Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the Internationa
l Court of Justice
Not an official document
APPLICATIONFOR ItEYIEW OFJUDGEMENT NO.333OFTHE
UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIW TRIBUNAL
AdvisoryOpinion of27 May 1987
I. Reviewoftheproceedingsand summaryoffacts
In its Advisory OpinioOIIthe question concerning the (pms. 1-22)
Nations Administrativekibunal,the Courtdecidedthat in
JudgementNo. 333 theUnited Nations AdmiinistrativeTri- The Court outlines the successetagesof the proceed-
bunaldidnotfailto exerciser~risdictivestedinit anddid ings before it(paras. 1-9) and summarizes thefactsof the
not err on anyquestionof law relatingto prcwisionsof thecaseasthey emerge fromthereasons adduced intheJudge-
Charter. mentof 8 July 1984in thecaseconcerningYakimtzv. the
Secretary-GeneraolftheUnitedNations,andassetout inthe
Thequestionssubmittedto tlleCourtbythe Committeeon documents submittedto thembunal (paras. 10-18). The
Applicationsfor Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judge- factsessential fanunderstandingof the decision reached.'
ments wereasfollows: bytheCourt areasfollows:
"(l) In its Judgement No. 333 of 8 June 1984 Mr. Vladimir VictorovichYakimetz(referred to in the
(AT/DECl333),did the UinlitedNations Administrative Opinionas "the Applicant")wasgivena five-year appoint-
Tribunalfailto exercise iuiisdictionvested init by notment(1977-1982) asReviserinthe RussianTlanslationServ-
respondingto the whethera legal impediment ice of the United Nations. In 1981,he wastransferred
existedtothefurtherm~lovmentintheUnitedNationsof Programme Officerto the Programme Planningand Co-
the Applicanaft theeipif)rofhiscontracton26Decem- ordination Office.At the endof 1982,his appointmentwas
ber 1983? extendedfor one year,expiringon 26December 1983,and
"(2) DidtheUnitedNationsAdministrativembunal, his letterof appointment statedt e was "on secondment
in the sameJudgementNo. 333, err on questionsof law from the Governmentof the Union of Soviet Socialist
relating to provisions of the Charter of the United Republics". (Para.10.)
Nations?"
TheCourtdecidedas follours: ProgrammePlanningandCo-ordinationinformedthe Appli-lor
cant that itwas his intentionto requestxtensionofhis
requestforanadvisoryopinio~l.cidedto calmplywiththe contractafterthe currentcontract expiredon 26 December
1983.On9February1983,the Applicantapplied forasylum
B. Unanimously,the Courtwas of-theopinion that the intheUnitedStatesofAmerica;on 10Februaryheinformed
United Nations AdministrativeTribunal,in its Judgement the Permanent Representativeof the USSR to the United
No. 333, did notfail to exercisejurisdictionvestedin it Nationsof his action,and statedthathe wasresigning from
not respondingto theuestiolrwhethera legalimpediment hispositionsinthe Soviet Governmen. nthe sameday, he
existedto the furtheremployinentin the UnitedNationsof notifiedtheSecretary-Generalofhisintenttoacquireper-
the Applicantafterthe expiryof his fixed-term contractonmanent resident status in the United States of America.
26December1983. (Para.1l..)
C. Byelevenvotestothree:,theCourtwasoftheopinion
thattheUnited NationsAdministrativembunal, inthe same On25October1983the Applicant addressed a memoran-
JudgementNo. 333,didnotemon anyquestionoflawrelat- dum totlleAssistantSecretary-GenelorProgrammePlan-
ingtothe provisionsoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations. ning andCo-ordination,inwhichheexpressed thehope that
IN FAVOUR: President NagczndraSingh; 'Kce-President itwouldbefoundpossibleonthe basisofhisperformanceto
Mbaye;Judges Lachs, RuI&, Elias,Oda, Ago, Sette- UnitedNations,"oreeven bettera careerappointment"Onhe
Camara,Bedjaoui,NiZhen~gyuT ,arassov. 23 November 1983, the Deputy Chiefof Staff Services
AGAINST: JudgesSchwebel,SirRobertJennings,Izvensen. informed the Applicantby letter "uponnslructionby the
OfficeoftheSecretary-General" thaittwasnotthe intention .
Singh; Vice-President baye;JudgesLachs, Ruth, Elias, of the Organizationto extend his fixed-term appointment
Oda, Ago. Sette-Camara,Scl~webel,Sir RobertJennings, beyonditsexpirationdate, i.e., 26 December 1983.On 29
Bedjaoui,NiZhengyu,EvensenandTarassov . November,the Applicant protested against the decindoan
referredto hisacquiredrightsunder GeneralAssemblyreso-
~ud~eLachs appended a declaration to the Advisory lution 371126, IV,paragraph5, whichprovides "thatstaR
Opinion. members on fixed-term appointmentsupon completion
JudgesElias,Odaand Agoappendedseparateolpinions to of five years of continuing good service shall be given
theAdvisoryOpinion. every reasonable considerationfarcareer appointment."
Judges Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings and Evensen (Rua. 13.)
appendeddissenting opinionI:theAdvisoryOpinion.
On 13December,the Applicant requested theSecretary-
Generalto reviewthe decisionnot toextend his appointment
under GeneralAssemblyresolution371126.Ina letterdatedhts
21December1983,the Assistant Secretary-CieneraflorPer-
sonnel Services replied to the Applicant's letter of 13
In their opinions the judges concerned stated and December andadvisedhim that, for the reasonsted, the
explained the positions theyadopted in regard to certainSecretary-Generalwas maintainingthe decision communi-
points dealtwithintheAdvisoryOpinion. catedintheletterof23November1983. (Para.14.) On 6 January1984,the Applicant filedthe applicationto wasnot"to retry thecaseand to attempt tosubstituteitsown
the United NationsAdministrativeTribunitlin respect of opiniononthemeritsforthatoftheTribunal".Thatprinciple
which Judgement No.333wasgiven.(ha. 14.) mustcontinueto guide itinthe presentcase.Inparticular,it
shouldnotexpressa viewonthecorrectnessotherwise ofany
TheApplicant then madea further appliciuionforUnited findingofthe Tribunial, nlessitisnecessarytodosoinorder
Nationsemployment. (Para.15.) toreplytothequestionsputto it. (Para.27.)
The Courtnotesthat, at apressconferenceon 4 January
1984,the spokesmanfortheSecretary-Generalsaid that"if m. First question
Mr. Yakimetzchosetoapplyforaposition .. . he would be (paras.28-58)
giveneveryconsiderationalongwithotherapplicantsforany
position". Italsonoted thattheNewYork7imesofthe same Thefirstquestionjputtothe Courtiswordedasfollows:
day carriedan article dealingwith the non-renewalof the "l. In its Judgement No. 333 of 8 June 1984
Applicant's contracti,nwhichtheExecutiveAssistant tothe (AT/DEC/333),did the United NationsAdministrative
Secretary-Generalwas quotedas havingsaid that "tohave Tribunalfail to exercise jurisdictionvested in it by not
thecontractextended .. .Sovietconsentwasessential.But, respondingto the questionwhethera legal impediment
hesaid,'the Sovietsrefused'." Commenting onthatreportin existedto thefurther1employmentin theUnited Nations
a letterto theNew YorkTimesdated 24 January 1984, the of the Applicant after the expiry of his contract on
Under-Secretary-Generalfor Administratioiland Manage- 26December 1983?
ment pointedoutthat"a personwhoisonlosmreturnstohis In his application to the Administrative Tribunal, the
government unless that government agrees otherwise". Applicantcontendedthat "therewasno legal bartohiseligi-
(Para.16.) bility for a new fixed-termcontract" or to a probationary
Followingthissummaryofthefacts,theOpinionpresents appointmentleadingtoa careerappointment.Heclaimedto
theprincipalcontentionsoftheApplicantand oftheRespon- havea "legallyandnlorallyjustifiableexpectancyofcontin-
dentassummarizedbytheTribunal,andliststhelegalissues ued U.N. employment,and a right to reasonable consider-
whichtheTribunalstatedwereinvolvedin thecase (paras. ation for a career appointment". Before the Tribunal,the
17 to 19). It then gives a brief analysis of Judgement Secretary-Generalstatedthat therewasnolegalimpediment
No. 333,(paras.20and21),towhichitretunissubsequently to the '@antof a career appointment,and asserted that the
inmoredetail. contested decisionht~dbeentakenafterconsiderationof all
the circumstancesin the case. This, he contended, consti-
ZI. The competenceoftheCourt togiveanadvisory opin- tuted "reasonablecoinsideration"withinthemeaningof the
ion,and theproprietyofdoingso GeneralAssembly re!rolutio371126(seeabove,p. 4). given
(paras.23-27) that the Applicanthad no "right" to "favourable consider-
The Court recalls that its competencteo deliveran advi- ationforacareerappointment".(Paras.29and30.)
soryopinionattherequestoftheCommittee cmApplications
forreviewofAdministrativeTribunalJudge~nents isderived Before the IXbunal, the Applicantmadeno referenceto
fromseveralprovisions:Article 11,paragraphs1and 2, of the recognitionby the Secretary-Generalthat therewas no
theStatuteoftheTribunal,Article96oftheCharterandArti- legal impediment,but took issue with the statementthat
cle65,paragraph 1,oftheStatuteoftheCowl:.Ithasalready "reasonable consideration"had beengiven.He arguedthat
had occasion to examine thequestion of its competence iftheSecretary-Generalwasundertheimpression,asthelet-
undertheseprovisions,whetherthe requestfclropinionorig- terof 21December 1983andthe statementsmadebycertain
inated,asin thepresentcase, froman appliciuionby a staff senior officialsindicated(see above,pp. 4 and 5), that any
member(ApplicationforReviewofJudgemenr N!o.158ofthe extensionof the Applicant's appointmenw t ithoutthe con-
UnitedNationsAdministrative TribunalF ,aslacase, 1973) sentofthegovernmentwhichhadsecondedhim wasbeyond
or from an applicationby a memberState (/lpplicationfor the scopeof his disciztionarypower, this wouldhave pre-
ReviewofJudgementNo.273oftheUnitedNationsAdminis- ventedhimfromgiving every reasonable consideration to a
trative Tribunal,Morrishedcase, 1982). In both cases, it career appointment.The Applicant therefore requested the
concludedthatitpossessedcompetence.Inth'epresentcase, Tribunalto findthat theviewwhichactuallywasheldatthat
itsviewisthatthequestionsaddressedto it su-clearly legal time-that asecondm.end t idgiveriseto alegalimpediment
questions arisingwithin the context of the:Committee's toany furtheremployment-was incorrect,sothatno "con-
activities.Paras2. 3and24.) sideration"on that biisiscouldbe "reasonable'*withinthe
meaning bf resolutio~i371126,and requestedit to findthat
As for the proprietyof giving an opiniorr,it is clearly there was no legal innpedimentto his furtheremployment
established,according totheCourt,thatthepcbwec ronferred after the expiryofhiscontracton 26 December 1983.The
by Article65 of the Statuteis of adiscretior~archaracter, Applicantheldthat the:Tribunalhadnotrespondedtohisplea
andalsothat thereplyof the Courtto a requestfor an advi- onthatpoint,andtheCourtisnowrequestedtostatewhether
sory opinion reflects its participation iactivitiesof the inthatregarditfailedtoexercisejurisdiction.(Patas.31and
UnitedNations and,in principle, should notbe refused.In 32.)
the presentcase, itconsidersin anyevent that thereis clear The Court consideirsthat the 'Ifibunal'shandlingof the
legaljustificationforreplyingtothetwoquestionsputtoitby questionofthe"legal impediment"isnotentirelyclear.The
the Committee. It recalls that,in its 1973Opinion,it sub- reasonforthis, accordlinto theCourt, isthatit wasobliged
jectedthemachineryestablishedbyArticle11oftheStatute to dealfirst withother contentions set outbythe Applicant.
oftheAdministrativeTribunaltocriticalexamination.While Asamatteroflogic,theTribunaldealtfirstwiththequestion
renewingsomeof itsreservationsasto theprtxedureestab- whetherthe Applicanth. ad a "justifiable expectancyofcon-
lishedbythatArticle,theCourt,anxiousto securethejudi-
cial protectionof officials, concludes thatit sh'uldgive an pointinoutthathwordsd"obsracjuridiqueaurenouvellemendrel'en-
advisoryopinioninthecase. (has. 25 and261.) gagementappearinintheFrencversion inclbotahcasofprolonga-
In its AdvisoryOpinionsof 1973and 19:82,the Court tionoinexisticontracta,ndthatofanappointdtistincftropre-
established the principle that role in reviewproceedings existicontractuallationshpara:8).tinued United Nations employment"-in other words, sion notto givethe Applicanta career appointment.In so
whether there wasa "legal expectancy"in thatccmnection, doing the Tribunalthereforerespondedto the Applicant's
since if such an expectancyexisted the Secretary-General pleathatit shouldbe adjudgedthattherewasnolegalimped-
wouldhavebeenobliged to providecontinuingemployment iment to thecontinuationof hisservice.(Para.48.)
to the Applicant withinthe lJnited Nations. Tht:'kibunal TheC:ouathenreferstoastatementbythePresidentofthe
foundthattherewasno legalexpectancy. On the onehand. AdministrativeTribunal,Mr.Ustor,appendedto theJudge-
the Consentof the national ,governmentco~xmed would ment,atidtothedissentingopinionof anothem r emberofthe
havebeenrequiredfortherenewalofthepreviouscontract, 'kibunal,theVice-PresidentMr.Kean.Itseems to theCourt
which wasa secondmentcollltract,and on the otherhand, impossibleto conclude thatthe Tribunaldid not address its
accordingto StaffRule 104.1% (b), fixedterma~~~ointments mindto theissueswhich werespecificallymentionedbyMr.
carrynoexpectancyofrenewalorofconversion anyother Ustorand Mr. Kean as the grounds for their disagreement
type of appointment. The l'kibunalalso held that the with part of the judgement relating to the "legal impedi-
Secretary-Generalhadgivenreasonableconsideration tothe ment" ad tothe"reasonableconsideration".TheTribunal,
Applicant'scase. Pursuantto section IV. paraga~h 5, of asabodyrepresentedbythemajoritywhichvotedinfavour
GeneralAssemblyresolution371126,but withoutsayingso of the Judgement, musthave drawnits ownconclusionson
explicitly.Paras.33to37 .) these issues, evenif these conclusionswere notspelt outas
Ananalysisofthejudgementthereforeshowsthat, forthe clearlyintheJudgementastheyoughtto havebeen. (Paras.
Tribunal,therecouldbe nolegalexpectancy,butneitherwas 49 to57 .)
there any legal impediment:to"reasonable consideration"
being givento an applicationfor a career appointment. As to the questionwhether "everyreasonable consider-
Accordingto the l'kibunal therewouldhave:been no legal ation" wasinfactgiven,theTribunaldecidedthisintheaffir-
impedimenttosuchanappointmentiftheSeci;etarc~-General, stituteitsownopinionforthatoftheTribunalonthemeritsof-
in the exerciseof his discretion,had seen fit to offer one.
(Paras.3841 .) that the Secretary-Generaldid notgive "every reasonable
consideration"totheApplicant'scase,inimplementationof
The Courtnotesthat the IP,~complaintof the Applicant resolution 371126,because he believed that there was a
againstthe Tribunalwas, ratherthanfailingtorespond tothe "legalimpediment".
questionwhethertherewasa legalimpedimenttohisfurther
employment, thatit paidinsufficientattentionto theindica- TheCourt,afterdueanalysisofthetextofJudgementNo.
tions thattheSecretary-Generalhadthought,hattherewasa 333oftheTribunal,considersthatthe 'kibunaldid notfailto
legalimpediments,othatthe''leasonableconsideration"either exercisejurisdictionvested in it by not respondingto the
nevertookplaceorwasvitiatcdbyabasic assumption-that questionwhethera legal impedimentexistedto the further
there was an impediment-which waslaterconcededto be employmentintheUnited NationsoftheApplicantafter the
incorrect.HeretheCourtreczillsthatinappropriatecasesitis expiryof his contracton 26 December1983.Accordingly,
entitledtolook behindthe stricttermsofthequestionaspre- the answerto the firstquestionput to it by the Committee
1951betweentheWHOandEgypt,1980),provide:dtof 25 itsrefor- mustbeinthe negative. (Para.58.) ,
requestingbody.In theiprese:intase, without going beyond IV. Secondquestion
thelimitsof thegroundofobjectioncontemplatedbyArticle (paras.59to96)
11of the 'kibunal'sStatuteand upheldby the Committee The{luestionisworded as
(failure to exercisejurisdiction), it isopen tothe Court to "2.) DidtheUnited NationsAdministrativeTribunal,
&fine the point on which it is asserted~latthe lfibunal in the sameJudgementNO.333, err on cjuestionsof law
failedtoexerciseitsjurisdiction,ifthiswillenableittogive relating to provisions of the Charter of the United
guidanceonthelegalquestionreallyinissue. Itthusseemsto Nations?"
the Courtessentialtoexaminenot onlywhetlhertheTribunal Concerningthenatureofitstask,theCourtrecallsthat the
failedtoexaminethe questioinofthelegal impediment to the interpre:tation,in general,of StaffRegulationsandRulesis
Applicant'sfurtheremployment-as it is requestedto do- not its business,but that it is the businessof the Courtto
but also whether the 'kibcmal omitted to examine the judge whetherthereis a contradictionbetweena particular
Secretary-General'sbelief in that regard, and the possible interpretationorapplicationof thembytheTkibunalandany
impactofthatbelief onhis abilitytogive"every reasonable of the provisionsof the Charterof the United Nations.It is
consideration"to a career appointment.If it can be estab- alsoopento the Courttojudge whetherthe is anycontra-
lished.inthiscase withsufficientcertainty thatthe l'kibunal diction betweentheTribunal'sinterpretationof anyotherrel-
addressedits mind to the mittterson whichthe Applicant's evant textssuchas, in thiscase, GeneralAssemblyresolu-
contentionswere based, there was no failure I:oexercise tion371126,andanyoftheprovisionsoftheCharter.(Paras.
jurisdictioninthat respect,whatevermay br houghtof the 59to 61.)
CO~C~US~O ~reachedintheli.ghtoftheinforrnationavailable ~h, firstprovisionof the Charterin respectofwhichthe
to it. (Paras.42to47.) Applicantcontendsthat thel'kibunalmade anerrorof lawis
The Courtrefers firstto itbeactualtextof the l'kibunal's Article101,paragraph I, whichprovidesthat"The staff[of
Judgement,whichdidnotdeidspecificallywiththequestion the Secretariat]shall be appointedbythe Secretary-General
of theexistenceof a "legal impediment".It doesnot how- under regulations establishedby the GeneralAssembly".
everconcludefromthis thatit failedto address itsmindto More specificallyt,he Applicant's complaintearsuponthe
thisquestion.WhattheJudgtzmens ttatesisthat,intheTribu- role whichoughtto have been playedby the Appointment
nal'sview, the Secretary-Generaclould taktthedecisionto and PromotionBoard,butwhichwasunable:toplaybecause
offertheApplicantacareert~ppointmentb ,ut was not bound ?oproposaleverreachedit, withtheresultthatit neverhada
to do so. It followsfrom this thatthe l'kibunalwas clearly chanceto considerhiscase.TheApplicant presentedthis as
deciding,thoughby implication, that there.was110absolute one elementof the denialof "reasonable consideration"of
legal impedimentwhichhad supposedlyinspired the deci- hiscase.TheTribunal foundthatit was"left to the Respon-
183dent to decide how every reasonable considerationfor a The Applicantalleges a failure to observeArticle 101,
careerappointmentshould be given to a sM member" and paragraph3, ofthe Charter,which provides:
that theRespondenthad "the sole authorityto decidewhat "The paramountconsiderationin the employmentof
constituted 'reasonable consideratio".Onthebasisofthis thestaff andinthedeterminationoftheconditionsofserv-
passage the Applicanctontendsthat thisiszlquestionoflaw ice shall be the necessityof securing the highest stand-
relatingto Article 101,paragraph1, of the Charter.(Paras. ardsof efficiency,competence,and integrity.Dueregard
62to69.) shallbepaidto theimportanceofrecruitingthe staff onas
TheCourtinterpretstheabove-quotedpassageasmeaning wideageographicalbasisaspossible."
thatit wasforthe Secretary-Generaltodecidewhatprocess He assertsthat the Tribunal'sJudgementfailedto weigh
constituted"reasonableconsideration",andnotthattheonly themandateof that Article againstotherfactors,and thatit
test of reasonableness was what the Secretary-General made meritsubservientto other considerations.It is clear
thoughtto be reasonable.Indeedthe Tribunal has nowhere that the expression "the paramountconsideration" is not
statedthattheSecretary-Generalpossesses unfettereddiscre- synonymouswith "the sole consideration",andit is for the
tion. Nevertheless, theTribunal didaccept as sufficienta Secretary-Generalto balancethe various considerations.It
statementbytheSecretary-Generalthatthe"'reasonable con- wasnotfortheTribunal, noris itfortheCourt,to substitute
sideration" requiredbyresolution371126 hadbeengiven. It its own appreciatiorof the problemfor his. The Secretary-
didnotrequiretheSecretary-Generatlo furni.shanydetailsof General's decisioncannob tesaidto havefailedtorespectthe
whenandhowit wasgiven,let alonecallingforevidenceto "paramount" characterof the considerationsmentionedin
that effect.Becausethe textsdo not specifywhich proce- Article 101, paragiraph3, simply because he took into
dures aretobefollowedinsuchacase,theCourtisunable to account allthe circumstancesof the case in order to give
regard this interpretation asin contradictionwith Article effecttothe interestsofthe Organization.(Paras.79to82.)
101,paragraph1,ofthe Charter.(Paras.701:o 73 .) Irrtaking his decision, the Secretary-Generalhad taken
TheSecretary-Generalhasalsoasserted that the decision accountof "the eventsof 10February1983"(thedateofthe
taken in this case was "legitimately motivated by the Applicant'scommu.nicationinformingthe Soviet Govern-
Secretary-General'sperceptionoftheinterestsoftheOrgani- mentthat he wasresigning from its service)"and thereaf-
zationtowhichheproperlygaveprecedenceovercompeting ter". TheTribunalexaminedthismatterinthecontextofthe
interests". TheTribunalneednothave acceptedthis;itmight newcontractualrelationship "which, accordintgotheAppli-
have regardedthe statementsquotedbytheApplicantas evi- cant, had been created between himself andthe United
dencethattheproblemofsecondmentand thelackofgovern- Nationson that date". Forhis part, the Secretary-General
mentconsenthad been allowed to dominatemore thanthe denied that"a continuing relationshipwitha nationalgov-
Secretary-Generaw l asreadytoadmit. Thatwasnot however ernment is a contractualobligationof any fixed-termstaff
the viewit took. It foundthat the.Secretary-Generalexer- member-seconded ornot" and that the Applicant's contin-
cised his discretionproperly". Whetheror not this was an ued employmentdid!not implythat a newcontractual rela-
error ofjudgmenton the Tribunal's part, w:hatis certainis tionshiphad been created. The 'Itibunalcommentson the
thatit wasnotan erroronaquestionoflawrelatingtoArticle significanceofnationalties,andexpressesdisapprovao lfthe
101,paragraph1, of the Charter.Theessentialpointis that Secretary-General'sabove-quoted remarks.It does not
theTribunaldid not abandonall claimtotesttheexerciseby apparently considerthem consistent with the ideas found
the Secretary-Generaol fhisdiscretionarypoweragainstthe shortlybeforehandinJudgementNo. 326(Fischman)which
requirementsof the Charter.On thecontrqr, it re-affirmed referredtoa"widely-heldbelief" expressedinareporttothe
the needto checkany "arbitraryor capricious exercise"of staff members who break theirtieswiththeirhomecountries
thispower.(Paras.74and75 .) can no longer claim to fulfil the conditions governing
employmentin the IJnitedNations.The Tribunaladds that
thispositionmustcontinueto provideanessential guidance
inthismatter.The Colurthereobservesthatthis"widely-held
belief" amountstotheviewsexpressedbysome delegatesto
TheApplicantclaimsthattheTtibunalcolrunittedanem theFifthCommitteein 1953attheEighthSessionoftheGen-
of lawrelatingtoArticle 100, paragraph I,of theCharter, eralAssembly,and never materializedinanAssembly reso-
whichprovides: lution.(Paras.83-85.)
"In the performance of their duties the Secretary-
GeneralandthesM shallnot seekorreceiveinstructions The Court also notesthat the relevant passagein Judge-
fromanygovernmentorfromanyother authorityexternal mentNo.333isnotessentialtothereasoningofthedecision,
to the Organization.They shall refrainfrom anyaction tion of law relating1:othe provisionsof the Charterof the
which might reflect ontheirpositionas internationaloffi- United Nations"whetheror not sucherroraffected the dis-
cialsresponsibleonlytotheOrganization.'" posalof the case. However, havingconsidered the relevant
TheApplicantdoesnotallegethatin refusinghimfurther passageof theJudgernent(para.XII), the Courtis unable to
employmentthe Secretary-Generaw l asmerelycanying out findthat theTribunaltherecommittedanerroroflaw "relat-
theinstructionsofagovernment,butconsidersthat thestate- ing to the provisions;of the Charter". For the Secretary-
mentsmadebyseniorofficialsasmentioned almve(pp.4and General, thechangecbfnationalitywasanacthavingnospe-
5)indicatedthat the Secretary-Generab lelievedthatfurther cific legal or administrative consequences. The'Itibunal
employment was impossible without the consent of the upheldthe Secretary-General'smaincontention,but at the
Applicant's government-which has been shown to be sametime pointedoutthat accordingtooneview, thechange
untrue-and thattheTribunalconcludedthatthiswas indeed ofnationalitywasnot necessarilysuchanact,butonewhich
thebeliefoftheSecretary-General.TheCourtdoen sot findit in somecircumstance:~ mayadversely affect the interests of
possibletoupholdthis contention, sinceitdoesnotconsider theUnitedNations.Thisisveryfarfromsayingthatachange
the Tribunal to have reachedthat conclusion.(Paras.76 to or attemptedchangeofnationalitymaybetreatedasa factor
78 .) outweighingthe "paramountconsideration"definedbyArti- cle 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter; this is what the Appli-Judgement No. 333 of 8 June 1984 (AT/DEC/333), did not
cant accuses the Secretary-Generalof having done. but the fail to exercisejurisdiction vestediitby not responding to
Tribunal did not agree with him, since it established that the question whether a legal impediment existed to the fur-
"reasonable consideration" had taken place. (Paras. 86 to theremploymentinthe UnitedNationsoftheApplicantafter
92.) theexpiry of his fixed-termcontracton 26 December 1983;
TheApplicantassertsthat the Tribunalerredonaquestion (2) withregard toQuestion 11,
of lawrelating toArticle8oftheCharter, whichiswordedas Byeleven votestothree,
follows: Thatthe United NationsAdministrative Tribunal, in the
"The United Nations shall placeno r~:smctionson the
eligibilityof menandwolnentoparticipateinanycapacity sameJudgementNo. 333, did noterr on anyquestionof law
and under conditions of equality in its principal andb- Nations. to ihe provisions of the Chaner of the United
sidiaryorgans."
IN FAVOUR: President Nagendra Singh; Vice-President
TheApplicant propoundsanovelviewofthatArticle, that Mbaye, Judges Lachs. Ruda, Elias, Oda. Ago, Sette-
iprohibits "any restrictionontheeligibilityofanyperson". Camara, Bedjaoui. NiandTarassov
The COWexplainswhy iti:;notcalled Up01todeal withthis AGAINST:Judges Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings and
contention, so that Article 8, even in the wide interpretation Evensen.
contended for by the Applicant, has no re11:vancewhatever.
(Para. 93.) SUMMAR YFDECLARATION.OPINIONSANDDISSENTING
OPINIONSAPPENDEDTO ADVISORO YPINION
*
* * DeclarationojJudge Laclrs
Judge Lachs recalls that when in 1973the Court firsthad
The Applicantassertsthel.t(heTribunale1-reJn aquestion ment of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, hege-
of law relating to Anicle ,?,paragraph 1, of the charier, appended as Presidentof the Court a declarationexpressing
namely: Organizatio,,is based onthe principleof the
sovereignequalityof its Membersw,cotlpledwithArticle improveandharmonizetheadministrativeprotectionofferedas
100,paragraph2: staffmembersofinternationalorganizations.Note was taken
Each Member 0E the United undertakes ofhis remarksintheGeneralAssemblyandthe International
to respect the exclusively international character of the civilservic e ~ ~ i ~ ~ i ~o,that stepwere taken towards
responsibilitiesof the Secretary-Generaland the staff and harmonizingthe proceduresof theAdministrative~ib~~~l~
not to seek to influence:them in the discharge of their ofthe ~ ~ i ~ ~ d ~ ani~t~e~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ b ~ ~~~,~~~ ~~~~~ l i ~ ~ -
responsibilities." tion and the eventual establishment of a single mbunai to
The complainthere examined appears to be that a certain cover all staffin the UnitedNationsfamily.Afterexpressing
government brought pressure to bear on the Secretxy- gratification that the remarks of a Member of the Court
GeneralcontrarytoArticle 100,paragraph2, ofttheCharter. should have begun to bear fruit in this way, Judge Lachs
In that event. even if there had been evidence (which there uttersthenopethatthisyear theGeneralAssemblywill cease
was not)thatamemberStatehadbehavedinviolationofthat postponing examination of the Secretary-General's latest
ArticleoftheCharter, the l7ribunalwould nothavebeen jus- report on the subject and will take some concrete steps
tified in making any finding in that respect, and could not towardsthe envisagedgoal.
thereforebecriticisedfor notdoingso. The Court can there-
foreseenopossibility of anerroroflawby theTribunalrelat- Separate opinionofJitdge l:lias
ingtoArticle2 andArticle 100.paragraph2. of theCharter.
(Paras.94 to 96.) In his separare opinion, Judge Elias urges the General
In respectof the second question put titin this case, the Assembly toreconsiderthe system of referring Administra-
Courtconcludes:hattheTribunal.initsJudgementNo. 333, tive Tribunal cases to the Court review. After examining
didnoterron anyquestionoflawrelatingtothe provisionsof thetexts and the previouscases ofthiskind, he emphasizes
theChaner. The reply tothatquestionalso mustthereforebe the need fora flexibleproceduretoenabletheCourt toraise
inthe negative. iPara.96.) legal issuesconsidered relevantand necessary for the
properdisposalofthe problem before itHeoutlinesapossi-
ble system comprising a Tribunal of First Instance and the
* AdministrativeTribunalsitting as a court of appeal. which
* * wouldentailarecastofthepresentStatuteoftheAdministra-
tive Tribunal. Judge EIias also comments on the Court's
The complete text of the operativepafizgral~h(~ara. 97) powerin advisorycasestodeterminethe realmeaningof the
willbe found below: questions it has to answer,and on the problemsraised in the
bly resolution 371126,secondment, and the discretion to be
THE COURT, exercisedbytheSecretary-Generalin mattersofthis kind.
A. Unanimously,
Decides to comply with the request for an advisory Separate opinionofJudgeQda
opinion;
B. Isoftheopinion Judge Oda thinks that question 1 has been erroneously
based in the lightof the ambivalentprovenanceof the draft-
(1) withregard toQuestion I. ingof the questionin the Committeeon Applications. If the
Unanimously United NationsAdministrative 'Iiibunal did not respond to
Thatthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal. in its "the question whethera legal impedimentexisted to further
I85employment . . ."to Mr. Yakimetz'sfurlher employment for that of the Administrative Tribunal.On thecontrary, the
in the UnitedNations. thisdid nonappear to him to be rele- United Nations General Assembly, in investing the Court
vant to the issueof whether rheTribun~lfhiled to exercise with the authorityI:oreviewjudgements of the Administra-
jurisdic:ion. tiveTribunalon the:groundof error of lawrelatingto provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter. had intended that the
With regard toquestion 2, Judge Oda thinks that on tne Courtshoulddeterminethemeritsofthecase, anddosowith
issueofwhethertheTribsnalerredon aquestionoflawrelst- binding force. The General Assembly hadempowered the
ing to the provisions of the L'niredNations Charter. the Court to act as the:final authority on interpretationof the
present Court is expected, in the light of the process of Charter and of staff regulations based thereon. One such
amending the Tribunal's Statutein 1955, 'tofunction as an regulation-enacted by General Assembly resolution
sppellate court LYS-ci-vithe Tribunaland the Court should 37i126, IV.paragraph5-was preciselyinissueinthiscase.
haveexaminedthe rceritsnoto~lyof the Judgementas such
but also of the decision of theecretary-Generainot to con- Bythe termsoftlnatregulation, the Secretary-Generalwas
tinue Mr. Yakimetz'scontrac1.FromthispointofviewJudge bound to have given Mr. Yakimetz "every reasonable con-
3dz holds that, in view of the Staff Rules and therelevant sideration" for acsueerappointment. In fact, Mr. Yakimetz
General Assembiyresolutions. hZr.Yakimctzdid nothave a was givennosuchconsideration.ThetermsoftheSecretary-
legaiexpectancy forfurther service withthe UnitedNations General's correspondencewith Mr. Yakimetzdemonstrate
towardsthe end of i983 at the expiry of his contract. while that the Secretary-General tookthe position at theoperative
the isncertaintiesof his sratus.caused by his application for timethat Mr.k'akimetz'scandidacyfor acareerappointment
asy!umin the Uni:edS:atesandhis alleged resignationfrom couldnot beconsidleredbecausehiscontract"was concluded
legitimatelyhaveSo'ken a factorconsidered bythe Secretary- on the basis of astxondment from . . .national civil serv-
ice," accordingly having "no expectancy . . .of conver-
rnentofUnitedNations staff. judgeOdasta::esthattheTribu-y- siontoanyothertypeofappointment". ThusMr. Yakimetz's
naldidrioterron anypointoflaw re!atingtothe provisionsof namecouldnotbe fbrwarded " 'forreasonable consideration
the Uni~edNationsCharterinsofarastheT~ibunaidid infact for career appointment' ". In Judge Schwebel's view, the
uphold the decision of the Secretary-General which canbe inferencewhichtheAdministrativeTribunal purportsto find
justified in the iight of the latitude give!! to him in this in this correspondence supporting its conclusion that the
respect. Secretary-General ineverthelessdidgiveMr. Yakimetz'scan-
diclacyeveryreasonableconsideraion isfanciful.
'Twosurrounding ciicumstances emphasize how insup-
SeparateopinionofJudgeAgo portable the AdministrativeTribunal'sconclusion is. First.
Judge .4g0 explains in his separate opinionwhy, despite shortly afterMr. Ifakimetz resigned his positions with the
xrtain reservaticns. he did not dissociate himself from the SovietGovernment, the Secretary-Generalbarredhim from
negariveanswersgiven by the Courtroboth the firstand the entering United Nationspremises. It is difficult to believe
second ques:ions. He states the reasons foi:the relative dis- thzt. at one and the same time, during 2 period for all of
satisfacriorihe feels inthis case, andon eachoccasionwhen whichMr. Yakimetzremainedbarred fromhisofficeandthe
?heCourt is calledupon to give an advisory opinionin the United Nations cor~idorsand cafeteria, he was being given
contextof proceedings forreviewof3 decisiorrofanAdrnin- every reasonable considerationfor a career appointment at
is~ativeTriburial.Whilerecognizing the necessityinprinci- theendoftheperiodwhichhewasdebarredFromservingout
ple. ofa reviewprocedure, hedoesnotbelievethattheexist- on United Nations:premises.
ingsystemisthe mostappropriateone for?heparzicularends 'The secsnd factx is that the Secretary-Generalfailed to
in .;iew. This system reliesupcn a committee of which the aclmowiedge,letdone actupon, theapplicationforaperma-
exlremelybroadcomposition. rtt!dtherypeof procedurefol- nent appointment which Mr.Yakirrietzssbmitted on 9 Janu-
lowed, do not correspond vev close!y :o those of a body ary 1984,daysaftertheexpirationof his fixed-termappoint-
er!trustedSxithjudicial, or at leastquasi-judicial functions. ment. That lack of reaction suggests that no consideration
Its cornperence is moreover confined to certain clearly- wa.sgiven to his application. If there is anotherexplanation
definedlegal aspects. with rne result that thejudgements of ofthe Secretary-General'sfailuretorespond, it hasnot been
the Administrative Tribunal areultimately beyondthe reach foithcoming.
of ay genuinejl~dicialreview, notonly asregards their legal Theresultanterrorsof lawae three:
aspects but also as regads their factual aspects. whichare
ofrenof greatimportance.Itcannotthereforebeclaimedthat Yakimetz'scareer appointment "every reasonable consider-
?.heexistingsystenifu!!ysafeguardsboth theoverridinginter-, ation" pursuantto 2 General Assembly regulation binding
.sts of the CjnitedNations asnilorganization and the legiti- uponhim, enactedinpursuance ofthe Assembly's authority
mateclaimsar lawof itsstaff~nrrnbers. providingthatthe staffshallbeappointed "underreguiations
Judge .%gor2k.s the view that theonly remedyforthis sit- established by the General Assembly" :An. !01. pm. 1).
raationwould bethe introductionof a second-~ieradministra- He:didnot,buttheTiibunalerredinfinding-without factual
tive court with cuwilpetenceto review the decisions of the basis-that hedid. Bynotrequiring the Secretary-Generalto
first-tiercjurt:in ail their legal and factual aspects. This act in accordancewith a regulation, rheTribunal committed
second-tier courr could exercisejurisdiction with regard to anerrorof lawrelatingto aCharter provision.
allthe existing administrative tribunals.dthusachievethe
unifiedjurisdiction whichhasproved diFficulttocreate atthe 2. TheAdministrative Tribunal indicatedtha:"the ques-
lower !evei. tion of hissuitability asan international civil servant" was
raisedby Mr. Yakimetz'sattemptedchangeof nationality. It
Dis.senringopinionofJudge Schwebel held that "essential guidance" is provided by the "widely
held belief" expressed in a United Nationscommittee that
In dissenting from theCourt's opinion. Judge Schwebel international officialsho elect "to break their ties with
disclaimed theCourt's position that itsproper role in this [their]countrycou.ldno longer claim to fulfilthe conditions
classofcase isnotto substituteitsown opiniononthe merits governing employinent in the United Nations". However,. way, tncause theRespondent'sletter,of 21 December 1983,
Article 101,paragraph3,oftheCharterprovidesthatthepar- toMr. Yakimetzsimplydidnot al!owofmy supposed"plain
amount consideration in the employment of staff shall be inference" that "reasonable consideration"had beengiven;
securingthe highest standartisof efficiency,competenceand on the:contrary it stated explicitly, though erroneously, that
integrity. Nationality is not a Charter criterion. The Tribtl- because Mr.Yakimetzhadbeenonsecond~nen:bythe USSR
nal's hclding that Mr. 'fakimetz's attempted change of Government it was not possible toconsider him forany fur-
nationality put into question his suitability for continued therappointment withoutthat Governmenl'sagreement.
United Nations service tra,nsgresseda Charter provision.
since itinvests nationality with an essentiality or para- In hoiding, therefore, that the Secretary-General had
mountcy whichconflictswith thetermsoffirticle 101.para- given reasonable considerationto such an appointment. the
graph3. Beliefsexpressed inUnitedNatiorscommitteesare Tribunal had erred in relation to provisions of the United
notsourcesoflaw;stillless;-naytheyderogs.tefrom theterms NationsCharter, becausetheGeneral Assembiy'sresolution
of theCharter. 371i26 was part of the corpus of law intendedto implement
3. The Secretary-Generalacted in theapparent convic- the Charter provisions concerning the status and indepen-
tion that Mr. Yakimetzcould noi be considered fora career denceof theinternational civilservice.
appointmentinthe absenceoftheconsentofthe SovietGov-
ernment. and thereby gave such consent a determinative Dissenting opiniorlof.lu&e fi~ensen
weight. Heaccordingly failed to fulfil his obligjationunder In his dissentingopinion Judge Evensen agrees with the
Article 100. paragraph 1.ofthe Charterto "refrain fromarty Advisory Opinioninregardtothe firstquestionaddressed to
action which mightreflect" on his position as an interna- theCourt bythe UnitedNationsCommitteeonAppiications.
tional official "responsible only to the Organization" The United Nations Administrative Tribunad l id not fail to
because, ineffect, heceded responsibilityinthis respecttoa exercise jurisdiction by not responding to rhe question
"government . ..orauthori.tyexternaltotheorf:anization". whether a legal impediment existed forthe further employ-
ThefailureoftheAdministrativeTribunaltoasslgnthiserror ment ,ofMr. Yakimetz.
constitutesanerror oflaw rc.latingtoaCha-terprovision. In regard to the second questionJudge Evensen holds the
opinion that the Administrative Tribunalin its Judgement
Llirsentingopinionof'/udge SirRobert Jeit:!irrgs
of the United NationsCharter. Although theUnitedNationsns
JudgeSir Rokrt Jennings, inhis dissent:ingopinion, was Secretary-General exercises discretionary powers in the
of the view thatthe questionreally in issue in the case was appointmentof the UnitedNationsstaff,certaincriteria must
whether the Tribunal was rightinholdingthat the Secretary- be reasonably complied with. Among theseconditions are
Genera: had given every 1:easonablec~nsideration to Mr. those laiddown in General Assembly resolution371126to
Yakimetz'sapplication for.a career appointment with the the effect that a staff member, upon completionof a fixed-
United Nations. as the Sezcretary-Generalagreed he was term appointmentof five years ofcontinuing good service.
boundto do underGeneial Assembly resolution371126. 1'1. shall be given "every reasonable consideration foi a career
paragraph5. appointmeni". Nor has sufficient attentionbeen paidto the
Asto the firstquestionaskedof theCouit for itsadvisor): requiremeniscontained in the StaffRules and Staff Regula-
opinion, JudgeJennings wascontenttoagree, or at leastnot tions totl~eeffect that in fillingvacancies the fullest regard
to disagree. with :he majorityopinion that the 'Tribunalhad shall be had to the qualificationsand experience of the per-
not failedto exercise its jurisdictionover whether there was sons already in the service of the United Nations. Mr.
any legal impediment to M:. Yakimetz'sappointment; this, Yakimetzhad the unqualifiedrecommendati~nof his supe-
however. for the reason that different viewson so abstract riorfor acareerappointment.
and conceptual a problem rnightbe held without necessary
comlnitalonewayor theotherto theanswerto begivento the In spite thereof Mr. Yakimetzwas placed on involuntary
question theCoiin v./:szailyca!iedupon tidecide. and indefiniteleaveof absence. Hewasdeniedaccess to the
premises of the United Nations includinghis office and :he
On the second question for the Court's opinion, which United Nationscafete~a while he was st:l! holdi~ga \.slid
directly raised the ce~tral!sue of the case, Sir Robert felt contractofemployment.
bound to dissent because, in his view. ,!heTribunal was In Judge ~Jensen's opinion the Administrative Tribunal
wronginfinding that theRespondenthadgiveneveryreason- erred in acquiescing in the Secretary-General's failure to
ableconsideration tothequr:stionofacareerappointmentfor apply theadministrativerules and regulations binding upon
Mr. Yakimetz;and this for two reasons. First. the Respon- him accordingto Article 101, paragraph 1, of the Charter..
denthadprovided noevidenceof the way .n whichhisdeci- The Tribunalfurthererred in notfindingthat theadministi-a-
sionhad ken made.ar ofainyreasonsforit. Simplytoaccept tive measurestaken againstMr. Yakimetzwere inconsistent
hisslatemen[thatproper considerationhad beengiven. with- with Article 100 of the Charter; and it erred under Articie
out objectiveevidenceof ii:shavingbeen clone,was subver- 101, paragraph3, of the Charter in treating-at ieast where
siveof a systemof judiciai controlof administrativediscre- career appointmentsareconcerned-government con:ien:as
!ion. Second, such evidenc aethere waspoinredthe other a paramountconsideration.
Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 27 May 1987