Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1982

Document Number
066-19820720-ADV-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
OF JUDGEMENT No. 273 OF THE UNITED

NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ADVISORY OPINION OF 20 JULY 1982

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION

DU JUGEMENT No273 DU TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIF DES NATIONS UNIES

AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 20 JUILLET 1982 Officia1citati:n
Application for Review of Judgemen273oof
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
OpinionI.C.J.Report1982, p. 325.

Mode officiel de citation
Demande de réformationdujugement no 273
du Tribunul administratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif;
C.I.JRecueil 1982p. 325.

Sales nurnbe475 1
Node vent: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1982 YEAR 1982
20 July
General List
No. 66 20 July 1982

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF JUDGEMENT No. 273 OF THE UNITED

NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Request for advisory opinion by the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgements - Article II of the Statute of the United

Nations Administrative Tribunal.
Proceedings commenced by applicationof a UnitedNations member Stateto the
Committee - Whether applicationtantamount to intervention of an entity notparty
totheoriginalproceedings - Ifs effect on authority ofSecretary-General- Principle
of equality of the parties.
Composition of United Nations Administrative Tribunal - Composition and
f~lnctioningof Committee on Applicatiorzsfor Review of Administrative Tribunal

Judgements - Requirements as to form of application to Committee - Whether
proceiduralirregularities and fuilure by Committee to ensure equality constitute
'tompelling reusons" for refusa1of advisory opinion.
Competence of the Court - Propriety of the Court'sgiving the opinio- Nature
und scope of the advisory opinion requested- Determination by the Court of the
nzeatling and implications of question submitted for advisory opinio- Need for
Court to uscertain and state legal questions reully in issue.

Objection to Judgement on ground of error on a question of law relating to
theprovisions of the Charter- Nature of task of Court - Meaning of error 'bn
a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter"- Relation between
General Assembly resolutions, Staff Regulations and Staff Rules as governing
relations of United Nations with its sta-f Role and competence of International
Civil Service Commission - Acquired rights and Staff Regulation 12.1 - Appli-
cation by Tribunal of two sets of rules equally applicable to situation of staff

member.

Objection to Judgement on ground of excess ofjurisdiction or competence.

ADVISORY OPINION

Present :President ELIAS ; Vice-President SETTE-CAMAR ;AJudges LACHS,

Mo~ozov, NAGENDRA SINGH,RUDA, MOSLER,ODA, AGO, EL-
KHANIS , CHWEBEL S,ir Robert JENNINGS DE LACHARRIÈRM E,BAYE,
BEDJAOU ;IRegistrar TORRES BERNARDEZ. In the matter of the Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal,

composed as above,

gives thefollowing Advisory Opinion

1. The question upon which the advisory opinion of theCourthas been asked
was laid before the Court by a letter dated 23July 1981,filed in the Registry on
28July 1981,from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. By that letter
the Secretary-General informed the Court that the Committee on Applications
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements had, pursuant to Article
Il of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, decided on
13July 1981that there was a substantial basis for the application made to that

Committee for reviewof Administrative TribunalJudgementNo. 273, and had
accordingly decided to request an advisory opinion of the Court. The decision of
theCommittee, which was setout inextenso in the Secretary-General's letter, and
certified copies of which in Englishand French were enclosed with that letter,
read as follows :

"The Committee on Applications for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal
Judgements has decided that there isa substantial basis within themeaning
of Article 11 ofthe Statute of the Administrative Tribunalfor the applica-
tion presented by the UnitedStates of America for reviewof Administrative
Tribunal Judgement No. 273,delivered at Geneva on 15May 1981. Accord-
ingly, the Committee requests an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the following question :

'1sthe judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in
Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General, warranted in
determining that General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17 Decem-
ber 1979could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the pay-
ment of repatriationgrants, evidenceof relocation to a countryother than
the country of the staff member's last duty station ?' "

2. In accordance with Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
notice of the request for an advisory opinion was given on 4 August 1981to al1
States entitled to appear before the Court ; a copy of the Secretary-General's
letter with the decision of the Committee appended thereto was transmitted to
those States.
3. Pursuant to Article 65,paragraph 2,of the Statute and toArticle 104of the
Rules of Court, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted tothe

Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question ; these
documents reached the Registry in English on 30September 1981and in French
on 10November 1981.
4. The President of the Court decided on 6 August 1981 that the United
Nations and its member States were to be considered as likely to be able to
furnishinformation on the question. Accordingly, on 10August 1981the Regis-
trar notified the Organization and its member States, pursuant to Article 66,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, that the Court would be prepared to
receive written statements from them within a time-limit fixed at 30 Octo-
ber 1981by an Order of the President dated 6 August 1981.
5. At the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, theActing
President of the Court, by Order of 8 October 1981,extended that time-limit to
30November 1981.
6. Withinthe time-limit assoextended,writtenstatements werereceivedfrom
the Governments of France and of the United States of America, and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Court, pursuant to
Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, a state-
ment setting forth the views of Mr. Ivor Peter Mortished, the former staff
rnember to whom the Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal relates. By

a telex message received in the Registry on 2 December 1981 the Secretary-
General informed the Court that he would not be submitting a written state-
ment to the Court other than formally transmitting the observations of
Mr. Mortished.
7. Copies of these statements were on 21 and 23December 1981communi-
cated to the United Nations and to the States to which the communication
provided for in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute had been addressed.
8. By letter of 1March 1982,France and theUnited States ofAmerica, aswell
as the United Nations, were informed that the Court, pursuant to Article 66,
paragraph 4, of its Statute, had decided to permit any State or organization
having presented or transmitted a written statement to submit comments in

writing on the statement made or transmitted by any other, and had fixed
15April 1982asthe time-limit for thesubmission of such comments. Within the
said time-limit,written conlments were received inthe Registry fromFranceand
from the United States of America. The Secretary-Generalalso transmitted to
thecourt a letter from counsel for Mr. Mortishedindicating that he didnot wish
to comment on the statements presented.

9. 011 19and 21 April 1982the Registrar transmitted to the United Nations
and to the States to which the communication provided for in Article 66, para-
graph 2, of the Statute had been addressed, copies of the written comments of
Franceand the United States of America, and informed them that theCourtdid
not intend to hold any sitting for the purpose of hearing oral statements or

comments in the case.

10. The Judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Judge-
ment No. 273) which was the subject of the application to the Committee on
Applicationsfor Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements resulting inthe

present request for advisory opinion was givenon 15May 1981incaseNo. 257,
Mortished v.theSecretary-Generalofthe UnitedNations. The facts of that case, as
found by theAdministrativeTribunal, werebrieflyas follows.Mr. Mortished, an
Irish national, entered the service of the International Civil Aviationganiza-
tion (ICAO) on 14 February 1949. In 1958 he was transferred to the United
Nations, and received a permanent appointment as a Translator/Précis-Writer.
On 1April 1967he was transferred from United Nations Headquarters in New
York to the United Nations Office at Geneva. On attaining the age of 60, he
retired from United Nations service on 30 April 1980.A benefit known as the"repatriation grant" is payable in certain circumstances to staff members at the
time of their separationfrom service, under United Nations Staff Regulation 9.4,

and Annex IV to the Staff Regulations, which provide as follows :

"Regulation 9.4 : The Secretary-General shall establish a scheme for the

payment of repatriation grants within the maximum rates and under the
conditions specified in annex IV to the present Regulations."
"AnnexIV

REPATRIATION GRANT
In principle, the repatriation grant shall be payable to staff members
whom the Organization is obligated to repatriate. The repatriation grant
shall not, however, be paid to a staff member who is summarily dismissed.
Detailed conditions and definitions relating to eligibility shall be deter-

mined by the Secretary-General. The amount of the grant shall be propor-
tional to the length of service with the United Nations, as follows :"

(Annex IV continues with a table of the amount of thegrant according to
length of "continuous service away from home country".)

The grant was established by General Assembly resolution 470 (V) of 15De-
cember 1950, following the abolition of an expatriation allowance which was
paid annually. The "detailed conditions and definitions" referred to in Annex IV
were laid down by the Secretary-General in Staff Rule 109.5.When Mr. Mor-
tished joined United Nations service in 1958 by transfer from ICAO, he had
received from the United Nations Office of Personnel a personnel action form

stating :"Service recognized ascontinuous from 14February 1949"and "Credit
towards repatriation grant commences on 14February 1949".

11. At the time of Mr. Mortished's retirement, the United Nations General
Assembly had recently adopted two successiveresolutions relating to (interulia)
the repatriation grant. By resolution 33/119 of 19December 1978,the General
Assembly decided

"that payment of the repatriation grant to entitled staff members shall be
made conditional upon thepresentation by the staff member of evidence of
actual relocation, subject to the terms to be established by the [International
Civil Service] Commission ;"

that is to Say,evidence that upon separation, the staff member was not con-
tinuing to reside in the country of his last duty station. Pursuant to this reso-
lution, the International Civil ServiceCommission established a text with a view
to the modification of the Staff Rule governing the repatriation grant, which had
not previously contained any requirement for evidence of this kind to be pro-
duced. This text was giveneffect from 1July 1979by the Secretary-General, first

byAdministrativeInstruction ST/A1/262 of 23April 1979,and subsequently by
an amendment to Staff Rule 109.5circulated on 22August 1979.Paragraphs (d)
and (fl of the new text of that Rule provided that : "(d) Paynîent of therepatriation grant shallbe subject to the provision by
the former staff member of evidence of relocation away from the country of
the last duty station. Evidence of relocation shall be constituted by
mentary evidence that the former staff member has established residence in
a country otherthan that of the last duty station."

"(f N otwithstanding paragraph (d) above, staff members already in
servicebefore 1July 1979shall retain the entitlement to repatriation grant
proportionate to the years and months of service qualifying for the grant
which they already had accrued at that date without the necessity of pro-
duction of evidence of relocation with respect to such qualifying ser-
vice."

In the case of Mr. Mortished, who had accrued the maximum qualifying service
(12 years) well before 1July 1979,paragraph (fl would have totally exempted
him from the requirement as to evidence of relocation.
12. On 17December 1979,however, the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tion 34/ 165 by which it decidedinter alia,hat:

"effective 1January 1980no staff member shall be entitled to any part of
the repatriation grant unless evidence of relocation away from the country
of the last duty station is provided".

On 21 December 1979the Secretary-General accordingly issued Administrative
InstructionST/AI/269, amending Administrative Instruction ST/AI/262 with
effectfrom 1January 1980 ;its effect wasto abolish the transitional provision of
Staff Rule 109.5 (f qluoted above. Even before Mr. Mortished retired on
30 April 1980,he had appealed to the Joint Appeals Board established by Staff
Rule 111,with a viewto claiming a right to repatriation grant withoutproducing
evidenceof relocation, and requested the agreement of the Secretary-General for
direct submission of an application to the Administrative Tribunalder Arti-
cle 7, paragraph1,of the Statute of the Tribunal. That was agreed to, but in the
meantime, on Mr. Mortished's retirement, the Secretariat had refused to make
payment to him of the repatriation grant without evidence of relocation.
Mr. Mortished seised the Administrative Tribunal of an appeal on 10 Octo-
ber 1980. In the meantime Administrative Instruction ST/AI/269 had been

followed up by a revised edition of the Staffles, with the deletion of para-
graph (fl of Rule 109.5.ByJudgement No. 273 the Tribunal decided, for reasons
to be examined below. that :

"By making payment of the Applicant's repatriation grant conditional on
theproduction of evidence ofrelocation, the Respondent failed to recognize
the Applicant's acquired right, which heeld by virtue of the transitional
system in force from 1July to 31 December 1979and setforth in Staff Rule

109.50."
The Tribunal recognized that Mr. Mortished "was entitled to receive that grant
on the terms defined in Staff Rule 109.5 despite the fact that that rule was no
longer in force on the date of [his]separation from the United Nations", and was
therefore entitled to compensation for thenjury sustained "as the result of adisregard of Staff Regulation 12.1 and Staff Rule 112.2(a)". That Regulation
and that Rule providepas follows :

"Regulation 12.1 : These Regulations may be supplemented or arnended
by the General Assembly, without prejudice to the acquired rights of staff
members."
"Rule 112.2

AMENDMENT OF . ..STAFF RULES
(a) These rules may be amended by the Secretary-General in a manner
consistent with the Staff Regulations."

The injury wasassessed at the amount of therepatriation grant of which payment
was refused.

13. On 15June 1981,the United States of America addressed a letter to the
Acting Legal Counsel of the United Nations by way of application to the

Committee on Applications for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements,
under Article 11,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Tribunal, asking the Com-
mittee to request an advisory opinion of the Court. The text of that application
is set out in paragraph 39 below. In accordance with the Provisional Rules of
Procedure of the Committee, a copy of the application was transmitted to
counsel for Mr. Mortished, and written comments on it were submitted on his
behalf to the Committee on 23 June 1981.A copy was also transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who advised the Committee on
23June 1981that he was not availing himself of his right under the Provisional
Rules of Procedure to submit comments on the application.

14. The Committee considered the application at two meetings held on 9 and
13July 1981. Counsel for Mr. Mortished had requested that he be given the
opportunity to participate in al1the proceedings of the Committee ; that he be
permitted to make statements to the Committee ; that the sessions of the Com-
mittee be open ;that the proceedings of the Committee be duly recorded ;and
that an official transcript of the record be made available to him (A/AC.86/
R.lOO,p. 3). The Committee decided, without a vote, that its discussions should
berecorded on tape, and that "if the United Statesapplication is accepted", they
would be "transcribed and distributed to the members of the Committee, to the
parties concerned in Mr. Mortished's case" and to the Court (A/AC.86(XX)/

PV.l, pp. 12, 13-15 ; A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 63). A proposal by the represen-
tative of the United Kingdom that theCommittee invite Mr. Mortished's counsel
to be present during the Committee's consideration of the application before it
and that, if necessary, he be permitted to make a statement, was rejected by the
Committee by 5votes to 2, with 9abstentions ;the representative of the United
States did not participate in the vote.
15. After members of the Committee had presented their viewson the appli-
cation presented by theUnited States, the Chairman requested theCommittee to
indicate whether there was a substantial basis for the application within the
meaning of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal on the

ground that the AdministrativeTribunal had erred on a question of law relatingto the provisionsof the Charter of the UnitedNations.The Committeeagreed,
by a vote of 14to2,with 1 abstention,that therewasa substantialbasisfor the
application on that ground. The Chairman then requested the Comrnitteeto
indicate whether there was a substantial basis for the applicationwithin the
meaning of Article 11 of the Statute of the AdministrativeTribunal on the
ground that the AdministrativeTribunal had exceededitsjurisdiction or com-
petence.TheCommitteeagreedbyavoteof 10to 2,with 6abstentions,thatthere
wasa substantialbasisfor the applicationon that ground.Neitherof thosetwo
grounds,nor any of the groundsstated in Article 11 of the Tribunal'sStatute,
had been mentioned, at least in the form in which they are enumerated
in that Article,in the United States application communicatedto Mr. Morti-
shed.The formulationof the questionto beput to the Courtwasthen adopted,
without a vote being taken, as set out in the applicationof the United States
of America.

16. The Court will begin by considering whether it is competent to
comply with this request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Com-
rnitteeon Applications for ReviewofAdministrative TribunalJudgements
(hereinafter called "the Committee"), and whether it should exercise its

discretion to do so.It isthe secondrequest whichhas been submitted under
the terms of Article 11,paragraphs 1and 2, of the Statute of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal which provide as follows :
"1. If a member State, the Secretary-General or the person in
respect of whom a judgement has been rendered by the Tribunal
(including any one who has succeeded to that person's rights on his
death) objects to the judgement on the ground that the Tribunal has
exceeded itsjurisdiction of competence or thattheTribunal has failed
to exercisejurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law

relating to the provisions of the Charter of theUnited Nations, orhas
committed a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a
failure of justice, such member State, the Secretary-General or the
person concerned may, within thirty days from thedate of thejudge-
ment, make a written application to the Committee established by
paragraph 4 of ths article asking the Comrnittee to request an advi-
sory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter.
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under
paragraph 1of this article, the Committee shall decide whether or not
there is a substantial basis for the application. If the Committee
decides that such abasis exists, it shallrequest an advisory opinion of
the Court,and the Secretary-General shall arrange to transmit to the
Court the views of the person referred to in paragraph 1."

It is however the first such request to arise from the Committee's consid-
eration of an application by a member State. It therefore raises problems
relating to the general aspects of the review procedure and also some
specific problems concerning the fact that the request now before theCourt is the outcome of an application by the Government of the United
States.
17. In 1973, when giving its Advisory Opinion on the Applicationfor
ReviewofJudgement No. 158ofthe UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal,

the Court envisaged a situation of this kind, though it was then no more
than ahypothesis. On that occasion,theadvisoryproceedings had been set
in train by a staff member's application to the Committee, and the Court
wascareful to stress that its conclusionsregarding the compatibility of the
review procedure with the requirements of the judicial process were to be
understood as applying to a case of that nature. It did not, of course,
overlook the fact that a similar request for an advisory opinion might, by
the terms of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal,
originate in a decision taken by the Committee on the application of a
member State. However, during the debates in the General Assembly in
1955,at the time of adoption of the procedure in question, various argu-
ments had been put forward against the propriety of the provision making
thispossible.This introduced "additional considerations which would cal1
for close examination bv the Court if it should receive a reauest for an
opinion resulting from an application to the Committee by a member
State" (I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 178,para. 31). Those considerations were
"without relevance" in the 1973 proceedings, so that it was not then

necessary for theCourt to evaluatethembefore reachingits decision on the
advisory opinion requested of it. It therefore stated that it was not to be
understood as "expressing any opinion in regard to any future proceedings
instituted under Article 11by a member State" (ibid.).Hence the Advisory
Opinion given by the Court on the Applicationfor Review of Judgement
No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal is relevant to its
approach tothepresent request on twomaincounts :because that Opinion
recognized that it would be incumbent upon the Court to examine the
features characteristic of any request for advisory opinion the Committee
decides to submit at the prompting of a member State, and because it
indicated that theCourt should bear in mind durin" that examination not
only the considerations applying to the review procedure in general but
also the "additional considerations" proper to the specific situation
created by the interposition of a mernber State in the review process.

18. The Court of course will not fail to discharge that duty. It will
consider the problems raised by the present request in the light of the

considerations previously discussed in its 1973Advisory Opinion and of
those whichit finds relevant to the present case. To that end, it must recall
those considerations which it found important for the above-mentioned
Opinion and then add those arising from the specialcharacteristics of the
present advisory proceedings. This will enable it to proceed to an exami-
nation of the coursein fact taken by the proceedingsleading to the present
request, in the light of the considerations in question.
19. In the Advisory Opinion of 1973, the Court pointed out that the
terms in Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal could not havehad the effectofchanging the nature of the Court's task under its own
Statute, the character of its functions or its manner of discharging them.
The Court therefore had a duty to ascertain whether the procedure in
whichitwascalledupon to play an essentialpart wastrulycompatible with
its task, its functions and the ways they are to be discharged. That meant
that it had to satisfy itself that this system enabling Administrative Tri-
bunal judgements to be reviewed by the indirect means of an advisory
opinion wascompatible with the provisions of the UnitedNationsCharter
and the Statute of the Court, and with the requirements of the judicial
process. As the necessity for the Court to make this assessment does not
depend on whether it was on the application of a staff member, the
Secretary-General or a member State that the Committee decided to

request an advisory opinion, the Court may for present purposes confine
itself to reiterating its previously adopted position.
20. In considering whether the review procedure was compatible with
the Charter, more especially Article 96, the Court first examined certain
doubtsthat had been expressed as to the legalityof employingits advisory
function in connection with the reviewof Administrative Tribunal judge-
ments. It found that there wasno reason for it todepart from theposition it
had adopted in agreeing to giveadvisory opinions on the Effect ofAwards
ofCompensation Madebythe UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal(1.C.J.
Reports1954,p. 47),andon Judgments ofthe Administrative Tribunalofthe
IL0 upon Complaints Made against Unesco(I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 77),
even though the questions laid before it in those cases had concerned the
rights of private individuals. In this respect the Court confirms its earlier
position that "The merefact that it is not the rights of States which are in
issue in the proceedings cannot suffice to deprive the Court of a compe-
tence expresslyconferred on it by its Statute" (I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 172,
para. 14).The fact that a request for an advisoryopinion derives,asit does
inthe present case, fromthe initiative of a member Stateand not from an
application by a staff member, as in the Advisory Opinion of 1973,does
not raise any additional considerations such as to modify the Court's
reasoning asto thecompatibility withtheCharter of itsexercisingadvisory
jurisdiction in such cases. The considerations contemplated by the Court

in 1973as calling for closeexamination in the event of a request from the
Committeemade on the application of a member State, werenot broached
in thecontext ofthequestion of the Court'scompetenceto givethe opinion
requested. Theyrelate tothequestion whether thisfeature ofthe procedure
established by Article 11is of such a character as should lead the Court,
althoughcompetent, to decline to answer the request (I.C.J. Reports1973,
p. 175,para. 24, and p. 178,para. 31), and will be considered below.

21. It is however a precondition of the Court's competence that the
advisory opinionbe requested by an organ duly authorizedto seekit under
the Charter, thatit be requested on alegalquestion, andthat, exceptin the
caseof the General Assemblyorthe SecurityCouncil, that questionshouldbe one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting organ.
Certain doubtshad been expressed in that regard also,but theCourt, in its
1973Advisory Opinion, found that the questions subrnitted to the Court
were legal questions arising within the scope of the Committee's own
activities, and concluded that the Committee on Applications for Review
of Administrative Tribunal Judgements was indeed

"an organ of the United Nations, duly constituted under Articles 7
and 22 of the Charter, and duly authorized under Article 96, para-
graph 2, of the Charter to request advisory opinions of the Court for
the purpose ofArticle 11of the Statute of the United Nations Admin-
istrative Tribunal".

Accordingly the Court declared itself competent under Article 65 of its
Statute (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 175,para. 23). The special features of the
proceedings leading up to the present request for advisory opinion afford
the Court no groundsfor departingfromits previousposition on thepoint
under consideration.

22. After finding that it was competent to give the advisory opinion
requested, the Court inits 1973Opinion recalled the discretionary nature
of the power it might thus exercise. It then considered whether, having
regard to the requirements ofitsjudicial character, to whichit must remain
faithful even in the exerciseof its advisory function, certain aspects of the
procedure laid down in Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal should not lead it to decline to give an advisory opinion (I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 75, para. 24). In the case at present before it, the Court
must undertake the same examination.
23. Having considered certain aspects of the review procedure which
were relevant to its response to the Committee's request, the Court, in the
1973 Advisory Opinion, reached certain conclusions. It noted that the
Committee was a "political organ", vested with functions that were "nor-

mally discharged by a legal body" and were to be regarded as "quasi-
judicial" in character. But as the Court explained
"there is no necessary incompatibility between the exercise of these
functions by a political body and the requirements of the judicial
process ... the compatibility or othenvise of any given system of
review with the requirements of the judicial process depends on the
circumstances and conditions of each particular system" (I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 176,para. 25).

The Court considers that the findings whch it thus expressed in its earlier
Advisory Opinion remain wholly relevant to the determination of its
proper response to the request now before it. It regards it as a highly
important principle that the requirements of thejudicial processshould be
observed not only during the two sets ofjudicial proceedings (one beforethe Administrative Tribunal, the other before the Court) but also during
the operation of the political organ with quasi-judicial functions which
furnisheswhat the Court in its earlierAdvisoryOpinion called "a potential
link" between them. It is essential for the Court's decision as to what

response it will make to the request for advisory opinion that the Com-
mittee'spart in theprocessshould be tested against the requirements ofthe
judicial process. As the satisfaction ofthose requirements depends on the
circumstances and conditions of the review system, and of the particular
casein question, theCourt must appraise, interalia,the circumstances and
conditions surroundingthefact that the Committee's partin the process in
the present case was originally set in motion by an application from a
member State.
24. In that connection, the Court, in the present proceedings, is called
upon to ask itself whether the part played by amember State in submitting
an application for review is not tantamount to intervention in the review
processby an entity whichwas not aparty to the originalproceedings. It is
contended in the Written Statement of Mr. Mortished that the proce-
dure

"allowing a third party to raise objections to ajudgement in whch it
hasno legal right or interest and to seek a review of that judgement is
contrary to fundamental principles of the judicial process".

In the first place, the Court observes that although a member State of the
United Nations be not a party to ajudgment rendered by the Adminis-
trative Tribunal in adispute between astaffmember and theOrganization,
it may wellhave a legalinterest in givingrise to areview of the Judgement.
Thisiscertainly so, where, asinthepresent case,the Judgement inquestion
ischallenged on the ground that an error has been committed on a question
of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, that is toyof a treaty to
which this State is a party. Secondly, the Court notes that the respective
roles of a member State which submits an application to the Cornmittee
and of the Committee itself are precisely defined by the Statute of the
Administrative Tribunal. Admittedly, it is the member State which, by
submitting its application to the Committee, gives rise to the Committee's
discussion of that application. Nevertheless, once the Committee has
decided that there is a substantial basis for the application, the request for
advisory opinion comes from the Committee and not from the member

State. The origin of the application which the Committee has to consider,
be it theinitiative of a member State, of the Secretary-General or of a staff
member party to the judgement in question, does not affect the formal
origin of the request submitted to the Court :it is always from the Com-
rnittee thatths request emanates. Besides,if that were not so, asneither a
member State nor the Secretary-General nor a staff member is authorized
by the Charter to request an advisory opinion of the Court, their request
would not be admissible. The Court was in no doubt in 1973 that the
request for an advisory opinion then before it emanated from the Com-mittee even though the Committee's decision had been taken on the
application of a staff member. It does not consider, in the present case
either, that the request before it emanates from a member State. Thus it
does not consider that this reauest constitutes an intervention. at review

level, of a member State and ience of a third person in relation to the
original proceedings.
25. The Court has also to take a position on two points relating to the
scope of the advisory opinion it is requested to give.On the one hand, the
view has been held that the fact that the Court's advisory opinion is, by
virtue of Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal, to have a conclusiveeffect with respect to the matters in litiga-
tion affords a ground for objecting to the exerciseof the Court's advisory
jurisdiction. The Court, however, in its 1973 Advisory Opinion, after
recalling the position it took on a similar contention based on Article XII
of the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal, in its Advisory Opinion
on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunalof the IL0 upon Cornplaints
Made against Unesco, found that

"the special effect to be attributed to the Court's opinion by Article
Il of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
furnishes no reason for refusing to comply with the request for an
opinion in the present instance" (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 183,
para. 39).

As the origin of the present advisory proceedings is irrelevant to appre-
ciation of thepoint under consideration, the Court confirms the position it
adopted in the matter in the Advisory Opinions of 1956and 1973.
26. On the other hand, in the present proceedings the Government of
the United States, in its written statement, has put forward another point
concerning the scope of the advisory opinion sought of the Court. This
point is not connected with the origin of the present request for advisory
opinion. However,as it was not raised during the advisory proceedings in
1973,it willbe as wellfor theCourt to consider it here. Warning the Court
of the consequences of not complyingwith the request for an opinion, the
Government of the United States made the following observation :

"The Assembly appears to have decided that the United Nations
and the General Assembly will not be bound by an adverse Admin-
istrative Tribunal judgement with respect to which substantial legal
doubt exists [that is to say, if objection has beentaken to thejudge-
ment, and the Committee has found that there is a substantial basis
for the objection] unless the Court sustains the Administrative Tri-
bunal on the law of the matter."

TheUnited States concluded that if theCourt declined to givean opinion,
that would "put in question the status of Judgement No. 273 of the
Administrative Tribunal", with manifest implications for the Court's dis-
cretion to give or to refuse the opinion requested. The Court does not
intend to pronounce on the intentionsimputable to theGeneral Assemblyin regard to this aspect of the reviewprocedure. Nevertheless, the adoption
of that procedure cannot have had the effect of amendingthe provisions of
the Charter or of the Statute of the Court whereby the Court's exercise of
its advisory jurisdiction remains discretionary. The Court would repeat
what it stated in 1956as to the binding force attributed by Article XII of
the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal to the advisory opinion

requested, that the provision in question "in no wise affects the way in
which the Court functions ... Nor does it affect thereasoningby which the
Court formsitsOpinionorthe content of the Opinion itself" (Judgmentsof
the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon Complaints Made against
Unesco,I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 84).TheCourt therefore considers that even
if its giving of an advisory opinion were legally indispensable for ajudge-
ment of the Administrative Tribunal to become final - a point which it
does not have to settle in relation to the present request - this consider-
ation should not prevent it from maintaining unimpaired the discretionary
character of its exercise of advisory jurisdiction.
27. An objection to the givingof an advisory opinion by the Court has
been based by Mr. Mortished on thecontradiction whichhefinds between
the application of the Government of the United States and certain
articles of the Charter concerning the Secretary-General and the Secre-
tariat. He contends that the initiative taken by a member State to seisethe
Committee

"impinges upon the authority of the Secretary-General under Arti-
cle 97of the United Nations Charter as Chief Administrative Officer
of the Organization, and conflicts with Article 100 of the Charter
regarding the 'exclusively international character' of the Secretar-
iat".

He has in particular maintained that the procedure contemplated by
Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal "allows any
member State to forcetheSecretary-Generaltorefrain from accepting and
implementing an otherwise final and binding judgement". The Court
recognizes that an application addressed by a member State to the Com-
mittee, when the Secretary-General has not taken any step of this kind,
will, in a case in which the Committee finds that it should ask for an
advisory opinion of the Court, lead to delay in the judgement of the
Tribunal becoming final. But this effect isnot produced by the application
addressed by the member State to the Comrnittee, which the Committee

can perfectly well reject. The effect in question must be attributed to the
decision of the Committee to seek an advisory opinion from the Court.
This ishoweverjust as much theeffect of the action oftheCommittee when
it is seisedby a staff member as when it is seisedby a member State.When
a member of the Secretariat, dissatisfied with the judgement given by
the Administrative Tribunal, endeavours to set in train a request by the
Committee for an advisory opinion, he also obliges the Secretary-General,
who was satisfied with thejudgement of the Tribunaland waspreparing to
implement it, to refrain from doing so until the judgement has been338 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

confirmed or modified. This is no more than the normal effect of the
operation of a review procedure. To Saythat it constitutes an encroach-

ment on the authority of the Secretary-General, and aviolation of Arti-
cle 100of the Charter,amounts to denying thatjudgements of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal which satisfy the Secretary-General may be subjected to
a review procedure. The Court cannot therefore accept Mr. Mortished's
views in this respect.
28. Forthe purposes of thepresent proceedings theCourt doesnot have
to analyse in detail the question of the powers of representing the United
Nations, whch presents aspects which are complex or obscure. It is suf-
ficient forit to find that the competence exercisedby the Committee in the
context ofArticle 11ofthe Statute of theAdministrative Tribunal doesnot
contradict thestatus of the Secretary-General as "the chief administrative
officer of the Organization" (Art. 97 of the Charter), nor to infringe the
"exclusively international character of [his]responsibilities" (Art. 100of
the Charter). Finally, the Court can find no justification for Mr. Mor-
tished'sfurtherclaimthat the staff member in whosefavour thejudgement
was given may, in challenging the views of the member State which dis-

putes thejudgement, bejeopardized inthe performance of his duties as an
international official,contrary to paragraph 1ofArticle 100.The fact that
a staff member disputes the legalviewsof a member State on proceedings
to which the staff member isaparty no more prevents hm from respecting
the duties resulting from hs international status under Article 100,than
his opposition to the contentions of the Secretary-General on the subject-
matter of the proceedings involveshim in a breach of the discipline to be
observed by a member of the Secretariat with regard to its chief admini-
strative officer.
29. The Court now comes to the principle which, in its 1973Advisory
Opinion, it regarded asarequirement of thejudicial process :the principle
of equality of the parties. In that Opinion the Court emphasized various
applications of the principle;it referred to it first with regard to the de-
cision by the Committee "after an examination of the opposing viewsof
the interested parties"I.C.J.Reports 1973,p. 176,para. 26). It also refer-
red to it in connection with the interpretation by the Committee of the

requirement laid down in Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal that there should be "a substantial basis for the application"
brought before the Committee. On this point, it noted that it would be
incompatible with the principles governing the judicial process if the
Committee werenot toadopt a uniform interpretation of this requirement
whether ornot the applicant was a staff member (ibi d. ,77,para. 29).It
wasalsoconcerned asto theinherent inequality resulting from theCourt's
Statute between the staff member, on the one hand, and the Secretary-
General, on theother. Observing that the difficulty arosefromthe terms of
Article 66of theCourt's Statute, whch makesprovision for the submission
of written or oral statements only by States and international organiza-
tions, the Court noted that Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal provides that the staff member is entitled to have his views transmitted to theCourt, with theimplication that thisis to bewithout any
control being exercisedoverthe contents by the Secretary-General. In this
way, the equality of a staff member before the Court is "a matter of right
guaranteed by the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal" (ibid., p. 180,
para. 35).Thus the Court, which, in its 1956Advisory Opinion, had con-
sidered that "any seeming or nominal absence of equality", inherent in

Article 66ofits Statute, should not prevent itfrom givingeffectto arequest
for advisory opinion, clearlytook the viewthat what wasessential wasthat
actualequalityshould be ensured by practical measures. In givingeffectto
the present request for advisory opinion, the Court must attribute great
importance, asit did in itsresponse to the request mentioned above, to the
question whether actual equality is ensured despite a seeming or nominal
absence of equality.
30. In the present case, that is to Sayin advisory proceedings resulting
from the application to the Committee of a member State, the problem of
the implementation of the principle of equality does not give rise to any
particular difficulty asregardsthe proceedings before the Court itself.The
viewsof the staff member concerned havebeen transmitted to the Court in
accordance with Article 11,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Adminis-
trative Tribunal. As the Court observed in its 1973Advisory Opinion :

"The Court is, therefore, only concerned to ensure that the inter-
ested parties shall have a fair and equal opportunity to present their
views to the Court respecting the questions on which its opinion is
requested and that the Court shall have adequate information to
enable it to administer justice in givingits opinion." (I.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 182,para. 38.)

As in that case, the Court "is satisfied that these requirements have been
met in thepresent proceedings" (ibid.).Sirnilarly,the decision, taken in the
present caseasin 1973,to do without oral proceedings, whilefor the Court
it amounts to depriving itself of a very useful procedure, appears to be a
sacrifice which isjustified by concern thereby to ensure actual equality.
This is however on the basis that the task of the Court in relation to the
judgement of the Tribunal is not fundamentally different from the task it
performed in the 1973Opinion ;thisisapoint to which the Court willhave
to return (paragraph 61 below).
31. But the problem is not merely that of equality before the Court. As
has been observed above, comparison of the review procedure with the

requirements governingthejudicial process,and thus in particular with the
principle of equality of the parties, must also be made with regard to that
stage of the review procedure which involves the intervention of the
Committee. From this point of view,theCourt should note a fundamental
aspect of the reviewprocedure which is not linked to the special circum-
stances of thepresent case,but which has been particularly highlighted by
it :thefact that theCommittee isno more than an organ of theparty which
was unsuccessful before the Tribunal, that is to Saythe United Nations.
Consequently, in the review procedure, one of the parties - the UnitedNations - has the right to decide the fate of the application for review
made by the other Party, the staff member, through the will of a political
organ, even if such organ has to some extent an "independent character"
(I.C.J. Reports1973,p. 173,para. 18).Thisfundamental inequality entails
a particularly careful examination of the rules governing the composition
and functioning of the Committee.
32. That Committee is composed of the member States the represen-
tatives of which have served on the GeneralCommittee of the most recent
regular session of the General Assembly. One of those States may be the
State which applies to the Committeeto request an advisory opinion of the
Court. In such a case, the government in question can itself present its

application, take an active part in the discussion thereof, and even take
part in the vote at the close of the discussion. Since neither such partici-
pation in the discussion nor voting are forbidden by the Statute of the
Administrative Tribunal, or by the rules of procedure of the Comrnittee,it
is certain that there is here a cause of inequality between the parties
concerned in the review procedure, which results from the nature of the
specialized organ created by the General Assembly, and from the rules
governing its functioning. Since the Court, maintaining the approach it
adopted on this point when it gave its 1973Opinion, proposes to assess
whether inequality exists at both the theoretical and the practical level, it
can conclude at once that on the theoretical level inequality exists. To
ascertain whether it also exists on the practical level, the Court must
examine what the Committee actually did when it was seised of the
application from the United States Government concerning Judgement
No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal. At the same time, the Court will
endeavour to establishwhether the Committee duly respected the elemen-
tary principle governing the judicial process, that an organ which inter-

venes in a procedure which, taken as a whole, isjudicial in nature, must
observe the rules governing its composition and its functioning.

33. Before turning to an examination of the proceedings of the Com-
mittee, the Court should however first deal with a point relating to the

composition of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal for its Judge-
ment No. 273,sinceit might be suggested that this was irregular, and that if
the irregularity were found to be such as to vitiate the decision of the
Tribunal, further examination of the question put to the Court would be
unnecessary. The Judgement begins as follows :

Composed of Madame Paul Bastid, President ; Mr. Endre Ustor,
Vice-President ; Mr. Francisco A. Forteza, Vice-President ;Mr. Her-
bert Reis, alternate member".

The verbatim record of the sitting of the Tribunal in the case records thepresence of these four members. The Judgement is signed by the President
and the two Vice-Presidents of the Tribunal ; there follows the statement
"Not being in agreement with the judgement, 1 set forth my dissenting
opinion below", which is signed by the alternate member, and his dissent-
ing opinion follows.
34. While under Article 3, paragraph 1, of its Statute, the Tribunal is
"composed of seven members, no two of whom may be nationals of the

same State", that Article then stipulates as follows:"Only three shallsitin
anyparticular case." The Tribunal isempowered by Article 6of its Statute
to establish its own Rules, and by Article 6, paragraph 1,of those Rules,
the President isauthorized to designate the three members of the Tribunal
who "shall constitute the Tribunal for the purpose of sitting in each
particular case or group of cases". This paragraph further provides, how-
ever,that the President "may, in addition, designate one ormore members
of the Tribunal to serveas alternates". It isobvious that, in thecasebefore
it. the President of the Tribunal exercisedher Dowerunder this article but
nowhere in the Judgement is there a statement as to the circumstances or
purposes dictating that an alternate member should be appointed. The
silenceof the Tribunal's Judgement on the issue leads to speculationas to
whether an alternate member isexpected to be designated by the President
normally in the absence of one of the regular three members or when such
alternate member possesses exceptional expertise or qualifications not to
be found in the three ordinary members of the Tribunal. It is thus a

question why it was considered proper for the alternate member to be
allowed to sit with the Tribunal when al1the three regular members were
available, and did sit ; the participation of the alternate member in the
Judgement wouldseem to require an explanation. It shouldalsobe recalled
that a dissenting opinion was appended by him to the Judgement of the
Tribunal.
35. Article 6 of the Rules of the Tribunal gives the President a discre-
tion, which must however be exercised in harmony with Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal quoted above. The published Judgements of the
Tribunal show that it has in the past sat on many occasionswith more than
three members present, without any explanation. So far as the Court is
aware no objection has been taken in the past to this practice. The case
concerning Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the UnitedNations
Administrative Tribunal in 1954sprang from Il judgements of the Tribu-
nal, the texts ofwhich werebefore the Court, in each ofwhich the Tribunal
was recorded to be composed of four persons. In that case the Court

howeverobserved that in none of the "reports orrelevant records" before it
was there to be found "any suggestion indicating that the Tribunal, when
rendering its awards in those 11cases,was not legally constituted accord-
ingto the provisions ofArticle 3 of its Statute" (I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 50).
At al1events theCourthas not been asked to consider whether the Tribunal
might have "committed a fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice" as contemplated by Article 11, para-
graph 1,of theTribunal's Statute, nor does the matter appear on theface ofit to disclose any failure ofjustice. Accordingly, further consideration of
the point does not seem to be called for.

36. The Court now turns to the proceedings of the Committee. The
material available to the Court concerning those proceedings includes not
only the Report of theCommittee (A/AC.86(XX)/25) but alsotranscripts
of a tape-recording of its meetings(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l and 2), supplied
pursuant to a decision of the Committee adopted in response to a request
to that effect by counsel for Mr. Mortished (paragraph 14 above). It is
however to be regretted that the Committee does not appear to have kept

an officia1list of those present and names of voters and absentees at the
time of each decision.
37. In the present case the records disclose a number of notable ir-
regularities attending the proceedings of the Committee at its 20th ses-
sion, and these must be considered in the light of the texts governing
the composition and activity of the Committee. Under Article 11, para-
graph 4, of theStatute of the AdministrativeTribunal, the Committee on
Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements is em-
powered to establish its own Rules. On 16October 1956the Committee
adopted Provisional Rules of Procedure (amended on 25 October 1956,
21January 1957and 11December 1974),which provide in Article 1that
"The proceedings of the Committee shall be governed by the rules of
procedure of the General Assembly applicableto comrnittees" (A/AC.86/
2/ Rev.2).
38. One of the most important irregularities in the procedure adopted
by theCommitteeconcernsitscomposition at its20th session,when it took
the decision to request the present advisory opinion. Article 11, para-
graph 4, of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
requires that the Committee be "composed of the member States the
representatives of which have served on the General Committee of the
most recent regular session of the General Assembly". One of the States in
question was Sierra Leone, sinceit participated in the General Committee

through its representative, who was Chairman of the Sixth Committee at
the relevant time. As he was, however, away from United Nations Head-
quarters on officia1business during the 20th session of the Committee, he
designated the representative of Canada, who was a Vice-Chairman of the
Sixth Committee, to act in hisplace, allegedly "under Rule 39of the Rules
of Procedure of the General Assembly". This replacement was irregular in
the case of the Committee on A~~lications for Review of Administrative
Tribunal Judgements, sinceit isdéarthatCanada wasnot one of theStates
Members composing the General Committee. It is true that theCommittee
on Applications for Review, at the outset of the meeting, accepted the
Canadian representative by taking the decision that "Canada, rather than
Sierra Leone, should serve as a member of the Committee at this session"(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, p. 6) ; but this decision itself could not be regarded
asregular since the Committeehas no power toderogate from Article 11of
the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. The Sierra
Leone chairman of the Sixth Committee could, and indeed should, have
nominated another member of the Sierra Leone delegation to sit on the

Committee on Applications for Review, but it was unquestionably irreg-
ular for him to have norninated the Canadian, as Vice-Chairman of the
Sixth Committee,to siton theCommittee on Applicationsfor Review,and
for this substitution to have been adopted by the Committee itself. The
irregularity was compounded by the election of the Canadian representa-
tive as Chairman of the Committee, even though the election as such
complied with Rule 103of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assem-
bly. Curiously enough the issue of the improper composition of the Com-
mittee was not raised either by the United States Government or by the
French Government, or even by counsel for Mr. Mortished, throughout
their respective Written Statements.And yet the matter isfundamental to
the whole question of the present reference to this Court.
39. Further irregularities relate to the Application submitted to the
Committee by the United States Government.As Mr. Mortished'scounsel's
letter to the Secretary of the Committee (A/AC.86/R.100, p. 2) indicates,
the United States' application was addressed to the Acting Legal Counsel

whereas it should have been addressed "to the officia1designated by the
Secretary-General to serve as Secretary of the Committee" under Arti-
cle II, paragraph 1, of the Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedure.
This irregularity isadmittedly not of great importance,but the fact that the
Committee nevertheless accepted the Application without comment is an
illustration of the lack ofigour with which the Committee conducted the
proceedings in the present case. The application in question reads as
follows :

"The United States respectfully requests the Committee on Appli-
cations for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements to request
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
matter of Judgement No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal.
Judgement No. 273 raises a question of law relating to the provi-
sions of the Charter of aconstitutional dimension within the ambit of
article 11 of thestatute of the Administrative Tribunal which is of
sufficient seriousness and magnitude to merit seeking the advice of

the International Court of Justice.
The General Assembly is expressly charged, pursuant to Arti-
cle 101of the United Nations Charter, with establishing regulations
concerning the staff. Resolution 34/165 constitutes the making of
such regulations. It States in relevant part:

"Decidesthat effective 1January 1980 no staff member shall
be entitled to any part of the repatriation grant unless evidence of relocation away from the country of the last duty station is
provided".

It isthus abundantly clear fromtheface of the resolution aswell asthe
legislativehistory that the General Assembly intended the resolution
to terminate the administrative practice of payments of repatriation
allowances to persons who do not relocate upon retirement. The
Secretary-Generalacted in strict compliance with this resolution, as
he was bound to do, when he issued administrative instruction ST/

AI/269. In invalidating these actions of the Secretary-General as
applied to Mr. Mortished, the Administrative Tribunal acted to deny
thefulleffect ofdecisionsof the General Assemblywhichwere neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
It is not the contention of the United States that there are no
circumstances in which the Administrative Tribunal could reject the
application of rules made by the General Assembly and no rights of
employees that the Administrative Tribunal may seek to preserve.
These issues are not raised by the instant case. The issue that is raised
is whether, in light of al1 the circumstances of the case, the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal gave due weight to the actions of the General
Assembly concerning repatriation grants when it found that

Mr. Mortished should be given a repatriation allowance even though
he did not depart or express an intention to relocate away from the
country of his last duty station.

In light of the constitutional dimensions of these issues, including
the relevance of Article 101of the Charter and the authority of the
General Assembly thereunder, it is believed that the matter calls for
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. It is
consequently Our view that the Committee on Applications for
Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements shouldask the Court
the following question :

'1sthejudgement of the UnitedNations Administrative Tribunal
in Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General,war-
ranted in deterrnining that General Assembly resolution 34/ 165of
17December 1979could not be given immediate effect in requir-
ing, for the payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation
to a country other than the country of the staff member's last duty
station ? "

40. Article II, paragraph 3, of the Committee's Provisional Rules of
Procedure provides that :

"The application shall contain the following information in the
order specified : (c) A statementsetting forth in detail thegrounds of the application
under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal and the supporting argument ..."

It is evident that the application of the United States did not comply with
this requirement. Article II, paragraph 3, of the Committee's Provisional
Rules of Procedure does not impose a sanction for its non-observance,and
it isto benoted thatin thecourse of the discussion two of the four grounds

specifiedin Article 11of theTribunal's Statute wereidentifiedasintended
by the application, and voted on (paragraph 15 above). In this respect it
would seemthat theCommitteedid not, on this particular occasion,follow
its "traditional" procedure, which the Chairman of the Committee at this
session stated to be that the Committee normally takes a decision on four
questions corresponding to the four grounds listed in Article 11, para-
graph 1,of the Statute of theTribunal. If this assertion of the Chairman of
the Committee is to be taken as correct, the procedure adopted at the
20th session was not that traditionally followed. So far as the procedural
irregularity in failing to state in the application the grounds of objection
was a breach of the Rules made by the Committee, the Committee may
thus be taken to have waived it. It must however be borne in mind that
Article 11,paragraph 1,of the Tribunal's Statute itself provides for appli-
cation to the Committee "If a member State,the Secretary-Generalor the
person in respect of whom ajudgement has been rendered by the Tribu-
nal.. .objects to the judgement on the ground that" the Tribunal had
committed one of the four specified errors.
41. Thus, the United Statesapplication to the Committee was formally
defective in not complying fully with the requirements of Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of the AdministrativeTribunal, and Article II,
paragraphs 1-3,of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee,
since the necessary details and supporting argument were not fully set out

therein. Furthermore, it is certain that Mr. Mortished, whose counsel
argued in hiscommunicationtotheCommittee that theapplication should
be rejected "on the grounds that it does not fa11within the terms of
Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal" (A/AC.86/
R.lOO,p. 9), was unable to identify in advance and comment on the two
specific grounds eventually selected by the Committee. Mr. Mortished, in
his written statement laid before the Court, has challenged the Commit-
tee's acting on a legally defective application, and has complained in this
respect of a breach of the principle audi alterampartem ;the Court con-
siders that such action exacerbated on the practical level the inequality
already established on the theoretical level(paragraph 32 above) between
the staff member and the applicant State. The same must be said of a
further action by the Committee which, while not a procedural defect in
the sense of being contrary to a text governing the activity of the Com-
mittee, was nevertheless, from the point of viewof the Committee's quasi-
judicial functions, a startling irregularity. This was the refusa1 of the
Committee to grant the request of counsel for Mr. Mortished to be giventhe opportunity to participate in the proceedings of the Committee at
which the United States application was considered (A/AC.86/R.100,
P 3).
42. The United States was a member of the General Committee of the
Assembly and therefore of the Committee on Applications, and its rep-
resentative not only sat on the Cornmitteeduring the proceedings,but also
submitted comments not elaborated in the original application, upon

which alone, as noted above, Mr. Mortished had had the opportunity to
comment in writing. When the representative of the United Kingdom on
the Committee identified specific grounds of objection to the Tribunal's
judgement, namely that it erred "on a question of law relating to the
Charter" and that it had committed "an excess ofjurisdiction or compe-
tence" (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, pp. 22-23),the United States representative
was able to endorse that approach and elaborate upon it. It is needless to
Saythat Mr. Mortished was deprived by the Committee's decision not to
admittheparticipation of hiscounsel of theopportunity ofknowing about
thesegrounds, and ofcommenting upon them. It must ofcourse in fairness
be recalled that the United States representative did not participate in
the vote on the admission of counsel for Mr. Mortished. Nevertheless,
Mr. Mortished was precluded from participating in the discussion of the
grounds of objection to theTribunal's Judgement, whiletherepresentative
of the applicant State was able to participate fully.
43. TheUnited StatesGovernmenthas asserted that theCommittee "is

not ajudicial body taking actionon the merits of the staff member'scase",
and that its procedures "need not bejudicial". This Court has howeverheld
in its 1973Advisory Opinion that the Committee is a body discharging
"quasi-judicial" functions, which operates between the Administrative
Tribunal and this Court by determining the legalquestion to be subrnitted
by it to the Court under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter (I.C.J.
Reports 1973,pp. 174,176).TheUnited Stateshas alsoargued that, in any
case, Mr. Mortished had been allowed to subrnit his written comment on
the United States' application, and that his appearance before the Com-
mittee was not necessary, since "There should be no requirement that the
staff member and the member Statebe in a position of equality in such a
process". It is, however,not true, as the United Statescontends, that "the
staff member's interest in an equal hearing is more compelling when it is
his own application which may be denied" ; the procedure before the
Committee is no doubt at least quasi-judicial, since it constitutes a ne-
cessary link between the findings of the Tribunal, which arejudicial, and

the reviewfindings of the Court, which are alsojudicial. Mr. Mortished's
written comments on theUnited States' application, although of interest to
the proceedings before the Committee, are not a valid substitute for his
observations on the grounds which emerged from the Committee's pro-
ceedings, It is not necessary to argue that the issues raised by the appli-
cation were not considered to be "uniquely within the competence of
Mr. Mortished's counselon whichhe must be heard in order forjustice in
fact to be done" (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, p. 16). 44. Thus theadmission by theCommittee ofthe incompleteapplication
by the United States,and the subsequent refusal to allow Mr. Mortished's
counsel toparticipate inits work,when theUnited Statesrepresentativeon
the Committee sat throughout the proceedings and explainedand argued
the grounds therefor, accentuated the irregularity of the proceedings. The
Committee was,inthe viewof the Court, under aduty in thecircumstances
of this case to take such steps as were open to it to mitigate the basic
inequality on the theoretical levelbetween theapplicant Stateand the staff
member (paragraph 32 above). It might, for example, have been wise for
theUnited Statesrepresentative to haverefrainedfromparticipatinginthe

substantive votes, as he did on the procedural vote on the admission of
Mr. Mortished's counsel. Since the Committee decided not to hear the
counsel, the United States representative could, with propriety, have
refrained from participating in the discussion.

45. Despite the irregularities described in the preceding paragraphs,
and despite also the failure of the Committee to show the concem for
equality appropriate to a body discharging quasi-judicial functions, the
Court nevertheless feels called upon, for reasons now to be explained, to
accept the task of assisting the United Nations Organization. It is in
accordance with the Court'sjurisprudence that, even though its power to
giveadvisory opinions is discretionary under Article 65of its Statute, only
"compelling reasons" would justify refusal of such a request (cf. I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 183 ;I.C.J. Reports1956, p. 86). Of course the irregula-
rities which feature throughout the proceedingsin the present case could
wellbe regarded as constituting "compelling reasons" for a refusa1by the
Court to entertain the request. The stability and efficiency of the inter-
national organizations, of which the United Nations is the supreme exam-
ple, are however of such paramount importance to world order, that the
Court should not fail to assist a subsidiary body of the United Nations

General Assembly in putting its operation upon a firm and secure foun-
dation. While it would have been a compellingreason, making it inap-
propriate for theCourt to entertain arequest,that itsjudicial role would be
endangered or discredited,that isnot soin the present case,and the Court
thus doesnot find that considerations ofjudicialrestraint shouldprevent it
from rendering the advisory opinion requested. In the present case such
a refusal would leave in suspense a very serious degation against the
AdministrativeTribunal, that it had in effect challenged the authority of
the General Assembly. While there can be no question, as pointed out in
paragraph 26 above, of any restriction on theCourt's discretion,the Court
will not refuse "its participation in the activities of the Organization"
(1.C.J.Reports1950, p. 71),sothat the important legalprinciples involved
may be disposedof, whilst at the same time the Court must point out the various irregularities. It isnot byappearing to shyaway fromthe latter that
the Court can discharge its truejudicial functions.

46. TheCourt willtherefore now turn tothe actual question on whichits

opinion isrequested, and will consider first whether, in the formin whichit
has been submitted, it is one which the Court can properly answer. The
question laid before the Court for advisory opinion by the request sub-
mitted by the decision of the Committee dated 13July 1981 is as fol-
lows :
"1s thejudgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
in Judgement No. 273, Mortishedv. the Secretary-General,warranted

in determining that General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17De-
cember 1979could not be givenimmediate effect in requiring, for the
payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country
other than the country of the staff member's last duty station ?"

The Committee in fact adopted exactly the question formulated by the
United States in its application to the Committee ; but as already noted,

before doing so it decided that there was a substantial basis for the
application on two of the specificgrounds provided forin Article 11of the
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal. Thus, in the first place, the ques-
tion put to the Court is, on the face of it, at once infelicitously expressed
and vague ;and, in the second place, the records and report of the Com-
rnittee cast doubt on whether the questionasframed really corresponds to
the intentions of the Committee in seising the Court. Its wording is infe-
licitous because of the expression used in asking whether Judgement
No. 273 is "warranted", and whether it gives "immediate effect" to Gtn-
eral Assembly resolution 34/ 165 ;it might havebeen differently andmore
happily phrased in language which made it clear that the question was a
legalquestion arising within the scopeof the activities of the Committee, in
accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter,
and one within the powers of the Committee to put under Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of theTribunal. It appears not to correspond to
the intentions of the Committee in that it is worded in such a way that it

does not disclose the two grounds of objection, error in law and excessof
jurisdiction, made to the Tribunal's Judgement during the discussions of
the Comrnittee, and which clearly lie at the basis of the question intended
tobe referred to the Court by the Committee. This defect derives from the
original omission of the United States Govemment to set forth those two
issues and supporting argument in its application to the Committee, a
defect which was later imperfectly covered up by the votes of the Com-
mittee finding that there was a substantial basis for the two grounds
discussed. 47. The Court has thereforeto consider whether it shouldconfine itself
to answeringthe question put ;or, having examined the question, decline
to give an opinion in response to the request ; or, in accordance with its
establishedjurisprudence, seektobring out what it conceivesto be the real
meaning of the Comrnittee'srequest, and thereafter proceed to attempt to
answer rationally and effectively "the legal questions really in issue"

(I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 89, para. 35). As will be explained below (para-
graph 55), it might be possible to give a reply to the question on its own
terms, but the reply would not appear to resolve the questions really in
issue, and it is also doubtful whether such a reply would be a proper
exercise of the Court's powers under Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute.
The dilemma has been emphasized in the written statement of France :
whilenot going sofar as to contend that the Court shouldnot giveeffect to
the request,the French Government observed that the question put to the
Court "does not indicateon what groundstheCommitteeonApplications
for Review has decided that 'there is a substantial basis' for the appli-
cationpresented by the United States ofAmerica" and that the Court may
therefore "encounter particular difficultiesin exercising itsjurisdiction".
It recalls that according to the established case-law of the Court in this
field, on the one hand "in giving its opinion the Court is, in principle,
bound by the terms of the questions formulated in the request" (I.C.J.

Reports 1973,p. 184,para. 41),while on the other hand, the Court'sjuris-
diction under Article 11 of the Statute is limited to the four specific
grounds of objection there specified, and
"consequently, the Comrnittee isauthorizedtorequest, and theCourt
to give, an advisory opinion only on legal questions which may
properly be consideredas falling withn the terms of one or more of

those four 'grounds"' (ibid.).
48. The Court does not however conclude that in the present case it is
obliged to decline on these grounds to givean opinion.The Court pointed

out in its advisoryopinion concerningthe Interpretation of theAgreement
of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt that

"if [the Court]is to remain faithful to the requirements of itsjudicial
character in the exerciseof its advisoryjurisdiction, it must ascertain
what are thelegalquestions reallyin issueinquestionsformulated in a
request" (I. C.J.Reports 1980, p. 88, para. 35).

If those questions, once ascertained, prove to be questions "which may
properly be consideredas falling withn the terms of one or more of" the
grounds contemplated in Article 11 of the Statute of the Tribunal, it is
upon those questions that the Court can give its opinion. In its 1973
Opinion the Court indicated the primacy of Article 11 over the actual
terms of therequest, when it pointed out that the scope ofthe questionput
to it is 50. After setting out the principal contentions of the two parties the
Tribunal noted that "The refusa1 to pay the repatriation grant to the
Applicant was ... grounded in Admuiistrative Instruction ST/AI/269,
established in pursuance of resolution 34/165" (para. 1). The Tribunal
then recalled the basis of the legal obligations of the United Nations
towards theApplicant. The Tribunal observed that the legalstatus of staff
members is defined by a contract, entitled "letter of appointment", the

provisionsof whicharebinding on theparties and can beamended onlyby
mutual agreement. The letter of appointment stipulatesthat the appoint-
mentis offered "subject tothe provisions of the Staff Regulations and Staff
Rules, together with such amendments as may from time to time be made
to such Staff Regulations and such Staff Rules". These documents of
generalapplication "are made an integral part of the contract and the staff
member accepts in advance any amendments whch may be made to
them", new provisions resulting from amendment becoming an integral
part of the contract on the date of their entry into force (para. II).
51. After outlining the gompetent authorities and procedures for the
making of Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (seeparagraphs 67ff.below),
the Tribunal noted that "the legal status of a staff member is govemed by
the provisions of the Staff Rules immediately on their entry into force"
(para. III). Citing Staff Regulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2 (a)(the texts
of which are set out in paragraph 12 above), the Tribunal stated that "the
Secretary-General is bound torespect the acquired rights of staffmembers
in the same way as the General Assembly" (para. IV). After noting the
provisions concerning the International Civil ServiceCommission, which
"form part of the régime governing the staff of the United Nations"
(para. V), the Tribunal turned to consideration of whether the Applicant
had rights on whichhemight relyasregards the repatriation grant. It noted
thepersonnel actionform of 1958(seeparagraph 10above) andfound that

the statements therein "unquestionably constitute the explicit recognition
by theUnited Nations of[Mr. Mortished's] entitlement tothe repatriation
grant, and validation for that purpose of more than nine years' service
already completed with ICAO" (para. VI), and that as a result of the
forma1reference thus made at the time of appointment to the principle of
the relationship between the amount of the grant and length of servicethe
Applicant was in the position "that special obligations towards him were
assumed by the United Nations" (para. VI).

52. TheTribunal examined the genesisand application of the repatria-
tion grant system, and found it proved that the system of not making
payment of the grant dependent on evidence of repatriation, proposed in
1952by theConsultative Committee onAdministrative Questions, "wasin
effect followed to the benefit of staff members, even though it was not
explicitly embodied in any United Nations regulation" (para. VIII). The
Tribunalfound that, in viewof theparticular situation of theApplicant, it
wasnot required to adjudicate inabstractothe question "whether apracticefollowed consistently for nearly 30years could generate an acquired right
within the meaning of Staff Regulation 12.1" (ibid.). The Tribunal con-
tinued :

"The existence of the repatriation grant and the respective roles of
the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in defining its
juridical rules of application have their foundation in the Staff
Regulations." (Para. IX.)

It quoted Staff Regulation 9.4and Annex IV to the Regulations (set out in
paragraph 10above), and noted the margin of discretion conferred on the
Secretary-General by these texts, and that Annex IV, in defining those
entitled to the grant, "does not refer to staff members actuallyrepatriated
but to those for whom that obligation on the part of the Organization
exists" (ibid.). The Tribunal concluded :

"These two provisions of the Staff Regulations, which expressly
acknowledge that therepatriation grant schemefalls within the scope
of the rule-making authority of the Secretary-General, are still in
force. No new provision relating to that grant was added to the Staff
Regulations by the General Assembly at either its thirty-third or
thirty-fourth sessions.
Thus the question whether the Applicant is entitled to rely on
acquired rights does not arise in respect of provisions of the Staff
Regulations which faIlwithin the cornpetence of the General Assem-
bly, eventhough the subject of theapplication is closelyrelated to the
decisions on the repatriation grant taken by the General Assembly."
(Zbid.)

53. Next the Tribunal examined the background to theadoption bythe
General Assemblyofresolution 331119,and the action subsequently taken
by the International Civil ServiceCommission (ICSC) and by the Secre-
tary-General. It noted that at no point in the discussion in the General
Assembly was the nature of theterms to be established by ICSC specified
(para. XI), and that theGeneral Assemblyset afundamental objective and
requested ICSC to establish the terms of implementation, ICSC being
required to take action in accordance with the powers vestedinitto ensure
CO-ordinationwithin the common system (para. XII). Referring to the
textsofparagraphs (d)and (f)of StaffRule 109.5asamended on 22 August
1979 (quoted in paragraph 11 above), the Tribunal observed that "In

taking this measure, the Secretary-General adopted the same position as
theExecutive Heads of the specializedagencies"(para. XII), and that "this
was the first time that a provision of the Staff Rules acknowledged that
entitlement to the repatriation grant might exist without evidence of re-
location being provided" (para. XIII). The Tribunal drew the conclusion
that "under the terms of Staff Rule 109.5 (f) . . theApplicant retains his
entitlement to the amount of the grant without the need, as regards that
period of service, to produce evidence of relocation" (para. XIII), and353 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

proceeded to examine the question whether that entitlement "can have
been effaced retroactively by the Secretary-General's deletion of sub-
paragraph (fl in pursuance of resolution 34/ 165"(para. XIV). The Tribu-
nal surveyed the circumstances preceding the adoption of that resolution
and noted that

"at no time did theGeneral Assembly contemplatesupplementing or

amending the provisions relating to the repatriation grant contained
in the Staff Regulations. Nor did the Assemblyexamine the text of the
Staff Rules in force since 1July 1979,andit never claimed that there
was any defect in the provisions introduced on that date which dim-
inished their validity. The Assembly simply stated a principle of
action which the Secretary-General acted upon in establishing a new
version of Staff Rule 109.5which, from 1January 1980,replaced the
versionpreviously in force on the basis of which the Applicant could
have obtained the repatriation grant." (Para. XIV.)

54. The Tribunal considered finally the question whether the Applicant
could rely on an acquired right, failure to recognizewhichwould giverise
to the obligation to compensate for the injury sustained (para. XV). It
referred to its own previous jurisprudence on acquired rights of staff

members, and concluded that, in the case before it,

"the link established by the General Assembly and the Secretary-
General between the amount of thegrant and length of serviceentitles
theApplicant to invoke an acquired right, notwithstanding the terms
of Staff Rule 109.5which came into force on 1January 1980with the
deletion of subparagraph (f) concerning the transitional system"
(para. XV).

The decision of theTribunal on Mr. Mortished's claimwas accordingly as
follows :

"By making payment of the Applicant's repatriation grant condi-
tional on the production of evidence of relocation, the Respondent
failed to recognize the Applicant's acquired right, whch he held by
virtue of the transitional system in force from 1July to 31 December

1979and set forth in Staff Rule 109.5 (fl.
Thestand taken by the Respondent has had the effect of depriving
the Applicant of payment of therepatriation grant. Recognizing that
theApplicant wasentitled toreceivethat grant onthe termsdefined in
Staff Rule 109.5 (f, despite the fact that that rule was no longer in
force on the date of the Applicant's separation from the United
Nations, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant sustained injury as the
result of a disregard of Staff Regulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2(a).
The Applicant is thus entitled to compensation for that injury. The injury should be assessed at the amount of the repatriation grant of
which payment was refused." (Para. XVI.)

55. Having thus summarized thejudgement of the Tribunal, the Court

can now turn to the question put to it. This, as already noted, is sparse and
elliptical, and seems to embody an assumption about the Tribunal's
judgement that ishardly sustainable. Even ifit be related to thegrounds of
objection stated in Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute, so as to ask the
Court whether the Tribunal "erred on a question of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" or "exceeded its juris-
diction or competence" in

"determining that General Assemblyresolution 34/ 165of 17Decem-
ber 1979 could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the
payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country
other than the country of the staff member's last duty station",

it seemsthat it might be a correct answer to reply simply that theTribunal
did not so determine. For it is important not to confuse what Mr. Mor-
tished asked theTribunal to decide and what it in fact did decide,whichis
somewhat different. If the decision of the Tribunal, quoted above, is
compared withMr.Mortished's claim,summarized inparagraph 49above,
it willbe apparent that the Tribunal did not find in the terms of what was
asked for in paragraph D of that statement of claim. It did not order the
Secretary-General to pay to Mr. Mortished "his entitlement to a repatria-
tion grant in accordance with Annex IV to the Staff Regulations". What it

did decidewasthat theApplicanthad an acquired right to receivethegrant
"on the terms defined in Staff Rule 109.5(fl despite the fact that that rule
was no longer in force on the date of the Applicant's separation from the
United Nations" ;and that he had accordingly sustained injury for which
compensation wasdue, the injurybeing assessedat the amount of thegrant
of which payment had been refused. Thus the decision was not that
resolution 34/ 165could notbe givenimmediate effectbut, on the contrary,
that the Applicant had sustained injury precisely by reason of its having
been givenimmediate effect by the Secretary-General inthe newversionof
the Staff Rules which omitted Rule 109.5 0. The difference between a
decision that resolution 34/ 165could not be givenimmediate effect and a
decision that, precisely because it had been given immediate effect, the
Applicant had-sustained injury, is not unimportant. Thejudgement of the
Tribunal in no way seeks to cal1in question the legal validity and effec-
tiveness of either resolution 34/165 or the Staff Rules made by the Sec-
retary-General for its immediate implementation. It drew what, in the
Tribunal's view, were the necessary consequences of the fact that the
adoption and application of those measures had infringed what the Tri-355 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

bunal considered to havebeen an acquired right of the staffmember, which
was therefore protected by Staff Regulation 12.1.

56. Thus this understanding of the actual question produces the above
answer which, important as it is, still leaves another question as it were
secreted between the lines of the question as originally formulated :
namely, was the decision of the Tribunal, in awarding Mr. Mortished a
sum equivalent to thegrant, even if it did not seek to deny the immediate
application of resolution 34/ 165, nevertheless one that denied "the full

effectof decisions of theGeneral Assembly" (paragraph 39above), and so
erred on a question of lawrelating to the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, or amounted to an excess of jurisdiction or competence ? This
seems to be the question which is the gravamen of the objection to the
Tribunal's Judgement, and theone which the Committeeintended to raise.
In order to answer it,theCourt must first consider the scopeof the concept
of error "on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations".
57. The ground of objection, that the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal "erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations", does not appear in the corresponding
article (Art. XII) of the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal, which
wasbefore theCourt in 1956 ;and itwasnot oneof thegrounds reliedon in
the Application for Review of Judgement No.158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunalin 1973. Its meaning has, accordingly, not pre-

viouslyfallen to be examinedby theCourt ;however, in the second of the
two casesjust mentioned, the Court indicated that this ground differed
from those then under examination in that the fact that the role of the
Court in review proceedings is not to retry the case

"does not mean that in an appropriate case,where thejudgement has
been challenged on the ground of an error on a question of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter, the Court may not be called
upon to review the actual substance of the decision" (1 . J. Reports
1973, p. 188,para. 48).

What then is the proper role of the Court when asked for an advisory
opinion inrespect of thisground of objection ?The answerto thisquestion
must depend not only upon the terms of Article 11,but also upon several

other factors including, first of all, the Court's Statute, the case-lawof the
Court, the general requirements for the exercise of thejudicial function ;
and, since Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute provides that
"Questions upon which the advisory opinion of theCourt isasked shall be
laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact
statement of the question upon which an opinion is required", upon the
terms of the particular question asked of the Court by the Cornmittee. 58. In another well-known passage in its 1973Advisory Opinion, pre-
ceding that quoted above, the Court declared that :
"the task of the Court is not to retry the case but to give its opinion
on the questions submitted to it concerning the objections lodged

against the Judgement. The Court is not therefore entitled to substi-
tute its own opinionfor that of theTribunal on the merits of the case
adjudicated by the Tribunal. Its role is to determine if the circum-
stances of the case, whether they relate to merits or procedure, show
that any objection made to the Judgement on one of the grounds
mentioned in Article 11 is well founded." (I.C.J. Reports 1973,
pp. 187-188,para. 47.)
That the Court's proper role is not to retry the case and to attempt to
substitute its own opinion on the merits for that of the Tribunal, is

apparent from the very fact that the question or questions on which the
Court is asked its opinion are, since they must conform to Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Tribunal's Statute, different from the questions which
theTribunal had to decide. As the Court then observed, they "arise not out
of thejudgements of the Administrative Tribunal, but out ofthe objections
to those judgements raised before the Committee itself" (ibid.,p. 174,
para. 21). There are, however, other reasons, some of them especially
compelling in the present case, why the Court should not attempt by an
advisory opinion to fil1the role of a court of appeal and to retry the issues
on the merits of this case as they were presented to the Tribunal.
59. Foremost amongst those reasonsmust bethe difficulties ofusing the
advisoryjurisdiction of theCourt for the task of tryinga contentious case,
and especially oneto which one of theparties is an individual. Someof the
difficulties may be mitigated by such devices as dispensing with oral
proceedings and enabling an individual to present written observations
through the intermediary of the Secretary-General ;but although such
safeguards of elementary principles of judicial procedure such as the

equality of the parties and the need to hear both sides may be adequate
where the issue for the Court is limited in the way indicated in its 1973
Opinion, they would need most careful re-appraisal were the Court called
upon tofunctionas an appeal court inrespect of thecontentious caseitself.
Where, however, "the task of the Court is not to retry the case but to reply
to thequestions put toit regardingtheobjections whichhave been raised to
the Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal" (1.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 182,para. 38),theposition isdifferent, and, asnoted above, the require-
ments of equality have been met, on that assumption, in the present
proceedings (paragraph 30 above).

60. Likewise, while the interposition, between the proceedings before
the Administrative Tribunal and the proceedings before the Court, of the
Committee, an essentially political body with discretion to determine
whether or not this Court shall be seised of the matter at all, is not
necessarily inappropriate for the purposes of seeking an advisory opinion,it would on theother hand beunacceptable if the advisory opinion wereto
be assimilated to a decision on appeal. The finding of the Courtin its 1973

Advisory Opinion (quoted in paragraph 23 above) that there was "no
necessary incompatibility between the exercise of these functions by a
political body and therequirements of thejudicial process" (I.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 176,para. 25)was on the assumption that the proceedings before
the Court were not to retry, on appeal, the same issue as that tried by the
Administrative Tribunal. This difficulty is especially cogent if, as in the
present case, the Committee, in its own exercise of what is clearly a
quasi-judicial function, has excluded from its proceedings one who was a
party in the case before the Tribunal, whilst the applicant State was able
not only to speak and argue but also to vote on the question whether its
own objection to the Judgement of the Tribunal had a "substantial basis"
or not. The gravity of these aspects has already been made clear above
(paragraphs 42-44).
61. The very according of a right, in Article II of the Statute of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, not only to the Secretary-Gen-
eral, or the person in respect of whom ajudgement has been rendered by
theTribunal,but alsoto any member State of the United Nations, to bring

before the Committee an objection to ajudgement of the Tribunal, sug-
gests of itself that the procedure before the Court was not intended to be
part of a procedure of appeal on the merits of the case. Such a right of
intervention by a third party is only explicable on the assumption that the
advisoryopinion isto deal withadifferentquestionfrom that submitted to
the Tribunal,and a question in which the intervening member State may
well have a legitimate interest (see paragraph 24 above).
62. In short the Court in the present case has not been, and in fact
could not be, asked to make a comprehensive review of the merits in the
caseof Mortished v.the Secretarv-General of the United Nations.but onlv to
giveitsopinion on twoparticular grounds of objection to theJudgement in
that case. The articles of the Charter that are possibly relevant to the first
ground of objection, that of error "on a question of law relating to the
provisions oftheCharter of theUnited Nations", are those of Chapter XV,
and in particular Article 101,paragraph 1,whereitisprovided :"The staff
shallbe appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established
by the General Assembly." It is clear, however, that the Court must first

consider whether it is only the possibility of an error in the application or
interpretation of those texts of the Charter itself which has to be investi-
gated. What is the scope of the enquiry to be conducted by the Court in
order that it may decide whether the Tribunal "has erred on a question of
law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" ?
63. This ground of objection was the subject of much discussion in the
SpecialCommittee on Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements set
up in 1954(resolution 888 (IX)), and also in the Fifth Committee of the
General Assembly. It iswell knownthat theformulation of this clausewas
the result of a compromise between those who wanted a review system
dealing with questions of law more generally, and those who favoured thenarrower range of permissible objections that appearsin the Statute of the
International Labour OrganisationAdministrative Tribunal(that is to Say,
a challenge to a decision of the Tribunal confirmingitsjurisdiction, or an

alleged fundamental fault in the procedure followed which vitiated the
decision of the Tribunal). In the opinion of the Court only limited assis-
tance with regard to this question is to be found by consulting the various
stages of the legislative history of Article 11 and the gradua1 evolution
within the SpecialCommittee ofthis compromise. For one thng, thewords
error "on a question of law relating to the (French :concernantles) pro-
visionsof the Charter of theUnited Nations" couldhardlybeplainer ;and
for another, the lirnits of the Court's role are, as has already been men-
tioned,determined not only by Article 11but alsoby other considerations
such as the inherent limitations of the advisory procedure and the im-
perative requirements of a judicial procedure in contentious cases. It is
rather in the light ofthese other considerations that any doubts over the
scope of Article 11 should be resolved.
64. In any event, the Court clearly could not decide whether ajudge-
ment about theinterpretation of Staff Regulations or Staff Rules has erred
on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, without

looking at that judgement to see what the Tribunal did decide. While to
that extent the Court has therefore to examine the Tribunal's decision on
the merits, it is not the business of the Court, after making that exami-
nation, itself to getinvolved in the question of the proper interpretation of
the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, as such, further than is strictly
necessary in order to judge whether the interpretation adopted by the
Tribunal is in contradiction with the requirements of the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
65. This conclusion, dictated by the considerations of principle noted
above, is also in accord with the actual words of the ground of objection
mentioned in Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute which speaks, not of
"error of law" but of error "on a question of law relating to the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations", and these latter words cannot be
other than words of qualification. It is true that the regulations and rules
applied by the Administrative Tribunal must derive their validity from the
provisions of the Charter. Indeed, al1valid regulations and rules adopted
by a United Nations organ cannot beother than based on theprovisions of
the Charter. It does not follow, however, that every question of the inter-

pretation or application of those regulations and rules is a question of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter. Nor indeed would the words of
Article 101of the Charter ordinarily be of any assistance or pertinence in
the task of interpreting arule or regulation. Accordingly, it would be quite
mistaken to suppose that, because the law applied by the Tribunal, or
indeed the law applied by any organ of the United Nations, derives its
ultimate validity from the Charter, the ground of Article 11 now under
examination means that an objectiontoany interpretation by theTribunal
of staff rules and regulations is a matter for an advisory opinion of the
Court. Furthermore, if the words "error on aquestion oflawrelatingtotheprovisions of the Charter" were to be interpreted to mean the same as
"error of law", the efforts in 1955to reach a compromise solution would
have been ineffective.

66. But if the interpretation, in general, of Staff Regulations and Rules

is not the business of the Court, it is, as already noted, very much the
business of this Court to judge whether there is a contradiction between a
particular interpretation or application of Staff Regulations and Rules by
the Tribunal and anv of the ~rovisions of the Charter : and such an
examination appears to be the purpose of the particular question asked of
the Courtin this present case.Thisquestion cannot be understood without
some reference to the history of the repatriation grant over the last 30
years, though it is not necessary to gointo the whole of that history. It was
established by the General Assembly by resolution 470 (V) of 15Decem-
ber 1950,which added, for the purpose, a new Regulation 35 and Annex II
to the Provisional Staff Regulations. In the Staff Regulations of 1952these
became Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV,quoted in paragraph 10above. The
repatriation grant was substituted for an earlier "expatriation allowance",
and seems never in fact to have been a grant limited to those who were
repatriated to their country of origin, so that the title of the grant has
always been a misnomer. It was from its inception based not upon repa-
triation but upon the United Nations' "obligation to repatriate", which has

since 1January 1953been defined in Rule 109.5 (a),as meaning an obli-
gationtoreturn the staff member on separation at United Nations expense
toa place outside the country of his duty station. The amount of the grant
wasfromthe outset made dependent on the number ofyears ofcontinuous
service by the staff member away from his home country.

67. It is important, however, to appreciate how Staff Regulations and
Rules are made. The relations of the United Nations with its staff are
governed primarily by the Staff Regulations established by the General
Assembly according to Article 101, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations. The successive editions of the Staff Regulations recite
Article 101at their commencement, and go on to state as their function
that :

"The Staff Regulations embody the fundamental conditions of
service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the United
Nations Secretariat. They represent the broad pnnciples of personnel
policy for the staffing and administration of the Secretariat. The
Secretary-General,as the Chief Administrative Officer, shall provide
and enforce such staff rules consistent with these principles as he
considers necessary."

68. Accordingly, the Staff Regulations are themselves elaborated and
applied in the Staff Rules ; and it is the Secretary-General who drafts the
Staff Rules, and in this he has necessarily a measure of discretion. This is
tempered by his duty to "report annually to the General Assembly suchStaff Rules and amendments thereto as he may make to implement the
Regulations" (Staff Regulation 12.2).The bringing into force of the Rules,
on a date fixedby the Secretary-General, is not subject to approval by the

General Assembly ; and on entry into force they immediately govern the
legal status of staff members. The Rules, according to Staff Rule 112.2(a)
(quoted in paragraph 12above), may be amended by the Secretary-Gen-
eral in a manner consistent with Staff Regulations. There is no doubt that
theGeneral Assemblyhas the power itself to make detailed regulations, as
for example, in Annex IV of the Staff Regulations which sets out the rates
of repatriation grant. As the Court said in 1954 :

"The General Assembly could at al1 times limit or control the
powers of the Secretary-General in staff matters, by virtue of the
provisions of Article 101 [of the Charter]." (I.C.J. Reports 1954,
p. 60.)
But in thepertinent General Assembly resolutions, 33/ 119and 341165,to
be examined below,it did not do so ; it laid down a principle which wasin

the usual way left to the Secretary-General to give effect to, first by an
administrative instruction, and eventually in a new version of the Staff
Rules.And whereit isleft to the Secretary-General to make rules there can
be no doubt that by making rules he speaks for and commits the United
Nations in its relations with staff members.

69. In the matter oftherepatriation grant, asin someother staff matters
also,thereis thefurther complication that entities other than the Secretary-
General have from time to time been concerned with the conditions of
serviceof staff members. The ConsultativeCommitteeon Administrative
Questions (CCAQ), a subsidiary of the Administrative Committee on
Co-ordination (ACC), and particularly concerned with relations between
the United Nations and specialized agencies, in a report of 14May 1952
(CO-ORDINATION/R.124) recommended, inter alia, that the repatria-
tion grant be paid on the basis of an obligation to repatriate, regardless of
whether the staff member was actually repatriated, but excluding those

summarily dismissed and those who had, or had voluntarily assumed, the
nationality of the country of thelast duty station.This wasto take account
of the fact that in the International Labour Organisation and the World
Health Organization, the Staff Regulations provided that thegrant was to
be payable on separation to persons "serving at a duty station outside of
the home country". The same Committee, after a further study, reported
on 6 May 1974(CCAQ/SEC/325(PER)) that "CCAQ Secretariat doubts
the feasibility of attempting to make payment of the grant dependent on
evidence of repatriation". 70. The other body involved has been the International Civil Service
Commission set up in 1974 (by General Assembly resolutions 3042
(XXVII) of 19December 1972,and 3357 (XXIX) of 18December 1974)
"for the regulation and CO-ordinationof the conditions of service of the
United Nations common system" ;it was thus particularly concerned with
an endeavour that staff rules should, as far as maybe, form a system

common to the United Nations system and to some specialized agencies,
and in respect of the repatriation grant it had, therefore, to take account
both of the United Nations Secretariat's three decades of practice and of
the position in the specialized agencies and other international organiza-
tions which participate in the United Nations common system.

71. The Tribunal, faced with Mr. Mortished's claim, had to take
account not only of resolution 34/ 165,and of Administrative Instruction
ST/AI/269 (replaced by the amended Staff Rules of 15July 1980), by
which resolution 34/ 165was put into effect, but also of the whole body of
regulations and rules relevant to the Applicant's claim. These regulations
and rules comprised in particular Staff Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV,
quoted in paragraph 10 above, and the following. In General Assembly
resolution 33/ 119of 19December 1978,which dealt with a Report of the
International Civil Service Commission, the General Assembly decided

that payment of the repatriation grant was to be made conditional on the
furnishing of evidence of relocation, "subject to the terms tobe established
by the Commission". On the basis of these terms the Secretary-General
was to make the required changes in the Staff Rules and report back at the
34th session "in accordance with the provisions of regulation 12.2of the
Staff Regulations". As noted above (paragraph Il), the Commission
adopted a text toimplement resolution 33/ 119,and this wasputinto effect
by the Secretary-General,first by Administrative Instruction ST/A1/262
of 23 April 1979, and then by the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/Staff Rules/
1/Rev.5) of 22 August 1979,Rule 109.5of whch dealt with the repatria-
tion grant. Paragraph (d)of that Rule accordingly provided that the pay-
ment of the grant was conditional on the presentation of evidence of
relocation. Paragraph (fl of that Rule, however, saved the entitlement
"Notwithstanding paragraph (d)above", of "Staff Members already in
servicebefore 1July 1979",whowere thereby to "retain theentitlement to
repatriation grant" in respect of servicealready accrued before that date,

without the necessity ofproduction of evidence ofrelocation "with respect
to such qualifying service". Paragraph (f)was in conformity with the text
prepared by the lnternational Civil Service Commission.

72. Next came General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17 Decem-ber 1979,on the "Report of the International Civil ServiceCommission",
whichwasagain for the most part concerned withreceiving and approving
the annual report of the Commission. It alsorecalled resolution 33/ 119in
which "it set down important objectives for maintaining and reinforcing
the common system and established guidelines for the future work of the
Commission". The rest of the resolution, in three parts, is to do with the
work of the Commission, and the only paragraph of direct interest to the
present case is the following :

"3. Decidesthat effective 1January 1980no staff member shall be
entitled to any part of the repatriation grant unless evidence of re-
location away from the country of the last duty station is pro-
vided."

The Secretary-General, accordingly, in order to put this decision into
effect, issued Administrative Instruction ST/AI/269 on 21 December
1979, and thereafter revised the Staff Rules (15 July 1980), in
Rule 109.5of which revised Rules, instead of theparagraph (f)of the 1979
Rule, there appeared "(f) (Cancelled)".
73. The Tribunalin the case of Mr. Mortished had to apply, therefore,
the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Staff Regulations estab-
lished by the General Assembly under Article 101, paragraph 1, of the
Charter, and alsothe StaffRulesbywhichthey wereimplemented. It noted
that the General Assembly, in Staff Regulation 12.1, had affirmed the
"fundamental principle of respect for acquired rights" andthat Staff Rule
112.2(a) provided for amendment of Staff Rules only in a manner con-

sistent with the Regulations (para. IV).It decided that Mr. Mortished had
indeed an acquired right, in the sense of Regulation 12.1 ;and that he had
therefore suffered injury by being, as a result of resolution 34/165 and
the resulting 1979 Administrative Instruction (ST/AI/269) and the 1980
amendment of the Staff Rules, deprived of his entitlement (para. XVI).
Accordingly the effectofresolution 34/ 165and the amended Ruleswithits
deletion of paragraph (f)was not retroactive to destroy Mr. Mortished's
"acquired right", having regard to Regulation 12.1whch provided pre-
cisely against such retroactive effect. The Tribunal's Judgement does not
anywherein fact suggestthat there could be an opposition betweenArticle
12.1of the Staff Regulations and paragraph 3 of section II of resolution
34/165.

74. The Government of the United States in its written statement
argues that thisdecision takes an erroneous viewof the law, and that even
assurning that Mr. Mortished had a right under paragraph (f)of the 1979
Rules, which the United States contests, that right did not survive reso-

lution 34/165 and the amended Rules, and that the only right Mr. Mor-
tished enjoyed at the date of separation was the right to a grant on his
furnishing evidence of relocation. There may be room for more than oneviewon the question what amounts toan acquired right ; andin particular
whether or not Mr. Mortished had an acquired right, which was saved by
the effect of Staff Regulation 12.1, and Staff Rule 112.2(a), either as a
result of paragraph (fl of Rule 109.5of the 1979Rules, or - a point noted
but not decided by the Tribunal - on the basis of "a practice followed
consistently for nearly 30years". Butto enterupon that question would be
preciselyto retry the casewith a viewto decidingwhether to substitute the
Court'sviewof the merits of the case for that of the Tribunal. This, for the
reasons explained above, is not the business of this Court. It is not the
businessof thisCourt todecidewhether theTribunal's Judgement involves
an error inits interpretation of the relevant instruments, unless it involves
an error on a question of law relating to the provisions of the United

Nations Charter.

75. In the Court's view it is not possible to Saythat the Tribunal in its
Judgement "erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter". The concept of an acquired right is, of course, neither defined
nor evenmentioned in the Charter. Article 101ofthe Charter doesprovide
that "The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regu-
lations established by the General Assembly". But it was precisely in the
Staff Regulations thus established by theGeneral Assembly itself that the
Tribunal found, and so must apply, the general provision about acquired
rights andthe non-retroactivity of supplementing or amending regulations
in regard to acquired rights. In fact Regulation 12.1waspresumably made
precisely in anticipation of, and to provide for, the kind of change in

conditions of service resulting from the Administrative Instruction and
amended Staff Rules which gave effect to resolution 34/165. The inter-
pretation of resolution 33/ 119which the International CivilServiceCorn-
mission and the Secretary-General had made in introducing the transi-
tional paragraph (flinto the Staff Rules of 1979acknowledged orcreateda
right forMr. Mortished, and this,said theTribunal, waspreserved by Staff
Regulation 12.1.Thus theTribunal sawitselfnot asin anywaychallenging
resolution 34/165 by means of a general notion of acquired rights but
simply as applying the existing Staff Regulations and Rules.

76. Certainly the Tribunal must accept and apply the decisions of the

General Assembly made in accordance with Article 101 of the United
Nations Charter. Certainly there can be no question of the Tribunal
possessing any "powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
decisions" taken by the General Assembly,powers which theCourt itself
doesnot possess(I.C.J. Reports1971,p. 45,para. 89).Nor didtheTribunal
supposethat it had any such competence. It was faced, however, not only
withresolution 34/ 165and the 1980Staff Rulesmade thereunder,but also
with Staff Regulation 12.1also made no less by and with the authonty of
the General Assembly. On the basis of itsfindingthat Mr. Mortished had an acquired right, it had therefore to interpret and apply these two sets of
rules, both of which were applicable to Mr. Mortished's situation. The
question is not whether the Tribunal was right or wrong in the way it
performed this task in the casebefore it ; the question - indeed, the only

matter on which the Court can pass - is whether the Tribunal erred on a
question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations. This it clearly did not do when it attempted only to apply to
Mr. Mortished's case what it found to be the relevant Staff Regulations
and Rules made under the authority of the General Assembly.

77. In the proceedings of the Committee there was somediscussion of a
second ground of objection to the Tribunal's Judgement, namely the
allegation that it had "exceeded its jurisdiction or competence", and on
this ground also there was found to be a "substantial basis" for the

application. It seems,however,from what was said in the Comrnittee that
this ground was not put forward as a ground entirely independent of the
allegation of error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter. The
representative of theUnited States,which had made theapplication to the
Committee, explained at one point in the discussion that the ground of
error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter "had been put to the
Committee on the basis that it did not by any means exclude, but rather
subsumed, the other ground of exceedingjurisdiction or competence"
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2 at p. 46). It would seem to follow from this that this
secondobjection must by definition fa11with thefirst. In fact thissuggested
excessofjurisdiction seems to have been conceived of as little more than
another wayofexpressingthe allegation that theTribunalhad decided that
General Assembly resolution 34/ 165 "could not be given immediate
effect", and that it was therefore attempting to exercise a competence of
judicial reviewover a General Assemblyresolution :the matter whichhas
already been dealt with above.

78. However that may be, the Tribunal's competence is defined in
Article 2 of its Statute, and the pertinent paragraph reads as follows :

"1. The Tribunal shall be competent to hear and passjudgement
upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employ-
ment of staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of
the terms of appointment of such staff members. The words 'con-
tracts' and 'terms of appointment' include al1pertinent regulations
and rules in force at the time ofallegednon-observance, including the
staff pension regulations."Thus, it isclear that theTribunal's jurisdiction included not only the terms
ofMr. Mortished's contract ofemployment and terms ofappointment, but
alsothemeaning and effectof Staff Regulations and Staff Rules,inforceat
the material time. Ttcan hardly be denied that Mr. Mortished's appeal to
the Tribunal, based as it was upon the various provisions of the Staff
Regulations and on Rules established by the Secretary-General in pur-
suance of those Staff Regulations, corresponds directly with both the
words and spirit of Article 2. It is difficult to see any possible ground on
which the Tribunal could be said to have exceeded the terms of itsjuris-
diction or competence thus defined. It sought to interpret and apply the
terms of Mr. Mortished's appointment, and therelevant Staff Regulations
and Rules and General Assembly resolutions. Even its application of the
notion of acquiredrights it derived from the Staff Regulationswhich had
been established by the General Assembly. It is impossible to Saythat the
Tribunal anywhere strayed into an area lying beyond the limits of its
jurisdiction asdefined in Article2ofits Statute. Whether or notit wasright
inits decision isnot pertinent to thequestion ofjurisdiction. As the French

Government has rightly pointed out, it appearsfrom the transcripts of the
proceedings that the Committee members "made a questionable assimi-
lation between a possible error of law that might have been committed by
theTribunaland the excessofjurisdiction imputedtoit". Anerror oflawis
not necessarily, and in fact is not usually, made by a Tribunal's exceeding
its competence or jurisdiction. As the Court observed in its Advisory
Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon
Complaints Made against Unesco,

"The circumstance that the Tribunal may have rightly or wrongly
adjudicated on the merits or that it may have rightly or wrongly
interpreted and applied the law for the purposes of determining the
merits, in no way affects itsjurisdiction. The latter is to be judged in
the light of the answer to the question whether the cornplaint was one
the merits of which fell to be determined by the Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the provisions governing its jurisdic-
tion." (I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 87.)

79. The Court has concluded that the Administrative Tribunal in
Judgement No. 273has neither erred on a question of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter of theUnited Nations,nor committed any excess
of its jurisdiction or competence. It wishes it to be clearly understood,
however, that the fact that it has, in the present case, decided to comply
with the request for an advisory opinion does not in any way imply
condonation of the various irregularities pointed out above, or of the
failure of the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements to do al1in its power to secure equality between the
applicant State and the staff member. The main reason for the Court's
deciding to complywith the request inthe present caseis,asit has stressed.
its desire to assist the General Assemblyifit should decide to reconsider its
present procedure related to review of the Administrative Tribunal's

Judgements.

80. For these reasons,

1. By nine votes to six,

Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion ;
IN FAVOUR :President Elias ;Vice-President Sette-Camara ;Judges Nagendra

Singh, Mosler,Ago, Schwebel,Sir Robert Jennings, de Lacharrièreand
Mbaye ;
AGAINST :Judges Lachs,Morozov,Ruda, Oda, El-Khani andBedjaoui.

2. With respect to the question as formulated in paragraph 48 above, is
of the opinion :

A. By ten votes to five,

That the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations in Judgement
No. 273 did not err on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations ;
IN FAVOUR :President Elias ;Vice-President Sette-Camara ;Judges Nagendra
Singh,Ruda, Mosler,Oda,Ago, SirRobert Jennings,de Lacharnère and

Mbaye ;
AGAINST :Judges Lachs, Morozov,El-Khani,Schwebeland Bedjaoui.

B. By twelve votes to three,
That the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations in Judgement
No. 273 did not commit any excess of the jurisdiction or competence

vested in it.
IN FAVOUR :President Elias; Vice-President Sette-Camara ; Judges Lachs,
NagendraSingh,Ruda,Mosler,Oda,Ago,SirRobert Jennings,de Lachar-
rière,Mbaye and Bedjaoui ;

AGAINST :Judges Morozov,El-Khaniand Schwebel.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the PeacePalace, The Hague, this twentieth day ofJuly, onethousand ninehundred and eighty-two, in two copies, one of which willbe placed in the
archivesof theCourtand theother transmitted to theSecretary-General of
the United Nations.

(Signed) T. O. ELIAS,

President.

(Signed) Santiago TORRESBERNARDEZ,
Registrar.

Judges NAGENDRA SINGH,RUDA,MOSLER and ODAappend separate
opinions to the Opinion of the Court.

Judges LACHSM , OROZOV E,L-KHANIand SCHWEBE append dissenting
opinions to the Opinion of the Court.

(Initialled)T.O.E.
(Initialled) S.T.B.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
OF JUDGEMENT No. 273 OF THE UNITED

NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

ADVISORY OPINION OF 20 JULY 1982

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION

DU JUGEMENT No273 DU TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIF DES NATIONS UNIES

AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 20 JUILLET 1982 Officia1citati:n
Application for Review of Judgemen273oof
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
OpinionI.C.J.Report1982, p. 325.

Mode officiel de citation
Demande de réformationdujugement no 273
du Tribunul administratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif;
C.I.JRecueil 1982p. 325.

Sales nurnbe475 1
Node vent: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1982 YEAR 1982
20 July
General List
No. 66 20 July 1982

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

OF JUDGEMENT No. 273 OF THE UNITED

NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Request for advisory opinion by the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgements - Article II of the Statute of the United

Nations Administrative Tribunal.
Proceedings commenced by applicationof a UnitedNations member Stateto the
Committee - Whether applicationtantamount to intervention of an entity notparty
totheoriginalproceedings - Ifs effect on authority ofSecretary-General- Principle
of equality of the parties.
Composition of United Nations Administrative Tribunal - Composition and
f~lnctioningof Committee on Applicatiorzsfor Review of Administrative Tribunal

Judgements - Requirements as to form of application to Committee - Whether
proceiduralirregularities and fuilure by Committee to ensure equality constitute
'tompelling reusons" for refusa1of advisory opinion.
Competence of the Court - Propriety of the Court'sgiving the opinio- Nature
und scope of the advisory opinion requested- Determination by the Court of the
nzeatling and implications of question submitted for advisory opinio- Need for
Court to uscertain and state legal questions reully in issue.

Objection to Judgement on ground of error on a question of law relating to
theprovisions of the Charter- Nature of task of Court - Meaning of error 'bn
a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter"- Relation between
General Assembly resolutions, Staff Regulations and Staff Rules as governing
relations of United Nations with its sta-f Role and competence of International
Civil Service Commission - Acquired rights and Staff Regulation 12.1 - Appli-
cation by Tribunal of two sets of rules equally applicable to situation of staff

member.

Objection to Judgement on ground of excess ofjurisdiction or competence.

ADVISORY OPINION

Present :President ELIAS ; Vice-President SETTE-CAMAR ;AJudges LACHS,

Mo~ozov, NAGENDRA SINGH,RUDA, MOSLER,ODA, AGO, EL-
KHANIS , CHWEBEL S,ir Robert JENNINGS DE LACHARRIÈRM E,BAYE,
BEDJAOU ;IRegistrar TORRES BERNARDEZ. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1982
20juillet
20juillet 1982 Rôle général
no66

DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION

DU JUGEMENT NO273 DU TRIBUNAL

ADMINISTRATIF DES NATIONS UNIES

Requêtepour avis consultatifprésentéepar le Comitédes demandes de réforma-
tion dejugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies - L'article II du
statut du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies.

Procédure déclenchéepar lu demande d'un Etat Membre des Nations Unies au
Comité - Cette demande équivaut-ellea l'intervention d'une entité quin'était pas
partie a l'instance initial?- Répercussions dela demande sur les pouvoirs du
Secrétairegénéral - Principe de l'égalité des parties.
Compositiot~du Tribunal udwzinistratif des Nations Unies - Compositioiî et
fonctionnement du Comitédes demandes de réformationdejugements du Tribunal

administratif- Cot7ditionsdeforme pour lesdemandes adresséesau Comité - Les
irrégularitésdeprocédureet lefait que leComitén'apas assurél'égalitéconstituent-
ils des((raisons décisives)pour refuser de donner l'avisconsultatif?
Compétencede la Cour - Opportunité,pour laCour,dedonner l'avisdemandé -
Nature etportéede l'avis consultatifdemandé - Déterminationpar la Courdu sens
et de laportée delu question soumisepour avisconsultatif- Nécessitépourla Cour

de rechercher et de formuler les questionsjuridiques véritablementenjeu.
Contestution dujugement au motif qu'une erreur de droit concernantles dispo-
sitions de la Charte aurait été commis- Nature de lu tâcheincombant a la Cour -
Sens de 1'0erreurde droit concernant lesdipositions dela Charte - Rapport entre
lesrésolutionsdel'Assembléegénérale et lesdispositiondsustatut etdurèglementdu
personnel comme instruments régissantles relations de l'Organisation desNations

Unies avec son personnel - Rôle et compétencede la Commission de la fonction
publique internationale- Les droits acquis etl'article12.1du statut dupersonne-
Application pur le Tribunal de deux sériesde dispositions applicablesa la situation
du fonctionnaire.
Contestation dujugement au motif qu'un excès dejuridiction ou de compétence
aurait étécommis.

AVIS CONSULTATIF

Présents : M. ELIASP , résident;M. SETTE-CAMAR VAic,e-Président;MM. LACHS,
Mo~ozov, NAGENDRASINGH, RUDA, MOSLER,ODA, AGO,
EL-KHANIS , CHWEBEs Li,r Robert JENNINGS M, M. DE LACHARRIÈRE,
MBAYEB , EDJAOUjIu,ges ; M. TORRES BERNARDEG Z,reffier. In the matter of the Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal,

composed as above,

gives thefollowing Advisory Opinion

1. The question upon which the advisory opinion of theCourthas been asked
was laid before the Court by a letter dated 23July 1981,filed in the Registry on
28July 1981,from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. By that letter
the Secretary-General informed the Court that the Committee on Applications
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements had, pursuant to Article
Il of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, decided on
13July 1981that there was a substantial basis for the application made to that

Committee for reviewof Administrative TribunalJudgementNo. 273, and had
accordingly decided to request an advisory opinion of the Court. The decision of
theCommittee, which was setout inextenso in the Secretary-General's letter, and
certified copies of which in Englishand French were enclosed with that letter,
read as follows :

"The Committee on Applications for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal
Judgements has decided that there isa substantial basis within themeaning
of Article 11 ofthe Statute of the Administrative Tribunalfor the applica-
tion presented by the UnitedStates of America for reviewof Administrative
Tribunal Judgement No. 273,delivered at Geneva on 15May 1981. Accord-
ingly, the Committee requests an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the following question :

'1sthe judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in
Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General, warranted in
determining that General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17 Decem-
ber 1979could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the pay-
ment of repatriationgrants, evidenceof relocation to a countryother than
the country of the staff member's last duty station ?' "

2. In accordance with Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
notice of the request for an advisory opinion was given on 4 August 1981to al1
States entitled to appear before the Court ; a copy of the Secretary-General's
letter with the decision of the Committee appended thereto was transmitted to
those States.
3. Pursuant to Article 65,paragraph 2,of the Statute and toArticle 104of the
Rules of Court, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted tothe

Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question ; these
documents reached the Registry in English on 30September 1981and in French
on 10November 1981.
4. The President of the Court decided on 6 August 1981 that the United
Nations and its member States were to be considered as likely to be able to
furnishinformation on the question. Accordingly, on 10August 1981the Regis-
trar notified the Organization and its member States, pursuant to Article 66, Au sujet de la demande de réformation du jugement no 273 du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies.

ainsi composée,

donne l'avis consultatif suiva:t

1. La Cour a étésaisie de la question sur laquelle un avis consultatif lui est
demandé par une lettre du Secrétaire générad l e l'organisation des Nations
Unies datéedu 23juillet 1981et enregistrée auGreffe le 28juillet 1981.Dans
cette lettre, le Secrétaire général orte à la connaissance de la Cour que, le

13juillet 1981,conformément àl'article 11du statut du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies, le Comitédes demandes de réformation de jugements du
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies a décidéque la demandedont il était
saisi, concernant le jugement no 273 dudit Tribunal, reposait sur des bases
sérieuseseta priéen conséquencelaCour de donner un avisconsultatif à cesujet.
La décision du Comité, qui est intégralement reproduite dans la lettre du
Secrétairegénéral etdont le texte certifié conformeen anglais et en français est
joint à cette lettre, est ainsi conç:e

<<Le Comité des demandes de réformation de jugements du Tribunal
administratif a décidéque, au sens de l'article 11 du statut du Tribunal
administratif, la demande de réformation des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
concernant lejugement no273 du Tribunal administratif rendu à Genèvele

15mai 1981reposait sur des bases sérieuses.Par conséquent,leComitéprie
la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur la
question suivante :
Dans sonjugement no273 concernant l'affaire Mortished c. le Secré-

tuire généradl e I'Orpisation des Nations Uniesle Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies pouvait-il légitimement déterminer que la résolu-
tion 34/ 165 de l'Assembléegénérale endate du 17 décembre1979, qui
subordonne le paiement de la prime de rapatriement à la présentationde
pièces attestant la réinstallation du fonctionnaire dans un pays autre
que celui de son dernier lieu d'affectation, ne pouvait prendre immé-
diatement effet ? ))

2. Conformément à l'article 66,paragraphe 1,du Statut de la Cour, larequête
pour avis consultatif a éténotifiée le août 1981 à tous les Etats admisà ester
devant la Cour ; copie de la lettre du Secrétaire généraal été transmise à ces
Etats, avec la décisiondu Comitéy annexée.

3. Conformément à l'article 65,paragraphe 2, du Statut età l'article 104du
Règlementde la Cour, le Secrétaire généradlel'organisation des Nations Unies
a transmis à la Cour un dossier de documents pouvant servir à élucider la
question ;ces documents sont parvenus au Greffe en langue anglaise le 30sep-
tembre 198 1 et en langue française le 10novembre 1981.
4. Le 6 août 1981, le Président de la Cour a jugé que l'organisation des
Nations Unies et ses Etats Membres étaientsusceptibles de fournir des rensei-
gnements sur la question. Le 10août 1981,le Greffier a fait connaître en con-
séquence à l'organisation età ses Etats Membres, en application de l'article 66,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, that the Court would be prepared to
receive written statements from them within a time-limit fixed at 30 Octo-
ber 1981by an Order of the President dated 6 August 1981.
5. At the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, theActing
President of the Court, by Order of 8 October 1981,extended that time-limit to
30November 1981.
6. Withinthe time-limit assoextended,writtenstatements werereceivedfrom
the Governments of France and of the United States of America, and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Court, pursuant to
Article II, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, a state-
ment setting forth the views of Mr. Ivor Peter Mortished, the former staff
rnember to whom the Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal relates. By

a telex message received in the Registry on 2 December 1981 the Secretary-
General informed the Court that he would not be submitting a written state-
ment to the Court other than formally transmitting the observations of
Mr. Mortished.
7. Copies of these statements were on 21 and 23December 1981communi-
cated to the United Nations and to the States to which the communication
provided for in Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute had been addressed.
8. By letter of 1March 1982,France and theUnited States ofAmerica, aswell
as the United Nations, were informed that the Court, pursuant to Article 66,
paragraph 4, of its Statute, had decided to permit any State or organization
having presented or transmitted a written statement to submit comments in

writing on the statement made or transmitted by any other, and had fixed
15April 1982asthe time-limit for thesubmission of such comments. Within the
said time-limit,written conlments were received inthe Registry fromFranceand
from the United States of America. The Secretary-Generalalso transmitted to
thecourt a letter from counsel for Mr. Mortishedindicating that he didnot wish
to comment on the statements presented.

9. 011 19and 21 April 1982the Registrar transmitted to the United Nations
and to the States to which the communication provided for in Article 66, para-
graph 2, of the Statute had been addressed, copies of the written comments of
Franceand the United States of America, and informed them that theCourtdid
not intend to hold any sitting for the purpose of hearing oral statements or

comments in the case.

10. The Judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Judge-
ment No. 273) which was the subject of the application to the Committee on
Applicationsfor Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements resulting inthe

present request for advisory opinion was givenon 15May 1981incaseNo. 257,
Mortished v.theSecretary-Generalofthe UnitedNations. The facts of that case, as
found by theAdministrativeTribunal, werebrieflyas follows.Mr. Mortished, an
Irish national, entered the service of the International Civil Aviationganiza-
tion (ICAO) on 14 February 1949. In 1958 he was transferred to the United
Nations, and received a permanent appointment as a Translator/Précis-Writer.
On 1April 1967he was transferred from United Nations Headquarters in New
York to the United Nations Office at Geneva. On attaining the age of 60, he
retired from United Nations service on 30 April 1980.A benefit known as theparagraphe 2, du Statut,que la Cour étaitdisposéeà recevoirdes exposés écrits
dans un délaidont, par ordonnance du Présidentrendue le 6 août 1981,ladate
d'expiration avait étéfixée au30 octobre 1981.
5. A la demande du Secrétaire général del'organisation des Nations Unies,

cette date a été reportéeau 30 novembre 1981par ordonnance du Présidenten
exercice rendu le 8octobre 198 1.
6. Dans ledélai ainsi prorogé,les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
et de la République française ont présenté desexposés écritset le Secrétaire
générad le l'organisation desNations Unies atransmisà laCour,conformément
à l'article 11,paragraphe 2, du statut du Tribunal administratif, un exposéde
l'opinion de M. Ivor Peter Mortished, l'ancien fonctionnaire que concerne le
jugement du Tribunal. Par un message télexparvenu au Greffe le 2 décembre
1981, le Secrétaire générala fait savoirà la Cour qu'il ne présenterait pas

d'exposé écrit et sebornerait à transmettre officiellement les observations de
M. Mortished.

7. Desexemplaires des exposésont ététransmis, les21et 23 décembre1981, à
l'organisation des Nations Unies etaux Etatà qui lacommunication prévuepar
l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut avait étéadressée.
8. Par lettre dulei mars 1982les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueet la France, ainsi
que l'organisation des Nations Unies, ont étéavisésque, conformément à
I'article66,paragraphe 4,de son Statut,laCouravait décidéd'autorisertout Etat

ou organisation ayant présenté ou transmis un exposé écrit à soumettre des
observations écrites sur les exposésfaits ou transmis par d'autres et avait fixéau
15avril 1982la date d'expiration du délaipour la présentation de ces observa-
tions. Dans ce délai,le Greffe a reçu des observations écrites des Etats-Unis
d'Amériqueet de la France. Le Secrétaire général deN s ations Unies a d'autre
part transmis à la Cour une lettre du conseil de M. Mortished où celui-ci
indiquait qu'il n'avait pas I'intention de formuler d'observationssur les exposés
présentés.
9. Les 19et 21 avril 1982,le Greffier a transmàl'Organisation des Nations

Unies et aux Etats à qui la communication prévue àl'article 66, paragraphe 2,
du Statut avait étéadressée,le texte des observations écritesdes Etats-Unis
d'Amérique etde la France, en précisant que la Cour n'avait pas I'intention de
tenir audience pour entendre des exposés ou des observations en l'espèce.

10. Lejugement no273duTribunal administratif des Nations Unies, objet de
la demande soumise au Comité des demandes de réformation dejugements du
Tribunal administratif qui a abouti la présente requêtpour avis consultatif,a
étérendule 15mai 1981dans l'affaire no257 Mortishedc. leSecrétairegénéradle
l'organisationdes Nations Unies. Les faits de I'espèce,tels qu'ils ressortent des
attendus du Tribunal administratif, peuvent se résumer commesuit. M. Mor-

tished, de nationalité irlandaise, entre le 14février1949au service de l'organi-
sation de l'aviation civile internationale (OACI). En 1958il est mutéI'Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies où il est engagé à titre permanent en qualité de
traducteur-rédacteur de comptesrendus analytiques. Le lei avril 1967ilest muté
du Siègede l'organisation àNew York à l'OfficedesNations Unies à Genève.Il
prend sa retraite le 30 avril 1980,ayant atteint l'âgede soixante ans. Une prime"repatriation grant" is payable in certain circumstances to staff members at the
time of their separationfrom service, under United Nations Staff Regulation 9.4,

and Annex IV to the Staff Regulations, which provide as follows :

"Regulation 9.4 : The Secretary-General shall establish a scheme for the

payment of repatriation grants within the maximum rates and under the
conditions specified in annex IV to the present Regulations."
"AnnexIV

REPATRIATION GRANT
In principle, the repatriation grant shall be payable to staff members
whom the Organization is obligated to repatriate. The repatriation grant
shall not, however, be paid to a staff member who is summarily dismissed.
Detailed conditions and definitions relating to eligibility shall be deter-

mined by the Secretary-General. The amount of the grant shall be propor-
tional to the length of service with the United Nations, as follows :"

(Annex IV continues with a table of the amount of thegrant according to
length of "continuous service away from home country".)

The grant was established by General Assembly resolution 470 (V) of 15De-
cember 1950, following the abolition of an expatriation allowance which was
paid annually. The "detailed conditions and definitions" referred to in Annex IV
were laid down by the Secretary-General in Staff Rule 109.5.When Mr. Mor-
tished joined United Nations service in 1958 by transfer from ICAO, he had
received from the United Nations Office of Personnel a personnel action form

stating :"Service recognized ascontinuous from 14February 1949"and "Credit
towards repatriation grant commences on 14February 1949".

11. At the time of Mr. Mortished's retirement, the United Nations General
Assembly had recently adopted two successiveresolutions relating to (interulia)
the repatriation grant. By resolution 33/119 of 19December 1978,the General
Assembly decided

"that payment of the repatriation grant to entitled staff members shall be
made conditional upon thepresentation by the staff member of evidence of
actual relocation, subject to the terms to be established by the [International
Civil Service] Commission ;"

that is to Say,evidence that upon separation, the staff member was not con-
tinuing to reside in the country of his last duty station. Pursuant to this reso-
lution, the International Civil ServiceCommission established a text with a view
to the modification of the Staff Rule governing the repatriation grant, which had
not previously contained any requirement for evidence of this kind to be pro-
duced. This text was giveneffect from 1July 1979by the Secretary-General, first

byAdministrativeInstruction ST/A1/262 of 23April 1979,and subsequently by
an amendment to Staff Rule 109.5circulated on 22August 1979.Paragraphs (d)
and (fl of the new text of that Rule provided that :dite (prime de rapatriement ))est payable dans certainscas aux fonctionnaires

au moment de la cessation de service en vertu de l'article 9.4 du statut du
personnel de l'Organisation desNations Unies et de l'annexe IVauditstatut, qui
disposent :
(Article 9.4.- LeSecrétairegénéralfixeub narèmepour leversement des

primes de rapatriement dans les limites des maximums indiqués à l'an-
nexe IV du présent statut et aux conditions prévuesdans cette annexe. ))
((Annexe IV

PRIME DE RAPATRIEMENT
Ont droit, en principe,à la prime de rapatriement les fonctionnaires que
l'organisation est tenue de rapatrier. La prime de rapatriement n'est tou-

tefois pas versée dans le cas d'un fonctionnaire renvoyésans préavis. Les
conditions et définitions concernant le droit a cette prime sont fixéesde
façon détailléepar le Secrétaire généralL . e montant de la prime est pro-
portionnel au temps que l'intéresséa passéau servicede l'Organisation des
Nations Unies et est calculé d'après le barèmesuivant :

(Suit un barème des primes verséesen fonction du nombre d'oannées
de service continu hors du pays d'origine D.)
La prime de rapatriement a étéinstituée par l'Assemblée générale dans sa

résolution 470 (V) du 15 décembre 1950, pour remplacer l'indemnité d'expa-
triation qui était auparavant payéeannuellement. Les conditions et défini-
tions))détailléesvisées à l'annexe IV ont étéfixéespar le Secrétaire général
dans la disposition 109.5du règlementdu personnel. En 1958,lorsque M. Mor-
tished est entré a l'organisation des Nations Unies venant de I'OACI, les ser-
vices du personnel de l'ONU lui ont remis une formule de mouvement de
personnel portant les indications suivantes :«Service recognized as continuous

from 14 February 1949 » et « Credit towards repatriation grant commenceson
14 February 1949 ».
11. Peu de temps avant le départ à la retraite de M. Mortished, l'Assemblée
générale avaitadoptésuccessivementdeux résolutionsquitraitaient, entre autres
sujets, de la prime de rapatriement. Par sa résolution 33/ 119 du 19décembre
1978l'Assembléeavait décidéce qui suit :

((le paiement de laprime de rapatriement auxfonctionnairesqui peuvent y
prétendre sera subordonnée à la présentation, par les intéressés,de pièces
attestant leur changement effectif de résidence, selon les modalités qui
seront établies par la Commission [de la fonction publique internatio-
nale] D.

Autrement dit, lespiècesviséesdevaient établirque lesfonctionnaires intéressés
ne continuaient pas àrésiderdans lepays de leur dernier lieu d'affectation après
la cessation de service. La Commission de la fonction publique internationale,
conformément à cette résolution,établitun texte en vue de modifier la dispo-

sition du règlementdu personnel régissantlaprime de rapatriement qui, jusque-
là, ne prévoyait pas la présentation de ces pièces justificatives. Le Secrétaire
généralmit ce texte en vigueur à compter du leTjuillet 1979,d'abord en distri-
buant le23 avril 1979l'instruction administrative ST/AI/262, puis en modifiant
le22 août 1979la disposition 109.5du règlementdu personnel, dont lesalinéas d)
et flétaient désormais ainsi libellés : "(d) Paynîent of therepatriation grant shallbe subject to the provision by
the former staff member of evidence of relocation away from the country of
the last duty station. Evidence of relocation shall be constituted by
mentary evidence that the former staff member has established residence in
a country otherthan that of the last duty station."

"(f N otwithstanding paragraph (d) above, staff members already in
servicebefore 1July 1979shall retain the entitlement to repatriation grant
proportionate to the years and months of service qualifying for the grant
which they already had accrued at that date without the necessity of pro-
duction of evidence of relocation with respect to such qualifying ser-
vice."

In the case of Mr. Mortished, who had accrued the maximum qualifying service
(12 years) well before 1July 1979,paragraph (fl would have totally exempted
him from the requirement as to evidence of relocation.
12. On 17December 1979,however, the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tion 34/ 165 by which it decidedinter alia,hat:

"effective 1January 1980no staff member shall be entitled to any part of
the repatriation grant unless evidence of relocation away from the country
of the last duty station is provided".

On 21 December 1979the Secretary-General accordingly issued Administrative
InstructionST/AI/269, amending Administrative Instruction ST/AI/262 with
effectfrom 1January 1980 ;its effect wasto abolish the transitional provision of
Staff Rule 109.5 (f qluoted above. Even before Mr. Mortished retired on
30 April 1980,he had appealed to the Joint Appeals Board established by Staff
Rule 111,with a viewto claiming a right to repatriation grant withoutproducing
evidenceof relocation, and requested the agreement of the Secretary-General for
direct submission of an application to the Administrative Tribunalder Arti-
cle 7, paragraph1,of the Statute of the Tribunal. That was agreed to, but in the
meantime, on Mr. Mortished's retirement, the Secretariat had refused to make
payment to him of the repatriation grant without evidence of relocation.
Mr. Mortished seised the Administrative Tribunal of an appeal on 10 Octo-
ber 1980. In the meantime Administrative Instruction ST/AI/269 had been

followed up by a revised edition of the Staffles, with the deletion of para-
graph (fl of Rule 109.5.ByJudgement No. 273 the Tribunal decided, for reasons
to be examined below. that :

"By making payment of the Applicant's repatriation grant conditional on
theproduction of evidence ofrelocation, the Respondent failed to recognize
the Applicant's acquired right, which heeld by virtue of the transitional
system in force from 1July to 31 December 1979and setforth in Staff Rule

109.50."
The Tribunal recognized that Mr. Mortished "was entitled to receive that grant
on the terms defined in Staff Rule 109.5 despite the fact that that rule was no
longer in force on the date of [his]separation from the United Nations", and was
therefore entitled to compensation for thenjury sustained "as the result of a (id) Le paiement de la prime de rapatriement est subordonné à la pré-
sentation, par l'ancien fonctionnaire, de pièces attestant qu'il change de
résidenceen s'installant dans un pays autre que celui de son dernier lieu
d'affectation. Est acceptéecommepreuvedu changement de résidencetoute
pièceattestant que l'ancienfonctionnaire a établi sa résidencedans un pays

autre que celui de son dernier lieu d'affectation. 1)
((flNonobstant l'alinéad) ci-dessus, les fonctionnaires ayant pris leurs
fonctionsavant le leijuillet 1979conservent le droitau montant de la prime
qui correspond aux années et aux mois de service ouvrant droit à ladite
prime déjà accomplis àcettedate,sans avoir à produire, ence qui concerne

cette période de service, une pièce attestant leur changement de rési-
dence. D

M. Mortished ayant accumulébien avant le lerjuillet 1979le nombre maximum
d'annéesde serviceprises en comptepour laprime(douze ans), I'alinéafll'aurait
complètement exemptéde l'obligation de faire la preuve de sa réinstallation.
12. Le 17décembre1979,cependant, l'Assembléegénéraleadopta la résolu-

tion34/165, par laquelle elle prenait entre autres la décisionsuivante :
((avec effet au lei janvier 1980, les fonctionnaires n'ont droit à aucun
montant au titre de la prime de rapatriement à moins qu'ils ne présentent

des piècesattestant qu'ilsseréinstallentdans un pays autre que celui de leur
dernier lieu d'affectation n.
Le 21 décembre 1979le Secrétairegénéralpublia en conséquence l'instruction

administrative ST/AI/269 portant modification de l'instruction administrative
ST/A1/262 avec effet au leijanvier 1980.Cette nouvelleinstruction avait pour
objet d'abroger la disposition transitoire précitée (disposition 109.5fi). Avant
mêmede prendre sa retraite le 30 avril 1980,M. Mortished avait saisi la com-
mission paritaire de recours prévue par la disposition 111 du règlement du
personnel d'une requête revendiquantle droit au bénéficede la prime de rapa-
triement sans avoir à justifier de la réinstallation,et avait demandéau Secrétaire
générald'accepter que cette requêtefût directement soumise au Tribunal admi-

nistratif ainsi que l'envisagel'article 7,paragraphe 1,du statutdu Tribunal, ce à
quoi le Secrétairegénéralavait consenti. A son départ à la retraite, le Secrétariat
refusa à M. Mortished leversement de la prime de rapatriement en l'absence de
preuve de la réinstallation. M. Mortished saisit le Tribunal administratif le
10octrobre 1980.Entre-temps, l'instruction administrative ST/AI/269 avait été
suivie d'une revision du règlement du personnel comportant la suppression de
I'alinéaflde la disposition 109.5.Le Tribunal seprononça comme suit dans son

jugement no273, pour des motifs qui seront examinésplus loin :
(iEn subordonnant le versement de la prime de rapatriement au requé-
rant à la production d'une pièceattestant son changement de résidence,le
défendeur a méconnu le droit acquis du requérant résultant pour lui du

régimetransitoire énoncédans la disposition 109.5fl en vigueur du leijuil-
let au 31 décembre 1979. IF
Le Tribunal concluait que M. Mortished (iétait en droit de recevoir cette prime

dans les conditions qui avaient étédéfiniespar la disposition 109.5 fl,bien que
celle-ci ait cesséd'êtreen vigueur àla date à laquelle le requéranta terminéses
services à l'organisation des Nations Unies 1);il étaitdonc en droit d'obtenirdisregard of Staff Regulation 12.1 and Staff Rule 112.2(a)". That Regulation
and that Rule providepas follows :

"Regulation 12.1 : These Regulations may be supplemented or arnended
by the General Assembly, without prejudice to the acquired rights of staff
members."
"Rule 112.2

AMENDMENT OF . ..STAFF RULES
(a) These rules may be amended by the Secretary-General in a manner
consistent with the Staff Regulations."

The injury wasassessed at the amount of therepatriation grant of which payment
was refused.

13. On 15June 1981,the United States of America addressed a letter to the
Acting Legal Counsel of the United Nations by way of application to the

Committee on Applications for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements,
under Article 11,paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Tribunal, asking the Com-
mittee to request an advisory opinion of the Court. The text of that application
is set out in paragraph 39 below. In accordance with the Provisional Rules of
Procedure of the Committee, a copy of the application was transmitted to
counsel for Mr. Mortished, and written comments on it were submitted on his
behalf to the Committee on 23 June 1981.A copy was also transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who advised the Committee on
23June 1981that he was not availing himself of his right under the Provisional
Rules of Procedure to submit comments on the application.

14. The Committee considered the application at two meetings held on 9 and
13July 1981. Counsel for Mr. Mortished had requested that he be given the
opportunity to participate in al1the proceedings of the Committee ; that he be
permitted to make statements to the Committee ; that the sessions of the Com-
mittee be open ;that the proceedings of the Committee be duly recorded ;and
that an official transcript of the record be made available to him (A/AC.86/
R.lOO,p. 3). The Committee decided, without a vote, that its discussions should
berecorded on tape, and that "if the United Statesapplication is accepted", they
would be "transcribed and distributed to the members of the Committee, to the
parties concerned in Mr. Mortished's case" and to the Court (A/AC.86(XX)/

PV.l, pp. 12, 13-15 ; A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 63). A proposal by the represen-
tative of the United Kingdom that theCommittee invite Mr. Mortished's counsel
to be present during the Committee's consideration of the application before it
and that, if necessary, he be permitted to make a statement, was rejected by the
Committee by 5votes to 2, with 9abstentions ;the representative of the United
States did not participate in the vote.
15. After members of the Committee had presented their viewson the appli-
cation presented by theUnited States, the Chairman requested theCommittee to
indicate whether there was a substantial basis for the application within the
meaning of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal on the

ground that the AdministrativeTribunal had erred on a question of law relatingréparationdu préjudice <(subi ..du fait de laméconnaissancede l'article 12.1du
statut dupersonnel et deladisposition 112.2 u)du règlementdu personnel ))dont

le texte est le suivant :
Article 12.1 - Les dispositions du présentstatut peuvent êtrecomplé-

téesou amendéespar l'Assembléegénérale s,ns préjudice desdroits acquis
des fonctionnaires.
<(Disposition 112.2

AMENDEMENTS ...AU RÈGLEMENT DU PERSONNEL
u) Le Secrétaire générap leut apporter au présent règlement les amen-

dements compatibles avec le statut du personnel. ))

Le préjudice était évalué aumontant de la prime de rapatriement dont le
versement avait étérefusé.

13. Le 15juin 1981les Etats-Unis d'Amérique adressèrent au conseillerjuri-
dique par intérimde l'organisation des Nations Unies une lettre dont l'objet
étaitde saisir, conformément à l'article Il, paragraphe 1,du statut du Tribunal,
leComitédesdemandes de réformationdejugements du Tribunal administratif

desNations Unies, afin qu'il prie la Cour de donner un avis consultatif. Le texte
de cette demande est reproduit au paragraphe 39 ci-après. Conformément au
règlement intérieur provisoire du Comité, copiede la demande fut remise au
conseil de M. Mortished, au nom de qui des observations écrites sur ladite
demande furent soumisesau Comitéle23juin 1981.Copie fut également remise
au Secrétairegénéradle l'organisation des Nations Unies qui, le23juin 1981,fit
savoir au Comitéqu'il ne se prévaudrait pas du droit que lui reconnaissait le

règlement intérieurprovisoire de présenter des observations.
14. Le Comitéexamina la demande au cours de deux séances,les9et 13juillet
1981.Leconseil de M. Mortished avait demandé : àêtreprésent à tous lesstades
de laprocédure du Comité ; àpouvoir faire desdéclarationsdevant celui-ci ;que
les séancesdu Comité soient publiques ;que les délibérationssoient enregis-
trées ; qu'une transcription officielle des débats soit mise à sa disposition

(A/AC.86/R.100, p. 3).LeComitédécidasans vote quelesdélibérationsseraient
enregistréessur bande magnétique etque, <(au cas où la requêtedes Etats-Unis
serait reçue O, l'enregistrement serait transcrit et distribué aux membres du
Comité, aux parties impliquées dans le cas de M. Mortished et à la Cour
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I, p. 6-7 ;A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 35) ;une proposition du
représentant du Royaume-Uni, tendant à ce que le Comitéinvite le conseil de

M. Mortished à assisteraux débatssur la demande et àyprendre éventuellement
la parole, fut rejetéepar le Comité par 5 voix contre 2, avec 9 abstentions, le
représentant des Etats-Unis ne prenant pas part au vote.

15. Après que les membres du Comité eurent débattu de la demande des

Etats-Unis, le président mit aux voix la question de savoir si cette demande
reposait sur des bases sérieuses au sens,de l'article 11 du statut du Tribunal
administratif au motif que le Tribunal aurait commis une erreur de droit
concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies. Le Comitédécidato the provisionsof the Charter of the UnitedNations.The Committeeagreed,
by a vote of 14to2,with 1 abstention,that therewasa substantialbasisfor the
application on that ground. The Chairman then requested the Comrnitteeto
indicate whether there was a substantial basis for the applicationwithin the
meaning of Article 11 of the Statute of the AdministrativeTribunal on the
ground that the AdministrativeTribunal had exceededitsjurisdiction or com-
petence.TheCommitteeagreedbyavoteof 10to 2,with 6abstentions,thatthere
wasa substantialbasisfor the applicationon that ground.Neitherof thosetwo
grounds,nor any of the groundsstated in Article 11 of the Tribunal'sStatute,
had been mentioned, at least in the form in which they are enumerated
in that Article,in the United States application communicatedto Mr. Morti-
shed.The formulationof the questionto beput to the Courtwasthen adopted,
without a vote being taken, as set out in the applicationof the United States
of America.

16. The Court will begin by considering whether it is competent to
comply with this request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Com-
rnitteeon Applications for ReviewofAdministrative TribunalJudgements
(hereinafter called "the Committee"), and whether it should exercise its

discretion to do so.It isthe secondrequest whichhas been submitted under
the terms of Article 11,paragraphs 1and 2, of the Statute of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal which provide as follows :
"1. If a member State, the Secretary-General or the person in
respect of whom a judgement has been rendered by the Tribunal
(including any one who has succeeded to that person's rights on his
death) objects to the judgement on the ground that the Tribunal has
exceeded itsjurisdiction of competence or thattheTribunal has failed
to exercisejurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law

relating to the provisions of the Charter of theUnited Nations, orhas
committed a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a
failure of justice, such member State, the Secretary-General or the
person concerned may, within thirty days from thedate of thejudge-
ment, make a written application to the Committee established by
paragraph 4 of ths article asking the Comrnittee to request an advi-
sory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter.
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under
paragraph 1of this article, the Committee shall decide whether or not
there is a substantial basis for the application. If the Committee
decides that such abasis exists, it shallrequest an advisory opinion of
the Court,and the Secretary-General shall arrange to transmit to the
Court the views of the person referred to in paragraph 1."

It is however the first such request to arise from the Committee's consid-
eration of an application by a member State. It therefore raises problems
relating to the general aspects of the review procedure and also some
specific problems concerning the fact that the request now before thepar 14voix contre 2, avec 1abstention, que la demande ieposait sur des bases
sérieusespour cemotif.Leprésidentpria ensuiteleComité dediresila demande
reposait sur des bases sérieusesau sens de l'article11 du statut du Tribunal
administratif au motif que le Tribunal aurait outrepassésa juridiction ou sa
compétence.Le Comitédécidapar 10voixcontre 2, avec6 abstentions, que la
demande reposait sur desbases sérieuses pour ce motif.Ni l'unni l'autre deces
deux motifs - ni aucun autre motif viséà l'article11du statut du Tribunal-
n'avaitétémentionné,aumoins souslaformeoùilsseprésententdanscetarticle,
dans la demande des Etats-Unis communiquée à M. Mortished. C'estdans la
rédactionquiluiétaitdonnéedanscettedemandequelaquestionposée àlaCour
fut alors adoptée sansvote.

16. La Cour recherchera d'abord sielle a compétencepourdonner suite
àlarequêtepour avis consultatif présentéepar le Comitédes demandes de
réformation de jugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies
(appelé ci-aprèsle Comité) et si elle doit exercer son pouvoir discrétion-
naire de le faire. Il s'agit de la seconde requête qui lui ait étéadresséeen

vertu des dispositions de l'article 11, paragraphes 1 et2, du statut du
Tribunal, dont le texte est le suivant :
<<1. Si un Etat Membre, le Secrétairegénéralou la personne qui a

étél'objet d'un jugement rendu par le Tribunal (y compris toute
personnequi a succédé mortis causa àses droits) contestele jugement
en alléguant que le Tribunal a outrepassé sa juridiction ou sa com-
pétence ou n'a pas exercésa juridiction ou a commis une erreur de
droit concernant lesdispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies ou a
commis, dans la procédure, une erreur essentielle qui a provoqué un

mal-jugé,cet Etat Membre, le Secrétaire généralou l'intéressé peut,
dans les trente jours suivant le jugement, demander par écrit au
Comité crééen vertu du paragraphe 4 du présent article de prier la
Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur la
question.

2. Dans les trentejours suivant la réceptionde lademande viséeau
paragraphe 1 du présent article, le Comité décidesi cette demande
repose sur des bases sérieuses.S'il en décideainsi, ilprie la Cour de
donner un avis consultatif et le Secrétairegénéralprend les disposi-
tions voulues pour transmettre àlaCour l'opinion de lapersonne visée

au paragraphe 1. ))
Toutefois c'est la première requêtede ce genre qui fasse suite à l'examen
par leComitéd'une demande émanantd'un Etat Membre. Ellepose donc à
la fois des problèmes liésaux aspects généraux de cette procédure de

réformation et des problèmes spécifiquestenant àce que larequêtedont laCourt is the outcome of an application by the Government of the United
States.
17. In 1973, when giving its Advisory Opinion on the Applicationfor
ReviewofJudgement No. 158ofthe UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal,

the Court envisaged a situation of this kind, though it was then no more
than ahypothesis. On that occasion,theadvisoryproceedings had been set
in train by a staff member's application to the Committee, and the Court
wascareful to stress that its conclusionsregarding the compatibility of the
review procedure with the requirements of the judicial process were to be
understood as applying to a case of that nature. It did not, of course,
overlook the fact that a similar request for an advisory opinion might, by
the terms of Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal,
originate in a decision taken by the Committee on the application of a
member State. However, during the debates in the General Assembly in
1955,at the time of adoption of the procedure in question, various argu-
ments had been put forward against the propriety of the provision making
thispossible.This introduced "additional considerations which would cal1
for close examination bv the Court if it should receive a reauest for an
opinion resulting from an application to the Committee by a member
State" (I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 178,para. 31). Those considerations were
"without relevance" in the 1973 proceedings, so that it was not then

necessary for theCourt to evaluatethembefore reachingits decision on the
advisory opinion requested of it. It therefore stated that it was not to be
understood as "expressing any opinion in regard to any future proceedings
instituted under Article 11by a member State" (ibid.).Hence the Advisory
Opinion given by the Court on the Applicationfor Review of Judgement
No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal is relevant to its
approach tothepresent request on twomaincounts :because that Opinion
recognized that it would be incumbent upon the Court to examine the
features characteristic of any request for advisory opinion the Committee
decides to submit at the prompting of a member State, and because it
indicated that theCourt should bear in mind durin" that examination not
only the considerations applying to the review procedure in general but
also the "additional considerations" proper to the specific situation
created by the interposition of a mernber State in the review process.

18. The Court of course will not fail to discharge that duty. It will
consider the problems raised by the present request in the light of the

considerations previously discussed in its 1973Advisory Opinion and of
those whichit finds relevant to the present case. To that end, it must recall
those considerations which it found important for the above-mentioned
Opinion and then add those arising from the specialcharacteristics of the
present advisory proceedings. This will enable it to proceed to an exami-
nation of the coursein fact taken by the proceedingsleading to the present
request, in the light of the considerations in question.
19. In the Advisory Opinion of 1973, the Court pointed out that the
terms in Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal could notCour est maintenant saisie fait suiteà la demande du Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis.
17. Une telle situation, alors qu'elle n'étaitencorequ'une éventualité,a
étéévoquéepar la Cour lorsqu'elle a statuéen 1973 sur la Demande de

réformationdujugement no158du Tribunaladministratif desNations Unies.
Cette procédureconsultative,en effet, avait étéprovoquéepar la demande
d'un fonctionnaire adressée au Comité. La Cour a pris alors soin de
souligner que c'étaitàpropos d'un cas de cegenre que devaients'entendre
les conclusions auxquelles elle parvenait quant à la compatibilité de la
procédurede réformation avec les exigences d'une bonne justice. Certes,
ellen'oubliait pasqu'une semblable demande d'avisconsultatif pouvait,en
vertu de l'article 11du statut du Tribunal administratif, faire suite une
décisiondu Comitéagissant à la demande d'un Etat Membre. Mais au

cours desdébats de l'Assemblée générale e,n 1955,au moment de l'adop-
tion decette procédure,divers arguments avaient étéavancéscontre l'op-
portunité de la disposition prévoyant une telle possibilité. Cesarguments
faisaientintervenirdes <<considérationsadditionnelles que la Cour devrait
soigneusement examiner si elle était unjour saisied'une requêtepour avis
consultatif sur demande adressée auComitéparun Etat Membre )>(C.I.J.
Recueil 1973,p. 178,par. 31). Lesdites considérations étaient (<sans per-
tinence )>dans l'affaire de 1973, de sorte que la Cour n'avait pas à les
évaluerpour prendre sa décisionsur l'avis consultatif qui lui étaitdeman-
dé.Ellea donc conclu qu'ilnefallaitpas considérer qu'elleexprimait (une

opinion à l'égardd'une procédure quiserait engagée à l'avenirpar un Etat
Membre en vertu de l'article 11 )>(ibid.).Ainsi l'avis consultatif rendu par
la Cour au sujet de la Demande de réformationdu jugement no 158 du
Tribunaladministratif desNations Unies intéresse lasolution de laquestion
présentementposée à la Cour à deux titresprincipaux : parce que cet avis
consultatif a reconnu le devoir qui incomberait àla Cour de se livrerà un
examen des traits caractéristiques qu'aurait une demande d'avis consul-
tatif intervenant sur décisiondu Comitéprovoquéepar l'initiative d'un
Etat Membre, et parce qu'il a indiqué que, au cours de l'examen en

question, la Cour devrait avoir l'esprit,outre lesconsidérationsvalablesà
l'égardde laprocédurederéformation engénéralc ,elles<<additionnelles)),
qui correspondent aux spécificitésde la situation crééepar l'interposition
d'un Etat Membre dans le processus de réformation.
18. La Cour n'entend évidemment pas se dérober à ce devoir. Elle
examinera les problèmes que pose la présente demande à la lumièredes
considérationsqu'elle avaitdéjàdégagéed sans sonavisconsultatif de 1973
et decellesquiluiparaissent pertinentes dans lecasprésent.Pour cela,illui
faut rappeler ces considérationsqu'elle avaitjugéesimportantespour son

avis susmentionné, puis y ajouter celles que les spécificitésde la présente
procédure consultativeappelleraient. Ellepourra alors examiner ledérou-
lement, dans lesfaits, delaprocédurequi aabouti àlaprésente requête,par
rapport aux considérations ainsi retenues.
19. Dans son avis consultatif de 1973, la Cour avait rappelé que les
dispositions de l'article 11 du statut du Tribunal administratif n'avaient havehad the effectofchanging the nature of the Court's task under its own
Statute, the character of its functions or its manner of discharging them.
The Court therefore had a duty to ascertain whether the procedure in
whichitwascalledupon to play an essentialpart wastrulycompatible with
its task, its functions and the ways they are to be discharged. That meant
that it had to satisfy itself that this system enabling Administrative Tri-
bunal judgements to be reviewed by the indirect means of an advisory
opinion wascompatible with the provisions of the UnitedNationsCharter
and the Statute of the Court, and with the requirements of the judicial
process. As the necessity for the Court to make this assessment does not
depend on whether it was on the application of a staff member, the
Secretary-General or a member State that the Committee decided to

request an advisory opinion, the Court may for present purposes confine
itself to reiterating its previously adopted position.
20. In considering whether the review procedure was compatible with
the Charter, more especially Article 96, the Court first examined certain
doubtsthat had been expressed as to the legalityof employingits advisory
function in connection with the reviewof Administrative Tribunal judge-
ments. It found that there wasno reason for it todepart from theposition it
had adopted in agreeing to giveadvisory opinions on the Effect ofAwards
ofCompensation Madebythe UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal(1.C.J.
Reports1954,p. 47),andon Judgments ofthe Administrative Tribunalofthe
IL0 upon Complaints Made against Unesco(I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 77),
even though the questions laid before it in those cases had concerned the
rights of private individuals. In this respect the Court confirms its earlier
position that "The merefact that it is not the rights of States which are in
issue in the proceedings cannot suffice to deprive the Court of a compe-
tence expresslyconferred on it by its Statute" (I.C.J. Reports 1973,p. 172,
para. 14).The fact that a request for an advisoryopinion derives,asit does
inthe present case, fromthe initiative of a member Stateand not from an
application by a staff member, as in the Advisory Opinion of 1973,does
not raise any additional considerations such as to modify the Court's
reasoning asto thecompatibility withtheCharter of itsexercisingadvisory
jurisdiction in such cases. The considerations contemplated by the Court

in 1973as calling for closeexamination in the event of a request from the
Committeemade on the application of a member State, werenot broached
in thecontext ofthequestion of the Court'scompetenceto givethe opinion
requested. Theyrelate tothequestion whether thisfeature ofthe procedure
established by Article 11is of such a character as should lead the Court,
althoughcompetent, to decline to answer the request (I.C.J. Reports1973,
p. 175,para. 24, and p. 178,para. 31), and will be considered below.

21. It is however a precondition of the Court's competence that the
advisory opinionbe requested by an organ duly authorizedto seekit under
the Charter, thatit be requested on alegalquestion, andthat, exceptin the
caseof the General Assemblyorthe SecurityCouncil, that questionshouldpas pu avoir pour effet de modifier la mission confiée à la Cour par son
propre Statut, ni le caractère de ses fonctions, ni la manière dont elle les
exerçait. La Cour avait donc le devoir d'examiner si la procédure dans
laquelle illui étaitdemandédejouer un rôle essentiel étaitbien compatible
avec cette mission, ces fonctions et les modalitésprévuespour leur exer-

cice. Cela signifiait qu'elle devait s'assurer que ce systèmede réformation
desjugements du Tribunal administratif par le biais d'un avis consultatif
était compatibleavecles dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unieset du
Statut de la Cour, ainsi qu'avec les exigences d'une bonne justice. La
nécessitéd'une telleévaluationdelapart dela Cour étantindépendantede
ceque la requêtepouravisconsultatif a pu êtreadoptéepar le Comité à la
suite de la saisine de celui-ci par un fonctionnaire, le Secrétaire généraolu
un Etat Membre, la Cour peut se borner à réaffirmer,à propos de la
présente demande, la position qu'elle a prise antérieurement.
20. Dans le cadrede cet examen de la compatibilité de la procédurede
réformation avec la Charte, et notamment avec son article 96, la Cour
s'étaitd'abord préoccupéede doutes qui avaient étéexprimésquant à la
légalitédu recours à sa fonction consultative en relation avec la réforma-

tion dejugements du Tribunal administratif. Elle avait conclu qu'elle ne
voyait pas de raison de s'écarterde l'attitude qu'elle avait adoptéelors-
qu'elle avait acceptéde donner un avis consultatif dans les affaires de
l'Effet dejugements du Tribunaladministratif desNations Uniesaccordant
indemnité(C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 47) et des Jugements du Tribunaladmi-
nistratif de l'OIT sur requêtes contrle'Unesco(C.I.J. Recuei1956, p. 77),
alors cependant que les questions qui lui étaient soumises dans ces cas
intéressaient les droits de particuliers. A cet égardla Cour confirme sa
position antérieureselon laquelle le faitque ce ne sont pas les droits des
Etats qui sont en cause dans la procédurene suffit pasà enleverà la Cour
une compétencequi lui est expressément conférép ear son Statut))(C.I.J.
Recueil 1973, p. 172,par. 14).Le fait qu'une requêtepour avis consultatif
ré~ulte,comme en la présenteespèce,de l'initiative d'un Etat Membre, et

non de la demanded'un fonctionnaire comme dans la procédure consul-
tative de 1973,ne fait pas intervenir de considérations additionnelles de
nature àmodifier l'argumentation relativeà lacompatibilitéavecla Charte
de l'exercice,par la Cour, de sa compétence consultative. Les considéra-
tions mentionnées par la Cour en 1973comme devant êtresoigneusement
examinéesen cas de requêtedu Comité présentée surdemanded'un Etat
Membre n'ont pas été abordéesdans le contexte de la question de la
compétence de la Cour pour rendre l'avis sollicité. Ellesintéressent la
question de savoir si cette caractéristique de la procédure instituéepar
l'article1est denature àinciterla Cour à refuser de répondreà larequête
bien qu'elle soitcompétente (C.I.J. Recueil1973,p. 175,par. 24, et p. 178,
par. 31) et seront envisagéesplus loin.
21. Toutefois, pour que la Cour ait compétence, il faut que l'avis

consultatif soit demandé par un organe dûment habilité à cet effet
conformément à la Charte, qu'il porte sur une questionjuridique et que,
sauf dans le cas de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité,cettebe one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting organ.
Certain doubtshad been expressed in that regard also,but theCourt, in its
1973Advisory Opinion, found that the questions subrnitted to the Court
were legal questions arising within the scope of the Committee's own
activities, and concluded that the Committee on Applications for Review
of Administrative Tribunal Judgements was indeed

"an organ of the United Nations, duly constituted under Articles 7
and 22 of the Charter, and duly authorized under Article 96, para-
graph 2, of the Charter to request advisory opinions of the Court for
the purpose ofArticle 11of the Statute of the United Nations Admin-
istrative Tribunal".

Accordingly the Court declared itself competent under Article 65 of its
Statute (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 175,para. 23). The special features of the
proceedings leading up to the present request for advisory opinion afford
the Court no groundsfor departingfromits previousposition on thepoint
under consideration.

22. After finding that it was competent to give the advisory opinion
requested, the Court inits 1973Opinion recalled the discretionary nature
of the power it might thus exercise. It then considered whether, having
regard to the requirements ofitsjudicial character, to whichit must remain
faithful even in the exerciseof its advisory function, certain aspects of the
procedure laid down in Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal should not lead it to decline to give an advisory opinion (I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 75, para. 24). In the case at present before it, the Court
must undertake the same examination.
23. Having considered certain aspects of the review procedure which
were relevant to its response to the Committee's request, the Court, in the
1973 Advisory Opinion, reached certain conclusions. It noted that the
Committee was a "political organ", vested with functions that were "nor-

mally discharged by a legal body" and were to be regarded as "quasi-
judicial" in character. But as the Court explained
"there is no necessary incompatibility between the exercise of these
functions by a political body and the requirements of the judicial
process ... the compatibility or othenvise of any given system of
review with the requirements of the judicial process depends on the
circumstances and conditions of each particular system" (I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 176,para. 25).

The Court considers that the findings whch it thus expressed in its earlier
Advisory Opinion remain wholly relevant to the determination of its
proper response to the request now before it. It regards it as a highly
important principle that the requirements of thejudicial processshould be
observed not only during the two sets ofjudicial proceedings (one beforequestion se pose dans le cadre de l'activitéde cet organe. Des doutes

avaient égalementétéexpriméssur ce point, mais dans son avis consul-
tatif de 1973la Cour a conclu que les questions qui lui étaient soumises
étaient des questionsjuridiques se posant dans le cadre de l'activitédu
Comité et que celui-ci étaitbien

(<un organe de l'organisation des Nations Unies dûment constituéen
vertu des articles7 et 22 de la Charte et dûment autorisé, conformé-
ment à l'article 96, paragraphe 2, de cet instrument,à demander à la
Cour des avisconsultatifs auxfins del'article 11du statut du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies )).

En conséquencela Cour s'était déclaréceompétenteenvertu de l'article 65
de son Statut (C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 175,par. 23). Les spécificitésde la
procédure ayant conduit à l'actuelle requête pour avis consultatif ne
constituent pas, pour la Cour, un motif de modification de la position
antérieurement prise par elle sur le point considéré.

22. La Cour, ayant admis qu'elle était compétente pourdonner l'avis
consultatif demandé, a rappelé dans sa décision de 1973 le caractère
discrétionnaire du pouvoir qu'elle exerçait ainsi. Elle a alors examiné si
certains aspects de la procédure prévuepar l'article 11 du statut du Tri-
bunal administratif ne devaient pas l'inciter à refuser de rendre l'avis
consultatif en question, compte tenu des exigences de son caractèrejudi-
ciaire,auxquelles elle doit rester fidèlemême dans l'exercicede sa fonction
consultative (C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 175,par. 24).LaCour doit, dans lecas

qui lui est présentement soumis, se livrer au même examen.
23. Au sujet de certains aspects de la procédurede réformation impor-
tants pour la réponse à donner à la demande du Comité,la Cour a, dans
l'avis consultatif de 1973,dégagéplusieurs conclusions. Elleareconnu que
le Comité est un <<organe politique )),doté de fonctions qui (<sont nor-
malement exercéespar un organejuridique >)et auxquelles on peut même
attribuer un <<caractère quasijudiciaire >).Mais, a dit la Cour :

<<il n'ypas forcément incompatibilitéentre lesexigences de lajustice
et l'exercice de ces fonctions par un organe politique ..le point de
savoir siun systèmede réformationest compatible avecles exigences
de la justice dépend des circonstances et des conditions de ce sys-
tème ))(C.1J. Recueil 1973, p. 176,par. 25).

La Cour considère que ces conclusions exprimées par elle dans l'avis
précité conserventtoute leur pertinence pour la détermination de la
réponsequ'elledoitfaire à la demande dont elleest maintenant saisie.Elle
juge d'une particulière importance que les exigences d'une bonne justice

soient respectéesnon seulement au cours des deux procéduresjudiciairesthe Administrative Tribunal, the other before the Court) but also during
the operation of the political organ with quasi-judicial functions which
furnisheswhat the Court in its earlierAdvisoryOpinion called "a potential
link" between them. It is essential for the Court's decision as to what

response it will make to the request for advisory opinion that the Com-
mittee'spart in theprocessshould be tested against the requirements ofthe
judicial process. As the satisfaction ofthose requirements depends on the
circumstances and conditions of the review system, and of the particular
casein question, theCourt must appraise, interalia,the circumstances and
conditions surroundingthefact that the Committee's partin the process in
the present case was originally set in motion by an application from a
member State.
24. In that connection, the Court, in the present proceedings, is called
upon to ask itself whether the part played by amember State in submitting
an application for review is not tantamount to intervention in the review
processby an entity whichwas not aparty to the originalproceedings. It is
contended in the Written Statement of Mr. Mortished that the proce-
dure

"allowing a third party to raise objections to ajudgement in whch it
hasno legal right or interest and to seek a review of that judgement is
contrary to fundamental principles of the judicial process".

In the first place, the Court observes that although a member State of the
United Nations be not a party to ajudgment rendered by the Adminis-
trative Tribunal in adispute between astaffmember and theOrganization,
it may wellhave a legalinterest in givingrise to areview of the Judgement.
Thisiscertainly so, where, asinthepresent case,the Judgement inquestion
ischallenged on the ground that an error has been committed on a question
of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, that is toyof a treaty to
which this State is a party. Secondly, the Court notes that the respective
roles of a member State which submits an application to the Cornmittee
and of the Committee itself are precisely defined by the Statute of the
Administrative Tribunal. Admittedly, it is the member State which, by
submitting its application to the Committee, gives rise to the Committee's
discussion of that application. Nevertheless, once the Committee has
decided that there is a substantial basis for the application, the request for
advisory opinion comes from the Committee and not from the member

State. The origin of the application which the Committee has to consider,
be it theinitiative of a member State, of the Secretary-General or of a staff
member party to the judgement in question, does not affect the formal
origin of the request submitted to the Court :it is always from the Com-
rnittee thatths request emanates. Besides,if that were not so, asneither a
member State nor the Secretary-General nor a staff member is authorized
by the Charter to request an advisory opinion of the Court, their request
would not be admissible. The Court was in no doubt in 1973 that the
request for an advisory opinion then before it emanated from the Com-(devant le Tribunal administratif puis devant la Cour) mais aussi au stade

du fonctionnement de l'organe politique à fonctions quasijudiciaires qui
assure entre ces deux procédures ce que la Cour a appelé dans son avis
précitéun <(lien potentiel))Laconfrontationde l'intervention du Comité
avecles exigences d'une bonne justice revêtun caractère essentiel pour la
détermination de la réponse que la Cour fera à la requête pour avis
consultatif. Comme la satisfaction de ces exigences dépend des circons-
tances et conditions du systèmede réformation, la Cour doit, parmi ces
circonstances et conditions, apprécier celles qui se rattachent au fait que
l'intervention du Comité a été déclenchéeen l'espècepar une demande
initiale d'un Etat Membre.

24. A cet égard la Cour, dans la présente procédure, est amenée à
rechercher si le rôlejouépar un Etat Membre dans la demande de réfor-
mation ne revient pas à faire intervenir dans cette réformation une entité
qui n'était paspartie auprocèsinitial. Dans sonexposéécritM , . Mortished
soutient que :

((laprocédurequi permet à un tiers decontesterunjugement à l'égard
duquel il n'aaucun droit et aucun intérêtjuridique, et d'en demander
la réformation, est contraire aux principes fondamentaux de la jus-
tice)).

Tout d'abord la Cour observequ'un Etat MembredesNations Unies, bien
qu'il nesoit pas partià unjugement rendu par leTribunal administratif au
sujet d'un litigeopposant un fonctionnaire du Secrétariat à l'organisation,
peut fort bien avoir unintérêtà provoquerlaréformationdecejugement. Il
en est certainement ainsi dans le cas où, comme en la présenteespèce,la
contestation dujugement en question repose sur l'invocation d'une erreur
de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte, c'est-à-dire d'un traité
auquel cet Etat est partie. Par ailleurs la Cour note que les rôles respectifs
de 1'Etat Membre qui adresse une demande au Comité et du Comité
lui-mêmesont définis avec ré ci si nar le statut du Tribunal adminis-

tratif. C'est certainement17Êtat ~emb;e qui, par sa demande adresséeau
Comité,provoque lesdébatsdecelui-cisur cettedemande.Cependant, une
fois que le Comité adécidéquela demande repose sur des bases sérieuses,
la requêtepour avis consultatif émanede lui et non de 1'Etat Membre.
L'origine de la demande dont est saisi le Comité, c'est-à-dire l'initiative
d'un Etat Membre, du Secrétaire générao lu d'un fonctionnaire partie au
premier jugement, est sans influence sur l'origine formelle de la requête
adressée à la Cour :cette requêteémanetoujours du Comité.S'iln'enétait
pas ainsi,du reste, comme ni les Etats Membres ni le Secrétaire généran li
les fonctionnaires ne sont habilitéspar la Charte àdemander à la Cour un

avisconsultatif,leurrequêtene serait par recevable. La Cour n'apas douté
en 1973 que l'avis consultatif qui lui étaitdemandéémanait du Comité,
alors même quela décisionde celui-ci avait étéprise à la demande d'un
fonctionnaire. Elle n'estime pas davantage, dans le cas présent, que lamittee even though the Committee's decision had been taken on the
application of a staff member. It does not consider, in the present case
either, that the request before it emanates from a member State. Thus it
does not consider that this reauest constitutes an intervention. at review

level, of a member State and ience of a third person in relation to the
original proceedings.
25. The Court has also to take a position on two points relating to the
scope of the advisory opinion it is requested to give.On the one hand, the
view has been held that the fact that the Court's advisory opinion is, by
virtue of Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal, to have a conclusiveeffect with respect to the matters in litiga-
tion affords a ground for objecting to the exerciseof the Court's advisory
jurisdiction. The Court, however, in its 1973 Advisory Opinion, after
recalling the position it took on a similar contention based on Article XII
of the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal, in its Advisory Opinion
on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunalof the IL0 upon Cornplaints
Made against Unesco, found that

"the special effect to be attributed to the Court's opinion by Article
Il of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
furnishes no reason for refusing to comply with the request for an
opinion in the present instance" (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 183,
para. 39).

As the origin of the present advisory proceedings is irrelevant to appre-
ciation of thepoint under consideration, the Court confirms the position it
adopted in the matter in the Advisory Opinions of 1956and 1973.
26. On the other hand, in the present proceedings the Government of
the United States, in its written statement, has put forward another point
concerning the scope of the advisory opinion sought of the Court. This
point is not connected with the origin of the present request for advisory
opinion. However,as it was not raised during the advisory proceedings in
1973,it willbe as wellfor theCourt to consider it here. Warning the Court
of the consequences of not complyingwith the request for an opinion, the
Government of the United States made the following observation :

"The Assembly appears to have decided that the United Nations
and the General Assembly will not be bound by an adverse Admin-
istrative Tribunal judgement with respect to which substantial legal
doubt exists [that is to say, if objection has beentaken to thejudge-
ment, and the Committee has found that there is a substantial basis
for the objection] unless the Court sustains the Administrative Tri-
bunal on the law of the matter."

TheUnited States concluded that if theCourt declined to givean opinion,
that would "put in question the status of Judgement No. 273 of the
Administrative Tribunal", with manifest implications for the Court's dis-
cretion to give or to refuse the opinion requested. The Court does not
intend to pronounce on the intentionsimputable to theGeneral Assemblydemande dont elleest saisieémaned'un Etat Membre. Ellene pense donc
pas que cette demande constitue l'intervention, au niveaude la réforma-
tion, d'un Etat Membre qui serait un tiers par rapport au procès ini-
tial.

25. La Cour doit aussi prendre position sur deux points liés àla portée
de l'avis consultatif qu'illui est demandé de rendre. D'une part, selon
certainesopinions, le faitque l'avisrendu par la Courdoit avoir, en vertu

de l'article 11,paragraphe 3,du statut du Tribunal administratif, un effet
décisoire à l'égarddes questions en litige, constituerait une objection à
l'exercicede la compétence consultativede la Cour. Celle-ci,toutefois, a
rappelédans son avis consultatif de 1973la position qu'elle avait prise,
dans son avis relatif aux Jugements du Tribunaladministratifde l'OIT sur
requêtes contre ['Unesco,au sujet d'un argument analogue fondésur l'ar-
ticleXII du statut de ce Tribunal. Elle concluait :

((l'effet spécil uel'article 11du statut duTribunal administratif des
Nations Unies attribue à l'avisde la Cour n'est pas une raison pour
refuser dedonner suite àla demande d'avis consultatifen la présente
espèce ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 183,par. 39).

Comme l'originede la présente procédure consultativenejoue aucun rôle
dans l'appréciationdu point considéré, laCour confirme la position prise
par elle à cet égarddans ses avis de 1956et 1973.
26. D'autre part, au cours de la présente procédure,le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis a, dans son exposé écritm, entionnéun autrepoint relatif à

la portéede I'avisconsultatif qu'il est demandé à la Cour de rendre. Ce
point ne se rattache pas a l'origine de la présentedemande d'avis. Tou-
tefois,commeiln'apas été soulevéaucours delaprocédureconsultativede
1973,il mériteun examen particulier de la part de la Cour. Mettant en
garde celle-cicontre une réponse négative à la requête pouravis, le Gou-
vernement des Etats-Unis affirme :

<<L'Assembléeparaît avoir décidéque ni l'organisation des Na-
tions Unies ni elle-mêmeneseraient tenues par unjugement défavo-
rable du Tribunal administratif qui soulèveraitdes doutesjuridiques
sérieux [c'est-à-diresi, le jugement étant contesté, le Comité avait
estimé que la contestation reposait sur des bases sérieuses] à moins
que la Cour ne confirme la décisiondu Tribunal administratif sur le
droit.)>

11en conclut qu'un refusde la Courdedonner l'avisdemandé (<remettrait
en question le statut du jugement no273 du Tribunal administratif ))ce
qui implique manifestement que la Cour n'aurait pas la facultéde refuser
I'avisdemandé.La Cour n'entend pas prendre position sur les intentions

que l'on peut prêter à l'Assemblée général el'égardde cet aspect de lain regard to this aspect of the reviewprocedure. Nevertheless, the adoption
of that procedure cannot have had the effect of amendingthe provisions of
the Charter or of the Statute of the Court whereby the Court's exercise of
its advisory jurisdiction remains discretionary. The Court would repeat
what it stated in 1956as to the binding force attributed by Article XII of
the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal to the advisory opinion

requested, that the provision in question "in no wise affects the way in
which the Court functions ... Nor does it affect thereasoningby which the
Court formsitsOpinionorthe content of the Opinion itself" (Judgmentsof
the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon Complaints Made against
Unesco,I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 84).TheCourt therefore considers that even
if its giving of an advisory opinion were legally indispensable for ajudge-
ment of the Administrative Tribunal to become final - a point which it
does not have to settle in relation to the present request - this consider-
ation should not prevent it from maintaining unimpaired the discretionary
character of its exercise of advisory jurisdiction.
27. An objection to the givingof an advisory opinion by the Court has
been based by Mr. Mortished on thecontradiction whichhefinds between
the application of the Government of the United States and certain
articles of the Charter concerning the Secretary-General and the Secre-
tariat. He contends that the initiative taken by a member State to seisethe
Committee

"impinges upon the authority of the Secretary-General under Arti-
cle 97of the United Nations Charter as Chief Administrative Officer
of the Organization, and conflicts with Article 100 of the Charter
regarding the 'exclusively international character' of the Secretar-
iat".

He has in particular maintained that the procedure contemplated by
Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal "allows any
member State to forcetheSecretary-Generaltorefrain from accepting and
implementing an otherwise final and binding judgement". The Court
recognizes that an application addressed by a member State to the Com-
mittee, when the Secretary-General has not taken any step of this kind,
will, in a case in which the Committee finds that it should ask for an
advisory opinion of the Court, lead to delay in the judgement of the
Tribunal becoming final. But this effect isnot produced by the application
addressed by the member State to the Comrnittee, which the Committee

can perfectly well reject. The effect in question must be attributed to the
decision of the Committee to seek an advisory opinion from the Court.
This ishoweverjust as much theeffect of the action oftheCommittee when
it is seisedby a staff member as when it is seisedby a member State.When
a member of the Secretariat, dissatisfied with the judgement given by
the Administrative Tribunal, endeavours to set in train a request by the
Committee for an advisory opinion, he also obliges the Secretary-General,
who was satisfied with thejudgement of the Tribunaland waspreparing to
implement it, to refrain from doing so until the judgement has been DEMANDE DE REFORMATION (AVIS CONSULTATIF) 337

procédurede réformation.Toutefoisl'adoption decette procédurene peut
pas avoir eupour effet de modifier les dispositions de la Charteni cellesdu
Statut de la Cour relatives au caractère discrétionnairede l'exercicepar la
Cour de sa fonction consultative. La Cour reprend ici ce qu'elle a dit en
1956 àproposde laforceobligatoire que l'article XII du statut du Tribunal

administratif de l'organisation internationale du Travail attacheà l'avis
demandé, à savoir que cette disposition<n'affecte en rien le mode selon
lequel la Cour fonctionne...ni le raisonnementpar lequel la Cour formera
son opinion, ni le contenu de l'avis lui-même ))(Jugements du Tribunal
administratif del'OIT sur requêtes contre l'Unesco C,.I.J. Recueil 1956,
p. 84).LaCour considèredonc que, même si - cequi n'apas àêtretranché
par elleàpropos de la présentedemande - un avis consultatif de sa part
étaitjuridiquement indispensable pour qu'unjugement du Tribunal admi-
nistratif devienne définitif, cette considération ne devrait pas l'empêcher
de préserverintégralementle caractère discrétionnaire de l'exercicede sa

fonction consultative.
27. Une objection àl'égardd'un avisde la Cour a ététiréepar M. Mor-
tished de la contradiction qu'il voit entre la demande du Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis etcertains articles dela Charte relatifs au Secrétairegénéral
et au Secrétariat.Selonlui,l'initiative prise par un Etat Membre de saisirle
Comité empiéterait

<<sur les pouvoirs conférésau Secrétaire générap lar l'article 97 de la
Charte des Nations Unies, en sa qualitéde plus haut fonctionnaire de
l'organisation et [contredirait] les dispositions de l'article 100 de la
Charte concernant le << caractère exclusivement international ))du
Secrétariat D.

Il a notamment soutenu que la procédureprévuepar l'article 11du statut
du Tribunal administratif permettrait <à n'importe quelEtat Membre de
forcer le Secrétaire général ne pas accepteret appliquer unjugement qui
sanscelaserait définitifetobligatoire.LaCour reconnaît quela demande
qu'un Etat Membre adresse au Comité alorsque le Secrétaire généran l'a
pris aucune mesure de ce genre va conduire, dans le cas où le Comitéjuge
qu'il doit demander un avis à la Cour, à retarder l'acquisition par le
jugement du Tribunal de son caractère définitif.Mais cet effet n'est pas

produit par la demande que 1'Etat Membre adresse au Comité et que
celui-cipeut fort bien rejeter. C'est àla décisiondu Comitéde demander un
avis consultatifà la Cour que l'effet en question doit êtreimputé.Or cet
effet est attribuable l'action du Comitéquand celui-ciest saisiaussi bien
par un fonctionnaire que par un Etat Membre. Lorsqu'un membre du
Secrétariat,mécontentdujugement du Tribunal administratif, s'efforcede
déclencher unedemande d'avis consultatif de la part du Comité,il con-
traint lui aussi le Secrétaire généralq,ui était satisfait du jugement du
Tribunal et s'apprêtait a le mettre en Œuvre, àsurseoir à cette exécution
jusqu'à ce que lejugement soit confirméoumodifié. Il n'y a là que l'effet

normal de la mise enŒuvred'une procédurede réformation. Déclarerque338 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

confirmed or modified. This is no more than the normal effect of the
operation of a review procedure. To Saythat it constitutes an encroach-

ment on the authority of the Secretary-General, and aviolation of Arti-
cle 100of the Charter,amounts to denying thatjudgements of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal which satisfy the Secretary-General may be subjected to
a review procedure. The Court cannot therefore accept Mr. Mortished's
views in this respect.
28. Forthe purposes of thepresent proceedings theCourt doesnot have
to analyse in detail the question of the powers of representing the United
Nations, whch presents aspects which are complex or obscure. It is suf-
ficient forit to find that the competence exercisedby the Committee in the
context ofArticle 11ofthe Statute of theAdministrative Tribunal doesnot
contradict thestatus of the Secretary-General as "the chief administrative
officer of the Organization" (Art. 97 of the Charter), nor to infringe the
"exclusively international character of [his]responsibilities" (Art. 100of
the Charter). Finally, the Court can find no justification for Mr. Mor-
tished'sfurtherclaimthat the staff member in whosefavour thejudgement
was given may, in challenging the views of the member State which dis-

putes thejudgement, bejeopardized inthe performance of his duties as an
international official,contrary to paragraph 1ofArticle 100.The fact that
a staff member disputes the legalviewsof a member State on proceedings
to which the staff member isaparty no more prevents hm from respecting
the duties resulting from hs international status under Article 100,than
his opposition to the contentions of the Secretary-General on the subject-
matter of the proceedings involveshim in a breach of the discipline to be
observed by a member of the Secretariat with regard to its chief admini-
strative officer.
29. The Court now comes to the principle which, in its 1973Advisory
Opinion, it regarded asarequirement of thejudicial process :the principle
of equality of the parties. In that Opinion the Court emphasized various
applications of the principle;it referred to it first with regard to the de-
cision by the Committee "after an examination of the opposing viewsof
the interested parties"I.C.J.Reports 1973,p. 176,para. 26). It also refer-
red to it in connection with the interpretation by the Committee of the

requirement laid down in Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal that there should be "a substantial basis for the application"
brought before the Committee. On this point, it noted that it would be
incompatible with the principles governing the judicial process if the
Committee werenot toadopt a uniform interpretation of this requirement
whether ornot the applicant was a staff member (ibi d. ,77,para. 29).It
wasalsoconcerned asto theinherent inequality resulting from theCourt's
Statute between the staff member, on the one hand, and the Secretary-
General, on theother. Observing that the difficulty arosefromthe terms of
Article 66of theCourt's Statute, whch makesprovision for the submission
of written or oral statements only by States and international organiza-
tions, the Court noted that Article 11of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal provides that the staff member is entitled to have his viewscelaconstitueun empiétement sur lespouvoirs du Secrétairegénéraelt une
violation de l'article 100dela Charte revientà refuser que lesjugements du
Tribunal administratif puissent êtresoumis à une procédure de réforma-

tion quand ils satisfont le Secrétaire général. LaCour ne peut donc
accepter les vues de M. Mortished sur ce point.

28. La Cour n'a pas, pour les besoins de la présente procédure, à
analyser dans le détail la question des pouvoirs de représentation de
l'organisation des Nations Unies, qui revêtdes aspects complexes et
obscurs. Il lui suffit de constater que la compétence exercéepar le Comité
dans le cadre de l'article 11du statut du Tribunal administratif ne nie pas

que le Secrétaire général soit (le plus haut fonctionnaire de l'organisa-
tion))(art. 97 de la Charte) ni ne porte atteinte au (<caractère exclusive-
ment international [de ses] fonctions ))(art. 100 de la Charte). Enfin la
Cour ne voit pas de fondement à l'allégationde M. Mortished selon
laquelle lefait dedevoir combattre l'opinion de 1'EtatMembre qui conteste
lejugement rendu en faveur du fonctionnaire risque d'empêcher celui-ci
d'accomplir ses devoirs de fonctionnaire international, en contradiction
avec les dispositions de l'article 100, paragraphe 1. L'opposition d'un
fonctionnaire aux vuesjuridiques d'un Etat Membre sur le procès auquel
ce fonctionnaire est partie ne l'empêchepas plus de respecter les devoirs

découlant deson statut international conformément à l'article 100queson
opposition aux thèsesdu Secrétaire généraslur l'objet du procèsne le met
eninfraction avecladiscipline quedoit observerun membre du Secrétariat
à l'égarddu chef de l'administration.

29. La Cour en vient maintenant au principe qu'elle a considérédans
son avis de 1973 comme constituant une exigence fondamentale d'une
bonne justice :le principe d'égalitéentre les parties. La Cour a souligné,
dans cet avis, diverses applications de ce principe. Elle en a fait état à

propos de la décisionprisepar leComité (<aprèsunexamen contradictoire
des thèsesdes parties (C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 176,par. 26). Elle s'y est
également référée à propos de l'interprétationpar leComitéde l'exigence,
énoncéepar l'article 11 du statut du Tribunal administratif, que la de-
mande dont le Comitéest saisi (repose sur des bases sérieuses )).Sur ce
point, elle a notéqu'il y aurait incompatibilité avec les principes d'une
bonne justice si le Comité n'interprétait pasde la mêmemanière cette
exigence selon que la demande émaneou non d'un fonctionnaire (ibid.,
p. 177,par. 29). Elle s'est également préoccupée de l'inégalitéinhérente,

résultantde son Statut,qui existe entre le fonctionnaire, d'une part, et, de
l'autre, leSecrétairegénéral. Relevanqtue la difficultétenait aux termes de
l'article 66 de son Statut,qui réserve auxEtats et aux organisations inter-
nationales la faculté de présenterdes exposés écritsou oraux, la Cour a
notéque le statut du Tribunal administratif prévoit,en son article 11,que
le fonctionnaire a droit à ce que son opinion soit transmise à la Cour par
l'intermédiairedu Secrétairegénéral, cequi implique que celui-ci nepeut transmitted to theCourt, with theimplication that thisis to bewithout any
control being exercisedoverthe contents by the Secretary-General. In this
way, the equality of a staff member before the Court is "a matter of right
guaranteed by the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal" (ibid., p. 180,
para. 35).Thus the Court, which, in its 1956Advisory Opinion, had con-
sidered that "any seeming or nominal absence of equality", inherent in

Article 66ofits Statute, should not prevent itfrom givingeffectto arequest
for advisory opinion, clearlytook the viewthat what wasessential wasthat
actualequalityshould be ensured by practical measures. In givingeffectto
the present request for advisory opinion, the Court must attribute great
importance, asit did in itsresponse to the request mentioned above, to the
question whether actual equality is ensured despite a seeming or nominal
absence of equality.
30. In the present case, that is to Sayin advisory proceedings resulting
from the application to the Committee of a member State, the problem of
the implementation of the principle of equality does not give rise to any
particular difficulty asregardsthe proceedings before the Court itself.The
viewsof the staff member concerned havebeen transmitted to the Court in
accordance with Article 11,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Adminis-
trative Tribunal. As the Court observed in its 1973Advisory Opinion :

"The Court is, therefore, only concerned to ensure that the inter-
ested parties shall have a fair and equal opportunity to present their
views to the Court respecting the questions on which its opinion is
requested and that the Court shall have adequate information to
enable it to administer justice in givingits opinion." (I.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 182,para. 38.)

As in that case, the Court "is satisfied that these requirements have been
met in thepresent proceedings" (ibid.).Sirnilarly,the decision, taken in the
present caseasin 1973,to do without oral proceedings, whilefor the Court
it amounts to depriving itself of a very useful procedure, appears to be a
sacrifice which isjustified by concern thereby to ensure actual equality.
This is however on the basis that the task of the Court in relation to the
judgement of the Tribunal is not fundamentally different from the task it
performed in the 1973Opinion ;thisisapoint to which the Court willhave
to return (paragraph 61 below).
31. But the problem is not merely that of equality before the Court. As
has been observed above, comparison of the review procedure with the

requirements governingthejudicial process,and thus in particular with the
principle of equality of the parties, must also be made with regard to that
stage of the review procedure which involves the intervention of the
Committee. From this point of view,theCourt should note a fundamental
aspect of the reviewprocedure which is not linked to the special circum-
stances of thepresent case,but which has been particularly highlighted by
it :thefact that theCommittee isno more than an organ of theparty which
was unsuccessful before the Tribunal, that is to Saythe United Nations.
Consequently, in the review procedure, one of the parties - the Uniteden contrôler le contenu. De ce fait, la situation d'égalidont lefonction-
naire bénéficie devant la Cour constitue (<un droit garanti par le statut du
Tribunal administratif 1(ibid.,p. 180,par. 35).Ainsila Cour qui, dans son

avis consultatif de 1956,avait considéréqu'une ((absence d'égalité appa-
rente ou théorique ))inhérente à l'article66 de son Statut, ne devait pas
l'empêcherde donner suite à une demande d'avis,a estiméclairement que
l'essentielétaitqu'uneégalité de faitsoit assuréepar desmesurespratiques.
En répondant à la présente demande d'avis consultatif, la Cour doit
attribuer, comme elle l'a fait dans sa réponse à la demande précitée,une
grande importance au point de savoir si se trouve assuréeune égalité
effective en dépitd'une inégalitéapparente ou théorique.

30. Dans le casprésent,c'est-à-dire dans celui d'une procédureconsul-
tative faisant suiteà la demande d'un Etat Membre devant le Comité,le
problèmede lamiseenŒuvredu principe d'égalité n'offrp easde difficulté
particulière pour la procédure devant la Cour elle-même. Lesvues du
fonctionnaire en cause ont ététransmises à la Cour conformément à
l'article 11,paragraphe 2, du statut duTribunal administratif. Ainsi quela

Cour l'a dit dans sons avis consultatif de 1973 :
(La Cour doit donc uniquement veiller à ce que les parties inté-
resséesaient la possibilitéde lui exposer, dans desconditions d'équité
et d'égalitél,eurs vues sur lesquestions propos desquellesun avislui

est demandé, et à ce qu'elle-même dispose d'informations adéquates
pour pouvoir rendre la justice en donnant son avis consultatif. ))
(C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 182,par. 38.)

Commeen 1973la Cour (estimeque cesconditionssont satisfaites dans la
présente procédure ))(ibid.). De même,la renonciation à la phase orale,
décidéedans la présente affairecomme dans celle de 1973,même sielle
revient pour la cour à se priver d'une procédure fort utile, paraît un
sacrificelégitimé par lapréoccupationd'assurer ainsiune égalité effective.
Il n'en va ainsi cependant que dans la mesure où la tâche de la Cour par
rapport au jugement du Tribunal n'est pas fondamentalement différente
de celle qu'elle a accomplie dans son avis de 1973 ; c'est là un point sur

lequel la Cour aura à revenir (paragraphe 61 ci-après).
31. Mais le problème ne se ramène pas à celui de l'égalitédevant la
Cour. Comme ila été observéplus haut, la comparaison dela procédurede
réformationavecles exigencesd'une bonnejustice, doncnotamment avec
leprincipe d'égalitéentre lesparties, doit s'effectuer ausàpropos de cette
hase de la ~rocédurede réformationaui fait intervenir le Comité. De ce
Point de vu;, la Cour doit noter un trafitfondamental de la procédurede
réformation quin'est pas liéaux particularités de la présenteespèce mais

qui a étéspécialement misen lumière à propos de celle-ci,à savoir le fait
que le Comitén'est qu'un organe de la partie qui a succombé devant le
Tribunal, c'est-à-dire l'organisation des Nations Unies. En conséquence,
dans la procédure de réformation, l'une des parties, l'organisation desNations - has the right to decide the fate of the application for review
made by the other Party, the staff member, through the will of a political
organ, even if such organ has to some extent an "independent character"
(I.C.J. Reports1973,p. 173,para. 18).Thisfundamental inequality entails
a particularly careful examination of the rules governing the composition
and functioning of the Committee.
32. That Committee is composed of the member States the represen-
tatives of which have served on the GeneralCommittee of the most recent
regular session of the General Assembly. One of those States may be the
State which applies to the Committeeto request an advisory opinion of the
Court. In such a case, the government in question can itself present its

application, take an active part in the discussion thereof, and even take
part in the vote at the close of the discussion. Since neither such partici-
pation in the discussion nor voting are forbidden by the Statute of the
Administrative Tribunal, or by the rules of procedure of the Comrnittee,it
is certain that there is here a cause of inequality between the parties
concerned in the review procedure, which results from the nature of the
specialized organ created by the General Assembly, and from the rules
governing its functioning. Since the Court, maintaining the approach it
adopted on this point when it gave its 1973Opinion, proposes to assess
whether inequality exists at both the theoretical and the practical level, it
can conclude at once that on the theoretical level inequality exists. To
ascertain whether it also exists on the practical level, the Court must
examine what the Committee actually did when it was seised of the
application from the United States Government concerning Judgement
No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal. At the same time, the Court will
endeavour to establishwhether the Committee duly respected the elemen-
tary principle governing the judicial process, that an organ which inter-

venes in a procedure which, taken as a whole, isjudicial in nature, must
observe the rules governing its composition and its functioning.

33. Before turning to an examination of the proceedings of the Com-
mittee, the Court should however first deal with a point relating to the

composition of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal for its Judge-
ment No. 273,sinceit might be suggested that this was irregular, and that if
the irregularity were found to be such as to vitiate the decision of the
Tribunal, further examination of the question put to the Court would be
unnecessary. The Judgement begins as follows :

Composed of Madame Paul Bastid, President ; Mr. Endre Ustor,
Vice-President ; Mr. Francisco A. Forteza, Vice-President ;Mr. Her-
bert Reis, alternate member".

The verbatim record of the sitting of the Tribunal in the case records theNations Unies, possèdele droit de faire déciderdu sort qu'elle réserveà la
demande de réformationémanantdel'autre partie, lefonctionnaire, parla
volontéd'un organe politique, même sicelui-cipossède jusqu'à un certain
point un (caractère indépendant )(C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 173,par. 18).
Cette inégalitéfondamentale conduit à examiner avec un soin particulier
les règles relatives la composition et au fonctionnement du Comité.

32. Celui-ciest composédesEtats Membres représentésau Bureau dela
dernière en date des sessions ordinaires de l'Assemblée générale L.'un de
ces Etats peut êtrecelui qui demande au Comité de solliciter un avis
consultatif de la Cour. Dans un tel cas, le gouvernement en question peut
présenter lui-mêmesa demande, participer activement aux débats à ce
sujet et mêmeau vote par lequel ces débatsse concluent. Puisque ni cette
participation aux débats ni ce vote ne sont interdits par le statut du
Tribunal administratif nipar le règlementdu Comité,ilest certain qu'ilya
là, entre les parties intéressées la procédure de réformation, une cause
d'inégalité découlantde la nature et des règles de fonctionnement de

l'organe spécialisécrépé ar l'Assemblée générale C.ommela Cour, fidèle à
l'approche qu'elle avaitadoptéesur cepoint en rendant sonavisen 1973,se
propose d'évaluer l'inégaliteéxistant sur leplan de la théorieet sur celuide
la pratique, ellepeut conclure déjà qu'au plan théoriquel'inégalité existe.
Pour déterminer si elle se maintient au niveau pratique, la Cour doit
examiner le comportement concret du Comitélorsqu'il a étésaisi de la
demandeémanant du Gouvernement desEtats-Unis au sujet dujugement
no273 du Tribunal administratif. En mêmetemps la Cour cherchera à
établirsileComitéabien respecté ceprincipeélémentairedebonne justice
qui consiste, pour un organe intervenant dans une procédure ayant glo-

balement un caractèrejudiciaire, à observer les règlesqui visent sa com-
position et son fonctionnement.

33. Auparavant, il convient cependant d'évoquerune question concer-
nant la composition du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies au
moment où celui-ci a rendu son jugement no 273. On pourrait en effet
contester la régularitéde cette composition et soutenir que, si la décision
du Tribunal s'était trouvéeviciéede ce fait, la Cour n'aurait pas pousser
plus loin l'examen de la question dont elleest saisie.Le texte dujugement
commence par les mots :

(<LETRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DES NATIONS UNIES,

Composécommesuit :Madame Paul Bastid, présidente ;M. Endre
Ustor, vice-président ; M. Francisco A. Forteza, vice-président ;
M. Herbert Reis, membre suppléant >i.
Le compte rendu sténographique de la séancepublique tenue par le Tri-presence of these four members. The Judgement is signed by the President
and the two Vice-Presidents of the Tribunal ; there follows the statement
"Not being in agreement with the judgement, 1 set forth my dissenting
opinion below", which is signed by the alternate member, and his dissent-
ing opinion follows.
34. While under Article 3, paragraph 1, of its Statute, the Tribunal is
"composed of seven members, no two of whom may be nationals of the

same State", that Article then stipulates as follows:"Only three shallsitin
anyparticular case." The Tribunal isempowered by Article 6of its Statute
to establish its own Rules, and by Article 6, paragraph 1,of those Rules,
the President isauthorized to designate the three members of the Tribunal
who "shall constitute the Tribunal for the purpose of sitting in each
particular case or group of cases". This paragraph further provides, how-
ever,that the President "may, in addition, designate one ormore members
of the Tribunal to serveas alternates". It isobvious that, in thecasebefore
it. the President of the Tribunal exercisedher Dowerunder this article but
nowhere in the Judgement is there a statement as to the circumstances or
purposes dictating that an alternate member should be appointed. The
silenceof the Tribunal's Judgement on the issue leads to speculationas to
whether an alternate member isexpected to be designated by the President
normally in the absence of one of the regular three members or when such
alternate member possesses exceptional expertise or qualifications not to
be found in the three ordinary members of the Tribunal. It is thus a

question why it was considered proper for the alternate member to be
allowed to sit with the Tribunal when al1the three regular members were
available, and did sit ; the participation of the alternate member in the
Judgement wouldseem to require an explanation. It shouldalsobe recalled
that a dissenting opinion was appended by him to the Judgement of the
Tribunal.
35. Article 6 of the Rules of the Tribunal gives the President a discre-
tion, which must however be exercised in harmony with Article 3 of the
Statute of the Tribunal quoted above. The published Judgements of the
Tribunal show that it has in the past sat on many occasionswith more than
three members present, without any explanation. So far as the Court is
aware no objection has been taken in the past to this practice. The case
concerning Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the UnitedNations
Administrative Tribunal in 1954sprang from Il judgements of the Tribu-
nal, the texts ofwhich werebefore the Court, in each ofwhich the Tribunal
was recorded to be composed of four persons. In that case the Court

howeverobserved that in none of the "reports orrelevant records" before it
was there to be found "any suggestion indicating that the Tribunal, when
rendering its awards in those 11cases,was not legally constituted accord-
ingto the provisions ofArticle 3 of its Statute" (I.C.J. Reports 1954,p. 50).
At al1events theCourthas not been asked to consider whether the Tribunal
might have "committed a fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice" as contemplated by Article 11, para-
graph 1,of theTribunal's Statute, nor does the matter appear on theface ofbunal en l'affaire fait état de la présence de ces quatre membres. Le
jugement est signépar la présidente et par les deux vice-présidents du
Tribunal ; puis vient lamention : <N'étant pas d'accordaveclejugement,
j'expose ci-après monopinion dissidente )>,qui est signéepar le membre

suppléant, dont l'opinion est ensuite reproduite.
34. L'article 3, paragraphe 1, du statut du Tribunal dispose que << le
Tribunal se compose de sept membres, tous de nationalité différente O,
maisilajoute :<<Troisd'entre euxseulement siègentdans chaque espèce. )>
L'article 6 du statut habilite le Tribunal à arrêterson règlement, lequel, à
l'article 6, paragraphe 1, donne pouvoir au présidentde désigner lestrois
membres du Tribunal qui <composent le Tribunal siégeantdans chaque

affaire ou groupe d'affaires )>.Il est cependant spécifiédans le même
paragraphe que le président (peut également désignerun ou plusieurs
membres du Tribunal en qualitéde suppléants ))De toute évidence,dans
l'affairedont ils'agit, leprésidentdu Tribunal aexercélesprérogativesque
lui confère ce texte ;mais lejugement ne dit rien des circonstances qui
imposeraient la désignation d'un suppléant,ni de l'objet d'une telle dési-
gnation. Le silence du Tribunal sur ce point amène à se demander si un
suppléantest normalement désignépar le président enl'absence d'undes

trois membres réguliersou si ce suppléant possède une spécialisationou
des qualifications exceptionnelles que n'auraient pas les trois membres
ordinaires du Tribunal. On est donc fondé à s'interroger sur les raisons
pour lesquellesilaparu opportunde laisser siégerlesuppléantalors que les
trois membres réguliersétaient présents surle siège ;la participation du
membre suppléant paraît appeler des éclaircissements. Il convient derap-
peler de surcroît que ledit suppléant a joint une opinion dissidente au
jugement du Tribunal.

35. L'article 6 du règlement du Tribunal reconnaît à son président un
pouvoir discrétionnaire, qui doit cependant être exercéd'une manière
compatible avecl'article 3précitédustatutdu Tribunal. Sil'onexamine les
jugements publiés,on s'aperçoit que dans le passéle Tribunal a souvent
siégé avecplus de trois membres, sansqu'aucune explication soitfournie à
cet égard. Pourautant que la Cour le sache, cette pratique n'a pas suscité

d'objection. Dans l'affaire de 1954relative à l'Effet dejugements du Tri-
bunaladministratif desNations Uniesaccordantindemnité, onzejugements
du Tribunal étaienten cause ;les textes en avaient étésoumis àla Cour, et
l'on voit que dans chaque cas le Tribunal se composait de quatre per-
sonnes. En l'occurrence la Cour avait néanmoins pris acte de ce que, dans
aucun des (<rapports ou textes pertinents )>qui lui avaient étéprésentés,
on ne trouve de suggestion qui donnerait à penser que le Tribunal,

lorsqu'il a rendu sesjugements dans les onze affaires, n'étaitpas légale-
ment constituéconformémentauxdispositions del'article 3de son statut )>
(C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 50). De toute façon la Cour n'est pas ici priée
d'examiner si le Tribunal <<a commis, dans la procédure, une erreur
essentielle qui a provoqué un mal-jugé )>au sens de l'article 11, para-it to disclose any failure ofjustice. Accordingly, further consideration of
the point does not seem to be called for.

36. The Court now turns to the proceedings of the Committee. The
material available to the Court concerning those proceedings includes not
only the Report of theCommittee (A/AC.86(XX)/25) but alsotranscripts
of a tape-recording of its meetings(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l and 2), supplied
pursuant to a decision of the Committee adopted in response to a request
to that effect by counsel for Mr. Mortished (paragraph 14 above). It is
however to be regretted that the Committee does not appear to have kept

an officia1list of those present and names of voters and absentees at the
time of each decision.
37. In the present case the records disclose a number of notable ir-
regularities attending the proceedings of the Committee at its 20th ses-
sion, and these must be considered in the light of the texts governing
the composition and activity of the Committee. Under Article 11, para-
graph 4, of theStatute of the AdministrativeTribunal, the Committee on
Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements is em-
powered to establish its own Rules. On 16October 1956the Committee
adopted Provisional Rules of Procedure (amended on 25 October 1956,
21January 1957and 11December 1974),which provide in Article 1that
"The proceedings of the Committee shall be governed by the rules of
procedure of the General Assembly applicableto comrnittees" (A/AC.86/
2/ Rev.2).
38. One of the most important irregularities in the procedure adopted
by theCommitteeconcernsitscomposition at its20th session,when it took
the decision to request the present advisory opinion. Article 11, para-
graph 4, of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
requires that the Committee be "composed of the member States the
representatives of which have served on the General Committee of the
most recent regular session of the General Assembly". One of the States in
question was Sierra Leone, sinceit participated in the General Committee

through its representative, who was Chairman of the Sixth Committee at
the relevant time. As he was, however, away from United Nations Head-
quarters on officia1business during the 20th session of the Committee, he
designated the representative of Canada, who was a Vice-Chairman of the
Sixth Committee, to act in hisplace, allegedly "under Rule 39of the Rules
of Procedure of the General Assembly". This replacement was irregular in
the case of the Committee on A~~lications for Review of Administrative
Tribunal Judgements, sinceit isdéarthatCanada wasnot one of theStates
Members composing the General Committee. It is true that theCommittee
on Applications for Review, at the outset of the meeting, accepted the
Canadian representative by taking the decision that "Canada, rather than
Sierra Leone, should serve as a member of the Committee at this session"graphe 1, du statut du Tribunal, et il ne semble pas non plus que la
composition du Tribunal soit en elle-même révélatricd e'un mal-jugé.La
question ne paraît donc pas appeler un examen plus approfondi.

36. La Cour en vient maintenant aux travaux du Comité.La documen-
tation dont elledispose à cet égardcomprend, outre le rapport du Comité
(A/AC.S6(XX)/25), la transcription de l'enregistrement de ses délibéra-
tions (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l et 2), fournie sur décisiondu Comitéprise àla
demande du conseil de M. Mortished (voir paragraphe 14ci-dessus). Il est
cependant regrettable que le Comitén'ait apparemment pas tenu de liste
officielle des membres présentset absents lors de chaque décision, nide

ceux qui ont pris part aux votes.

37. En la présente espècela documentation révèleque les travaux du
Comité àsa vingtième sessionont été marqués par d'importantes irrégu-
larités, qu'il convient d'examiner a la lumièredes textes régissantla com-
position et l'activitédu Comité.En vertu de l'article 11,paragraphe 4, du
statut du Tribunal administratif, le Comité des demandes de réformation
établit son propre règlement. Le 16 octobre 1956, il a donc adopté un
règlementintérieurprovisoire (amendéles25octobre 1956,2l janvier 1957

et 11décembre 1974),qui stipule en son article premier :((Les débatsdu
Comitésont régispar les dispositions du règlementintérieurde 1'Assem-
bléegénérale applicables aux commissions. ~(A/AC.86/2/Rev.2.)

38. Une des irrégularitésles plus importantes dans la procédure suivie
par le Comitéest celle qui a affectésa composition à la vingtième session,
au cours de laquelle il a décidéde soumettre la présenterequêtepour avis
consultatif. Aux termes de l'articleIl, paragraphe 4,du statut du Tribunal

administratif des Nations Unies, le Comitéest <composédes Etats Mem-
bresreprésentésau Bureau dela dernièreendate dessessions ordinaires de
l'Assemblée générale ))Parmi ces Etats figurait la Sierra Leone, dont le
représentant siégeaitau Bureau en sa qualité de président de la Sixième
Commission au moment considéréS . 'étantabsentédu Siègede l'organi-
sation des Nations Unies en déplacement officiel pendant la vingtième
session du Comité, ce représentant adésigné lereprésentant du Canada,
vice-présidentde la Sixième Commission, pour le remplacer, censément
(<envertu de l'article 39 du règlementintérieurde l'Assemblée général )).

Ce remplacement n'était pas régulierdans le cadre du Comité, puisque
manifestement le Canada n'étaitpas du nombre des Etats Membres com-
posant le Bureau. Il est vrai que, dès le début deses travaux, le Comité a
admis la présence du représentant du Canada quand il a décidé : (le
Canada remplacera la Sierra Leone au Comité à la présente session ))
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV. 1,p. 3) ;mais cette décision elle-mêmn ee saurait être
tenue pour régulière, leComité n'ayant pas lepouvoir de déroger à l'ar-(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, p. 6) ; but this decision itself could not be regarded
asregular since the Committeehas no power toderogate from Article 11of
the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. The Sierra
Leone chairman of the Sixth Committee could, and indeed should, have
nominated another member of the Sierra Leone delegation to sit on the

Committee on Applications for Review, but it was unquestionably irreg-
ular for him to have norninated the Canadian, as Vice-Chairman of the
Sixth Committee,to siton theCommittee on Applicationsfor Review,and
for this substitution to have been adopted by the Committee itself. The
irregularity was compounded by the election of the Canadian representa-
tive as Chairman of the Committee, even though the election as such
complied with Rule 103of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assem-
bly. Curiously enough the issue of the improper composition of the Com-
mittee was not raised either by the United States Government or by the
French Government, or even by counsel for Mr. Mortished, throughout
their respective Written Statements.And yet the matter isfundamental to
the whole question of the present reference to this Court.
39. Further irregularities relate to the Application submitted to the
Committee by the United States Government.As Mr. Mortished'scounsel's
letter to the Secretary of the Committee (A/AC.86/R.100, p. 2) indicates,
the United States' application was addressed to the Acting Legal Counsel

whereas it should have been addressed "to the officia1designated by the
Secretary-General to serve as Secretary of the Committee" under Arti-
cle II, paragraph 1, of the Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedure.
This irregularity isadmittedly not of great importance,but the fact that the
Committee nevertheless accepted the Application without comment is an
illustration of the lack ofigour with which the Committee conducted the
proceedings in the present case. The application in question reads as
follows :

"The United States respectfully requests the Committee on Appli-
cations for Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements to request
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
matter of Judgement No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal.
Judgement No. 273 raises a question of law relating to the provi-
sions of the Charter of aconstitutional dimension within the ambit of
article 11 of thestatute of the Administrative Tribunal which is of
sufficient seriousness and magnitude to merit seeking the advice of

the International Court of Justice.
The General Assembly is expressly charged, pursuant to Arti-
cle 101of the United Nations Charter, with establishing regulations
concerning the staff. Resolution 34/165 constitutes the making of
such regulations. It States in relevant part:

"Decidesthat effective 1January 1980 no staff member shall
be entitled to any part of the repatriation grant unless evidenceticle 11du statut du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies. Le prési-
dentde la SixièmeCommission, ressortissantde la Sierra Leone, aurait pu
etdû sefaire remplacer au Comitépar un autre membre deladélégation de
cet Etat, mais il n'étaitcertainement pas régulier qu'il désigne le vice-
président canadiendela SixièmeCommissionpour siégerau Comitéetque
leComitélui-mêmeacceptecettesubstitution. L'irrégularité aété aggravée
par l'électiondu représentant canadien comme président du Comité,
même sicette élection n'enfreignaitpas en elle-même l'article103 du

règlementintérieurde l'Assemblée générale. Asse éztrangement,la ques-
tion de la composition irrégulièredu Comitédesdemandesde réformation
n'a étésoulevée nipar le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, ni par le Gou-
vernement français, ni mêmepar le conseil de M. Mortished dans leurs
exposés écrits respectifs.Pourtant il s'agit d'une question fondamentale
pour la saisine de la Cour.

39. D'autres irrégularités concernentla demande soumise au Comité
par leGouvernement desEtats-Unis. Il ressort dela lettre queleconseilde

M. Mortished a fait tenir au secrétairedu Comité (A/AC.86/R.100, p. 2)
que la demande des Etats-Unis a étéadresséeau conseillerjuridique par
intérim, alorsqu'elle aurait dû l'êtr(<au fonctionnaire que le Secrétaire
général désignp eour exercer les fonctions de secrétairedu Comité ))aux
termes de l'article II, paragraphe 1, du règlementintérieurprovisoire de
celui-ci.Cette irrégularitén'est certespas d'une importance majeure, mais
lefait que leComitéaitacceptélademande sanscommentaire témoignedu
défautde rigueur avec lequel il a menéses travaux dans cette affaire. La
demande en question était ainsi rédigée :

(<Les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueseraient reconnaissants au Comité
desdemandes de réformationdejugements du Tribunal administratif

de bien vouloir prier la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un
avis consultatif sur lejugement no273 du Tribunal administratif.
Le jugement no273 soulèveune question de droit concernant les
dispositions de la Charte desNations Unies, au sensde l'article 11du
statut du Tribunal administratif,question decaractèrestatutaire dont
la gravitéet l'importance justifient que la Cour internationale de
Justice soit sollicitéede donner son avis.
Aux termes de l'article 101de la Charte des Nations Unies, l'As-
sembléegénéraleestexpressément chargd éeefixerlesrèglestouchant
le personnel du Secrétariat.La résolution34/ 165porte précisément
sur la fixation de ces règles.Cette résolutiondit entre autres dispo-
sitions:

«Décidq eue, avec effet au lerjanvier 1980,les fonctionnaires
n'ont droità aucunmontant au titrede laprime de rapatriement à of relocation away from the country of the last duty station is
provided".

It isthus abundantly clear fromtheface of the resolution aswell asthe
legislativehistory that the General Assembly intended the resolution
to terminate the administrative practice of payments of repatriation
allowances to persons who do not relocate upon retirement. The
Secretary-Generalacted in strict compliance with this resolution, as
he was bound to do, when he issued administrative instruction ST/

AI/269. In invalidating these actions of the Secretary-General as
applied to Mr. Mortished, the Administrative Tribunal acted to deny
thefulleffect ofdecisionsof the General Assemblywhichwere neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
It is not the contention of the United States that there are no
circumstances in which the Administrative Tribunal could reject the
application of rules made by the General Assembly and no rights of
employees that the Administrative Tribunal may seek to preserve.
These issues are not raised by the instant case. The issue that is raised
is whether, in light of al1 the circumstances of the case, the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal gave due weight to the actions of the General
Assembly concerning repatriation grants when it found that

Mr. Mortished should be given a repatriation allowance even though
he did not depart or express an intention to relocate away from the
country of his last duty station.

In light of the constitutional dimensions of these issues, including
the relevance of Article 101of the Charter and the authority of the
General Assembly thereunder, it is believed that the matter calls for
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. It is
consequently Our view that the Committee on Applications for
Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements shouldask the Court
the following question :

'1sthejudgement of the UnitedNations Administrative Tribunal
in Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General,war-
ranted in deterrnining that General Assembly resolution 34/ 165of
17December 1979could not be given immediate effect in requir-
ing, for the payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation
to a country other than the country of the staff member's last duty
station ? "

40. Article II, paragraph 3, of the Committee's Provisional Rules of
Procedure provides that :

"The application shall contain the following information in the
order specified : moins qu'ilsne présentent despiècesattestant qu'ils seréinstallent
dans un pays autre que celui de leur dernier lieu d'affectation>>.

Le libelléde la résolutionet la genèsede son élaboration prouvent à
l'évidenceque l'Assemblée généralseouhaitait par-là mettre fin àla
pratique administrativeconsistant àpayer la prime de rapatriement à
des fonctionnaires qui ne se réinstallent pas après leur départ à la
retraite. En adoptant l'instruction administrative ST/AI/269, le
Secrétaire générasl'est strictement conformé àcette résolution, ainsi
qu'il était tenude le faire. En invalidant l'application de ces mesures
du Secrétaire général à M. Mortished, le Tribunal administratif a
empêché que des décisionsde l'Assemblée générale q,ui n'étaientni

arbitraires, ni inconséquentes, prennent pleinement effet.
Les Etats-Unis d'Amérique neprétendent pasqu'il n'existeaucune
circonstance dans laquelle le Tribunal administratif peut rejeter l'ap-
plication de règlesadoptéespar l'Assemblée générale, naiucun droit
que le Tribunal peut chercher à protéger. Ce ne sont pas là des
questions que soulèvela présenteaffaire. La question qui sepose est
de savoir si,eu égard toutes lescirconstances del'affaire, leTribunal
administratif a dûment pris en considération les décisionsde l'As-
semblée générale concernant la prime de rapatriement lorsqu'il a
décidéque M. Mortished avait droit au paiement d'une prime de
rapatriement mêmes'il ne quittait pas le pays de son dernier lieu
d'affectation ou nemanifestaitpas l'intention de seréinstallerdans un
autre pays.

Etant donnélecaractère statutaire de cesquestions, notamment de
l'applicabilitéde l'article 101 de la Charte et des pouvoirs qui sont
conférés à l'Assemblée générala eux termes dudit article, les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique considèrent que cette affaire appelle un avis
consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice. Par conséquent, la
questionque leComitédesdemandes deréformationdejugements du
Tribunal administratif devrait poser à la Cour devrait êtrela sui-
vante :

<Dans sonjugement no273,concernant l'affaire Mortished c. le
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation d Neastions Unies,le Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies pouvait-il légitimement détermi-
ner que la résolution 34/165 de l'Assembléegénéraleen date du
17 décembre 1979, qui subordonne le paiement de la prime de
rapatriement àla présentation de piècesattestant la réinstallation
du fonctionnaire dans un pays autre que celui de son dernier lieu
d'affectation, ne pouvait prendre immédiatement effet ? )>

40. L'article II, paragraphe 3, du règlement intérieur provisoire du
Comité dispose :

<<La demande doit contenir, dans l'ordre indiqué,les renseigne-
ments suivants : (c) A statementsetting forth in detail thegrounds of the application
under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal and the supporting argument ..."

It is evident that the application of the United States did not comply with
this requirement. Article II, paragraph 3, of the Committee's Provisional
Rules of Procedure does not impose a sanction for its non-observance,and
it isto benoted thatin thecourse of the discussion two of the four grounds

specifiedin Article 11of theTribunal's Statute wereidentifiedasintended
by the application, and voted on (paragraph 15 above). In this respect it
would seemthat theCommitteedid not, on this particular occasion,follow
its "traditional" procedure, which the Chairman of the Committee at this
session stated to be that the Committee normally takes a decision on four
questions corresponding to the four grounds listed in Article 11, para-
graph 1,of the Statute of theTribunal. If this assertion of the Chairman of
the Committee is to be taken as correct, the procedure adopted at the
20th session was not that traditionally followed. So far as the procedural
irregularity in failing to state in the application the grounds of objection
was a breach of the Rules made by the Committee, the Committee may
thus be taken to have waived it. It must however be borne in mind that
Article 11,paragraph 1,of the Tribunal's Statute itself provides for appli-
cation to the Committee "If a member State,the Secretary-Generalor the
person in respect of whom ajudgement has been rendered by the Tribu-
nal.. .objects to the judgement on the ground that" the Tribunal had
committed one of the four specified errors.
41. Thus, the United Statesapplication to the Committee was formally
defective in not complying fully with the requirements of Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of the AdministrativeTribunal, and Article II,
paragraphs 1-3,of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee,
since the necessary details and supporting argument were not fully set out

therein. Furthermore, it is certain that Mr. Mortished, whose counsel
argued in hiscommunicationtotheCommittee that theapplication should
be rejected "on the grounds that it does not fa11within the terms of
Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal" (A/AC.86/
R.lOO,p. 9), was unable to identify in advance and comment on the two
specific grounds eventually selected by the Committee. Mr. Mortished, in
his written statement laid before the Court, has challenged the Commit-
tee's acting on a legally defective application, and has complained in this
respect of a breach of the principle audi alterampartem ;the Court con-
siders that such action exacerbated on the practical level the inequality
already established on the theoretical level(paragraph 32 above) between
the staff member and the applicant State. The same must be said of a
further action by the Committee which, while not a procedural defect in
the sense of being contrary to a text governing the activity of the Com-
mittee, was nevertheless, from the point of viewof the Committee's quasi-
judicial functions, a startling irregularity. This was the refusa1 of the
Committee to grant the request of counsel for Mr. Mortished to be given c) Un exposédétaillédes motifs prévus au paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle 11 du statut du Tribunal administratif aue le demandeur
invoque, avec l'indication des arguments à l'appui.)>

Il est clair que la demande des Etats-Unis n'étaitpas conforme à cette
prescription. L'article II, paragraphe 3, du règlementintérieurprovisoire
du Comiténeprévoitaucunesanctionen casdemanquement,et ilconvient

de noter que, durant la discussion, deux des quatre motifs énumérés à
l'article 11du statut du Tribunal ont étédégagéscomme étantceux que
visait la demande et ont donnélieu à un vote (paragraphe 15ci-dessus). Il
semble qu'en cette occasion le Comitén'ait pas suivi la procédure <<tra-
ditionnelle )évoquée par son présidentdurant la sessionet qui consisterait
selon luià se prononcer sur quatre questions successives, correspondant
aux quatre motifs spécifiés à l'article 11,paragraphe 1, du statut du Tri-
bunal. Sicetteaffirmation doit êtretenuepourexacte, laprocéduresuivie à
la vingtième sessionn'était pas laprocédurehabituelle. Dans la mesure où
l'irrégularitéprocédurale commise en ne spécifiant pasdans la demande

les motifs de contestation contrevenait au règlementarrêté par le Comité,
on peut admettre que celui-ci a dérogé à son propre règlement. Il faut
cependant se rappeler que l'article11,paragraphe 1,du statut lui-mêmedu
Tribunal dispose que le Comité peut êtresaisi <si un Etat Membre, le
Secrétaire général oluapersonne qui a été l'objet d'unjugement rendu par
le Tribunal ..conteste lejugement en alléguant que [on thegroundthat] )>
le Tribunal a commis l'une des quatre erreurs viséesdans le texte.

41. Ainsi la demande des Etats-Unis au Comitéprésenteelle-mêmeun
vicedeforme dansla mesure où ellene respecte pastoutes lesprescriptions
de l'article 11, paragraphe 1, du statut du Tribunal administratif et de

l'articleII, paragraphes 1 3, du règlementintérieurprovisoire du Comité,
les renseignements et l'exposé des motifs exigésétant en l'occurrence
incomplets. De plus, ilest hors de douteque M. Mortished, dont leconseil,
dans sa communication au Comité, plaidait pour le rejet de la demande
comme ne satisfaisant pas <<aux conditions énoncéesdans l'article 11du
statut du Tribunal administratif ))(A/AC.86/R.100, p. 9), n'a eu aucun
préavisdes deux motifs précisque le Comitédevait retenir et n'a pas pu
présenter d'observations à leur sujet. Dans l'exposé écrit qu'il soumis
ultérieurement à la Cour, M. Mortished a critiqué la suite donnéepar le
Comité à une demande juridiquement défectueuse,et s'est plaint à cet

égardd'une violation du principe audialterampartem ;la Cour considère
que l'attitude du Comité a eu pour effet d'aggraver, dans la pratique,
l'inégalitdéjàprésente enthéorie(paragraphe 32ci-dessus) entre lefonc-
tionnaire et l'Etat demandeur. Il en va de mêmepour une autre mesure du
Comité qui,bien que ne constituant pas un vice de procédureen ce sens
qu'elle aurait contrevenu à un texte régissant l'activitédu Comité,n'en
étaitpas moins, si l'on songe aux fonctions quasi judiciaires de celui-ci,
d'une irrégularitésaisissante.l s'agitdu refus du Comitéde permettre au
conseil de M. Mortished d'assister, commeille souhaitait,à tous lesstadesthe opportunity to participate in the proceedings of the Committee at
which the United States application was considered (A/AC.86/R.100,
P 3).
42. The United States was a member of the General Committee of the
Assembly and therefore of the Committee on Applications, and its rep-
resentative not only sat on the Cornmitteeduring the proceedings,but also
submitted comments not elaborated in the original application, upon

which alone, as noted above, Mr. Mortished had had the opportunity to
comment in writing. When the representative of the United Kingdom on
the Committee identified specific grounds of objection to the Tribunal's
judgement, namely that it erred "on a question of law relating to the
Charter" and that it had committed "an excess ofjurisdiction or compe-
tence" (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, pp. 22-23),the United States representative
was able to endorse that approach and elaborate upon it. It is needless to
Saythat Mr. Mortished was deprived by the Committee's decision not to
admittheparticipation of hiscounsel of theopportunity ofknowing about
thesegrounds, and ofcommenting upon them. It must ofcourse in fairness
be recalled that the United States representative did not participate in
the vote on the admission of counsel for Mr. Mortished. Nevertheless,
Mr. Mortished was precluded from participating in the discussion of the
grounds of objection to theTribunal's Judgement, whiletherepresentative
of the applicant State was able to participate fully.
43. TheUnited StatesGovernmenthas asserted that theCommittee "is

not ajudicial body taking actionon the merits of the staff member'scase",
and that its procedures "need not bejudicial". This Court has howeverheld
in its 1973Advisory Opinion that the Committee is a body discharging
"quasi-judicial" functions, which operates between the Administrative
Tribunal and this Court by determining the legalquestion to be subrnitted
by it to the Court under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter (I.C.J.
Reports 1973,pp. 174,176).TheUnited Stateshas alsoargued that, in any
case, Mr. Mortished had been allowed to subrnit his written comment on
the United States' application, and that his appearance before the Com-
mittee was not necessary, since "There should be no requirement that the
staff member and the member Statebe in a position of equality in such a
process". It is, however,not true, as the United Statescontends, that "the
staff member's interest in an equal hearing is more compelling when it is
his own application which may be denied" ; the procedure before the
Committee is no doubt at least quasi-judicial, since it constitutes a ne-
cessary link between the findings of the Tribunal, which arejudicial, and

the reviewfindings of the Court, which are alsojudicial. Mr. Mortished's
written comments on theUnited States' application, although of interest to
the proceedings before the Committee, are not a valid substitute for his
observations on the grounds which emerged from the Committee's pro-
ceedings, It is not necessary to argue that the issues raised by the appli-
cation were not considered to be "uniquely within the competence of
Mr. Mortished's counselon whichhe must be heard in order forjustice in
fact to be done" (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, p. 16).dela procédure du Comité sur l'examen de la demande des Etats-Unis
(A/AC.86/R.100, p. 3).

42. Les Etats-Unis faisaient partie du Bureau de l'Assembléeet par
suite du Comitédes demandes de réformation. Or, non seulement leur

représentant a siégéau Comité,mais il a en outre fait des déclarations
amplifiant la demande initiale, la seule, comme on l'a vu, sur laquelle
M. Mortished ait eu l'occasion de formuler des observations écrites.
Quand le représentant du Royaume-Uni au Comité adégagédes motifs
précisde contestation dujugement du Tribunal, àsavoir que celui-ciaurait
<commis une erreur de droit concernant la Charte 1)et <<outrepassé sa
juridiction ou sa compétence )>(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I, p. 12),le représen-
tant des Etats-Unis a pu souscrire à cette approche et s'en servir pour
consolider sa thèse.Il va sansdireque, par la décisiondu Comitéde nepas
admettre son conseil, M. Mortished a étéprivéde la possibilitéde con-

naître les motifs invoquéset de présenter des observations à leur sujet.
Certes, ilestjuste de reconnaîtrequelereprésentant desEtats-Unis n'apas
participéau scrutin sur l'admission du conseil de M. Mortished. M. Mor-
tishedn'en apas moins été empêché de participer au débatsur lesmotifs de
contestation dujugement du Tribunal, alors que le représentant de 1'Etat
demandeur a pu le faire sans restriction.

43. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a affirméque le Comité (<n'est
pas un organejudiciaire qui déciderait au fond de la cause du fonction-
naire r,et que ses méthodes de travail << ne doivent pas nécessairement
avoir un caractèrejudiciaire )iLaCour anéanmoinsestimé,dans son avis

consultatif de 1973,que leComitéestun organe qui s'acquitte defonctions
<<quasijudiciaires )et s'interposeentreleTribunal administratif etla Cour
pour déterminer la questionjuridique à soumettre à celle-ci en vertu de
l'article 96, paragraphe2, de la Charte (C.Z. Recueil 1973, p. 174, 176).
Les Etats-Unis ont en outrefait valoir que, de toute façon, M. Mortished
avait pu transmettre ses observations écritesau sujet de la demande qu'ils
avaient présentée etque sa comparution devant le Comité n'était pas
nécessaire vuqu'~iln'estpasindispensable auxfins decetteprocédureque
lefonctionnaireet l'Etat Membre soient surun pied d'égalité)>.Il n'estpas
vrai cependant que, commele soutiennent lesEtats-Unis, <l'intérêt qu'a le
fonctionnaire à êtreentendu dans des conditions d'égalité esp tlus décisif

lorsque c'est sa propre requêtequi risque d'être rejetée)>sans nul doute
la procéduredevant le Comité est au moins quasi judiciaire, puisqu'elle
constitue un lien nécessaireentre les conclusions du Tribunal, qui ont un
caractèrejudiciaire, et les conclusions de la Cour statuant enréformation,
qui sont aussijudiciaires. Les observations écritesde M. Mortished sur la
demande des Etats-Unis présentent assurément de l'intérêp tour les tra-
vaux du Comité mais elles ne remplacent pas à proprement parler les
observations qu'il aurait pu formuler sur les motifs dégagésdurant ces
travaux. Il ne sert de rien de dire que le Comitén'était saisi<<d'aucune
question sur laquelle [le conseil de M. Mortished soit] particulièrement 44. Thus theadmission by theCommittee ofthe incompleteapplication
by the United States,and the subsequent refusal to allow Mr. Mortished's
counsel toparticipate inits work,when theUnited Statesrepresentativeon
the Committee sat throughout the proceedings and explainedand argued
the grounds therefor, accentuated the irregularity of the proceedings. The
Committee was,inthe viewof the Court, under aduty in thecircumstances
of this case to take such steps as were open to it to mitigate the basic
inequality on the theoretical levelbetween theapplicant Stateand the staff
member (paragraph 32 above). It might, for example, have been wise for
theUnited Statesrepresentative to haverefrainedfromparticipatinginthe

substantive votes, as he did on the procedural vote on the admission of
Mr. Mortished's counsel. Since the Committee decided not to hear the
counsel, the United States representative could, with propriety, have
refrained from participating in the discussion.

45. Despite the irregularities described in the preceding paragraphs,
and despite also the failure of the Committee to show the concem for
equality appropriate to a body discharging quasi-judicial functions, the
Court nevertheless feels called upon, for reasons now to be explained, to
accept the task of assisting the United Nations Organization. It is in
accordance with the Court'sjurisprudence that, even though its power to
giveadvisory opinions is discretionary under Article 65of its Statute, only
"compelling reasons" would justify refusal of such a request (cf. I.C.J.
Reports 1973, p. 183 ;I.C.J. Reports1956, p. 86). Of course the irregula-
rities which feature throughout the proceedingsin the present case could
wellbe regarded as constituting "compelling reasons" for a refusa1by the
Court to entertain the request. The stability and efficiency of the inter-
national organizations, of which the United Nations is the supreme exam-
ple, are however of such paramount importance to world order, that the
Court should not fail to assist a subsidiary body of the United Nations

General Assembly in putting its operation upon a firm and secure foun-
dation. While it would have been a compellingreason, making it inap-
propriate for theCourt to entertain arequest,that itsjudicial role would be
endangered or discredited,that isnot soin the present case,and the Court
thus doesnot find that considerations ofjudicialrestraint shouldprevent it
from rendering the advisory opinion requested. In the present case such
a refusal would leave in suspense a very serious degation against the
AdministrativeTribunal, that it had in effect challenged the authority of
the General Assembly. While there can be no question, as pointed out in
paragraph 26 above, of any restriction on theCourt's discretion,the Court
will not refuse "its participation in the activities of the Organization"
(1.C.J.Reports1950, p. 71),sothat the important legalprinciples involved
may be disposedof, whilst at the same time the Court must point out thecompétent et [doive] être entendu pour que justice soit effectivement
rendue ))(A/AC.86(XX)/PV. 1,p. 8).
44. L'acceptation par le Comité dela demande incomplète des Etats-

Unis et son refus ultérieur d'autoriser le conseil de M. Mortished à par-
ticiperà sestravauxalors que lereprésentant desEtats-Unis apu y assister
du début à lafin et expliqueret défendre lesmotifs de la demande ne font
qu'accentuerl'irrégularitédelaprocédureS .elonlaCour, leComitédevait,
dans les circonstances de l'espèce,prendre les mesures à sa disposition
pour atténuer l'inégalité fondamentale existant en théorie entre 1'Etat
demandeur et le fonctionnaire (paragraphe 32 ci-dessus). Il eût peut-être
étésage, par exemple, que le représentant des Etats-Unis s'abstienne de
participer aux votes sur le fond, ainsi qu'il l'avait fait lors du vote de

procédure sur l'admission du conseil de M. Mortished. Le Comité ayant
décidéde ne pas entendre celui-ci,il aurait été approprié que le représen-
tant des Etats-Unis ne prenne pas part au débat.

45. En dépitdesirrégularitéé s voquéesdans lesparagraphesprécédents
et du fait que le Comitén'a pas non plus fait preuve du souci d'égalitéqui

eût convenu à un organismechargéde fonctionsquasijudiciaires, la Cour
croitdevoir,pour lesraisons quivontmaintenant êtreexposées,assumerla
tâcheconsistant à aider l'organisation desNations Unies. Il est d'ailleurs
conforme à sajurisprudence que, bien quel'article 65de son Statutdonne
un caractère discrétionnaire à sa compétence consultative, seules des
((raisons décisives ))puissent justifier le rejet d'une telle requête (C.I.J.
Recueil 1973, p. 183 ;C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 86). Certes les irrégularités
qui, depuis le début,ont marqué la présente affaire pourraient fort bien
être considéréecsomme des (<raisons décisives permettant à la Cour de

déclinerla requête. Toutefois la stabilité et l'efficacitédes organisations
internationales, dont l'organisation des Nations Unies représente
l'exemple suprême, sontd'une importance si fondamentale pour l'ordre
mondial que la Cour ne saurait manquer d'aider un organesubsidiairede
l'AssembléegénéraledesNations Unies à asseoir sonfonctionnement sur
des bases fermes et sûres. Le risque de voir le rôlejudiciaire de la Cour
compromis ou discréditéeût étéuneraisod nécisivedenepas donner suite
à la requête ;ce risque n'existepas en l'espèceetla Cour, par conséquent,
n'estime pas que des considérations d'autolimitation judiciaire doivent

l'empêcherderendrel'avis consultatif demandé.Dansla présente affaire,
un telrefuslaisseraitsansréponseunetrès graveallégationdirigéecontrele
Tribunal administratif, selon laquelle le Tribunal aurait en réalité défié
l'autoritéde l'Assemblée générale .ien que, comme il est dit au para-
graphe 26 ci-dessus, il ne puisse y avoir de restriction au pouvoir discré-
tionnaire de la Cour, celle-cis'abstiendrade refuser sa <participation ..à
l'action de l'organisation (C.I.J. Recueil1950,p. 71),afin que lesimpor-
tants principesjuridiques enjeu puissent êtreprécisés ;mais elle doit en various irregularities. It isnot byappearing to shyaway fromthe latter that
the Court can discharge its truejudicial functions.

46. TheCourt willtherefore now turn tothe actual question on whichits

opinion isrequested, and will consider first whether, in the formin whichit
has been submitted, it is one which the Court can properly answer. The
question laid before the Court for advisory opinion by the request sub-
mitted by the decision of the Committee dated 13July 1981 is as fol-
lows :
"1s thejudgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
in Judgement No. 273, Mortishedv. the Secretary-General,warranted

in determining that General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17De-
cember 1979could not be givenimmediate effect in requiring, for the
payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country
other than the country of the staff member's last duty station ?"

The Committee in fact adopted exactly the question formulated by the
United States in its application to the Committee ; but as already noted,

before doing so it decided that there was a substantial basis for the
application on two of the specificgrounds provided forin Article 11of the
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal. Thus, in the first place, the ques-
tion put to the Court is, on the face of it, at once infelicitously expressed
and vague ;and, in the second place, the records and report of the Com-
rnittee cast doubt on whether the questionasframed really corresponds to
the intentions of the Committee in seising the Court. Its wording is infe-
licitous because of the expression used in asking whether Judgement
No. 273 is "warranted", and whether it gives "immediate effect" to Gtn-
eral Assembly resolution 34/ 165 ;it might havebeen differently andmore
happily phrased in language which made it clear that the question was a
legalquestion arising within the scopeof the activities of the Committee, in
accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter,
and one within the powers of the Committee to put under Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of theTribunal. It appears not to correspond to
the intentions of the Committee in that it is worded in such a way that it

does not disclose the two grounds of objection, error in law and excessof
jurisdiction, made to the Tribunal's Judgement during the discussions of
the Comrnittee, and which clearly lie at the basis of the question intended
tobe referred to the Court by the Committee. This defect derives from the
original omission of the United States Govemment to set forth those two
issues and supporting argument in its application to the Committee, a
defect which was later imperfectly covered up by the votes of the Com-
mittee finding that there was a substantial basis for the two grounds
discussed.mêmetemps signalerlesdiversesirrégularitésdela procédure.Cen'estpas
en paraissant les ignorer que la Cour pourrait s'acquitter de sa véritable
fonction judiciaire.

46. La Cour envient donc à laquestionsur laquelle illuiest demandéde
donner un avis consultatif ;ellerecherchera tout d'abord si, compte tenu
de sarédaction,ellepeut àbon droit y répondre.Dansla requêtedont elle
est saisieà la suite de la décision prisepar le Comité le 13juillet 1981,la
question est poséeen ces termes :

(Dans son jugement no 273 concernant l'affaire Mortished c. le
Secrétaire généra dle I'Organisationdes Nations Unies le Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies pouvait-il légitimement déterminer
que la résolution 34/ 165de l'Assemblée générale en date du 17dé-
cembre 1979,quisubordonne lepaiement delaprimede rapatriement
à la présentation de piècesattestant laréinstallation du fonctionnaire
dans un pays autre que celui de son dernier lieu d'affectation, ne
pouvait prendre immédiatement effet?

Le Comité aen fait repris telle quelle la question formulée par les Etats-
Unis dans la demande qu'ils lui avaient soumise, mais, comme il est
indiquéplus haut, le Comité avait auparavant décidéque cettedemande
reposait sur desbases sérieusespour deuxdes motifs spécifiés à l'article 11
du statut du Tribunal administratif. Ainsi, en premier lieu, la question

soumise àla Cour, considéréeen elle-même,apparaît à la foismal poséeet
vague ; en deuxième lieu, les procès-verbaux et le rapport du Comité
permettent de douter que, telle qu'elle se présente, ellecorresponde vrai-
ment aux intentions qui animaientleComité quand celui-cia saisila Cour.
La question est mal posée àcause des expressions utiliséespour demander
si, dans lejugement no273, le Tribunal pouvait <<légitimementdétermi-
ner...))et s'il donne immédiatement effet ))à la résolution 34/165 de
l'Assemblée générale ;elle aurait pu êtreconçuedifféremmentet de façon
plus heureuse en des termes qui eussent montréqu'il s'agissaitbien d'une
questionjuridique seposant dans lecadrede l'activitédu Comité - comme

le requiert l'article 96, paragraphe, de la Charte des Nations Unies - et
que le Comitéétaithabilité à la poser conformément a l'article 11,para-
graphe 1,du statut du Tribunal. La question ne paraît pas cadrer avecles
intentions du Comité,car ellene faitpas apparaître lesdeux motifs :erreur
de droit et excèsde compétence,pour lesquels lejugement du Tribunal a
été contestéau cours des débatsdu Comité etquisont manifestement à la
base mêmede la requêtedont celui-ci a entendu saisir la Cour. Ce défaut
tient à l'omission initiale du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, qui n'a pas
spécifié cesdeux motifs et les arguments à l'appui dans sa demande au
Comité,et cetteomission n'a été qu'imparfaitement réparéepar lesvotes à

la suite desquels le Comité aconclu que la demande reposait sur des bases
sérieusespour ces deux motifs. 47. The Court has thereforeto consider whether it shouldconfine itself
to answeringthe question put ;or, having examined the question, decline
to give an opinion in response to the request ; or, in accordance with its
establishedjurisprudence, seektobring out what it conceivesto be the real
meaning of the Comrnittee'srequest, and thereafter proceed to attempt to
answer rationally and effectively "the legal questions really in issue"

(I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 89, para. 35). As will be explained below (para-
graph 55), it might be possible to give a reply to the question on its own
terms, but the reply would not appear to resolve the questions really in
issue, and it is also doubtful whether such a reply would be a proper
exercise of the Court's powers under Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute.
The dilemma has been emphasized in the written statement of France :
whilenot going sofar as to contend that the Court shouldnot giveeffect to
the request,the French Government observed that the question put to the
Court "does not indicateon what groundstheCommitteeonApplications
for Review has decided that 'there is a substantial basis' for the appli-
cationpresented by the United States ofAmerica" and that the Court may
therefore "encounter particular difficultiesin exercising itsjurisdiction".
It recalls that according to the established case-law of the Court in this
field, on the one hand "in giving its opinion the Court is, in principle,
bound by the terms of the questions formulated in the request" (I.C.J.

Reports 1973,p. 184,para. 41),while on the other hand, the Court'sjuris-
diction under Article 11 of the Statute is limited to the four specific
grounds of objection there specified, and
"consequently, the Comrnittee isauthorizedtorequest, and theCourt
to give, an advisory opinion only on legal questions which may
properly be consideredas falling withn the terms of one or more of

those four 'grounds"' (ibid.).
48. The Court does not however conclude that in the present case it is
obliged to decline on these grounds to givean opinion.The Court pointed

out in its advisoryopinion concerningthe Interpretation of theAgreement
of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt that

"if [the Court]is to remain faithful to the requirements of itsjudicial
character in the exerciseof its advisoryjurisdiction, it must ascertain
what are thelegalquestions reallyin issueinquestionsformulated in a
request" (I. C.J.Reports 1980, p. 88, para. 35).

If those questions, once ascertained, prove to be questions "which may
properly be consideredas falling withn the terms of one or more of" the
grounds contemplated in Article 11 of the Statute of the Tribunal, it is
upon those questions that the Court can give its opinion. In its 1973
Opinion the Court indicated the primacy of Article 11 over the actual
terms of therequest, when it pointed out that the scope ofthe questionput
to it is 47. La Cour doit donc sedemander sielledoit secontenter de répondre

àla question telle qu'elle est poséeou, ayant examinécelle-ci,refuser d'y
donner suite ;ou si, conformément à sajurisprudence, elledoit s'efforcer
de dégager cequi lui paraît être l'intention véritabledu Comité, puis de
chercher àrépondre,de façon rationnelle et satisfaisante,aux (points de
droit ...véritablement mis en jeu ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 89, par. 35).
Comme on le verra ci-après(paragraphe 55), il serait éventuellement pos-
sible de répondre à la question prise àla lettre, mais une telle réponsene

résoudraitpas, semble-t-il, les points véritablement en jeu. Il est en outre
douteux que ce soit, pour la Cour, une manière appropriée d'exercer les
pouvoirs que lui confèrel'article 11du statut du Tribunal. L'exposé écrit
du Gouvernement français souligne bien ce dilemme. Sans aller jusqu'à
dire que laCour ne doit pasdonner suite à la requête, cegouvernement fait
observer que la question posée à la Cour (in'indique pas les motifs sur
lesquels le Comitédes demandes de réformation s'estfondépour décider

que la demande présentéepar les Etats-Unis d'Amérique (irepose sur des
bases sérieuses et que de cefait la Cour risque d'ciéprouverdesdifficultés
particulièrespour exercer sajuridiction o.Ilrappelle que certes, envertu de
sajurisprudence, (lorsqu'ellerend son avis, la Cour est en principe liéepar
le libellédes questions formuléesdans la requête )>(C.I.J. Recueil 1973,
p. 184, par. 41), mais que la compétence de la Cour sur la base de l'ar-
ticle 11du statut du Tribunal n'en estpas moins limitée auxquatre motifs

précisde contestation spécifiésdans cet article, et

(il s'ensuit que le Comité n'est autorisé à demander, et la Cour à
donner, un avis consultatif que sur les questionsjuridiques qui peu-
vent légitimement êtreconsidérées commese rattachant à un ou
plusieurs de ces quatre motifs )>(ibid.).

48. La Cour ne conclut cependant pas qu'en la présente espèce ces
raisons l'obligent à refuser son avis. Dans son avis consultatif sur l'Inter-
prétation del'accorddu 25 mars 1951 entre l'OMS et I'Egypte,la Cour a
soulignéque :

(pour rester fidèle aux exigences de son caractère judiciaire dans
l'exercice de sa compétence consultative, [la Cour] doit rechercher
quelles sont véritablement les questionsjuridiques que soulèvent les
demandes formulées dans une requête ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 88,
par. 35).

Si ces questions, une fois éclaircies, se révèlentêtredes questions (iqui
peuvent légitimementêtreconsidérées comme serattachant à un ou plu-
sieurs )>des motifs envisagés à l'article 11du statut du Tribunal, c'està leur

propos que la Cour peut exprimer son avis. Dans sa décisionde 1973la
Cour a indiqué que l'article 11 prévaut sur le texte de la requête,en
soulignant que la portée de la question posée : <<dépend,en premier lieu, de l'article 11du statut du Tribunal admi-
nistratif qui spécifielesmotifs pour lesquels unjugement duTribunal
peut êtrecontesté par la voie consultative et, en second lieu, des
termes dela requête adressée àla Cour (C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 183,

par. 41).
La Cour, en la présente espèce, conclut donc que pour répondre à la
requêtedu Comitéelledoit examinersichacun des motifs de contestation
auxquelsle Comité a trouvé des bases sérieuses >)est fondé, bien qu'au-
cun de ces motifs de contestation ne soit formellement énoncé dans la

question posée à la Cour. Comme elle l'a dit dans son avis consultatif de
1980 :
<<la Cour ne pourrait ...s'acquitter convenablement de l'obligation
qui lui incombe en l'espèce si,dans sa réponse à la requête,elle ne
prenait pas en considération tous les aspectsjuridiques pertinents du

sujet sur lequel portent les questions>)(Interprétationde l'accorddu
25 mars 1951 entre l'OMS et I'Egppte, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 89,
par. 35).
La Cour interprète donc la question qui lui est posée comme l'invitant à

décider si, sur les points mentionnés dans cette question, le Tribunal
administratif a <commisune erreur dedroit concernant lesdispositions de
la Charte ou <<outrepassésajuridiction ou sacompétence D.Ce n'estpas
l'ordre dans lequel cesdeuxmotifsfigurent àl'article 11,paragraphe 1, du
statut du Tribunal, mais c'estceluidans lequelleComitélesaexaminéset a
voté à leur sujet. La Cour en traitera égalementdans cet ordre.

49. Afin d'examiner les objections formulées contre le jugement du
Tribunal la Cour doit de toute évidencerappeler tout d'abord quelleétait
lanature dela demande soumise auTribunal, cequ'ila décidé enfait et les
motifs qu'il a donnés de sa décision. Les faits de l'espèceont déjàété
résumésauxparagraphes 10 à12ci-dessus.Dans sarequête,M. Mortished
priait le Tribunal de dire et juger que, en vertu des modalités et des
conditions fixéesde façon détailléepar le Secrétaire général ence qui
concerne le paiement de la prime de rapatriement, il avait droit à cette
prime sans avoir à produire de piècesattestant son changement de rési-
dence ;que son droit à une prime de rapatriement était un droit acquis ;

que cedroit nepouvait êtreabolirétroactivement dufait de modifications
apportées ultérieurement au statut et au règlement du personnel ; et il
demandait au Tribunal :
((D. Compte tenu de cequiprécède,d'ordonnerau Secrétairegéné-
ral de lui verser la somme àlaquelle il a droit au titre de la prime de

rapatriement conformément à l'annexe IV au statut du person-
nel.>) 50. After setting out the principal contentions of the two parties the
Tribunal noted that "The refusa1 to pay the repatriation grant to the
Applicant was ... grounded in Admuiistrative Instruction ST/AI/269,
established in pursuance of resolution 34/165" (para. 1). The Tribunal
then recalled the basis of the legal obligations of the United Nations
towards theApplicant. The Tribunal observed that the legalstatus of staff
members is defined by a contract, entitled "letter of appointment", the

provisionsof whicharebinding on theparties and can beamended onlyby
mutual agreement. The letter of appointment stipulatesthat the appoint-
mentis offered "subject tothe provisions of the Staff Regulations and Staff
Rules, together with such amendments as may from time to time be made
to such Staff Regulations and such Staff Rules". These documents of
generalapplication "are made an integral part of the contract and the staff
member accepts in advance any amendments whch may be made to
them", new provisions resulting from amendment becoming an integral
part of the contract on the date of their entry into force (para. II).
51. After outlining the gompetent authorities and procedures for the
making of Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (seeparagraphs 67ff.below),
the Tribunal noted that "the legal status of a staff member is govemed by
the provisions of the Staff Rules immediately on their entry into force"
(para. III). Citing Staff Regulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2 (a)(the texts
of which are set out in paragraph 12 above), the Tribunal stated that "the
Secretary-General is bound torespect the acquired rights of staffmembers
in the same way as the General Assembly" (para. IV). After noting the
provisions concerning the International Civil ServiceCommission, which
"form part of the régime governing the staff of the United Nations"
(para. V), the Tribunal turned to consideration of whether the Applicant
had rights on whichhemight relyasregards the repatriation grant. It noted
thepersonnel actionform of 1958(seeparagraph 10above) andfound that

the statements therein "unquestionably constitute the explicit recognition
by theUnited Nations of[Mr. Mortished's] entitlement tothe repatriation
grant, and validation for that purpose of more than nine years' service
already completed with ICAO" (para. VI), and that as a result of the
forma1reference thus made at the time of appointment to the principle of
the relationship between the amount of the grant and length of servicethe
Applicant was in the position "that special obligations towards him were
assumed by the United Nations" (para. VI).

52. TheTribunal examined the genesisand application of the repatria-
tion grant system, and found it proved that the system of not making
payment of the grant dependent on evidence of repatriation, proposed in
1952by theConsultative Committee onAdministrative Questions, "wasin
effect followed to the benefit of staff members, even though it was not
explicitly embodied in any United Nations regulation" (para. VIII). The
Tribunalfound that, in viewof theparticular situation of theApplicant, it
wasnot required to adjudicate inabstractothe question "whether apractice 50. Aprèsavoir récapitulélesprincipaux argumentsdesdeuxparties,le
Tribunal note que <<le refus de payer la prime de rapatriement au requé-
rant a ..été fondé sur l'instruction administrative ST/AI/269 établieen

conséquencede la résolution 34/ 165 >)(par. 1).Le Tribunal rappelle en-
suite les bases des obligationsjuridiques de l'organisation à l'égarddu
requérant. Il commence par constater que la situationjuridique desfonc-
tionnaires est déterminéepar un contrat, intitulé<<lettredenomination )),
dont les dispositions lient les parties et ne peuvent êtremodifiéesque
d'accord entre elles. La lettre de nomination préciseque l'engagement est
offert<<sousréserve desdispositionsapplicables du statut et du règlement
du personnel, ainsi quede toutes modifications ultérieuresde ces textes o.
Ces documents de portéegénérale <sont incorporésdans le contrat et le

fonctionnaire accepte à l'avance lesmodifications qui pourront leur être
apportées ;les dispositions nouvelles résultant de ces modifications se
trouvent incorporées dans le contrat à la date de leur entréeen vigueur
(par. II).
51. Ayant déterminéles autorités compétenteset les procéduressuivies
pour établir le statut et le règlement du personnel (voir ci-après para-
graphes 67 et suivants), le Tribunal constate que <la situation juridique
d'un fonctionnaire est régiepar lesdispositions du règlementdu personnel
dès qu'elles sont entrées en vigueur ))(par.III). Citant l'article 12.1 du

statut du personnel et la disposition 112.2 a) du règlement du personnel
(dont les textes sont reproduits au paragraphe 12ci-dessus), ilaffirme que
<<le Secrétaire général est tende respecter les droits acquis des fonction-
naires comme l'Assemblée générale elle-même ))(par. IV).Puis, ayant pris
note des dispositions relatives à la Commission de la fonction publique
internationale qui <font partie du régimeapplicable au personnel des
Nations Unies 1)(par. V), le Tribunal aborde la question de savoir si le
requérant possédait desdroits dont il pouvait se prévaloiren ce qui con-
cerne la prime de rapatriement. Examinant à ce propos la formule de

mouvement de personnel de 1958(voir paragraphe 10 ci-dessus), le Tri-
bunal constate que les termes de ce document <constituent incontesta-
blement de la part de l'organisation la reconnaissance expresse du droit
[de M. Mortished] à la prime de rapatriement comme de lavalidation à cet
effet de plus de neuf ansde servicesdéjàaccomplis à I'OACI (par. VI) et
que,enraison dela référenceformelleainsifaite lors de sonengagement au
principe du lien entre le montant de la prime et la duréedes services, le
requérantse trouvait dans une situation où <desobligations spécialesont
étéassuméespar l'organisation à cet égard ))(par. VI).

52. Après avoir examiné lagenèsede la prime de rapatriement et son
mode d'application, le Tribunal en tire la conclusion que le système
consistant à ne pas subordonner le paiement de la prime àla preuve d'un
changement de résidence,proposé en 1952par le Comitéconsultatif pour
les questions administratives, <<a étéeffectivement suivi au bénéficedes
fonctionnaires, mêmesi aucun texte réglementaire de l'organisation des
Nations Unies ne le consacrait expressément ))(par. VIII). Eu égard à la
situation propre du requérant, il estime ne pas avoir à se prononcer infollowed consistently for nearly 30years could generate an acquired right
within the meaning of Staff Regulation 12.1" (ibid.). The Tribunal con-
tinued :

"The existence of the repatriation grant and the respective roles of
the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in defining its
juridical rules of application have their foundation in the Staff
Regulations." (Para. IX.)

It quoted Staff Regulation 9.4and Annex IV to the Regulations (set out in
paragraph 10above), and noted the margin of discretion conferred on the
Secretary-General by these texts, and that Annex IV, in defining those
entitled to the grant, "does not refer to staff members actuallyrepatriated
but to those for whom that obligation on the part of the Organization
exists" (ibid.). The Tribunal concluded :

"These two provisions of the Staff Regulations, which expressly
acknowledge that therepatriation grant schemefalls within the scope
of the rule-making authority of the Secretary-General, are still in
force. No new provision relating to that grant was added to the Staff
Regulations by the General Assembly at either its thirty-third or
thirty-fourth sessions.
Thus the question whether the Applicant is entitled to rely on
acquired rights does not arise in respect of provisions of the Staff
Regulations which faIlwithin the cornpetence of the General Assem-
bly, eventhough the subject of theapplication is closelyrelated to the
decisions on the repatriation grant taken by the General Assembly."
(Zbid.)

53. Next the Tribunal examined the background to theadoption bythe
General Assemblyofresolution 331119,and the action subsequently taken
by the International Civil ServiceCommission (ICSC) and by the Secre-
tary-General. It noted that at no point in the discussion in the General
Assembly was the nature of theterms to be established by ICSC specified
(para. XI), and that theGeneral Assemblyset afundamental objective and
requested ICSC to establish the terms of implementation, ICSC being
required to take action in accordance with the powers vestedinitto ensure
CO-ordinationwithin the common system (para. XII). Referring to the
textsofparagraphs (d)and (f)of StaffRule 109.5asamended on 22 August
1979 (quoted in paragraph 11 above), the Tribunal observed that "In

taking this measure, the Secretary-General adopted the same position as
theExecutive Heads of the specializedagencies"(para. XII), and that "this
was the first time that a provision of the Staff Rules acknowledged that
entitlement to the repatriation grant might exist without evidence of re-
location being provided" (para. XIII). The Tribunal drew the conclusion
that "under the terms of Staff Rule 109.5 (f) . . theApplicant retains his
entitlement to the amount of the grant without the need, as regards that
period of service, to produce evidence of relocation" (para. XIII), andabstracto sur la question de savoir<<si une pratique constamment suivie
depuis près de trente ans pouvait faire naître un droit acquis au sens de
l'article 12.1du statut du personnel))(ibid.). Il ajou:e

<<L'existence de la prime de rapatriement et le rôle respectif de
l'Assemblée générale et du Secrétaire générad lansla détermination
de son régimejuridique reposent sur le statut du personnel. )>
(Par. IX.)

LeTribunal, citant l'article 9.4du statut du personnel et l'annexe IV audit
statut (reproduits au paragraphe 10 ci-dessus), remarque que ces textes
laissent une certaine marge d'appréciation au Secrétairegénéral etque
l'annexe IV, en définissant les bénéficiairesde la prime, <<ne vise pas
les fonctionnaires effectivement rapatriés mais ceux pour lesquels cette
obligation existe à la charge de l'organisation (ibid.). Le Tribunal
conclut :

<<Ces deux dispositions du statut du personnel qui reconnaissent
expressémentque lerégimedelaprime de rapatriement rentredans la
compétence réglementaire du Secrétaire généralsont toujours en
vigueur. Aucun texte nouveau concernant cette prime n'a étéincor-
porédans le statut du personnel par l'Assemblée généralle ors de ses
trente-troisième et trente-quatrième sessions.
La question de savoir si le requérantest en droitde seprévaloirde
droits acquis ne sepose donc pas par rapportàdes textes du statut du
personnel relevant delacompétencedel'Assemblée générale,mêmesi
l'objet de la requêtese rattache étroitement aux décisions prisespar
l'Assemblée généraleconcernant la prime de rapatriement.
(Ibid.)

53. Puis le Tribunal examine les circonstances à la suite desquelles
l'Assemblée généralaeadoptéla résolution33/ 119,ainsi que les mesures
prises ultérieurement par la Commission de la fonction publique interna-
tionale (CFPI) et par leSecrétairegénéral.l noteque lesmodalitésdevant
être établies par laCFPI n'ont étéprécisées àaucun moment pendant les
débats del'Assemblée(par. XI), et que celle-cis'estbornée àformuler un

objectif fondamental en chargeant la CFPI d'en établirles conditions de
mise en Œuvre,la CFPI étantpriée d'agirconformément à la compétence
qui lui avait étéattribuée pour assurer la coordination dans le cadre du
régimecommun(par. XII). Seréférant àlapromulgationdesalinéas d)etfi
de la disposition 109.5du règlement du personnel, telle que modifiéele
22 août 1979(voirleparagraphe 11ci-dessus),le Tribunal signale que<<ce
faisant, le Secrétaire général adoptéla même positionque les chefs de
secrétariat des institutions spécialisées(par. XII) et que, pour la pre-
mièrefois,un texte du règlementdu personnel reconnaissait que le droit à
la prime de rapatriement pouvait exister sans que soit attestéle change-
ment de résidence ))(par. XIII). Ayant conclu que <conformément à la
disposition 109.5fl...lerequérantconservele droitaumontant delaprime
sans avoirà produire, en ce quiconcernecettepériodede service,une pièce353 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

proceeded to examine the question whether that entitlement "can have
been effaced retroactively by the Secretary-General's deletion of sub-
paragraph (fl in pursuance of resolution 34/ 165"(para. XIV). The Tribu-
nal surveyed the circumstances preceding the adoption of that resolution
and noted that

"at no time did theGeneral Assembly contemplatesupplementing or

amending the provisions relating to the repatriation grant contained
in the Staff Regulations. Nor did the Assemblyexamine the text of the
Staff Rules in force since 1July 1979,andit never claimed that there
was any defect in the provisions introduced on that date which dim-
inished their validity. The Assembly simply stated a principle of
action which the Secretary-General acted upon in establishing a new
version of Staff Rule 109.5which, from 1January 1980,replaced the
versionpreviously in force on the basis of which the Applicant could
have obtained the repatriation grant." (Para. XIV.)

54. The Tribunal considered finally the question whether the Applicant
could rely on an acquired right, failure to recognizewhichwould giverise
to the obligation to compensate for the injury sustained (para. XV). It
referred to its own previous jurisprudence on acquired rights of staff

members, and concluded that, in the case before it,

"the link established by the General Assembly and the Secretary-
General between the amount of thegrant and length of serviceentitles
theApplicant to invoke an acquired right, notwithstanding the terms
of Staff Rule 109.5which came into force on 1January 1980with the
deletion of subparagraph (f) concerning the transitional system"
(para. XV).

The decision of theTribunal on Mr. Mortished's claimwas accordingly as
follows :

"By making payment of the Applicant's repatriation grant condi-
tional on the production of evidence of relocation, the Respondent
failed to recognize the Applicant's acquired right, whch he held by
virtue of the transitional system in force from 1July to 31 December

1979and set forth in Staff Rule 109.5 (fl.
Thestand taken by the Respondent has had the effect of depriving
the Applicant of payment of therepatriation grant. Recognizing that
theApplicant wasentitled toreceivethat grant onthe termsdefined in
Staff Rule 109.5 (f, despite the fact that that rule was no longer in
force on the date of the Applicant's separation from the United
Nations, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant sustained injury as the
result of a disregard of Staff Regulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2(a).
The Applicant is thus entitled to compensation for that injury. Theattestant son changement de résidence ))(par. XIII), le Tribunal pose la
question de savoir sice droit<<apu êtreaboli rétroactivementdu faitde la
suppression de l'alinéa fl par le Secrétaire généraeln conséquencede la
résolution 34/ 165 )(par. XIV). Le Tribunal évoque à ce sujet les circons-
tances dans lesquelles ce texte a étéadoptéet relèveque :

<<àaucun moment l'Assemblée généralne'a envisagéde compléterou
de modifier les textes du statut du personnel relatifsà la prime de
rapatriement. L'Assembléen'a pas non plus considéré letexte du
règlementdu personnel en vigueur depuis le lerjuillet 1979et ellen'a
aucunement prétendu que les dispositions introduites à cette date
étaient frappéesd'un vice qui en affecterait la validité. L'Assemblée
s'estbornée àénoncerun principed'action dont leSecrétairegénéraa l
tenu compte en établissantun nouveau texte de la disposition 109.5,
texte qui,à dater du lerjanvier 1980,a remplacé letexte antérieure-
ment en vigueur sur la base duquel le requérant pouvait obtenir la

prime de rapatriement. ))(Par. XIV.)

54. Enfin le Tribunal pose la question de savoir si le requérant pouvait
invoquer un droit acquis dont la méconnaissancedonnait lieu à l'obliga-
tion de réparerle préjudice subi (par. XV). Invoquant sa propre jurispru-
dence sur la question des droits acquis desfonctionnaires,ilconclut qu'en
l'espèce :

<<lelien établipar l'Assembléegénéraleet leSecrétairegénéraelntre le
montant de laprimeet lesservicesaccomplis donneau requéranttitre
à se prévaloird'un droit acquis nonobstant les termes de la disposi-

tion 109.5du règlemententréeenvigueurle lerjanvier 1980et suppri-
mant l'alinéa fl relatif au régimetransitoire (par.XV).

En conséquence le Tribunal statue comme suit :

<<En subordonnant le versement de la prime de rapatriement au
requérant à la production d'une pièceattestant son changement de
résidence, ledéfendeur améconnu ledroit acquis du requérant résul-
tant pour lui du régimetransitoire énoncédans la disposition 109.5fl

en vigueur du lerjuillet au 31décembre 1979.
La position adoptée par le défendeur a pour effet de priver le
requérant du versement de la prime de rapatriement. Ayant reconnu
que le requérant était endroit de recevoir cette prime dans les con-
ditions qui avaient étédéfiniespar la disposition 109.5 fl, bien que
celle-ci ait cesséd'êtreen vigueurà la date àlaquelle le requérant a
terminéses services à l'organisation des Nations Unies, le Tribunal
constate que le requérant a subi un préjudicedu fait de la mécon-
naissance de l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel et de la disposi- injury should be assessed at the amount of the repatriation grant of
which payment was refused." (Para. XVI.)

55. Having thus summarized thejudgement of the Tribunal, the Court

can now turn to the question put to it. This, as already noted, is sparse and
elliptical, and seems to embody an assumption about the Tribunal's
judgement that ishardly sustainable. Even ifit be related to thegrounds of
objection stated in Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute, so as to ask the
Court whether the Tribunal "erred on a question of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" or "exceeded its juris-
diction or competence" in

"determining that General Assemblyresolution 34/ 165of 17Decem-
ber 1979 could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the
payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country
other than the country of the staff member's last duty station",

it seemsthat it might be a correct answer to reply simply that theTribunal
did not so determine. For it is important not to confuse what Mr. Mor-
tished asked theTribunal to decide and what it in fact did decide,whichis
somewhat different. If the decision of the Tribunal, quoted above, is
compared withMr.Mortished's claim,summarized inparagraph 49above,
it willbe apparent that the Tribunal did not find in the terms of what was
asked for in paragraph D of that statement of claim. It did not order the
Secretary-General to pay to Mr. Mortished "his entitlement to a repatria-
tion grant in accordance with Annex IV to the Staff Regulations". What it

did decidewasthat theApplicanthad an acquired right to receivethegrant
"on the terms defined in Staff Rule 109.5(fl despite the fact that that rule
was no longer in force on the date of the Applicant's separation from the
United Nations" ;and that he had accordingly sustained injury for which
compensation wasdue, the injurybeing assessedat the amount of thegrant
of which payment had been refused. Thus the decision was not that
resolution 34/ 165could notbe givenimmediate effectbut, on the contrary,
that the Applicant had sustained injury precisely by reason of its having
been givenimmediate effect by the Secretary-General inthe newversionof
the Staff Rules which omitted Rule 109.5 0. The difference between a
decision that resolution 34/ 165could not be givenimmediate effect and a
decision that, precisely because it had been given immediate effect, the
Applicant had-sustained injury, is not unimportant. Thejudgement of the
Tribunal in no way seeks to cal1in question the legal validity and effec-
tiveness of either resolution 34/165 or the Staff Rules made by the Sec-
retary-General for its immediate implementation. It drew what, in the
Tribunal's view, were the necessary consequences of the fact that the
adoption and application of those measures had infringed what the Tri- tion 112.2a)du règlementdu personnel.Lerequérantestdonc en droit
d'obtenir réparation de ce préjudice. Lepréjudice doit êtreévalué au
montant mêmede la prime de rapatriement dont l'octroi lui a été
refusé.1)(Par. XVI.)

55. Ayant ainsi résumé lejugementdu Tribunal, la Cour en vient à la
question qui luiestposée.Comme on l'avu, celle-ciestbrèveetelliptique et
semble partir d'un postulat difficilement soutenable au sujet dujugement.
Mêmesi on la rattache aux motifs de contestation énumérés àl'article 11
du statut du Tribunal, de manière à demander à la Cour si le Tribunal a
commis «une erreur dedroitconcernant les dispositions de la Chartedes
Nations Unies ou a <<outrepassé sajuridiction ou sa compétence ))en
déterminant

<<que la résolution34/ 165de l'Assembléegénéraleen date du 17 dé-
cembre 1979,quisubordonne lepaiement delaprime derapatriement
àla présentation de piècesattestant la réinstallationdu fonctionnaire
dans un pays autre que celui de son dernier lieu d'affectation, ne
pouvait prendre immédiatement effet O,
la réponse correcte consisterait, semble-t-ilà dire simplement que le
Tribunal n'a rien déterminéde semblable. Car il importe dene pas con-

fondre ce que M. Mortished a prié le Tribunal de décideret ce que le
Tribunal a effectivement décidé,qui est assez différent.Sil'oncompare la
demande de M. Mortished, résumée auparagraphe 49 ci-dessus, à la
décision précitédeu Tribunal, on s'aperçoit immédiatement que le Tribu-
nal n'apasstatuécomme M. Mortished l'enpriait danssa conclusion D. Le
Tribunal n'a pas ordonnéau Secrétaire généradle verser à M. Mortished
<la somme à laquelle il a droit au titre de la prime de rapatriement
conformément àl'annexe IVdu statut du personnel 1)Cequ'ila décidée,n
fait, c'est que le requérant avait un droit acquisevoir la prime <dans
les conditions qui avaient étédéfiniespar la disposition9.5f), bien que
celle-ciait cesséd'êtreen vigueurla dateà laquelle lerequérant a terminé
sesservices àl'organisation desNations Unies ); et qu'il avaitdonc subi
un préjudicedont il devait obtenir réparation,lepréjudiceétantévaluéau

montant de la prime dont l'octroi avait étérefusé. Ainsila décisionne
consistait pasà dire que la résolution34/ 165ne pouvait prendre immé-
diatement effet,mais àdire tout au contraireque, précisémentparceque le
Secrétairegénéraalvait donnéeffetimmédiat à larésolutionen adoptant le
nouveau texte du règlement du personnel où ne figurait plus la disposi-
tion 109.5 fl l,requérant avait subi un préjudice. La différence entre
décider que la résolution 34/165 ne peut recevoir d'effet immédiat et
déciderque, précisémentparce qu'elleareçu effet immédiat,le requérant a
subi un préjudice, estloin d'êtrenégligeable.Dans son jugement, le Tri-
bunal n'a nullement cherché à mettre en doute la validitéet l'effectivité
juridiques de la résolution34/165 ni de la disposition du règlement du
personnel arrêtéepar le Secrétaire généralour la mettre immédiatement355 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (ADVISORO YPINION)

bunal considered to havebeen an acquired right of the staffmember, which
was therefore protected by Staff Regulation 12.1.

56. Thus this understanding of the actual question produces the above
answer which, important as it is, still leaves another question as it were
secreted between the lines of the question as originally formulated :
namely, was the decision of the Tribunal, in awarding Mr. Mortished a
sum equivalent to thegrant, even if it did not seek to deny the immediate
application of resolution 34/ 165, nevertheless one that denied "the full

effectof decisions of theGeneral Assembly" (paragraph 39above), and so
erred on a question of lawrelating to the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, or amounted to an excess of jurisdiction or competence ? This
seems to be the question which is the gravamen of the objection to the
Tribunal's Judgement, and theone which the Committeeintended to raise.
In order to answer it,theCourt must first consider the scopeof the concept
of error "on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations".
57. The ground of objection, that the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal "erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations", does not appear in the corresponding
article (Art. XII) of the Statute of the IL0 Administrative Tribunal, which
wasbefore theCourt in 1956 ;and itwasnot oneof thegrounds reliedon in
the Application for Review of Judgement No.158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunalin 1973. Its meaning has, accordingly, not pre-

viouslyfallen to be examinedby theCourt ;however, in the second of the
two casesjust mentioned, the Court indicated that this ground differed
from those then under examination in that the fact that the role of the
Court in review proceedings is not to retry the case

"does not mean that in an appropriate case,where thejudgement has
been challenged on the ground of an error on a question of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter, the Court may not be called
upon to review the actual substance of the decision" (1 . J. Reports
1973, p. 188,para. 48).

What then is the proper role of the Court when asked for an advisory
opinion inrespect of thisground of objection ?The answerto thisquestion
must depend not only upon the terms of Article 11,but also upon several

other factors including, first of all, the Court's Statute, the case-lawof the
Court, the general requirements for the exercise of thejudicial function ;
and, since Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute provides that
"Questions upon which the advisory opinion of theCourt isasked shall be
laid before the Court by means of a written request containing an exact
statement of the question upon which an opinion is required", upon the
terms of the particular question asked of the Court by the Cornmittee.en Œuvre.Il atirélesconséquences qui, à son avis,s'imposaient du faitque
l'adoption etla mise enapplication de cesmesures avaient porté atteinte à
ce que le Tribunal a estimé avoirétéun droit acquis par le requérant,
protégé à ce titre par l'article 12.1du statut du personnel.
56. Comprise ainsi, la question effectivement posée suscite donc la

réponseci-dessus qui, aussi importante soit-elle, laisse subsisterune autre
question qui, pourrait-on dire, sedissimule entre leslignes du texte soumis
à la Cour :mêmes'iln'apas cherché àcontesterl'application immédiate de
la résolution34/ 165,leTribunal, enaccordant à M.Mortished un montant
équivalant à celui de la prime, n'en a-t-il pas moins (empêché que des
décisionsde l'Assemblée générale ...prennent pleinement effet i)(para-
graphe 39 ci-dessus) et commis par-là une erreur de droit concernant les
dispositions dela Charte desNations Unies ou outrepassésajuridiction ou
sa compétence ? Telle parait êtrela question qui est à la base de la con-

testation du jugement du Tribunal et qu'il entrait dans les intentions du
Comitéde soulever. Pour yrépondre,la Cour doit examiner tout d'abord la
portéede la notion cl'(erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies i).
57. Le motif de contestation suivant lequelleTribunal administratif des
Nations Unies aurait <<commis une erreur de droit concernant les dipo-
sitions de la Charte des Nations Unies i)ne figure pas dans la disposition
correspondante(art. XII)du statut du Tribunal administratif de l'OIT, sur
la base duquel la Cour avait étésaisie en 1956 ;ce n'était pasnon plus un
des motifs invoqués lorsde la Demande de réformationdujugement no158

du Tribunaladministratif desNations Uniesen 1973.La Cour n'a doncpas
eujusqu'ici l'occasion d'enapprofondir lesens.Mais, dans ladeuxième des
deux affaires qui viennent d'êtrementionnées, la Cour a indiqué que ce
motif différaitde ceux qu'elle considéraitalors, car, bien que le rôle de la
Cour dans une instance de réformation ne soit pas de refaire le pro-
cès :

<Cela ne veut pas dire que, le cas échéant,si un jugement était
contestéen raison d'une erreur de droit concernant lesdipositions de

la Charte, la Cour ne pourrait pas êtreappelée àexaminer la décision
au fond. (C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 188,par. 48.)

Quel rôle doit donc jouer la Cour quand elle est appelée àrendre un avis
consultatif sur cette base ?La réponsea cette question dépend nécessai-
rement, non seulement du libelléde l'article 11, mais aussi d'autres fac-
teurs et tout d'abord du Statut de la Cour, desajurisprudence et de tout ce
qu'exige en général l'exercicede la fonction judiciaire ;et puisque, aux

termes de l'article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut : (Les questions sur les-
quelles l'avis consultatif de la Cour est demandé sont exposées àla Cour
par unerequêteécrite qui formule, entermesprécis,la questionsur laquelle
l'avisde la Cour est demandé D,la réponsedépendraaussi du libelléde la
question particulière que le Comitépose en l'espèce. 58. In another well-known passage in its 1973Advisory Opinion, pre-
ceding that quoted above, the Court declared that :
"the task of the Court is not to retry the case but to give its opinion
on the questions submitted to it concerning the objections lodged

against the Judgement. The Court is not therefore entitled to substi-
tute its own opinionfor that of theTribunal on the merits of the case
adjudicated by the Tribunal. Its role is to determine if the circum-
stances of the case, whether they relate to merits or procedure, show
that any objection made to the Judgement on one of the grounds
mentioned in Article 11 is well founded." (I.C.J. Reports 1973,
pp. 187-188,para. 47.)
That the Court's proper role is not to retry the case and to attempt to
substitute its own opinion on the merits for that of the Tribunal, is

apparent from the very fact that the question or questions on which the
Court is asked its opinion are, since they must conform to Article 11,
paragraph 1,of the Tribunal's Statute, different from the questions which
theTribunal had to decide. As the Court then observed, they "arise not out
of thejudgements of the Administrative Tribunal, but out ofthe objections
to those judgements raised before the Committee itself" (ibid.,p. 174,
para. 21). There are, however, other reasons, some of them especially
compelling in the present case, why the Court should not attempt by an
advisory opinion to fil1the role of a court of appeal and to retry the issues
on the merits of this case as they were presented to the Tribunal.
59. Foremost amongst those reasonsmust bethe difficulties ofusing the
advisoryjurisdiction of theCourt for the task of tryinga contentious case,
and especially oneto which one of theparties is an individual. Someof the
difficulties may be mitigated by such devices as dispensing with oral
proceedings and enabling an individual to present written observations
through the intermediary of the Secretary-General ;but although such
safeguards of elementary principles of judicial procedure such as the

equality of the parties and the need to hear both sides may be adequate
where the issue for the Court is limited in the way indicated in its 1973
Opinion, they would need most careful re-appraisal were the Court called
upon tofunctionas an appeal court inrespect of thecontentious caseitself.
Where, however, "the task of the Court is not to retry the case but to reply
to thequestions put toit regardingtheobjections whichhave been raised to
the Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal" (1.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 182,para. 38),theposition isdifferent, and, asnoted above, the require-
ments of equality have been met, on that assumption, in the present
proceedings (paragraph 30 above).

60. Likewise, while the interposition, between the proceedings before
the Administrative Tribunal and the proceedings before the Court, of the
Committee, an essentially political body with discretion to determine
whether or not this Court shall be seised of the matter at all, is not
necessarily inappropriate for the purposes of seeking an advisory opinion, 58. Dans un autre passage bien connu de son avisconsultatif de 1973,

précédantcelui qui est citéplus haut, la Cour a déclaré :
<<la Cour n'a pas pour mission ..de refaire le procès maisde donner
son avissur lesquestions qui luisont soumisesau sujet desobjections
soulevéescontre le jugement. La Cour n'est donc pas habilitée à
substituer son opinion à celle du Tribunal sur le fond de l'affaire

tranchéepar celui-ci. Son rôle est de déterminers'ilressort des cir-
constances de l'espèce,concernant le fond ou la procédure, qu'une
contestation formulée contrele jugement pour l'un des motifs men-
tionnés à l'article 11 est fondée.))(C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 187-188,
par. 47.)

Que la Cour n'ait pas pour rôle de refaire le procèsni d'essayer de subs-
tituer son opinionsur lefond à celledu Tribunal estattestéparlefaitque la
ou lesquestions sur lesquellesla Cour estconsultéedoiventêtreconformes
à l'article 11, paragraphe 1, du statut du Tribunal et diffèrent donc de
cellessur lesquelles le Tribunal a étéappelé à statuer. Comme la Cour l'a
dit en 1973, <elles ne sont pas soulevées ..par lesjugements du Tribunal
administratif mais par les objections formulées contre ces jugements
devant le Comité lui-même >)(ibid.,p. 174,par. 21). Il existe cependant
d'autres raisons, dont certaines sont particulièrement impérieuses enla
présenteespèce,pour lesquelles la Cour ne doit pas essayer, en matière
consultative, de jouer le rôle d'une juridiction d'appel et de rejuger les

points de fond tels qu'ils ont étéplaidésdevant le Tribunal.
59. Une desprincipales raisons est qu'il serait forcément difficilede se
servir de la juridiction consultative de la Cour pour juger une affaire
contentieuse, dans le cas surtout où l'une des parties est une personne
privée Certaines difficultés peuvent être atténuées pardes procédés
consistant par exemple à supprimer la procédureorale et à permettre à
la personne intéresséd ee présenter des observations écritespar l'intermé-
diaire du Secrétaire général ; mais, bien que ces façons de garantir des
principes élémentairesde procédurejudiciaire,telsque l'égalité dep sarties
etlanécessité delesentendre l'uneetl'autre. ~uissent suffireauand la Cour
est saisie de questions bien circonscrites comme en 1973,elles devraient

êtreréexaminéesde ~rèssi la Cour devait fonctionner comme une iuri-
diction d'appel par rapport à l'affaire contentieuse elle-même.Dans la
mesure cependant où <la Cour a pour tâche non pas de refaire le procès
mais de répondre auxquestionsqui lui sont poséesau sujet des objections
soulevéescontre lejugement du Tribunal administratif )>(C.I.J.Recueil
1973,p. 182,par. 38), la situation se présentedifféremment ;comme il a
été soulignéplushaut (paragraphe 30),lesexigencesde l'égalité sont, dans
cette perspective, satisfaites en la présente instance.
60. De même,si l'interposition, entre l'instance devant le Tribunal et
l'instance devant la Cour, du Comité,organe essentiellement politique
dotédu pouvoir discrétionnairede déterminersila Cour serasaisieou non,

n'estpas nécessairementinappropriéequand il s'agitde demander un avis
consultatif, elle apparaîtrait en revanche inacceptable si l'avisconsultatifit would on theother hand beunacceptable if the advisory opinion wereto
be assimilated to a decision on appeal. The finding of the Courtin its 1973

Advisory Opinion (quoted in paragraph 23 above) that there was "no
necessary incompatibility between the exercise of these functions by a
political body and therequirements of thejudicial process" (I.C.J. Reports
1973, p. 176,para. 25)was on the assumption that the proceedings before
the Court were not to retry, on appeal, the same issue as that tried by the
Administrative Tribunal. This difficulty is especially cogent if, as in the
present case, the Committee, in its own exercise of what is clearly a
quasi-judicial function, has excluded from its proceedings one who was a
party in the case before the Tribunal, whilst the applicant State was able
not only to speak and argue but also to vote on the question whether its
own objection to the Judgement of the Tribunal had a "substantial basis"
or not. The gravity of these aspects has already been made clear above
(paragraphs 42-44).
61. The very according of a right, in Article II of the Statute of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, not only to the Secretary-Gen-
eral, or the person in respect of whom ajudgement has been rendered by
theTribunal,but alsoto any member State of the United Nations, to bring

before the Committee an objection to ajudgement of the Tribunal, sug-
gests of itself that the procedure before the Court was not intended to be
part of a procedure of appeal on the merits of the case. Such a right of
intervention by a third party is only explicable on the assumption that the
advisoryopinion isto deal withadifferentquestionfrom that submitted to
the Tribunal,and a question in which the intervening member State may
well have a legitimate interest (see paragraph 24 above).
62. In short the Court in the present case has not been, and in fact
could not be, asked to make a comprehensive review of the merits in the
caseof Mortished v.the Secretarv-General of the United Nations.but onlv to
giveitsopinion on twoparticular grounds of objection to theJudgement in
that case. The articles of the Charter that are possibly relevant to the first
ground of objection, that of error "on a question of law relating to the
provisions oftheCharter of theUnited Nations", are those of Chapter XV,
and in particular Article 101,paragraph 1,whereitisprovided :"The staff
shallbe appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established
by the General Assembly." It is clear, however, that the Court must first

consider whether it is only the possibility of an error in the application or
interpretation of those texts of the Charter itself which has to be investi-
gated. What is the scope of the enquiry to be conducted by the Court in
order that it may decide whether the Tribunal "has erred on a question of
law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" ?
63. This ground of objection was the subject of much discussion in the
SpecialCommittee on Reviewof Administrative Tribunal Judgements set
up in 1954(resolution 888 (IX)), and also in the Fifth Committee of the
General Assembly. It iswell knownthat theformulation of this clausewas
the result of a compromise between those who wanted a review system
dealing with questions of law more generally, and those who favoured thedevait êtreassimilé àune décision enappel. La conclusion de la Courdans
sons avis de 1973,déjàcitéeau paragraphe 23ci-dessus, suivant laquelle il
n'yavaitpas G forcémentincompatibilitéentre lesexigencesde lajustice et

l'exercicede ces fonctions par un organe politique ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1973,
p. 176,par. 25),reposait sur lepostulat que laprocédure devant la Courne
consistait pas à rejuger en appel ce qui avait étéjugé par le Tribunal
administratif. La difficultéest encoreplusgrande si,commeen la présente
espèce,le Comité,dans l'exercicede ce qui est àl'évidenceune fonction
quasi judiciaire, refuse d'admettre à ses débats une partie à l'instance
devant leTribunal, alors que 1'Etatdemandeur est àmême,non seulement
de faire valoir ses arguments, mais encore de participer au vote destiné a
déterminersi ses propres objections contre lejugement du Tribunal repo-

sentou non sur des bases sérieusesD. La gravitéde ces aspectsa déjàété
soulignée(paragraphes 42-44).

61. Le simple fait qu'à l'article 11du statut du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies le droit de saisir le Comitéd'une objection contre un
jugement du Tribunal soit reconnu non seulement au Secrétaire généraelt
à la personne qui a étél'objet de ce jugement, mais aussi aux Etats
Membresdes Nations Unies,suffit à démontrerque la procédure devantla
Cour n'étaitpas conçue comme un élémentd'une procédure d'appel au

fond. Le droit d'intervention d'un tiers ne peut s'expliquer que si l'on
admet que l'avis consultatif doit traiter d'une question différente de celle
dont le Tribunal s'estoccupéet à laquelle l'Etat Membreintervenant peut
fort bien avoir un intérêtlégitime (voirparagraphe 24 ci-dessus).

62. Bref la Cour, en la présenteespèce,ne s'estpas vu et ne pouvait pas
se voir demander de reconsidérer le fond en l'affaire Mortished c. le
Secrétaire général de ['Organisation dN estions Unies,mais seulement de
donner son avis sur deux motifs particuliers de contestation de ce juge-

ment.Les articles de la Charteque lepremier motif de contestation - celui
de I'Gerreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations
Unies ))- pourrait concerner sont ceux du chapitre XV, en particulier
l'article 101, paragraphe 1, en vertu duquel : <<Le personnel est nommé
par le Secrétairegénéralconformément aux règlesfixéespar l'Assemblée
générale. ))Il est cependant clair que la premièrequestion pour la Cour est
de savoir sielle doit secontenter d'examiner siune erreur d'application ou
d'interprétation de ces dispositions de la Charte elle-mêmea pu se pro-
duire. Quelle doit êtrel'étenduede l'enquête à entreprendrepour que la

Cour soit à mêmede décidersi le Tribunal <(a commis une erreur de droit
concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies )?
63. Ce motif de contestation a suscitéde longs débatsaucomitéspécial
qui, en 1954,avait étéchargé d'étudier la questionde la réformation des
jugements du Tribunal administratif (résolution 888 (IX)), ainsi qu'à la
Cinquième Commission de l'Assemblée générale O.n sait quela formule
retenue est le résultat d'un compromisentre lespartisans d'un systèmede
réformation portant sur les questions de droit à titre généralet ceux quinarrower range of permissible objections that appearsin the Statute of the
International Labour OrganisationAdministrative Tribunal(that is to Say,
a challenge to a decision of the Tribunal confirmingitsjurisdiction, or an

alleged fundamental fault in the procedure followed which vitiated the
decision of the Tribunal). In the opinion of the Court only limited assis-
tance with regard to this question is to be found by consulting the various
stages of the legislative history of Article 11 and the gradua1 evolution
within the SpecialCommittee ofthis compromise. For one thng, thewords
error "on a question of law relating to the (French :concernantles) pro-
visionsof the Charter of theUnited Nations" couldhardlybeplainer ;and
for another, the lirnits of the Court's role are, as has already been men-
tioned,determined not only by Article 11but alsoby other considerations
such as the inherent limitations of the advisory procedure and the im-
perative requirements of a judicial procedure in contentious cases. It is
rather in the light ofthese other considerations that any doubts over the
scope of Article 11 should be resolved.
64. In any event, the Court clearly could not decide whether ajudge-
ment about theinterpretation of Staff Regulations or Staff Rules has erred
on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, without

looking at that judgement to see what the Tribunal did decide. While to
that extent the Court has therefore to examine the Tribunal's decision on
the merits, it is not the business of the Court, after making that exami-
nation, itself to getinvolved in the question of the proper interpretation of
the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, as such, further than is strictly
necessary in order to judge whether the interpretation adopted by the
Tribunal is in contradiction with the requirements of the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
65. This conclusion, dictated by the considerations of principle noted
above, is also in accord with the actual words of the ground of objection
mentioned in Article 11 of the Tribunal's Statute which speaks, not of
"error of law" but of error "on a question of law relating to the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations", and these latter words cannot be
other than words of qualification. It is true that the regulations and rules
applied by the Administrative Tribunal must derive their validity from the
provisions of the Charter. Indeed, al1valid regulations and rules adopted
by a United Nations organ cannot beother than based on theprovisions of
the Charter. It does not follow, however, that every question of the inter-

pretation or application of those regulations and rules is a question of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter. Nor indeed would the words of
Article 101of the Charter ordinarily be of any assistance or pertinence in
the task of interpreting arule or regulation. Accordingly, it would be quite
mistaken to suppose that, because the law applied by the Tribunal, or
indeed the law applied by any organ of the United Nations, derives its
ultimate validity from the Charter, the ground of Article 11 now under
examination means that an objectiontoany interpretation by theTribunal
of staff rules and regulations is a matter for an advisory opinion of the
Court. Furthermore, if the words "error on aquestion oflawrelatingtothepenchaient pour la gamme d'objections plus restreinte envisagée dans le
statut du Tribunal administratif del'organisation internationale du Tra-
vail (c'est-à-dire la contestation d'une décisiondu Tribunal affirmant sa
compétence,ou l'allégationd'unefaute essentielledans laprocéduresuivie
ayant viciéladécision).De l'avisdela Cour, lesdiversesétapesdestravaux

préparatoires de l'article 11et l'élaboration progressivedu compromis au
sein du comitéspécialnejettent que des lueurs limitées sur la question.
D'une part les mots ((erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies >) pourraient difficilement être plus clairs ;
d'autre part leslimites du rôle de la Cour, comme on l'avu, résultentnon
seulement de l'article 11 mais aussi d'autres considérations tellesque les
contraintes inhérentes à la procédure consultative et les exigences impé-
ratives de la procédurejudiciaire en matière contentieuse. Ce sont plutôt
ces autres considérations qui permettent de dissiper des doutes éventuels
au sujet de la portée de l'article 11.

64. De toute manière,il est évidentque la Courne saurait décidersi un
jugement interprétantlestatut ou lerèglementdu personnel comporteune
erreur de droitconcernant lesdispositions dela Charte sanssereporter à ce
jugement pour s'assurer de ce que le Tribunal a dit réellement.Dans cette
limite, la Cour doit donc examiner la décision du Tribunal au fond. Cet
examen une foisterminé,ellen'apas à sepencher sur la question de ceque
serait, en soi, la bonne interprétation du statut et du règlement du per-
sonnel, au-delà de ce qui est strictement nécessaire pour déterminer si
l'interprétation du Tribunal est contraire à ce que prescrivent les disposi-
tions de la Charte des Nations Unies.

65. La conclusion qui précède, dictée par lesconsidérationsde principe
notées ci-dessus.concorde aussi avec le libellémêmedu motif de contes-
tation mentionné dans l'article 11du statut du Tribunal, qui ne vise pas
1'<e<rreur de droit )mais l'((erreur de droit concernant les dis~ositions de
la Charte des Nations Unies )),ces derniersmots ne pouvant avoir qu'un
effet restrictif.l est vrai que les dispositions du statut et du règlementdu
personnel appliquées par le Tribunal administratif doivent tirer leur vali-
ditédes dispositions de la Charte. A vrai dire, un statut ou règlement
valablement adopté par un organe des Nations Unies ne saurait avoir
d'autre fondement que cesdernières dispositions. Il n'endécoule paspour

autantque toute questiond'interprétation ou d'application du statut ou du
règlement soit une question de droit concernant les dispositions de la
Charte. Au reste les termes de l'article 101 de la Charte ne sont pas
ordinairement d'un grand secours ni d'une grande pertinence pour inter-
préter les dispositions du statut ou du règlement du personnel. Il serait
donc tout a fait erronéde supposer que, parce que ledroit appliqué par le
Tribunal ou par tout organe des Nations Unies tire en dernière analyse sa
validitéde la Charte, le motif de l'article 11en cours d'examen signifierait
que, chaque fois qu'une interprétation du statut ou du règlementdu per-
sonnel donnéepar le Tribunal serait contestée, ildeviendrait possible deprovisions of the Charter" were to be interpreted to mean the same as
"error of law", the efforts in 1955to reach a compromise solution would
have been ineffective.

66. But if the interpretation, in general, of Staff Regulations and Rules

is not the business of the Court, it is, as already noted, very much the
business of this Court to judge whether there is a contradiction between a
particular interpretation or application of Staff Regulations and Rules by
the Tribunal and anv of the ~rovisions of the Charter : and such an
examination appears to be the purpose of the particular question asked of
the Courtin this present case.Thisquestion cannot be understood without
some reference to the history of the repatriation grant over the last 30
years, though it is not necessary to gointo the whole of that history. It was
established by the General Assembly by resolution 470 (V) of 15Decem-
ber 1950,which added, for the purpose, a new Regulation 35 and Annex II
to the Provisional Staff Regulations. In the Staff Regulations of 1952these
became Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV,quoted in paragraph 10above. The
repatriation grant was substituted for an earlier "expatriation allowance",
and seems never in fact to have been a grant limited to those who were
repatriated to their country of origin, so that the title of the grant has
always been a misnomer. It was from its inception based not upon repa-
triation but upon the United Nations' "obligation to repatriate", which has

since 1January 1953been defined in Rule 109.5 (a),as meaning an obli-
gationtoreturn the staff member on separation at United Nations expense
toa place outside the country of his duty station. The amount of the grant
wasfromthe outset made dependent on the number ofyears ofcontinuous
service by the staff member away from his home country.

67. It is important, however, to appreciate how Staff Regulations and
Rules are made. The relations of the United Nations with its staff are
governed primarily by the Staff Regulations established by the General
Assembly according to Article 101, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations. The successive editions of the Staff Regulations recite
Article 101at their commencement, and go on to state as their function
that :

"The Staff Regulations embody the fundamental conditions of
service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the United
Nations Secretariat. They represent the broad pnnciples of personnel
policy for the staffing and administration of the Secretariat. The
Secretary-General,as the Chief Administrative Officer, shall provide
and enforce such staff rules consistent with these principles as he
considers necessary."

68. Accordingly, the Staff Regulations are themselves elaborated and
applied in the Staff Rules ; and it is the Secretary-General who drafts the
Staff Rules, and in this he has necessarily a measure of discretion. This is
tempered by his duty to "report annually to the General Assembly suchdemander à la Cour un avis consultatif. De plus, si les mots (<erreur de
droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte étaient interprétéscomme

voulant dire simplement erreur de droit D, c'est en vain qu'on se serait
efforcéen 1955de parvenir à une solution de compromis.
66. Mais, s'iln'appartient pas àla Cour d'interpréterengénéralle statut
et le règlementdu personnel, il lui incombe au plus haut degré, commeon
l'avu, de rechercher si l'interprétation ou l'application particulière que le
Tribunalfaitde ce statut et de cerèglementcontredit une disposition dela
Charte ; et il apparaît que la question particulière posée à la Cour en la
présenteespècevise àprovoquerun telexamen. Cette question nepeut être
comprisesans aborder jusqu'à un certain point l'historique de la prime de
rapatriement au cours des trente dernièresannées ;il n'estcependant pas
nécessairede refaire tout cet historique. La prime de rapatriement a été

instaurée par l'Assembléegénéraledans sa résolution 470 (V) du 15 dé-
cembre 1950,qui ajoutait à cette fin un nouvel article 35 et une annexe II
austatut provisoire du personnel. Dans le statut du personnel de 1952,ces
textes sont devenus l'article 9.4 et l'annexe IV citésau paragraphe 10
ci-dessus. Destinée à remplacer une indemnité antérieuredite d'(<expa-
triation ))la prime de rapatriement semble n'avoir jamais étélimitéeen
fait aux fonctionnaires rapatriés dans leur pays d'origine ; de ce point de
vue la prime a toujours étémal nommée.Dèsson entrée envigueur, elle
n'était donc pas fondée sur le rapatriement, mais sur Y((obligation de
rapatrier >)des Nations Unies, telle que la disposition 109.5a) la définit

depuisle le*janvier 1953, àsavoir l'obligation d'assumer, à la cessation de
service,lesfrais deretour desfonctionnaires dans un lieu situéhorsdu pays
d'affectation. Et lemontant de laprimedépenddepuisl'originedu nombre
d'annéesde serviceininterrompu accomplies par le fonctionnaire hors de
son propre pays.
67. Ilimporte cependant de bien voir comments'élaborent lestatut et le
règlementdu personnel. Lesrelations de l'organisation des Nations Unies
avec son personnel sont régiesavant tout par le statut du personnel établi
par l'Assemblée généralceonformément à l'article 101,paragraphe 1,dela
ChartedesNations Unies. Lesversions successivesdu statut du personnel
commencent toutes par le texte de cet article de la Charte et définissent

ensuite en ces termes le rôle du statut :
<Le statut du personnel énonce les conditions fondamentales
d'emploi, ainsi que les droits, obligations et devoirs essentiels du
Secrétariatde l'Organisation desNations Unies. Il pose les principes
généraux à suivre pour le recrutement et l'administration du Secré-

tariat. Le Secrétaire générael,n saqualitéde chef de l'administration,
édicte et applique dans un règlement du personnel les dispositions,
compatibles avec ces principes, qu'il juge nécessaires. >)
68. Ainsi le statut du personnel est à son tour préciséet appliqué au

moyen du règlementdu personnel ;etcedernier estrédigé par le Secrétaire
généralq , ui pour cela dispose nécessairementd'un certain pouvoir discré-
tionnaire. Ce pouvoir est limitépar l'obligation qu'ale Secrétaire généralStaff Rules and amendments thereto as he may make to implement the
Regulations" (Staff Regulation 12.2).The bringing into force of the Rules,
on a date fixedby the Secretary-General, is not subject to approval by the

General Assembly ; and on entry into force they immediately govern the
legal status of staff members. The Rules, according to Staff Rule 112.2(a)
(quoted in paragraph 12above), may be amended by the Secretary-Gen-
eral in a manner consistent with Staff Regulations. There is no doubt that
theGeneral Assemblyhas the power itself to make detailed regulations, as
for example, in Annex IV of the Staff Regulations which sets out the rates
of repatriation grant. As the Court said in 1954 :

"The General Assembly could at al1 times limit or control the
powers of the Secretary-General in staff matters, by virtue of the
provisions of Article 101 [of the Charter]." (I.C.J. Reports 1954,
p. 60.)
But in thepertinent General Assembly resolutions, 33/ 119and 341165,to
be examined below,it did not do so ; it laid down a principle which wasin

the usual way left to the Secretary-General to give effect to, first by an
administrative instruction, and eventually in a new version of the Staff
Rules.And whereit isleft to the Secretary-General to make rules there can
be no doubt that by making rules he speaks for and commits the United
Nations in its relations with staff members.

69. In the matter oftherepatriation grant, asin someother staff matters
also,thereis thefurther complication that entities other than the Secretary-
General have from time to time been concerned with the conditions of
serviceof staff members. The ConsultativeCommitteeon Administrative
Questions (CCAQ), a subsidiary of the Administrative Committee on
Co-ordination (ACC), and particularly concerned with relations between
the United Nations and specialized agencies, in a report of 14May 1952
(CO-ORDINATION/R.124) recommended, inter alia, that the repatria-
tion grant be paid on the basis of an obligation to repatriate, regardless of
whether the staff member was actually repatriated, but excluding those

summarily dismissed and those who had, or had voluntarily assumed, the
nationality of the country of thelast duty station.This wasto take account
of the fact that in the International Labour Organisation and the World
Health Organization, the Staff Regulations provided that thegrant was to
be payable on separation to persons "serving at a duty station outside of
the home country". The same Committee, after a further study, reported
on 6 May 1974(CCAQ/SEC/325(PER)) that "CCAQ Secretariat doubts
the feasibility of attempting to make payment of the grant dependent on
evidence of repatriation".de faire rapport chaque année àl'Assemblée généralseur toute disposi-
tion du règlementdu personnel ou toute modification à cerèglementqu'ila

pu prescrire en application du présent statut ))(art. 12.2 du statut du
personnel). L'entréeen vigueur des dispositions du règlement, à la date
fixéepar le Secrétaire généraln ,'est pas soumise à l'approbation de l'As-
semblée générale ;et,à leur entréeen vigueur, ces dispositions régissent
immédiatement la situation juridique des fonctionnaires. La disposi-
tion 112.2 a)du règlementdu personnel (citéeauparagraphe 12)préciseen
outre que le Secrétaire générap leut apporter à ce règlement les amende-
ments compatibles avec le statutdu personnel. Certes, l'Assemblée géné-
rale a elle-mêmele pouvoir de promulguer des règlesdétaillées, comme

dans l'annexe IV au statut du personnel, où l'on trouve le barème de la
prime de rapatriement. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit en 1954 :
Aux termes des dispositions de l'article 101[de la Charte], l'As-
semblée générale pouvait à tout moment limiter ou contrôler les

pouvoirs du Secrétaire généralen matière de personnel. ))(C.Z.J.
Recueil 1954, p. 60.)
Mais dans les résolutionspertinentes - 33/ 119 et 34/ 165 - qui seront
examinéesplus loin, l'Assembléegénérale n7a.pasfait cela: elle a poséun

principe, en laissant comme d'habitude au Secrétairegénéralle soin de lui
donner effet aumoyen d'abord d'uneinstruction administrative puis d'une
nouvelleversion du règlementdu personnel. Or, quand le soin de formuler
le règlement est laisséau Secrétairegénérali,l n'est pas contestable qu'en
s'en acquittant celui-ci représente et engage l'organisation des Nations
Unies dans ses relations avec le personnel.
69. S'agissant de la prime de rapatriement comme d'autres questions
intéressant le personnel, une nouvelle complication tient au fait que des
entitésautres que le Secrétairegénéral s'occupent à l'occasior,des condi-
tionsd'emploi desfonctionnaires. LeComitéconsultatif pour lesquestions

administratives (CCQA), organe subsidiaire du Comité administratif de
coordination (CAC) plus particulièrement chargé des relations entre
l'organisation des Nations Unies et les institutions spécialisées, avait
notamment recommandé, dans un rapport du 14mai 1952 (CO-ORDI-
NATION/R.124), que la prime fût payéesur la base de l'obligation de
rapatrier, indépendamment du rapatriement effectif des fonctionnaires
intéressés,autrement dit que seuls fussent exclus les fonctionnaires ren-
voyéssans préavis ou ayant la nationalité du pays de leur dernier lieu
d'affectation ou encore ayant volontairement acquis cette nationalité.On

entendait par-là tenir compte du fait qu'àl'organisation internationale du
Travail et à l'organisation mondiale de la Santéles statuts du personnel
prévoientque laprime estpayable, au moment dela cessation de service, à
toute personne en poste dans un lieu d'affectation situé hors de son
pays )).Le mêmecomité, après avoirde nouveau étudiéla question, indi-
qua dans un document du 6 mai 1974 (CCAQ/SEC/325(PER)) que (le
secrétariatdu CCQA doute qu'il soitpossible de tenter de subordonner le
versement de la prime à la preuve du rapatriement )). 70. The other body involved has been the International Civil Service
Commission set up in 1974 (by General Assembly resolutions 3042
(XXVII) of 19December 1972,and 3357 (XXIX) of 18December 1974)
"for the regulation and CO-ordinationof the conditions of service of the
United Nations common system" ;it was thus particularly concerned with
an endeavour that staff rules should, as far as maybe, form a system

common to the United Nations system and to some specialized agencies,
and in respect of the repatriation grant it had, therefore, to take account
both of the United Nations Secretariat's three decades of practice and of
the position in the specialized agencies and other international organiza-
tions which participate in the United Nations common system.

71. The Tribunal, faced with Mr. Mortished's claim, had to take
account not only of resolution 34/ 165,and of Administrative Instruction
ST/AI/269 (replaced by the amended Staff Rules of 15July 1980), by
which resolution 34/ 165was put into effect, but also of the whole body of
regulations and rules relevant to the Applicant's claim. These regulations
and rules comprised in particular Staff Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV,
quoted in paragraph 10 above, and the following. In General Assembly
resolution 33/ 119of 19December 1978,which dealt with a Report of the
International Civil Service Commission, the General Assembly decided

that payment of the repatriation grant was to be made conditional on the
furnishing of evidence of relocation, "subject to the terms tobe established
by the Commission". On the basis of these terms the Secretary-General
was to make the required changes in the Staff Rules and report back at the
34th session "in accordance with the provisions of regulation 12.2of the
Staff Regulations". As noted above (paragraph Il), the Commission
adopted a text toimplement resolution 33/ 119,and this wasputinto effect
by the Secretary-General,first by Administrative Instruction ST/A1/262
of 23 April 1979, and then by the Staff Rules (ST/SGB/Staff Rules/
1/Rev.5) of 22 August 1979,Rule 109.5of whch dealt with the repatria-
tion grant. Paragraph (d)of that Rule accordingly provided that the pay-
ment of the grant was conditional on the presentation of evidence of
relocation. Paragraph (fl of that Rule, however, saved the entitlement
"Notwithstanding paragraph (d)above", of "Staff Members already in
servicebefore 1July 1979",whowere thereby to "retain theentitlement to
repatriation grant" in respect of servicealready accrued before that date,

without the necessity ofproduction of evidence ofrelocation "with respect
to such qualifying service". Paragraph (f)was in conformity with the text
prepared by the lnternational Civil Service Commission.

72. Next came General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17 Decem- 70. L'autre organe ayant joué un rôleest la Commission de la fonction
publique internationale, crééeen 1974(en application des résolutionsde
l'Assemblée général3 e042(XXVII) du 19décembre1972et 3357(XXIX)
du 18décembre1974)pour <<réglementer et...coordonner les conditions
d'emploidans lesorganisationsappliquant lerégimecommundesNations
Unies ): elleest ainsi particulièrement intéresséeauxefforts visaàtfaire
du règlementdu personnel, dans toute la mesure du possible, un système
commun à l'ensemble des organismes des Nations Unies et à certaines
institutions spécialisées. Elle devaitdonc ce titre, en ce qui concerne la

prime de rapatriement, tenir compte à la fois des trenteans de pratique du
Secrétariatdel'organisation des Nations Unies et de la situation existant
dans les institutions spécialiséeset autres organisations participant au
régimecommun.
71. Saiside la requêtede M. Mortished,leTribunal devait tenir compte
non seulement de la résolution 34/165 et de l'instruction administrative
ST/AI/269 (remplacéepar lerèglementdu personnel amendé le15juillet
1980)donnant effet à cette résolution, mais ausside tout l'ensemble de
dispositions statutaires ou réglementaires applicables à ce cas d'espèce.
Ces dispositions comprenaient en particulier, outre l'article 9.4 du statut

du personnel et l'annexe IV citésau paragraphe 10 de l'avis, les textes
ci-après. Dans sa résolution 33/119 du 19 décembre 1978 consacrée au
rapport de la Commission de la fonction publique internationale, l'As-
sembléegénérala evait décidéque lepaiement de la prime de rapatriement
serait subordonné à la présentation de pièces attestant le changement
effectif de résidence desintéressés,selon lesmodalitésquiseront établies
par la Commission )>En fonction des modalités ainsi établies,le Secré-
taire généraldevait apporter les modifications nécessaires au règlement
du personnel et faire rapport à ce sujetà l'Assemblée générale lord se
sa trente-quatrième session, <conformément aux dispositions de l'ar-
ticle 12.2du statut du personnel1).Comme on l'avu au paragraphe 11,la

Commission a adoptéun texte pour mettre en Œuvrela résolution 33/119
et le Secrétaire générallui a donnéeffet au moyen d'abord de l'instruction
administrative ST/AI/262 du 23 avril 1979,puis du règlementdu person-
nel (ST/SGB/Staff Rules/l/Rev.5) du 22 août 1979, où la disposi-
tion 109.5traitait de la prime de rapatriement.l étaitspécifià l'alinéd)
de cette disposition,conformément à la décisionde l'Assemblée générale,
que le paiement de la prime de rapatriement était subordonné à la pré-
sentation de pièces attestant le changement de résidencede l'intéressé.
Cependant l'alinéa fl de la mêmedisposition préservait << nonobstant
l'alinéad) ci-dessus ))la position des <<fonctionnaires ayant pris leurs

fonctions avant le lerjuillet 1979))qui àce titre<<conservent le droit au
montant de la prime ))pour les annéesde service déjàaccomplies à cette
date, sans avoirà produire <<en ce qui concernecettepériode de service
de piècesattestant leur changement de résidence. Le textede cet alinéa fl
correspondait au texte établipar la Commission de la fonction publique
internationale.
72. Puis vint la résolution 34/165 de l'Assemblée généraled,atéeduber 1979,on the "Report of the International Civil ServiceCommission",
whichwasagain for the most part concerned withreceiving and approving
the annual report of the Commission. It alsorecalled resolution 33/ 119in
which "it set down important objectives for maintaining and reinforcing
the common system and established guidelines for the future work of the
Commission". The rest of the resolution, in three parts, is to do with the
work of the Commission, and the only paragraph of direct interest to the
present case is the following :

"3. Decidesthat effective 1January 1980no staff member shall be
entitled to any part of the repatriation grant unless evidence of re-
location away from the country of the last duty station is pro-
vided."

The Secretary-General, accordingly, in order to put this decision into
effect, issued Administrative Instruction ST/AI/269 on 21 December
1979, and thereafter revised the Staff Rules (15 July 1980), in
Rule 109.5of which revised Rules, instead of theparagraph (f)of the 1979
Rule, there appeared "(f) (Cancelled)".
73. The Tribunalin the case of Mr. Mortished had to apply, therefore,
the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Staff Regulations estab-
lished by the General Assembly under Article 101, paragraph 1, of the
Charter, and alsothe StaffRulesbywhichthey wereimplemented. It noted
that the General Assembly, in Staff Regulation 12.1, had affirmed the
"fundamental principle of respect for acquired rights" andthat Staff Rule
112.2(a) provided for amendment of Staff Rules only in a manner con-

sistent with the Regulations (para. IV).It decided that Mr. Mortished had
indeed an acquired right, in the sense of Regulation 12.1 ;and that he had
therefore suffered injury by being, as a result of resolution 34/165 and
the resulting 1979 Administrative Instruction (ST/AI/269) and the 1980
amendment of the Staff Rules, deprived of his entitlement (para. XVI).
Accordingly the effectofresolution 34/ 165and the amended Ruleswithits
deletion of paragraph (f)was not retroactive to destroy Mr. Mortished's
"acquired right", having regard to Regulation 12.1whch provided pre-
cisely against such retroactive effect. The Tribunal's Judgement does not
anywherein fact suggestthat there could be an opposition betweenArticle
12.1of the Staff Regulations and paragraph 3 of section II of resolution
34/165.

74. The Government of the United States in its written statement
argues that thisdecision takes an erroneous viewof the law, and that even
assurning that Mr. Mortished had a right under paragraph (f)of the 1979
Rules, which the United States contests, that right did not survive reso-

lution 34/165 and the amended Rules, and that the only right Mr. Mor-
tished enjoyed at the date of separation was the right to a grant on his
furnishing evidence of relocation. There may be room for more than one17décembre 1979,sur le << rapport de la Commission de la fonction pu-
blique internationale )>,qui était une fois encore principalement consa-

crée à l'examen et à l'approbation du rapport annuel de la Commission.
L'Assembléey rappelait en outre sa résolution 33/119,dont les disposi-
tions <énonçaientd'importants objectifs pour le maintien et le renforce-
ment du régimecommun et établissaient desprincipesdirecteurspour les
travaux futursde la Commission D.Lereste de la résolution, divisen trois
sections, porte sur les travaux de la Commission, et le seul paragraphe
présentant un intérêt directen l'espèce est lesuivant :

<3. Décid eue, avec effet au leijanvier 1980,les fonctionnaires

n'ont droit à aucun montant au titre de la prime de rapatriement à
moins qu'ils ne présentent des pièces attestant qu'ils se réinstallent
dans un pays autre que celui de leur dernier lieu d'affectation. ))

Le Secrétaire généralp,our donner effet à cette décision,publia l'instruc-
tion administrative ST/AI/269 du 21 décembre 1979et modifia en con-
séquencele règlementdu personnel le 15juillet 1980.Dans ce texte revisé,
l'alinéaf)de ladisposition 109.5du règlementde 1979étaitremplacépar la
mention (fl(Supprimée) )).

73. Dans le cas de M. Mortished,le Tribunal devait donc appliquer les
résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée généralel,e statut du personnel
établi par l'Assemblée généraleconformément à l'article 101, para-
graphe 1, de la Charte, et les dispositions du règlementdu personnel qui
leur donnaient effet. Le Tribunal aconstaté qu'àl'article 12.1du statut du
personnel l'Assemblée généraleaffirmait (<le principe fondamental du res-
pect desdroits acquis )et que la disposition 112.2a)du règlementdu per-
sonnel n'autorisait que les amendements compatibles avec le statut du
personnel (par. IV). Il a estiméque M. Mortished avait effectivement un

droit acquis au sens de l'article 12.1du statut et que M. Mortished avait
donc subi un préjudice du fait que la résolution 34/165, l'instruction
administrative ST/AI/269 de 1979et la revision correspondante du règle-
ment du personnel en 1980l'avaient privéde ce droit (par. XVI).Dans ces
conditions, la résolution34/ 165et le règlement revisé,ou l'alinéafl avait
été supprimén ,e pouvaient avoir pour effet d'annuler rétroactivement un
(<droit acauis))de M.Mortished. comDtetenu del'article 12.1du statut du
personnel qui vise précisément à empêcherun tel effet rétroactif. En fait,
dansson jugement, le Tribunal ne laisse nulle part entendre qu'il puissey

avoir opposition entre l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel et le para-
graphe 3, section II, de la résolution 34/ 165.
74. Dans son exposéécritl,eGouvernement des Etats-Unis affirme que
cette décision relèved'une conception erronée du droit, qu'en supposant
mêmeque M. Mortishedeûtun droit envertu de l'alinéaf)du règlementde
1979,ce que ce gouvernement conteste, ce droit n'aurait pas survécu à la
résolution 34/ 165 et àla revision du règlement, et que le seul droit dont
iouissait M. Mortished à la date de sa cessation de service étaitle droià
une prime payée surprésentation de piècesattestant son changement deviewon the question what amounts toan acquired right ; andin particular
whether or not Mr. Mortished had an acquired right, which was saved by
the effect of Staff Regulation 12.1, and Staff Rule 112.2(a), either as a
result of paragraph (fl of Rule 109.5of the 1979Rules, or - a point noted
but not decided by the Tribunal - on the basis of "a practice followed
consistently for nearly 30years". Butto enterupon that question would be
preciselyto retry the casewith a viewto decidingwhether to substitute the
Court'sviewof the merits of the case for that of the Tribunal. This, for the
reasons explained above, is not the business of this Court. It is not the
businessof thisCourt todecidewhether theTribunal's Judgement involves
an error inits interpretation of the relevant instruments, unless it involves
an error on a question of law relating to the provisions of the United

Nations Charter.

75. In the Court's view it is not possible to Saythat the Tribunal in its
Judgement "erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter". The concept of an acquired right is, of course, neither defined
nor evenmentioned in the Charter. Article 101ofthe Charter doesprovide
that "The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regu-
lations established by the General Assembly". But it was precisely in the
Staff Regulations thus established by theGeneral Assembly itself that the
Tribunal found, and so must apply, the general provision about acquired
rights andthe non-retroactivity of supplementing or amending regulations
in regard to acquired rights. In fact Regulation 12.1waspresumably made
precisely in anticipation of, and to provide for, the kind of change in

conditions of service resulting from the Administrative Instruction and
amended Staff Rules which gave effect to resolution 34/165. The inter-
pretation of resolution 33/ 119which the International CivilServiceCorn-
mission and the Secretary-General had made in introducing the transi-
tional paragraph (flinto the Staff Rules of 1979acknowledged orcreateda
right forMr. Mortished, and this,said theTribunal, waspreserved by Staff
Regulation 12.1.Thus theTribunal sawitselfnot asin anywaychallenging
resolution 34/165 by means of a general notion of acquired rights but
simply as applying the existing Staff Regulations and Rules.

76. Certainly the Tribunal must accept and apply the decisions of the

General Assembly made in accordance with Article 101 of the United
Nations Charter. Certainly there can be no question of the Tribunal
possessing any "powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
decisions" taken by the General Assembly,powers which theCourt itself
doesnot possess(I.C.J. Reports1971,p. 45,para. 89).Nor didtheTribunal
supposethat it had any such competence. It was faced, however, not only
withresolution 34/ 165and the 1980Staff Rulesmade thereunder,but also
with Staff Regulation 12.1also made no less by and with the authonty of
the General Assembly. On the basis of itsfindingthat Mr. Mortished hadrésidence.Les opinions peuvent diverger quant àce qui constitue un droit
acquis ; et plus particulièrement quant à savoir si M. Mortishedjouissait
ounon d'un droit acquisprotégépar l'article 12.1du statut du personnel et

par la disposition 112.2a)du règlementdu personnel, que ce soit en vertu
de l'alinéaf)de la disposition109.5du règlementde 1979ou - point quele
Tribunal a noté sans se prononcer àce sujet - en vertu d'une ((pratique
constamment suiviependant prèsde trente ans o.Mais entrer dans l'exa-
men de cette question reviendrait précisément à refaire le procès età
décidersi les conclusions de la Cour sur le fond doivent se substituer à
celles du Tribunal. Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, telle n'estpas la
tâche de la Cour. La tâche de la Cour n'estpas de décidersilejugement du
Tribunalcomporte une erreur dans l'interprétation desinstruments appli-
cables, à moins qu'il ne s'agisse d'une erreur de droit concernant les
dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies.

75. De l'avisde la Cour, il n'est pas possiblede dire que leTribunal(a
commis une erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte D.
Certes, la notion dedroit acquis n'estni définieni mêmementionnéedans
la Charte. L'article 101de la Charte seborne à énoncer que (lepersonnel
est nommépar le Secrétaire général conformément aux règles fixéespar
l'Assemblée générale o.Mais c'estjustement dans le statut du personnel
ainsi établipar l'Assembléegénérale elle-mêmequele Tribunal a trouvé -
et a trouvé l'obligation d'appliquer- la disposition générale concernant
les droits acquis,et la non-rétroactivitél'égard desdroits acquisdes dis-
positions complétant ou amendant ce statut. Il est même à présumer

que l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel a précisément été conçu en pré-
vision de modifications des conditions d'emploi comme celles qui résul-
tent de l'instruction administrative et des dispositions du règlement du
personnel amendéesquiont donnéeffet àla résolution34/165.L'interpré-
tation que la Commission de la fonction publique internationale et le
Secrétaire général avaientdonnée de la résolution 33/119 en introdui-
sant la clause transitoire de l'alinéafl dans le règlement du personnel
de 1979avait reconnuou créé un droit pour M. Mortished,droit qui, d'après
le Tribunal, était préservé par l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel. Le
Tribunal a donc considéré que, loinde contester aucunement la résolu-
tion 34/ 165en invoquant une notion généralede droits acquis, il ne fai-

sait qu'appliquer les dispositions en vigueur du statut et du règlementdu
personnel.
76. Il estcertain que le Tribunal doit accepter et appliquer les décisions
prises par l'Assembléegénéraleconformément à l'article 101de la Charte
desNations Unies. Il est certain aussi que le Tribunal ne saurait avoir de
pouvoirs de contrôle judiciaire ni d'appel en ce qui concerne les dèci-
sions de l'Assembléegénérale - pouvoirs que la Cour elle-mêmene
possèdepas (C.I.J. Recueil 1971,p. 45, par. 89). Mais le Tribunal n'a pas
pensé disposer de tels pouvoirs. Reste qu'il se trouvait en présence,non
seulement de la résolution 34/165 et du règlement reviséde 1980établi

conformément à cetterésolution,mais encore de l'article 12.1du statut du
personnel, lui aussiétablipar l'Assembléegénérale elle-mêmeenvertu des an acquired right, it had therefore to interpret and apply these two sets of
rules, both of which were applicable to Mr. Mortished's situation. The
question is not whether the Tribunal was right or wrong in the way it
performed this task in the casebefore it ; the question - indeed, the only

matter on which the Court can pass - is whether the Tribunal erred on a
question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations. This it clearly did not do when it attempted only to apply to
Mr. Mortished's case what it found to be the relevant Staff Regulations
and Rules made under the authority of the General Assembly.

77. In the proceedings of the Committee there was somediscussion of a
second ground of objection to the Tribunal's Judgement, namely the
allegation that it had "exceeded its jurisdiction or competence", and on
this ground also there was found to be a "substantial basis" for the

application. It seems,however,from what was said in the Comrnittee that
this ground was not put forward as a ground entirely independent of the
allegation of error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter. The
representative of theUnited States,which had made theapplication to the
Committee, explained at one point in the discussion that the ground of
error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter "had been put to the
Committee on the basis that it did not by any means exclude, but rather
subsumed, the other ground of exceedingjurisdiction or competence"
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2 at p. 46). It would seem to follow from this that this
secondobjection must by definition fa11with thefirst. In fact thissuggested
excessofjurisdiction seems to have been conceived of as little more than
another wayofexpressingthe allegation that theTribunalhad decided that
General Assembly resolution 34/ 165 "could not be given immediate
effect", and that it was therefore attempting to exercise a competence of
judicial reviewover a General Assemblyresolution :the matter whichhas
already been dealt with above.

78. However that may be, the Tribunal's competence is defined in
Article 2 of its Statute, and the pertinent paragraph reads as follows :

"1. The Tribunal shall be competent to hear and passjudgement
upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employ-
ment of staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of
the terms of appointment of such staff members. The words 'con-
tracts' and 'terms of appointment' include al1pertinent regulations
and rules in force at the time ofallegednon-observance, including the
staff pension regulations."pouvoirsqui sont les siens.Ayant conclu que M. Mortished avaitun droit

acquis,il devait donc interpréter et fairejouer ces deux sériesde disposi-
tions,qui étaientl'une etl'autre applicablesala situation de M. Mortished.
Laquestion n'estpas de savoirsileTribunal s'estbien oumal acquittédesa
tâche dans l'affairedont il étaitsaisi.La question - en fait leseulpoint sur
lequella Cour puisse statuer - consiste àsavoirsileTribunala commisune
erreur de droitconcernant les dispositions de laCharte desNations Unies.

Il est manifestequ'il n'en est pas ainsi,puisque le Tribunal n'a fait qu'es-
sayer d'appliquer au cas de M. Mortished les dispositionsqu'il a jugées
pertinentes du statut etdu règlementdu personnelétablissousl'autoritéde
l'Assemblée générale.

77. Au cours de sesdélibérationsle Comitéa examiné un second motif
de contestation du jugement du Tribunal, à savoir que celui-ci aurait
<<outrepassé sa juridiction ou sa compétence )>et il a estimé que pour

ce motif égalementla demande reposait sur des (bases sérieuses )).Il
semblecependant ressortir destravaux du Comitéque ce motif de contes-
tation n'a pas été avancé comme entièrementdistinct de celui de l'erreur
de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte. Le représentant des
Etats-Unis, auteurs de la demande soumise au Comité, a expliqué à un

certain moment que le motif de l'erreur de droit concernant les disposi-
tions de la Charte avait étésuggéré (au Comité,étantentendu que cette
question n'exclut aucunement, mais au contraire englobe, l'autre motif
selon lequel le Tribunal a outrepassésa juridiction ou sa compétence
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 26). Il paraît en découlerque le second motif
doit, par définition, partager le sort du premier. En réalité ilsemble que

l'excèsdejuridiction invoquéait étésurtout conçu comme une autre façon
de prétendre que le Tribunal avait décidéque la résolution 34/165
de l'Assembléegénérale (<ne pouvait prendre immédiatement effet ))et
avait donc voulu exercer un pouvoir de contrôlejudiciaire sur une résolu-
tion de l'Assemblée générale - question qui a déjà étéexaminée.

78. Quoi qu'il en soit, la compétencedu Tribunal est définie par l'ar-
ticle 2 de son statut, dont le paragraphe pertinent est rédigé comme
suit :

(<1. Le Tribunal est compétent pour connaître des requêtesinvo-
quant l'inobservation du contrat d'engagement des fonctionnaires

du Secrétariat des Nations Unies ou des conditions d'emploi de
ces fonctionnaires, et pour statuer sur lesdites requêtes.Les termes
(<contrat )>et <conditionsd'emploi ))comprennent toutes dispositions
pertinentes du statut et du règlement en vigueur au moment de
l'inobservation invoquée,ycompris lesdispositionsdu règlementdes

pensions du personnel. ))Thus, it isclear that theTribunal's jurisdiction included not only the terms
ofMr. Mortished's contract ofemployment and terms ofappointment, but
alsothemeaning and effectof Staff Regulations and Staff Rules,inforceat
the material time. Ttcan hardly be denied that Mr. Mortished's appeal to
the Tribunal, based as it was upon the various provisions of the Staff
Regulations and on Rules established by the Secretary-General in pur-
suance of those Staff Regulations, corresponds directly with both the
words and spirit of Article 2. It is difficult to see any possible ground on
which the Tribunal could be said to have exceeded the terms of itsjuris-
diction or competence thus defined. It sought to interpret and apply the
terms of Mr. Mortished's appointment, and therelevant Staff Regulations
and Rules and General Assembly resolutions. Even its application of the
notion of acquiredrights it derived from the Staff Regulationswhich had
been established by the General Assembly. It is impossible to Saythat the
Tribunal anywhere strayed into an area lying beyond the limits of its
jurisdiction asdefined in Article2ofits Statute. Whether or notit wasright
inits decision isnot pertinent to thequestion ofjurisdiction. As the French

Government has rightly pointed out, it appearsfrom the transcripts of the
proceedings that the Committee members "made a questionable assimi-
lation between a possible error of law that might have been committed by
theTribunaland the excessofjurisdiction imputedtoit". Anerror oflawis
not necessarily, and in fact is not usually, made by a Tribunal's exceeding
its competence or jurisdiction. As the Court observed in its Advisory
Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon
Complaints Made against Unesco,

"The circumstance that the Tribunal may have rightly or wrongly
adjudicated on the merits or that it may have rightly or wrongly
interpreted and applied the law for the purposes of determining the
merits, in no way affects itsjurisdiction. The latter is to be judged in
the light of the answer to the question whether the cornplaint was one
the merits of which fell to be determined by the Administrative
Tribunal in accordance with the provisions governing its jurisdic-
tion." (I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 87.)

79. The Court has concluded that the Administrative Tribunal in
Judgement No. 273has neither erred on a question of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter of theUnited Nations,nor committed any excess
of its jurisdiction or competence. It wishes it to be clearly understood,
however, that the fact that it has, in the present case, decided to comply
with the request for an advisory opinion does not in any way imply
condonation of the various irregularities pointed out above, or of the
failure of the Committee on Applications for Review of AdministrativeIl est donc certain que la compétencedu Tribunal ne s'étendaitpas seu-
lement aux clauses du contrat d'engagement de M. Mortished et à ses
conditions d'emploi maisaussi àla signification eà l'effetdesdispositions
du statut et du règlement du personnel en vigueur à la date de l'inobser-
vation invoquée.On ne saurait nier en effet que lerecours de M. Mortished
devantleTribunal, quiétait fondésurlesdiversesdispositions du statut du

personnel et sur le règlementétablipar le Secrétairegénéraelnvertu dudit
statut, correspondît directement, tant dans lalettre quedans l'esprit, audit
article 2. Il est difficile d'imaginer en l'espèceun motif permettant de
considérerque le Tribunal a outrepassé sajuridiction ou sa compétence
ainsi définies. LeTribunal s'est efforcéd'interpréter et d'appliquer les
conditions d'emploi de M. Mortished, ainsi que les dispositions applica-
bles du statut du personnel, du règlementdu personnel et des résolutions
de l'Assemblée générale L.'application qu'il a faite de la notion de droits
acquis est elle-mêmedérivédeu statut du personnelétablipar l'Assemblée.
Il n'est pas possible de soutenir que le Tribunal s'est en un point quel-

conque aventuré au-delà des limites de sa compétence telle qu'elle est
circonscrite par l'articlede son statut.La question de savoirsi sadécision
est correcte ou non est sans rapport avec la question de la compétence.
Commele Gouvernement français l'a souligné à juste titre, il ressort de la
transcription des débatsdu Comitéque ses membres <(ont procédé à une
assimilation contestable entre l'éventuelleerreur de droit qu'aurait com-
mise le Tribunal et l'excèsde compétence qui lui est imputé )>Les erreurs
de droit des tribunaux ne découlent pas nécessairement, nimême habi-
tuellement, d'un excèsde compétenceou dejuridiction. Comme la Cour l'a
dit dans son avisconsultatif relatif auxugementsdu Tribunaladministratif
de l'OIT sur requêtes contre l'Unesc o

(Le fait que le Tribunal aurait bien ou mal jugé au fond, qu'il
aurait bien ou mal interprétéet appliquéle droit pour juger au fond
n'affecte pas sa compétence. Celle-cidoit êtreappréciée enrecher-
chant si la requête étaitde celles dont l'examen au fond relève dela
connaissance du Tribunal administratif selon les dispositions gouver-

nant la compétence de celui-ci. ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 87.)

79. La Cour a conclu que le Tribunal administratif, dans sonjugement
no273, n'a ni commis d'erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies ni outrepassé sajuridiction ou sa compétence.
Elle tient cependant à souligner que le fait d'avoir décidé enla présente
espècede donner suite à la requêtepour avisconsultatif n'implique aucu-
nement qu'elle tienne pour excusables les diverses irrégularitéssignalées
plus haut, ni le fait que le Comitédes demandes de réformation dejuge-
ments du Tribunal administratif n'ait pas uséde tous les moyens en son Tribunal Judgements to do al1in its power to secure equality between the
applicant State and the staff member. The main reason for the Court's
deciding to complywith the request inthe present caseis,asit has stressed.
its desire to assist the General Assemblyifit should decide to reconsider its
present procedure related to review of the Administrative Tribunal's

Judgements.

80. For these reasons,

1. By nine votes to six,

Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion ;
IN FAVOUR :President Elias ;Vice-President Sette-Camara ;Judges Nagendra

Singh, Mosler,Ago, Schwebel,Sir Robert Jennings, de Lacharrièreand
Mbaye ;
AGAINST :Judges Lachs,Morozov,Ruda, Oda, El-Khani andBedjaoui.

2. With respect to the question as formulated in paragraph 48 above, is
of the opinion :

A. By ten votes to five,

That the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations in Judgement
No. 273 did not err on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations ;
IN FAVOUR :President Elias ;Vice-President Sette-Camara ;Judges Nagendra
Singh,Ruda, Mosler,Oda,Ago, SirRobert Jennings,de Lacharnère and

Mbaye ;
AGAINST :Judges Lachs, Morozov,El-Khani,Schwebeland Bedjaoui.

B. By twelve votes to three,
That the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations in Judgement
No. 273 did not commit any excess of the jurisdiction or competence

vested in it.
IN FAVOUR :President Elias; Vice-President Sette-Camara ; Judges Lachs,
NagendraSingh,Ruda,Mosler,Oda,Ago,SirRobert Jennings,de Lachar-
rière,Mbaye and Bedjaoui ;

AGAINST :Judges Morozov,El-Khaniand Schwebel.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the PeacePalace, The Hague, this twentieth day ofJuly, onethousand ninepouvoir pour garantir l'égalité entre 1'Etatdemandeur et le fonctionnaire
intéressé.SilaCour a décidéde donner suite à la requêteenl'espèce, c'est,
comme elle l'a souligné,principalement parce qu'elle tient à aider l'As-
sembléegénérale au casoù celle-cidécideraitde reconsidérerla procédure
actuellement suivie en matière de réformation dejugements du Tribunal
administratif.

80. Par ces motifs,

1. Par neuf voix contre six,

Décide de donner suite à la requêtepour avis consultatif ;
POUR :M. Elias, Président ;M. Sette-Camara, Vice-Président; MM.Nagen-
draSingh,Mosler,Ago,Schwebel,sirRobert Jennings,MM.deLacharrière
et Mbaye, juges ;

CONTRE : MM.Lachs, Morozov,Ruda, Oda, El-Khaniet Bedjaoui, juges.

2. Concernant la question telle qu'elle estformulée auparagraphe 48
ci-dessus, est d'avis :

A. Par dix voix contre cinq,

Que dans lejugement no273leTribunal administratif desNations Unies
n'a pas commis d'erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte
des Nations Unies ;
POUR :M.Elias, Président ;M.Sette-Camara, Vice-Président; MM.Nagen-

dra Singh,Ruda, Mosler,Oda,Ago,sirRobert Jennings,MM.de Lachar-
rièreet Mbaye, juges ;
CONTRE : MM. Lachs, Morozov,El-Khani,Schwebel etBedjaoui, juges.

B. Par douze voix contre trois,
Que dans lejugement no273leTribunal administratif des Nations Unies
n'a pas outrepassé sajuridiction ou sa compétence ;

POUR :M.Elias, Président ; M.Sette-Camara, Vice-Président ; MM.Lachs,
Nagendra Singh,Ruda, Mosler,Oda, Ago,sir Robert Jennings,MM.de
Lacharrière, Mbayeet Bedjaoui, juges ;

CONTRE : MM.Morozov,El-Khaniet Schwebel, juges.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-deux, en deuxhundred and eighty-two, in two copies, one of which willbe placed in the
archivesof theCourtand theother transmitted to theSecretary-General of
the United Nations.

(Signed) T. O. ELIAS,

President.

(Signed) Santiago TORRESBERNARDEZ,
Registrar.

Judges NAGENDRA SINGH,RUDA,MOSLER and ODAappend separate
opinions to the Opinion of the Court.

Judges LACHSM , OROZOV E,L-KHANIand SCHWEBE append dissenting
opinions to the Opinion of the Court.

(Initialled)T.O.E.
(Initialled) S.T.B.exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé aux archivesde la Cour et dont
l'autre sera transmis au Secrétaire géle l'organisation des Nations
Unies.

Le Président,
(Signé)T. O. ELIAS.

Le Greffier,

(Signé)Santiago TORRES BERNARDEZ.

MM. NAGENDRA SINGHR, UDA,MOSLER et ODA,juges,joignentàl'avis
consultatif les exposésde leur opinion individuelle.

MM. LACHSM , OROZOV E,L-KHANIet SCHWEBEjL u,ges,joignenàl'avis
consultatif les exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé)T.O.E.

(Paraphé)S.T.B.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1982

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