rnonnloul IuaAslu aJOn~o:squd agl qi~
.. . ildmm or rpuopuI )Oiuawuabog apr ;Ourd agl uo
turaoi~nio*a~ainaij spijo a~osiuau~&iayi gurpnpm ma iwinud am moq 8.i~ 'botwa1 am q
.,uauo<ir.daqi jo siurmaapipmay mp >ui*u~ uogeni!pnw Syqurn ayi ir pawaauoaLjdaa(1
,riuapdapq
,rlsaoopq pur 'iJnOdSuuainmmpraq n .,'pSnuod aisq ~om~ap ruonounlohan aina~da~ jo aApnux
Iouriieiuxaidai rp. jo srnautairisagl pioay Buinu~ adai agl k.qiuamaieisagl 8qnlam 'ioql in3 JO
,;bolpaJ ayiO1 nalqnr api 00 opeut nnamateisagl pmayWH
Sunrjarraldwd pm sarriunogpr~uologoi a~napqda
10Bunuei aqi no noneniaq agl jo nonrinau1q
suiai pJe?arqitn noiirnris agl oo aaiiymog FIAS
aq:10ilodai avi zo ~aid=u>aD~YIYIDI~SYI~DYFOR v> ACAlNST 31
ABSTAINED ri ABSENT 16 FOR 62 AGAlNSTII
ABSTAINEDAJ ABSENT 1'
--
/COUNTRY
/COUNTRY FOR wi ACAlNST ir
ABSTAlNED M ABSENT 11

I ,',
1 (,il1 1
1 COUNTRY i. :!ji
lzl?l!l:!

irtn rrir ur I.sriuruii aiibM1< r.mti L. I..air.

64 36'50. Qoatb. d Ln ïhmr

ïk Genrrd Asse-
RKO~IUIIIiIIcIO.LYnWe nm ofrll popiam self.
-ud ln&p&m in - mm dm
iaofihcQllrrofthcUmrcdNmoa~udofUr mW.l sinmm mnng fmm ur rru auiorraifama
iDFm Tm ud dis upn al1rpociliuragcnciaipl
CarnmcrdRopla.~mlu&~I5I4(Xw o<bcr naumoar of~r~-a~~- ~mau svl~m.mP.
of14 Dacmba 19fû. ruuiir &e WorlFad Rom. thsVniiedN*
Childrcn'sucdud ihcOffia ofthUN& ~uom l(ld,
Commiuiom fa Refugea.immdiuelyio assisrn-
lbcir mpciveheu of compencc. ihe -le cd*
Tarim;

Ha~luamiddmcbrpprddmmpmddm~pçul
CommiaŒmdmSinuIjmwiibrrfirdmdmIinplmra-
1i9mddmLkhma!mdmoMsiqor~
~folmvlCainmcrtad~&b,mErirTuoal'
radoQcrrr*rmn Qamcn>.'*
W~tmd8tdm~ddmpop*dta
TidarrpDIDddmrnt*.l-aliDm
QaadmtdfmkinbT~.
TtR~naioftbcrrpondhkmmyûcirnlmb
-ofhaTima.=

9. ~eidrs m $lude inths~p~siom~ dm
dIiny-smentûsion ih itementide"QunuW cd 6LI
Ti"~
wid~a*Mimmainnpdmïuüad.lid~~
d ta Ti.
k<ud dm sl~ommtofibcrcprrvntuivn PW.
mgal. P==dm~~g Pma.
Hmg ka4 ihcsuaercm ofdm icpncotaove oihr
Fmuc RcmlwiooLnade Ti Loo Mepmhte.:' ihr
libcniionmorrmmiof ta Ti. ud of vuin. L.
Ti piticam. u udl n ofdm icpeunmva ofm~
wvcmmcnulam&&iam.='

rc
-~-4a-rwm~>. r*m.~"'@
2. DcrhmdutdmpopkdtaTunmmuabc~. c-. '*-. W. 454.
abledüedym~dnrovofuoucmhebuuol u lu..IL*-. Pr. 114.
~rricnnûcoailAucmbl~&urionrudinurmuo~ " lbid*il* & IJame.
.u~rscppdposcmirrr.
3 cour~lpo"rlimacned p.ms. iumly poiùipl.
uUrdmtiurrsuyPova.ddmrrprvnuovadibr
Eut Timse popk. u weU P indaesm. cwpnu
iuilmrb dm UnircdNuioarwim a nw iogummeeq
dmïuü exxarrvd dmn@ m uK&cmmtnuun by at
poplc ofta rumr.
4. NourdminiDliive~bydmConmmrniofru.
mgd.udinihc ofdmCarini ofMiD
iacn d Pomiulm= 1980radink ABSTAiNEDs ABSENTTij

1
! COUNTRY - -
d o<hcrelevatdocumcnu.'
T~"#muofthe~ofibe~Ce<ienlmdr
qvauonof & li."
Tahngmu of mu>luuo1982/2Idop<son8
ber1982" bytheSub-CommisiononPmicntion%
mminuion d RoMton of .Hinaim.
Havin#kwd theiutcmnid therrpramwive 01Pa-
Nad." n hl imniniwnuigk.
Hmtng hrnrdthe sutcmntof therepmcnutived
Indomna.*
Hovlnf knrh suiemau01 IhcrrpcuntmiuofQ
FM= R~voIUOOnln&a Tm Ln= Mqac+ce iodd
".nau *am. w wellU ofhlrepCY.UDYelOfmP
pvemmcnui mm.*

8 Pow.

~ia~&io&uooo,~~XXX~0f
12 aambci 15'75.3M 3 1 &smhr 15'76.3YoYf
2) Nacmbrr 1977. 3- d 13 Drombcr 1978.WYt
dII~1979,3S77dllNorrmhrl9%3d
3630d24Narmhr1911.FOR L) AGAI~ST 4 Annex27

Stateinentby Chairman,Commission on HumanRights,48th Session, 1992

58. At the 54th meeting. on 4 March 1992. the Chairman of the Coimiission made

th* following statanieiithe had bean aeked to malraaaaoimcing what had been
agreed by consmaus by the Coamiaeion on th* Situation of BumanRights in

Fast Timor:
''The Conmisriori on iï- aishts notes with serious concorn the human

riohte situation in Eaet Thor, and stroqly deplores the-violent
incident in Dili on 12 Navember 1991. which reoulted in the loos of lives

and injuries to a large nher of eivilhs md in my uaaccourrted for.

'The bnmiasia welc-s the early action of the Indonesian
Cave-t in aotting up a national coniniooion of inqui- and the prompt

re8poo.e which ita advance teport elicited from the higheot Endonesian authorities; expresse8 its hope that, as annoimced by the Indonesian

C~vernment. further investigation into the action of the security
personnel on 12 Nov-ber 1991 and into the fate of thos. maccounted for

will clarify the remaining diacrepancies, naniely oa the number of people
killed and those remaining.

"TheCornmiasion ie encouraged by the recent annouacement by the

Indonesian authorities of disciplin- masures and military court
proceedhgs ccgarding some meŒbers of its arined forces and urgea the

Indonesian Government to briag to trial and puniah al1 those Éomd
respoasible. Furthemore. the Cdssion calls upon the Indoaeaim

authorities to ensure that al1 civiliana urested on th@ occaaion are
treated hrtmanely. tht those brought to trial are arrured of proper legal

rcpreseatation and fair trial and thot those not involved in violent

activitics are released rithout dalay.
"The ComiSsion welC0ma thc appoh-t of Hr. S. AmonWako, an

Petsoail bvoy of the Secretaq-Genera~ of the United Natiom, to obtain
clarification oo the trasic -tu of 12 Nwder 1991, and the

willingness of tb Indonesiaxa authoritibs to cooperate fully vith him.

Th. C01Eniü6iO8 encouragen the SecmtarpGeneral ta coatinue his good
offices for achieving a just, cooprehealiive end intamatianally

acceptable settlainnt of the question of Bart Timor.
"The Ccamiarion urgeo the ktiiawat of Indonenia to improvo the

human rights situation fa bt Thors c-dn tbo report entitled 'Viait
by the Speciol ilapporteut to Iadoncalr uid Fkst Thor' of its

Special Rapporteur an Torture, prepated following hie viait at the

invitation of the Indonesian -t; urgea the Indonenian authoritioa
to take the necerrary rteps to implewot its recoaawdatims +ad loob

foiward toa report tbnaa; calls on th Indonesian Dovetnmoat to
facilitate access to hst Thor for additional h-itarian orgariizatiorw

and for humau righta orggiizati&s; and reqwests the Secrotary-General to
continue ta follw closely the htniu nights ritution in East Timor ad

to keap the Cornnisaion informsd at its forty-ainth aeaeion."

59. At the eame uteetfng. aubsequait to the stataeat by the Chai-, draft
resolution t/CN.1/199Z/L.Z7 was withdram by the sponsors.