Order of 2 June 1999

Document Number
106-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ

DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. CANADA)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 2JUIN 1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA vCANADA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER OF 2 JUNE 1999 Mode officiel de citation:
Licéité de l'emploi delaforce (Yougoslavie c. Canada),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnancedu 1999,
C.1.JRecueil 199p. 259

Officia1citat:on
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada),
Provisional Measures,er of 2 June 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 259

NOde vente:728 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number
ISBN 92-1-070796-6 2 JUIN 1999

ORDONNANCE

LICÉITÉDE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. CANADA)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.CANADA)

REQUEST FORTHE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL

MEASURES

2 JUNE 1999

ORDER INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1999 1999
2 June
General List
2 June1999 No. 106

CASE CONCERNING

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA v.CANADA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Presen: Vice-President WEERAMANTRA Yc,ting Presid;nPresident
SCHWEBELJ;udges ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER ,ANJEVA,
HERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER K,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUREK NO, OIJMANSJ;udges ad hoc
LALONDE, KRECAR ; egistrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,

After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 andf the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73 and 74 of thees of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the Federalblic of Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter "Yugoslavia") filed in the Registry of the Court on
29 April 1999, instituting proceedings against Canada "for violation of
the obligation not to use force", Makes the folloi.vingOrder:

1. Whereas in that Application Yugoslavia defines the subject of the
dispute as follows:
"The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of Canada by which it
has violated its international obligation banning the use of force

against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the interna1
affairs of another State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty
of another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population
and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the envi-
ronment, the obligation relating to free navigation on international
rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms, the obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the obliga-
tion not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause
the physical destruction of a national group";

2. Whereas in the said Application Yugoslavia refers, as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1948(hereinafter the "Genocide Con-
vention") ;
3. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia States that the claims sub-
mitted by it to the Court are based upon the following facts:

"The Government of Canada, together with the Governments of
other Member States of NATO, took part in the acts of use of force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by taking part in bomb-
ing targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In bombing the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military and civilian targets were
attacked. Great number of people were killed, including a great
many civilians. Residential houses came under attack. Numerous
dwellings were destroyed. Enormous damage was caused to schools,
hospitals, radio and television stations, cultural and health institu-
tions and to places of worship. A large number of bridges, roads and
railway lines were destroyed. Attacks on oil refineries and chemical
plants have had serious environmental effects on cities, towns and
villages in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The use of weapons

containing depleted uranium is having far-reaching consequences for
human life. The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating con-
ditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in
whole or in part. The Government of Canada is taking part in the
training, arming, financing, equipping and supplying the so-called
'Kosovo Liberation Amy'" ;and whereas it further Statesthat the said claims are based on the follow-
ing legal grounds:

"The above acts of the Government of Canada represent a gross
violation of the obligation not to use force against another State. By
financing, arming, training and equippingthe so-called 'Kosovo Lib-
eration Army', support is given to terrorist groups and the secession-
ist movement in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

in breach of the obligation not to intervene in the interna1 affairs of
another State. In addition, the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1949and of the Additional Protocol No. 1of 1977on the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects in time of war have been vio-
lated. The obligation to protect the environment has also been
breached. The destruction of bridges on the Danube is in contraven-
tion of the provisions of Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on free
navigation on the Danube. The provisions of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have also

been breached. Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been
breached. Furthermore, the activities in which Canada is taking part
are contrary to Article 53, paragraph 1,of the Charter of the United
Nations" ;

4. Whereas the claims of Yugoslavia are formulated as follows in the
Application :

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
- by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, Canada has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use
force against another State;
- by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and
supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called 'Kosovo Liberation
Army', Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;

- by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, Canada has acted

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;
- by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monu-
ments of culture, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any act

of hostility directed against historical monuments, works of art
or places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual herit-
agi of people;
by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, Canada has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;

by taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable envi-
ronmental damaee: ",
by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted ura-
nium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons

and not to cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;

- by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, commu-
nications, health and cultural institutions, Canada has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to
information, the right to health care as well as other basic
human rights;

- by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers,
Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on
international rivers;
- by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by
causing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted

uranium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict
on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction, in whole or in part;

- Canada is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations;

- Canada is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the above
obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

- Canada is obliged to provide compensation for the damage done
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and
juridical persons" ;

and whereas, at the end of its Application, Yugoslavia reserves the right
to amend and supplement it;
5. Whereas on 29 April 1999, immediately after filing its Application,Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provisional
measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court; and whereas that
request was accompanied by a volume of photographic annexes pro-
duced as "evidence" ;
6. Whereas, in support of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia contends inter alia that, since the onset of the
bombing of its territory, and as a result thereof, about 1,000 civilians,
including 19 children, have been killed and more than 4,500 have sus-
tained serious injuries; that the lives of three million children are endan-
gered; that hundreds of thousands of citizens have been exposed to poi-
sonous gases; that about one million citizens are short of water supply;
that about 500,000 workers have become jobless; that two million citi-
zens have no means of livelihood and are unable to ensure minimum

means of sustenance; and that the road and railway network has suffered
extensive destruction; whereas, in its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, Yugoslavia also lists the targets alleged to have come
under attack in the air strikes and describes in detail the damage alleged
to have been inflicted upon them (bridges, railway lines and stations,
roads and means of transport, airports, industry and trade, refineries and
warehouses storing liquid raw materials and chemicals, agriculture, hos-
pitals and health care centres, schools, public buildings and housing
facilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, cultural-historical monu-
ments and religious shrines); and whereas Yugoslavia concludes from
this that:

"The acts described above caused death, physical and mental
harm to the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; huge
devastation; heavy pollution of the environment, so that the Yugo-
slav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in
part" ;

7. Whereas, at the end of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia states that
"If the proposed measure were not to be adopted, there will be
new losses of human life, further physical and mental harm inflicted
on the population of the FR of Yugoslavia, further destruction of
civilian targets, heavy environmental pollution and further physical
destruction of the people of Yugoslavia";

and whereas, while reserving the right to amend and supplement its
request, Yugoslavia requests the Court to indicate the following measure:

"Canada shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall
refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia"; 8. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures was
accompanied by a letter from the Agent of Yugoslavia, addressed to the
President and Members of the Court, which read as follows:
"1have the honour to bring to the attention of the Court the latest
bombing of the central area of the town of Surdulica on 27 April
1999at noon resulting in losses of lives of civilians, most of whom

were children and women, and to remind of killings of peoples in
Kursumlija, Aleksinac and Cuprija, as well as bombing of a refugee
convoy and the Radio and Television of Serbia, just to mention
some of the well-known atrocities. Therefore, 1would liketo caution
the Court that there is a highest probability of further civilian and
military casualties.
Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requests proprio motu orto fixa datefor a hearing
at earliest possible time";

9. Whereas on 29 April 1999, the day on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar sent to the Canadian Government signed copies
of the Application and of the request, in accordance with Article 38,para-
graph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; and whereas
he also sent to that Government copies of the documents accompanying
the Application and the request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures;
10. Whereas on 29 April 1999the Registrar informed the Parties that
the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, to hold hearings on 10and 11May 1999,where they would be

able to present their observationson the request for the indication ofpro-
visional measures;
11. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by transmittal of the
printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of the United
Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court, the Regis-
trar on 29 April 1999informed those States of the filing of the Applica-
tion and of its subject-matter, and of the filing of the request for the
indication of provisional measures;
12. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of
Yugoslav nationality, the Yugoslav Government has availed itself of the
provisions of Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr.
Milenko KreCa to sit as judge ad hoc in the case; and whereas no objec-
tion to that choice was raised within the time-limit fixed for thepurpose
pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court; whereas,
since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of Canadian national-
ity, the Canadian Government has availed itself of the provisions ofArticle 31of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr. Marc Lalonde to sit
as judge ad hoc in the case; whereas, within the time-limit fixed for the
purpose pursuant to Article 35,paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, Yugo-
slavia, referring to Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute, objected to
that choice; and whereas the Court, after due deliberation, found that the
nomination of a judge ud hoc by Canada was justified in the present
phase of the case;
13. Whereas, at the public hearings held between 10and 12May 1999,
oral observations on the request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures were presented by the following:

Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Agent,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Paul J.1. M. de Waart,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Miodrag MitiC,
Mr. Olivier Corten;
On behaif of Canada:

Mr. Philippe Kirsch, Agent;
14. Whereas, in this phase of the proceedings, the Parties presented the

following submissions :
On hrhulf of Yugosluvia:

"[Tlhe Court [is asked] to indicate the following provisional
measure :
Canada . . .shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and
shall refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia";

On behaif of Canada:
"Canada respectfully requests the Court to reject the request for
provisional measures made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
on 29 April 1999" ;

15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life

and human suffering in al1parts of Yugoslavia;

16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force
in Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises
very serious issues of international law ; 17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the mainte-
nance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statute of the
Court;
18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that al1parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, includ-
ing humanitarian law;

19. Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have
jurisdiction over legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or
between other States to whom access to the Court has been granted;
whereas the Court has repeatedly stated "that one of the fundamental
principles of itsStatute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of those States to itsjurisdiction" (East Timor (Por-
tugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101,para. 26); and
whereas the Court can therefore exercise iurisdiction onlv between States
parties to a dispute who not only have access to the ~o;rt but also have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for the
individual dispute concerned ;
20. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate

such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court might
be established:

21. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute; whereas each of the two Parties has made a declaration recog-
nizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to that provi-
sion; whereas Yugoslavia's declaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on 26 April 1999,and that of Canada on
10 May 1994;

22. Whereas Yugoslavia's declaration is formulated as follows :

"1hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro- LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 267

city, theurisdiction of the said Court in al1disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The

present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions
which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial
disputes.
The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may
be given to terminate the acceptance";

and whereas the declaration of Canada reads as follows

"On behalf of the Government of Canada.
(1) 1givenotice that 1hereby terminate the acceptance by Canada
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
hitherto effective by virtue of the declaration made on 10September

1985in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of
the Court.
(2) 1 declare that the Government of Canada accepts as compul-
sory ipsofacto and without special convention, on condition of reci-
procity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in con-
formity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court,
untilsuch time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance,
over al1disputes arising after the present declaration with regard to
situations or facts subsequent to this declaration, other than:

(a) disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall
agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settle-
ment;
(b) disputes with the Government of any other country which is a
member of the Commonwealth, al1of which disputes shall be
settled insuch manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree;

(c) disputes with regard to questions which by international law
fa11exclusivelywithin the jurisdiction of Canada; and

(d) disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and manage-
ment measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing
in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in the Convention on
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, 1978,and the enforcement of such measures.

(3) The Government of Canada also reserves the right at any

time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, and with effect as from the moment of such notification, either to add to, amend or withdraw any of the fore-
going reservations, or any that may hereafter be added.

It is requested that this notification be communicated to the Gov-
ernments of al1 the States that have accepted the Optional Clause
and to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice";

23. Whereas Canada contends that the jurisdiction of the Court can-
not be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in

this case; whereas it argues that the Yugoslav declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court "is inapplicable by its own terms to disputes in
existence before 25 April [1999]";whereas it points out in this connection
that "[tlhere is nothing in the description of the subject-matter of the dis-
pute in the Application against Canada of 29 April that relates specifi-
cally to events subsequent to 25 April, or to any change in the character
of the dispute subsequent to that date"; and whereas Canada accordingly
concludes that "[tlhe dispute referred to in the Applicant's own pleading,
therefore, is not one arising or that may arise after 25 April 1999";
24. Whereas, according to Yugoslavia, "[tlhe issue before the Court is
that of interpreting a unilateral declaration of acceptance of itsjurisdic-
tion, and thus of ascertaining the meaning of the declaration on the basis
of the intention of itsuthor"; whereas Yugoslavia contends that the text
of its declaration "allows al1 disputes effectively arising after 25 April
1999 to be taken into account"; whereas, referring to bombing attacks
carried out by NATO member States on 28 April, 1 May, 7 May and

8 May 1999, Yugoslavia States that, "[iln each of these cases, which are
only examples, [it]denounced the flagrant violations of international law
of which it considered itself to have been the victim", and the "NATO
member States denied having violated any obligation under international
law"; whereas Yugoslavia asserts that "each of these events therefore
gave rise to 'a disagreement on a point of law or fact', a disagreement . . .
the terms of which depend in each case on the specific features of the
attack" in question; whereas Yugoslavia accordingly concludes that,
since these events constitute "instantaneous wrongful acts", there exist "a
number of separate disputes which have arisen" between the Parties
"since 25 April relating to events subsequent to that date"; and whereas
Yugoslavia argues from this that "[tlhere is no reason to exclude prima
facie the Court's jurisdiction over disputes having effectively arisen after
25 April, as provided in the text of the declaration"; and whereas Yugo-
slavia adds that to exclude such disputes from the jurisdiction of the
Court "would run entirely counter to the manifest and clear intention of
Yugoslavia" to entrust the Court with the resolution of those disputes;

25. Whereas Yugoslavia has accepted the Court's jurisdiction ratione
temporis in respect only, on the one hand, of disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of its declaration and, on the other hand, of
those concerning situations or facts subsequent to that signature (cf.Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1960, p. 34); whereas, in order to assess whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion in the case, it is sufficient to decide whether in terms of the text of the
declaration, the dispute brought before the Court "arose" before or after
25 April 1999,the date on which the declaration was signed;
26. Whereas Yugoslavia's Application is entitled "Application of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Canada for Violation of the
Obligation Not to Use Force" ; whereas in the Application the "subject of
the dispute" (emphasis added) is described in general terms (see para-
graph 1 above); but whereas it can be seen both from the statement of
"facts upon which the claim is based" and from the manner in which the
"claims" themselves are formulated (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above) that
the Application is directed, in essence, against the "bombing of the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", to which the Court is
asked to put an end;
27. Whereas it is an established fact that the bombings in question
began on 24 March 1999 and have been conducted continuously over a
period extending beyond 25 April 1999; and whereas the Court has no
doubt, in the light, inter alia,of the discussions at the Security Council

meetings of 24 and 26 March 1999 (SlPV.3988 and 3989), that a "legal
dispute" (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 100,
para. 22) "arose" between Yugoslavia and the Respondent, as it did also
with the other NATO member States, well before 25 April 1999concern-
ing the legality of those bombings as such, taken as a whole;
28. Whereas the fact that the bombings have continued after 25 April
1999and that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is
not such as to alter the date on which the dispute arose; whereas each
individual air attack could not have given rise to a separate subsequent
dispute; and whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, Yugoslavia has
not established that new disputes, distinct from the initial one, have
arisen between the Parties since 25 April 1999 in respect of subsequent
situations or facts attributable to Canada;
29. Whereas, as the Court recalled in its Judgment of 4 December

1998in the case concerning Fislleries Jurisdiction (Spainv. Canada),

"It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon
the limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court: '[tlhisjurisdiction only exists within the limits within whichit

has been accepted' (Phosphutes in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I. J..
Series AIB, No. 74, p. 23)" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453, para. 44);
and whereas, as the Permanent Court held in its Judgment of 14 June
1938 in the Pl~osphatesin Morocco case (Preliminary Objections), "it is
recognized that, as a consequence of a condition of reciprocity stipulated
in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court", any limitation
ratione temporis attached by one of the Parties to its declaration of

acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction "holds good as between the Parties" LEGALITYOF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 270

(Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74,
p. 10);whereas, moreover, as the present Court noted in its Judgment of
11 June 1998in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), "[als early as
1952,it held in the caseconcerning Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.that, when dec-
larations are made on condition of reciprocity, 'jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court only to the extent to which the two Declarations coincide in
conferring it' (I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 103)"(1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 298,
para. 43); and whereas it follows from the foregoing that the declarations
made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not
constitute a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court could prima facie

be founded in this case;

30. Whereas Canada also contends that the jurisdiction of the Court
cannot be founded prima facie on Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute,
since the Yugoslav declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court "is
a transparent nullity"; whereas Canada, referring to United Nations
Security Council resolution 777 (1992) dated 19 September 1992and to
United Nations General Assembly resolution 4711dated 22 September
1992,argues that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a Member
of the United Nations as a successor State", and that, not having duly
acceded to the Organization, it is not in consequence a party to the Stat-
ute of the Court;
31. Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat, as
expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992from the Legal Counsel of
the Organization (doc. A/471485),and to the latter's subsequent practice,
contends for its part that General Assembly resolution 4711"[neither] ter-
minate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia's membership in the Organiza-
tion", and that the said resolution did not take away from Yugoslavia

"[its] right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly
bodies" ;
32. Whereas, in viewof its finding in paragraph 29 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;

33. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the second place,
to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article IX of the Genocide Con-
vention, which provides:

"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment ofthe present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute" ;

and whereas in its Application Yugoslaviastates that the subject ofthe dis-
pute concerns inter alia "acts of Canada by which it has violated its inter-
national obligation . . .not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calcu-
lated to cause the physical destruction of a national group"; whereas, in
describing the facts on which the Application is based, Yugoslavia states:
"The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions calculated
at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part";
whereas, in its statement of the legal grounds on which the Application is
based, Yugoslavia contends that "the obligation . .. not to impose delib-
erately on a national group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group has been breached"; and whereas one of

the claims on the merits set out in the Application isformulated as follows:
"by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by caus-
ing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted ura-
nium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about its physical destruc-

tion, in whole or in part";
34. Whereas Yugoslavia contends moreover that the sustained and
intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily
populated areas, constitutes "a serious violation of Article II of the
Genocide Convention"; whereas it argues that "the pollution of soil, air
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the
environment with depleted uranium, inflicts conditions of life on the

Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction";
whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such
that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already
known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country's power
supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent
must be aware, "impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part7',the
Yugoslav national group as such;

35. Whereas for its part Canada contends that "the facts alleged in the
Application bear no genuine relation to the Genocide Convention which
is invoked as a basis for jurisdiction"; whereas Canada, referring to the
fact that Yugoslavia had invoked Article II (c) of the Convention,

observes inter aliathat "the essence of genocide is intention and destruc-
tion - the destruction of entire populations"; that the Applicant "did
not even attempt to address the question of intent"; and that

"this cheapensthe concept of genocide and deprives it of its integrity
asan autonomous principle to equate it with the use of force or even aggression, or with collateral damage suffered by civilians, or with
issues related to the proportionality of the use of force";

and whereas Canada accordingly concludes that "[tlhe Genocide Con-
vention cannot, therefore, provide prima facie jurisdiction for the meas-
ures sought" ;
36. Whereas it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and Canada are
parties to the GenocideConvention without reservation; and whereas Ar-
ticle IX of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a basis on
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the extent that
the subject-matter of the dispute relates to "the interpretation, applica-
tion or fulfilment" of the Convention, inciuding disputes "relating to the
responsibility of a statefor genocide or for any of the other acts enumer-
ated in article III" of the said Convention;
37. Whereas, in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dis-
pute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists,
the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains
that the Convention applies, while the other denies it; and whereas in the

present case the Court must ascertain whether the breaches of the Con-
vention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions
of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one
which the Court would have jurisdiction rutione materiae to entertain
pursuant to Article 1X (cf. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of Americu), Preliminury Objection, Judgment, 1.C.J.
Reports 1996 (II), p. 810, para. 16);
38. Whereas the definition of genocide set out in Article II of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
actscommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, assuch:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group ;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of lifecalculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group";
39. Whereas it appears to the Court, from this definition, "that the
essential characteristic of genocide is the intended destruction of 'a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group'" (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention und Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provi-
sionul Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993,

p. 345, para. 42); whereas the threat or use of force against a State can-
not in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II
of the Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court,does not appear at the present stageof the proceedings that the bombings
which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application "indeed entail the
element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above" (Legality of the Tl~reator Useof Nuclear Weapons, Adiii-
sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26);

40. Whereas the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this
stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the
Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by
Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case;

41. Whereas, it follows from what has been said above that the Court
lacks prima faciejurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's Application; and
whereas it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever
in order to protect the rights invoked therein;
42. Whereas, however, the findings reached by the Court in the present
proceedings in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the

Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the
admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and
whereas they leave unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugosla-
via and Canada to submit arguments in respect of those questions;

43. Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question
of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compat-
ibility of particular acts with international law; the former requires con-
sent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with
the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full
legal arguments by both parties;
44. Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the
Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them
that violate international law, including humanitarian law; whereas any
disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved
by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the
Charter, is left to the parties;
45. Whereas in this context the parties should take care not to aggra-
vate or extend the dispute;
46. Whereas, when such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace,

breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special
responsibilitiesunder Chapter VI1of the Charter; 47. For these reasons,

(1) By twelve votes to four,
Rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submit-

ted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999;
INFAVOU R esidentSchwebel; JudgesOda, Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans;
Judge ad hoc Lalonde
AGAINST :ice-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; Judges Shi,
Vereshchetin;Judge ad hoc Kreéa;

(2) By fifteen votes to one,

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
IN FAVOUR :ice-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans ;Judges ad hoc Lalonde,Kreéa ;

AGAINS Tudge Oda

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousandine
hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in

the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Canada,
respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge KOROMA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.

Judges ODA, HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGURa ENd KOOIJMANa Sppend
separate opinions to the Order of the Court.

19 Vice-President WEERAMANTRY A,cting President, Judges SHI and
VERESHCHET aId, Judge ad hoc KRECAappend dissenting opinions to
the Order of the Court.

(InitialledC.G.W.
(InitiulledE.V.O.

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ

DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. CANADA)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 2JUIN 1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA vCANADA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER OF 2 JUNE 1999 Mode officiel de citation:
Licéité de l'emploi delaforce (Yougoslavie c. Canada),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnancedu 1999,
C.1.JRecueil 199p. 259

Officia1citat:on
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada),
Provisional Measures,er of 2 June 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 259

NOde vente:728 1
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number
ISBN 92-1-070796-6 2 JUIN 1999

ORDONNANCE

LICÉITÉDE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. CANADA)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v.CANADA)

REQUEST FORTHE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL

MEASURES

2 JUNE 1999

ORDER COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

2juin ANNÉE 1999
Rôle général
no106 2 juin1999

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. CANADA)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. WEERAMANTRY vi,ce-président, faisant fonction de pré-
sident en l'affaire;SCHWEBEL p,résident de la Cour;
MM. ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER, ANJEVAH, ERCZEGH,
SHI, FLEISCHHAUEK R, ROMA,ERESHCHETIM N, e HIGGINS,
MM. PARRA-ARANGURE KO,OIJMANju, es; MM. LALONDE,
KRECAj,uges ad hoc; M. VALENCIA-OSPIgref,jer.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré chambre du conseil,

Vu les articles 41 et 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 73 et 74 de
son Règlement,
Vu la requête déposear la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie (ci-
aprèsdénomméela (Yougoslavi»)au Greffe de la Cour le 29 avril 1999,
par laquelle elle a introduit une instance contre le Canada-
tion de l'obligation de ne pas recourirloi de la force)), INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1999 1999
2 June
General List
2 June1999 No. 106

CASE CONCERNING

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA v.CANADA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Presen: Vice-President WEERAMANTRA Yc,ting Presid;nPresident
SCHWEBELJ;udges ODA, BEDJAOUIG , UILLAUMER ,ANJEVA,
HERCZEGH,SHI, FLEISCHHAUER K,OROMA,VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGUREK NO, OIJMANSJ;udges ad hoc
LALONDE, KRECAR ; egistrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,

After deliberation,
Having regard to Articles 41 andf the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73 and 74 of thees of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the Federalblic of Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter "Yugoslavia") filed in the Registry of the Court on
29 April 1999, instituting proceedings against Canada "for violation of
the obligation not to use force", Rend l'ordonnancesuivante:

1. Considérant que, dans cette requête,la Yougoslavie définit l'objet
du différend ainsi que suit:
«L'objet du différendporte sur lesactes commis par le Canada, en
violation de sonobligationinternationale de nepas recouriràl'emploi
de la force contre un autre Etat, de l'obligation de ne pas s'immiscer

dans les affaires intérieuresd'un autre Etat, de l'obligation de ne pas
porter atteinteà la souveraineté d'unautre Etat, de l'obligation depro-
téger lespopulations civileset les biens de caractèrecivil en temps de
guerre, de l'obligation de protéger l'environnement, de l'obligation
touchant a la libertéde navigation sur lescours d'eau internationaux,
de l'obligation concernantlesdroits et libertésdameritauxde la per-
sonne humaine,de l'obligationde ne pas utiliserdesarmesinterdites,de
l'obligation dene pas soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national
a desconditions d'existencedevant entraîner sa destruction physique));

2. Considérant que, dans ladite requête,la Yougoslavie, pour fonder
la compétencede la Cour, invoque le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Sta-
tut de la Cour et l'articleIX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide,adoptée par l'Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies le 9 décembre 1948 (ci-après dénomméela ((convention
sur le génocide»);
3. Considérant que, dans sa requête,la Yougoslavie expose que les
demandes qu'elle soumet a la Cour sont fondéessur les faits ci-après:

«Le Gouvernement du Canada, conjointement avec les gouverne-
ments d'autres Etats membres de l'OTAN, a recouru à l'emploide la
force contre la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie en prenant part
au bombardement de cibles dans la Républiquefédéralede Yougo-
slavie. Lors des bombardements de la Républiquefédéralede You-
goslavie, des cibles militaires et civiles ont étéattaquées. Un grand
nombre de personnes ont été tuéesd ,ont de très nombreux civils.
Des immeubles d'habitation ont subi des attaques. Un grand nom-
bre d'habitations ont étédétruites. D'énormes dégâto snt étécausés
a des écoles, deshôpitaux, des stations de radiodiffusion et de télévi-

sion, des structures culturelles et sanitaires, ainsi qu'a des lieux de
culte. Nombre de ponts, routes et voies de chemin de fer ont été
détruits. Les attaques contre des raffineries de pétrole et des usines
chimiques ont eu de graves effets dommageables pour l'environne-
ment de villes et de villages de la Républiquefédéralede Yougosla-
vie. L'emploi d'armes contenant de l'uranium appauvri a de lourdes
conséquencespour la vie humaine. Les actessusmentionnésontpour
effet de soumettre intentionnellement un groupe ethnique a des
conditions devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou par-
tielle. Le Gouvernement du Canada prend part à l'entraînement, à
l'armement, au financement, a l'équipement et à l'approvisionne-
ment de la prétendue «armée de libérationdu Kosovo »; Makes the folloi.vingOrder:

1. Whereas in that Application Yugoslavia defines the subject of the
dispute as follows:
"The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of Canada by which it
has violated its international obligation banning the use of force

against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the interna1
affairs of another State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty
of another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population
and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the envi-
ronment, the obligation relating to free navigation on international
rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms, the obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the obliga-
tion not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause
the physical destruction of a national group";

2. Whereas in the said Application Yugoslavia refers, as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1948(hereinafter the "Genocide Con-
vention") ;
3. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia States that the claims sub-
mitted by it to the Court are based upon the following facts:

"The Government of Canada, together with the Governments of
other Member States of NATO, took part in the acts of use of force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by taking part in bomb-
ing targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In bombing the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military and civilian targets were
attacked. Great number of people were killed, including a great
many civilians. Residential houses came under attack. Numerous
dwellings were destroyed. Enormous damage was caused to schools,
hospitals, radio and television stations, cultural and health institu-
tions and to places of worship. A large number of bridges, roads and
railway lines were destroyed. Attacks on oil refineries and chemical
plants have had serious environmental effects on cities, towns and
villages in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The use of weapons

containing depleted uranium is having far-reaching consequences for
human life. The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating con-
ditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in
whole or in part. The Government of Canada is taking part in the
training, arming, financing, equipping and supplying the so-called
'Kosovo Liberation Amy'" ;261 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)

et considérant qu'elle indique en outre que lesdites demandes reposent
sur les fondements juridiques suivants:

«Les actes susmentionnésdu Gouvernement canadien constituent
une violation flagrante de I'obligation de ne pas recourirl'emploi
de la force contre un autre Etat. En finançant, armant, entraînant et
équipantla prétendue«arméede libérationdu Kosovo)), le Gouver-
nement canadien apporte un appui à des groupes terroristes et au
mouvement sécessionnistesur le territoire de la Républiquefédérale
de Yougoslavie, en violation de I'obligation de ne pas s'immiscer
dans les affaires intérieures d'unautre Etat. De surcroît, les disposi-
tions de la convention de Genèvede 1949et du protocole addition-

nelno 1de 1977 relatives à la protection des civils et des biens de
caractère civil en temps de guerre ont étéviolées.1y a eu aussi vio-
lation de I'obligation de protéger l'environnement.La destruction de
ponts sur le Danube enfreint les dispositions de l'article 1 de la
convention de 1948relative à la libertéde navigation sur le Danube.
Les dispositions du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et
politiques et du pacte international relatif aux droits économiques,
sociaux et culturels de 1966 ont elles aussi étéviolées.En outre,
I'obligation énoncéedans la convention pour la prévention et la
répressiondu crime de génocidede ne pas soumettre intentionnelle-
ment un groupe national àdes conditions d'existencedevant entraî-
ner sa destruction physique a étéviolée.De plus, les activitésaux-
quelles le Canada prend part sont contraires au paragraphe 1 de

l'article3 de la Charte des Nations Unies));
4. Considérant que les demandes de la Yougoslavie sont ainsi formu-
léesdans la requête:

«Le Gouvernement de la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie prie
la Cour internationale de Justice de dire et juger:

qu'en prenant part aux bombardements du territoire de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, le Canada a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas recourir à l'emploi de la force contre un autre Etat;
qu'en prenant part à l'entraînement,à l'armement, au finance-
ment, à l'équipementet à l'approvisionnement de groupes terro-
ristes, savoir la prétendue((arméede libérationdu Kosovo)), le
Canada a agi contre la République fédéralede Yougoslavie, en
violation de son obligation de ne pas s'immiscerdans les affaires
d'un autre Etat;
qu'en prenant part à des attaques contre des cibles civiles, le
Canada a agi contre la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie, en
violation de son obligation d'épargner la population civile, les

civils et les biens de caractère civil;
qu'en prenant part a la destruction ou a l'endommagement de
monastères, d'édificesculturels, le Canada a agi contre laépu-and whereas it further Statesthat the said claims are based on the follow-
ing legal grounds:

"The above acts of the Government of Canada represent a gross
violation of the obligation not to use force against another State. By
financing, arming, training and equippingthe so-called 'Kosovo Lib-
eration Army', support is given to terrorist groups and the secession-
ist movement in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

in breach of the obligation not to intervene in the interna1 affairs of
another State. In addition, the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1949and of the Additional Protocol No. 1of 1977on the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects in time of war have been vio-
lated. The obligation to protect the environment has also been
breached. The destruction of bridges on the Danube is in contraven-
tion of the provisions of Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on free
navigation on the Danube. The provisions of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have also

been breached. Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been
breached. Furthermore, the activities in which Canada is taking part
are contrary to Article 53, paragraph 1,of the Charter of the United
Nations" ;

4. Whereas the claims of Yugoslavia are formulated as follows in the
Application :

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
- by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, Canada has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use
force against another State;
- by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and
supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called 'Kosovo Liberation
Army', Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;

- by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, Canada has acted

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;
- by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monu-
ments of culture, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas commettre d'actes d'hostilité dirigéscontre des monu-
ments historiques, des Œuvresd'art ou des lieux de culte consti-
tuant le patrimoine culturel ou spirituel d'un peuple;
qu'en prenant part à l'utilisation de bombes en grappe, leCanada
a agi contre la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie,en violation
de son obligation de ne pas utiliser des armes interdites, c'est-
à-dire des armes de nature à causer des maux superflus;
qu'en prenant part aux bombardements de raffineries de pétrole
et d'usines chimiques,le Canada a agi contre la Républiquefédé-

rale de Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de ne pas
causer de dommages substantiels à l'environnement;
qu'en recourant à l'utilisation d'armes contenant de l'uranium
appauvri, le Canada a agi contre la Républiquefédéralede You-
goslavie, en violation de son obligation de ne pas utiliser des
armes interdites et de ne pas causer de dommages de grande
ampleur à la santéet à l'environnement;
qu'en prenant part au meurtre de civils,à la destruction d'entre-
prises, de moyens de communication et de structures sanitaires et
culturelles, le Canada a agi contre la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de respecter le droit
à la vie, le droit au travail, le dràil'information, le droit aux
soins de santéainsi que d'autres droits fondamentaux de la per-

sonne humaine;
qu'en prenant part ala destruction de ponts situéssur des cours
d'eau internationaux, le Canada a agi contre la Républiquefédé-
rale de Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de respecter
la libertéde navigation sur les cours d'eau internationaux;
qu'en prenant part aux activités énumérées ci-dessus et e parti-
culier en causant des dommages énormes àl'environnement eten
utilisant de l'uranium appauvri, le Canada a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, en violation de son obligation de
ne pas soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national à des
conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique
totale ou partielle;
que le Canada porte la responsabilitéde la violation des obliga-

tions internationales susmentionnées;
que le Canada est tenu de mettre fin immédiatement à la viola-
tion des obligations susmentionnées à l'égardde la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie;
que le Canada doit réparation pour les préjudices causés à la
République fédéralede Yougoslavie ainsi qu'a ses citoyens et
personnes morales »;

et considérant qu'au terme de sa requêtela Yougoslavie se réservele
droit de modifier et de complétercelle-ci;
5. Considérant que,le 29 avril 1999,immédiatementaprèsle dépôtde of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any act

of hostility directed against historical monuments, works of art
or places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual herit-
agi of people;
by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, Canada has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering;

by taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable envi-
ronmental damaee: ",
by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted ura-
nium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons

and not to cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;

- by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, commu-
nications, health and cultural institutions, Canada has acted
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to
information, the right to health care as well as other basic
human rights;

- by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers,
Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on
international rivers;
- by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by
causing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted

uranium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict
on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction, in whole or in part;

- Canada is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations;

- Canada is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the above
obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

- Canada is obliged to provide compensation for the damage done
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and
juridical persons" ;

and whereas, at the end of its Application, Yugoslavia reserves the right
to amend and supplement it;
5. Whereas on 29 April 1999, immediately after filing its Application,263 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)

sa requête,la Yougoslavie a en outre présenté unedemande en indication
de mesures conservatoires invoquant l'article 73 du Règlement de la
Cour; et que la demande était accompagnéed'un volume d'annexes pho-
tographiques produites à titre de «preuves»;
6. Considérant que, à l'appui de sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Yougoslavie soutient notamment que, depuis le début
des bombardements contre son territoire, et du fait de ceux-ci, environ
mille civils,dont dix-neuf enfants, ont étués etplus de quatre mille cinq
cents grièvement blessés;que la vie de trois millions d'enfants est mena-

cée;que des centaines de milliers de personnes ont étéexposées à des gaz
toxiques; qu'environ un million de personnes sont privéesd'approvision-
nement en eau; qu'environ cinq cent mille travailleurs ont perdu leur
emploi; que deux millions de personnes sont sans ressources et dans
l'impossibilitéde se procurer le minimum vital; et que les réseauxrou-
tier et ferroviaire ont subi d'importants dégâts; considérant que, dans
sa demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, la Yougoslavie
énumèrepar ailleurs les cibles qui auraient étéviséespar les attaques
aériennes et décrit en détailles dommages qui leur auraient étéinfligés
(ponts, gares et lignes de chemins de fer, réseau routier et moyens de
transport, aéroports,commerce et industrie, raffinerieset entrepôtsdema-
tières premières liquides et de produits chimiques, agriculture, hôpitaux

et centres médicaux,écoles, édificespublicset habitations, infrastructures,
télécommunications,monuments historiques et culturels et édifices reli-
gieux); et considérant que la Yougoslavie en conclut ce qui suit:
«Les actes décrits ci-dessus ont causé des morts ainsi que des
atteintesà I'intégritéphysique et mentale de la population de la
Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie, de trèsimportants dégâts,une
forte pollution de I'environnement, de sorte que la population you-

goslave setrouve soumise intentionnellement à des conditions d'exis-
tence devant entraîner la destruction physique totale ou partielle de
ce groupe»;
7. Considérant que, au terme de sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Yougoslavie préciseque

«Si les mesures demandéesne sont pas adoptées,il y aura de nou-
velles pertes en vies humaines, de nouvelles atteintes à I'intégrité
physique et mentale de la population de la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie, d'autres destructions de cibles civiles, une forte pollu-
tion de I'environnement et la poursuite de la destruction physique de
la population de Yougoslavie »;

et considérant que, tout en se réservantle droit de modifier et de com-
plétersa demande, elle prie la Cour d'indiquer la mesure suivante:
«Le Canada doit cesser immédiatement de recourir à l'emploi de
la force et doit s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de
recours ou un recours a l'emploi de la force contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie »;Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provisional
measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court; and whereas that
request was accompanied by a volume of photographic annexes pro-
duced as "evidence" ;
6. Whereas, in support of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia contends inter alia that, since the onset of the
bombing of its territory, and as a result thereof, about 1,000 civilians,
including 19 children, have been killed and more than 4,500 have sus-
tained serious injuries; that the lives of three million children are endan-
gered; that hundreds of thousands of citizens have been exposed to poi-
sonous gases; that about one million citizens are short of water supply;
that about 500,000 workers have become jobless; that two million citi-
zens have no means of livelihood and are unable to ensure minimum

means of sustenance; and that the road and railway network has suffered
extensive destruction; whereas, in its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, Yugoslavia also lists the targets alleged to have come
under attack in the air strikes and describes in detail the damage alleged
to have been inflicted upon them (bridges, railway lines and stations,
roads and means of transport, airports, industry and trade, refineries and
warehouses storing liquid raw materials and chemicals, agriculture, hos-
pitals and health care centres, schools, public buildings and housing
facilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, cultural-historical monu-
ments and religious shrines); and whereas Yugoslavia concludes from
this that:

"The acts described above caused death, physical and mental
harm to the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; huge
devastation; heavy pollution of the environment, so that the Yugo-
slav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in
part" ;

7. Whereas, at the end of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia states that
"If the proposed measure were not to be adopted, there will be
new losses of human life, further physical and mental harm inflicted
on the population of the FR of Yugoslavia, further destruction of
civilian targets, heavy environmental pollution and further physical
destruction of the people of Yugoslavia";

and whereas, while reserving the right to amend and supplement its
request, Yugoslavia requests the Court to indicate the following measure:

"Canada shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall
refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia"; 8. Considérant que la demande en indication de mesures conserva-
toires était accompagnée d'une lettre de l'agent de la Yougoslavie,
adresséeau président etaux membres de la Cour, qui étaitainsi libellée:
«J'ai l'honneur d'appeler l'attention de la Cour sur le dernier
bombardement qui a frappé le centre de la ville de Surdulica le
27 avril 1999à midi et entraînéla mort de civils,pour la plupart des

enfants et des femmes, et de vous rappeler les morts de Kursumlija,
Aleksinac et Cuprija, ainsi que le bombardement d'un convoi de
réfugiéset de l'immeuble abritant la radio et la télévision serbes,
pour ne citer que quelques exemplesdes atrocitésque chacun connaît.
Je tiens en conséquence a prévenir la Cour qu'il est fort probable
qu'il y aura encore d'autres victimes civiles et militaires.
Considérant le pouvoir conféré à la Cour aux termes du para-
graphe 1de l'article75de son Règlement,et compte tenu de l'extrême
urgence de la situation néedes circonstances décritesdans les de-
mandes en indication de mesures conservatoires, je prie la Cour de
bien vouloir se prononcer d'officesur les demandes présentéesou de
fixerune date pour la tenue d'une audience dans lesmeilleursdélais));

9. Considérant que, le 29 avril 1999, date a laquelle la requêteet la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires ont été dé~oséesau
Greffe, le greffier a fait tenir au Gouvernement canadien des copies
signéesde la requêteet de la demande, conformément au paragraphe 4 de
I'article8et au paragraphe 2 de I'article73 du Règlementde la Cour; et
qu'il a égalementfait tenir audit gouvernement une copie des documents
qui accompagnaient la requêteet la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires;
10. Considérant que, le 29 avril 1999,le greffier a aviséles Parties que
la Cour avait décidé,conformément au paragraphe 3 de l'article 74 de
son Règlement, de tenir audience les 10 et 11 mai 1999 aux fins de les

entendre en leurs observations sur la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires :
11. considéiant qu'en attendant que la communication prévueau para-
graphe 3 de I'article40 du Statut àtl'article42 du Règlementde la Cour
ait étéeffectuéepar transmission du texte bilingue imprimé dela requête
aux Membres des Nations Unies et aux autres Etats admis à ester devant
la Cour, le greffier a, le 29 avril 1999,informéces Etats du dépôtde la
requêteet de son objet, ainsi que du dépôt de la demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires;
12. Considérant que, la Cour ne comptant pas sur le siègede juge de
nationalitéyougoslave, le Gouvernement yougoslave a invoquélesdispo-
sitions de I'article 31 du Statut de la Cour et a désignéM. MilenkoKreia
pour siégeren qualité dejuge ad hoc en l'affaire; et qu'aucune objection
à cette désignation n'a étésoulevéedans le délaifixé à cet effet en vertu
du paragraphe 3 de I'article 35 du Règlement de la Cour; considérant
que, la Cour ne comptant pas sur le siègede juge de nationalité cana-

dienne, le Gouvernement canadien a invoqué les dispositions de I'ar- 8. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures was
accompanied by a letter from the Agent of Yugoslavia, addressed to the
President and Members of the Court, which read as follows:
"1have the honour to bring to the attention of the Court the latest
bombing of the central area of the town of Surdulica on 27 April
1999at noon resulting in losses of lives of civilians, most of whom

were children and women, and to remind of killings of peoples in
Kursumlija, Aleksinac and Cuprija, as well as bombing of a refugee
convoy and the Radio and Television of Serbia, just to mention
some of the well-known atrocities. Therefore, 1would liketo caution
the Court that there is a highest probability of further civilian and
military casualties.
Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requests proprio motu orto fixa datefor a hearing
at earliest possible time";

9. Whereas on 29 April 1999, the day on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar sent to the Canadian Government signed copies
of the Application and of the request, in accordance with Article 38,para-
graph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; and whereas
he also sent to that Government copies of the documents accompanying
the Application and the request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures;
10. Whereas on 29 April 1999the Registrar informed the Parties that
the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, to hold hearings on 10and 11May 1999,where they would be

able to present their observationson the request for the indication ofpro-
visional measures;
11. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by transmittal of the
printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of the United
Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court, the Regis-
trar on 29 April 1999informed those States of the filing of the Applica-
tion and of its subject-matter, and of the filing of the request for the
indication of provisional measures;
12. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of
Yugoslav nationality, the Yugoslav Government has availed itself of the
provisions of Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr.
Milenko KreCa to sit as judge ad hoc in the case; and whereas no objec-
tion to that choice was raised within the time-limit fixed for thepurpose
pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court; whereas,
since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of Canadian national-
ity, the Canadian Government has availed itself of the provisions of LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)
265

ticle 31 du Statut de la Cour et a désignéM. Marc Lalonde pour siéger
en qualité dejuge ad hoc en l'affaire; que, dans le délaifixé à cet effet
en vertu du paragraphe 3 de l'article 35 du Règlement, la Yougoslavie,se
référantau paragraphe 5 de l'article 31 du Statut, a fait objectiàncette
désignation; et que la Cour, après délibération,est parvenue àla conclu-
sion que la désignation d'unjuge ad hoc par le Canada sejustifiait dans
la présentephase de l'affaire;
13. Considérant que, aux audiences publiques qui ont été tenuesentre
le 10et le 12mai 1999,des observations orales sur la demande en indica-
tion de mesures conservatoires ont étéprésentées:

au nom de la Yougoslavie:
par M. Rodoljub Etinski, agent,

M. Ian Brownlie,
M. Paul J. 1.M. de Waart,
M. Eric Suy,
M. Miodrag MitiC,
M. Olivier Corten;
au nom du Canada:

par M. Philippe Kirsch, agent ;
14. Considérant que, dans cette phase de la procédure,les Parties ont

présentéles conclusions suivantes:
au nom de la Yougoslavie:

«[L]a Cour [est priée]d'indiquer la mesure conservatoire sui-
vante :
[L]eCanada ...doi[t] cesser immédiatement de recourir à l'emploi
de la force etoi[t] s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de
recours ou un recours à l'emploi de la force contre la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie »;

au nom du Canada:
«Le Canada prie respectueusement la Cour de rejeter la demande

en indication de mesures conservatoires présentéepar la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie le 29 avril 1999));

15. Considérant que la Cour est profondément préoccupéepar le
drame humain, les pertes en vieshumaines et les terribles souffrances que
connaît le Kosovo et qui constituent la toile de fond du présent différend,
ainsi que par les victimes et les souffrances humaines que l'on déplorede
façon continue dans l'ensemble de la Yougoslavie;
16. Considérant que la Cour est fortement préoccupéepar l'emploi de
la force en Yougoslavie; que, dans les circonstances actuelles, cet emploi
soulève des problèmes très gravesde droit international;Article 31of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr. Marc Lalonde to sit
as judge ad hoc in the case; whereas, within the time-limit fixed for the
purpose pursuant to Article 35,paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, Yugo-
slavia, referring to Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute, objected to
that choice; and whereas the Court, after due deliberation, found that the
nomination of a judge ud hoc by Canada was justified in the present
phase of the case;
13. Whereas, at the public hearings held between 10and 12May 1999,
oral observations on the request for the indication of provisional meas-
ures were presented by the following:

Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Agent,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Paul J.1. M. de Waart,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Miodrag MitiC,
Mr. Olivier Corten;
On behaif of Canada:

Mr. Philippe Kirsch, Agent;
14. Whereas, in this phase of the proceedings, the Parties presented the

following submissions :
On hrhulf of Yugosluvia:

"[Tlhe Court [is asked] to indicate the following provisional
measure :
Canada . . .shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and
shall refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia";

On behaif of Canada:
"Canada respectfully requests the Court to reject the request for
provisional measures made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
on 29 April 1999" ;

15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life

and human suffering in al1parts of Yugoslavia;

16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force
in Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises
very serious issues of international law ; 17. Considérant que la Cour garde présents à l'esprit les buts et les
principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, ainsi que lesresponsabilités qui
lui incombent, en vertu de ladite Charte et du Statut de la Cour, dans le
maintien de la paix et de la sécurité;
18. Considérant que la Cour estime nécessairede souligner que toutes
lesparties qui seprésententdevant elledoivent agir conformément àleurs
obligations en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies et des autres règles

du droit international,y compris du droit humanitaire;

19. Considérant qu'en vertu de son Statut la Cour n'a pas automati-
quement compétence pour connaître des différendsjuridiques entre les
Etats parties audit Statut ou entre les autres Etats qui ont été admis à
ester devant elle; que la Cour a déclaréà maintes reprises «que l'un des
principes fondamentaux de son Statut est qu'elle nepeut trancher un dif-
férendentre des Etats sans que ceux-ci aient consenti à sa juridiction))
(Timor oriental (Portugal c.Australie), arrêt,C.1J. Recueil 1995, p. 101,
par. 26); et que la Cour ne peut donc exercer sa compétence à l'égard

d'Etats partiesà un différendque si ces derniers ont non seulement accès
à la Cour, mais ont en outre acceptésa compétence, soitd'une manière
générale, soitpour le différendparticulier dont il s'agit;
20. Considérant que, en présence d'une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires, point n'est besoin pour la Cour, avant de décider
d'indiquer ou non de telles mesures, de s'assurer de manière définitive
qu'ellea compétencequant au fond de l'affaire, mais qu'ellene peut indi-
quer ces mesures que si les dispositions invoquéespar le demandeur sem-
blent prima facie constituer une base sur laquelle la compétence de la
Cour pourrait êtrefondée;

21. Considérant que la Yougoslavie, dans sa requête,prétenden pre-
mier lieu fonder la compétence dela Cour sur le paragraphe 2 de l'article
36 du Statut; que chacune des deux Parties a fait une déclaration recon-
naissant la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour en vertu de cette disposi-
tion; que la déclaration dela Yougoslavie a été déposé auprès du Secré-
taire général del'organisation des Nations Unies le 26 avril 1999,et celle
du Canada le 10mai 1994;
22. Considérant que la déclarationde la Yougoslavie est ainsi conçue:

[Traduction du Greffe]
«Je déclarepar la présenteque le Gouvernement de la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie, conformément au paragraphe 2 de I'ar-
ticle 36 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, reconnaît
commeobligatoirede plein droit et sans convention spéciale,àl'égard
de tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation, c'est-à-dire sous 17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the mainte-
nance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statute of the
Court;
18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that al1parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, includ-
ing humanitarian law;

19. Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have
jurisdiction over legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or
between other States to whom access to the Court has been granted;
whereas the Court has repeatedly stated "that one of the fundamental
principles of itsStatute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of those States to itsjurisdiction" (East Timor (Por-
tugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101,para. 26); and
whereas the Court can therefore exercise iurisdiction onlv between States
parties to a dispute who not only have access to the ~o;rt but also have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for the
individual dispute concerned ;
20. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate

such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court might
be established:

21. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute; whereas each of the two Parties has made a declaration recog-
nizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to that provi-
sion; whereas Yugoslavia's declaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on 26 April 1999,and that of Canada on
10 May 1994;

22. Whereas Yugoslavia's declaration is formulated as follows :

"1hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro- condition de réciprocité, ljuridiction de la Cour pour tous les diffé-
rends, surgissant ou pouvant surgir après la signature de la présente
déclaration, qui ont trait des situations ouà des faits postérieurà
ladite signatureàl'exceptiondesaffaires pour lesquelleslesparties ont
convenu ou conviendront d'avoir recours à une autre procédureou à
une autre méthode derèglement pacifique. La présentedéclaration
ne s'applique pas aux différends relatifsdes questions qui, en vertu
du droit international, relèvent exclusivementde la compétencedela

République fédéralede Yougoslavie, ni aux différendsterritoriaux.
L'obligation susmentionnée n'est acceptéeque pour une période
qui durera jusqu'à notification de l'intention d'y mettrein));

et que la déclaration du Canada se lit comme suit

«Au nom du Gouvernement du Canada,
1) Nous notifions par la présente l'abrogation de l'acceptation
par le Canada de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale
de Justice, acceptation qui ajusqu'à présentproduit effet en vertu de
la déclaration faite le 10 septembre 1985 en application du para-
graphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut de ladite Cour.

2) Nous déclaronsque le Gouvernement du Canada, conformé-
ment aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut de la
Cour, accepte comme obligatoire de plein droit et sans convention
spéciale,sous condition de réciprocité et jusqu'àce qu'il soit donné
notification de l'abrogation de cette acceptation, la juridiction de la
Cour en ce qui concerne tous les différendsqui s'élèveraientaprèsla
date de la présentedéclaration,au sujet de situations ou de faits pos-
térieursà ladite déclaration, autres que:

a) les différends au sujet desquels les parties en cause seraient
convenues ou conviendraient d'avoir recours àun autre mode de
règlement pacifique;
6) les différends avecle gouvernement d'un autre pays membre du
Commonwealth britannique des nations, différendsqui seront
réglésselon une méthode convenue entre les parties ou dont elles
conviendront ;
c) les différends relatiàsdes questions qui, d'après le droit inter-
national, relèvent exclusivementde la juridiction du Canada; et
d) lesdifférendsauxquels pourraient donner lieu lesmesures de ges-
tion et de conservation adoptées par le Canada pour les navires

pêchantdans la zone de réglementation de I'OPAN, telle que
définiedans la convention sur la future coopération multilatérale
dans les pêchesde l'Atlantique Nord-Ouest, 1978,et l'exécution
de telles mesures.
3) Le Gouvernement du Canada se réserve égalementle droit de
compléter,modifier ou retirer à tout moment l'une quelconque des
réserves formulées ci-dessuso, u toutes autres réservesqu'il pourrait LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 267

city, theurisdiction of the said Court in al1disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The

present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions
which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial
disputes.
The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may
be given to terminate the acceptance";

and whereas the declaration of Canada reads as follows

"On behalf of the Government of Canada.
(1) 1givenotice that 1hereby terminate the acceptance by Canada
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
hitherto effective by virtue of the declaration made on 10September

1985in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of
the Court.
(2) 1 declare that the Government of Canada accepts as compul-
sory ipsofacto and without special convention, on condition of reci-
procity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in con-
formity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court,
untilsuch time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance,
over al1disputes arising after the present declaration with regard to
situations or facts subsequent to this declaration, other than:

(a) disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall
agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settle-
ment;
(b) disputes with the Government of any other country which is a
member of the Commonwealth, al1of which disputes shall be
settled insuch manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree;

(c) disputes with regard to questions which by international law
fa11exclusivelywithin the jurisdiction of Canada; and

(d) disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and manage-
ment measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing
in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as defined in the Convention on
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, 1978,and the enforcement of such measures.

(3) The Government of Canada also reserves the right at any

time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, and with effect as from the moment of such268 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)

formuler par la suite, moyennant une notification adresséeau Secré-
taire généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies, les nouvelles
réserves,modifications ou retraits devant prendre effet à partir de la
date de ladite notification.
Nous vous prions de bien vouloir transmettre la présentenotifica-
tion aux gouvernements de tous les Etats qui ont acceptéla clause
facultative ainsi qu'au Greffier de la Cour internationaledeJustice));

23. Considérant que le Canada fait valoir que la compétence de la
Cour ne saurait êtrefondéesur le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut

de la Cour en l'espèce; qu'ilexpose que la déclarationyougoslaved'accep-
tation de la juridiction de la Cour, «de par ses termes mêmes, estinap-
plicable à des différendsnésavant le 25 avril [1999]»; qu'il précise à cet
égard que «[l]a description de l'objet du différenddont il est question
dans la requêteintroduite le 29 avril contre le Canada ne vise expressé-
ment aucun événement survenuaprèsle 25 avril ni aucun changement du
caractère du différend postérieura cette date)); et qu'il en conclut que
«[l]e différendauquel se réfèrele demandeur ..n'est donc aucunement
un différendsurgissant ou pouvant surgir après le 25 avril 1999));
24. Considérant que, selon la Yougoslavie, «le problème poséici a la
Cour est d'interpréterune déclarationunilatéraled'acceptation de sa juri-
diction, et donc de dégagerle sens de cette déclaration sur la base de
l'intention de son auteur)); considérant quela Yougoslavie soutient que le
texte de sa déclaration((permetde prendre en compte tous les différends
qui ont effectivement surgi postérieurementau 25 avril 1999));que, seréfé-
rant a des bombardements effectuéspar les Etats membres de I'OTAN les
28 avril, le' mai, 7 mai et 8 mai 1999, la Yougoslavie fait valoir que,

<c[dlans chacun de ces cas, qui ne sont que des exemples parmi d'autres »,
elle a «dénoncéles violations flagrantes du droit international dont elle
estime avoir été la victime)e)t lestats membres deI'OTANont niéavoir
violé unequelconque obligation de droit international)); que la Yougosla-
vie affirme que ((chacun de cesévénements a donc donnélieu a un ((désac-
cord sur un point de droit ou de fai», désaccorddont ..lestermes dépen-
dent à chaque fois des spécificités de l'attaque)) concernée; qu'elle en
déduit que,ces événementsconstituant des «délits instantanés)),il existe
((quantitéde différendsdistincts qui ont surgi))entre les Parties «après le
25 avril concernant des événements postérieurs a cette date)); et qu'elle en
conclut qu'«il n'existeaucune raison d'écarter,prima fucie, la compétence
de la Cour pour traiter des différends effectivement survenusaprès le
25 avril, conformémentau texte ...de la déclaration));et considérant que
la Yougoslavie ajoute qu'exclurecesdifférends delajuridiction de la Cour
((serait en totale contradiction avec l'intention manifesteet claire de la
Yougoslavie» de confier à la Cour le règlementdesdits différends;
25. Considérant que la Yougoslavie n'a accepté lajuridiction de la

Cour rutione temporis que pour ce qui est d'une part des différendssur-
gissant ou pouvant surgir après la signature de sa déclaration etd'autre
part de ceux qui concerneraient des situations ou des faits postérieurs a notification, either to add to, amend or withdraw any of the fore-
going reservations, or any that may hereafter be added.

It is requested that this notification be communicated to the Gov-
ernments of al1 the States that have accepted the Optional Clause
and to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice";

23. Whereas Canada contends that the jurisdiction of the Court can-
not be founded on Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court in

this case; whereas it argues that the Yugoslav declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court "is inapplicable by its own terms to disputes in
existence before 25 April [1999]";whereas it points out in this connection
that "[tlhere is nothing in the description of the subject-matter of the dis-
pute in the Application against Canada of 29 April that relates specifi-
cally to events subsequent to 25 April, or to any change in the character
of the dispute subsequent to that date"; and whereas Canada accordingly
concludes that "[tlhe dispute referred to in the Applicant's own pleading,
therefore, is not one arising or that may arise after 25 April 1999";
24. Whereas, according to Yugoslavia, "[tlhe issue before the Court is
that of interpreting a unilateral declaration of acceptance of itsjurisdic-
tion, and thus of ascertaining the meaning of the declaration on the basis
of the intention of itsuthor"; whereas Yugoslavia contends that the text
of its declaration "allows al1 disputes effectively arising after 25 April
1999 to be taken into account"; whereas, referring to bombing attacks
carried out by NATO member States on 28 April, 1 May, 7 May and

8 May 1999, Yugoslavia States that, "[iln each of these cases, which are
only examples, [it]denounced the flagrant violations of international law
of which it considered itself to have been the victim", and the "NATO
member States denied having violated any obligation under international
law"; whereas Yugoslavia asserts that "each of these events therefore
gave rise to 'a disagreement on a point of law or fact', a disagreement . . .
the terms of which depend in each case on the specific features of the
attack" in question; whereas Yugoslavia accordingly concludes that,
since these events constitute "instantaneous wrongful acts", there exist "a
number of separate disputes which have arisen" between the Parties
"since 25 April relating to events subsequent to that date"; and whereas
Yugoslavia argues from this that "[tlhere is no reason to exclude prima
facie the Court's jurisdiction over disputes having effectively arisen after
25 April, as provided in the text of the declaration"; and whereas Yugo-
slavia adds that to exclude such disputes from the jurisdiction of the
Court "would run entirely counter to the manifest and clear intention of
Yugoslavia" to entrust the Court with the resolution of those disputes;

25. Whereas Yugoslavia has accepted the Court's jurisdiction ratione
temporis in respect only, on the one hand, of disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of its declaration and, on the other hand, of
those concerning situations or facts subsequent to that signature (cf.269 LICEITÉDE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)

ladite signature (cf.Droit de passage sur territoire indien, fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 34); qu'aux fins d'apprécierla compétence de la
Cour en l'espèce,il suffit de déterminer si, conformément au texte de la
déclaration,le différendportédevant la Cour a «surgi» avant ou aprèsle
25 avril 1999,date à laquelle ladite déclaration a étésignée;

26. Considérant quela requête dela Yougoslavie est intitulée((Requête
de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie contre le Canada pour viola-
tion de l'obligation de ne pas recourirà l'emploi dela force)); que, dans
la requête,l'«objet du différend))(les italiques sont de la Cour) est décrit
en termes généraux(voir paragraphe 1ci-dessus); mais qu'il ressort tant
de l'exposé des«faits sur lesquels les demandes sont fondées))que de la
formulation de ces «demandes» elles-mêmes(voir paragraphes 3 et 4 ci-
dessus) que la requêteest dirigée,dans son essence, contre les ((bombar-
dements du territoire de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie», aux-
quels il est demandé à la Cour de mettre un terme;
27. Considérant qu'il est constant que les bombardements en cause

ont commencéle 24 mars 1999et se sont poursuivis, de façon continue,
au-delà du 25 avril 1999;et qu'il nefait pas de doute pour la Cour,au vu
notamment des débats du Conseil de sécurité des24 et 26 mars 1999
(SlPV.3988et 3989), qu'un ((différendd'ordre juridique)) (Timor oriental
(Portugal c. Australie), C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 100, par. 22) a «surgi»
entre la Yougoslavie et 1'Etat défendeur, comme avec les autres Etats
membres de l'OTAN, bien avant le 25 avril 1999,au sujet de la licéitde
ces bombardements comme tels, pris dans leur ensemble;
28. Considérant que la circonstance que ces bombardements se soient
poursuivis aprèsle 25 avril 1999et que le différendlesconcernant ait per-
sistédepuis lors n'est pasde nature à modifier la date àlaquelle le diffé-

rend avait surgi; que des différendsdistincts n'ont pu naître par la suite
l'occasion de chaque attaque aérienne; et qu'a ce stade de la procédure,
la Yougoslavie n'établitpas que des différendsnouveaux, distincts du dif-
férend initial,aient surgi entre les Parties aprèsle 25 avril 1999au sujet de
situations ou de faits postérieurs imputables au Canada;
29. Considérant que, comme la Cour l'a rappelé dans son arrêt du
4 décembre 1998 en l'affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries
(Espagne c. Canada),

«Il appartient à chaque Etat, lorsqu'il formule sa déclaration, de
décider des limites qu'il assigneson acceptation de lajuridiction de
la Cour: «la juridiction n'existe que dans les termes où elle a été
acceptée)) (Phosphutes du Maroc, arrêt, 1938, C. P.J.1. sérieAIB
n" 74, p. 23))) (C.I.JRecueil 1998, p. 453, par. 44);

et que, comme la Cour permanente l'a relevédans son arrêt du 14juin
1938dans l'affaire des Phosphates du Maroc (exceptions préliminaires),
«il est reconnu que, par l'effet de la condition de réciprocité inscriteau
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour», toute limitation
ratione temporis apportéepar l'une desparties à sa déclaration d'accepta-
tion de lajuridiction de la Cour «fait droit entre les parti(PhosphatesRight of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1960, p. 34); whereas, in order to assess whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion in the case, it is sufficient to decide whether in terms of the text of the
declaration, the dispute brought before the Court "arose" before or after
25 April 1999,the date on which the declaration was signed;
26. Whereas Yugoslavia's Application is entitled "Application of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Canada for Violation of the
Obligation Not to Use Force" ; whereas in the Application the "subject of
the dispute" (emphasis added) is described in general terms (see para-
graph 1 above); but whereas it can be seen both from the statement of
"facts upon which the claim is based" and from the manner in which the
"claims" themselves are formulated (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above) that
the Application is directed, in essence, against the "bombing of the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", to which the Court is
asked to put an end;
27. Whereas it is an established fact that the bombings in question
began on 24 March 1999 and have been conducted continuously over a
period extending beyond 25 April 1999; and whereas the Court has no
doubt, in the light, inter alia,of the discussions at the Security Council

meetings of 24 and 26 March 1999 (SlPV.3988 and 3989), that a "legal
dispute" (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 100,
para. 22) "arose" between Yugoslavia and the Respondent, as it did also
with the other NATO member States, well before 25 April 1999concern-
ing the legality of those bombings as such, taken as a whole;
28. Whereas the fact that the bombings have continued after 25 April
1999and that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is
not such as to alter the date on which the dispute arose; whereas each
individual air attack could not have given rise to a separate subsequent
dispute; and whereas, at this stage of the proceedings, Yugoslavia has
not established that new disputes, distinct from the initial one, have
arisen between the Parties since 25 April 1999 in respect of subsequent
situations or facts attributable to Canada;
29. Whereas, as the Court recalled in its Judgment of 4 December

1998in the case concerning Fislleries Jurisdiction (Spainv. Canada),

"It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon
the limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court: '[tlhisjurisdiction only exists within the limits within whichit

has been accepted' (Phosphutes in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I. J..
Series AIB, No. 74, p. 23)" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453, para. 44);
and whereas, as the Permanent Court held in its Judgment of 14 June
1938 in the Pl~osphatesin Morocco case (Preliminary Objections), "it is
recognized that, as a consequence of a condition of reciprocity stipulated
in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court", any limitation
ratione temporis attached by one of the Parties to its declaration of

acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction "holds good as between the Parties"du Maroc, arrêt,1938, C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no 74, p. 22); qu'en outre,
comme la présente Cour l'a noté dans son arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en
l'affaire de laFrontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le
Nigériu(Cameroun c. Nigéria), «[d]ès 1952,elle a jugédans l'affaire de
I'Anglo-lranian Oil Co. que, lorsque des déclarations sont faites sous
condition de réciprocité,((compétenceest conférée à la Cour seulement
dans la mesure où elles coïncident pour la lui conférer (C.I.J. Recueil

1952, p. 103)))(C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 298, par. 43); et considérant qu'il
découle de ce qui précèdeque les déclarations faites par les Parties
conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut ne constituent
pas une base sur laquelle la compétencede la Cour pourrait prima facie
êtrefondéedans le cas d'espèce;

30. Considérantque le Canada soutient aussi que la compétence dela
Cour en l'espèce nesaurait êtrefondée,primafacie, sur le paragraphe 2 de
l'article36du Statut, car la déclarationyougoslave d'acceptationde lajuri-
diction de la Cour«est manifestement entachéede nullité));que, se référant
à la résolution777 (1992), en date du 19 septembre 1992,du Conseil de
sécurité desNations Unies, età la résolution4711,en date du 22 septembre
1992, de l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies, il fait valoir que «[l]a
République fédérale de Yougoslavn i'estpas membre del'organisation des
Nations Unies en qualité d'Etat successeur)) età défaut d'avoirdûment

accédé à l'organisation, n'est par suite pas partie au Statut de la Cour;
31. Considérant que la Yougoslavie, se référant àla position du Secré-
tariat, telle qu'expriméedans une lettre en date du 29 septembre 1992du
conseiller juridique de l'organisation(doc. Al47/485), ainsi qu'à la pra-
tique ultérieurede celle-ci, soutient pour sa part que la résolution4711
de l'Assemblée généran le'a«pas [mis] finà l'appartenance de la Yougo-
slavieà l'Organisation et ne [l'a pas suspendue] non plus)), ladite réso-
lution n'ôtant pas à la Yougoslavie «le droit de participer aux travaux
d'organes autres que ceux qui relèventde l'Assembléegénérale));
32. Considérant que, eu égard à la conclusionà laquelle elle est par-
venue au paragraphe 29 ci-dessus, la Cour n'a pas à examiner cette
question à l'effet de décider si elle peut ou non indiquer des mesures
conservatoires dans le cas d'espèce;

33. Considérantque la Yougoslavie, dans sa requête, prétend en second

lieu fonder la compétencede la Cour sur l'article IX de la convention sur
le génocide,aux termes duquel:
«Les différendsentre les Parties contractantes relatiàsI'interpré-
tation, l'application ou l'exécutionde la présenteconvention, y com-
pris ceux relatifsla responsabilitéd'un Etat en matièrede génocide
ou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérésà l'articlIIIseront LEGALITYOF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 270

(Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 74,
p. 10);whereas, moreover, as the present Court noted in its Judgment of
11 June 1998in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), "[als early as
1952,it held in the caseconcerning Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.that, when dec-
larations are made on condition of reciprocity, 'jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court only to the extent to which the two Declarations coincide in
conferring it' (I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 103)"(1.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 298,
para. 43); and whereas it follows from the foregoing that the declarations
made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute do not
constitute a basis on which thejurisdiction of the Court could prima facie

be founded in this case;

30. Whereas Canada also contends that the jurisdiction of the Court
cannot be founded prima facie on Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute,
since the Yugoslav declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court "is
a transparent nullity"; whereas Canada, referring to United Nations
Security Council resolution 777 (1992) dated 19 September 1992and to
United Nations General Assembly resolution 4711dated 22 September
1992,argues that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a Member
of the United Nations as a successor State", and that, not having duly
acceded to the Organization, it is not in consequence a party to the Stat-
ute of the Court;
31. Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat, as
expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992from the Legal Counsel of
the Organization (doc. A/471485),and to the latter's subsequent practice,
contends for its part that General Assembly resolution 4711"[neither] ter-
minate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia's membership in the Organiza-
tion", and that the said resolution did not take away from Yugoslavia

"[its] right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly
bodies" ;
32. Whereas, in viewof its finding in paragraph 29 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;

33. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the second place,
to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article IX of the Genocide Con-
vention, which provides:

"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment ofthe present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the LICEITEDE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)

soumis a la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d'une partie
au différend» ;

et considérant que, dans sa requête,la Yougoslavie indique que l'objet du
différendporte notamment sur «les actes commis par le Canada, en viola-
tion de son obligation internationale...de ne pas soumettre intentionnel-
lement un groupe national à des conditions d'existencedevant entraîner sa
destruction physique));qu'en décrivantles faits sur lesquels la requêteest
fondée,la Yougoslavie précise: «Les actes susmentionnés ont poureffetde
soumettre intentionnellement un groupe ethnique à des conditions devant
entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle)); qu'en exposant les
fondementsjuridiques de la requête,ellesoutient que ((l'obligation..de ne

pas soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national à des conditions
d'existencedevant entraîner sa destruction physique a étéviolée));et que
l'une des demandes au fond contenues dans la requêteest ainsi formulée:
((qu'en prenant part aux activités énumérées ci-dessus e ent particu-
lier en causant des dommages énormes à l'environnement et en utili-

sant de l'uranium appauvri, le Canada a agi contre la République
fédérale de Yougoslaviee ,n violation de son obligation de ne pas sou-
mettre intentionnellement un groupe national à des conditions d'exis-
tence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle));
34. Considérant que la Yougoslavie soutient en outre que le bombar-

dement constant et intensif de l'ensemble de son territoire, y compris les
zones les plus peuplées,constitue «une violation grave de l'article II de la
convention sur le génocide));qu'elle fait valoir que «la pollution du sol,
de l'air et de l'eau, ladestruction de l'économiedu pays, la contamination
de l'environnement par de l'uranium appauvri reviennent à soumettre la
nation yougoslave à des conditions d'existence devant entraîner sa des-
truction physique)); qu'elle affirme que c'est la nation yougoslave tout
entière, en tant que telle, qui est prise pour cible; et qu'elle souligneque
le recoursà certaines armes, dont on connaît par avance lesconséquences
dommageables à long terme sur la santéet l'environnement, ou la des-
truction de la plus grande partie du réseaud'alimentation en électricité

du pays, dont on peut prévoird'avance lesconséquencescatastrophiques,
«témoigne[nt]implicitement de l'intention de détruire totalement ou par-
tiellement)) le groupe national yougoslave en tant que tel;
35. Considérant que le Canada soutient pour sa part que «les faits
alléguésdans la requêtene présententaucun lien véritable avecla conven-
tion sur le génocidequi est invoquée commebase de compétence)); que,
se référantà l'invocation par la Yougoslavie de l'alinéa c) de l'article II
de la convention, il fait observer que le génocide,«par essence, contient
deux éléments:l'intention et la destructioiz- la destruction de popula-
tions entières)); que le demandeur «n'a mêmepas tenté d'aborder la
question de l'intention)); et que

«c'est affaiblir la notion de génocide etnuireà son intégritéen tant
que principe autonome que d'assimiler celui-ci à l'utilisation de la International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute" ;

and whereas in its Application Yugoslaviastates that the subject ofthe dis-
pute concerns inter alia "acts of Canada by which it has violated its inter-
national obligation . . .not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calcu-
lated to cause the physical destruction of a national group"; whereas, in
describing the facts on which the Application is based, Yugoslavia states:
"The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions calculated
at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part";
whereas, in its statement of the legal grounds on which the Application is
based, Yugoslavia contends that "the obligation . .. not to impose delib-
erately on a national group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group has been breached"; and whereas one of

the claims on the merits set out in the Application isformulated as follows:
"by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by caus-
ing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted ura-
nium, Canada has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of lifecalculated to bring about its physical destruc-

tion, in whole or in part";
34. Whereas Yugoslavia contends moreover that the sustained and
intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily
populated areas, constitutes "a serious violation of Article II of the
Genocide Convention"; whereas it argues that "the pollution of soil, air
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the
environment with depleted uranium, inflicts conditions of life on the

Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction";
whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such
that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already
known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country's power
supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent
must be aware, "impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part7',the
Yugoslav national group as such;

35. Whereas for its part Canada contends that "the facts alleged in the
Application bear no genuine relation to the Genocide Convention which
is invoked as a basis for jurisdiction"; whereas Canada, referring to the
fact that Yugoslavia had invoked Article II (c) of the Convention,

observes inter aliathat "the essence of genocide is intention and destruc-
tion - the destruction of entire populations"; that the Applicant "did
not even attempt to address the question of intent"; and that

"this cheapensthe concept of genocide and deprives it of its integrity
asan autonomous principle to equate it with the use of force or even272 LICÉITÉDE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE (ORD. 2 VI 99)

force ou même à l'agression, ou encore aux dommages collatéraux
subis par des civils, ou aux problèmes soulevés enmatière de pro-
portionnalité de l'emploi de la force));

et considérantqu'ilen conclut que «la convention sur le génocide nesau-
rait donc constituerprimafacie une base de compétencepour lesmesures
sollicitées;
36. Considérant qu'il n'estpas contestéque tant la Yougoslavie que le
Canada sont parties à la convention sur le génocide,sans réserves; etque
I'article IX de la convention semble ainsi constituer une base sur laquelle
la compétence dela Cour pourrait êtrefondée,pour autant que l'objet du

différendait trait à ((l'interprétation, l'application ou l'exécution))de la
convention, ycompris lesdifférends((relatifs àla responsabilitéd'un Etat
en matière de génocideou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés
à l'article III» de ladite convention;
37. Considérant que, à l'effet d'établir,mêmeprima facie, si un diffé-
rend au sens de I'article IX de la convention sur le génocide existe, la
Cour ne peut se borner à constater que l'une desparties soutient que la
convention s'applique alors que l'autre le nie; et que, au cas particulier,
elledoit rechercher silesviolations de la convention alléguéepsar la You-
goslavie sont susceptibles d'entrer dans les prévisionsde cet instrument et
si, par suite, le différend estde ceux dont la Cour pourrait avoir compé-

tence pour connaître ratione materiae par application de l'article IX
(cf. Plates-formes pétrolières(Républiqueislumique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis
d'Amérique), exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II),
p. 810, par. 16);
38. Considérant que la définitiondu génocide, figurant à I'articleII de
la convention sur le génocide,se lit comme suit:

«Dans la présente convention,le génocide s'entend del'un quel-
conquedesactesci-après,commisdans l'intentiondedétruire,en tout ou
en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux,commetel
a) meurtre de membres du groupe;
b) atteinte grave à l'intégrité physiqueou mentale de membres du
groupe;

c) soumission intentionnelle du groupe a des conditions d'existence
devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;
d) mesures visant a entraver les naissances au sein du groupe;
e) transfert forcéd'enfants du groupe a un autre groupe»;
39. Considérant qu'il apparaît à la Cour, d'aprèscette définition,«que

la caractéristique essentielle du génocide est ladestruction intentionnelle
d'un ((groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux»» (Application de la
convention pour lapréventionet larépression du crime de génocidem , e-
sures conservatoires, ordonnance du 13 septembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil
1993, p. 345, par. 42); que le recours ou la menace du recours àl'emploi
de la force contre un Etat ne sauraient en soi constituer un acte de géno-
cide au sens de I'articleII de la convention sur le génocide;et que, de aggression, or with collateral damage suffered by civilians, or with
issues related to the proportionality of the use of force";

and whereas Canada accordingly concludes that "[tlhe Genocide Con-
vention cannot, therefore, provide prima facie jurisdiction for the meas-
ures sought" ;
36. Whereas it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and Canada are
parties to the GenocideConvention without reservation; and whereas Ar-
ticle IX of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a basis on
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the extent that
the subject-matter of the dispute relates to "the interpretation, applica-
tion or fulfilment" of the Convention, inciuding disputes "relating to the
responsibility of a statefor genocide or for any of the other acts enumer-
ated in article III" of the said Convention;
37. Whereas, in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dis-
pute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists,
the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains
that the Convention applies, while the other denies it; and whereas in the

present case the Court must ascertain whether the breaches of the Con-
vention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions
of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one
which the Court would have jurisdiction rutione materiae to entertain
pursuant to Article 1X (cf. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of Americu), Preliminury Objection, Judgment, 1.C.J.
Reports 1996 (II), p. 810, para. 16);
38. Whereas the definition of genocide set out in Article II of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
actscommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, assuch:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group ;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of lifecalculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group";
39. Whereas it appears to the Court, from this definition, "that the
essential characteristic of genocide is the intended destruction of 'a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group'" (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention und Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provi-
sionul Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993,

p. 345, para. 42); whereas the threat or use of force against a State can-
not in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II
of the Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court,273 LICÉITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)

l'avis de la Cour, il n'apparaît pas au présentstade de la procédure que
les bombardements qui constituent l'objet de la requête yougoslave
«comporte[nt] effectivement l'élémentd'intentionnalité, dirigé contre
un groupe comme tel, que requiert la disposition sus-citée)) (Licéitéde
lu menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires. avisconsultatif: C.I.J.
Recueil 1996 (I), p. 240, par. 26);
40. Considérant que la Cour n'est dèslors pas en mesure de conclure,
à ce stade de la procédure, que les actes que la Yougoslavie impute au

défendeur seraient susceptibles d'entrer dans les prévisionsde la conven-
tion sur le génocide;et que l'articleIX de la convention, invoqué par la
Yougoslavie, ne constitue partant pas une base sur laquelle la compé-
tence de la Cour pourrait prima facie être fondée dans le cas d'espèce;

41. Considérant qu'il résultede ce qui précèdeque la Cour n'a pas
prima furie compétencepour connaître de la requêtede la Yougoslavie;
et qu'elle ne saurait dèslors indiquer quelque mesure conservatoire que
ce soità l'effet de protégerles droits qui y sont invoqués;
42. Considérant toutefois que les conclusions auxquelles la Cour est
parvenue en la présenteprocédurene préjugenten rien la compétence de
la Cour pour connaître du fond de l'affaire, ni aucune question relativeà
la recevabilité de la requêteou au fond lui-même,et qu'elles laissent
intact le droit du Gouvernement yougoslave et du Gouvernement cana-
dien de faire valoir leurs moyens en la matière;

43. Considérant qu'ilexiste une distinction fondamentale entre la ques-
tion de l'acceptation par un Etat de la juridiction de la Cour et la com-
patibilitéde certains actes avec le droit international; la compétenceexige
le consentement; la compatibilité ne peut êtreappréciéeque quand la
Cour examine le fond, après avoir établisa compétence etentendu les

deux parties faire pleinement valoir leurs moyens en droit;
44. Considérant que les Etats, qu'ils acceptent ou non la juridiction
de la Cour, demeurent en tout état de cause responsables des actes
contraires au droit international, y compris au droit humanitaire, qui
leur seraient imputables;que tout différend relatifàla licéitde tels actes
doit être réglépar des moyens pacifiques dont le choix est laisséaux par-
ties conformément a l'article 33 de la Charte;
45. Considérant que dans ce cadre les parties doivent veiller à ne pas
aggraver ni étendrele différend;
46. Considérant que, lorsqu'un tel différend suscite une menacecontre
la paix, une rupture de la paix ou un acte d'agression, le Conseil de sécu-
ritéest investi de responsabilités spéciales envertu du chapitreVI1de la
Charte;does not appear at the present stageof the proceedings that the bombings
which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application "indeed entail the
element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above" (Legality of the Tl~reator Useof Nuclear Weapons, Adiii-
sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26);

40. Whereas the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this
stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the
Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by
Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case;

41. Whereas, it follows from what has been said above that the Court
lacks prima faciejurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's Application; and
whereas it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever
in order to protect the rights invoked therein;
42. Whereas, however, the findings reached by the Court in the present
proceedings in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the

Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the
admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and
whereas they leave unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugosla-
via and Canada to submit arguments in respect of those questions;

43. Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question
of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compat-
ibility of particular acts with international law; the former requires con-
sent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with
the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full
legal arguments by both parties;
44. Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the
Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them
that violate international law, including humanitarian law; whereas any
disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved
by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the
Charter, is left to the parties;
45. Whereas in this context the parties should take care not to aggra-
vate or extend the dispute;
46. Whereas, when such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace,

breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special
responsibilitiesunder Chapter VI1of the Charter;274 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD.2 VI 99)

47. Par ces motifs,

1) Par douze voix contre quatre,

Rejette la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée
par la République fédéralede Yougoslavie le 29 avril 1999;

POUR: M. Schwebel,présidentde lu Cour;MM. Oda, Bedjaoui,Guillaume,
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Mme Higgins,MM. Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,juges; M. Lalonde,juge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisantfonction de présidenten
l'affaire; MM.Shi,Vereshchetinjuges; M. Kreka,jugead hoc;

2) Par quinze voix contre une,

Réserve la suite de la procédure.
POUR: M. Weeramantry, vice-président,faisant fonction de président en
l'affaireM. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour;MM. Bedjaoui, Guillaume,
Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma,VereshchetinMme Higgins,
MM. Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, juges; MM. Lalonde, Kreca,jugesad
hoc ;
CONTRE :M. Oda, juge.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix,à La Haye, le deux juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-neuf, en
trois exemplaires, dontl'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour et
les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie et au Gouvernement du Canada.

Le vice-président,
(Signé) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY

Le greffier,
(SignéE )duardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

M. KOROMA j,ge, joint une déclaration a l'ordonnance.

M. ODA,Mme HIGGINSe ,t MM. PARRA-ARANGURE etNKOOIJMANS,
juges, joignent a l'ordonnance les exposésde leur opinion individuelle. 47. For these reasons,

(1) By twelve votes to four,
Rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submit-

ted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999;
INFAVOU R esidentSchwebel; JudgesOda, Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans;
Judge ad hoc Lalonde
AGAINST :ice-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; Judges Shi,
Vereshchetin;Judge ad hoc Kreéa;

(2) By fifteen votes to one,

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
IN FAVOUR :ice-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel; Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans ;Judges ad hoc Lalonde,Kreéa ;

AGAINS Tudge Oda

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousandine
hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in

the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Canada,
respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge KOROMA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.

Judges ODA, HIGGINS,PARRA-ARANGURa ENd KOOIJMANa Sppend
separate opinions to the Order of the Court.

19275 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OR2 VI 99)

M. WEERAMANTRvY ic,e-président, faisant fonction de président en
l'affaire, MM. SHIet VERESHCHETjIu g,es, et M. KRECAj,uge ad hoc,
joignentà l'ordonnance les exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé) C.G.W.

(Paraphé) E.V.O. Vice-President WEERAMANTRY A,cting President, Judges SHI and
VERESHCHET aId, Judge ad hoc KRECAappend dissenting opinions to
the Order of the Court.

(InitialledC.G.W.
(InitiulledE.V.O.

ICJ document subtitle

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Order of 2 June 1999

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