COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS
ET ORDONNANCES
INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS
AND ORDERS COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. PORTUGAL)
DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES
ORDONNANCE DU 2 JUIN 1999
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING
LEGAIJTY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
ORDER OF 2 JUNE 1999 Mode officielde citation:
Licéité del'emploi de laforce (Yougoslavie c. Portugal),
mesuresconsrrvutoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
C.1.J. Recueil 1999, p. 656
Officia1cita:ion
LegProvisionalusures, Order of 2 June 1999,tugal),
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 656
No àevente: 773 3
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number
ISBN 92-1-070801-6 2 JUIN 1999
ORDONNANCE
LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. PORTUGAL)
DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATlON OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
2 JUNE 1999
ORDER INTER'NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1999 1999
2 June
Generalist
2 June 1999 No. III
CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
ORDER
Pre.ernt: Vice-President WEERAMANTRYc,ting PrrsidentPresident
SCHWEBEL; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER , ANJEVA,
HERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER K,OROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,I'ARRA-ARANGUREK NO, OIJMANS;udge ad hoc
KKECAR ; egistrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73 and 74 of thes of Court,
Having regard to.he Application by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter "Yugoslavia") filed in the Registry of the Court on
29 .4pril 1999, instituting proceedings against the Portuguese Republic
(hereinafter "Portugal") "for violation of the obligation not to use force", Mukes the following Order:
1. Whereas in that Application Yugoslavia defines the subject of the
dispute as follows:
"The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of Portugal by which it
has violated its international obligation banning the use of force
against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the interna1
affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty
of another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population
and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the envi-
ronment, the obligation relating to free navigation on international
rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms, the obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the obliga-
tion not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause
the physical destruction of a national group";
2. Whereas in the said Application Yugoslavia refers, as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court, to Article36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1948(hereinafterthe "Genocide Con-
vention") ;
3. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia States that the claims sub-
mitted by it to the Court are based upon the following facts:
"The Government of Portugal, together with the Governments of
other Member States of NATO, took part in the acts of use of force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by taking part in bomb-
ing targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In bombing the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military and civilian targets were
attacked. Great number of people were killed, including a great
many civilians. Residential houses came under attack. Numerous
dwellings were destroyed. Enormous damage was caused to schools,
hospitals, radio and television stations, cultural and health institu-
tions andto places ofworship. A large number of bridges, roads and
railway lines were destroyed. Attacks on oil refineries and chemical
plants have had serious environmental effects on cities, towns and
villages in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The use of weapons
containing depleted uranium is having far-reachingconsequences for
human life. The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating con-
ditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnie group, in
whole or in part. The Government of Portugal is taking part in the
training, arming, financing, equipping and supplying the so-called
'Kosovo Liberation Army'"; LEGALlTY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 658
and whereas it further states that the said claims are based on the follow-
ing legal grounds:
"The above acts of the Government of Portugal represent a gross
violation of the obligation not to use force against another State. By
financing, arming, training and equipping the so-called 'Kosovo Lib-
eration Army', support is given to terrorist groupsand the secession-
ist movement in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of the obligation not to intervene in the interna1 affairs of
another State. In addition, the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1949and of the Additional Protocol No. 1of 1977on the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects in time of war have been vio-
lated. The obligation to protect the environment has also been
breached. The destruction of bridges on the Danube is in contraven-
tion of the provisions of Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on free
navigation on the Danube. The provisions of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Cov-
enant on Econornic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have also
been breached. Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been
breached. Furthi:rmore, the activities in which Portugal is taking
part are contrary to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations" ;
4. Whereas the claims of Yugoslavia are formulated as follows in the
Application :
"The Governnient of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
- by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Portugal has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use
force against another State;
- by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and
supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called 'Kosovo Liberation
Army', Portugal has acted againstthe Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;
- by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;
- by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monu-
ments of culture, Portugal has acted against the Federal Repub- lic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any
act of hostility directed against historical monuments, works of
art or places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual
heritage of people;
- by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
- by t,aking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable envi-
ronmental damage ;
- by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted ura-
nium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons
and not to cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;
by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, commu-
nications, health and cultural institutions, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to
information, the right to health care as well as other basic
human rights;
- by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers,
Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on
international rivers;
- by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by
causing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted
uranium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict
on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical d.estruction, in whole or in part;
- Portugal is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations ;
- Portugal is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Portugal is obliged to provide compensation for the damage
done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens
and juridical persons" ;
and whereas, at the end of its Application, Yugoslavia reserves the right
to amend and supplement it;
5. Whereas on 29 April 1999,immediately after filing its Application,Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provisional
measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court; and whereas that
request was accompanied by a volume of photographic annexes pro-
duced as "evidence" ;
6. Whereas, in support of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia contends interaliu that, since the onset of the
bombing of its territory, and as a result thereof, about 1,000 civilians,
including 19 children.,have been killed and more than 4,500 have sus-
tained serious injuries; that the lives of three million children are endan-
gered; that hundreds of thousands of citizens have been exposed to poi-
sonous gases; that about one million citizens are short of water supply;
that about 500,000 workers have become jobless; that two million citi-
zens have no means of livelihood and are unable to ensure minimum
means of sustenance; and that the road and railway network has suffered
extensive destruction; whereas, in its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, Yugoslavia also lists the targets alleged to have come
under attack in the air strikes and describes in detail the damage alleged
to have been inflicted upon them (bridges, railway lines and stations,
roads and means of transport, airports, industry and trade, refineries and
warehouses storing liquid raw materials and chemicals, agriculture, hos-
pitals and health cai-e centres, schools, public buildings and housing
facilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, cultural-historical monu-
ments and religious ishrines); and whereas Yugoslavia concludes from
this that:
"The acts described above caused death, physical and mental
harm to the popiilation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; huge
devastation; heavy pollution of the environment, so that the Yugo-
slav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in
part" ;
7. Whereas, at the end of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia states that
"If the proposed measure were not to be adopted, there will be
new losses of human life, further physical and mental harm inflicted
on the population of the FR of Yugoslavia, further destruction of
civilian targets,heavy environmental pollution and further physical
destruction of the people of Yugoslavia";
and whereas, while reserving the right to amend and supplement its
request, Yugoslavia requests the Court to indicate the following measure:
"Portugal shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall
refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia"; 8. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures was
accompanied by a letter from the Agent of Yugoslavia, addressed to the
President and Members of the Court, which read as follows:
"1 have the horiour to bring to the attention of the Court the latest
bombing of the central area of the town of Surdulica on 27 April
1999at noon resulting in losses of lives of civilians, most of whom
were children and women, and to remind of killings of peoples in
Kursumlija, Aleksinac and Cuprija, as well as bombing of a refugee
convoy and the Radio and Television of Serbia, just to mention
some of the well-known atrocities. Therefore, 1would like to caution
the Court that there is a highest probability of further civilian and
military casualties.
Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requestsproprio motu or to fixa date for a hearing
at earliest possible time";
9. Whereas on 29 April 1999,the day on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar sent to the Portuguese Government signed copies
of the Application and of the request, in accordance with Article 38, para-
graph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; and whereas
he also sent to that Government copies of the documents accompanying
the Application and the request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures;
10. Whereas on 29 April 1999the Registrar informed the Parties that
the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, to hold hearings on 10and 11 May 1999,where they would be
able to present their observations on the request for the indication of pro-
visional measures ;
11. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by transmittal of the
printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of the United
Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court, the Regis-
trar on 29 April 1999informed those States of the filing of the Applica-
tion and of its subject-matter, and of the filing of the request for the
indication of provisional measures;
12. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of
Yugoslav nationality, the Yugoslav Government has availed itself of the
provisions of Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr.
Milenko Kreca to sit as judge ad hoc in the case; and whereas no objec-
tion to that choice was raised within the time-limit fixed for the purpose
pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court;
13. Whereas, at the public hearings held between 10and 12May 1999,oral observations on the request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures were presented by the Parties:
On behaif of'Yugoslai~ia :
Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Agent,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Paul J. 1.M. de Waart,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Miodrag Mitic.,
Mr. Olivier Corten:
On behaif of'Portugal'.
Mr. JoséLeite Martins, Agent;
and whereas at the hearings a question was put by a Member of the
Court, to which one of the Parties replied orally and the other in writing;
14. Whereas, in this phase of the proceedings, the Parties presented the
following submissions :
On hehaij"of Yugoslavia:
"[The] Court [is asked] to indicate the following provisional
measure :
Portugal .. .shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and
shall refrain froni any act of threat or use of force against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia";
On hehaif of'Portugal:
"The submissions [of Portugal] are as follows:
- The International Court of Justice has not prima facie jurisdic-
tion to decide on the provisional measures requested by the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia.
- It has no jurisdiction based on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
International Court of Justice Statute, as the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is not a United Nations member State; therefore,
on14with the General Assembly and the Security Council's per-
mission coultl it legally put forward such request.
It has nojurisdiction sincethe declaration of the optional clause's
acceptance formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
substantially includes only the facts related to the period after
25-26 April 1999,and the situations originated before that date.
- Furthermore, it has no jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX
of the Genocide Convention, as the Portuguese Republic was
not a party at the time of the request's deposition in Court. - Article IX of the Genocide Convention - another ground for
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claim - is not, clearly,
applicable to the facts referred.
- In the unlikely event the International Court of Justice would
consider to have jurisdiction, it should take into consideration
that, underlying the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's request,
there is a situation of abuse of process since the declaration of
optional clause acceptance was delivered just a few days before
the action was filed in the International Court of Justice.
- Undoubtedly, there is also abuse of process when the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia comes before the International Court of
Justice in orcler to pursue an objective clearly rejected by the
United Nations Security Council, competent organ in the United
Nations system, ratione materiae.
- If, hypothetically, the International Court of Justice would decide
it has prima faciejurisdiction and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia'srequeistdid not constitute an abuse of process, even then,
there would riot be the requirements to indicate the provisional
measures - as there are no rights based either in the Genocide
Convention or in other international instruments that, in this
context, are in jeopardy, and as the interruption of NATO's
effort puts in danger rights that must prevail over others that
eventually may be affected by that intervention.
- An eventual indication of such measures, if restricted to a reduced
number of States, due to their position vis-à-vis the optional
clause, woultl have no significant effect under the prevailing
circumstances.
- Furthermore. that eventual indication does not contribute, or
seems not to contribute, to a constructive approach to the reso-
lution of the legal dispute.
Having said so, the Portuguese Republic is of the view that the
Court should reject the request for indication of provisional meas-
ures formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life
and human suffering in al1parts of Yugoslavia;
16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force
in Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises
very serious issues of international law; 17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the main-
tenance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statute of the
Court;
18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that al1parties
appearing before it miist act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, includ-
ing humanitarian law;
19. Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have
jurisdiction over legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or
between other States to whom access to the Court has been granted;
whereas the Court has repeatedly stated "that one of the fundamental
principles of itsStatute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of' those States to itsjurisdiction" (East Timor (Por-
tugal v. Australiu), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101,para. 26); and
whereas the Court can therefore exercisejurisdiction only between States
parties to a dispute who not only have access to the Court but also have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for the
individual dispute concerned;
20. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court might
be established;
21. Whereas in its ~ipplication Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute; whereas each of the two Parties has made a declaration recog-
niziiig the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to that provi-
sion; whereas Yugosl;ivia'sdeclaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on 26 April 1999,and that of Portugal on
19 Ilecember 1955;
22. Whereas Yugoslavia's declaration is formulated as follows:
"1hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro-
city, thejurisdiction of the said Court in al1disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The
present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions
which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial
disputes.
The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may
be given to terminate the acceptance";
and whereas the declaration of Portugal reads as follows:
"Under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, 1 declare on behalf of the Portuguese Government
that Portugal recognizes the jurisdiction of this Court as compulsory
ipso,facto and without special agreement, as provided for in the said
paragraph 2 of Article 36 and under the following conditions:
(1) the present declaration covers disputes arising out of events both
prior and subsequent to the declaration of acceptance of the
"optional clause"which Portugal made on 16December 1920as
a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice;
(2) the present declaration enters into force at the moment it is
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; it
shall be valid for a period of one year, and thereafter until notice
of its denunciation is given to the said Secretary-General;
(3) the Portuguese Government reserves the right to exclude from
the scope of the present declaration, at any time during its valid-
ity, any given category or categories of disputes, by notifying the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and with effect from
the moment of such notification";
23. Whereas Portugal contends that the jurisdiction of the Court can-
not be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in
this case; whereas it argues that Yugoslavia's declaration of acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court "states clearly that it applies only to dis-
putes 'arising after the signature of the present declaration"'; whereas
Portugal adds, referring to the definition of a dispute given in the Muv-
rommatis case, that the "dispute object of the current procedure has
arisen well before 25 April 1999 (or 26 April 1999 . . .)";and whereas
Portugal accordingly concludes that "the dispute which underlies therequest for the indication of provisional measures is not covered by the
optional clause declaration" made by Yugoslavia;
24. Whereas, according to Yugoslavia, "[tlhe issue before the Court is
that of interpreting a iinilateral declaration of acceptance of its jurisdic-
tion, and thus of ascertaining the meaning of the declaration on the basis
of the intention ofits author"; whereas Yugoslavia contends that the text
of its declaration "allows al1 disputes effectively arising after 25 April
1999 to be taken into account"; whereas, referring to bombing attacks
carried out by NATO member States on 28 April, 1 May, 7 May and
8 May 1999, Yugoslavia states that, "[iln each of these cases, which are
only examples, [it]denounced the flagrant violations of international law
of which it considered itself to have been the victim", and the "NATO
member States denied having violated any obligation under international
law"; whereas Yugoslavia asserts that "each of these events therefore
gave rise to 'adisagreement on a point of law or fact', a disagreement . ..
the terms of which depend in each case on the specific features of the
attack" in question; whereas Yugoslavia accordingly concludes that,
since these events constitute "instantaneous wrongful acts", there exist "a
number of separate disputes which have arisen" between the Parties
"since 25 April relating to events subsequent to that date"; and whereas
Yugoslavia argues from this that "[tlhere is no reason to exclude prima
facie the Court's jurisdiction over disputes having effectively arisen after
25 April, as provided in the text of the declaration"; and whereas Yugo-
slavia adds that to exclude such disputes from the jurisdiction of the
Court "would run entirely counter to the manifest and clear intention of
Yugoslavia" to entrust the Court with the resolution of those disputes;
25. Whereas Yugoslavia has accepted the Court's jurisdiction rutione
temporis in respect only, on the one hand, of disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of its declaration and, on the other hand, of
those concerning situations or facts subsequent to that signature (cf.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1960, p. 34); whereas, in order to assess whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion in the case, itis sufficient to decide whether, in terms of the text of
the declaration, the dispute brought before the Court "arose" before or
after 25 April 1999,the date on which the declaration was signed;
26. Whereas Yugoslavia's Application is entitled "Application of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Portugal for Violation of the
Obligation Not to Use Force"; whereas in the Application the "subject of
the dispute" (emphasis added) is described in general terms (see para-
graph 1 above); but whereas it can be seen both from the statement of
"facts upon which the claim is based" and from the manner in which the
"claims" themselves are formulated (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above) that
the Application is directed, in essence, against the "bombing of the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" which the Court is
req~iestedto bring to an end;
27. Whereas it is an established fact that the bombings in questionbegan on 24 March 1999and have been conducted continuously over a
period extending beyond 25 April 1999; and whereas the Court has no
doubt, in the light, inter alia, of the discussions at the Security Council
meetings of 24 and 26 March 1999 (SlPV.3988 and 3989), that a "legal
dispute" (East Timor (Portugal v. Australiu), 1.C.J. Reports 1995,p. 100,
para. 22) "arose" between Yugoslavia and the Respondent, as it did also
with the other NATO inember States, well before 25 April 1999concern-
ing the legality ofthose bombings as such, taken as a whole;
28. Whereas the fact that the bombings have continued after 25 April
1999and that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is
not such as to alter the date on which the dispute arose; whereas each
individual air attack could not have given rise to a separate subsequent
dispute; and whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, Yugoslavia has
not established that riew disputes, distinct from the initial one, have
arisen between the Parties since 25 April 1999 in respect of subsequent
situations or facts attrrbutable to Portugal;
29. Whereas, as the Court recalled in its Judgment of 4 December
1998 in the case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada),
"It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon
the limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court: '[tlhisjurisdiction only exists within the limits within which
it has been accepted' (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938.
P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74, p. 23)" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453,
para. 44);
and whereas, as the Permanent Court held in its Judgment of 14 June
1938 in the Phosphates in Morocco case (Preliminary Objections), "it is
recognized that, as a consequence of the condition of reciprocity stipu-
lated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court", any limi-
tation ratione tempo ri.attached by one of the Parties to its declaration of
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction "holds good as between the Parties"
(Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment. 1938. P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74,
p. 10); and whereas it follows from the foregoing that the declarations
made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not
constitute a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court could prima facie
be founded in this case;
30. Whereas Portugal also contends that in this case the jurisdiction of
the Court cannot be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
having regard to United Nations Security Council resolutions 777 (1992)
of 19 September 1992 and 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993 and to United
Nations General Assembly resolutions 4711of 22 September 1992 and
48185of 20 December 1993; whereas it argues in this connection that
"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a United Nations member"and that, having failed to "renew its United Nations membership", it is in
consequence not a party to the Statute of the Court;
31. Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat, as
expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992from the Legal Counsel of
the Organization (doc. A/471485),and to the latter's subsequent practice,
contends for its part that General Assembly resolution 4711"[neither] ter-
minate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia's membership in the Organiza-
tion", and that the said resolution did not take away from Yugoslavia
"[its] right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly
bodies" ;
32. Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 29 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;
33. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the second place,
to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article IX of the Genocide
Convention, which provides :
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute";
and whereas in its Application Yugoslavia states that the subject of the
dispute concerns inter uliu "acts of Portugal by which it has violated its
international obligation . .. not to deliberately inflict conditions of life
calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group"; whereas,
in describing the f'actson which the Application is based, Yugoslavia
states: "The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions
calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in
part"; whereas, in its statement of the legal grounds on which the Appli-
cation is based, Yugoslavia contends that "the obligation . . . not to
impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of the group has been breached";
and whereas one of the claims on the merits set out in the Application is
forniulated as follows :
"by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by caus-
ing enormous erivironmental damage and by using depleted ura-
nium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part"; 34. Whereas Yugoslavia contends moreover that the sustained and
intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily
populated areas, constitutes "a serious violation of Article II of the
Genocide Convention"; whereas it argues that "the pollution of soil, air
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the
environment with depleted uranium, inflicts conditions of life on the
Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction";
whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such
that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already
known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country's power
supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent
must be aware, "impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part", the
Yugoslav national group as such;
35. Whereas for its part Portugal contends that Article IX of the
Genocide Convention "provides a basis for jurisdiction only in respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of that
Convention"; that Yugoslavia "has failed to prove any breach of the
Genocide Convention, actual or threatened"; that "the specific intent
which is necessary for the crime [of genocidel's existence is absent in the
case"; that the actions in which Portugal allegedly took part "are clearly
inadequate to the corrimitment of a crime that would require a selective
effort in the choice of victims, incompatible with the contingent effect of
the employed means"; and that in consequence "both the objective and
subjective elements of the crime are missing, and so there is not theslight-
est basis for claiming successfullythe existence offacts relevant under the
Genocide Convention attributable to the Portuguese Republic"; and
whereas Portugal accordingly concludes that Article IX of the Genocide
Convention "[does not] provide a prima facie basis for jurisdiction";
36. Whereas, in order for Article IX of the Convention to be capable
of constituting a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded ratione materiue, the subject-matter of the dispute must relate to
"the interpretation, application or fulfilment" of the Convention, includ-
ing disputes "relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide or for
any of the other acts enumerated in article III" of the said Convention;
37. Whereas, in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dis-
pute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists,
the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains
that the Convention applies, while the other denies it; and whereas in the
present case the Court must ascertain whether the breaches of the Con-
vention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions
of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one
which the Court has jurisdiction ratione rnateriae to entertain pursuant
to Article IX (cf. Oill'latforms (Islamic Repuhlic of Iran v.United Statesof Arnerica), Preliminury Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 810, para. 16);
38. Whereas the definition of genocide set out in Article II of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:
"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
actscommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(u) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group ;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group";
39. Whereas it appears to the Court, from this definition, "that the
essential characteristic: of genocide is the intended destruction of 'a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group'" (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention und Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provi-
sionul Measures, Order of 13 Septemher 1993, 1. C.J. Reports 1993,
p. 345, para. 42); whereas the threat or use of force against a State can-
not in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II
of the Genocide Convention;and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings
which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application "indeed entail the
element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above" (Legulity of the Threat or Use of'Nucleur Weapons, Advi-
sory Opitziorz,1.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26);
40. Whereas the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this
stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the
Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by
Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case;
41. Whereas Portugal further contends that at the date on which
Yugoslavia filed its Application, namely 29 April 1999, Portugal "was
not party to the Genocide Convention - although its instrument of
accession had already been deposited in the United Nations"; and
whereas, in reply to a question from a Member of the Court at the hear-
ings, the Agent of Portugal produced a Note Verbale, dated 16 February
1999, in which the United Nations Secretary-General stated that, pursu-
ant to Article XIlI, third paragraph, of the Convention, the latter would LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 671
enter into force for Portugal on 10May 1999,that is, on the ninetieth day
following deposit of it:;instrument of accession ;
42. Whereas Yugoslavia, in its written reply to the above question,
invoked for its part "the principle well established by the practice of the
Court according to which the Court should not penalize a defect in a pro-
cedural act which the Applicant could easily remedy";
43. Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 40 above, there is no
need for the Court to consider this question for the purpose of deciding
whether or not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;
44. Whereas it follows from what has been said above that the Court
lacks prima faciejurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's Application; and
whereas it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever
in order to protect the rights invoked therein;
45. Whereas, however, the findings reached by the Court in the present
proceedings in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the
admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and
whereas they leave unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugosla-
via and Portugal to submit arguments in respect of those questions;
46. Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question
of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compat-
ibility of particular acts with international law: the former requires con-
sent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with
the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full
legal arguments by both parties;
47. Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the
Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them
that violate international law, including humanitarian law; whereas any
disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved
by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the
Charter, is left to the parties;
48. Whereas in this context the parties should take care not to aggra-
vate or extend the dispute;
49. Whereas, when such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special
responsibilitiesunder Chapter VI1of the Charter; 50. For these reasons,
(1) By eleven votes to four,
Rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submit-
ted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999;
IN FAVOUR :President Schwebel;Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans;
AC~AINS Vic:e-PresidenrWeeramantry, Acting Presiden;Judges Shi,Veresh-
chetin; Judge ad hoc Kreca;
(2) By fourteen votes to one,
Rrserves the subsequent procedure for further decision
IN FAVOUR:Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans ;Judge ad hoc Kreta :
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Federal Rep~iblic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the
Portuguese Republic, respectively.
(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.
[Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.
Judge KOKOMA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.
Judges ODA, HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUREaN nd KOOIJMANS append
separate opinions to the Order of the Court.
20 Vice-President WEERAMANTRA Y,ting President, Judges SHI and
VERESHCHETI an, Judge ad hoc KRECA append dissenting opinions to
theOrder of the Court.
(InitialledC.G.W
(InitialiedE.V.O.
COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS
ET ORDONNANCES
INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS
AND ORDERS COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. PORTUGAL)
DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES
ORDONNANCE DU 2 JUIN 1999
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
CASE CONCERNING
LEGAIJTY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
ORDER OF 2 JUNE 1999 Mode officielde citation:
Licéité del'emploi de laforce (Yougoslavie c. Portugal),
mesuresconsrrvutoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
C.1.J. Recueil 1999, p. 656
Officia1cita:ion
LegProvisionalusures, Order of 2 June 1999,tugal),
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 656
No àevente: 773 3
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number
ISBN 92-1-070801-6 2 JUIN 1999
ORDONNANCE
LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. PORTUGAL)
DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATlON OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
2 JUNE 1999
ORDER COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
1999 ANNÉE 1999
2 juin
Rôlegénéral
no 111 2 juin1999
AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. PORTUGAL)
DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES
ORDONNANCE
Présents: M. WEERAMANTRv Y,e-président,faisant fonction de pré-
sident en I'uffuire M. SCHWEBELp,résident de lu Cour;
MM. ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER , ANJEVAH, ERCZEGH,
SHI,FLEISCHHAUEK R, ROMAV, ERESHCHETIM N, e HIGGINS,
MM. PARRA-ARANGURE KNO,OIJMANS,ges; M. KRECAj,uge
ad hoc; M. VALENCIA-OSPIN grf,jrr.
La Cour internationale de Justice,
Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré nhambre du conseil,
Vu les articles 41 et 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 73 et 74 de
son Règlement,
Vu la requête déposear la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie (ci-
après dénomméela <<Yougoslavie»)au Greffe de la Cour le29 avril 1999,
par laquelle elle a introduit une instance contre la République portugaise
(ci-aprèsdénomméele ((Portugal))) ((pour violation de l'obligation de ne
pas recourirl'emploi de la force)), INTER'NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1999 1999
2 June
Generalist
2 June 1999 No. III
CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.PORTUGAL)
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES
ORDER
Pre.ernt: Vice-President WEERAMANTRYc,ting PrrsidentPresident
SCHWEBEL; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER , ANJEVA,
HERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER K,OROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,I'ARRA-ARANGUREK NO, OIJMANS;udge ad hoc
KKECAR ; egistrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.
The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73 and 74 of thes of Court,
Having regard to.he Application by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter "Yugoslavia") filed in the Registry of the Court on
29 .4pril 1999, instituting proceedings against the Portuguese Republic
(hereinafter "Portugal") "for violation of the obligation not to use force", Rend l'ordonnance suivante
1. Considérant que, dans cette requête, laYougoslavie définitl'objet
du différendainsi que suit:
((L'objetdu différendporte sur les actes commispar le Portugal, en
violation de son obligationinternationale de ne pas recourir a l'emploi
de la force contre un autre Etat, de I'obligationde ne pas s'immiscer
dans les affaires intérieuresd'un autre Etat, de l'obligationde ne pas
porter atteintela souverainetéd'un autre Etat, de I'obligationde pro-
tégerles populations civileset les biens de caractèrecivilen temps de
guerre, de I'obligationde protéger l'environneme,e I'obligationtou-
chantà la libertéde navigation sur les cours d'eau internationaux, de
l'obligation concernant les droits et libertésfondamentaux de la per-
sonne humaine, deI'obligationde ne pas utiliserdes armes interdites,de
l'obligationde ne pas soumettreintentionnellement ungroupe national
ades conditions d'existencedevant entraîner sa destruction physique));
2. Considérant que, dans ladite requête,la Yougoslavie, pour fonder
la compétencede la Cour, invoque le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Sta-
tut de la Cour et l'articleX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répressiondu crime de génocide,adoptée par l'Assemblée généraldees
Nations Unies le 9 décembre 1948 (ci-après dénomméela ((convention
sur le génocide)));
3. Considérant que, dans sa requête,la Yougoslavie expose que les
demandes qu'elle soumet a la Cour sont fondéessur les faits ci-après:
«Le Gouvernement du Portugal, conjointement avec les gouver-
nements d'autres Etats membres de l'OTAN, a recouru à l'emploide
la force contre la République fédéralede Yougoslavie en prenant
part au bombardement de cibles dans la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie. Lors des bombardements de la Républiquefédéralede
Yougoslavie, des cibles militaires et civiles ont été attaquées.Un
grand nombre de personnes ont ététuées,dont de très nombreux
civils. Des immeubles d'habitation ont subi des attaques. Un grand
nombre d'habitations ont été détruites.D'énormesdégâts ont été
causésà des écoles,deshôpitaux, des stations de radiodiffusion et de
télévision, es structures culturelles et sanitaires, ainsis lieux
de culte. Nombre de ponts, routes et voies de chemin de fer ont été
détruits. Les attaques contre des raffineries de pétrole etdes usines
chimiques ont eu de graves effets dommageables pour I'environne-
ment de villes et de villages de la Républiquefédéralede Yougosla-
vie. L'emploi d'armes contenant de l'uranium appauvri a de lourdes
conséquencespour la vie humaine. Lesactes susmentionnésont pour
effet de soumettre intentionnellement un groupe ethnique à des
conditions devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou par-
tielle. Le Gouvernement du Portugal prend part à l'entraînement, a
l'armement, au financement, à l'équipementet a I'approvisionne-
ment de la prétendue «armée de libération du Kosovo*; Mukes the following Order:
1. Whereas in that Application Yugoslavia defines the subject of the
dispute as follows:
"The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of Portugal by which it
has violated its international obligation banning the use of force
against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the interna1
affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty
of another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population
and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the envi-
ronment, the obligation relating to free navigation on international
rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms, the obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the obliga-
tion not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause
the physical destruction of a national group";
2. Whereas in the said Application Yugoslavia refers, as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court, to Article36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1948(hereinafterthe "Genocide Con-
vention") ;
3. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia States that the claims sub-
mitted by it to the Court are based upon the following facts:
"The Government of Portugal, together with the Governments of
other Member States of NATO, took part in the acts of use of force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by taking part in bomb-
ing targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In bombing the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military and civilian targets were
attacked. Great number of people were killed, including a great
many civilians. Residential houses came under attack. Numerous
dwellings were destroyed. Enormous damage was caused to schools,
hospitals, radio and television stations, cultural and health institu-
tions andto places ofworship. A large number of bridges, roads and
railway lines were destroyed. Attacks on oil refineries and chemical
plants have had serious environmental effects on cities, towns and
villages in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The use of weapons
containing depleted uranium is having far-reachingconsequences for
human life. The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating con-
ditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnie group, in
whole or in part. The Government of Portugal is taking part in the
training, arming, financing, equipping and supplying the so-called
'Kosovo Liberation Army'";658 LICEITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
et considérant qu'elle indique en outre que lesdites demandes reposent
sur les fondements juridiques suivants:
«Les actes susmentionnésdu Gouvernement portugaisconstituent
une violation flagrante de I'obligation de ne pas recourir à l'emploi
de la force contre un autre Etat. En finançant, armant, entraînant et
équipantla prétendue«arméede libérationdu Kosovo)), le Gouver-
nement portugais apporte un appui à des groupes terroristes et au
mouvement sécessionnistesur le territoire de la Républiquefédérale
de Yougoslavie, en violation de I'obligation de ne pas s'immiscer
dans les affaires intérieuresd'un autre Etat. De surcroît, les disposi-
tions de la convention de Genèvede 1949et du protocole addition-
nel no 1 de 1977 relatives à la protection des civils et des biens de
caractère civil en temps de guerre ont étéviolées. Il a eu aussi vio-
lation de I'obligation de protéger l'environnement. La destruction de
ponts sur le Danube enfreint les dispositions de l'article 1 de la
convention de 1948relative à la libertéde navigation sur le Danube.
Les dispositions du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et
politiques et du pacte international relatif aux droits économiques,
sociaux et culturels de 1966 ont elles aussi étéviolées.En outre,
I'obligation énoncéedans la convention pour la prévention et la
répressiondu crime de génocidede ne pas soumettre intentionnelle-
ment un groupe national a des conditions d'existencedevant entraî-
ner sa destruction physique a étéviolée.De plus, les activitésaux-
quelles le Portugal prend part sont contraires au paragraphe 1 de
l'article 53de la Charte des Nations Unies));
4. Considérant que les demandes de la Yougoslavie sont ainsi formu-
léesdans la requête:
«Le Gouvernement de la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie prie
la Cour internationale de Justice de dire et juger:
- qu'en prenant part aux bombardements du territoire de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, le Portugal a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas recourir à l'emploi de la force contre un autre Etat;
- qu'en prenant part à l'entraînement, à l'armement, au finance-
ment, à l'équipementet à l'approvisionnement de groupes terro-
ristes, savoir la prétendue«arméedelibérationdu Kosovo)), le
Portugal a agi contre la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie, en
violation de son obligation de ne pas s'immiscerdans les affaires
d'un autre Etat;
- qu'en prenant part à des attaques contre des ciblesciviles,le Por-
tugal a agi contre la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie, envio-
lation de son obligation d'épargnerla population civile, les civils
et les biens de caractère civil;
- qu'en prenant part à la destruction ou à l'endommagement de
monastères, d'édificesculturels, le Portugal a agi contre laépu- LEGALlTY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 658
and whereas it further states that the said claims are based on the follow-
ing legal grounds:
"The above acts of the Government of Portugal represent a gross
violation of the obligation not to use force against another State. By
financing, arming, training and equipping the so-called 'Kosovo Lib-
eration Army', support is given to terrorist groupsand the secession-
ist movement in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of the obligation not to intervene in the interna1 affairs of
another State. In addition, the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1949and of the Additional Protocol No. 1of 1977on the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects in time of war have been vio-
lated. The obligation to protect the environment has also been
breached. The destruction of bridges on the Danube is in contraven-
tion of the provisions of Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on free
navigation on the Danube. The provisions of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Cov-
enant on Econornic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have also
been breached. Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been
breached. Furthi:rmore, the activities in which Portugal is taking
part are contrary to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations" ;
4. Whereas the claims of Yugoslavia are formulated as follows in the
Application :
"The Governnient of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
- by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Portugal has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use
force against another State;
- by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and
supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called 'Kosovo Liberation
Army', Portugal has acted againstthe Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;
- by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;
- by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monu-
ments of culture, Portugal has acted against the Federal Repub- blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas commettre d'actes d'hostilitédirigéscontre des monu-
ments historiques, des Œuvresd'art ou des lieux de culte consti-
tuant le patrimoine culturel ou spirituel d'un peuple;
- qu'en prenant part à l'utilisation de bombes en grappe, le Portu-
gal a agi contre la République fédéralede Yougoslavie, en viola-
tion de son obligation de ne pas utiliser des armes interdites,
c'est-à-dire des armes de nature à causer des maux superflus;
- qu'en prenant part aux bombardements de raffineries de pétrole
et d'usines chimiques, le Portugal a agi contre la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie, enviolation de son obligation de ne pas
causer de dommages substantiels à I'environnement;
- qu'en recourant à l'utilisation d'armes contenant de l'uranium
appauvri, le Portugal a agi contre la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de ne pas utiliser des
armes interdites et de ne pas causer de dommages de grande
ampleur à la santéet à I'environnement;
- qu'en prenant part au meurtre de civils, à la destruction d'entre-
prises, de moyens de communication et de structures sanitaires et
culturelles, le Portugal a agi contre la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de respecter le droit
à la vie. le droit au travail. le droià l'information. le droit aux
soins de santéainsi que d'autres droits fondamentaux de la per-
sonne humaine :
- qu'en prenant ;art à la destruction de ponts situéssur des cours
d'eau internationaux, le Portugal a agi contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de res-
pecter la libertéde navigation sur lescours d'eau internationaux;
- qu'en prenant part aux activitésénuméréec si-dessus et en parti-
culier en causant des dommages énormesa I'environnement et en
utilisant de l'uranium appauvri, le Portugal a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national a des
conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique
totale ou partielle;
- que le Portugal porte la responsabilitéde la violation des obli-
gations internationales susmentionnées;
- que le Portugal est tenu de mettre fin immédiatement à la viola-
tion des obligations susmentionnées à l'égardde la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie;
- que le Portugal doit réparation pour les préjudicescausés à la
République fédéralede Yougoslavie ainsi qu'à ses citoyens et
personnes morales »;
et considérant qu'au terme de sa requêtela Yougoslavie se réservele
droit de modifier et de complétercelle-ci;
5. Considérant que, le 29 avril 1999,immédiatementaprèsle dépôt de lic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any
act of hostility directed against historical monuments, works of
art or places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual
heritage of people;
- by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;
- by t,aking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable envi-
ronmental damage ;
- by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted ura-
nium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons
and not to cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;
by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, commu-
nications, health and cultural institutions, Portugal has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to
information, the right to health care as well as other basic
human rights;
- by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers,
Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on
international rivers;
- by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by
causing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted
uranium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict
on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical d.estruction, in whole or in part;
- Portugal is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations ;
- Portugal is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Portugal is obliged to provide compensation for the damage
done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens
and juridical persons" ;
and whereas, at the end of its Application, Yugoslavia reserves the right
to amend and supplement it;
5. Whereas on 29 April 1999,immediately after filing its Application,sa requête, la Yougoslaviea en outre présenté une demandeen indication
de mesures conservatoires invoquant l'article 73 du Règlement de la
Cour; et que la demande était accompagnéed'un volume d'annexes pho-
tographiques produites à titre de «preuves»;
6. Considérant que, à l'appui de sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Yougoslavie soutient notamment que, depuis le début
des bombardements contre son territoire, et du fait de ceux-ci, environ
mille civils,dont dix-neuf enfants, ont éttués etplus dequatre millecinq
cents grièvement blessés;que la vie de trois millions d'enfants est me-
nacée;que des centaines de milliers de personnes ont étéexposées à des
gaz toxiques; qu'environ un million de personnes sont privéesd'appro-
visionnement en eau; qu'environ cinq cent mille travailleurs ont perdu
leur emploi; que deux millions de personnes sont sans ressources et
dans l'impossibilitéde se procurer le minimum vital; et que les réseaux
routier et ferroviaire ont subi d'importants dégâts; considérant que,dans
sa demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, la Yougoslavie
énumèrepar ailleurs les cibles qui auraient étéviséespar les attaques
aérienneset décriten détailles dommages qui leur auraient étéinfligés
(ponts, gares et lignes de chemins de fer, réseauroutier et moyens de
transport, aéroports, commerceet industrie, raffinerieset entrepôts de ma-
tières premières liquideset de produits chimiques, agriculture, hôpitaux
et centres médicaux,écoles, édificepsublics et habitations, infrastructures,
télécommunications,monuments historiques et culturels et édifices reli-
gieux); et considérant que la Yougoslavie en conclut ce qui suit:
«Les actes décrits ci-dessus ont causé des morts ainsi que des
atteintesà l'intégritéphysique et mentale de la population de la
Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie, de trèsimportants dégâts, une
forte pollution de l'environnement, de sorte que la population you-
goslave se trouve soumise intentionnellement à des conditions d'exis-
tence devant entraîner la destruction physique totale ou partielle de
ce groupe));
7. Considérant que, au terme de sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Yougoslavie préciseque
«Si les mesures demandées nesont pas adoptées, il y aura de nou-
velles pertes en vies humaines, de nouvelles atteintes à l'intégrité
physique et mentale de la population de la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie, d'autres destructions de cibles civiles, une forte pollu-
tion de l'environnement et la poursuite de la destruction physique de
la population de Yougoslavie»;
et considérant que, tout en se réservant le droit de modifier et de com-
plétersa demande, elle prie la Cour d'indiquer la mesure suivante:
((Le Portugal doit cesser immédiatementde recourir à l'emploi de
la force et doit s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de
recours ou un recours a l'emploi de la force contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie)) ;Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provisional
measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court; and whereas that
request was accompanied by a volume of photographic annexes pro-
duced as "evidence" ;
6. Whereas, in support of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia contends interaliu that, since the onset of the
bombing of its territory, and as a result thereof, about 1,000 civilians,
including 19 children.,have been killed and more than 4,500 have sus-
tained serious injuries; that the lives of three million children are endan-
gered; that hundreds of thousands of citizens have been exposed to poi-
sonous gases; that about one million citizens are short of water supply;
that about 500,000 workers have become jobless; that two million citi-
zens have no means of livelihood and are unable to ensure minimum
means of sustenance; and that the road and railway network has suffered
extensive destruction; whereas, in its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, Yugoslavia also lists the targets alleged to have come
under attack in the air strikes and describes in detail the damage alleged
to have been inflicted upon them (bridges, railway lines and stations,
roads and means of transport, airports, industry and trade, refineries and
warehouses storing liquid raw materials and chemicals, agriculture, hos-
pitals and health cai-e centres, schools, public buildings and housing
facilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, cultural-historical monu-
ments and religious ishrines); and whereas Yugoslavia concludes from
this that:
"The acts described above caused death, physical and mental
harm to the popiilation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; huge
devastation; heavy pollution of the environment, so that the Yugo-
slav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in
part" ;
7. Whereas, at the end of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia states that
"If the proposed measure were not to be adopted, there will be
new losses of human life, further physical and mental harm inflicted
on the population of the FR of Yugoslavia, further destruction of
civilian targets,heavy environmental pollution and further physical
destruction of the people of Yugoslavia";
and whereas, while reserving the right to amend and supplement its
request, Yugoslavia requests the Court to indicate the following measure:
"Portugal shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall
refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia";661 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
8. Considérant que la demande en indication de mesures conser-
vatoires était accompagnée d'une lettre de l'agent de la Yougoslavie,
adresséeau président etaux membres de la Cour, qui étaitainsi libellée:
«J'ai l'honneur d'appeler l'attention de la Cour sur le dernier
bombardement qui a frappé le centre de la ville de Surdulica le
27 avril 1999 amidi et entraînéla mort de civils, pour la plupart des
enfants et des femmes, et de vous rappeler les morts de Kursumlija,
Aleksinac et Cuprija, ainsi que le bombardement d'un convoi de
réfugiés etde l'immeuble abritant la radio et la télévision serbes,
pour neciter que quelques exemplesdes atrocités quechacunconnaît.
Je tiens en conséquence à prévenir laCour qu'il est fort probable
qu'il y aura encore d'autres victimes civiles et militaires.
Considérant le pouvoir conféré a la Cour aux termes du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 75 de son Règlement, et compte tenu de l'ex-
trêmeurgence de la situation néedes circonstances décritesdans les
demandes en indication de mesures conservatoires, je prie la Cour
de bien vouloir se prononcer d'office sur les demandes présentées
ou de fixer une date pour la tenue d'une audience dans les meilleurs
délais);
9. Considérant que le 29 avril 1999, date à laquelle la requêteet la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires ont été déposéeasu
Greffe, le greffier a fait tenir au Gouvernement portugais des copies
signéesde la requêteet de la demande, conformément au paragraphe 4 de
l'article 38 et au paragraphe2 de I'article 73 du Règlementde la Cour; et
qu'il a égalementfait tenir audit gouvernement une copie des documents
qui accompagnaient la requêteet la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires ;
10. Considérant que, le 29 avril 1999,le greffiera avisé lesParties que
la Cour avait décidé,conformément au paragraphe 3 de I'article 74 de
son Règlement, de tenir audience les 10 et 11 mai 1999 aux fins de les
entendre en leurs observations sur la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires ;
11. Considérantqu'en attendant quela communication prévueau para-
graphe 3de I'article 40du Statut et à I'article42 du Règlementde la Cour
ait étéeffectuéepar transmission du texte bilingue impriméde la requête
aux Membres des Nations Unies et aux autres Etats admis à ester devant
la Cour, le greffier a, le 29 avril 1999,informéces Etats du dépôtde la
requêteet de son objet, ainsi que du dépôt de la demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires;
12. Considérant que, la Cour ne comptant pas sur le siègede juge de
nationalitéyougoslave, le Gouvernement yougoslave a invoquélesdispo-
sitions de I'article 31 du Statut de la Cour et a désigné Milenko KreCa
pour siégeren qualité dejuge ad hoc en l'affaire; et qu'aucune objection
à cette désignation n'a été soulevédeans le délaifixé à cet effet en vertu
du paragraphe 3 de l'article 35 du Règlementde la Cour;
13. Considérant que, aux audiences publiques qui ont été tenuesentre 8. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures was
accompanied by a letter from the Agent of Yugoslavia, addressed to the
President and Members of the Court, which read as follows:
"1 have the horiour to bring to the attention of the Court the latest
bombing of the central area of the town of Surdulica on 27 April
1999at noon resulting in losses of lives of civilians, most of whom
were children and women, and to remind of killings of peoples in
Kursumlija, Aleksinac and Cuprija, as well as bombing of a refugee
convoy and the Radio and Television of Serbia, just to mention
some of the well-known atrocities. Therefore, 1would like to caution
the Court that there is a highest probability of further civilian and
military casualties.
Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requestsproprio motu or to fixa date for a hearing
at earliest possible time";
9. Whereas on 29 April 1999,the day on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar sent to the Portuguese Government signed copies
of the Application and of the request, in accordance with Article 38, para-
graph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; and whereas
he also sent to that Government copies of the documents accompanying
the Application and the request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures;
10. Whereas on 29 April 1999the Registrar informed the Parties that
the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, to hold hearings on 10and 11 May 1999,where they would be
able to present their observations on the request for the indication of pro-
visional measures ;
11. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by transmittal of the
printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of the United
Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court, the Regis-
trar on 29 April 1999informed those States of the filing of the Applica-
tion and of its subject-matter, and of the filing of the request for the
indication of provisional measures;
12. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of
Yugoslav nationality, the Yugoslav Government has availed itself of the
provisions of Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr.
Milenko Kreca to sit as judge ad hoc in the case; and whereas no objec-
tion to that choice was raised within the time-limit fixed for the purpose
pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court;
13. Whereas, at the public hearings held between 10and 12May 1999,le 10et le 12mai 1999,des observations orales sur la demande en indica-
tion de mesures conservatoires ont été présentées:
au nom de la Yougoslavie:
par M. Rodoljub Etinski, ugent,
M. Ian Brownlie,
M. Paul J. 1. M. de Waart,
M. Eric Suy,
M. Miodrag Mitic,
M. Olivier Corten;
crunom du Portugal:
par M. JoséLeite Martins, ugrnt;
et considérant qu'à l'audience unmembre de la Cour a posé uneques-
tion, à laquelle l'une des Parties a répondu oralement et l'autre par écrit;
14. Considérant que, dans cette phase de la procédure, les Parties ont
présentéles conclusions suivantes:
uu nom de lu Yougoslavir .
«[L]a Cour [est priée]d'indiquer la mesure conservatoire sui-
vante :
[L]ePortugal ..doi[t]cesser immédiatementde recourir à l'emploi
de la force etdoi[t] s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de
recours ou un recours à l'emploi de la force contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie » ;
au nom du Portugal:
(([Les]conclusions [du Portugal] sont les suivantes:
- la Cour internationale de Justice n'a pas compétence prima facie
pour prendre une décisionsur lesmesures conservatoires deman-
déespar la République fédérale de Yougoslavie;
- elle ne peut fonder sa compétencesur le paragraphe 2 de l'article
36de son Statut, car la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie n'est
pas un Etat Membre de l'organisation des Nations Unies et ce
n'est qu'avec l'autorisation de l'Assembléegénérale etdu Conseil
de sécuritéqu'elleserait légalement habilitée à présenterune telle
demande ;
- la Cour n'est pas compétentecar la déclaration d'acceptation de
la clause facultative faite par la République fédéralede Yougo-
slavie porte en réalitéuniquement sur les faits se rapportant a la
période postérieureau 25-26avril 1999,et les situations en cause
sont néesavant cette date;
- en outre, la Cour ne peut fonder sa compétencesur l'article 1X
de la convention sur le génocide,car la République portugaise
n'était pas partie a cette convention à la date a laquelle la
demande a étéprésentée à la Cour;oral observations on the request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures were presented by the Parties:
On behaif of'Yugoslai~ia :
Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Agent,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Paul J. 1.M. de Waart,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Miodrag Mitic.,
Mr. Olivier Corten:
On behaif of'Portugal'.
Mr. JoséLeite Martins, Agent;
and whereas at the hearings a question was put by a Member of the
Court, to which one of the Parties replied orally and the other in writing;
14. Whereas, in this phase of the proceedings, the Parties presented the
following submissions :
On hehaij"of Yugoslavia:
"[The] Court [is asked] to indicate the following provisional
measure :
Portugal .. .shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and
shall refrain froni any act of threat or use of force against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia";
On hehaif of'Portugal:
"The submissions [of Portugal] are as follows:
- The International Court of Justice has not prima facie jurisdic-
tion to decide on the provisional measures requested by the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia.
- It has no jurisdiction based on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
International Court of Justice Statute, as the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is not a United Nations member State; therefore,
on14with the General Assembly and the Security Council's per-
mission coultl it legally put forward such request.
It has nojurisdiction sincethe declaration of the optional clause's
acceptance formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
substantially includes only the facts related to the period after
25-26 April 1999,and the situations originated before that date.
- Furthermore, it has no jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX
of the Genocide Convention, as the Portuguese Republic was
not a party at the time of the request's deposition in Court.663 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
l'article IX de la convention sur le génocide- autre fondement
de la demande de la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie - n'est
pas à l'évidenceapplicable aux faits allégués;
dans le cas peu probable où la Cour internationale de Justice
s'estimerait compétente, elle devrait prendre en considération le
fait que la demande de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie
constitue en réalitéun abus de procédure, étant donnéque la
déclaration d'acceptation de la clause facultative a été faitequel-
quesjours àpeine avant que l'action soit engagéedevant la Cour
internationale de Justice;
le fait que la République fédéralede Yougoslavie se présente
devant la Cour internationale de Justice pour poursuivre un
objectif clairement rejetépar le Conseil de sécuritéde l'ONU,
l'organe compétent ratione mutrriae du système des Nations
Unies, constitue aussi a l'évidence unabus de procédure;
dans l'hypothèseoù la Cour internationale de Justice déciderait
qu'elle estcompétente prima fucie et que la demande de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie ne constitue pas un abus de pro-
cédure,lesconditions requises pour indiquer des mesures conser-
vatoires ne seraient tout de mêmepas réuniesdu fait qu'aucun
droit se fondant soit sur la convention sur le génocide, soitsur
d'autres instruments internationaux, ne se trouve menacé en
l'occurrence, tandis que l'interruption des efforts déployéspar
l'OTAN compromettrait d'autres droits qui doivent prévaloir
sur d'autres droits susceptibles d'êtreaffectéspar cette interven-
tion;
l'indication éventuellede telles mesures, si elle étaitlimitàeun
nombre restreint d'Etats, compte tenu de leur situation au regard
de la clause facultative, n'aurait aucun effet notable dans les cir-
constances actuelles;
en outre, cette indication éventuellede mesures conservatoires ne
contribuerait pas ou ne semble pas devoir contribuerà une appro-
che constructive du règlementdu différendd'ordre juridique;
Pour toutes ces raisons, la République portugaise est d'avis que la
Cour devrait rejeter la demande en indication de mesures conserva-
toires présentéepar la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie»;
15. Considérant que la Cour est profondément préoccupéepar le
drame humain, les pertes en vieshumaines et les terribles souffrances que
connaît le Kosovo et qui constituent la toile de fond du présentdifférend,
ainsi que par les victimes et les souffrances humaines que l'on déplore de
façon continue dans l'ensemble de la Yougoslavie;
16. Considérant que la Cour est fortement préoccupéepar l'emploi de
la force en Yougoslavie; que, dans les circonstances actuelles, cet emploi
soulève des problèmes très gravesde droit international; - Article IX of the Genocide Convention - another ground for
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claim - is not, clearly,
applicable to the facts referred.
- In the unlikely event the International Court of Justice would
consider to have jurisdiction, it should take into consideration
that, underlying the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's request,
there is a situation of abuse of process since the declaration of
optional clause acceptance was delivered just a few days before
the action was filed in the International Court of Justice.
- Undoubtedly, there is also abuse of process when the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia comes before the International Court of
Justice in orcler to pursue an objective clearly rejected by the
United Nations Security Council, competent organ in the United
Nations system, ratione materiae.
- If, hypothetically, the International Court of Justice would decide
it has prima faciejurisdiction and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia'srequeistdid not constitute an abuse of process, even then,
there would riot be the requirements to indicate the provisional
measures - as there are no rights based either in the Genocide
Convention or in other international instruments that, in this
context, are in jeopardy, and as the interruption of NATO's
effort puts in danger rights that must prevail over others that
eventually may be affected by that intervention.
- An eventual indication of such measures, if restricted to a reduced
number of States, due to their position vis-à-vis the optional
clause, woultl have no significant effect under the prevailing
circumstances.
- Furthermore. that eventual indication does not contribute, or
seems not to contribute, to a constructive approach to the reso-
lution of the legal dispute.
Having said so, the Portuguese Republic is of the view that the
Court should reject the request for indication of provisional meas-
ures formulated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life
and human suffering in al1parts of Yugoslavia;
16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force
in Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises
very serious issues of international law;664 LICEITÉ DE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
17. Considérant que la Cour garde présents à l'esprit les buts et les
principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi que les responsabilités qui
lui incombent, en vertu de ladite Charte et du Statut de la Cour, dans le
maintien de la paix et de la sécurité;
18. Considérant que la Cour estime nécessairede souligner que toutes
lesparties qui se présentent devant elledoivent agir conformément àleurs
obligations en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies et des autres règles
du droit international,y compris du droit humanitaire;
19. Considérant qu'en vertu de son Statut la Cour n'a pas automati-
quement compétence pour connaître des différendsjuridiques entre les
Etats parties audit Statut ou entre les autres Etats qui ont étéadmis a
ester devant elle; que la Cour a déclaréà maintes reprises «que l'un des
principes fondamentaux de son Statut est qu'elle ne peut trancher un dif-
férendentre des Etats sans que ceux-ci aient consenti à sa juridiction))
(Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie), arrêt,C.I.J. Recuei1995, p. 101,
par. 26); et que la Cour ne peut donc exercer sa compétence à l'égard
d'Etats partiesà un différendque si ces derniers ont non seulement accès
à la Cour, mais ont en outre acceptésa compétence, soitd'une manière
générale, soitpour le différendparticulier dont il s'agit;
20. Considérant que, en présence d'une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires, point n'est besoinpour la Cour, avant de décider
d'indiquer ou non de telles mesures, de s'assurer de manière définitive
qu'elle a compétencequant au fond de l'affaire, mais qu'elle ne peut indi-
quer ces mesures que si les dispositions invoquéespar le demandeur sem-
blent prima fucie constituer une base sur laquelle la compétence de la
Cour pourrait êtrefondée;
21. Considérant que la Yougoslavie, dans sa requête,prétenden pre-
mier lieu fonder la compétencede la Cour sur le paragraphe 2 de l'ar-
ticle 36 du Statut; que chacune des deux Parties a fait une déclaration
reconnaissant la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour en vertu de cette dis-
position; que la déclaration de la Yougoslavie a été déposéaeuprès du
Secrétaire générad le l'organisation des Nations Unies le 26 avril 1999,
et celle du Portugal le 19décembre 1955;
22. Considérant que la déclaration dela Yougoslavie est ainsi conçue:
[Traduction du Grelfe]
«Je déclarepar la présente quele Gouvernement de la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'ar-
ticle 36 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, reconnaît
commeobligatoire de plein droit et sans convention spéciale,l'égard
de tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation, c'est-à-dire sous
condition de réciprocité,lajuridiction de la Cour pour tous lesiffé- 17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the main-
tenance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statute of the
Court;
18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that al1parties
appearing before it miist act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, includ-
ing humanitarian law;
19. Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have
jurisdiction over legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or
between other States to whom access to the Court has been granted;
whereas the Court has repeatedly stated "that one of the fundamental
principles of itsStatute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of' those States to itsjurisdiction" (East Timor (Por-
tugal v. Australiu), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101,para. 26); and
whereas the Court can therefore exercisejurisdiction only between States
parties to a dispute who not only have access to the Court but also have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for the
individual dispute concerned;
20. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court might
be established;
21. Whereas in its ~ipplication Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute; whereas each of the two Parties has made a declaration recog-
niziiig the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to that provi-
sion; whereas Yugosl;ivia'sdeclaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on 26 April 1999,and that of Portugal on
19 Ilecember 1955;
22. Whereas Yugoslavia's declaration is formulated as follows:
"1hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro-
city, thejurisdiction of the said Court in al1disputes arising or which rends, surgissant ou pouvant surgir après la signature de la présente
déclaration, qui ont trait des situations ou à des faits postérieurà
ladite signatureà l'exceptiondesaffairespour lesquelleslesparties ont
convenu ou conviendront d'avoir recours à une autre procédureou a
une autre méthode de règlement pacifique. La présentedéclaration
ne s'applique pas aux différends relatifs des questions qui, en vertu
du droit international, relèvent exclusivement de lacompétencedela
République fédéralede Yougoslavie, ni aux différendsterritoriaux.
L'obligation susmentionnée n'est acceptéeque pour une période
qui durera jusqu'à notification de l'intention d'y mettre fin»;
et que la déclaration du Portugal se lit comme suit:
«En vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour
internationale de Justice, je déclare,au nom du Gouvernement por-
tugais, que le Portugal reconnaît comme obligatoire, de plein droit et
sans convention spéciale, lajuridiction de la Cour, conformément
audit paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 et dans les conditions énoncées
ci-après:
1) La présente déclaration s'applique aux différends nésd'événe-
ments survenus avant ou après la déclarationd'acceptation de la
((disposition facultative» que le Portugal a faite le 16 décembre
1920,en tant que partie au Statutde la Cour permanente de Jus-
tice internationale;
2) La présentedéclaration entre en vigueur a la date de son dépôt
auprèsdu Secrétaire généra dle l'organisation des Nations Unies;
elle demeurera en vigueur pendant un an et, par la suite, jusqu'à
ce qu'une notification de dénonciation soit adresséeau Secrétaire
général ;
3) LeGouvernement portugais seréserveledroit d'excluredu champ
d'application de la présentedéclaration, à tout moment au cours
de sa validité, uneou plusieurs catégories déterminéed se diffé-
rends, en adressant au Secrétairegénéralde l'organisation des
Nations Unies une notification qui prendra effet à la date où elle
aura étédonnée»;
23. Considérant que le Portugal fait valoir que la compétence de la
Cour ne saurait être fondéesur le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut
de la Cour en l'espèce; qu'il exposeque la déclarationyougoslave d'accep-
tation de la juridiction de la Cour ((indique clairement que celle-ci ne
vaut que pour les différends((surgissant après la signature de la présente
déclaration»»; qu'il ajoute, en se référant à la définitiond'un différend
donnéedans l'affaire Mavrommatis, que le ((différendqui fait l'objet de
la présenteprocédure a surgi bien avant le 25 avril 1999 (ou le 26 avril
1999 ...»; et qu'il en conclut que «le différend qui est à la base de la may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The
present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions
which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial
disputes.
The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may
be given to terminate the acceptance";
and whereas the declaration of Portugal reads as follows:
"Under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, 1 declare on behalf of the Portuguese Government
that Portugal recognizes the jurisdiction of this Court as compulsory
ipso,facto and without special agreement, as provided for in the said
paragraph 2 of Article 36 and under the following conditions:
(1) the present declaration covers disputes arising out of events both
prior and subsequent to the declaration of acceptance of the
"optional clause"which Portugal made on 16December 1920as
a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice;
(2) the present declaration enters into force at the moment it is
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; it
shall be valid for a period of one year, and thereafter until notice
of its denunciation is given to the said Secretary-General;
(3) the Portuguese Government reserves the right to exclude from
the scope of the present declaration, at any time during its valid-
ity, any given category or categories of disputes, by notifying the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and with effect from
the moment of such notification";
23. Whereas Portugal contends that the jurisdiction of the Court can-
not be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in
this case; whereas it argues that Yugoslavia's declaration of acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the Court "states clearly that it applies only to dis-
putes 'arising after the signature of the present declaration"'; whereas
Portugal adds, referring to the definition of a dispute given in the Muv-
rommatis case, that the "dispute object of the current procedure has
arisen well before 25 April 1999 (or 26 April 1999 . . .)";and whereas
Portugal accordingly concludes that "the dispute which underlies the666 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires n'est pas couvert
par la déclaration au titre de la clause facultative))faite par la Yougo-
--..i- >
24. Considérant que, selon la Yougoslavie, «le problème poséici à la
Cour est d'interpréterune déclaration unilatérale d'acceptation de sa juri-
diction, et don; de dégagerle sens de cette déclaration sur la base de
l'intention de son auteur)); considérantque la Yougoslavie soutient que le
texte de sa déclaration ((permet de prendre en compte tous les différends
qui ont effectivementsurgi postérieurementau 25 avril 1999));que, se réfé-
rant à des bombardements effectuéspar les Etats membres de l'OTAN les
28 avril, 1" mai, 7 mai et 8 mai 1999, la Yougoslavie fait valoir que,
«[d]ans chacun de ces cas, qui ne sont que des exemplesparmi d'autres)),
elle a ((dénoncéles violations flagrantes du droit international dont elle
estimeavoirétéla victime))et les ((Etatsmembres de l'OTAN ont niéavoir
violéune quelconque obligation de droit international)); que la Yougosla-
vie affirme que «chacun de cesévénements a donc donnélieu à un ((désac-
cord sur un point de droit ou de fait)), désaccorddont ...lestermes dépen-
dent à chaque fois des spécificitésde l'attaque)) concernée; qu'elle en
déduit que,ces événementsconstituant des «délitsinstantanés)),il existe
((quantitéde différends distinctsqui ont surgi))entre les Parties ((aprèsle
25 avril concernant des événements postérieurs à cette date)); et qu'elleen
conclut qu'«il n'existeaucune raison d'écarter,primafacie, la compétence
de la Cour pour traiter des différendseffectivement survenus après le
25 avril, conformémentau texte ...de la déclaration));et considérantque
la Yougoslavie ajoute qu'exclurecesdifférendsde lajuridiction de la Cour
«serait en totale contradiction avec l'intention manifeste et claire de la
Yougoslavie))de confier a la Cour le règlementdesdits différends;
25. Considérant que la Yougoslavie n'a accepté la juridiction de la
Cour ratione temporis que pour ce qui est d'une part des différendssur-
gissant ou pouvant surgir après la signature de sa déclarationet d'autre
part de ceux qui concerneraient des situations ou des faits postérieurs à
ladite signature (cf. Droit de passage sur territoire indien,fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 34); qu'aux fins d'apprécierla compétencede la
Cour en l'espèce,il suffit de déterminer si,conformément au texte de la
déclaration,le différendporté devant la Cour a ((surgi ))avant ou aprèsle
25 avril 1999,date a laquelle ladite déclaration a été signée;
26. Considérantque la requêtede la Yougoslavie est intitulée ((Requête
de la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie contre le Portugal pour viola-
tion de l'obligation de ne pas recourir a l'emploi de la force));que, dans
la requête, l'«objet du différend))(les italiques sont de la Cour) est décrit
en termes généraux (voirparagraphe 1ci-dessus); mais qu'il ressort tant
de l'exposédes «faits sur lesquels les demandes sont fondées))que de la
formulation de ces «demandes» elles-mêmes(voir paragraphes 3 et 4 ci-
dessus) que la requêteest dirigée,dans son essence, contre les «bombar-
dements du territoire de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie», aux-
quels il est demandé à la Cour de mettre un terme;
27. Considérant qu'il est constant que les bombardements en causerequest for the indication of provisional measures is not covered by the
optional clause declaration" made by Yugoslavia;
24. Whereas, according to Yugoslavia, "[tlhe issue before the Court is
that of interpreting a iinilateral declaration of acceptance of its jurisdic-
tion, and thus of ascertaining the meaning of the declaration on the basis
of the intention ofits author"; whereas Yugoslavia contends that the text
of its declaration "allows al1 disputes effectively arising after 25 April
1999 to be taken into account"; whereas, referring to bombing attacks
carried out by NATO member States on 28 April, 1 May, 7 May and
8 May 1999, Yugoslavia states that, "[iln each of these cases, which are
only examples, [it]denounced the flagrant violations of international law
of which it considered itself to have been the victim", and the "NATO
member States denied having violated any obligation under international
law"; whereas Yugoslavia asserts that "each of these events therefore
gave rise to 'adisagreement on a point of law or fact', a disagreement . ..
the terms of which depend in each case on the specific features of the
attack" in question; whereas Yugoslavia accordingly concludes that,
since these events constitute "instantaneous wrongful acts", there exist "a
number of separate disputes which have arisen" between the Parties
"since 25 April relating to events subsequent to that date"; and whereas
Yugoslavia argues from this that "[tlhere is no reason to exclude prima
facie the Court's jurisdiction over disputes having effectively arisen after
25 April, as provided in the text of the declaration"; and whereas Yugo-
slavia adds that to exclude such disputes from the jurisdiction of the
Court "would run entirely counter to the manifest and clear intention of
Yugoslavia" to entrust the Court with the resolution of those disputes;
25. Whereas Yugoslavia has accepted the Court's jurisdiction rutione
temporis in respect only, on the one hand, of disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of its declaration and, on the other hand, of
those concerning situations or facts subsequent to that signature (cf.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1960, p. 34); whereas, in order to assess whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion in the case, itis sufficient to decide whether, in terms of the text of
the declaration, the dispute brought before the Court "arose" before or
after 25 April 1999,the date on which the declaration was signed;
26. Whereas Yugoslavia's Application is entitled "Application of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Portugal for Violation of the
Obligation Not to Use Force"; whereas in the Application the "subject of
the dispute" (emphasis added) is described in general terms (see para-
graph 1 above); but whereas it can be seen both from the statement of
"facts upon which the claim is based" and from the manner in which the
"claims" themselves are formulated (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above) that
the Application is directed, in essence, against the "bombing of the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" which the Court is
req~iestedto bring to an end;
27. Whereas it is an established fact that the bombings in question667 LICEITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)
ont commencéle 24 mars 1999et se sont poursuivis, de façon continue,
au-delà du 25 avril 1999;et qu'il nefait pas de doute pour la Cour, au vu
notamment des débats du Conseil de sécurité des24 et 26 mars 1999
(SlPV.3988et 3989).qu'un ((différendd'ordre juridique)) (Timor oriental
(Portugal c. Australie), C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 100, par. 22) a «surgi»
entre la Yougoslavie et 1'Etat défendeur, comme avec les autres Etats
membres de l'OTAN, bien avant le 25 avril 1999,au sujet de la licéitde
ces bombardements comme tels, pris dans leur ensemble;
28. Considérant que la circonstance que ces bombardements se soient
poursuivis aprèsle 25 avril 1999et que le différendlesconcernant ait per-
sistédepuis lors n'est pas de natureà modifier la dateà laquelle le diffé-
rend avait surgi; que des différendsdistincts n'ont pu naître par la suite
l'occasion de chaque attaque aérienne;et qu'à ce stade de la procédure,
la Yougoslavie n'établit pasque des différendsnouveaux, distincts du dif-
férendinitial, aient surgi entre lesParties aprèsle 25 avril 1999au sujet de
situations ou de faits postérieurs imputables au Portugal;
29. Considérant que, comme la Cour l'a rappelé dans son arrêtdu
4 décembre 1998 en l'affaire de la Compétenceen matière de pecheries
(Espugne c. Canada),
«11appartient à chaque Etat, lorsqu'il formule sa déclaration, de
décider des limites qu'il assigneson acceptation de lajuridiction de
la Cour: «la juridiction n'existe que dans les termes où elle a été
acceptée)) (Phosphates du Maroc, urret, 1938, C.P.J.I. sérieAIB
no 74,p. 23)))(C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 453, par. 44);
et que, comme la Cour permanente l'a relevédans son arrêtdu 14juin
1938 dans l'affaire des Phosphates du Maroc (exceptions préliminaires),
«il est reconnu que, par l'effet de la condition de réciprocité inscriteau
paragraphe 2 de I'article 36 du Statut de la Cour)), toute limitation
rationr temporis apportée par l'unedes partiesà sa déclaration d'accepta-
tion de la juridiction de la Courfait droit entre les parties)) (Phosphates
du Maroc, arrêt, 1938, C. P.J.I. sérieAIB no 74, p. 22); et considérant
qu'il découlede ce qui précèdeque les déclarations faites par les Parties
conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut ne constituent
pas une base sur laquelle la compétence dela Cour pourrait prima furie
être fondée dans le cas d'espèce;
30. Considérant que le Portugal soutient aussi que la compétencedela
Cour en l'espèce nesaurait être fondée surle paragraphe 2 de l'article 36
du Statut eu égard aux résolutions777 (1992), en date du 19septembre
1992,et 821 (1993), en date du 28 avril 1993,du Conseil de sécurité des
Nations Unies, ainsi qu'aux résolutions4711,en date du 22 septembre
1992,et 48188,en date du 20 décembre1993,de l'Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies; qu'il fait valoiràce propos que ((la Républiquefédéralebegan on 24 March 1999and have been conducted continuously over a
period extending beyond 25 April 1999; and whereas the Court has no
doubt, in the light, inter alia, of the discussions at the Security Council
meetings of 24 and 26 March 1999 (SlPV.3988 and 3989), that a "legal
dispute" (East Timor (Portugal v. Australiu), 1.C.J. Reports 1995,p. 100,
para. 22) "arose" between Yugoslavia and the Respondent, as it did also
with the other NATO inember States, well before 25 April 1999concern-
ing the legality ofthose bombings as such, taken as a whole;
28. Whereas the fact that the bombings have continued after 25 April
1999and that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is
not such as to alter the date on which the dispute arose; whereas each
individual air attack could not have given rise to a separate subsequent
dispute; and whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, Yugoslavia has
not established that riew disputes, distinct from the initial one, have
arisen between the Parties since 25 April 1999 in respect of subsequent
situations or facts attrrbutable to Portugal;
29. Whereas, as the Court recalled in its Judgment of 4 December
1998 in the case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada),
"It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon
the limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court: '[tlhisjurisdiction only exists within the limits within which
it has been accepted' (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938.
P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74, p. 23)" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453,
para. 44);
and whereas, as the Permanent Court held in its Judgment of 14 June
1938 in the Phosphates in Morocco case (Preliminary Objections), "it is
recognized that, as a consequence of the condition of reciprocity stipu-
lated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court", any limi-
tation ratione tempo ri.attached by one of the Parties to its declaration of
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction "holds good as between the Parties"
(Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment. 1938. P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74,
p. 10); and whereas it follows from the foregoing that the declarations
made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not
constitute a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court could prima facie
be founded in this case;
30. Whereas Portugal also contends that in this case the jurisdiction of
the Court cannot be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
having regard to United Nations Security Council resolutions 777 (1992)
of 19 September 1992 and 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993 and to United
Nations General Assembly resolutions 4711of 22 September 1992 and
48185of 20 December 1993; whereas it argues in this connection that
"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a United Nations member"668 LICÉITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
de Yougoslavie n'est pas membre de l'organisation des Nations Unies))
et,à défautd'avoir ((renouveléson adhésion à l'organisation des Nations
Unies)), n'est par suite pas partie au Statut de la Cour;
31. Considérant que la Yougoslavie, se référant à la position du Secré-
tariat, telle qu'expriméedans une lettre en date du 29 septembre 1992du
conseiller juridique de l'organisation(doc. Al47/485), ainsi qu'à la pra-
tique ultérieurede celle-ci, soutient pour sa part que la résolution 4711
de l'Assembléegénérale n'a «pas [mis]fin à l'appartenance de la Yougo-
slavieà l'organisation et ne [l'apas suspendue] non plus)), ladite résolu-
tion n'ôtant pas à la Yougoslavie «le droit de participer aux travaux
d'organes autres que ceux qui relèventde l'Assembléegénérale));
32. Considérant que, eu égard à la conclusion à laquelle elle est
parvenue au paragraphe 29 ci-dessus, la Cour n'a pas à examiner cette
question à l'effet de décidersi elle peut ou non indiquer des mesures
conservatoires dans le cas d'espèce;
33. Considérantque la Yougoslavie, dans sa requête, prétend en second
lieu fonder la compétencede la Cour sur l'articleIX de la convention sur
le génocide,aux termes duquel:
«Les différendsentre les Parties contractantes relatifà I'interpré-
tation, l'application ou l'exécutionde la présenteconvention, y com-
pris ceux relatifsla responsabilitéd'un Etat en matiérede génocide
ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énuméré s l'article III, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice,à la requêted'une partie
au différend»;
et considérant que, dans sa requête,la Yougoslavie indiqueque l'objet du
différendporte notamment sur «les actes commis par le Portugal, en vio-
lation de son obligation internationale...de ne pas soumettre intention-
nellement un groupe national à des conditions d'existence devant entraî-
ner sa destruction physique)); qu'en décrivantles faits sur lesquels la
requête est fondéel,a Yougoslavie précise: ((Les actes susmentionnésont
pour effet de soumettre intentionnellement un groupe ethnique à des
conditions devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle));
qu'en exposant les fondements juridiques de la requête,elle soutient que
((l'obligation...de ne pas soumettre intentionnellement un groupe natio-
nal à des conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique
a étéviolée)); et que l'une des demandes au fond contenues dans la
requêteest ainsi formulée:
((qu'en prenant part aux activités énumérée csi-dessus et en particu-
lier en causant des dommages énormes à l'environnement et en uti-
lisant de l'uranium appauvri, le Portugal a agi contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de ne pas
soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national à des conditions
d'existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou par-
tielle:and that, having failed to "renew its United Nations membership", it is in
consequence not a party to the Statute of the Court;
31. Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat, as
expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992from the Legal Counsel of
the Organization (doc. A/471485),and to the latter's subsequent practice,
contends for its part that General Assembly resolution 4711"[neither] ter-
minate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia's membership in the Organiza-
tion", and that the said resolution did not take away from Yugoslavia
"[its] right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly
bodies" ;
32. Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 29 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;
33. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the second place,
to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article IX of the Genocide
Convention, which provides :
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute";
and whereas in its Application Yugoslavia states that the subject of the
dispute concerns inter uliu "acts of Portugal by which it has violated its
international obligation . .. not to deliberately inflict conditions of life
calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group"; whereas,
in describing the f'actson which the Application is based, Yugoslavia
states: "The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions
calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in
part"; whereas, in its statement of the legal grounds on which the Appli-
cation is based, Yugoslavia contends that "the obligation . . . not to
impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of the group has been breached";
and whereas one of the claims on the merits set out in the Application is
forniulated as follows :
"by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by caus-
ing enormous erivironmental damage and by using depleted ura-
nium, Portugal has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part";669 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)
34. Considérant que la Yougoslavie soutient en outre que le bombar-
dement constant et intensif de l'ensemble de son territoire, y compris les
zones les plus peuplées,constitue «une violation grave de I'article IIde la
convention sur le génocide));qu'elle faitvaloir que «la pollution du sol,
de l'air etde l'eau, la destruction de l'économiedu pays, la contamination
de I'environnement par de l'uranium appauvri reviennent à soumettre la
nation yougoslave à des conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa des-
truction physique)); qu'elle affirmeque c'est la nation yougoslave tout
entière, en tant que telle, qui est prise pour cible; et qu'elle souligne que
le recoursà certaines armes. dont on connaît Daravance lesconséauences
dommageables à long terme sur la santé et I'environnement, ou la des-
truction de la plus grande partie du réseaud'alimentation en électricité
du pays, dont on peut prévoir d'avancelesconséquencescatastrophiques,
«témoigne[nt]implicitement de l'intention de détruire totalement ou par-
tiellement)) legroupe national yougoslave en tant que tel;
35. Considérant que le Portugal soutient pour sa part que l'article IX
de la convention sur le génocide«ne fournit une base de compétenceque
pour les différendsconcernant l'interprétation, l'applicationou I'exécu-
tion de ladite convention)); que la Yougoslavie «n'a pas prouvéqu'il y
ait eu une quelconque violation ou menace de violation de la convention
sur le génocide));que ((l'intention spécifiquequi est nécessairepour que
[I]ecrime [de génocide] existeest absente en l'espèce));que les actes aux-
quels le Portugal aurait pris part «ne répondent pas, à l'évidence, à la
commission d'un crime qui suppose un effort de sélectionquant au choix
des victimes,encontradiction avec l'effetaléatoiredes moyensemployés));
et que dèslors «les élémentstant objectif que subjectif du crime de géno-
cide font défaut,et ..il n'existe..pas la moindre base pour plaider vala-
blement l'existencede faits relevant de la convention sur le génocidequi
seraient imputables à la Républiqueportugaise...»; et considérantque le
Portugal en conclut que l'articleIX dela convention sur le génocide«ne
fournit pas ...une base de compétenceprimu facien;
36. Considérant que, pour que I'article IX de la convention puisse
constituer une base sur laquelle la compétencede la Cour pourrait être
fondée ratione muteriae, il échet que l'objet du différend ait trait à
((l'interprétation,l'application ou l'exécutio))de la convention, y com-
pris les différends ((relatifs la responsabilité d'un Etat en matière de
génocideou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énuméré às I'article III))
de ladite convention;
37. Considérant que, il'effet d'établir,mêmeprimu facie, si un diffé-
rend au sens de I'article IX de la convention sur le génocide existe,la
Cour ne peut se borner à constater que l'une des parties soutient que la
convention s'applique alors que l'autre le nie; et que, au cas particulier,
elledoit rechercher si lesviolations de la convention alléguéepar la You-
goslavie sont susceptibles d'entrer dans lesprévisionsde cet instrument et
si, par suite, le différend estde ceux dont la Cour pourrait avoir compé-
tence pour connaître ratione tnateriue par application de I'article IX
(cf. Plutes-formes pétroliéres(Républiqueislamique d'Iran c. Etuts- Unis 34. Whereas Yugoslavia contends moreover that the sustained and
intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily
populated areas, constitutes "a serious violation of Article II of the
Genocide Convention"; whereas it argues that "the pollution of soil, air
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the
environment with depleted uranium, inflicts conditions of life on the
Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction";
whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such
that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already
known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country's power
supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent
must be aware, "impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part", the
Yugoslav national group as such;
35. Whereas for its part Portugal contends that Article IX of the
Genocide Convention "provides a basis for jurisdiction only in respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of that
Convention"; that Yugoslavia "has failed to prove any breach of the
Genocide Convention, actual or threatened"; that "the specific intent
which is necessary for the crime [of genocidel's existence is absent in the
case"; that the actions in which Portugal allegedly took part "are clearly
inadequate to the corrimitment of a crime that would require a selective
effort in the choice of victims, incompatible with the contingent effect of
the employed means"; and that in consequence "both the objective and
subjective elements of the crime are missing, and so there is not theslight-
est basis for claiming successfullythe existence offacts relevant under the
Genocide Convention attributable to the Portuguese Republic"; and
whereas Portugal accordingly concludes that Article IX of the Genocide
Convention "[does not] provide a prima facie basis for jurisdiction";
36. Whereas, in order for Article IX of the Convention to be capable
of constituting a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded ratione materiue, the subject-matter of the dispute must relate to
"the interpretation, application or fulfilment" of the Convention, includ-
ing disputes "relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide or for
any of the other acts enumerated in article III" of the said Convention;
37. Whereas, in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dis-
pute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists,
the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains
that the Convention applies, while the other denies it; and whereas in the
present case the Court must ascertain whether the breaches of the Con-
vention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions
of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one
which the Court has jurisdiction ratione rnateriae to entertain pursuant
to Article IX (cf. Oill'latforms (Islamic Repuhlic of Iran v.United States670 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)
d'Amérique), exception préliminaire, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II),
p. 810, par. 16);
38. Considérant que la définitiondu génocide,figurant àl'article II de
la convention sur le génocide,se lit comme suit:
«Dans la présenteconvention le génocides'entend de l'un quel-
conque des actes ci-après, commis dans l'intention de détruire, en
tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux,
comme tel :
a) meurtre de membres du groupe;
b) atteinte grave à l'intégritéphysique ou mentale de membres du
groupe ;
C) soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d'existence
devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;
d) mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;
e) transfert forcéd'enfants du groupe à un autre groupe));
39. Considérantqu'il apparaît à la Cour, d'aprèscette définition,«que
la caractéristique essentielle du génocideest la destruction intentionnelle
d'un «groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux>>»(Application de lu
convention pour lapréventionet la répressiondu crime de génocide,me-
sures conservatoires, ordonnance du 13 septembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil
1993, p. 345, par. 42); que le recours ou la menace du recoursà l'emploi
de la force contre un Etat ne sauraient en soi constituer un acte de géno-
cide au sens de l'articleII de la convention sur le génocide;et que, de
l'avis de la Cour, il n'apparaît pas au présentstade de la procédureque
les bombardements qui constituent l'objet de la requête yougoslave
«comporte[nt] effectivement l'élémentd'intentionnalité, dirigé contre
un groupe comme tel, que requiert la disposition sus-citée)) (Licéitéde
la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires, avis consultutiJ; C.I.J.
Recueil 1996 (I), p. 240, par. 26);
40. Considérant aue la Cour n'est dès lorswasen mesure de conclure.
à ce stade de la procédure, que les actes que la Yougoslavie impute au
défendeur seraientsusce~tiblesd'entrer dans les révisionsde la conven-
tion sur le génocide; etque l'articleX de la convention, invoqué par la
Yougoslavie, ne constitue partant pas une base sur laquelle la compé-
tence de la Cour pourrait primu facie être fondéedans le cas d'espèce;
41. Considérant que le Portugal fait aussi valoir que, a la date à
laquelle la Yougoslavie a déposé sa requête à, savoir le 29 avril 1999,il
((n'étaitpas partieàla convention sur le génocide - bien que son instru-
ment d'adhésionait déjà été déposé a l'organisation des Nations Unies));
et considérant qu'en réponse à une question posée par un membre
de la Cour à l'audience. l'agent du Portugal a produit une note ver-
bale, en date du 16 février 1999, par laquelle le Secrétairegénéralde
l'organisation des Nations Unies a indiqué que, conformémentau para-of Arnerica), Preliminury Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 810, para. 16);
38. Whereas the definition of genocide set out in Article II of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:
"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
actscommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(u) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group ;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group";
39. Whereas it appears to the Court, from this definition, "that the
essential characteristic: of genocide is the intended destruction of 'a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group'" (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention und Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provi-
sionul Measures, Order of 13 Septemher 1993, 1. C.J. Reports 1993,
p. 345, para. 42); whereas the threat or use of force against a State can-
not in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II
of the Genocide Convention;and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings
which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application "indeed entail the
element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above" (Legulity of the Threat or Use of'Nucleur Weapons, Advi-
sory Opitziorz,1.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26);
40. Whereas the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this
stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the
Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by
Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case;
41. Whereas Portugal further contends that at the date on which
Yugoslavia filed its Application, namely 29 April 1999, Portugal "was
not party to the Genocide Convention - although its instrument of
accession had already been deposited in the United Nations"; and
whereas, in reply to a question from a Member of the Court at the hear-
ings, the Agent of Portugal produced a Note Verbale, dated 16 February
1999, in which the United Nations Secretary-General stated that, pursu-
ant to Article XIlI, third paragraph, of the Convention, the latter would671 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
graphe 3 de l'article XII1 de la convention, celle-ci entrerait en vigueur,
pour le Portugal, le 10mai 1999,soit le quatre-vingt-dixièmejour suivant
le dépôtde son instrument d'adhésion;
42. Considérant que la Yougoslavie, dans sa réponse écrite à la ques-
tion susmentionnée, a invoquépour sa part «le principe bien établidans
la pratique de la Cour suivant lequel la Cour ne doit pas sanctionner un
défaut qui affecterait un acte de procédure et auquel le demandeur pour-
rait aisémentporter remède));
43. Considérant que, eu égard à la conclusion à laquelle elle est par-
venue au paragraphe 40 ci-dessus, point n'est besoinpour la Cour d'exa-
miner cette question aux fins de déterminer si elle peut ou non indiquer
des mesures conservatoires dans le cas d'espèce;
44. Considérant qu'il résultede ce qui précèdeque la Cour n'a pas
prima facie compétencepour connaître de la requête dela Yougoslavie;
et qu'elle ne saurait dèslors indiquer quelque mesure conservatoire que
ce soità l'effet de protéger les droits qui y sont invoqués;
45. Considérant toutefois que les conclusions auxquelles la Cour est
parvenue en la présenteprocédurene préjugent enrien la compétence de
la Cour pour connaître du fond de l'affaire, ni aucune question relative
la recevabilitéde la requêteou au fond lui-même,et qu'elles laissent
intact le droit du Gouvernement yougoslave et du Gouvernement portu-
gais de faire valoir leurs moyens en la matière;
46. Considérantqu'il existe unedistinction fondamentale entre la ques-
tion de l'acceptation par un Etat de la juridiction de la Cour et la com-
patibilité de certains actes avec le droit international; la compétenceexige
le consentement; la compatibilité ne peut êtreappréciéeque quand la
Cour examine le fond, après avoir établisa compétence etentendu les
deux parties faire pleinement valoir leurs moyens en droit;
47. Considérant que les Etats, qu'ils acceptent ou non la juridiction
de la Cour, demeurent en tout état de cause responsables des actes
contraires au droit international, y compris au droit humanitaire,
qui leur seraient imputables; que tout différend relatià la licéide tels
actes doit êtreréglépar des moyens pacifiques dont le choix est laissé
aux parties conformément à l'article 33 de la Charte;
48. Considérant que dans ce cadre les parties doivent veillerà ne pas
aggraver ni étendrele différend;
49. Considérant que, lorsqu'un tel différend suscite une menacecontre
la paix, une rupture de la paix ou un acte d'agression, le Conseil de sécu-
ritéest investi de responsabilités spéciales en vertudu chapitreI1de la
Charte; LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 671
enter into force for Portugal on 10May 1999,that is, on the ninetieth day
following deposit of it:;instrument of accession ;
42. Whereas Yugoslavia, in its written reply to the above question,
invoked for its part "the principle well established by the practice of the
Court according to which the Court should not penalize a defect in a pro-
cedural act which the Applicant could easily remedy";
43. Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 40 above, there is no
need for the Court to consider this question for the purpose of deciding
whether or not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;
44. Whereas it follows from what has been said above that the Court
lacks prima faciejurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's Application; and
whereas it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever
in order to protect the rights invoked therein;
45. Whereas, however, the findings reached by the Court in the present
proceedings in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the
admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and
whereas they leave unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugosla-
via and Portugal to submit arguments in respect of those questions;
46. Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question
of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compat-
ibility of particular acts with international law: the former requires con-
sent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with
the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full
legal arguments by both parties;
47. Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the
Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them
that violate international law, including humanitarian law; whereas any
disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved
by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the
Charter, is left to the parties;
48. Whereas in this context the parties should take care not to aggra-
vate or extend the dispute;
49. Whereas, when such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special
responsibilitiesunder Chapter VI1of the Charter; 50. Par ces motifs,
1)Par onze voix contre quatre,
Rejette la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée
par la République fédéralede Yougoslavie le 29 avril 1999;
POURM : . Schwebel,président delu Cour; MM. Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma,Mn" Higgins. MM. Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,juges;
CONTRE M: . Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonctionde président en
l'affaire;. Shi, Vereshchetin,juges; M. Kreka,juge ad hoc;
2) Par quatorze voix contre une,
Réserve la suite de la procédure.
POUR:M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en
I'aj~aire;M. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour; MM. Bedjaoui, Guillaume,
Ranjeva, Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,MmeHiggins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,juges; M. KreEa,juge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Oda,juge.
Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix,à La Haye, le deux juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-neuf, en
trois exemplaires, dont'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie et au Gouvernement de la République
portugaise.
Le vice-président,
(Signé) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.
M. KOROMAju , ge, joint une déclaration à l'ordonnance.
M. ODA, MmC HIGGINS,et MM. PARRA-ARANGURE etNKOOIJMANS,
juges, joignent a l'ordonnance les exposésde leur opinion individuelle.
20 50. For these reasons,
(1) By eleven votes to four,
Rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submit-
ted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999;
IN FAVOUR :President Schwebel;Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans;
AC~AINS Vic:e-PresidenrWeeramantry, Acting Presiden;Judges Shi,Veresh-
chetin; Judge ad hoc Kreca;
(2) By fourteen votes to one,
Rrserves the subsequent procedure for further decision
IN FAVOUR:Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans ;Judge ad hoc Kreta :
AGAINSJ Tu:dge Oda.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Federal Rep~iblic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the
Portuguese Republic, respectively.
(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.
[Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.
Judge KOKOMA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.
Judges ODA, HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUREaN nd KOOIJMANS append
separate opinions to the Order of the Court.
20673 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD2 VI 99)
M. WEERAMANTRvY ic,e-président, faisant fonction de président en
l'affaire,M. SHIet VERESHCHETjIuN g,es, et M. KRECAj,uge ad hoc,
joignentà l'ordonnance les exposésde leur opinion dissidente.
(Paraphé) C.G.W.
(Paraphé) E.V.O. Vice-President WEERAMANTRA Y,ting President, Judges SHI and
VERESHCHETI an, Judge ad hoc KRECA append dissenting opinions to
theOrder of the Court.
(InitialledC.G.W
(InitialiedE.V.O.
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures
Order of 2 June 1999