Judgment of 18 July 1966

Document Number
046-19660718-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA v. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

SECOND PHASE

JUDGMENT OF 18 JULY 1966

COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,

AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRES DU SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN
(ÉTHIOPIE c. AFRIQUE DU SUD;

LIBÉRIA c. AFRIQUE DU SUD)

DEUXIÈME PHASE

ARRÊT DU 18 JUILLET 1966 Officialcitation:
South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1966,p. 6.

Mode officielde citation:
Sud-Ouest africain, deuxième phasea,rrêt,C.I.J. Recup.6.1966,

( .Olde nv...: 299 / INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1966
1966
18 July
General List: 18 July 1966
Nos. 46 & 47

SOUTH WESTAFRICACASES

(ETHIOPIA 1,.SOUTH AFRICA;

LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)
SECOND PHASE

Alleged contraventionsof League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa-
Question of the legal status of the Applicarzts-Stagoverned by their position
asformer members of the League-Antecedent question arisingon the merits of

the case whethevApplicants, as individual States former members of the League,
have any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of theiv claim-Character
of the mandates systern within theframework of the League-Effecof Article 22
of the League Covenant instituting the systern generally-Obligationsof each
mandatory dejîned itz particular instvuments of mandate-Structure of these
instruments-Clauses conferring in respect of the mandated territory direct
cornn7ercialor other specialrights onLeague mernbersitztheir capacity asseparate
States-Clauses providing for the carrying out of the mandate as a "sacred trust
of civilization" in regard to the inhabitatlts of the territory-Mandaobliga-
tions under latter class of clarisesowed to League as an entity, not to member
States individually-Lack of any Iegal right for member States individually to
claimperformance of these obligations-Additionalrights not acquired by reason
of dissolution of the League.

Political, moral and humar~itarianconsiderations not in themselves genevative
of legal rights and obligatiorzs.
Jurisdictiotzal clause of the mandates-Effecof decision given by the Court
in 1962 on the question of ifs competence-Relationshipbetween decisions on a
preliminary objection and any question of merits-Znability in principle of juris-
dictional clauses to confer substantive rights-Capacto involceajurisdictional
clarisedoes not imply existence of arzylegal right or inferest relative to the merits of the clairn-Interpretationof jurisdictional clause of the mandates-Juris-
dictional clauses of the minorities treaties not comparable-Analyof League
practice in respect of mandates-Znconsistency with existence of rights now
clairnedby the Applicants.

Functions of a court of law-Lirnitof the teleologicalprinciple of interpreta-
tion-Court not entitled by way of interpretation to revise, rectify or supplement.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Percy SPENDER;Vice-President' WELLINGTON KOO;
Judges WINIARSKS I,PIROPOULO Sir, Gerald FITZMAURICKEO, RETSKY,
TANAKAJ,ESSUPM , ORELLIP,ADILLA NERVO,FORSTERG , ROS;Judges
ad hoc Sir Louis MBANEFO VAN WYK;Registrar AQUARONE.

In the South West Africa cases,

between
the Empire of Ethiopia,
represented by

H.E. Dr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy,
Hon. Ernest A. Gross, Member of the New York Bar,
as Agents,
assisted by
Hon. Edward R. Moore, Under-Secretary of State of Liberia,
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Frank G. Dawson, Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Richard A. Falk, Professor of International Law, Princeton University

and Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Arthur W. Rovine, Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. Neville N. Rubin, Lecturer in African Law at the School of Oriental and
African Studies of the University of London and Advocate of the Supreme
Court of South Africa,
as Adviser;
the Republic of Liberia,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Nathan Barnes,
Hon. Ernest A. Gross,
as Agents,

Hon. Edward R. Moore,
as Agent and Counsel,
5 assisted by

Mr. Keith Highet,
Mr. Frank G. Dawson,
Mr. Richard A. Falk,
Mr. Arthur W. Rovine,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. Neville N. Rubin,
as Adviser,

and
the Republic of South Africa,

represented by
Dr. J.P. verLoren van Themaat, S.C., Professor of International Law at the
University of South Africa and Consultant to the Department of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. R. G. McGregor, Deputy Chief State Attorney,

as Agents,
and by
Mr. R. F. Botha, Department of Foreign Affairs and Advocate of the
Supreme Court of South Africa,
as Agent and Adviser,

assisted by
Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. G. van R. Muller, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Dr. P. J. Rabie, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. E. M. Grosskopf, Member of the South African Bar,
Dr. H. J. 0. van Heerden, Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. A. S. Botha, Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. P. R. van Rooyen, Member of the South African Bar,

as Counsel,
and by
Mr. H. J. Allen, Department of Bantu Administration and Development,

Mr. H. Heese, Department of Foreign Affairs and Advocate of the Supreme

Court of South Africa,
as Advisers,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:

By its Judgment of 21 December 1962, the Court rejected the four prelimi-
nary objections raised by the Government of South Africà and found that it
had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute submitted to it
on 4 November 1960by the Applications of the Governments of Ethiopia and
Liberia. Time-limits for the filing of the further pleadings on the merits were
fixed or, at the request of the Parties, extended, by Orders ofFebruary 1963,
18 September 1963, 20 January 1964 and 20 October 1964; and the second
6phase of the cases became ready for hearing on 23 December 1964, when the
Rejoinder of the Government of South Africa was filed.
Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute, and the Order of the
Court of 20 May 1961, the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, acting in
concert, chose Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the Eastern Region of

Nigeria, to sit asJudgead hoc. In accordance with the same Article, the Govern-
ment of South Africa chose the Honourable J. T. van Wyk, Judge of the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, to sit as Judge ad hoc.
Both judges had sat in the first phase of the proceedings.

On 14 March 1965, the Government of South Africa notified the Court of
its intention to make an application to the Court relating to the composition
of the Court for the purposes of these cases. The said notification was duly
cornrnunicated to the Agents for the Applicants. The Court heard the conten-
tions of the Parties with regard to the application at closed hearings held on
15 and 16 March 1965 and decided not to accede to the application. This
decision was embodied in an Order of 18 March 1965.
Public sittings of the Court were heldduring the periods 15 March to 14July
and 20 September to 29 November 1965.
During these public sittings the Court heard the oral arguments and replies

to H.E. Mr. Nathan Barnes, Hon. Ernest A. Gross, Agents, and Hon. Edward
R. Moore, Agent and Counsel, on behalf of the Governments of Ethiopia and
Liberia and of Dr. J. P. verLoren van Themaat, S.C., Mr. R. F. Botha, Agents,
Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Mr.E. M. Grosskopf, Mr. G. van R. Muller, S.C.,
Mr. P. R. van Rooyen, Dr. H. J. 0. van Heerden and Dr. P. J. Rabie, S.C.,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of South Africa.
At the hearings from 27 April to 4 May 1965,the Cd)wt heard the views of
the Parties on a proposal made by counsel for South Africa at the hearing on
30 March 1965 to the effect that the Court should carry out an inspection
in loco in the Territory of South West Africa and also that the Court should
visit South Africa, Ethiopia and Li'beria,and one or two countries of theCourt's
own choosing south of the sahaka. At the hearing on 24 May 1965the President
announced that this request would not be deliberated on by the Court until
afteral1the evidence had been calied and the addresses of the Parties concluded.
At the public sitting on 29 November 1965the President announced that the

Court had decided not to accede to this request. This decision was embodied
in an Order of the same date.
At the hearing on 14 May 1965,the President announced that the Court was
unable to accede to a proposal made on behalf of Ethiopia and Liberia that
the Court should decide that South Africa, in lieu of calling witnesses or experts
to testify personally, should embody the evidence in depositions or written
statements. In the view of the Court, the Statute and Rules of Court cpnteni-
plated a right in a party to produce evidence by calling witnesses and experts,
and it must be left to exercise the right as it saw fit, subject to the provisions
of the Statute and Rules of Court.
At the hearings from 18June to 14July and from 20September to 21October
1965,the Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts called by the
Government of SouthAfricain reply to questions put to them in examination,
cross-examination and re-examination on behalf of the Parties, and by Members

of the Court. The following persons gave evidence: Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen,
Commissioner-General for the Northern Sotho; Professor E. van den Haag,
Professor of Social Philosophy at New York University; Professor J. P. van
S. Bruwer, Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University
71O SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

of Port Elizabeth; Professor R. F. Logan, Professor of Geography at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; Mr. P. J. Cillie, Editor of Die Burger, Cape
Town; The Rev. J. S. Gericke, Vice-Chairman of the Synod of the Dutch
Reformed Church of South Africa ana Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Stellenbosch; Professor D. C. Krogh, Head of the Department of Economics,

University of South Africa; Mr. L. A. Pepler, Director of Bantu Development
in South Africa; Dr. H. J. van Zyl, Deputy Secretary, Department of Bantu
Education; Dr. C. H. Rautenbach, Rector of the University of Pretoria; Mr.
K. Dahlmann, Editor of the Allgemeine Zeitung, Windhoek; Brigadier-General
S.L. A. Marshall, Chief Historian of theUnited States Army in various theatres;
Professor C. A. W. Manning, formerly Professor of International Relations,
University of London; Professor S. T. Possony, Director of International
Political Studies Programme, Hoover Institute, Stanford University.

In the course of the written proceedings, the following Submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On behavof the Governmetzts of Ethiopia and Liberia,

in the Applications:
"Wherefore, may it please the Court, to adjudge and declare, whether
the Government of the Union of South Africa is present or absent and
aftersuch time limitations as the Court may see fit to fix, that:

A. South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred
upon His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa, accepted by His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf
of the Government of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the
Council of the League of Nations on December 17, 1920; andthat the
aforesaid Mandate is a treaty in force, within the meaning of Article 37
of the Statute of the International Courtof Justice.
B. The Union of South Africa remains subject to the international
obligations set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations and in the Mandatefor South West Africa, and that the General

Assembly of the UnitedNations is legallyqualified to exercisethe super-
visory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with
regard to the administration of the Territory; and that the Union is
under an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the
General Assembly with regard to the exercise of the Mandate.
C. The Union of South Africa remains subject to the obligations to
transmit to the United Nations petitions from the inhabitants of the
Territory, aswell as to submit an annual report to the satisfaction of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 6 of the Mandate.

D. The Union has substantially modified the terms of the Mandate
without the consent of the United Nations; that such modification is a
violation of Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant;
and that the consent of the United Nations is a necessary prerequisite
and condition to attempts on the part of the Union directly or indirectly
to modify the terms of the Mandate.
E. The Union has failed to promote to the utmost the material and

moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory;
its failure to do so isa violation of Article 2of the Mandateand Article 22
812 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its deter-
minations";
in the Memorials:

"Upon the basis of the foregoing allegations of fact, supplemented by
such facts as may be adduced in further testimony before this Court, and
the foregoing statements of law, supplemented by such other statements
of law as may be hereinafter made, may it please the Court to adjudge and
declare, whether the Government of the Union of South Africa is present
or absent, that:

1. South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred upon
His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to
be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa, accepted by his Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the Council of
the League of Nations on December 17, 1920;
2. the Union of South Africa continues to have the international
obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
and in the Mandate for South West Africa as well as the obligation to

transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory
functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the annual
reports and the petitions are to be submitted;
3. the Union, in the respects set forth in Chapter V of this Memorial
and summarized in Paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof, has practised apaut-
heid, Le., has distinguished as to race, color, national or tribal origin in
establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the Territory; that
such practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the
Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and
that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid

in the Territory;

4. the Union, by virtue of the economic, political, social and educational
policies applied within the Territory, which are described in detail in
Chapter V of this Memorial and sumrnarized at Paragraph 190 thereof,
has failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and
social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure to do so
is in violation of its obligations as stated in the second paragraph of
Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the
Union has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to

take al1practicable action to fulfillits duties under such Articles;

5. the Union, by word and by action, in the respects set forth in Chapter
VI11of this Memorial, has treated the Territory in a manner inconsistent
with the international status of the Territory, and has thereby impeded
opportunities for self-determination by the inhabitants of the Territory;
that such treatment is in violation of the Union's obligations as stated in
the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the
Covenant;that the Union hasthe duty forthwith to cease the actions sum-

marized in Section C of Chapter VI11herein, and to refrain from similar
actions in the future; and that the Union has the duty to accord full faith
and respect to the international status of the Territory; 6. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapter VI1 herein, has
established rnilitary baseswithin the Territory in violation of itsobligations
as stated in Article4 of the Mandate and Article 22of theCovenant; that
the Union has the duty forthwith to remove al1such rnilitary bases from
within the Territory; and that the Union has the duty to refrain from the
establishment of military bases within the Territory;

7. the Union has failed to render to the General Assembly of the United
Nations annual reports containing informatioil with regard to the Territory
and indicating the measures it has taken to carry out its obligations under
the mandate; that suc11failure is a violation of its obligations as stated
in Article 6 of the Mafidate; and that the Union has the duty forthwith
to render such annual reports to the General Assembly;

8. the Union has failed to transmit to the General Assembly of the
United Nations petitions from the lerritory's inhabitants addressed to
the General Assembly; that such failure is a violation of its obligations as
Maiidatory; and that the Unioii has the duty to transmit such pîtiîions
to the General Assembly;

9. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapters V, VI, VI1and
VJII of this Memorial coupled with its intent as recounted herein, has
attempted to modify substantially the terrns of the Mandate, without
the consent of the United Nations; that such attempt is in violation of its
dutiesas stated in Article7 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant;
and that the consent of the United Nations is a necessary prerequisite
and condition precedent to attempts on the part of the Union directly
or indirectly to modify the terms of the Mandate.

The Applicant reserves the right to request the Court to declare and
adjudge in respect to events which rnay occur subsequent to the date this
Memorial is filed, including any event by which the Union's juridical and
constitutional relationship to Her Britannic Majesty undergoes any sub-
stantial modification.
May it also please the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it
rnay deem fit and proper in regard to this Mcmorial, and to rnake al1

necessary awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate
its determinations";
in the Reply:

"Upon the basis of the allegations of fact in the Mcmorials, supple-
mented by those set forth herein or which rnay subsequently be adduced
before this HonourableCourt,and the staternents of law pertainingthereto,
asset forth in the Memorials and in this Reply, or by such other staternents
as hereafter rnay be made, Applicants respectfully reiterate their prayer
that the Court adjudge and declare in accordance with, and on the basis
of, the Submissions set forth in the Memorials, which Submissions are
hereby reaffirmed and incorporated by reference herein.

Applicants further reserve the right to request the Court to declare and
adjudge in respect of events which rnay occur subsequent to the date of
filing of this Reply.

Applicants further reiterate and reaffirm their prayer that it rnay please
the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it rnay deem fit and proper
in regard to the Memorials or to this Reply, and to make al1 necessary
11 awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its deter-
minations."

On behaifof the Government of South Africa,
in the Counter-Memorial:

"Upon the basis of the statements of fact and law as set forth in the
several Volumes of this Counter-Memorial, may it please the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Submissions of the Governments of Ethiopia
and Liberia as recorded at pages 168 to 169 of their Memorials are un-
founded and that no declaration be made as claimed by them.
In particular Respondent submits:
1. That the whole Mandate for South West Africa lapsed on the disso-
lution of the League of Nations, and that Respondent is, in consequence
thereof, no longer subject to any legal obligations thereunder.

2. In the alternative to (1) above, and in the event of it being held that
the Mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the
League of Nations:
(a) Relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 2, 7 and 8,
that Respondent's former obligations under the Mandate to report
and account to, and to submit to the supervision of, the Council of
the League of Nations, lapsed upon the dissolution of the League,
and have not been replaced by any similar obligations relative to
supervision by any organ of the United Nations or any other organi-
zation or body. Respondent is therefore under no obligation to submit
reports concerning its administration of South West Africa, or to
transmit petitions fromtheinhabitants of that Territory, to the United

Nations or any other body;

(b) Relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9,
that Respondent has not, in any of the respects alleged, violated its
obligations as stated in the Mandate or in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations";
in the Rejoinder:

"1. Upon the basis of the statements of law and fact set forth in the
Counter-Mernorial, as supplemented in this Rejoinder and as may here-
after be adduced in further proceedings, Respondent reaffirms the Sub-
missions made in the Counter-Memorial and respectfully asks that such
Submissions be regarded as incorporated herein by reference.

2. Respondent further repeats its prayer that it may please the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Submissions of the Governments of Ethiopia
and Liberia, as recorded in the Memorials and as reaffirmed in the Reply,
are unfounded, and that no declaration be made as claimed by them."

In the oral proceedings the following Submissions were presented by the
Parties:

On behaifof the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia,
at the hearirig on 19 May 1965:
12 "Upon the basis of allegations of fact, and statements of law set forth
in the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein, may it please the
Court to adjudge and declare, whether the Government of the Republic
of South Africa is present or absent, that:

(1) South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred
upon His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa, accepted by His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of
the Government of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the
Council of the League of Nations on 17 December 1920;
(2) Respondent continues to have the international obligations stated
in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate
for South West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from

the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised
by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are
to be submitted;
(3) Respondent, by laws and regulations, and officia1 methods and
measures, which are set out in the pleadings herein, has practised apartheid,
Le., has distinguished as to race, colour, national or tribal origin in estab-
lishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the Territory; that such
practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Man-
date and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that
Respondent has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in
the Territory ;

(4) Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social and educational
policies applied within the Territory, by means of laws and regulations,
and officia1methods and rneasures, which are set out in the pleadings
herein, has, in the light of applicable international standards or inter-
national legal norm, or both, failed to promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Terri-
tory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in
Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that Res-
pondent has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to
take al1practicable action to fulfil its duties under such Articles;

(5) Respondent, by word and by action, has treated the Territory in a
rnanner inconsistent with the international status of the Territory, and
has thereby impeded opportunities for self-determination bythe inhabitants
of the Territory: that such treatrnent is in violation of Respondent's
obligations as siated in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the-p an date
and Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty forthwith
to cease such actions, and to refrain frorn sirnilar actions in the future;
and that Respondent has the duty to accord full faith and respect to the
international status of the Territory;

(6) Respondent has established military bases within the Territory in
violation of its obligations as stated in Article 4 of the Mandate and
Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty forthwith to
rernove al1such military bases frorn within the Territory; and that Respon-
dent hasthe duty to refrain fromthe establishment of military bases within
the Territory ; (7) Respondent has failed to render to the General Assembly of the
United Nations annual reports containing information with regard to the
Territory and indicating the measures it has taken to carry out its obliga-
tions under the Mandate; that such failure is a violation of its obligations
as stated in Article 6 of the Mandate; and that Respondent has the duty
forthwith to render such annual reports to the General Assembly;

(8) Respondent has failed to transmit to the General Assembly of the
United Nations petitions fromthe Territory's inhabitants addressed to the
General Assembly; that such failure is a violation of its obligations as
Mandatory; and that Respondent has the duty to transmit such petitions
to the General Assembly;
(9) Respondent has attempted to modify substantially the terms of the

Mandate, without the consent of the United Nations; that such attempt
is in violation of its duties as stated in Article 7 of the Mandate and Article
22 of the Covenant; andthat the consent of the United Nations is a neces-
sary prerequisite and condition precedent to attempts on thepart of Respon-
dent directly or indirectly to modify the terms of the Mandate.

May it also please the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it
may deem fit and proper in regard to these submissions, and to make al1
necessary awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its
determinations."

On behaifof the Govevnment of South Afvica,

at the hearing on 5 November 1965:
"We repeat and re-affirm Our submissions, as set forth in Volume 1,
page 6, of the Counter-Memorial and confirmed in Volume II, page 483,
of the Rejoinder. These submissions can be brought up-to-date without
any amendments of substance and then they read as follows:

Upon the basis of the statements of fact and law as set forth in Re-
spondent's pleadings and the oral proceedings, may it please the Court
to adjudge and declare that the submissions of the Governments of Ethio-
pia and Liberia, as recorded at pages 69-72 of the verbatim record of
19 May 1965, C.R. 65/35, are unfounded and that no declaration be made
as claimed by them.
In particular, Respondent submits-
(1) That the whole Mandate for South West Africa lapsed on the dis-
solution of the League of Nations and that Respondent is, in consequence
thereof, no longer subject to any legal obligations thereunder.

(2) In the alternative to (1)bove, and in the event of it being held that
the Mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the
League of Nations:
(a) Relative to Applicants' submissions numbers 2, 7 and 8,
that the Respondent's former obligations under the Mandate to report
and account to, and to submit to the supervision, of the Council of the
League of Nations, lapsed upon the dissolution of the League, and
have not been replaced by any similar obligations relative to super-
vision by any organ of the United Nations or any other organization
or body. Respondent is therefore under no obligation to submit reports concerning its administration of South West Africa, or to
Nations or any other body;habitantsofthat Territory,to the United

(6) Relative to Applicants' submissions numbers 3, 4, 5, 6and 9,
thatthe Respondenthasnot, in any ofthe respectsalleged,violatedits
obligationsas stated in the Mandate or in Artic22of the Covenant
of the Leagueof Nations."

1. In the present proceedings the two applicant States, the Empire of

Ethiopia and the Republic of Liberia (whose cases are identical and will
for present purposes be treated as one case), acting in the capacity of
States which were rnembers of the former League of Nations, put
forward various allegations of contraventions of the League of Nations
Mandare for South West Africa, said to have been committed by the
respondent State, the Republic of South Africa, as the administering
authority.
2. In an earlier phase of the case, which took place before the Court in
1962, four preliminary objections were advanced, based on Article 37
of the Court's Statute and thejurisdictional clause(Article 7,paragraph 2)
of the Mandate for South West Africa, which were al1of them argued by
the Respondent and treated by the Court as objections to its jurisdiction.
The Court, by its Judgment of 21 December 1962,rejected each of these

objections, and thereupon found that it had "jurisdiction to adjudicate
upon the merits of the dispute".
3. In the course of the proceedings on the merits, comprising the ex-
change of written pleadings, the oral arguments of the Parties and the
hearing of a considerable number of witnesses, the Parties put forward
various contentions on such matters as whether the Mandate for South
West Africa was still in force,-and if so, whether the Mandatory's
obligation under Article 6 of the Mandate to furnish annual reports
to the Council of the former League of Nations concerning its ad-
ministration of the mandated territory had become transformed by one
means or another into an obligation to furnish such reports to the
General Assembly of the United Nations, or had, on the other hand,
lapsed entire1y;-whether there had been any contravention by the

Respondent of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate which
required the Mandatory to "promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territoryV,-whether there had been any contravention of Article 4 of
the Mandate, prohibiting (except for police and .local defence purposes)
the "military training of the natives", and forbidding the establishment
of military or naval bases, or the erection of fortifications in the territory.
The Applicants also alleged that the Respondent had contravened
paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Mandate (which provides that the Man-
date can only be modified with the consent of the Council of the League

15of Nations) by attempting to modify the Mandate without the consent
of the General Assembly of the United Nations which, so it was con-

tended, had replaced the Council of the League for this and other pur-
poses. There were other allegations also, which it is not necessary to
set out here.
4. On al1these matters, the Court has studied the written pleadings
and oral arguments of the Parties, and has also given consideration
to the question of the order in which the various issues would fa11to be
dealt with. In this connection, there was one matter that appertained
to the merits of the case but which had an antecedent character, namely
the question of the Applicants' standing in the present phase of the
proceedings,-not, that is to say, of their standing before the Court
itself, which was the subject of the Court's decision in 1962, but the
question, as a matter of the merits of the case, of their legal right or
interest regarding the subject-matter of their claim, as set out in their
final submissions.
5. Despite the antecedent character of this question, the Court was
unable to go into it until the Parties had presented their arguments
on the other questions of merits involved. The same instruments are

relevant to the existence and character of the Respondent's obligations
concerning the Mandate as are alsorelevant to the existence and character
of the Applicants' legal right orinterest in that regard. Certain humani-
tarian principles alleged to affcct the nature of the Mandatory's obliga-
tions in respect of the inhabitants of the mandated territory were also
pleaded as a foundation for the right of the Applicants to claim in their
own individual capacities the performance of those same obligations.
The implications of Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Mandate, referred to
above, require to be considered not onlyin connection with paragraph (9)
and certain aspects of paragraph (2) of the Applicants' final submis-
sions, but also, as will be seen in due course, in connection with that
of the Applicants' standing relative to the merits of the case. The ques-
tion of the position following upon the dissolution of the League of
Nations in 1946has the same kind of double aspect, and so do other
matters.
6. The Parties having dealt with al1the elements involved, it became

the Court's duty to begin by considering those questions which had
such a character that a decision respecting any of them might render
unnecessary an enquiry into other aspects of the matter. There are two
questions in the present case which have this character. One is whether
the Mandate still subsists at all, as the Applicants maintain that it does
in paragraph (1) of their final submissions; for if it does not, then
clearly the various allegations of contraventions of the Mandate by the
Respondent fa11 automatically to the ground. But this contention,
namely as to the continued subsistence of the Mandate, is itself part of
the Applicants' whole claim as put forward in their final submissions,
being so put forward solely in connection with the remaining parts of
the claim, and as the necessary foundation for these. For this reason
the other question, which (as already mentioned) is that of the Appli- cants' legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim, is even
more fundamental.

7. It is accordingly to this last question that the Court must now turn.
Before doing so however, it should be made clear that when, in the

present Judgment, the Court considers what provisions of the Mandate
for South West Africa involve a legal right or interest for the Applicants,
and what not, it does so without pronouncing upon, and wholly without
prejudice to, the question of whether that Mandate is still in force.
The Court moreover thinks it necessary to state that its 1962 decision
on the question of competence was equally given without prejudice to
that of the survival of the Mandate, which is a question appertaining
to the merits of the case. It was not in issue in 1962,except in the sense
that survival had to be assumed for the purpose of determining the
purely jurisdictional issue which was al1that was then before the Court.
It was made clear in the course of the 1962proceedings that it was upon
this assumption that the Respondent was arguing the jurisdictional issue;
and the same view is reflected in the Applicants' final submissions (1)
and (2) in the present proceedings, the effect of which is to ask the
Court to declare (inter alia) that the Mandate still subsists, and that
the Respondentis still subject to the obligations it provides for. It is,cor-
respondingly, a principal part of the Respondent's case on the meritsthat

since(asitcontends) the Mandate no longer exists, the Respondenthas no
obligations under it, and thereforecannot be in breach of the Mandate.
~hi~isamatter which, for reasons to be given later in another connection,
but equally applicable here, could not have been the subject of any final
determination by a decision on a purely preliminary point of jurisdiction.
8. The Respondent's final submissions in the present proceedings ask
simply for a rejection of those of the Applicants, both generally and in
detail. But quite apart from the recognized right of the Court, implicit
in paragraph 2 of Article 53 of its Statute, to selectproprio inotu the
basis of its decision, the Respondent did in the present phase of the case,
particularly in its written pleadings, deny that the Applicants had any
legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim,-a denial
which, at this stage of the case, clearly cannot have been intended merely
as an argument against the applicability of the jurisdictional clause of
the Mandate. In its final submissions the Respondent asks the Court,
upon the basis, interalia, of "the statements of fact and law as set forth

in [its] pleadings and the oral proceedings", to make no declaration
as claimed by the Applicants in their final submissions.

9. The Court now comes to the basis of its decision in the present
proceedings. In order to lead up to this, something must first be said
about the structure characterizing the Mandate for South West Mrica,
17in common with the other various mandates; and here it is necessary to
stress that no true appreciation of the legal situation regarding any
particular mandate, such as that for South West Africa, can be arrived
at unless it is borne in mind that this Mandate was only one amongst
a number of mandates, the Respondent only one amongst a number
of mandatories, and that the salient features of the mandates system as
a whole were, with exceptions to be noted where material, applicable

indifFerently to al1the mandates. The Mandate for South West Africa
was not a special case.

10. The mandates system, as is well known, was formally instituted by
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. As there indicated,
there were to be three categories of mandates, designated as 'A','B'and
'C' mandates respectively, the Mandate for South West Africa being
one of the 'C' category. The differences between these categories lay
in the nature and geographical situation of the territories concerned,
the state of development of their peoples, and the powers accordingly
to be vested in the administering authority, or mandatory, for each
territory placed under mandate. But although it was by Article 22
of the League Covenant that the system as such was established, the
precise terms of each mandate, covering the rights and obligations
of the mandatory, of the League and its organs, and of the individual
members of the League, in relation to each mandated territory, were

set out in separate instruments of mandate which, with one exception
to be noted later, took the form of resolutions of the Council of the
League.
11. These instruments, whatever the differencesbetween certain oftheir
terms, had various features in common as regards their structure. For
present purposes, their substantive provisions may be regarded as falling
into two main categories. Onthe one hand, and of course as the principal
element of each instrument, there were the articles defining the manda-
tory's powers, and its obligations in respect of the inhabitants of the
territory and towards the League and its organs. These provisions,
relating to the carrying out of the mandates as mandates, will hereinafter
be referred to as "conduct of the mandate7', or simply "conduct"
provisions. On the other hand, there were articles conferring in different
degrees, according to the particular mandate or category of mandate,
certain rights relative to the mandated territory, directly upon the
members of the League as individual States, or in favour of their
nationals. Many of these rights were of the same kind as areto be found

in certain provisions of ordinary treaties of commerce, establishment
and navigation concluded between States. Rights of this kind will
hereinafter be referred to as "special interests" rights, embodied in the
"special interests" provisions of the mandates. As regards the 'A' and
'B' mandates (particularly the latter) these rights were numerous and
figured prominently-a fact which, as will be seen later, is significant
for the case of the 'C' mandates also, even though, in the latter case,
18they were confined to provisions for freedom for missionaries ("nationals
of any State Member of the League of Nations") to "enter into, travel
and reside in the territory for theurpose of prosecuting their calling9'-
(Mandate for South West Africa, Article 5). In the present case, the
dispute between the Parties relates exclusivelyto the former of these two
categories of provisions, and not to the latter.

12. Thebroad distinctionjust noticed wasa genuine,indeed an obvious
one. Even if it may be the case that certain provisions of some of the
mandates (such as for instance the "open door" provisions of the 'A'

and 'B'mandates) can be regarded as having a double aspect, this does
not affect the validity or relevance of the distinction. Such provisions
would, in their "conduct of the mandate" aspect, fa11under that head;
and in their aspect of affordingcommercialopportunities for members of
the League and their nationals, they would come under the head of
"special interests" clauses. It is natural that commercial provisions of
this kind could redound to the benefit of a mandated territory and its
inhabitants in so far as the use made of them by States members of the
League had the effect of promoting the economic or industrial develop-
ment of the territory. In that sense and to that extent these provisions
could no doubt contribute to furthering the aims of the mandate; and
their due implementation bythe mandatories wasin consequencea matter
of concern to the League and its appropriate organs dealing with man-
dates questions. But this was incidental, and was never their primary
object. Their primary object was to benefit the individual members of
the League and their nationals. Any action or intervention on the part
of member States in this regard would be for that purpose-not in

furtherance of the mandate as such.
13. In addition to the classesof provisions so far noticed, everyinstru-
ment of mandate contained ajurisdictional clausewhich,with a singleex-
ception to be noticed in due course, was in identical terms for each man-
date, whether belonging to the 'A','B'or 'C'category. The language and
effectofthis clausewill beconsidered later; but it provided for a reference
of disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice and, so the
Court found in the first phase of the case, as already mentioned, this
reference was now, by virtue of Article 37 of the Court's Statute, to be
construed as a reference to the present Court. Another feature of the
mandates generally, was a provision according to which thsir terms
could not be modified without the consent of the Council of the League.
A further element, though peculiar to the 'C'mandates, may be noted:
it was provided both by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League and
by a provision of the instruments of 'C'mandates that, subject to certain

conditions not here material, a 'C' mandatory was to administer the
mandated territory "as an integral portion of its own territory". 14. Having regard to the situation thus outlined, and in particular to
the distinction to be drawn between the "conduct" and the "special
interests" provisions of the various instruments of mandate, the question
which now arises for decision by the Court is whether any legal riglzt
or interest exists for the Applicants relative to the Mandate, apart
from such as they may have in respect of thelatter category of provisions;
-a matter on which the Court expresses no opinion, since ihis category
is not in issue in the present case. In respect of the former category-xhe
"conduct" provisions-the question which has to be decided is whether,

according to the scheme of the mandates and of the mandates system
as a whole, any legal right or interest (which is a different thing from
a political interest) was vested in the members of the League of Nations,
including the present Applicants, individually and each in its own
separate right to cal1for the carrying out of the mandates as regards
their "conduct" clauses;-or whether this function must, rather, be
regarded as having appertained exclusivelyto the League itself, and not
to each and every member State, separately and independently. Tnother
words, the question is whether the various mandatories had any direct
obligation towards the other members of the League individually, as
regards the carrying out of the "conduct" provisions of the mandates.

15. If the answer to be given to this question should have the effect
that the Applicants cannot be regarded as possessing the legal right or
interest claimed, it would follow that even if the various allegations of
contraventions of the Mandate for South West Africa on the part of

the Respondent were established, the Applicants would still not be
entitled to the pronouncements and declarations which, in their final
submissions, they ask the Court to make. This is no less true in respect
of their ha1 submissions (1) and (2) than of the others. In these two
submissions, the Applicants in substance affirm, and ask the Court to
declare, the continued existence of the Mandate and of the Respondent's
obligations thereunder. In the present proceedings however, the Court
is concerned with the final submissions of the Applicants solely in the
context of the "conduct" provisions of the Mandate. It has not to
pronounce upon any of the Applicants' final subrnissions as these might
relate to any question of "special interests" if a claim in respect of
these had been made. The object of the Applicants' submissions (1) and
(2) is to provide the basis for their remaining submissions, which are
made exclusively in the context of a claim about provisions concerning
which the question immediately arises whether they are provisions in
respect of which the Applicants have any legal right or interest. If the
Court finds that the Applicants do have such a right or interest, it would

then be called upon to pronounce upon the first of the Applicants'
ha1 submissions-(continued existence of the Mandate), since if that
one should be rejected, the rest would automatically fa11to the ground.
If on the other hand the Court should find that such a right or interest
does not exist, it would obviously be inappropriate and misplaced to
make any pronouncement on this first submission of the Applicants, or
20on the second, sincein the context of the present case the question of the

continued existenceof the Mandate, and of the Respondent's obligations
thereunder, would arise solely in connection with provisions concerning
which the Court had found that the Applicants lacked any legal right
or iiiterest.

16. It is in their capacityas former members of the League of Nations
that the Applicants appear before the Court; and the rights they claim
are those that the members of the League are said to have been invested
with in the time of the League. Accordingly, in order to determine
what the rights and obligations of the Parties relative to the Mandate
were and are (supposing it still to be in force, but without prejudice to
that question); and in particular whether (as regards the Applicants)
these include aily right individually to call for the due execution of the
"coi~duct" provisions, and (for the Respondent) an obligation to be

answerable to the Applicants in respect of its administration of the
Mandate, the Court must place itself at the point in time wheil the
mandates system was being instituted, and when the instruments of
maildate were being framed. The Court must have regard to the situation
as it was at that time, which was the critical one, and to the intentions
of those concerned as they appear to have existed, or are reasonably
to be inferred, in the light of that situation. Intentions that might have
been formed if the Mandate had been framed at a much later date,
and in the knowledge of circumstances, such as the eventual dissolution
of the League and its aftermath, that could never originally have been
foreseen, are not relevant. Only on this basiscan a correct appreciation
of the legal rights of the Parties be arrived at. This view is supported by
a previous finding of the Court (Rights of United States Nationals in
Morocco, I.C.J. Reports 1952, at p. 189),the effect-of which is that the
meaning of a juridical notion in a historical context, must be sought by
reference to the way in which that notion was understood in that context.
17. It follows that any enquiry into the rights and obligations of the

Parties in the present case must proceed principally on the basis of
considering, in the setting of their period, the texts of the instruments
and particular provisions intended to give juridical expression to the
notion of the "sacred trust of civilization" by instituting a mandates
system.
18. The enquiry must pay no less attention to the juridical character
and structure of the institution, the League of Nations, within the
framework of which the mandates system was organized, and which
inevitablydeterminedhowthis systemwasto operate,-by what methods,
-through what channels,-and by means of what recourses. One
fundamental element of this juridical character and structure, which in
a sense governed everything else, was that Article 2 of the Covenant
provided that the "action of the League under this Covenant shall be
effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council,with a permanent Secretariat". If the action of the League as a whole
was thus governed, it followed naturally that the individual member
States could not themselves act differently relative to League matters,
unless it was otherwise specially so provided by some article of the
Covenant.

19. As is well known, the mandates system originated in the decision
taken at the Peace Conference following upon the world war of 1914-
1918, that the colonial territories over which, by Article 119 of the

Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced "au her rights and titles" jn
favour of the then Principal AUied and Associated Powers, should not
be annexed by those Powers or by any country affiliated to them, but
should be placed under an international régime,in the application to
the peoples of those territories, deemed "not yet able to stand by them-
selves", of the principle, declared by Article 22 of the League Covenant,
that their "weU-beingand development" should form "a sacred trust of
civilization".
20. The type of régime specified by Article 22 of the Covenant as
constituting the "best method of giving practical effectto this principle"
was that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced
nations ... who are willing to accept it7',-and here it was specifically
added that it was to be "on behalf of the League" that "this tutelage
shouldbe exercisedbythose nations as Mandatories". It was not provided
that the mandates should, either additionally or in the alternative, be
exercised on behalf of the members of the League in their individual
capacities. The mandatories were to be the agents of, or trustees for

the League,-and not of, orfor, each and everymember of it individually.
21. The same basic idea was expressed again in the thirdparagraph of
the preamble to the instrument of mandate for South West Africa,
where it was recited that the Mandatory, in agreeing to accept the
Mandate, had undertaken "to exercise it on behalf of the League of
Nations". No other behalf was specified in which the Mandatory had
undertaken, either actually or potentially, to exercise the Mandate.
The effect of this recital, as the Courtees it, was to register an implied
recognition (a) on the part of the Mandatory of the right of the League,
acting as an entity through its appropriate organs, to require the due
execution of the Mandate in respect of its "conduct" provisions; and
(b) on the part of both the Mandatory and the Council of the League,
of the character of the Mandate as a juridical régime set within the
framework of the League as an institution. There was no similar recogni-
tion of any right as being additionally and independently vested in any
other entity, such as a State, or as existing outside or independently of
the League as an institution; nor was any undertaking at al1given by
the Mandatory in that regard.

22. It was provided by paragraph 1of Article 22 of the Covenant that
ccse~~ritiesor the performance" of the sacred trust were to be "embodied
22 in this Covenant". This important reference to the f'performance" of
the trust contemplated, as itsaid, securities to be afforded by the Cove-
nant itself. By paragraphs 7 and 9 respectively of Article 22, every
mandatory was to "render to the Council [of the League-not to any
other entity] an annual report in reference to the territory committed
to its charge";and a permanent commission, which came to be known
as the Permanent Mandates Commission, was to be constituted "to
receive and examine" these annual reports and "to advise the Council
on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates". The Perma-
nent Mandates Commission alone had this advisory role, just as the
Council alone had the supemisory function. The Commission consisted

of independent experts in their own right, appointed in their persona1
capacity as such, not as representing any individual member of the
League or the member States generally.
23. The obligation to furnish annual reports was reproduced in the
instruments of mandate themselves, where it was stated that they were
to be rendered "to the satisfaction of the Council". Neither by the
Covenant nor by the instruments of mandate, was any role reserved to
individual League members in respect of these reports, furnishable to
the Council, and referred by it to the Permanent Mandates Commission.
It was the Council that had to be satisfied, not the individual League
members. The part played by the latter, otherthan such as weremembers
of the Council, was exclusivelythrough their participation in the work
of the Assembly of the League when, acting under Article 3 of the
Covenant, that organ exercisedin respect ofmandatesquestionsits power
to deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League".
It was as being within the sphere of the League as an institution that
mandates questions were dealt with by its Assembly.

24. Thesethen werethe methods, andthe only methods, contemplated
by the Covenant as "securities" for the performance of the sacred trust,
and it was in the Covenant that they were to be embodied. No security
taking the form of a right for every member of the League separately
and individually to requirefrom the mandatories the due performance of
their mandates, or creating a liability for each mandatory to be answer-
able to them individually,-still less conferringa right of recourse to the
Court in these regards,-was provided by the Covenant.

25. This result is precisely what was to be expected from the fact that
the mandates system was an activity of the League of Nations, that is
to Sayof an entity functioningas an institution. In such a setting, rights
cannot be derived from the mere fact of membership of the organization

in itself: the rights that member States can legitimately claim must be
derived from and depend on the particular terms of the instrument
constitutive of the organization, and of the other instruments relevant
23in the context. This principle is necessarily applicable as regards the
question of what rights member States can claim in respect of a régime
such as results from the mandates system, functioning within the frame-
work of the organization. For this reason, and in this setting, there
could, as regards the carrying out of the "conduct" provisions of the
various mandates, be no question of any legaltie betweenthe mandatories
and other individual members. The sphere of authority assigned to the
mandatories by decisions of the organization could give rise to legal ties
only between them severally,as mandatories, and the organization itself.
The individual member States of the organization could take part in
the administrative process only through their participation in the

activities of the organs by means of which the League was entitled to
function. Such participation did not give rise to any right of direct
intervention relative to the mandatories: this was, and remained, the
prerogative of the League organs.

26. On the other hand, this did not mean that the member States were
mere helpless or impotent spectators of what went on, or that they
lacked al1means of recourse. On the contrary, as members of the League
Assembly, or as members of the League Council, or both, as the case
might be, they could raise any question relating to mandates generally,
orto some one mandatein particular, for consideration by those organs,
and could, by their participation, influence the outcome. The records
both of the Assemblyand of other League organs show that the members
of the League in fact made considerable use of this faculty. But again,
its exercise-always through the League-did not confer on them any
separate right of direct intervention. Rather did it bear witness to the
absence of it.

27. Such is the background against which must be viewed the provi-
sions by which the authority of the various mandatories was dehed, and
which the Court will now proceed to consider.

28. Byparagraph 8 of Article 22 of the Covenant, it was provided that
the "degree of authority, control or administration" which the various
mandatories were to exercise, wasto be "explicitly defined in each case
by the Council", if these matters had not been "previously agreed upon
by the Members of the League". The language of this paragraph was
reproduced, in effecttextually, in the fourth paragraph of the preamble
to the Mandate for South West Africa, which the League Council itself
inserted, thus stating the basis on which it was acting in adopting the
resolution of 17 December 1920, in which the terms of mandate were
set out.Taken by itself this necessarilyimplied that these terms had not
been "previously agreed upon by the Members of the League". There

is however some evidence in the record to indicate that in the context
of the mandates, the allusion to agreement on the part of "the Members
of the League" was regarded at the time as referring only to the five
Principal Allied and Associated Powers engaged in the drafting; but this
24of course could only lend emphasis to the view that the members of the
League generally were not considered as having any direct concernwith
the setting up of the various mandates; and the record indicates that
they were given virtually no information on the subject until a very
late stage.
29. There is also evidence that the delays were due to difficultiesover
certain of the commercial aspects of the mandates, but that the Principal
Powers had already decided that the mandates should in any event be
issued by the Council of the League, thereby giving them a definitely
institutional basis.Preliminary and private negotiations and considera-
tion of drafts by member States, or certain of them, is a normal way
of leading up to the resolutions adopted by an international organ, and
in no way affectstheir character as eventually adopted. Accordingly the
League Council proceeded to issue the Mandate which, being in the
form of a resolution, did not admit of those processes of separate
signature and ratification generally utilized at the time in al1cases where

participation on a "party" basis was intended. Thismethod was common
to al1the mandates, except the 'A'mandate for Iraq which, significantly,
was embodied in a series of treaties between the United Kingdom, as
Mandatory, and Iraq. No other member of the League was a party
to these treaties. It was to the League Council alone that the United
Kingdom Government reported concerning the conclusion of these
treaties, and to which it gave assurances that the general pattern of their
contents would be the same as for the other mandates.
30. Nor did eventhe Principal Alliedand Associated Powers asagroup
have the last word on the drafting of the Mandate. This was the Coun-
cil's. In addition to the insertion as already mentioned, of the fourth
paragraph of the preamble, the Council made a number of alterations
in the draft before finally adopting it. One ofthese is significant in the
present context. Unlike the final version of the jurisdictional clause of
the Mandate as issued by the Council and adopted for al1the mandates,
by which the Mandatory alone undertook to submit to adjudication in
the event of a dispute with another member of the League, the original

version would have extended the competence of the Court equally to
disputesreferred toit by the Mandatory asplaintiff, as wellas to disputes
arising between other members of the League intesr e. The reason for
the change effected by the Council is directly relevant to what was
regarded as being the status of the individual members of the League
in relation to the Mandate. This reason was that, as was soon perceived,
an obligation to submit to adjudication could not be imposed upon
them without their consent. But of course, had they been regarded as
"parties" to the instrument of Mandate, as if to a treaty, they would
thereby have been held to have given consent to al1that it contained,
including the jurisdictional clause. Clearly they were not so regarded. 31. Another circumstance calling for notice is that, as mentioned
earlier, the Mandate contained a clause-paragraph 1 of Article 7 (and
similarlyintheother mandates)-providing that the consent of the Coun-
cil of the League was required for any modification of the terms of the
Mandate; but it was not stated that the consent of individual members of
the League was additionally required. There is no need to enquire
whether, in particular cases-for instance for the modification of any
of their "special interests" under the mandate-the consent of the
member States would have been necessary, sincewhat is now in question
is the "conduct" provisions. As to these, the specialposition given to the
Council of the League by paragraph 1 of Articl~ 7 confirms the view
that individual member States were not regarded as having a separate
legal right or interest of their own respecting the administration of the

Mandate. It is certainly inconsistent with the view that they were con-
sidered as separate parties to the instrument of mandate.

32. The real position of the individual members of the League relative
to the various instruments of mandate was a different one. They were
not parties to them; but they were, to a limited extent, and in certain
respects only, in the position of deriving rights from these instruments.
Not being parties to the instruments of mandate, they could draw
from them only such rights as these unequivocally conferred, directly
or by a clearly necessary implication. The existence of such rights could
not be presumed or merely inferred or postulated. But in Article 22
of the League Covenant, only the mandatories are mentioned in con-
nection with the carrying out of themandates in respect of theinhabitants
of the mandated territories and as regards the League organs. Except
in the procedural provisions of paragraph 8 (the "if not previously
agreed upon" clause) the only mention of the members of the League
in Article 22is in quite another context, namely at theend ofparagraph 5,

where it is provided that the mandatories shall "also secure equal
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the
League". It is the same in the instruments of mandate. Apart from the
jurisdictional clause, which will be considered later, mention of the
members of the League is made only in the "special interests" provisions
of these instruments. It is in respect of these interests alone that any
direct link is established between the mandatories and the members of
the League individually. In the case of the "conduct" provisions, mention
is made only of the mandatory and, where required, of the appropriate
organ of the League. The link in respect of these provisions is with the
League or League organs alone.

33. Accordingly, viewing the matter in the light of the relevant texts
and instruments, and having regard to the structure of the League,

26within the framework of which the mandates system functioned, the
Court considers that even in the time of the League, even as members
of the League when that organization still existed, the Applicants did
not, in their individual capacity as States, possess any separate self-
contained right which they could assert, independently of, or additionally
to, the right of the League, in the pursuit of its collective, institutional
activity, to require the due performance of the Mandate in discharge
of the "sacred trust". This right was vested exclusivelyin the League,
and was exercised through its competent organs. Each member of the
League could share in its collective, institutional exerciseby the League,

through their participation in the work of its organs, and to the extent
that these organs themselves were empowered under the mandates
system to act. By their right to activate these organs (of which they
made full use), they could procure consideration of mandates questions
as of other matters within the sphere of action of the League. But no
right was reserved to them, individuallyas States, and independently of
their participation in the institutional activities of the League, as com-
ponent parts of it, to claim in their own name,-still less as agents
authorized to represent the League,-the right to invigilate the sacred
trust,-to set themselves up as separate custodians of the various
mandates. This was the role of the League organs.

34. To put this conclusionin another way, the position was that under
the mandates system, and within the general framework of the League

system, the various mandatories were responsible for their conduct of
the mandates solely to the League-in particular to its Council-and
were not additionally and separately responsible to each and every
individual State member of the League. If the latter had been given a
legal right or interest on an individual "State" basis, this would have
meant that each member of the League, independently of the Council
or other competent League organ, could have addressed itself directly
to every mandatory, for the purpose of calling for explanations or
justifications of its administration, and generally to exact from the
mandatory the due performance of its mandate, according to the view
which that State might individually take as to what was required for
the purpose.
35. Clearly no such right existed under the mandates system as con-
templated by any of the relevant instruments. It would have involved
a position of accountability by the mandatories to each and every
member of the League separately, for otherwise there would have been
nothing additional to the normal faculty of participating in the collective

work of the League respecting mandates. The existence of such an
additional right could not however be reconciled with the way in which
the obligation of the mandatories, both under Article 22 of the League
Covenant, and (in the case of South West Africa) Article 6 of the
instrument of Mandate, was limited to reporting to the League Council,and to itssatisfactionalone. Sucha situation would have beenparticularly
unimaginable in relation to a systemwhich, within certain limits, allowed
the mandatories to determine for themselves by what means they would
carry out their mandates: and afortiori would this have been so in the
case of a 'C'mandate, having regard to the specialpower of administra-
tion as "an integral portion of its own territory" which, as already
noted, was conferred upon the mandatory respecting this category of
mandate.

36. The foregoing conclusions hold good whether the League is
regarded as having possessed the kind of corporate juridical personality
that the Court, in its Advisory Opinion in the case of Reparation for
InjuriesSufered in the Service of the UnitedNations (I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 174),found the United Nations to be invested with,-or whether the
League is regarded as a collectivity of States functioning on an institu-
tional basis, whose collectiverights in respect of League matters were, as

Article 2 of the Covenant implied, exercisable only through the appro-
priate League organs, and not independently of these.

37. In order to test the conclusionsthus reached, it islegitimate to have
regard to the probable consequences of the view contended for by the
Applicants,-or at any rate to the possibilities that would have been
opened up if each member of the League had individually possessed
the standing and rights now claimed. One question which arises is that
of how far the individual members of the League would have been in
a position to play the role ascribed to them. The Applicants, as part of
their argument in favour of deeming the functions previously discharged
by theCouncil ofthe Leagueto havepassed now to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, insisted on the need for "informed" dealings
with the Mandatory :only a body sufficientlyendowedwith the necessary

knowledge, experience and expertise could, it was said, adequately
discharge the supervisory role. Yet at the same time it was contended
that individual members of the League,-not directly advised by the
Permanent Mandates Commission,-not (unless members of the Coun-
cil) in touch with the mandates questions except through their partici-
pation in the work of the League Assembly,-nevertheless possessed a
right independently to confront the various mandatories over their
administration of the mandates, and a faculty to cal1upon them to alter
their policies and adjust their courses accordingly. The two contentions
are inconsistent, and the second affronts al1the probabilities.

38. No less difficultthan the position of a mandatory caught between
a number of possible different expressions of view, would have been

28that of the League Council whose authority must have been undermined,
and its action often frustrated, by the existence of some 40 or 50 in-
dependent centres of invigilatory rights.
39. Equally inconsistent would the position claimed for individual
League members have been with that of the mandatory as a member of
the Council on mandates questions. As such, the mandatory, on the basis
of the normal League voting rule, and by virtue of Article 4, paragraphs
5 and 6, and Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, possessed a vote

necessary to the taking of any forma1Council decision on a question of
substance relative to its mandate (at least in the sense that, if cast, it
must not be adversely cast); so that, in the last resort, the assent, or
non-dissent, of the mandatory had to be negotiated.

40. In the opinion of the Court, those who intended the one system
cannot simultaneously have intended the other: and if in the time of
the League,-if as members of the League,-the Applicants did not
possess the rights contended for,-evidently they do not possess them
now. There is no principle of law which, following upon the dissolution
of the League, would operate to invest the Applicants with rights they
did not have even when the League was still in being.

41. The Court will now turn to the various contentions that have
been or might be advanced in opposition to the view it takes; and
will firstdeal with a number of points which have a certain general
affinity.
42. Firstly, it may be represented that the consequences described
above as being rendered possible if individual members ofthe Leaguehad
had the rights now contended for by the Applicants, are unrea1,-because
thetrue position under the mandates systemwasthat, evenifin al1normal
circumstances the mandatories were responsible to the Council of the
League alone, nevertheless the individual members of the League pos-
sessed a right of last resort to activate the Court under the jurisdictional
clause if any mandate was being contravened. The Court will consider
the effect of the jurisdictional clause later; but quite apart from that,
the argument is misconceived. It is evident that any such right would
have availed nothing unless the members of the League had individually
possessed substantive rights regarding the carrying out of the mandates
which they could make good before the Court, if and when they did

activate it. If, however, they possessed such rights then, as already noted,
irrespective of whether they went to the Court or not, they were entitled
at al1times, outside League channels, to confront the mandatories over
the administration of their mandates, just as much as in respect of their
"special interests" under the mandate. The theory that the members of
29the League possessed such rights, but were precluded from exercising
them unless by means of recourse to adjudication, constitutes an essen-
tially improbable supposition for which the relevant texts afford no
warrant. These texts did not need to impose any such limitation, for
the simple reason that they did not create the alleged rights.

43. Again, it has been pointed outthat there is nothing unprecedented
in a situation in which the supervision of a certain matter is, on the
political plane, entrusted to a given body or organ, but where certain
individual States-not al1 of them necessarily actual parties to the in-
struments concerned-have parallel legal rights in regard to the same
matter, which they can assert in specified ways. This is true but irrele-
vant, since for the present purposes the question is not whether such
rights could be, but whether they were in fact conferred. In various
instances cited by way of example, not only was the intention to confer
the right and its special purpose quite clear,-it was also restricted to
a small group of States, members, either permanent or elected, of the
supervisory organ concerned. In such a case, the right granted was,
in effect, part of the institutional or conventional machinery of control,
and its existence could occasion no difficulty or confusion. This type
of case, which will be further discussed later, in connection with the
jurisdictional clause of the mandates, is not the same as the present one.

44.Next, it may be said that a IegaIright or interest need not necessarily
relate to anything material or "tangible", and can be infringed even
though no prejudice of a material kind has been suffered. In this con-
nection, the provisions of certain treaties and other international in-
struments of a humanitarian character, and the terms of various arbitral
and judicial decisions, are cited as indicating that, for instance, States
may be entitled to uphold somegeneral principle eventhough the particu-
lar contravention of it alleged has not affected their own material in-
terests;-that again, States may have a legal interest in vindicating a
principle of international law, even though they have, in the given
case, suffered no material prejudice, or ask only for token damages.
Without attempting to discuss how far, and in what particular circum-
stances, these things might be true, it sufficesto point outthat, in holding
that the Applicants in the present case could only have had a legal
right or interest in the "special interests" provisions of the Mandate,
the Court does not in any way do so merely because these relate to a
material or tangible object. Nor, in holding that no legal right or interest
exists for the Applicants, individually as States, in respect of the "con-

duct" provisions, does the Court do so because any such right, or in-
terest would not have a material or tangible object. The Court simply
holds that such rights or interests, in order to exist, must be clearly
vested in those who claim them, by some text or instrument, or rule
of 1aw;-and that in the present case, none were ever vestedin individual
members of the League under any of the relevant instruments, or as a
30constituent part of the mandates system as a whole, or 'otherwise.

45. Various miscellaneous propositions are also advanced: the Man-
date is more deseming of protection than the "special interests" of any
particular State;-there would be nothing extraordinary in a State
having a legal right to vindicate a purely altruistic interest;-and so
forth. But these are not really legal propositions: they do not eliminate
the need to find the particular provisions orules of law the existence of
which they assume, but do not of themselvesdemonstrate.

46. It is also asked whether, even supposing that the Applicants only
had an interest on the political level respecting the conduct of the Man-
date, this would not have sufficedto enable them to seek a declaration
from the Court as to what the legal position was under the Mandate,
so that, for instance, they could know whether they would be on good
ground in bringing before the appropriate political organs, acts of the
mandatory thought to involve a threat to peace or good international
relations.
47. The Court is concerned in the present proceedings only with the
rights which the Applicants had as former members of the League of
Nations-for it is in that capacity alone that they are now appearing.
If the contention above described is intended to mean that because, for
example, the Applicants would, under paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the
League Covenant, have had "the friendly right ... to bring to the atten-
tion of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance ... which
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding ...
upon which peace depends", they would therefore also-and on that ac-
count-have had the right to obtain a declaration from the Court as
to what the mandatory's obligations were, and whether a violation of
these had occurred;-if this is the contention, the Court can only reply
to it in the negative. A provision such as Article 11 of the Covenant
could at most furnish a motive why the Applicants (or other members

of the League) might wish to know what the legal position was. It could
.not of itself give them any right to procure this knowledge from the
Court which they would not otherwise have had under the Mandate
itself.
48. On the other hand, an appropriate organ of the League such as the
Council could of course have sought an advisory opinion from the
Court on any such matter. It is in this connection that the chief objection
to the theory under discussion arises. Under the Court's Statute as it
is at present framed, States cannot obtain mere "opinions" from the
Court. Thisfaculty is reserved to certaininternational organs empowered
to exercise it by way of the process of requesting the Court for an ad-
visory opinion. It was open to the Council of the League to make use of
this process in case of any doubt as to the rights of the League or its
31 34 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

members relative to mandates. But in their individual capacity, States
can appear before the Court only as litigants in a dispute with another
State, even if their object in so doing js only to obtain a declaratory
judgment. The moment they so appear however, it is necessary for
them, even for that limited purpose, to establish, in relation to the de-
fendant party in the case, the existence of a legal right or interest in the
subject-matter of their claim, such as to entitle them to the declarations
or pronouncements they seek: or in other words that they are parties
to whom the defendant State is answerable under the relevant instrument

or rule of law.

49. The Court must now turn to certain questions of a wider character.
Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, that
humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to generate
legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and should proceed
accordingly. The Court does not think so. It is a court of law, and can
take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given a
sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a
social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through
and within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal
service thatwould be rendered.
50. Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis
for rules of law,just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the United
Nations Charter constitute the moral and political basis for the specific

legal provisions thereafter set out. Such considerations do not, however,
in themselves amount to rules of law. Al1States are interested-have an
interest-in such matters. But the existence of an "interest" does not
of itself entai1 that this interest is specificallyjuridical in character.
51.It is inthe light of these considerations that theCourt must examine
what is perhaps the most important contention of a general character
that has been advanced in connection with this aspect of the case,
namely the contention by which it is sought to derive a legal right or
interest in the conduct of the mandate from the simple existence, or
principle, of the "sacred trust". The sacred trust, it is said, is a "sacred
trust of civilization". Hence al1 civilized nations have an interest in
seeing that it is carried out. An interest, no doubt;-but in order that
this interest may take on a specifically legal character, the sacred trust
itself must be or become something more than a moral or humanitarian
ideal. In order to generate legal rights and obligations, it must be given
juridical expression and be clothed in legal form. One such form might

be the United Nations trusteeship system,-another, as contained in
Chapter XI of the Charter concerning non-self-governing territories,
which makes express reference to "a sacred trust". In each case the legal
rights and obligations are those, and only those, provided for by the
relevant texts, whatever these may be.
52. In the present case, the principle of the sacred trust has as its sole
3235 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

juridical expression the mandates system. As such, it constitutes a
moral ideal given form as a juridical régimein the shape of that system.
But it is necessary not to confuse the moral ideal with the legal rules
intended to give it effect. For the purpose of realizing the aims of the
trust in the particular form of any given mandate, its legal rights and
obligations were those, and those alone, which resulted from the rele-
vant instruments creating the system, and the mandate itself, within
the framework of the League of Nations.
53. Thus it is that paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant, in the
same breath that it postulates the principle of the sacred trust, specifies

in terms that, in order to give "effect to this principle", the tutelage of
the peoples of the mandated territories should be entrusted to certain
nations, "and that this tutelage should be exercisedby them" as manda-
tories "on behalf of the League". It was from this that flowed al1the
legal consequences already noticed.
54. To sumup,the principle ofthe sacred trust has no residualjuridical
content which could, so far as any particular mandate is concerned,
operate per se to give rise to legal rights and obligations outside the
system as a whole; and, within the system equally, such rights and obli-
gations exist only in so far as there is actual provision forthem. Once
the expression to be given to an idea has been accepted in the form of a
particular régimeor system, its legal incidents are those of the régime
or system. It is not permissible to import new ones by a process of
appeal to the originating idea-a process that would, ex hypotlzesi,
have no natural limit. Hence, although, as has constantly been reiterated,
the members of the League had an interest in seeingthat the obligations

entailed by the mandates system were respected, this was an interest
which, according to the very nature of the system itself, they could
exercise only through the appropriate League organs, and not indi-
vidually.

55. Next, it may be suggested that even if the legal position of the
Applicants and of other individual members of the League of Nations
was as the Court holds it to be, this was so only during the lifetime of
the League, and that when the latter was dissolved, the rights previously
resident in the League itself, or in its competent organs, devolved, so
to speak, upon the individual States which were members of it at the
date of its dissolution. There is, however, no principle of law which
would warrant such a conclusion. Although the Court held in the earlier

1962 phase of the present case that the members of a dissolved inter-
national organization can be deemed, though no longer members of
it, to retain rights which, as members, they individually possessed
when the organization was in being, this could not extend to ascribing
to them, upon and by reason of the dissolution, rights which, even
previously as members, they never did individually possess. Nor of 36 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

course could anything that occurred subsequent to the dissolution
of the League operate to invest its members with rights they did not,
in that capacity, previously have,-and itis the rights which they had
as members of the League that are now in question.

56. The Court can equally not read the unilateral declarations, or state-
ments of intention as they have been called, which were made by the
various mandatories on the occasion of the dissolution of the League,
expressing their willingness to continue to be guided by the mandates
in their administration of the territories concerned, as conferring on
the members of the League individually any new legal rights or interests
of a kind they did not previously possess.

57. Another argument which requires consideration is that in so far as
the Court's view leads to the conclusion that there is now no entity
entitled to claim the due performance of the Mandate, it must be un-
acceptable. Without attempting in any way to pronounce on the various
implications involved in this argument, the Court thinks the inference
sought to be drawn from it is inadmissible. If, on a correct legal reading
of a given situation, certain alleged rights are found to be non-existent,
the consequences of this must be accepted. The Court cannot properly
postulate the existence of such rights in order to avert those conse-
quences. This would be to engage in an essentially legislative task, in
the service of political ends the promotion of which, however desirable
in itself, lies outside the function of a court-of-law.

58. The Court comes now to a more specific category of contention
arising out of the existence and terms of the jurisdictional clause of the
Mandate,and of the effect ofthe Court's Judgment of 21 December 1962
in that regard. The Court's present Judgment is founded on the relevant
provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the character
of the League as an organization, and the substantive provisions of
the instrument of Mandate for South West Afrjca. The question now
to be considered is whether there is anything arising out of its previous
Judgment, or the terms of the jurisdictional clause of the Mandate,
which should lead the Court to modify the conclusions arrived at on
those foundations.
59.In the first place, it is contended that the question of the Applicants'
legal right or interest was settled by that Judgment and cannot now
be reopened. As regards the issue of preclusion, the Court finds it un-
necessasr to pronounce on various issues which have been raised in

this connection, such as whether a decision on a preliminary objection
constitutes a res judicata in the proper sense of that term,-whether
it ranks as a "decision" for the purposes of Article 59 of the Court's
34 Statute, or as "final" within the meaning of Article 60. The essential
point is that aecision on a preliminaryobjection can never be preclusive
of a matter appertaining to the merits, whether or not it has in fact
been dealt with in connection with the preliminary objection. When
preliminary objections are entered by the defendant party in a case,
the proceedings on the merits are, by virtue of Article 62, paragraph 3,
of the Court's Rules, suspended. Thereafter, and until the proceedings
on the merits are resumed, the preliminary objections having been re-
jected, there can be no decision finally determining or pre-judging any
issue of merits. It may occur that a judgment on a preliminary objection
touches on a point of merits, but this it can do only in a provisional
way, to the extent necessary for deciding the question raised by the pre-
liminary objection. Any finding on the point of merits therefore, ranks
simply as part of the motivation of the decision on the preliminary

objection, and not as the object of that decision. It cannot rank as a
final decision on the point of merits involved.

60. Itis however contended that, even if the Judgment of 1962was,
for the above-mentioned reasons, not preclusive of the issue of the Ap-
plicants' legal right or interest, it did in essence determine that issue
because it decided that the Applicants were entitled to invoke the juris-
dictional clause of the Mandate, and that if they had a sufficientinterest
to do that, they must also have a sufficientinterest in the subject-matter
of their claiin. This view is not well-founded. The faculty of invoking
a jurisdictional clausedepends upon what tests or conditions of the right
to do so are laid down by the clause itself. To hold that the parties in
any given case belong to the category of State specifiedin the clause,-
that the dispute has the specified character,-and that the forum is the

one specified,-is not the same thing as finding the existence of a legal
right or interest relative to the merits of the claim. The jurisdictional
clause of the Mandate for South West Africa (Article 7, paragraph 2),
which appeared in al1 the mandates, reads as follows:

"The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should
anse between the Mandatory and another Member of the League
of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of

the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled
by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations."
Looking at this provision; assumingthe existenceof a dispute; assuming
that negotiations had taken place; that these had not settledthe dispute;
and that the Court was, by the operation of Article 37 of its Statute,

duly substituted for the Permanent Court as the competent forum
(al1 of which assumptions would be in accordance with the Court's
35 38 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

Judgment of 1962);-then al1 that the Applicants had to do in order
to bnng themselves under this clause and establish their capacity to
invoke it, was to show (a) ratione personae, that they were members
of the League, constructively if not actually, or must be deemed still
so to be for the purposes of this provision, notwithstandiiigthe dissolu-
tion of the League; and (b) ratione materiae, that the dispute did relate
to the interpretation or application of one or more provisions of the
Mandate. If the Court considered that these requirements were satisfied,
it could assume jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits without

going into the question of the Applicants' legal nght or interest relative
to the subject-matter of their claim; for the jurisdictional clause did
not, according to its terms, require them to establish the existence of
such a right or interest for the purpose of founding the competence
of the Court.
61. Hence, whatever observations the Court may have made on that
matter, it remained for theApplicants, on the merits, to establish that they
had this right or interest in the carrying out of the provisions which they
invoked, such as to entitle them to the pronouncements and declarations
they were seeking from the Court. Since decisions of an interlocutory
character cannot pre-judge questions of merits, there can be no contra-
diction between a decision allowing that the Applicants had the capacity
to invoke the jurisdictional clause-this being the only question which,
so far as this pointgoes, the Court was then called upon to decide, or
could decide,-and a decision that the Applicants have not established
the legal basis of their claim on the merits.

62. It is next contended that this particular jurisdictional clause has an
effect which is more extensive than if it is considered as a simple juris-
dictional clause: that it is a clause conferringa substantive right,-that
the substantive right it confers is precisely the right to claim from the
Mandatory the carrying out of the "conduct of the Mandate" provisions
of the instrument of mandate,-and that in consequence, evenif the right
is derivable from no other source, it is derivable from and implicit in
this clause.
63. Let it be observedfirst of al1that it would be remarkable ifthis were
the case,-that is to Sayif so important a right, having such potentially
far-reaching consequences,-intended, so the Applicants contend, to
play such an essential role in the scheme of the Mandate-of al1 the
mandates, and of the system generauy-had been created indirectly,

and in so casual and almost incidental a fashion, ,by an ordinary juris-
dictional clause, lacking as will shortly be seen in any of the special
features thatmight giveit the effectclaimed,-and which would certainly
be requisite inorder to achieve that effect. The Court considers it highly
unlikely that, given the far-reaching consequencesinvolved and, accord-
ing to the Applicants, intended, the framers of the mandates system, had
36they had any such intention, would have chosen this particular type of
jurisdictional clause as the method of carrying it out.

64. In truth however, there is nothing about this particular jurisdic-
tional clause to differentiate it from many others, or to make it an excep-
tion to the rule that, in principle, jurisdictional clauses are adjectival not
substantivein their nature and effect. It is of course possible to introduce

into such a clause extra paragraphs or phrases specifically conveying
substantiverights or imposing substantiveobligations;but the particular
section of any clause which provides for recourse to ail indicated forum,
on the part of a specifiedcategory of litigant, in relation to a certain kind
of dispute-or those words in it which provide this-cannot simul-
taneously and per se invest the parties with the substantive rights the
existence of which is exactly what they will have to demonstrate in the
forum concerned, and which it is the whole object of the latter to de-
termine. It is a universal and necessary, but yet almost elementary
principle of procedural law that a distinction has to be made between,
on the one hand, the right to activate a court and the right of the court to
examine the merits of the claim,-and, on the other, the plaintiff party's
legal right in respect of the subject-matter of that which it claims, which
would have to be established to the satisfaction of the Court.
65. In the present case, that subject-matter includes the question
whether the Applicants possessanylegal right to require the performance
of the "conduct" provisions of the Mandate. This is something which
cannot be predetermined by the language of a cornmon-form juris-

dictional clause such as Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Mandate for
South West Africa. This provision, with slight differences of wording
and emphasis, is in the same form as that of many other jurisdictional
clauses. The Court can see nothing in it that would take the clause
outside the normal rule that, in a dispute causing the activation of a
jurisdictional clause, the substantiverights themselves which the dispute
is about, must be sought for elsewhere than in this clause, or in some
element apart from it,-and must therefore be established aliunde vel
aliter.Jurisdictional clauses do not determine whether parties have sub-
stantive rights, but only whether, if they have them, they can vindicate
them by recourse to a tribunal.
66. Such rights may be derived from participation in an international
instrument by a State which has signed and ratified, or has acceded,
or has in some other manner become a party to it; and which in con-
sequence, and subject to any exceptions expressly indicated, is entitled
to enjoy rights under al1 the provisions of the instrument concerned.
Since the Applicants cannot bring themselves under this head, they
must show that the "conduct" provisions of the mandates conferred

rights in terms on rnembers of the League as individual States, in the
same way that the "special interests" provisions did. It is however
contended that there is a third possibility, and that on the basis of the
jurisdictional clause alone, the Applicants, as members of the League,
were part of the institutional machinery of control relative to the man-
37dates, and that in this capacity they had a right of action of the same
kind as,for instance, members of the League Councilhad under thejuris-
dictional clauses of the minorities treaties of that period, for the pro-
tection of minority rights. On this footing the essence of the contention
is that the Applicants do not need to show the existence of any substan-
tive rights outside the jurisdictional clause, and that they had-that
al1members of the League had-what was in effect a policing function
under the mandates and by virtue of thejurisdictional clause.

67. The Court has examined this contention, but does not think that
the two cases are in any way comparable. When States intend to create
a right of action of this kind they adopt a different method.Such a right

has, in special circumstances, been conferred on States belonging to
a body of compact size such as the Council of the League of Nations,
invested with special supervisory functions and even a power of inter-
vention in the matter, as provided by the jurisdictional clause of the
minorities treaties-see for instance Article 12 of the minorities treaty
with Poland, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919, which was typical.
Even so the right, as exercisable by members of the League Council,
in effectaspart ofthe Council'swork, with whichthey would ex lzypothesi
have been fully familiar, was characterized at the time by an eminent
Judge and former President of the Permanent Court as being "in every
respect very particular in character" and as going "beyond the province
of general international law". The intention to confer it must be quite
clear; and the Court holds that for the reasons which have already been
given,and for others to be considered later, there was never any intention
to confer an invigilatory function of this kind on each and everymember
of the League.
68. It has to be asked why,if anything ofthe sort wasthought necessary
in the case of the mandates, it was notdone in the same way as under the

minorities clauses (which, in general, were drafted contemporaneously
by the sameauthors)-namely by conferring a right of action on members
of the League Council as such, seeingthat it was the Council which had
the supervisory function under the mandates? This would have been
the obvious, and indeed the only workable method of procedure. Alter-
natively, it must be asked why, if it was indeed thought necessary in the
case of mandates to invest al1 the members of the League with this
function, forthe protection of the mandates, it was apparently considered
sufficient in the minorities case to bring in only the members of the
LeagueCouncil?
69. The Court finds itselfunable to reconcile the two types of case ex-
cept upon the assumption, strongly supported by every other factor in-
volved, that, as regards the mandates, the jurisdictional clause was in-
tended to servea differentpurpose, namelyto givethe individual members
of the League the means, which might not otherwise be available to
them through League channels, of protecting their "special interests"
relative to the mandated territories. In the minorities case, the right
of action of the members of the Council under the jurisdictional clause

38. was only intended for the protection of minority populations. No other
purpose in conferring a right of action on members of the League
Council would have been possible in that case. This was not so in regard
to the mandates, the provisions of which afforded another and perfectly
natural explanation of the jurisdictional~clause and of its purpose;
whereas, if a policing function had been intended, it is obviously to the
members of the Council that it would have been given, and in the same
sort of terms as in the minorities case.
70. In this last connection it is of capital importance that the right as

conferredin the minorities case wassubjected to certain characterizations
which were wholly absent in the case of the jurisdictional clause of the
mandates. Any "difference of opinion" was characterized in advance
as being justiciable, because it was to be "held to be a dispute of an
international character" withinthemeaning ofArticle 14of the Covenant
(this was the well-known "deeming" clause), so that no question of any
lack of legal right or interest could arise. The decisions of the Court
were moreover, to be final and, by means of a reference to Article 13
of the Covenant, were given an effect erga omnes as a general judicial
settlement binding on al1 concerned. The jurisdictional clause of the
mandates on the other hand, was essentially an ordinary jurisdictional
clause, having none of the special characteristics or effects of those of
the minorities treaties.

71. That the League Councilhad functionsin respect of mandates,just
as it did in respect of minorities,can only serve to underline the fact
that in the former case no right of recourse to the Court was conferred

on the members of the Council in their capacity as such, although the
mandates were drafted in full knowledge of what the minorities treaties
contained. The true significance of the minorities case is that it shows
that those who framed the mandates were perfectly capable of doing
what the Applicants claim was done, when they intended to. The
conclusionmust be that in the case ofthe mandates they did not intend to.

72. Sincethe course adopted in the minorities case does not constitute
any parallel to that of the mandates, the Applicants' contention is seen
to depend in the last analysis almost entirely on what has been called
the broad and unambiguouslanguage of the jurisdictional clause-or in
other words its literalmeaning taken in isolation and without reference to
any otherconsideration.Thecombination ofcertainphrases in this clause,
namely the reference to "any dispute whatever", coupled with the further

words "between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of
Nations" and thephrase "relating ..to theprovisions of the Mandate", is
said to permit of a referenceto the Court ofa dispute about any provision
ofthe Mandate, and thus to imply,reflector bear witness to the existence
of a legal right or interest for every member of the League in the due
execution of every such provision. The Court does not however consider
39 that the word "whatever" in Article 7, paragraph 2, does anything more
than lend emphasis to a phrase that would have meant exactly the same
without it; or that the phrase "any dispute" (whatever) means anything
intrinsically different from "a dispute"; or that the reference to the
"provisions" of the Mandate, in the plural, has any different effect
from what would have resulted from saying "a provision". Thus reduced
to its basic meaning, it can be seen that the clause is not capable of

carrying the load the Applicants seek to put upon it, and which would
result in giving such clauses an effect that States accepting the Court's
jurisdiction by reason of them, could never supposethem to have.

73. In this connection theCourt thinks it desirable to draw attention to
the fact that a considerable proportion of the acceptances of its com-
pulsoryjurisdiction whichhave been given under paragraph 2 of Article
36 of the Statute of the Court, are couched in language similarly broad
and unambiguous and even wider, covering al1 disputes between the
accepting State and any other State (and thus "any dispute whateverM)-
subject only to the one condition of reciprocity or, in some cases, to
certain additional conditions such as that the dispute must have arisen
after a specified date. It could never be supposed however that on the
basis of this wide language the accepting State, by invoking this clause,
was absolved from establishing a legal right or interest in the subject-
matter of its claim. Otherwise, the conclusion would have to be that
by accepting the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court in the widest terms
possible, States could additionally create a legal right or interest for

themselves in the subject-matter of any claim they chose to bring, and
a corresponding answerability on the part of the other accepting State
concerned. The underlying proposition that by conferring competence
on the Court, a jurisdictional clause can thereby and of itself confer a
substantive right, is one which the Court must decline to entertain.

74. TheCourt must now, though only as a digression, glanceat another
aspect of the matter. The present Judgment is based on the viewthat the
question of what rights, as separate members of the League, the Appli-
cants had in relation to the performance of the Mandate, is a question
appertaining to the merits of their claim. It has however been suggested
that the question is really one of the admissibility of the claim, and
that as such it was disposed of by the Court's 1962Judgment.

75. In the "dispositif" of the 1962Judgment, however, the Court, after
considering the four preliminary objections advanced-which were
objections to the competence of the Court-simply found that it had
"jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits". It thus appears that the
Court in 1962 did not think that any question of the admissibility of
40 the claim, as distinct from that of its own jurisdiction arose, or that
the Respondent had put forward any plea of inadmissibility as such:
nor had it,-for in arguing that the dispute was not of the kind contem-
plated by the jurisdictional clause of the Mandate, the purpose of the
Respondent was to show that the case was not covered by that clause,
andthat it did not in consequencefa11within the scope of the competence
conferred on the Court by that provision.
76. If therefore any question of admissibility were involved, it would
fa11to be decided now, as occurred in the merits phase of the Nottebohm
case (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4); and al1that the Court need Sayis that

if this were so, it would determine the question in exactly theame way,
and for the same reasons, as in the present Judgment. In other words,
looking at the matter from the point of view of the capacity of the
Applicants to advance their present claim, the Court would hold that
they had not got such capacity, and hence that the claim iwas inad-
missible.

77. Resuming the main thread of its reasoning, the Court will now
refer to a supplementary element that furnishes indications in opposition
to the interpretation of the jurisdictional clause advanced by theAppli-
cants. This contra-indication is afforded by the genesis of the juris-
dictional clause appearing in al1 the instruments of mandate. The
original drafts contained no jurisdictional clause. Such a clause was
first introduced in connection with the'B'mandates by one ofthe States
participating in the drafting, and concurrently with proposals made by
that same State for a number of detailed provisions about commercial
and other "special interests" rights (including missionary rights) for

member States of the League. It was little discussed but, so far as it is
possible to judge from what is only a sumrnary record, what discussion
there was centred mainly onthe commercial aspects of the mandates and
the possibility of disputes arising in that regard over the interests of
nationals of members of the League. This appears very clearly from the
statements summarized on pages 348, 349 and 350 of Part VI A of the
Recueil des Actes of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1920,if these
statements are read as a whole. No corresponding clear connection
emerges between the clause and possible disputes between mandatories
and individual members of the League over the conduct of the mandates
as mandates. That such disputes could arise does not seem to have been
envisaged. In the same way, the original drafts of the 'C' mandates
which, in a different form, contained broadly al1 that now appears in
the first four articles of the Mandate for South West Africa, had no
jurisdictional clauseand no "missionary clause" either. The one appeared
when the other did.

78. The inference to be drawn from this drafting history is confirmed
by the very fact thatthe question of aight of recourse to the Court arose only at the stage of the drafting of the instruments of mandate, and that
as already mentioned, no such right figured among the "securities"
for theperformance of the sacred trust embodied in the LeagueCovenant.
79. After going through various stages,the jurisdictional clause finally
appeared in the same form in all the mandates, except that in the case
of the Mandate for Tanganyika (as it then was) a drafting caprice
caused the retention of an additional paragraph which did not appear,
or had been dropped in al1the other cases. Once the principle of a juris-
dictional clause had been accepted, the clause was then introduced as

a matter of course into all the mandates. This furnishes the answer
to the contention that, in the case of theC'mandates, it must have been
intended to relate to something more than the single "missionary clause"
(Article5 in the Mandate for South West Africa). Also, it must not
be forgotten that it was simultaneously with the missionary clause
that the jurisdictional clause was introduced; and that at the timemuch
importance was attached to missionary rights. In any event, whatever
the purpose of the jurisdictional clause, it was the same for all the
mandates, and for the three categories of mandate. It is in the light
of the mandates system generally that this purpose must be assessed,
-and, so considered, the purpose is clear.

80. The Court willnow consider a final contention which has been ad-
vanced in support of the Applicants' claim of right, namely the so-called
"necessity" argument.
81. In order todo this, and at the risk of someunavoidablerepetition, it

isnecessaryto reviewa little more closelythe functioning of the mandates
system. This system, within the larger setting of the League, was an
entirely logical one. Thevarious mandatories did not deal with the indi-
vidual members of the League over the "conduct" provisions of their
mandates, but with the appropriate League organs. If any difficulty
should arise over the interpretation of any mandate, or the character
of the mandatory's obligations, which could not be cleared up by dis-
cussion or reference to an ad lzoc committee of jurists-a frequent
practice in the League-the Council could in the last resort request the
Permanent Court for an advisory opinion. Such an opinion would not
of course be binding on the mandatory-it was not intended that it
should be-but it would assistthe work of the Council.
82. In the Council, which the mandatory was entitled to attend as a
member for the purposes of any mandate entrusted to it, if not otherwise
a member-(Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant), the vote of the
mandatory, if present at the meeting, was necessary for any actual
"decision" of the Council, since unanimity of those attending was the

basic voting rule on matters of substance in the main League organs-
(Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant). Thus there could never be
any formal clash between the mandatory and the Council as such.
In practice, the unanimity rule was frequently not insisted upon, or itsimpact was mitigated by a process of give-and-take, and by various
procedural devices to which both the Council and the mandatories lent
themselves. So far as the Court's information goes, there never occurred
any case in which a mandatory "vetoed" what would otherwise have
been a Council decision. Equally, however, much trouble was taken
to avoid situations in which the mandatory would have been forced
to acquiesce in the views of the rest of the Council short of casting an

adverse vote. The occasional deliberate absence of the mandatory
from a meeting, enabled decisions to be taken that the mandatory might
have felt obliged to vote against if it had been present. This was part
of the above-mentioned process for arriving at generally acceptable
conclusions.
83. Such were the methods,broadly speaking, adopted in the relations
between the various mandatories and the League over the conduct of the
mandates, and it can be seen how out of place in the context would
have been the existence of substantive rights for individual members
of the League in the conduct of the mandates (particularly if backed up
by a right of recourse to the Court) exercisable independently of the
Council at the will of the member State. On the other hand-and here
again the concept was entirely logical-by the combined effect of the
"special interests" provisions and the jurisdictional clause-(the latter
alone could not have sufficed)-a right of recourse was given to the
individual League members in respect of such interests, since the League
Council could not be expected to act in defence of a purely national,
not "League", interest.

84. Under this system,viewedas a whole, the pcssibility of any serious
complication was remote; nor did any arise. That possibility would have
been introduced only if the individual members of the League had
been held to have the rights the Applicants now contend for. In actual
fact, in the 27 years of the League, all questions were, by one means or
another, resolved in the Council; no request was made to the Court for
an advisory opinion; so far as is known, no member of the League
attempted to settle direct with the mandatory any question that did not
affect its own interests as a State orhose of its nationals, and no cases
were referred to the Permanent Court under the adjudication clause
except the various phases of one single case (that of the kfavrommatis
Concessions)coming under the head of "special interests". These facts
may not be conclusive in themselves; but they have a significance which
the Court cannot overlook, as suggesting that any divergences of view
concerning the conduct of a mandate were regarded as being matters
that had their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay

between the mandatory and the competent organs of the League,-not
between the mandatory and individual members of the Laague. 85. Such then is the background against which the "necessity" argu-
ment has to be viewed. The gist of the argument is that since the Council
had no means of imposing its views on the mandatory, and since no
advisory opinion it might obtain from the Court would be binding on
the latter, themandate could have been flouted at will. Hence, so the
contention goes, it was essential, as an ultimate safeguard or security
for the performance of the sacred trust, that each member of the League
should be deemed to have a legal right or interest in that matter and, in
the last resort, be able to take direct action relative to it.
86. It is evident on the face of it how misconceived such an argument
must be in the context of a system which was expressly designed to
include al1those elements which, according to the "necessity" argument,

it was essential to guard or provide securities against. The Court will
leave on one side the obvious improbability that had the framers of the
mandates system really intended that it should be possible in the last
resort to impose a given course or policy on a mandatory, in the perfor-
mance of the sacred trust, they would have left this to the haphazard
and uncertain action of the individual members of the League, when
other much more immediate and effective methods were to hand-
for instance, by providing that mandatories should not be members
of the Council for mandates purposes, though entitled to attend, or
should not be entitled to exercise a vote on mandates questions; or
again by investing members of the Council itself with a right of action
before the Court, as in the minorities case. The plain fact is that, in
relation to the "conduct" provisions of the mandates, it was never the
intention that the Council should be able to impose its views on the
various mandatories-the system adopted was one which deliberately
rendered this impossible. It was never intended that the views of the

Court should be ascertained in a manner binding on mandatories, or
that mandatories should be answerable to individual League members
as such in respect of the "conduct" provisions of the mandates. It is
scarcely likely that a system which, of set purpose, created a position
such that, if a mandatory made use of its veto, it would thereby block
what would othenvise be a decision of the Council, should simultaneously
invest individual members of the League with, in effect, a legal right of
complaint if this veto, to which the mandatory was entitled, was made
use of. In this situation there was nothing at al1unusual. In the inter-
national field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last resort
be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception,-and this was even more the case in 1920 than today.

87. As regards the possibility that a mandatory might be acting con-
trary not only to the views of the rest of the Council but to the mandate
itself, the risk of this was evidentlyen with open eyes; andthat the risk

was remote, the event proved. Acceptance of the Applicants' contention
on the other hand, would involve acceptance of the proposition that
even if the Council of the League should be perfectly satisfied with the
way in which a mandatory was carrying out its mandate, any individualmember of the League could independently invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court in order to have the same conduct declared illegal, although,
as mentioned earlier, no provision for recourse to the Court was included

amongst the "securities" provided for by the Covenant itself. Here
again the difference isevident betweenthis case and that of the minorities,
where it was the members of the Council itself who 'had that right.
The potential existence of such a situation as would have arisen from
investing al1 the members of the League with the right in question is
not reconcilable with the processes described above for the supervision
of the mandates. According to the methods and procedures of the League
as applied to the operation of the mandates system, it was by argument,
discussion, negotiation and CO-operativeeffort that matters were to be,
and were, carried fonvard.

88. For these reasons the Court, bearing in mind that the rights of the
Applicants must be determined by reference to the character of the
system said to giverise to them, considers that the "necessity" argument
fallsto the ground for lack ofverisimilitudein the context ofthe economy

and philosophy of that system. Looked at in another way moreover,
the argument amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the equiva-
lent of an "actio popularis", or right resident in any member of a com-
munity to take legal action in vindication of a public interest. But
although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems
of law, it is not known to international law as it stands at present:
nor is the Court able to regard it as imported by the "general principles
of law" referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of its Statute.

89. The Court feels obliged in conclusion to point out that the whole
"necessity" argument appears, in the final analysis, to be based on
considerations of an extra-legal character, the product of a process of
after-knowledge. Such a theory was never officially advanced during
the period of the League, and probably never would have been but for
then con-
the dissolution of that organization and the fact that it was
sidered preferable to rely on the anticipation that mandated territories
would be brought within the United Nations trusteeship system. It is
these subsequent events alone, not anything inherent in the mandates
system as it was originally conceived, and is correctly to be interpreted,
that give rise to the alleged "necessity". But that necessity, if it exists,
lies in the political field. Ites not constitute necessity in the eyes of
the law. If the Court, inorder to parry the consequences of these events,
were now to read into the mandates system, by way of, so to speak,
remedial action, an element wholly foreign to its real character and
structure as originally contemplated when the system was instituted, itwould be engaging in an ex post facto process, exceeding its functions
as a court of law. As is implied by the opening phrase of Article 38,

paragraph 1, of its Statute, the Court is not a legislative body. Its duty
is to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it.
90. It is always open to parties to a dispute, if they wish the Court to
givea decision on a basis of ex aequo et bono, and are so agreed, to invoke
the power which, in those circumstances, paragraph 2 of this same
Article 38 confers on the Court to give a decision on that basis, not-
withstanding the provisions of paragraph 1. Failing that, the duty of the
Court is plain.
91. It may be urged that the Court is entitled to engage in a process
of "filling in thegaps", in the application of a teleologicalprinciple of
interpretation, according to which instruments must be given their
maximum effect in order to ensure the achievement of their underlying
purposes. The Court need not here enquire into the scope of a principle
the exact bearing of which is highly controversial, for it is clear that it
can have no application in circumstances in which the Court would
have to go beyond what can reasonably be regarded as being a process
of interpretation, and would have to engage in a process of rectification

or revision. Rights cannot be presumed to exist merely because it might
seem desirable that they should. On a previous occasion, which had
certain affinities with the present one, the Court declined to find that
an intended three-member commission could properly be constituted
with two members only, despite the (as the Court had held) illegal refusa1
of one of the parties to the jurisdictional clause to appoint its arbitrator
-and although the whole purpose of the jurisdictional clause was
thereby frustrated. In so doing, the Court (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 229)
said that it was its duty "to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them".
It continued :

"The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res
magis valeat quampereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness,
cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the
settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as
stated above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit."

In other words, the Court cannot remedy a deficiency if, in order to do
so, it has to exceed the bounds of normal judicial action.

92. It may also be urged that the Court would be entitled to makegood
an omission resulting from the failure of those concerned to foresee
what might happen, and to have regard to what it may be presumed
the framers of the Mandate would have wished, or would even have
made express provision for, had they had advance knowledge of what
was to occur. The Court cannot however presume what the wishes and
intentions of those concerned would have been in anticipation of events

46 that were neither foreseen nor foreseeable; and even if it could, it would
certainly not be possible to make the assumptions in effect contended
for by the Applicants as to what those intentions were.

93. In this last connection, it so happens that there is in fact one test
that can be applied, namely by enquiring what the States who were
members of the League when the mandates system was instituted did
when, as Members of the United Nations, they joined in setting up
the trusteeship system that was to replace the mandates system. In
effect, as regards structure, they did exactly theame as had been done
before, with only one though significant difference. There were of
course marked divergences,as regards for instance composition, powers,
and voting rules, between the organs of the United Nations and those of
the League. Subject to that however, the Trusteeship Council was to
play the same sort of role as the Permanent Mandates Commission had
done, and the General Assembly (or Security Council in the case of
strategic trusteeships) was to play the role of the League Council; and
it was to these bodies that the various administering authorities became
answerable. No right of supervision or of calling the administering

authority to account was given to individual Members of the United
Nations, whose sphere of action, as in the case of the League members,
is to be found in their participation in the work of the competent organs.

94. The significant differencereferred to lies in the distribution of the
jurisdictional clause amongst the various trusteeship agreements. The
clause itself is almost identical in its terms with that which figured in
the mandates, and was clearly taken straight from these ("any dispute
whatever", "between the Administering Authority and another Member
of the United Nations", "relating to ... the provisions of this Agree-
ment"). But whereas the jurisdictional clause appeared in al1the man-
dates, each of which contained "special interests" provisions, it figures

only in those trusteeship agreements which contain provisions of this
type, and not in agreements whose provisions are confined entirely to
the performance of the trust in accordance with the basic objectives of
the system as set out in Article76 of the Charter.

95. If therefore, the contention put forward by the Applicants in the
present case were correct in principle (and this contention is in a major
degree founded on the existenceand wording of the jurisdictional clause,
and also involves the erroneous assumption that it can per se confer
substantive rights), it would follow that, in the case of some of the
trusteeships, individual members of the United Nations would be held
to have a legal right or interest in the conduct and administration of

the trust, but in relation to others they would not, although these were
no less trusteeships,-no less an expression of the "sacred trust of
civilization". The implications beconle even more striking when it is
realized that the trusteeships to which no jurisdictional clause attaches
are three previous Pacific 'C' mandates-that is to Say the class of
47 territory inhabited by precisely the most undeveloped categories of
peoples, the least "able to stand by themselves".

96. It has been sought to explainthis apparent anomaly by referenceto
the strong negotiating position in which the various mandatories found
themselves, inasmuch as they were not legally obliged to place their
mandated territories under trusteeship at all, and could therefore,
within limits, make their own terms. But this would in no way explain
why they seem to have been willing to accept a jurisdictional clause in
the case of trusteeships that contained "special interests" provisions,
including one Pacific 'C' mandate of this kind, but were not willing
to do so in the case of trusteeships whose terms provided only for the
performance of the trust in accordance with the basic objectives of the
systeni.
97. No doubt, as has been pointed out, even where no jurisdictional
clause figures in a trusteeship agreement, it would be possible, inthose
cases where the administering authority had made an appropriately
worded declaration in acceptance of the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction
under the optional clause provision of Article 36 of the Court's Statute,
for another member of the United Nations having made a similar and

interlocking declaration, to seise the Court of a dispute regarding
the performance of the trust. The number of cases in which this could
occur has, however, always beenvery limited, and the process is rendered
precarious and uncertain, not only by the conditions contained in, and
the nature of the disputes covered by certain of these declarations,
but also by their liability to amendment, withdrawal, or non-renewal.
The optional clause system could therefore in no way have afforded a
substitute for a general obligation to adjudicate, if such an obligation
had really been regarded as essential;-moreover, even in those cases
where an optional clause declaration could be invoked, it would still be
necessary for the invoking State-as here-to establish the existence of a
legal right or interest in the subject-matter of its claim.
98. It has also been sought to explain why certain trusteeship agree-
ments do not contain the jurisdictional clause by a further appeal to the
"necessity" argument. This clause was no longer necessary, so it was
contended, because the United Nations voting rule was different. In the
League Council, decisions could not be arrived at without the concur-

rence of the mandatory, whereas in the United Nations the majority
voting rule ensured that a resolution could not be blocked by any single
vote. This contention would not in any event explain why the clause
was accepted for some trusteeships and not for others. But the whole
argument is misconceived. If decisions of the League Council could not
be arrived at without the concurrence, express or tacit, of the mandatory,
they were, when arrived at, binding: and if resolutions of the United
Nations GeneraI Assembly (which on this hypothesis would be the
relevant organ) can be arrived at without the concurrence of the ad-
ministering authority, yet when so arrived at-and subject to certain
exceptions not here material-they are not binding, but only recom-
mendatory in character. The persuasive force of Assembly resolutionscan indeed be very considerable,-but this is a differentthing. It operates
on the political not the legal level: it does not make these resolutions
binding in law. If the "necessity" argument were valid therefore, it
would be applicable as much to trusteeships as it is said to be to man-
dates, because in neither case could the administering authority be
coerced by means of the ordinary procedures of the organization.
Theconclusion to be drawn is obvious.

99. In the light of these various considerations,the Court findsthat the
Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right or
interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims,
and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them.

100. For these reasons,

by the President's casting vote-the votes being equally divided,

decidesto reject the claims of the Empire of Ethiopia and the Republic
of Liberia.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague,this eighteenthday of July, one thousand
nine hundred and sixty-six,in four copies, one of which will be placed
in the archivesofthe Court and the otherstransmitted to the Government
of the Empire of Ethiopia, the Government of the Republic of Liberia
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, respectively.

(Signed) Percy C. SPENDER,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

President Sir Percy SPENDEm Rakes the following declaration:

1. The judgment of the Court, which consists of its decision and the
reasons upon which it is based (Article 56 (1) ofthe Statute), is that the
Applicants cannot be considered to have established that they have
any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of the present claims,
and that accordinglytheir claims are rejected. 2. Having so decided, the Court's task was completed. It was not
necessary for it to determine whether the Applicants' claims should or
could be rejected on any other grounds. Specifically it was not called
upon to consider or pronounce upon the complex of issues and questions
involved in Article 2 of the mandate instrument ("The Mandatory
shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of the inhabitants of the territorysubject to the present
Mandate"); or Article 6 thereof ("Thr Mandatory shall make to the
Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction
of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory,

and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed
under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5"); or to enter into a legal enquiry as to
what it would or might have decided in respect to these and related
matters had it not reached the decision it did. To have done so would,
in my view, have been an excess of the judicial function.

3. The Judgment of the Court does not represent the unanimous
opinion of the judges and, in consequence, Article 57 of the Statute of
the Court, which provides that in that case "any judge shall be entitled
to deliver aseparate opinion", comes into operation.
4. It follows that any judge, whether he concurs in or dissents from
the Court's judgment, is entitled, if he wishes, to deliver a separate
opinion.

5. Since in my view there are grounds other than as stated in the
Judgment upon which the Applicants' claims or certain of them could
have been rejected, and since 1 agree with the Court's Judgment, there
arises for me the question whether, and if so to what extent, it is per-
missible or appropriate to express by way of separate opinion my
views on these additional grounds for rejecting the Applicants' claims
or certain ofthem.
6. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider not
merely the text of Article 57 but the general purpose it was intended
to serve, and its intended application.

7. 1 would not wish to Say anything which would unreasonably
restrict the right accorded to a judge by Article 57. It is an important
right which must be safeguarded. Can it be, however, that there are
no limits to the scope and extent of the exercise of this right by any
individual judge? 1 cannot think so. There must, it seems to me, be
some limits, to proceed beyond which could not be claimed to be a
proper exercise of the right the Statute confers.
8. The right of a judge to express a dissenting opinion in whole or in
part was not easily won.

9. In the Hague Convention of 1899 a right of dissent from arbitral
decisions was recognized; it was adopted without discussion. At the
Hague Conference of 1907 the question of dissent or no dissent was
discussed at considerable length. In the result the right of dissent was
suppressed.
50 10. The Committee of Jurists, in drafting the Statute of th- Permanent
Court in 1920, after discussion, reached the conclusion that a judge
should be allowed to publish his dissent, but not his reasons. This
however failed to receive the approval of the Council of the League
at its tenth meeting in Brussels in October of that year. There was
then introduced into the text the right of a judge who did not concur
in al1or part of the judgment to deliver a separate opinion.

11. The record reveals clearly that this recognition of the right of
ajudge not only to publish his dissent but, as well, to express the reasons

for thesame, was the result of compromise (Leagueof Nations Documents
on Article 14 of the Covenant,pp. 138et seq.). It was stated by Sir Cecil
Hurst, who was at Brussels, and who defended,before the Sub-Committee
of the Assembly, the view arrived at at the Brussels meeting of the
Council, that the reason for disagreeing witl-ithe Committee of Jurists
was because it was feared in England that the decisions of the Court
might establish rules of law which would be incompatible with the
Anglo-saxon legal system. The agreement reached in the Council of
the League in Brussels,it seemsclear, aimed at avoiding this apprehended
danger by the publication of dissenting opinions.

12. This would strongly sugg,:st that the contemplated purpose of
the publication of the dissent, certainly its mainpurpose, was to enable
the view of the dissenting judge or judges on particular questions of
law dealt with in the Court's judgment to be seen side by side with
the views of the Court on these questions.
13. In the result there was, without dissent, written into the Statute

of the Permanent Court Article 57 thereof, which read:
"If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judgs, dissenting judges are entitled
to deliver aseparate opinion."

14. There is the considerable authority of President of the Permanent
Court Max Huber for the view that the contemplated purpose of the
right to publish reasons for a dissent was as stated in paragraph 12
above. In the course of a long discussion in that Court in July of 1926
on the general principle of dissenting opinions (Series D, Addendum

No. 2, p. 215) he is recorded as having observed (my italics):

"Personally the President had always construed the right con-
ferred on judges by Article 57 as a right to state their reasons and
not simply to express their dissent, the object being to enable judges
to explain their understanding of international law in order to
false impression that a particular judgment
prevent the creation of a
or opinionexpressed the unanimous opinion of the Court, in regard
to the interpretation of internationallaw on aparticularpoint." 15. Further support for Max Huber's view is, 1 think, to be found
in a resolution of the Permanent Court of 17 February 1928which, in
part, read as follows (my italics): "Dissenting opinions are designed
solelyto setforth thereasonsfor whichjudges donotfeel ableto accept the
opinionof the Court. .."
16. It would amear evident from the record that it would have
been quite forei& to the understanding of those who drafted the
provision according the right of a judge to publish the reasons for his
dissent, that this right could be one which permitted a judge to express
his opinion at large, on matters not directly connected with the nature
and subject-matter of the Court's decision.
17. This then was the origin of Article 57 of this Court's Statute,
which was evidently based by its framers not only on the text of the
corresponding article in the Statute of the Permanent Court, but, as
well, upon the commonly understood purpose a dissenting opinion was
designed to serve.
18. Article 57 of this Court's Statute extends the ri~ht-to deliver
a separate opinion to any judge, where the judgment does not represent
in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges.
19. If a dissenting judge is free to state his opinion on matters which
are not directly connected with the Court's judgment, so it would
appear is a concurring judge who, for any reason which recommends
itself to him, desires to deliver a separate opinion.

20. In other words, if any judge is entitled to give a separate opinion
quite outside the range of the Court's decision and on issues upon
which the Court has made no findings of any kind, every other judge
is so entitled. The inevitable confusion which this could lead to cannot,
in my view, be supported by any rational interpretation and application
of Article 57.It would, or could, inpractice be destructive of theauthority
of the Court.

21. President Basdevant, a former distinguished President of this
Court, in his Dictionary of the Terminologyof InternationalLaw (p. 428)
defines an individual concurring opinion as not a mere statement of
disagreement as to the reasons given for a decision, the dispositif of
which the judge accepts, but the forma1 explanation he gives of the
grounds on which he personally does so; whilst a dissenting opinion
denotes not a mere statement of dissent relative to a decision but the
forma1 explanation given of the grounds on which the judge bases his
dissent.
22. In the light of al1these considerations the following conclusions
appear justified:

(a) individual opinions, whether dissenting or merely separate, were,
when the Court's Statute was drafted, regarded as such as were
directly connected with and dependent upon the judgment of the 55 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DECLS . PENDER)
Court itself (or in the case of advisory opinions (Statute, Article 68,
Rules, Article 84 (2)), its opinion), in the sense of either agreeing
or disagreeing with it, or its motivation, or as to the sufficiencyof

the latter;
(b) the judgment (or opinion) of theCourt must bethefocalpoint of the
differentjudicial viewsexpressed on any occasion, sinceit is the exis-
tence and nature of the judgrnent (or opinion) and their relation-
ship to it that gives individual opinions their judicial character;
(c) in principle such opinions should not purport to deal with matters
that fa11entirely outside the range of the Court's decision, or of
the decision'smotivation;
(d) there must exist a close direct link between individual opinions
and the judgment of the Court.

23. If these conclusions are, as 1 think them to be, sound, there
still remain wide limits within which an individual judge may quite
properly go into questions that the Court has not dealt with, provided
he keeps within the ambit of the order of question decided by the Court,

and in particular observes the distinction between questions of a pre-
liminary or antecedent character and questions not having that character.
1 cannot however agree that a separate or dissenting opinion may
properly include al1 that a judge thinks the judgment of the Court
should have included.
24. The mere fact that a judgment (or opinion) of the Court has been
given does not afford justification for an expression of views at large
on matters which entirely exceed the limits and intended scope of the
judgment (or opinion). Without the judgment (or opinion) there would,
of course, be no relationship and nothing of a judicial character that
could be said by any judge. There is equally no relationship imparting
judicial character to utterances about questions which the Court has not
treated of at all.
25. Suppose that the Court, on a request to give an advisory opinion,

refuses to do so, as for example it did in the case of Eastern Carelia,
1923, Series B, No. 5, on a specific ground stated; could a judge of the
Court, by way of a separate individual or dissenting opinion, proceed
to give his views as to what the opinion of the Court should have been
if it had decided to express it?1 should have thought not.

26. 1s there in principle any real distinction between this supposed
case and the present cases? 1 think not. The Court has decided, on
what is a preliminary question of the merits, that the Applicants' claims
must be rejected: thus further examination of the merits becomes
supererogatory. 1s any judge in a separate opinion, in disregard of the
particular issue or question decided by the Court and the reasoning
in support of the decision, entitled to go beyond giving his reasons for
disagreeing with that decision, and passing entirely outside it to express

his views on what the Court should have decided in relation to other
matters of the merits, on which no decision has been arrived at and noexpression of opinion has been given by the Court? To do so, in my
view, would be to go outside the proper limits of an individual or
separate opinion.
27. It cannot be that the mere dispositifitself can enlarge the proper
scope of a separate opinion. The dispositif cannot be disembowelled

from the Court's opinion as expressed in its motivations. It surely
cannot be that just because the dispositifrejects the claims, it is permis-
sible for a dissenting judge to give his reasons why the claims should
be upheld in whole or part. The content of the judgment must be ob-
tained from reading together the decision and the reasons upon which
it is based. The claims are dismissed for particular assigned reasons
and on a specificground. It is to these reasons and this ground, it seems
to me, that in principle al1separate opinions must be directed, not to
wholly unconnected issues or matters.

28. It would seem inconceivable that a judge who concurs in the
dispositifshould in aseparate opinionbe freeto go beyond considerations
germane to the actual decision made by the Court and its motivations.
In the present cases he would, of course, be free to advance another
ground of the same order as that on which the Court's decision rests

which would separately justify it, or other related reasons which might
go to support it. But it would hardly be justifiable for such a judge to
proceed further into the merits, expressing his views on how he thinks
the Court should or would have pronounced upon the whole complex
of questions centering around different provisions of the Mandate, for
example Articles 2 and 6 thereof, had the Court not reached the decision
it actually did.
29. There is however no warrant to be found in Article 57 of the
Court's Statute which would leave it free for a dissenting judge to do
this but not a concurring judge. They both stand upon an equal footing.
The dispositif and a judge's vote thereon, for or against, could not,
in itself, affect the proper limits within which any separate opinion
under Article 57may be delivered.

30. In the present cases the questions of merits that arise can them.

selves be divided into two categories, namely questions of what mighi
be called the ultimate merits and certain other questions which, thougk
appertaining to the merits, have an antecedent or more fundamenta:
character, in the sense that if decided in a certain way they render a
decision on the ultimate merits unnecessary and indeed unwarranted.
As the Judgment States,there are two questions having that character-
that of the Applicailts' legal right and interest (which is the basis of
the Court's decision) and that of the continued subsistence of the
Mandate for South West Africa.

31. It would be entirely proper for a judge who votes in favour of
the dispositif to base a separate opinion wholly or in part upon the
second of those two questions. He would not be going outside theorder of question considered by the Court, namely that of antecedent
issues on merits operating as a bar to al1 the Applicants' claims, he
would not have attempted to pronounce on the question of ultimatc
merits, necessarily excluded and rendered irrelevant by the Court':
Judgment.
32. To the extent that any separate opinion, whether concurring or
dissenting, goes outside the order of the question considered by the
Court, it is my view that the opinion ceases to have any relationsl-ii~:
with the judgment of the Court, whatever the means may be by which

such a relationship or link is sought to be estab!ished-it ceasestherefore
to be an expression properly in the nature of a judicial expression of
opinion, for, as has been already indicated, it is only through their
relationship to the judgment that a judicial character is imparted to
individual opinions.
33. In my view, such an opinion, to the extent it exceeds these limits,
ceases to be a separate opinion as contemplated by the Court's Statute
and Rules since it expresses viewsabout matters for which the judgment
of the Court does not provide the basis necessary for the process of
agreement or disagreement which is the sole legitimate raison d'être
of a separate opinion.
34. 1 am not persuaded that the views 1 have expressed are in any
sense invalidated if it be that on one or two occasions this or that judge
has, in some manner, not acted in conformity therewith. Action which

is impermissible does not become permissible because it may have been
overlooked at the time or no objection taken. The correct path to follow
remains the correct path even though there may have been occasional
straying from it.
35. These views must dictate my own action. However 1 might agree
or disagree with the views expressed by any individual judge in a
separate opinion in relation to the complex of questions both of law
and fact centering around Articles 2 and 6 of the Mandate and certain
other articles thereof, 1would not, in my considered view, be entitled to
express any opinion thereon. Were 1 to do so 1 would be expressing
purely personal and extra-judicial views contrary to what I think is the
object and purpose of Article 57of the Statute, and contrary, in my view,
to the best interests of the Court.
36. And what it is not permissible or proper to do in a separate
opinion, it is certain would be impermissible and improper to do in a

declaration.
37. 1 associate myself unreservedly with the Court's Judgment, and,
having regard to the viewsherein expressed,have nothing to add thereto.

Judge MORELLaInd Judge ad hoc VAN WYKappend Separate Opinions
to the Judgment of the Court.

55 Vice-President WELLINGNOO,Judges KORETSKTA, NAKAJ,ESSUP,
PADILLANERVOF,ORSTERand Judgead hoc Sir Louis MBANppend
Dissenting Opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) P. C. S.
(Initialled) S. A.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA v. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

SECOND PHASE

JUDGMENT OF 18 JULY 1966

COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,

AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRES DU SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN
(ÉTHIOPIE c. AFRIQUE DU SUD;

LIBÉRIA c. AFRIQUE DU SUD)

DEUXIÈME PHASE

ARRÊT DU 18 JUILLET 1966 Officialcitation:
South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment,I.C.J. Reports 1966,p. 6.

Mode officielde citation:
Sud-Ouest africain, deuxième phasea,rrêt,C.I.J. Recup.6.1966,

( .Olde nv...: 299 / INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1966
1966
18 July
General List: 18 July 1966
Nos. 46 & 47

SOUTH WESTAFRICACASES

(ETHIOPIA 1,.SOUTH AFRICA;

LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)
SECOND PHASE

Alleged contraventionsof League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa-
Question of the legal status of the Applicarzts-Stagoverned by their position
asformer members of the League-Antecedent question arisingon the merits of

the case whethevApplicants, as individual States former members of the League,
have any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of theiv claim-Character
of the mandates systern within theframework of the League-Effecof Article 22
of the League Covenant instituting the systern generally-Obligationsof each
mandatory dejîned itz particular instvuments of mandate-Structure of these
instruments-Clauses conferring in respect of the mandated territory direct
cornn7ercialor other specialrights onLeague mernbersitztheir capacity asseparate
States-Clauses providing for the carrying out of the mandate as a "sacred trust
of civilization" in regard to the inhabitatlts of the territory-Mandaobliga-
tions under latter class of clarisesowed to League as an entity, not to member
States individually-Lack of any Iegal right for member States individually to
claimperformance of these obligations-Additionalrights not acquired by reason
of dissolution of the League.

Political, moral and humar~itarianconsiderations not in themselves genevative
of legal rights and obligatiorzs.
Jurisdictiotzal clause of the mandates-Effecof decision given by the Court
in 1962 on the question of ifs competence-Relationshipbetween decisions on a
preliminary objection and any question of merits-Znability in principle of juris-
dictional clauses to confer substantive rights-Capacto involceajurisdictional
clarisedoes not imply existence of arzylegal right or inferest relative to the merits COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1966 1966
18juillet
18juillet 1966 Rôle général
nos46& 47

AFFAIRESDU SUD-OUESTAFRICAIN

(ÉTHIOPIE c. AFRIQUE DU SUD;
LIBÉRIA c. AFRIQUE DU SUD)

DEUXIÈME PHASE

Infractions alléguées auMandat de la Société desNations pour le Sud-Ouest
africain - Question du statut juridique des demandeurs - Statut régipar leur
situation d'anciens Membres de la Société - Question defond prioritaire relative
au point de savoir si les demandeurs ont à titre indii~iduel,comme anciens Etats
Membres de la Société,un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de l'objet de la
demande - Nature du système des Mandats dans le cadre de la Sociétédes Na-
tions - Efet de l'article 22 du Pacte instituant le système d'une manière géné-
rale - Obligations de chaque Mandataire définiesdans des actes de Mandat -
Structure de ces actes - Dispositions conférantdirectement et individuellement

aux Etats Membres des droits commerciarix ou autres droits particuliers concer-
nant le territoire sous Mandat - Dispositions relativesù l'exécutiondu Mandat
en accomplissement d'une ((missionsacrée de civilisation )à l'égarddes habitants
du territoire- Obligations du Mandataire en vertu de ces dernières dispositions
dues à la Société des Nationsen tant qu'entitéet non aux Etats Membres à titre
individuel - Etats Membres privésde tout droit de réclamer ù titre individuel
l'exécution deces obligations - Absence de droits supplémentaires découland te
la dissolution de la Société des Nations.
Considérationspolitiques, morales et humanitaires inaptes à engendrer par
elles-mêmes des droitset obligatiorzsjuridiques.

Clausejuridictionnelle des Mandats - Effet de la décision renduepar la Cour
en 1962 sur sa compétence - Rapport entre des décisions sur une exception
préliminaire ettoute question defond - Inaptitude de principe des clauses juri-
dictionnellesà conférerdesdroits touchant aufond - La qualitépour invoquer une
clause juridictionnelle n'impliquepas l'existence d'un droit ou intérêt juridique

4 of the clairn-Interpretationof jurisdictional clause of the mandates-Juris-
dictional clauses of the minorities treaties not comparable-Analyof League
practice in respect of mandates-Znconsistency with existence of rights now
clairnedby the Applicants.

Functions of a court of law-Lirnitof the teleologicalprinciple of interpreta-
tion-Court not entitled by way of interpretation to revise, rectify or supplement.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Percy SPENDER;Vice-President' WELLINGTON KOO;
Judges WINIARSKS I,PIROPOULO Sir, Gerald FITZMAURICKEO, RETSKY,
TANAKAJ,ESSUPM , ORELLIP,ADILLA NERVO,FORSTERG , ROS;Judges
ad hoc Sir Louis MBANEFO VAN WYK;Registrar AQUARONE.

In the South West Africa cases,

between
the Empire of Ethiopia,
represented by

H.E. Dr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy,
Hon. Ernest A. Gross, Member of the New York Bar,
as Agents,
assisted by
Hon. Edward R. Moore, Under-Secretary of State of Liberia,
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Frank G. Dawson, Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Richard A. Falk, Professor of International Law, Princeton University

and Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Arthur W. Rovine, Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. Neville N. Rubin, Lecturer in African Law at the School of Oriental and
African Studies of the University of London and Advocate of the Supreme
Court of South Africa,
as Adviser;
the Republic of Liberia,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Nathan Barnes,
Hon. Ernest A. Gross,
as Agents,

Hon. Edward R. Moore,
as Agent and Counsel,
5quant au fond de la demande - Interpuétationde la clause juridictionnelle des
Mandats - Clauses iuridictionnelles des traitésde minorités noncornnara-les
Analyse de la patiqUe de la Société des Nationsen matière de ~andats - Son

incompatibilité avec l'existence des droits actuellemerzt revendiqués par les de-
mandeurs.
Fonctions d'un tribunal- Limites du principe téléologiqd'interprétatio-
Impossibilitéportu la Cour de reviser, rectifier ou compléterun texte par voie
d'interprétation.

.Présents:ir Percy SPENDERP,résident;M. WELLINGTOK NOO, Vice-Président;
MM. WINIARSKI S,PIROPOULOsSi,r Gerald FITZMAURICE M,M. Ko-
RETSKY T,ANAKAJ,ESSUPM , ORELLIP ,ADILLA NERVOF ,ORSTER G,ROS,
juges; sir Louis MBANEFO , .VAN WYK,juges ad hoc; M. AQUARONE,
Grefier.

En les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain,
entre

l'Empire d'Ethiopie,
représentépar
S. Exc. M. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy,
l'honorable Ernest A. Gross, membre du barreau de New York,

comme agents,
assistéspar
l'honorable Edward R. Moore, sous-secrétaired'Etat du Libéria,
M. Keith Highet, membre du barreau de New York,
M. Frank G. Dawson, membre du barreau de New York,
M. Richard A. Falk, professeur de droit international à l'université de
Princeton et membre du barreau de New York,

M. Arthur W. Rovine, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,
comme conseils,
et par

M. Neville N. Rubin, chargé de cours de droit africainà l'Ecole des études
orientales et africaines del'université de Londres et avocat a la Cour
suprême d'Afrique du Sud,
comme conseiller;
la République du Libéria,

représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Nathan Barnes,
l'honorable Ernest A. Gross,
comme agents,

l'honorable Edward R. Moore,
comme agent et conseil, assisted by

Mr. Keith Highet,
Mr. Frank G. Dawson,
Mr. Richard A. Falk,
Mr. Arthur W. Rovine,
as Counsel,
and by

Mr. Neville N. Rubin,
as Adviser,

and
the Republic of South Africa,

represented by
Dr. J.P. verLoren van Themaat, S.C., Professor of International Law at the
University of South Africa and Consultant to the Department of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. R. G. McGregor, Deputy Chief State Attorney,

as Agents,
and by
Mr. R. F. Botha, Department of Foreign Affairs and Advocate of the
Supreme Court of South Africa,
as Agent and Adviser,

assisted by
Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. G. van R. Muller, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Dr. P. J. Rabie, S.C., Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. E. M. Grosskopf, Member of the South African Bar,
Dr. H. J. 0. van Heerden, Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. A. S. Botha, Member of the South African Bar,
Mr. P. R. van Rooyen, Member of the South African Bar,

as Counsel,
and by
Mr. H. J. Allen, Department of Bantu Administration and Development,

Mr. H. Heese, Department of Foreign Affairs and Advocate of the Supreme

Court of South Africa,
as Advisers,

composed as above,

delivers thefollowing Judgment:

By its Judgment of 21 December 1962, the Court rejected the four prelimi-
nary objections raised by the Government of South Africà and found that it
had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute submitted to it
on 4 November 1960by the Applications of the Governments of Ethiopia and
Liberia. Time-limits for the filing of the further pleadings on the merits were
fixed or, at the request of the Parties, extended, by Orders ofFebruary 1963,
18 September 1963, 20 January 1964 and 20 October 1964; and the second
6 assistéspar
M. Keith Highet,
M. Frank G. Dawson,

M. Richard A. Falk,
M. Arthur W. Rovine,
comme conseils,
et par
M. Neville N. Rubin,

comme conseiller,

la République sud-africaine,

représentéepar
M. J. P. verLoren van Themaat, S.C., professeur de droit international à
l'université d'Afrique du Sud et conseiller auprès du département des
Affaires étrangères,
M. R. G. McGregor, Chief Stnte Attorney adjoint,
comme agents,

et par
M. R. F. Botha, du département des Affaires étrangères, avocat à la Cour
suprême d'Afrique du Sud,
comme agent et conseiller,

assistéspar
M. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. G. van R. Muller, S.C., membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. P. J. Rabie, S.C., membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. E. M. Grosskopf, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. H. J. 0. van Heerden, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. A. S. Botha, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,
M. P. R. van Rooyen, membre du barreau d'Afrique du Sud,

comme conseils,
et par
M. H. J. Allen, du département de l'administration et du développement
bantous,
M. H. Heese, du département des Affaires étrangères, avocat à la Cour
suprême d'Afrique du Sud,

comme conseillers,

LACOUR,
ainsi composée,

rend l'arrêt suivant:
Par arrêtdu 21 décembre 1962, la Cour a rejeté les quatre exceptions pré-

liminaires soulevées par le Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud et dit qu'elle
était compétente pour statuer sur le fond du différenddont elle avait étésaisie
le 4 novembre 1960par des requêtesémanant des Gouvernements de 1'Ethiopie
et du Libéria. Les délais prévuspour la suite de la procédure sur le fond ont
étéfixésou prorogés à la demande des Parties par les ordonnances des 5 fé-
vrier et 18 septembre 1963, 20janvier et 20 octobre 1964 et l'instance dans saphase of the cases became ready for hearing on 23 December 1964, when the
Rejoinder of the Government of South Africa was filed.
Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Statute, and the Order of the
Court of 20 May 1961, the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, acting in
concert, chose Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the Eastern Region of

Nigeria, to sit asJudgead hoc. In accordance with the same Article, the Govern-
ment of South Africa chose the Honourable J. T. van Wyk, Judge of the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, to sit as Judge ad hoc.
Both judges had sat in the first phase of the proceedings.

On 14 March 1965, the Government of South Africa notified the Court of
its intention to make an application to the Court relating to the composition
of the Court for the purposes of these cases. The said notification was duly
cornrnunicated to the Agents for the Applicants. The Court heard the conten-
tions of the Parties with regard to the application at closed hearings held on
15 and 16 March 1965 and decided not to accede to the application. This
decision was embodied in an Order of 18 March 1965.
Public sittings of the Court were heldduring the periods 15 March to 14July
and 20 September to 29 November 1965.
During these public sittings the Court heard the oral arguments and replies

to H.E. Mr. Nathan Barnes, Hon. Ernest A. Gross, Agents, and Hon. Edward
R. Moore, Agent and Counsel, on behalf of the Governments of Ethiopia and
Liberia and of Dr. J. P. verLoren van Themaat, S.C., Mr. R. F. Botha, Agents,
Mr. D. P. de Villiers, S.C., Mr.E. M. Grosskopf, Mr. G. van R. Muller, S.C.,
Mr. P. R. van Rooyen, Dr. H. J. 0. van Heerden and Dr. P. J. Rabie, S.C.,
Counsel, on behalf of the Government of South Africa.
At the hearings from 27 April to 4 May 1965,the Cd)wt heard the views of
the Parties on a proposal made by counsel for South Africa at the hearing on
30 March 1965 to the effect that the Court should carry out an inspection
in loco in the Territory of South West Africa and also that the Court should
visit South Africa, Ethiopia and Li'beria,and one or two countries of theCourt's
own choosing south of the sahaka. At the hearing on 24 May 1965the President
announced that this request would not be deliberated on by the Court until
afteral1the evidence had been calied and the addresses of the Parties concluded.
At the public sitting on 29 November 1965the President announced that the

Court had decided not to accede to this request. This decision was embodied
in an Order of the same date.
At the hearing on 14 May 1965,the President announced that the Court was
unable to accede to a proposal made on behalf of Ethiopia and Liberia that
the Court should decide that South Africa, in lieu of calling witnesses or experts
to testify personally, should embody the evidence in depositions or written
statements. In the view of the Court, the Statute and Rules of Court cpnteni-
plated a right in a party to produce evidence by calling witnesses and experts,
and it must be left to exercise the right as it saw fit, subject to the provisions
of the Statute and Rules of Court.
At the hearings from 18June to 14July and from 20September to 21October
1965,the Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts called by the
Government of SouthAfricain reply to questions put to them in examination,
cross-examination and re-examination on behalf of the Parties, and by Members

of the Court. The following persons gave evidence: Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen,
Commissioner-General for the Northern Sotho; Professor E. van den Haag,
Professor of Social Philosophy at New York University; Professor J. P. van
S. Bruwer, Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University
7 deuxième phase s'est trouvéeen état le 23 décembre 1964, date du dépôt de
la duplique du Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud.
En application de l'article 31, paragraphe 3, du Statut et de l'ordonnance
de la Cour du 20 mai 1961,les Gouvernements de l'Ethiopie et du Libéria ont

désignéd'un commun accord sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice de la Nigéria
de l'Est, pour siégercomme juge ad hoc. En application de ce mêmearticle,
le Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud a désignépour siégercomme juge ad
hoc l'honorable J. T. van Wyk, jugeà 1'AppellateDivision de la Cour suprême
d'Afrique du Sud. Ces deux juges avaient participéà la première phase de la
procédure.
Le 14 mars 1965, le Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud a notifiéa la Cour
son intention de lui présenterune requêterelative la composition de la Cour
aux fins des affaires qui lui étaient soumises. Cette notification a été dûment
communiquéeaux agents des demandeurs. La Cour a entendu les observations
des Parties au cours d'audiences tenuesà huis clos les 15 et 16 mars 1965 et
a décidéde ne pas faire droit à la requête.Cette décisiona fait l'objet d'une
ordonnance du 18 mars 1965.

Des audiences publiques ont ététenues du 15 mars au 14 juiliet 1965 et
du 20 septembre au 29 novembre 1965.
Au cours de ces audiences, la Cour a entendu en leurs plaidoiries et répon-
ses, pour les Gouvernements de l'Ethiopie et du Libéria: S. Exc. M. Nathan
Barnes, l'honorable Ernest A. Gross, agents, et l'honorable EdwarR. Moore,
agent et conseil; et pour leouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud: MM. J. P.
verLoren van Themaat, S.C., et R. F. Botha, agents, D. P. de Villiers, S.C.,
E. M. Grosskopf, G. van R. Muller, S.C., P. R. van Rooyen, H. J. O. van
Heerden et P. J. Rabie, S.C., conseils.
Au cours des audiences tenues entre le 27 avril et le 4 mai 1965, la Cour a

entendu les observations des Parties sur une proposition faite par le conseil
de l'Afrique du Sud à l'audience du 30 mars 1965 tendant à ce que la Cour
procède à une descente sur les lieux dans le territoire du Sud-Ouest africain
et visite aussi l'Afrique du Sud,'Ethiopie et le Libéria, ainsi qu'un ou deux
pays situésau sud du Sahara à choisir par la Cour. Le Président a annoncé à
l'audience du 24 mai que la Cour ne délibéreraitsur cette demande que lorsque
tous les témoins et experts auraient étéentendus et que les Parties auraient
achevéleurs plaidoiries. A l'audience publique du 29 novembre 1965, le Pré-
sident a annoncé que la Cour avait décidéde ne pas retenir la demande. Cette
décisiona fait l'objet d'une ordonnance du mêmejour.
A l'audience du 14mai 1965,le Présidenta annoncé que la Cour ne saurait
faire droit la proposition de 1'Ethiopieet du Libériatendantà ce que la Cour
invite l'Afrique du Sud à consigner les déclarations des témoins ou experts

dans des dépositionsou exposésécrits,au lieu de les faire entendre en personne.
La Cour a considéré qu'auxtermes du Statut et du Règlement une partie à
une instance a le droit de produire tous élémentsde preuve en faisant citer des
témoinsou experts et doit êtreautoriséeà exercer ce droit comme ellel'entend
sous réservedes dispositions du Statut et du Règlement.
Au cours des audiences tenues du 18juin au 14juillet et du 20 septembre
au 21 octobre 1965, la Cour a entendu les témoinset experts présentéspar le
Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud dans leurs réponsesaux questions qui leur
ont étéposéesau cours de leurs divers interrogatoires par les Parties et par les
membres de la Cour. Ont ainsi déposé:M. W. W. M. Eiselen, commissaire
généralpour les Sothos du Nord; M. E. van den Haag, professeur de philo-
sophie sociale a l'université de New York; M. J. P. van S. Bruwer, professeur

d'anthropologie sociale et cultureàll'universitéde Port Elizabeth; M. R. F.
71O SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

of Port Elizabeth; Professor R. F. Logan, Professor of Geography at the Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; Mr. P. J. Cillie, Editor of Die Burger, Cape
Town; The Rev. J. S. Gericke, Vice-Chairman of the Synod of the Dutch
Reformed Church of South Africa ana Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Stellenbosch; Professor D. C. Krogh, Head of the Department of Economics,

University of South Africa; Mr. L. A. Pepler, Director of Bantu Development
in South Africa; Dr. H. J. van Zyl, Deputy Secretary, Department of Bantu
Education; Dr. C. H. Rautenbach, Rector of the University of Pretoria; Mr.
K. Dahlmann, Editor of the Allgemeine Zeitung, Windhoek; Brigadier-General
S.L. A. Marshall, Chief Historian of theUnited States Army in various theatres;
Professor C. A. W. Manning, formerly Professor of International Relations,
University of London; Professor S. T. Possony, Director of International
Political Studies Programme, Hoover Institute, Stanford University.

In the course of the written proceedings, the following Submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On behavof the Governmetzts of Ethiopia and Liberia,

in the Applications:
"Wherefore, may it please the Court, to adjudge and declare, whether
the Government of the Union of South Africa is present or absent and
aftersuch time limitations as the Court may see fit to fix, that:

A. South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred
upon His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa, accepted by His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf
of the Government of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the
Council of the League of Nations on December 17, 1920; andthat the
aforesaid Mandate is a treaty in force, within the meaning of Article 37
of the Statute of the International Courtof Justice.
B. The Union of South Africa remains subject to the international
obligations set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations and in the Mandatefor South West Africa, and that the General

Assembly of the UnitedNations is legallyqualified to exercisethe super-
visory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with
regard to the administration of the Territory; and that the Union is
under an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the
General Assembly with regard to the exercise of the Mandate.
C. The Union of South Africa remains subject to the obligations to
transmit to the United Nations petitions from the inhabitants of the
Territory, aswell as to submit an annual report to the satisfaction of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 6 of the Mandate.

D. The Union has substantially modified the terms of the Mandate
without the consent of the United Nations; that such modification is a
violation of Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant;
and that the consent of the United Nations is a necessary prerequisite
and condition to attempts on the part of the Union directly or indirectly
to modify the terms of the Mandate.
E. The Union has failed to promote to the utmost the material and

moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory;
its failure to do so isa violation of Article 2of the Mandateand Article 22
8Logan, professeur de géographie à l'université de Californie (Los Angeles);
M. P. J. Cillie, rédacteur en chef de Die Burger (Le Cap); M. J. S. Gericke,
vice-présidentdu synode de 1'Eglisehollandaiseréformée d'Afrique du Sud et
vice-chancelier de l'université de Stellenbosch; M. D. C. Krogh, chef du dé-
partement d'économie politique à l'université d'Afrique du Sud; M. L. A.

Pepler, directeur du développementbantou en Afrique du Sud; M. H. J. van
Zyl, secrétaire adjoint au département de l'enseignement bantou; M. C. H.
Rautenbach, recteur de l'université de Pretoria; M. K. Dahlmann, rédacteur
en chef de I'Allgenzeine Zeitung (Windhoek); le généralS. L. A. Marshall,
chef historien de l'armée des Etats-Unis sur divers théâtres d'opérations;
M. C. A. W. Manning, ancien professeur de relations internationales à l'Uni-
versitéde Londres; M. S. T. Possony, directeur du programme d'études de
politique internationaleà l'Institut Hoover, Universitéde Stanford.

Dans la procédure écrite, les conclusions ci après-ont étéprésentéespar les
Parties:

Au nom des Gouverneme~itsde I'Ethiopie et du Libéria,

dans les requêtes:
(Plaiseà la Cour dire et juger, tant en présence qu'en l'absencedu Gou-
vernement de l'Union sud-africaine et dans les délaisque la Cour peut
estimer devoir fixer, que:

A. Le Sud-Ouest africain est un territoire sous Mandat conférépar
les Principales Puissances alliées et associéeà S.M. britannique pour
êtreexercé enson nom par le Gouvernement de l'Union de l'Afrique du
Sud, accepté par S.M. britannique agissant pour le Gouvernement de
l'Union de l'Afrique de Sud et en son nom, et confirmépar le Conseil
de la Sociétédes Nations le 17 décembre 1920;et que ledit Mandat est
un traitéen vigueur au sens de l'article 37 du Statut de la Cour interna-

tionale de Justice.
B. L'Union sud-africaine demeure soumise aux obligations interna-
tionales énoncées à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société desNations et
dans le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, et que l'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies est juridiquement qualifiéepour exercer les fonctions
de surveillance exercéesauparavant par la Sociétédes Nations en ce
qui concerne l'administration du territoire, et que l'union est tenue de
se soumettre à la surveillance et au contrôle de l'Assemblée générale

en ce qui concerne l'exercicedu Mandat.
C. L'Union sud-africaine demeure soumise à l'obligation de trans-
mettre aux Nations Unies les pétitions des habitants du territoire et
d'adresser un rapport annuel satisfaisant les Nations Unies, conformé-
ment àl'article 6 du Mandat.

D. L'Union a apporté aux dispositions du Mandat des modifications
de fond sans l'autorisation des Nations Unies; que cette modification
est une violation de l'article 7 du Mandat et de l'article 22 du Pacte; et
que l'autorisation deshTations Unies est uce condition préalable indis-
pensable à toute tentative de la part de l'Union de modifier directement
ou indirectement les dispositions du Mandat.
E. L'Union n'a pas accru, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le

bien-être matérielet moral ainsi que le progrès social des habitants du
Territoire; que cette carence est une violation de l'article 2 du Mandat SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (ARRÊT) 11

et de l'article 22 du Pacte; et que l'Union a le devoir de prendre sur-le-
champ toutes les mesures possibles pour remplir ses obligations aux
termes de ces articles.

F. Dans l'administration du Territoire, l'Union a pratiqué l'apartheid,
c'est-à-dire qu'elle a établi une discrimination fondée sur la race, la
couleur, l'origine nationale ou tribale, lorsqu'elle a fixéles droits et
devoirs des habitants du Territoire; que cette pratique constitue une
violation de l'article 2 du Mandat et de l'article 22 du Pacte; et que
l'Union a le devoir de cesser sur-le-champ de pratiquer l'opavtheid dans
le Territoire.

G. Dans l'administration du Territoire, l'union a adoptéet appliqué
une législation, des règlements, des proclamations et des ordonnances
administratives qui par leurs termes et dans leur applicationsont arbi-
traires, déraisonnables, injustes et contrairàsla dignitéhumaine; que
les mesures officiellesde l'Union mentionnées ci-avant violent l'article 2
du Mandat et l'article 22 du Pacte; et que l'Union a le devoir de rap-
porter sur-le-champ et de ne pas appliquer ces législations, règlements,
proclamations et ordonnances administratives.

H. L'Union a adopté et appliqué une législation, des règlements ad-
ministratifs et des mesures officielles qui suppriment les droits et les
libertés des habitants du Territoire, droits essentielà l'évolution ré-
gulière vers l'autonomie, à laquelle leur donnent implicitement droit
le Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations, les dispositions du Mandat et les
normesinternationalescouramment acceptéestellesqu'ellessont inscrites
dans la Charte des Nations Unies et la Déclaration des droits de
l'homme; que les actes ci-dessus de l'Union violent l'article 2 du Man-
dat et l'article 22 du Pacte; et quel'Union a le devoir de cesser et de

s'abstenir sur-le-champ de toute action qui entrave le développement
régulier de l'autonomie dans le Territoire.
1. L'Union a exercédespouvoirs d'administration et de législationsur
le Territoire incompatibles avec le statut international du Territoire;
que l'action susdite de l'Union constitue une violation de l'article 2 du
Mandat et de l'article 22 du Pacte; que l'Union a le devoir de s'abste-
nir de tous actes d'administration et de législation qui soient incompa-
tibles avec le statut international du Territoire.

J. L'Union n'a pas envoyé à L'Assemblée générale desNations Unies
des rapports annuels contenant des informations intéressant le Terri-
toire et indiquant les mesures qu'elle a prises pour assurer ses engage-
ments aux termes du Mandat; que cette carence est une violation de
l'article 6 du Mandat;et que l'Union a le devoir d'envoyer sur-le-champ
ces rapports annuels à l'Assembléegénérale.

K. L'Union n'a pas transmis à l'Assemblée généraledes Nations
Unies les pétitions des habitants du Territoire adresséesà l'Assemblée
générale;quecette carence est une violation de la règlede la Sociétédes
Nations; et que l'Union a le devoir de transmettre ces pétitionsà l'As-
semblée générale.

Le demandeur se réserve le droit de demander à la Cour de statuer à
l'égard de toute autre et nouvelle question que le demandeur pourrait
juger opportun de lui soumettre.
Plaise également à la Cour se prononcer sur tout ce qu'elle pourra es-
timer pertinent et convenable se rapportant à la présente requête, etren-
912 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its deter-
minations";
in the Memorials:

"Upon the basis of the foregoing allegations of fact, supplemented by
such facts as may be adduced in further testimony before this Court, and
the foregoing statements of law, supplemented by such other statements
of law as may be hereinafter made, may it please the Court to adjudge and
declare, whether the Government of the Union of South Africa is present
or absent, that:

1. South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred upon
His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to
be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa, accepted by his Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the Council of
the League of Nations on December 17, 1920;
2. the Union of South Africa continues to have the international
obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
and in the Mandate for South West Africa as well as the obligation to

transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory
functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the annual
reports and the petitions are to be submitted;
3. the Union, in the respects set forth in Chapter V of this Memorial
and summarized in Paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof, has practised apaut-
heid, Le., has distinguished as to race, color, national or tribal origin in
establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the Territory; that
such practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the
Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and
that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid

in the Territory;

4. the Union, by virtue of the economic, political, social and educational
policies applied within the Territory, which are described in detail in
Chapter V of this Memorial and sumrnarized at Paragraph 190 thereof,
has failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and
social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure to do so
is in violation of its obligations as stated in the second paragraph of
Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the
Union has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to

take al1practicable action to fulfillits duties under such Articles;

5. the Union, by word and by action, in the respects set forth in Chapter
VI11of this Memorial, has treated the Territory in a manner inconsistent
with the international status of the Territory, and has thereby impeded
opportunities for self-determination by the inhabitants of the Territory;
that such treatment is in violation of the Union's obligations as stated in
the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the
Covenant;that the Union hasthe duty forthwith to cease the actions sum-

marized in Section C of Chapter VI11herein, and to refrain from similar
actions in the future; and that the Union has the duty to accord full faith
and respect to the international status of the Territory; dre toute décision et prendre toute ordonnance, y compris une décision
sur les dépens, pour donner effet à ce qu'elle aura statué 1);

dans les mémoires:
((Sefondant sur les allégations de fait ci-avant, complétéespar tels faits
qui pourront ressortir de nouveaux témoignages présentés à la Cour, et
sur les conclusions juridiques ci-avant, complétées par toutes autres décla-
rations qui pourront êtrefaites par la suite, plaisà la Cour dire et juger,

tant en présence qu'en l'absence du Gouvernement de l'Union sud-afri-
caine, que:
1. Le Sud-Ouest africain est un territoire sous Mandat conférépar les
Principales Puissances alliées et associéesà Sa Majesté britannique pour
êtreexercé en son nom par le Gouvernement de l'Union de l'Afrique du
Sud, accepté par Sa Majesté britannique agissant pour le Gouvernement
de l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud et en son nom, et confirmépar le Conseil
de la Sociétédes Nations le 17 décembre 1920;

2. L'Union sud-africaine demeure soumise aux obligations internatio-
nales énoncées à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations et dans le
Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, ainsi qu'à l'obligation de transmettre
aux Nations Unies les pétitions des habitants du Territoire, les fonctions
de surveillance étantexercéespar les Nations Unies auxquellesles rapports
annuels et les pétitions doivent êtreenvoyés;

3. L'Union, dans toutes les circonstances exposkes au chapitre V du
présent mémoireet résuméesdans les paragraphes 189 et 190 dudit mé-
moire, a pratiqué l'apartheid, c'est-à-dire qu'elle a établiune discrimination
fondée sur la race, la couleur, l'origine nationale ou tribale, lorsqu'elle
a fixé lesdroits et devoirs des habitants du Territoire; que cette pratique
constitue une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurent à l'ar-
ticle2 du Mandat et a l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société desNations; et
que l'Union a le devoir de cesser sur-le-champ de pratiquer l'apartheid
dans le Territoire;

4. Par l'effet des principes économiques, politiques, sociaux et éduca-
tifs appliqués dans le Territoire et décritsen détailau chapitre V du pré-
sent mémoire, puis résumésau paragraphe 190 dudit mémoire, l'Union
n'a pas accru, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le bien-être matériel
et moral ainsi que le progrès social deshabitants du Territoire; et que cette
carence constitue une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurent
au second alinéade l'article 2 du Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte; et que
l'Union a le devoir de mettre sur-le-champ un terme aux violations in-
diquées ci-avant et de prendre toutes les mesures possibles pour remplir
ses obligations aux termes desdits articles;

5. L'Union, par ses paroles et par sesactes, a agià l'égardduTerritoire,
dans toutes lescirconstances exposéesau chapitre VI11du présent mémoire,
d'une manière incompatible avec le statut international du Territoire et a
entravé par la les chances qu'avaient les habitants du Territoire de s'en-
gager dans la voie del'autodétermination; que ces agissements constituent
une violation des obligations de l'union telles qu'elles figurent au premier
alinéade l'article 2 du Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte; que l'Union a le
devoir de mettre sur-le-champ un terme aux agissements résumés à la

section C du chapitre VI11ci-avant et de s'abstenir dans l'avenir de pa-
reils agissements; et que l'Union a le devoir de respecter en toute bonne
foi le statut international du Territoire; 6. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapter VI1 herein, has
established rnilitary baseswithin the Territory in violation of itsobligations
as stated in Article4 of the Mandate and Article 22of theCovenant; that
the Union has the duty forthwith to remove al1such rnilitary bases from
within the Territory; and that the Union has the duty to refrain from the
establishment of military bases within the Territory;

7. the Union has failed to render to the General Assembly of the United
Nations annual reports containing informatioil with regard to the Territory
and indicating the measures it has taken to carry out its obligations under
the mandate; that suc11failure is a violation of its obligations as stated
in Article 6 of the Mafidate; and that the Union has the duty forthwith
to render such annual reports to the General Assembly;

8. the Union has failed to transmit to the General Assembly of the
United Nations petitions from the lerritory's inhabitants addressed to
the General Assembly; that such failure is a violation of its obligations as
Maiidatory; and that the Unioii has the duty to transmit such pîtiîions
to the General Assembly;

9. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapters V, VI, VI1and
VJII of this Memorial coupled with its intent as recounted herein, has
attempted to modify substantially the terrns of the Mandate, without
the consent of the United Nations; that such attempt is in violation of its
dutiesas stated in Article7 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant;
and that the consent of the United Nations is a necessary prerequisite
and condition precedent to attempts on the part of the Union directly
or indirectly to modify the terms of the Mandate.

The Applicant reserves the right to request the Court to declare and
adjudge in respect to events which rnay occur subsequent to the date this
Memorial is filed, including any event by which the Union's juridical and
constitutional relationship to Her Britannic Majesty undergoes any sub-
stantial modification.
May it also please the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it
rnay deem fit and proper in regard to this Mcmorial, and to rnake al1

necessary awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate
its determinations";
in the Reply:

"Upon the basis of the allegations of fact in the Mcmorials, supple-
mented by those set forth herein or which rnay subsequently be adduced
before this HonourableCourt,and the staternents of law pertainingthereto,
asset forth in the Memorials and in this Reply, or by such other staternents
as hereafter rnay be made, Applicants respectfully reiterate their prayer
that the Court adjudge and declare in accordance with, and on the basis
of, the Submissions set forth in the Memorials, which Submissions are
hereby reaffirmed and incorporated by reference herein.

Applicants further reserve the right to request the Court to declare and
adjudge in respect of events which rnay occur subsequent to the date of
filing of this Reply.

Applicants further reiterate and reaffirm their prayer that it rnay please
the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it rnay deem fit and proper
in regard to the Memorials or to this Reply, and to make al1 necessary
11 6. L'Union, par les mesures décrites au chapitre VI1ci-avant, a établi
des basrs militaires sur le Territoire en violation de ses obligations telles
qu'elles figurentà l'article 4 du Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte; que
l'Union a le devoir de supprimer sur-le-champ toutes les bases militaires

établiessur le Territoire; et que l'Union a le devoir de s'abstenir d'établir
des bases militaires sur le Territoire;
7. L'Union n'a pas envoyé à l'Assemblée généraledes Nations Unies
des rapports annuels contenant des informations intéressant le Territoire
et indiquant les mesures qu'elle a prises pour assurer ses engagements aux
termes du Mandat; que cette carence est une violation de ses obligations
telles qu'elles figureàtl'article 6 du Mandat; et que l'Union a le devoir

d'envoyer sur-le-champ ces rapports annuels à l'Assemblée générale;
8. L'Union n'a pas transmis à l'Assemblée généraledes Nations Unies
les pétitions des habitants du Territoire adresséeàl'Assemblée générale:
que cette carence est une violation de ses obligations de an data ir et;
que l'union a le devoir de transmettre ces pétitions à l'Assemblée géné-
rale;

9. L'Union, par ses agissements décrits aux chapitres V, VI, VI1 et
VI11du présent mémoire, s'ajoutant à ses intentions telles qu'elles sont
exposées ci-avant, a tenté d'apporter aux dispositions du Mandat desmo-
difications de fond sans l'autorisation des Nations Unies; que cette ten-
tative constitue une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurent
l'article 7 du Mandat età l'article 22 du Pacte; et que l'autorisation des
Nations Unies est une condition préalable indispensable à toute tentative

de la part de l'Union de modifier directement ou indirectement les dis-
positions du Mandat.
Le demandeur se réserve le droit de prier la Cour de dire et juger à
l'égard de tous événementsqui pourraient se produire après la date
du dépôt du présent mémoire,y compris tout événemententraînant toute
modification de fond dans les rapports juridiques et constitutionnels entre
1'Union et Sa Majesté britannique.
Plaise également à la Cour se prononcer sur tout ce qu'elle pourra es-
timer pertinent et convenable se rapportant au présent mémoireet rendre
toute décision et prendre toute ordonnance, y compris une décision sur
les dépens, pour donner effet à ce qu'elle aura statu1);

dans la réplique:

((Sur la base des faits alléguésdans leurs mémoireset de ceux qui sont
indiqués dans le présent document ou qui pourraient êtreultérieurement
présentésà la Cour et sur la base des exposésde droit pertinents qui fi-
gurent dans lesmemoires et dans la présente réplique, ainsique de toutes
autres déclarationsqui pourront êtresoumises par la suite, les demandeurs
réitèrent respectueusement la demande qu'ils ont faite à la Cour de se
prononcer en conformité et sur la base des conclusions énoncéesdans les
mémoires, conclusions qu'ils confirment par les présenteset qui sont incor-
poréespar voie de référence.
Les demandeurs se réservent en outre le droit de prier la Cour de se
prononcer sur tous événementsqui pourront se produire après la date du

dépôt de la présente réplique.
Les demandeurs renouvellent et confirment leur requêtetendant à ce
qu'il plaiseà la Cour se prononcer sur tout ce qu'elle pourra estimer per-
tinent et convenable se rapportant aux mémoiresou à la présente réplique awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its deter-
minations."

On behaifof the Government of South Africa,
in the Counter-Memorial:

"Upon the basis of the statements of fact and law as set forth in the
several Volumes of this Counter-Memorial, may it please the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Submissions of the Governments of Ethiopia
and Liberia as recorded at pages 168 to 169 of their Memorials are un-
founded and that no declaration be made as claimed by them.
In particular Respondent submits:
1. That the whole Mandate for South West Africa lapsed on the disso-
lution of the League of Nations, and that Respondent is, in consequence
thereof, no longer subject to any legal obligations thereunder.

2. In the alternative to (1) above, and in the event of it being held that
the Mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the
League of Nations:
(a) Relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 2, 7 and 8,
that Respondent's former obligations under the Mandate to report
and account to, and to submit to the supervision of, the Council of
the League of Nations, lapsed upon the dissolution of the League,
and have not been replaced by any similar obligations relative to
supervision by any organ of the United Nations or any other organi-
zation or body. Respondent is therefore under no obligation to submit
reports concerning its administration of South West Africa, or to
transmit petitions fromtheinhabitants of that Territory, to the United

Nations or any other body;

(b) Relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9,
that Respondent has not, in any of the respects alleged, violated its
obligations as stated in the Mandate or in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations";
in the Rejoinder:

"1. Upon the basis of the statements of law and fact set forth in the
Counter-Mernorial, as supplemented in this Rejoinder and as may here-
after be adduced in further proceedings, Respondent reaffirms the Sub-
missions made in the Counter-Memorial and respectfully asks that such
Submissions be regarded as incorporated herein by reference.

2. Respondent further repeats its prayer that it may please the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Submissions of the Governments of Ethiopia
and Liberia, as recorded in the Memorials and as reaffirmed in the Reply,
are unfounded, and that no declaration be made as claimed by them."

In the oral proceedings the following Submissions were presented by the
Parties:

On behaifof the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia,
at the hearirig on 19 May 1965:
12 et rendre toute décisionet prendre toute ordonnance, y compris une dé-
cision sur les dépens, pour donner effet à ce qu'elle aura statué.))

Au nom du Couvertlement de 1'Afriq~~d eu Sud,

dans le contre-mémoire:
((Sefondant sur les considérations de fait et de droit exposéesdans les
différents volumes du présent contre-mémoire, plaise à la Cour dire et
juger que lesconclusions des Gouvernements de 1'Ethiopieet du Libériaqui

figurent aux pages 168 et 169 de leurs mémoiressont sans fondement et
que la Cour ne fera aucune desdéclarations proposées par les demandeurs.
Le défendeur conclut en particulier:
1. Que le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain dans son ensemble est
devenu caduc lors de la dissolution de la Société desNations et que le
défendeur n'est plus en conséquence soumis à aucune des obligations ju-

ridiques découlant du Mandat.
2. Subsidiairement, au cas où l'on estimerait que le Mandat en tant que
tel est demeuréen vigueur malgréla dissolution de laSociété des Nations:

a) en ce qui concerne les conclusions nos 2, 7 et 8 des demandeurs,

que les obligations incombant antérieurement au défendeur en vertu
du Mandat et consistant a faire rapport et à rendre compte au Conseil
de la Société desNations et à se soumettre àla surveillance de ce Con-
seil ont pris fin lors de la dissolution de la Sociétéet n'ont pas étérem-
placéespar des obligations similaires concernant une surveillance par
un organe quelconque desNations Unies, par toute autre organisation
ou par tout autre organisme. Le défendeur n'estdonc tenu ni de pré-
senter desrapports relatifs à son administration du Sud-Ouest africain
ni de transmettre les pétitions des habitants du Territoire soit aux

Nations Unies soit à tout autre organisme;
6) en ce qui concerne les conclusions nos3, 4, 5, 6 et 9 des demandeurs,
que le défendeurn'a, suraucun des points allégués,violé leo sbligations
lui incombant d'aprèsle Mandat ou l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société
des Nations 1);

dans la duplique:
((1. Vu les exposésde droit et les exposésde fait contenus dans le con-
tre-mémoire,complété parla présente duplique, et tous élémentsqui pour-
raient êtreprésentéspar la suite au cours de l'instance, le défendeurcon-
firme les conclusions formuléesdans le contre-mémoireet prie respectueu-
sement la Cour de tenir ces conclusions pour incluses dans la présente

duplique par voie de référence.
2. Le défendeur renouvelle sa demande tendant à ce qu'il plaiseà la
Cour dire et juger que les conclusions des Gouvernements de 1'Ethiopie
et du Libéria, présentées dans les mémoires et reprises dans la réplique,
sont sans fondement et que la Cour ne fera aucune des déclarations pro-
poséespar les demandeurs. ))

Au cours de la procédure orale, les conclusions ci-après ont étéprésentées
par les Parties:

Au nom des Gouverr~ementsde I'Ethiopie et du Libéria,
à l'audience du 19 mai 1965: "Upon the basis of allegations of fact, and statements of law set forth
in the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein, may it please the
Court to adjudge and declare, whether the Government of the Republic
of South Africa is present or absent, that:

(1) South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate conferred
upon His Britannic Majesty by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa, accepted by His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of
the Government of the Union of South Africa, and confirmed by the
Council of the League of Nations on 17 December 1920;
(2) Respondent continues to have the international obligations stated
in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate
for South West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from

the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised
by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are
to be submitted;
(3) Respondent, by laws and regulations, and officia1 methods and
measures, which are set out in the pleadings herein, has practised apartheid,
Le., has distinguished as to race, colour, national or tribal origin in estab-
lishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the Territory; that such
practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Man-
date and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that
Respondent has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in
the Territory ;

(4) Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social and educational
policies applied within the Territory, by means of laws and regulations,
and officia1methods and rneasures, which are set out in the pleadings
herein, has, in the light of applicable international standards or inter-
national legal norm, or both, failed to promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Terri-
tory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in
Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that Res-
pondent has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to
take al1practicable action to fulfil its duties under such Articles;

(5) Respondent, by word and by action, has treated the Territory in a
rnanner inconsistent with the international status of the Territory, and
has thereby impeded opportunities for self-determination bythe inhabitants
of the Territory: that such treatrnent is in violation of Respondent's
obligations as siated in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the-p an date
and Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty forthwith
to cease such actions, and to refrain frorn sirnilar actions in the future;
and that Respondent has the duty to accord full faith and respect to the
international status of the Territory;

(6) Respondent has established military bases within the Territory in
violation of its obligations as stated in Article 4 of the Mandate and
Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty forthwith to
rernove al1such military bases frorn within the Territory; and that Respon-
dent hasthe duty to refrain fromthe establishment of military bases within
the Territory ; ((Vu les allégations de fait et les considérations de droit énoncéesdans
lesécritures et les plaidoiries, plaisà la Cour dire et juger, tant en pré-
sence qu'en l'absence du Gouvernement *dela République sud-africaine,
que:
1. Le Sud-Ouest africain est un territoire sous Mandat conférépar les
Principales Puissances alliées et associées à Sa Majesté britannique pour
êtreexercéen son nom par le Gouvernement de l'lrnior: de l'Afrique du
Sud, accepté par Sa Majesté britannique agissant pour le Gouvernement

de l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud et en son nom, et confirmépar le Conseil
de la Société desNations le 17 décembre 1920;
2. Le défendeur demeure soumisaux obligations internationalesénoncées
à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Sociéti des Nations et dans le Mandat pour ie
Sud-Ouest africain, ainsi qu'à l'obligation de transmettre aux Nations
Unies les pEtitions des habitants du Territoire, les fonctions de surveil-
lance étant exercéespar les Nations Unies auxquelles les rapports annuels
et les pétitions doivent êtreenvoyés;

3. Par les lois et règlements et par les méthodes et actes officiels décrits
dans les écritures, le défendeur a pratiqué l'apartheid, c'est-à-dire qu'il a
établi une distinction fondée sur la race, la couleur, l'origine nationale
ou tribale, lorsqu'il a fixéles droits et devoirs des habitants du Territoire;
que cette pratique constitue une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles
figurent à l'article 2 du Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des
Nations; et que le défendeur a le devoir de cesser sur-le-champ de prati-
quer l'apartheid dans le Territoire;
4. Par l'effet des principes économiques, politiques, sociaux et éduca-

tifs appliqués dans le Territoire, par les lois et règlements et par les mé-
thodes et actes officiels décrits dans les écritures, le défendeur, au regard
des ((standards 1)internationaux applicables ou de la norme juridique in-
ternationale applicable ou de ces deux critères à la fois, n'a pas accru, par
tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le bien-êtrematériel et moral ainsi que le
progrès social des habitants du Territoire; que cette carence constitue
une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurenàl'article 2 du Man-
dat et à l'article 22 du Pacte; et que le défendeur a le devoir demettre sur-
le-champ un terme aux violations indiquées ci-avant et de prendre toutes
les mesures possibles pour remplir ses obligations aux termes desdits
articles ;

5. Le défendeur, par ses paroles et par ses actes, a agi à l'égarddu Ter-
ritoire d'une manière incompatible avec le statut international du Ter-
ritoire et a entravé par là les chances qu'avaient les habitants du Terri-
toire de s'engager dans la voie de l'autodétermination; que ces agissements
constituent une violation des obligations du défendeur telles qu'elles figu-
rent au premier alinéa de l'article 2 du Mandat et à l'article22 du Pacte;
que le défendeur a le devoir de mettre sur-le-champ un terme h ces agis-
sements et de s'abstenir dans l'avenir de pareils agissements; et que le
défendeura le devoir de respecter en toute bonne foi le statut international
du Territoire;

6. Le défendeur a établi des bases militaires sur le Territoire en vio-
lation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurect a l'article 4 du Mandat et
à l'article 22 du Pacte; que le défendeur a le devoir de supprimer sur-le-
champ toutes les bases militaires établies sur le Territoire; et que le défen-
deur a le devoir de s'abstenir d'établir des bases militaires sur le Territoire; (7) Respondent has failed to render to the General Assembly of the
United Nations annual reports containing information with regard to the
Territory and indicating the measures it has taken to carry out its obliga-
tions under the Mandate; that such failure is a violation of its obligations
as stated in Article 6 of the Mandate; and that Respondent has the duty
forthwith to render such annual reports to the General Assembly;

(8) Respondent has failed to transmit to the General Assembly of the
United Nations petitions fromthe Territory's inhabitants addressed to the
General Assembly; that such failure is a violation of its obligations as
Mandatory; and that Respondent has the duty to transmit such petitions
to the General Assembly;
(9) Respondent has attempted to modify substantially the terms of the

Mandate, without the consent of the United Nations; that such attempt
is in violation of its duties as stated in Article 7 of the Mandate and Article
22 of the Covenant; andthat the consent of the United Nations is a neces-
sary prerequisite and condition precedent to attempts on thepart of Respon-
dent directly or indirectly to modify the terms of the Mandate.

May it also please the Court to adjudge and declare whatever else it
may deem fit and proper in regard to these submissions, and to make al1
necessary awards and orders, including an award of costs, to effectuate its
determinations."

On behaifof the Govevnment of South Afvica,

at the hearing on 5 November 1965:
"We repeat and re-affirm Our submissions, as set forth in Volume 1,
page 6, of the Counter-Memorial and confirmed in Volume II, page 483,
of the Rejoinder. These submissions can be brought up-to-date without
any amendments of substance and then they read as follows:

Upon the basis of the statements of fact and law as set forth in Re-
spondent's pleadings and the oral proceedings, may it please the Court
to adjudge and declare that the submissions of the Governments of Ethio-
pia and Liberia, as recorded at pages 69-72 of the verbatim record of
19 May 1965, C.R. 65/35, are unfounded and that no declaration be made
as claimed by them.
In particular, Respondent submits-
(1) That the whole Mandate for South West Africa lapsed on the dis-
solution of the League of Nations and that Respondent is, in consequence
thereof, no longer subject to any legal obligations thereunder.

(2) In the alternative to (1)bove, and in the event of it being held that
the Mandate as such continued in existence despite the dissolution of the
League of Nations:
(a) Relative to Applicants' submissions numbers 2, 7 and 8,
that the Respondent's former obligations under the Mandate to report
and account to, and to submit to the supervision, of the Council of the
League of Nations, lapsed upon the dissolution of the League, and
have not been replaced by any similar obligations relative to super-
vision by any organ of the United Nations or any other organization
or body. Respondent is therefore under no obligation to submit 7. Le défendeurn'a pas envoyé àl'Assembléegénérale des'NationsUnies
des rapports annuels contenant des informations intéressant le Territoire
et indiquant les mesures qu'il a prises pour assurer ses engagements aux
termes du Mandat; que cette carence est une violation de ses obligations
telles qu'elles figurentl'article 6 du Mandat; et que le défendeur a le
devoir d'envoyer sur-le-champ ces rapports annuels à l'Assemblée géné-

rale;
8. Le défendeurn'a pas transmis à l'Assembléegénérale desNations
Unies les pétitions des habitants du Territoire adressées à l'Assemblée
générale;que cette carence est une violation de ses obligations de Man-
dataire; et que le défendeur a le devoir de transmettre ces pétitionsAs-
sembléegénérale;

9. Le défendeuratentéd'apporter aux dispositions du Mandat des mo-
difications de fond sans l'autorisation desationsunies; que qette ten-
tative constitue une violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurent
l'article 7duMandat etàl'article 22duPacte; et que l'autorisation des Na-
tions Unies est une condition préalable indispensableà toute tentative de
la part du défendeur de modifier directement ou indirectement les disposi-
tions du Mandat.

Plaise également à la Cour se prononcer sur tout ce qu'elle pourra es-
timer pertinent et convenable se rapportant aux présentes conclusions
et rendre toute décisionet prendre toute ordonnance, y compris une dé-
cision sur les dépens,pour donner effet à ce qu'elle aura statué))

Au nom du Gouvernementde l'Afrique du Sud,
à l'audience du 5 novembre 1965:

((Nous répétonset réitéronsles conclusions que nous avons énoncées
dans lecontre-mémoire, volume 1,page 6, et confirméesdans la duplique,
volume II, page 483. Ces conclusions, qui peuvent êtremises à jour sans
amendement de fond, sont les suivantes:

Vu les considérations de fait et de droit énoncéesdans les écritureset
lesplaidoiries du défendeur,plaise la Courdire etjuger quelesconclusions
des Gouvernements éthiopien et libérien figurant au compte rendu de
l'audience du 19 mai 1965 sont sans fondement et que la Cour ne fera
aucune des déc,,rations proposéespar les demandeurs.

Le défendeur conclut en particulier:
1. Que le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain dans son ensemble est

devenu caduc lors de la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations et que le
défendeur n'est plus en conséquence soumis à aucune des obligations
juridiques découlant du Mandat.
2. Subsidiairement, au cas où l'on estimerait que le Mandat en tant
que tel est demeuré en vigueur malgré la dissolution de la Société des
Nations:

a) en ce qui concerne les conclusions nos 2, 7 et 8 des demandeurs,
que les obligations incombant antérieurement'au défendeur en vertu
du Mandat et consistant à faire rapport eà rendre compte au Conseil
de la Société desNations et à se soumettre à la surveillance de ce
Conseil ont pris fin lors de la dissolution de la Sociétéet n'ont pas été
remplacéespar des obligations similaires concernant une surveillance
par un organe quelconque des Nations Unies, par toute autre organi- reports concerning its administration of South West Africa, or to
Nations or any other body;habitantsofthat Territory,to the United

(6) Relative to Applicants' submissions numbers 3, 4, 5, 6and 9,
thatthe Respondenthasnot, in any ofthe respectsalleged,violatedits
obligationsas stated in the Mandate or in Artic22of the Covenant
of the Leagueof Nations."

1. In the present proceedings the two applicant States, the Empire of

Ethiopia and the Republic of Liberia (whose cases are identical and will
for present purposes be treated as one case), acting in the capacity of
States which were rnembers of the former League of Nations, put
forward various allegations of contraventions of the League of Nations
Mandare for South West Africa, said to have been committed by the
respondent State, the Republic of South Africa, as the administering
authority.
2. In an earlier phase of the case, which took place before the Court in
1962, four preliminary objections were advanced, based on Article 37
of the Court's Statute and thejurisdictional clause(Article 7,paragraph 2)
of the Mandate for South West Africa, which were al1of them argued by
the Respondent and treated by the Court as objections to its jurisdiction.
The Court, by its Judgment of 21 December 1962,rejected each of these

objections, and thereupon found that it had "jurisdiction to adjudicate
upon the merits of the dispute".
3. In the course of the proceedings on the merits, comprising the ex-
change of written pleadings, the oral arguments of the Parties and the
hearing of a considerable number of witnesses, the Parties put forward
various contentions on such matters as whether the Mandate for South
West Africa was still in force,-and if so, whether the Mandatory's
obligation under Article 6 of the Mandate to furnish annual reports
to the Council of the former League of Nations concerning its ad-
ministration of the mandated territory had become transformed by one
means or another into an obligation to furnish such reports to the
General Assembly of the United Nations, or had, on the other hand,
lapsed entire1y;-whether there had been any contravention by the

Respondent of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate which
required the Mandatory to "promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territoryV,-whether there had been any contravention of Article 4 of
the Mandate, prohibiting (except for police and .local defence purposes)
the "military training of the natives", and forbidding the establishment
of military or naval bases, or the erection of fortifications in the territory.
The Applicants also alleged that the Respondent had contravened
paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Mandate (which provides that the Man-
date can only be modified with the consent of the Council of the League

15 sation ou par tout autre organisme. Le défendeurn'est donc tenu
ni de présenterdesrapports relatifà sonadministrationdu Sud-Ouest
africain ni detransmettre lespétitionsdeshabitants du Territoire soit
aux Nations Uniessoit à tout autre organisme;
b) en ce qui concerneles conclusionsnos 3, 4, 5, 6et 9 des demandeurs,
queledéfendeurn'a,sur aucun despointsallégués,violle ésobligations
lui incombant d'aprèsle Mandat ou l'article 22 du Pacte de laSociété
desNations. ))

1. Dans la présenteinstance, lesdeux Etats demandeurs dont lescauses
sont identiques et seront considérées ci-après commeconstituant une
affaire unique, l'Empire d'Ethiopie et la Républiquedu Libéria, agissant
en qualitéd'anciens Etats Membres de la SociétédesNations, ont allégué
que diverses infractions au Mandat de la Société desNations pour le

Sud-Ouest africain auraient étécommises par YEtat défendeur,la Répu-
blique sud-africaine, en tant qu'autorité administrante.

2. Dans une phase antérieure de l'affaire qui s'est déroulée devantla
Cour en 1962, quatre exceptions préliminaires fondées sur l'article 37
du Statut de la Cour et sur la clausejuridictionnelle du Mandat pour le
Sud-Ouest africain (article 7, deuxième alinéa)ont étésoulevées,que le
défendeur a plaidées et que la Cour a traitées comme étant toutes des
exceptions d'incompétence. Par arrêtdu 21 décembre 1962, la Cour a
rejeté chacune de ces exceptions et dit qu'elle était ((compétentepour

statuer sur le fond du différend 1).
3. Lors de la procédure sur le fond, au cours de laquelle des pièces
écritesont étédéposées, des plaidoiries prononcées etun nombre impor-
tant de témoins entendus, les Parties ont présentéleurs thèses sur divers
points parmi lesquels les suivants :le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain
est-il toujours en vigueur? Dans l'affirmative, l'obligation incombant au
Mandataire en vertu de l'article 6 du Mandat d'envoyer au Conseil de la
Sociétédes Nations un rapport annuel sur l'administration du territoire
sous Mandat s'est-elletransforméede quelque manière en une obligation

d'adresser des rapports à l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies, ou
bien cette obligation est-elle devenue entièrement caduque? Le défendeur
a-t-il contrevenu au deuxième alinéade l'article 2 du Mandat imposant
au Mandataire l'obligation d'accroître, «par tous les moyens en son
pouvoir, le bien-être matériel etmoral ainsi que le progrès social des
habitants du territoire))? A-t-il contrevenu à l'article 4 du Mandat
interdisant l'instruction militaire des indigènes)),sauf pour assurer la
police et la défense locales, etprohibant l'installation de bases militaires
ou navales ou l'établissement de fortifications dans le territoire? Les

demandeurs ont en outre alléguéque le défendeur aurait enfreint le
premier alinéa de l'article 7 du Mandat, suivant lequel l'autorisation du
Conseil de la Société desNations était nécessaire pour modifier les
dispositions du Mandat, en essayant de modifier le Mandat sans l'auto-of Nations) by attempting to modify the Mandate without the consent
of the General Assembly of the United Nations which, so it was con-

tended, had replaced the Council of the League for this and other pur-
poses. There were other allegations also, which it is not necessary to
set out here.
4. On al1these matters, the Court has studied the written pleadings
and oral arguments of the Parties, and has also given consideration
to the question of the order in which the various issues would fa11to be
dealt with. In this connection, there was one matter that appertained
to the merits of the case but which had an antecedent character, namely
the question of the Applicants' standing in the present phase of the
proceedings,-not, that is to say, of their standing before the Court
itself, which was the subject of the Court's decision in 1962, but the
question, as a matter of the merits of the case, of their legal right or
interest regarding the subject-matter of their claim, as set out in their
final submissions.
5. Despite the antecedent character of this question, the Court was
unable to go into it until the Parties had presented their arguments
on the other questions of merits involved. The same instruments are

relevant to the existence and character of the Respondent's obligations
concerning the Mandate as are alsorelevant to the existence and character
of the Applicants' legal right orinterest in that regard. Certain humani-
tarian principles alleged to affcct the nature of the Mandatory's obliga-
tions in respect of the inhabitants of the mandated territory were also
pleaded as a foundation for the right of the Applicants to claim in their
own individual capacities the performance of those same obligations.
The implications of Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Mandate, referred to
above, require to be considered not onlyin connection with paragraph (9)
and certain aspects of paragraph (2) of the Applicants' final submis-
sions, but also, as will be seen in due course, in connection with that
of the Applicants' standing relative to the merits of the case. The ques-
tion of the position following upon the dissolution of the League of
Nations in 1946has the same kind of double aspect, and so do other
matters.
6. The Parties having dealt with al1the elements involved, it became

the Court's duty to begin by considering those questions which had
such a character that a decision respecting any of them might render
unnecessary an enquiry into other aspects of the matter. There are two
questions in the present case which have this character. One is whether
the Mandate still subsists at all, as the Applicants maintain that it does
in paragraph (1) of their final submissions; for if it does not, then
clearly the various allegations of contraventions of the Mandate by the
Respondent fa11 automatically to the ground. But this contention,
namely as to the continued subsistence of the Mandate, is itself part of
the Applicants' whole claim as put forward in their final submissions,
being so put forward solely in connection with the remaining parts of
the claim, and as the necessary foundation for these. For this reason
the other question, which (as already mentioned) is that of the Appli-risation de l'Assemblée générale desNations Unies, laquelle aurait
remplacé le Conseil à cet égard comme à d'autres égards. D'autres
allégationsont encore été formulées qu'il est inutile d'indiquer ici.

4. La Cour a étudiéles piècesécriteset les plaidoiries des Parties sur
tous ces points et s'est préoccupéede l'ordre dans lequel il convenait de
les examiner. A ce point de vue, il se pose une question relevant du fond
mais ayant un caractère prioritaire: elle concerne la qualitédes deman-
deurs en la phase actuelle de la procédure; en fait, il s'agit non pas de
la question de l'aptitude des demandeurs à se présenter devant la Cour,
qui a été tranchéepar l'arrêtde 1962,mais de la question de fond de leur
droit ou intérêjturidique au regard de l'objet de la demande telle qu'elle
étéénoncéedans leurs conclusions finales.
a

5. En dépitdu caractère prioritaire de cette question, la Cour ne pou-
vait l'examiner avant que lesParties aient présenté leurargumentation sur
l'ensemble des points de fond. En effet, qu'il s'agisse de l'existence et
de la nature des obligations du défendeur relativement au Mandat ou
bien de l'existenceet de la nature du droit ou intérêjturidique des deman-
deurs à cet égard, ce sont les mêmes textesqui sont pertinents. On a
soutenu égalementque certains principes humanitaires, qui auraient une
influence sur la nature des obligations du Mandataire concernant les
habitants duterritoire, seraienta base du droit des demandeurs d'exiger
à titre individuel l'exécutionde ces obligations. Les conséquences du
premier alinéa de l'article du Mandat, mentionné plus haut, doivent

êtreexaminéesnon seulement par rapport à la conclusion finale no 9
des demandeurs et àcertains élémentsde la conclusion no 2 mais encore,
comme on le verra plus loin, par rapport àla question de la qualitédes
demandeurs au regard du fond. La situation consécutive à la dissolution
de la Société desNations en 1946soulèveelle aussi un problème revêtant
un double aspect, et il en est de mêmepour d'autres points.

6. Les Partiesayanttraité de tous les élémenten cause, il est du devoir
de la Cour de commencer par examiner les quiestions présentant un
caractère tel qu'une décision l'égardde l'une d'entre elles peut rendre
inutile tout examen des autres aspects de l'affaire. Deux questions revê-
tent ce caractère en l'espèce. L'une estde savoir si le Mandat subsiste,
ce que les demandeurs ont soutenu dans leur conclusion finale no 1,
car, si tel n'étaitpas le cas, il va de soi que leurs griefs fondéssur les

infractions au Mandat qu'ils reprochent au défendeurtomberaient auto-
matiquement. Mais la thèse relative au maintien en vigueur du Mandat
n'est qu'un élémentde l'ensemble de la demande énoncéedans les con-
clusions finales des demandeurs, car elle n'a étéavancée qu'enliaison
avec les autres élémentsde la demande dont elle étaitprésentéecomme la
base nécessaire. C'estpour cette raison que l'autre question, qui concerne,
comme on l'a déjàsignalé, ledroit ou intérêt juridiquedes demandeurs
16 cants' legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim, is even
more fundamental.

7. It is accordingly to this last question that the Court must now turn.
Before doing so however, it should be made clear that when, in the

present Judgment, the Court considers what provisions of the Mandate
for South West Africa involve a legal right or interest for the Applicants,
and what not, it does so without pronouncing upon, and wholly without
prejudice to, the question of whether that Mandate is still in force.
The Court moreover thinks it necessary to state that its 1962 decision
on the question of competence was equally given without prejudice to
that of the survival of the Mandate, which is a question appertaining
to the merits of the case. It was not in issue in 1962,except in the sense
that survival had to be assumed for the purpose of determining the
purely jurisdictional issue which was al1that was then before the Court.
It was made clear in the course of the 1962proceedings that it was upon
this assumption that the Respondent was arguing the jurisdictional issue;
and the same view is reflected in the Applicants' final submissions (1)
and (2) in the present proceedings, the effect of which is to ask the
Court to declare (inter alia) that the Mandate still subsists, and that
the Respondentis still subject to the obligations it provides for. It is,cor-
respondingly, a principal part of the Respondent's case on the meritsthat

since(asitcontends) the Mandate no longer exists, the Respondenthas no
obligations under it, and thereforecannot be in breach of the Mandate.
~hi~isamatter which, for reasons to be given later in another connection,
but equally applicable here, could not have been the subject of any final
determination by a decision on a purely preliminary point of jurisdiction.
8. The Respondent's final submissions in the present proceedings ask
simply for a rejection of those of the Applicants, both generally and in
detail. But quite apart from the recognized right of the Court, implicit
in paragraph 2 of Article 53 of its Statute, to selectproprio inotu the
basis of its decision, the Respondent did in the present phase of the case,
particularly in its written pleadings, deny that the Applicants had any
legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim,-a denial
which, at this stage of the case, clearly cannot have been intended merely
as an argument against the applicability of the jurisdictional clause of
the Mandate. In its final submissions the Respondent asks the Court,
upon the basis, interalia, of "the statements of fact and law as set forth

in [its] pleadings and the oral proceedings", to make no declaration
as claimed by the Applicants in their final submissions.

9. The Court now comes to the basis of its decision in the present
proceedings. In order to lead up to this, something must first be said
about the structure characterizing the Mandate for South West Mrica,
17au regard de l'objet de la demande, est encore plus fondamentale.

7. C'est donc cette dernière question que la Cour examjnera mainte-
nant. La Cour tient cependant à préciserau préalableque, en recherchant
dans le présentarrêtquelles sont, parmi les dispositions du Mandatpour
le Sud-Ouest africain, cellesqui impliquent un droit ou intérêjturidique
chez les demandeurs, elle ne se prononcera nullement sur la question du
maintien en vigueur du Mandat et ne la préjugera en rien. Il y a lieu de
souligner en outre que la décision renduepar la Cour en 1962 sur la
compétence ne préjugeaitpas non plus la question du maintien en
vigueur du Mandat, laquelle relèvedu fond. Cette question ne se posait
pas en 1962,si ce n'est ence sens que la Cour devait postuler le maintien

en vigueur du Mandat en vue de trancher le problème purement juri-
dictionnel qui était le seul dont elle fût alors saisie. Le défendeur a
nettement indiquédans la procédurede 1962que telle étaitl'hypothèse
dont il partait pour traiter de la question de compétence;on retrouve la
mêmeidéedans les conclusions finales nos 1 et 2 que les demandeurs
ont formulées enla phase actuelle et par lesquellesils ont invitéla Cour
à dire notamment que le Mandat subsiste et que le défendeur demeure
soumis aux obligations qu'il prévoit.De même, l'un des élémenp trin-
cipaux de la thèsesoutenur par le défendeurau fond a consisté à arguer
que, le Mandat n'existant plus, le défendeurn'a plus d'obligations en
vertu de cet instrument et ne saurait donc les violer. C'est une question
qui, pour des motifs que la Cour exposera plus loin à un autre propos
mais qui valent ici aussi, ne pouvait êtretranchée définitivemenptar une
décisionrendue sur un point purement préliminaire de compétence.

8. Par les conclusions finales qu'il a soumises en l'espèce,le défendeur
s'est bornéà demander le rejet des conclusions finales des demandeurs
dans leur ensemble et de chacune d'elles en particulier.l convient toute-
fois de noter, d'une part, que la Cour a le droit, implicitement reconnu
par l'article3, paragraphe 2, de son Statut, de choisir elle-mêmeles
motifs de ses décisionset, d'autre part, que le défendeura contestédans
la présente phasede l'affaire,en particulier dans ses piècesde procédure
écrite,le droit ou intérêjturidique des demandeurs au regard de l'objet
de la demande, ce qui, à ce stade de la procédure, ne pouvaitêtrede sa
part un simpleargumentcontre l'applicabilitéde la clausejuridictionnelle
du Mandat. Dans ses conclusions finales,le défendeur s'estfondéno-
tamment sur ales considérations de fait et de droit énoncéesdans les
écritures etles plaidoirie» pour inviter la Cour à ne faire aucune des
déclarationsproposéespar les demandeurs.

9. La Cour en vient maintenant aux motifs de sa décisionen l'espèce.
Pour débuter, elle dira quelques mots de la structure caractérisant le
Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain de mêmvque les autres Mandats;
17in common with the other various mandates; and here it is necessary to
stress that no true appreciation of the legal situation regarding any
particular mandate, such as that for South West Africa, can be arrived
at unless it is borne in mind that this Mandate was only one amongst
a number of mandates, the Respondent only one amongst a number
of mandatories, and that the salient features of the mandates system as
a whole were, with exceptions to be noted where material, applicable

indifFerently to al1the mandates. The Mandate for South West Africa
was not a special case.

10. The mandates system, as is well known, was formally instituted by
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. As there indicated,
there were to be three categories of mandates, designated as 'A','B'and
'C' mandates respectively, the Mandate for South West Africa being
one of the 'C' category. The differences between these categories lay
in the nature and geographical situation of the territories concerned,
the state of development of their peoples, and the powers accordingly
to be vested in the administering authority, or mandatory, for each
territory placed under mandate. But although it was by Article 22
of the League Covenant that the system as such was established, the
precise terms of each mandate, covering the rights and obligations
of the mandatory, of the League and its organs, and of the individual
members of the League, in relation to each mandated territory, were

set out in separate instruments of mandate which, with one exception
to be noted later, took the form of resolutions of the Council of the
League.
11. These instruments, whatever the differencesbetween certain oftheir
terms, had various features in common as regards their structure. For
present purposes, their substantive provisions may be regarded as falling
into two main categories. Onthe one hand, and of course as the principal
element of each instrument, there were the articles defining the manda-
tory's powers, and its obligations in respect of the inhabitants of the
territory and towards the League and its organs. These provisions,
relating to the carrying out of the mandates as mandates, will hereinafter
be referred to as "conduct of the mandate7', or simply "conduct"
provisions. On the other hand, there were articles conferring in different
degrees, according to the particular mandate or category of mandate,
certain rights relative to the mandated territory, directly upon the
members of the League as individual States, or in favour of their
nationals. Many of these rights were of the same kind as areto be found

in certain provisions of ordinary treaties of commerce, establishment
and navigation concluded between States. Rights of this kind will
hereinafter be referred to as "special interests" rights, embodied in the
"special interests" provisions of the mandates. As regards the 'A' and
'B' mandates (particularly the latter) these rights were numerous and
figured prominently-a fact which, as will be seen later, is significant
for the case of the 'C' mandates also, even though, in the latter case,
18 il convient de souligner à cet égard que l'on ne saurait véritablement
apprécier la situation juridique relativeà un Mandat donné comme le
Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain si l'on oublie qu'il n'était qu'un
Mandat parmi d'autres, que le défendeur n'était qu'un Mandataire

parmi d'autres et que les caractéristiques du système des Mandats dans
son ensemble se retrouvaient uniformément dans chacun des Mandats,
saufexceptionsqui seront signaléeslorsque celasera pertinent. Le Mandat
pour le Sud-Ouest africain n'était pas un cas spécial.

10. Le système des Mandats a étéoficiellement créé,on le sait, par
l'article2 du Pacte de la SociétédesNations. Ainsi que cetexte l'indique,
il devait y avoir trois catégories de Mandats, appelés respectivement
Mandats A, B et C, le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain appartenant
àla catégorie C.Les différencesentre ces catégoriestenaient.au caractère
età la situation géographique des territoires, au degré de développement
de leurs populations et aux pouvoirs dévolus en conséquenceaux auto-

rités administrantes, c'est-à-dire aux Mandataires. Bien que le système
en tant que tel ait été établipar l'article22 du Pacte, les dispositions
propres à chacun des Mandats et concernant à l'égardde chaque terri-
toire en cause les droits et les devoirs du Mandataire, ceux de la Société
des Nations et de ses organes, ainsi que ceux des Membres de cette
organisation à titre individuel, ont éénoncéesdans des actes de Mandat
distincts qui,à une exception près signalée plus loin, ont pris la forme
de résolutionsdu Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations.

11. Malgréles différencesque l'on pouvait remarquer entre certaines
de leurs dispositions, ces actes présentaient des similitudes de structure.
Auxfins du présentarrêt,onpeut considérerque leursdispositions defond
se répartissaient en deux grandes catégories. D'une part - et c'étaitlà

bien entendu l'élémentprincipal de chacun de ces instruments - il y
avait des articles définissantles pouvoirs du Mandataire, ses obligations
concernant les habitants du territoire et ses obligations envers la Société
des Nations et les organes de celle-ci. Ces articles, se rapportant l'exé-
cution des Mandats en tant que tels, seront dénommés ci-après dispositions
relativesà lagestion des Mandats ou plus brièvement dispositions relatives
à la gestion. D'autre part, il y avait des articles qui conféraient directe-
ment aux Etats Membres de la Sociétédes Nations dans leur intérêt
individuel ou dans l'intérêt de leurs ressortissants,des degrés variables
selon le Mandat ou la catégorie de Mandat, certains droits concernant
les territoires sous Mandat. Nombre de ces droits rappelaient ceux que
l'on rencontre couramment dans certaines clauses des traitésd'établisse-
ment, de commerce et de navigation conclus entre Etats. Les dispositions

ayant trait à ces droits, qui correspondaient à des intérêts particuliers,
seront dénommées ci-aprèsdispositionsdes Mandats relativesaux intérêts
particuliers. Dans le cas des Mandats A et surtout des Mandats B, les
droits de ce genre étaient nombreux et tenaient une grandeplace; commethey were confined to provisions for freedom for missionaries ("nationals
of any State Member of the League of Nations") to "enter into, travel
and reside in the territory for theurpose of prosecuting their calling9'-
(Mandate for South West Africa, Article 5). In the present case, the
dispute between the Parties relates exclusivelyto the former of these two
categories of provisions, and not to the latter.

12. Thebroad distinctionjust noticed wasa genuine,indeed an obvious
one. Even if it may be the case that certain provisions of some of the
mandates (such as for instance the "open door" provisions of the 'A'

and 'B'mandates) can be regarded as having a double aspect, this does
not affect the validity or relevance of the distinction. Such provisions
would, in their "conduct of the mandate" aspect, fa11under that head;
and in their aspect of affordingcommercialopportunities for members of
the League and their nationals, they would come under the head of
"special interests" clauses. It is natural that commercial provisions of
this kind could redound to the benefit of a mandated territory and its
inhabitants in so far as the use made of them by States members of the
League had the effect of promoting the economic or industrial develop-
ment of the territory. In that sense and to that extent these provisions
could no doubt contribute to furthering the aims of the mandate; and
their due implementation bythe mandatories wasin consequencea matter
of concern to the League and its appropriate organs dealing with man-
dates questions. But this was incidental, and was never their primary
object. Their primary object was to benefit the individual members of
the League and their nationals. Any action or intervention on the part
of member States in this regard would be for that purpose-not in

furtherance of the mandate as such.
13. In addition to the classesof provisions so far noticed, everyinstru-
ment of mandate contained ajurisdictional clausewhich,with a singleex-
ception to be noticed in due course, was in identical terms for each man-
date, whether belonging to the 'A','B'or 'C'category. The language and
effectofthis clausewill beconsidered later; but it provided for a reference
of disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice and, so the
Court found in the first phase of the case, as already mentioned, this
reference was now, by virtue of Article 37 of the Court's Statute, to be
construed as a reference to the present Court. Another feature of the
mandates generally, was a provision according to which thsir terms
could not be modified without the consent of the Council of the League.
A further element, though peculiar to the 'C'mandates, may be noted:
it was provided both by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League and
by a provision of the instruments of 'C'mandates that, subject to certain

conditions not here material, a 'C' mandatory was to administer the
mandated territory "as an integral portion of its own territory". on le verra plus loin, ce fait étaitégalementsignificatifpour les Mandats
C, bien que leurs seules dispositions concernant des intérêtsparticuliers
fussent cellesqui visaient la facultélaisséeaux missionnaires ((sujets ou

citoyens de tout Membre de la Société desNations ...de pénétrer,de
circuler etde résiderdans leterritoire dans lebut d'exercer leur ministère
(Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, article 5). En l'espèce,le différend
entre les Parties concerne exclusivementla première des deux catégories
de dispositions indiquées et nullement la seconde.
12. La distinction généraledont on vient de faire état avait un ca-
ractère réel et même évidenQ t.ue des dispositions de certains Mandats
fussent susceptibles d'être rattachéeasux deux catégories, tellela clause
de la porte ouverte des Mandats A et B,celan'ôte riende sa valeur ni de
sa pertinence à cette distinction. De telles dispositions relevaient de la
première catégoriesi l'on seplaçait sur le plan dela gestion des Mandats
et de la seconde, celle des intérêtsparticuliers, si l'on envisageait les
avantages commerciaux octroyésaux Membres de la Sociétédes Nations

età leurs ressortissants. Ces clauses commerciales pouvaient naturelle-
ment jouer au bénéfice des territoires sous Mandat et de leurs habitants,
pour autant que leur application par les Etats Membres avait un effet
favorable au développement économiqueou industriel des territoires.
En ce sens et dans cette mesure, elles pouvaient indubitablement con-
tribuer à la réalisation des objectifs desMandats; leur bonne exécution
par les Mandataires intéressaitdoncla Sociétédes Nations et ses organes
compétents en matière de Mandats. Mais cela était accessoire et n'a
jamais constituéleur but principal. Ce but étaitde favoriser les intérêts
des Membres de la Société desNations et de leurs ressortissants. Une
action ou une intervention des Etats Membres en la matière ne pouvait
tendre qu'à cela et non à faire exécuterles Mandats en tant que tels.

13. En plus des catégoriesde dispositions que l'on vient d'indiquer,

chaque acte de Mandat contenait une clausejuridictionnelle dont, àune
exception prèsqui sera indiquéele moment venu, lelibelléétaitidentique,
que le Mandat appartînt à la catégorieA, à la catégorieB ou àla catégo-
rieC. Cette clause, dont le texte et l'effetseront examinésplusloin, prévo-
yait le renvoi des différendsà la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale; or, comme on l'a déjà signalél,aCour actuelle ajugédansla premiè-
re phase de l'affaireque, par application de l'article de son Statut, elle
constituait la juridiction compétente à la place de la Cour permanente.
Un autre caractère commun des Mandats étaitde contenir une clause
aux termes de laquelle l'autorisation du Conseil était nécessairepour
modifier leurs dispositions.Il y a lieu enfin de noter une caractéristique
propre aux Mandats C: aussi bien le Pacte dans son article 22 que ces
Mandats dans une de leurs dispositions énonçaient, sous réserve de

certaines conditions sans importance ici, que les Mandataires de la
catégorieC administreraient les territoires sous Mandat «comme partie
intégrante de [leur] territoire. 14. Having regard to the situation thus outlined, and in particular to
the distinction to be drawn between the "conduct" and the "special
interests" provisions of the various instruments of mandate, the question
which now arises for decision by the Court is whether any legal riglzt
or interest exists for the Applicants relative to the Mandate, apart
from such as they may have in respect of thelatter category of provisions;
-a matter on which the Court expresses no opinion, since ihis category
is not in issue in the present case. In respect of the former category-xhe
"conduct" provisions-the question which has to be decided is whether,

according to the scheme of the mandates and of the mandates system
as a whole, any legal right or interest (which is a different thing from
a political interest) was vested in the members of the League of Nations,
including the present Applicants, individually and each in its own
separate right to cal1for the carrying out of the mandates as regards
their "conduct" clauses;-or whether this function must, rather, be
regarded as having appertained exclusivelyto the League itself, and not
to each and every member State, separately and independently. Tnother
words, the question is whether the various mandatories had any direct
obligation towards the other members of the League individually, as
regards the carrying out of the "conduct" provisions of the mandates.

15. If the answer to be given to this question should have the effect
that the Applicants cannot be regarded as possessing the legal right or
interest claimed, it would follow that even if the various allegations of
contraventions of the Mandate for South West Africa on the part of

the Respondent were established, the Applicants would still not be
entitled to the pronouncements and declarations which, in their final
submissions, they ask the Court to make. This is no less true in respect
of their ha1 submissions (1) and (2) than of the others. In these two
submissions, the Applicants in substance affirm, and ask the Court to
declare, the continued existence of the Mandate and of the Respondent's
obligations thereunder. In the present proceedings however, the Court
is concerned with the final submissions of the Applicants solely in the
context of the "conduct" provisions of the Mandate. It has not to
pronounce upon any of the Applicants' final subrnissions as these might
relate to any question of "special interests" if a claim in respect of
these had been made. The object of the Applicants' submissions (1) and
(2) is to provide the basis for their remaining submissions, which are
made exclusively in the context of a claim about provisions concerning
which the question immediately arises whether they are provisions in
respect of which the Applicants have any legal right or interest. If the
Court finds that the Applicants do have such a right or interest, it would

then be called upon to pronounce upon the first of the Applicants'
ha1 submissions-(continued existence of the Mandate), since if that
one should be rejected, the rest would automatically fa11to the ground.
If on the other hand the Court should find that such a right or interest
does not exist, it would obviously be inappropriate and misplaced to
make any pronouncement on this first submission of the Applicants, or
20 14. Compte tenu de la situation ainsi esquisséeet en particulier de la
distinctionà établir entre les dispositions des divers actes de Mandat
selon qu'elles visaient la gestion ou les intérêts particuliers, la question
à trancher par la Cour est de savoir si les demandeurs ont relativement
au Mandat un droit ou intérêtjuridique autre quecelui qu'ilspourraient
avoir au regard des dispositions de la seconde catégorie maissur lequel
la Cour s'abstiendra de se prononcer puisque ces dispositions ne font
l'objet d'aucune contestation en l'espèce.Pour ce qui est de la première
catégorie,c'est-à-diredes dispositions relativesa gestion, la questioà
résoudre est de savoir si, vu la contexture des actes de Mandat et le

système des Mandats dans son ensemble, les Membres de la Société
des Nations, y compris les demandeurs en la présente affaire,avaient
à titre individuel et distinctun droit ou intérêtjuridi-uece qui diffère
d'un intérêt politique - leur permettant de réclamer l'exécutiondes
dispositions des Mandats relativesàla gestion, ou si l'on doit considérer
que cettefonction revenait exclusivementà la Sociétédes Nations et non
à chacun des Etats Membres de façon distincte et indépendante. En
d'autres termes,ils'agitdesavoirsilesMandatairesavaientuneobligation
directe envers les autres Membres de la Sociétédes Nations à titre indi-
viduel en ce qui concernait l'exécutiondes dispositions des Mandats
relativesà la gestion.
15. S'il résulte de la réponsecette question que les demandeurs ne

sauraient être considérécsomme ayant le droit ou intérêtjuridique invo-
qué,il s'ensuivraque, même à supposerétablieslesdiversesinfractions au
Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain reprochéesau défendeur,les deman-
deurs ne seront pas pour autant fondés à obtenir de la Cour les déclara-
tions qu'ils sollicitent par leurs conclusions finales. Cela est aussi vrai
des conclusions finalesos 1et 2 que des autres. Par cesdeux conclusions,
les demandeurs ont en substance affirmé,et demandé à la Cour de pro-
clamer, le maintien en vigueur du Mandat ainsi que des obligations
imposéespar celui-ciau défendeur. Or, dans la présenteinstance,la Cour
est saisie de conclusions finales des demandeurs qui ne visent que les
dispositionsdu Mandat relatives à la gestion. Elle n'a pàsseprononcer

sur des conclusions finales des demandeurs se rattachant aux intérêts
particuliers, car aucune demande n'a étésoumise àce sujet. L'objet des
conclusions nos 1 et 2 des demandeurs était de constituer la base de
leurs autres conclusions, uniquement présentéesàpropos d'une demande
visant des dispositions dont on doit chercheràsavoir avant toute chose
si les demandeurs ont à leur égard un droit ou intérêt juridique.Si la
Cour estime que les demandeurs possèdent bien un droit ou intérêt
juridique, elle sera alors appeléeà se prononcer sur leur conclusion
finaleno 1 relative au maintien en vigueur du Mandat car, au cas où
cette conclusion serait rejetée,les autres tomberaient automatiquement.
Si, au contraire, la Cour estime que les demandeurs ne possèdent aucun

droit ou intérêt juridique,il sera manifestement inapproprié et hors de
propos qu'elle se prononce sur leurs conclusionsnos 1ou 2, car, dans le
contexte de la présente affaire,la question du maintien en vigueur du
Mandat ainsi que des obligations imposéespar celui-ci au défendeurne
20on the second, sincein the context of the present case the question of the

continued existenceof the Mandate, and of the Respondent's obligations
thereunder, would arise solely in connection with provisions concerning
which the Court had found that the Applicants lacked any legal right
or iiiterest.

16. It is in their capacityas former members of the League of Nations
that the Applicants appear before the Court; and the rights they claim
are those that the members of the League are said to have been invested
with in the time of the League. Accordingly, in order to determine
what the rights and obligations of the Parties relative to the Mandate
were and are (supposing it still to be in force, but without prejudice to
that question); and in particular whether (as regards the Applicants)
these include aily right individually to call for the due execution of the
"coi~duct" provisions, and (for the Respondent) an obligation to be

answerable to the Applicants in respect of its administration of the
Mandate, the Court must place itself at the point in time wheil the
mandates system was being instituted, and when the instruments of
maildate were being framed. The Court must have regard to the situation
as it was at that time, which was the critical one, and to the intentions
of those concerned as they appear to have existed, or are reasonably
to be inferred, in the light of that situation. Intentions that might have
been formed if the Mandate had been framed at a much later date,
and in the knowledge of circumstances, such as the eventual dissolution
of the League and its aftermath, that could never originally have been
foreseen, are not relevant. Only on this basiscan a correct appreciation
of the legal rights of the Parties be arrived at. This view is supported by
a previous finding of the Court (Rights of United States Nationals in
Morocco, I.C.J. Reports 1952, at p. 189),the effect-of which is that the
meaning of a juridical notion in a historical context, must be sought by
reference to the way in which that notion was understood in that context.
17. It follows that any enquiry into the rights and obligations of the

Parties in the present case must proceed principally on the basis of
considering, in the setting of their period, the texts of the instruments
and particular provisions intended to give juridical expression to the
notion of the "sacred trust of civilization" by instituting a mandates
system.
18. The enquiry must pay no less attention to the juridical character
and structure of the institution, the League of Nations, within the
framework of which the mandates system was organized, and which
inevitablydeterminedhowthis systemwasto operate,-by what methods,
-through what channels,-and by means of what recourses. One
fundamental element of this juridical character and structure, which in
a sense governed everything else, was that Article 2 of the Covenant
provided that the "action of the League under this Covenant shall be
effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, se poserait qu'au sujet de dispositions au regard desquelles la Cour
aurait jugéque les demandeursn'ont aucun droit ou intérêjturidique.

16. C'est en qualité d'anciens Membres de la SociétédesNations que
les demandeurs se présentent devant la Cour et les droits qu'ils revendi-
quent sont ceux dont, d'aprèseux,jouissaient les Membres de la Société
des Nations à l'époque decelle-ci. En conséquence,pour déterminer les
droits et les devoirs passés etprésentsdes PartiesS'égard du Mandat -
à supposer celui-ci encore en vigueur mais sans préjugerla question -,
pour détermineren particulier s'ilscomportent, du cAtédes demandeurs,
le droit propre d'exiger la bonne exécutiondes dispositions relatives
àla gestion du Mandat et, du côtédu défendeur,l'obligation derépondre
de l'administration du Mandat devant les demandeurs, la Cour doit se
placer à l'époque où lesystèmedes Mandats a été institué et où les actes

de Mandat ont étérédigés. Elledoit tenir compte de la situation à
cette date, qui est la date critique, et des intentions que les intéressés
semblent bien avoir eues ou que l'on peut raisonnablementleur attribuer
en fonction de la situation. Les intentions qu'ils auraient pu avoir si le
Mandat avait été rédigb éeaucoup plus tard, une fois connues certaines
circonstances absolument imprévisibles à l'origine, commela dissolution
de la Société des Nations et ses suites, sont sans pertinence. Telle est la
seule manière d'apprécier correctement les droits des Parties. Cette
opinion trouve une confirmation dans un prononcé antérieur de la Cour
(Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d'Amériqueau Maroc, C.I.J.
Recueil 1952, p. 189),d'aprèslequel, pour dégagerle sens d'une notion
juridique dans un contexte h;storique, il faut tenir compte de la manière
dont cette notion étaitcomprise à l'origine dans le contexte.

17. Il enrésultequ'un exaraen des droits et obligations desPartiesdans
la présente affairedoit consisterprincipalementàétudier,enles replaçant
àleur époque,les textes des instruments et des dispositions particulières
qui, en créantle système desMandats, ont eu pour but de traduire en
termesjuridiques la notion de ((missionsacréede civilisatio».

18. Cet examen n'en doit pas moins tenir compte de la nature et de la
structure juridiques de la Sociétédes Nations, institutiondaris le cadre
de laquelle a été organiséle systèmedes Mandats, car le mode de fonc-
tionnement du système,sesméthodes,sesrouages et sesvoiesde recours
en dépendaientinévitablement.Un élémenf tondamental de cette nature
et de cette structure juridiques, qui en un sens régissaittout le reste,
étaiténoncé à l'article 2duPacte:«L'actiondela Sociétét,elle qu'elleest

définiedans leprésent Pacte,s'exercepar une Assembléeet un Conseil
assistésd'un Secrétariatpermanent. a Sil'action dela SociétdesNationswith a permanent Secretariat". If the action of the League as a whole
was thus governed, it followed naturally that the individual member
States could not themselves act differently relative to League matters,
unless it was otherwise specially so provided by some article of the
Covenant.

19. As is well known, the mandates system originated in the decision
taken at the Peace Conference following upon the world war of 1914-
1918, that the colonial territories over which, by Article 119 of the

Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced "au her rights and titles" jn
favour of the then Principal AUied and Associated Powers, should not
be annexed by those Powers or by any country affiliated to them, but
should be placed under an international régime,in the application to
the peoples of those territories, deemed "not yet able to stand by them-
selves", of the principle, declared by Article 22 of the League Covenant,
that their "weU-beingand development" should form "a sacred trust of
civilization".
20. The type of régime specified by Article 22 of the Covenant as
constituting the "best method of giving practical effectto this principle"
was that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced
nations ... who are willing to accept it7',-and here it was specifically
added that it was to be "on behalf of the League" that "this tutelage
shouldbe exercisedbythose nations as Mandatories". It was not provided
that the mandates should, either additionally or in the alternative, be
exercised on behalf of the members of the League in their individual
capacities. The mandatories were to be the agents of, or trustees for

the League,-and not of, orfor, each and everymember of it individually.
21. The same basic idea was expressed again in the thirdparagraph of
the preamble to the instrument of mandate for South West Africa,
where it was recited that the Mandatory, in agreeing to accept the
Mandate, had undertaken "to exercise it on behalf of the League of
Nations". No other behalf was specified in which the Mandatory had
undertaken, either actually or potentially, to exercise the Mandate.
The effect of this recital, as the Courtees it, was to register an implied
recognition (a) on the part of the Mandatory of the right of the League,
acting as an entity through its appropriate organs, to require the due
execution of the Mandate in respect of its "conduct" provisions; and
(b) on the part of both the Mandatory and the Council of the League,
of the character of the Mandate as a juridical régime set within the
framework of the League as an institution. There was no similar recogni-
tion of any right as being additionally and independently vested in any
other entity, such as a State, or as existing outside or independently of
the League as an institution; nor was any undertaking at al1given by
the Mandatory in that regard.

22. It was provided by paragraph 1of Article 22 of the Covenant that
ccse~~ritiesor the performance" of the sacred trust were to be "embodied
22 dans son ensemble s'exerçait ainsi, il en allait naturellement de même
pour les Etats Membres qui, sauf disposition formelle du Pacte en sens

contraire, ne pouvaient à titre individuel agir autrement en ce qui con-
cernait les affaires relevant de la Société.

19. On sait que le systèmedes Mandats a eu pour origine une décision
prise àla conférencedela paix qui a suivila guerre mondiale de 1914-1918 :

les territoires coloniaux à l'égarddesquels, en vertu de l'article 119 du
traité de Versailles, l'Allemagne renonçait à ((tous ses droits et titre»
en faveur des Principales Puissances alliéeset associéesdevaient être
non pas annexéspar ces Puissances ou par des pays qui leur seraient
liésmais placéssous un régimeinternational, ce qui permettrait d'appli-
quer aux peuples de ces territoires considéréscomme «non encore
capables de se diriger eux-mêmes 1)le principe proclamé à l'article 22
du Pacte selon lequel ((le bien-êtreet le développementde ces peuples

forment une mission sacréede civilisation ».
20. Le genre de régimequi, d'aprèsl'article 22 du Pacte, constituait la
«ineilleure méthode de réaliserpratiquement ce principe ))consistait à
((confier la tutelle de ces peuples aux nations développées ...qui consen-
tent à l'accepter1);le texte ajoutait expressément que c'était ((au nom
de la Société ))qu'elles ((exerceraient cette tutelle en qualitéde Manda-
taires». Il n'étaitpas dit que les Mandats devaient êtreexercés,en outre
ou à défaut,au nom des Membres de la Société desNations à titre indi-

viduel. Les Mandataires devaient êtreles agents ou trusteesde la Société
des Nations et non de chacun de ses Membres individuellement.

21. La mêmeidéede base a été à nouveau expriméeau troisième con-
sidérantdu préambuledel'acte de Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, où
il était spécifiéqu'en acceptant le Mandat le Mandataire avait entre-
pris de l'exercer au nom de la Société desNations ».Il n'étaitpas précisé
que le Mandataire eût entrepris effectivement ou virtuellement d'exercer

le Mandat au nom de qui que ce fût d'autre. De l'avis de la Cour, il
résultede ce considérant a) que le Mandataire a reconnu implicitement
le droit pour la Société desNations, agissant en tant qu'entitépar l'inter-
médiaire de ses organes compétents, d'exiger la bonne exécution des
dispositions relatives à la gestion du Mandat; b) que le Mandataire et
le Conseil ont reconnu implicitement que le Mandat avait le caractère
d'un régimejuridique établi dans le cadre de la Société desNations en
tant qu'institution. On n'a nullement reconnu qu'un droit quelconque
était conféréen outre et de façon indépendante à une autre entité, un

Etat par exemple, ni qu'un droit quelconque existait en dehors ou indé-
pendamment de la Société desNations en tant qu'institution; le Manda-
taire n'a pas pris non plus le moindre engagement à cet égard.
22. Aux termes de l'article 22, paragraphe 1, du Pacte, il convenait
((d'incorporer dans le présent Pacte des garanties pour l'accomplisse- in this Covenant". This important reference to the f'performance" of
the trust contemplated, as itsaid, securities to be afforded by the Cove-
nant itself. By paragraphs 7 and 9 respectively of Article 22, every
mandatory was to "render to the Council [of the League-not to any
other entity] an annual report in reference to the territory committed
to its charge";and a permanent commission, which came to be known
as the Permanent Mandates Commission, was to be constituted "to
receive and examine" these annual reports and "to advise the Council
on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates". The Perma-
nent Mandates Commission alone had this advisory role, just as the
Council alone had the supemisory function. The Commission consisted

of independent experts in their own right, appointed in their persona1
capacity as such, not as representing any individual member of the
League or the member States generally.
23. The obligation to furnish annual reports was reproduced in the
instruments of mandate themselves, where it was stated that they were
to be rendered "to the satisfaction of the Council". Neither by the
Covenant nor by the instruments of mandate, was any role reserved to
individual League members in respect of these reports, furnishable to
the Council, and referred by it to the Permanent Mandates Commission.
It was the Council that had to be satisfied, not the individual League
members. The part played by the latter, otherthan such as weremembers
of the Council, was exclusivelythrough their participation in the work
of the Assembly of the League when, acting under Article 3 of the
Covenant, that organ exercisedin respect ofmandatesquestionsits power
to deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League".
It was as being within the sphere of the League as an institution that
mandates questions were dealt with by its Assembly.

24. Thesethen werethe methods, andthe only methods, contemplated
by the Covenant as "securities" for the performance of the sacred trust,
and it was in the Covenant that they were to be embodied. No security
taking the form of a right for every member of the League separately
and individually to requirefrom the mandatories the due performance of
their mandates, or creating a liability for each mandatory to be answer-
able to them individually,-still less conferringa right of recourse to the
Court in these regards,-was provided by the Covenant.

25. This result is precisely what was to be expected from the fact that
the mandates system was an activity of the League of Nations, that is
to Sayof an entity functioningas an institution. In such a setting, rights
cannot be derived from the mere fact of membership of the organization

in itself: the rights that member States can legitimately claim must be
derived from and depend on the particular terms of the instrument
constitutive of the organization, and of the other instruments relevant
23 ment ))de la mission sacréede civilisation. Cette mention importante de
1'«accomplissement )de la mission concernait donc des garanties à pré-

voir dans le Pacte lui-même.En vertu de l'article 22, paragraphes 7 et 9,
tout Mandataire devait ((envoyerau Conseil [dela Sociétédes Nations -
età aucune autre entité] unrapport annuelconcernant lesterritoires dont
il [avait] la charg» et une commission permanente, connue plus tard
sous le nom de Commission permanente des Mandats, devait êtreconsti-
tuée afin((derecevoir et d'examiner )les rapports annuels et de donner
au Conseilson avis sur toutes questions relativesà l'exécution desMan-
dats)). La Commission permanente des Mandats avait seule ce rôle
consultatif, tout commele Conseil avait seul unefonction de surveillance.

La Commission étaitcomposéed'experts indépendantsnommés à titre
personnel et ne représentant ni un Membre donné ni l'ensemble des
Membres de la Société des Nations.
23. L'obligation d'envoyer desrapports annuels a étéreprise dans les
actes de Mandat où l'on spécifiait qu'ils devaient satisfairele Conseil.
Ni le Pacte ni les actes de Mandat ne faisaient jouer aux Membres de la
Société desNations à titre individuel un rôle quelconque à l'égard de
ces rapports, qui devaient êtreadressésau Conseil et étaientrenvoyés
par celui-ci à la Commission permanente des Mandats. Il s'agissait de
satisfaire le Conseil et non les Membres de la Société desNations indi-

viduellement. Les Membres qui ne siégeaientpas au Conseil n'interve-
naient que dansla mesure où ilsparticipaient aux travaux de l'Assemblée
quand cet organe exerçait, en matièrede Mandats, la facultéqu'il avait,
en vertu de l'article3 du Pacte, de connaître «de toute question qui
[rentrait] dans la sphère d'activité dela Société)).C'est parcequ'elles
entraient dans la sphère d'activitéde la Société desNations en tant
qu'institution que l'Assemblée connaissait des questions relat:lves aux
Mandats.
24. Telles étaientdonc les méthodes,les seules méthodes,envisagées
par le Pacte comme ((garanties 1pour l'accomplissement de la mission

sacrée de civilisation; c'estdans le Pacte qu'elles devaient être incorpo-
rées.Le Pacte ne prévoyaitaucune garantie souslaforme d'un droit pour
tout Membre de la Société des Nations d'exiger àtitre distinct et indivi-
duel la bonne exécution desMandats par les Mandataires, ou sous la
forme d'une obligation imposée à chaque Mandatairede répondrede son
administration devant chacun des Membres individuellement, et encore
moins sous la forme d'un droit de saisir la Cour en la matière.

25. C'est précisément à cela que l'on devaits'attendre dèslors que le
système des Mandats s'inscrivait dans les activitésde la Sociétédes
Nations, c'est-à-dire d'une entité fonctionnant en tant qu'institution.
Dans un cadre de ce genre, le simple fait d'appartenir à l'organisation
ne créepas de droits en soi: les droits dont les Etats membres peuvent
légitimementse prévaloir doivent découler desdispositions particulières
de l'acte constitutif de l'organisation et desautres instruments pertinentsin the context. This principle is necessarily applicable as regards the
question of what rights member States can claim in respect of a régime
such as results from the mandates system, functioning within the frame-
work of the organization. For this reason, and in this setting, there
could, as regards the carrying out of the "conduct" provisions of the
various mandates, be no question of any legaltie betweenthe mandatories
and other individual members. The sphere of authority assigned to the
mandatories by decisions of the organization could give rise to legal ties
only between them severally,as mandatories, and the organization itself.
The individual member States of the organization could take part in
the administrative process only through their participation in the

activities of the organs by means of which the League was entitled to
function. Such participation did not give rise to any right of direct
intervention relative to the mandatories: this was, and remained, the
prerogative of the League organs.

26. On the other hand, this did not mean that the member States were
mere helpless or impotent spectators of what went on, or that they
lacked al1means of recourse. On the contrary, as members of the League
Assembly, or as members of the League Council, or both, as the case
might be, they could raise any question relating to mandates generally,
orto some one mandatein particular, for consideration by those organs,
and could, by their participation, influence the outcome. The records
both of the Assemblyand of other League organs show that the members
of the League in fact made considerable use of this faculty. But again,
its exercise-always through the League-did not confer on them any
separate right of direct intervention. Rather did it bear witness to the
absence of it.

27. Such is the background against which must be viewed the provi-
sions by which the authority of the various mandatories was dehed, and
which the Court will now proceed to consider.

28. Byparagraph 8 of Article 22 of the Covenant, it was provided that
the "degree of authority, control or administration" which the various
mandatories were to exercise, wasto be "explicitly defined in each case
by the Council", if these matters had not been "previously agreed upon
by the Members of the League". The language of this paragraph was
reproduced, in effecttextually, in the fourth paragraph of the preamble
to the Mandate for South West Africa, which the League Council itself
inserted, thus stating the basis on which it was acting in adopting the
resolution of 17 December 1920, in which the terms of mandate were
set out.Taken by itself this necessarilyimplied that these terms had not
been "previously agreed upon by the Members of the League". There

is however some evidence in the record to indicate that in the context
of the mandates, the allusion to agreement on the part of "the Members
of the League" was regarded at the time as referring only to the five
Principal Allied and Associated Powers engaged in the drafting; but this
24dans le contexte et doivent êtrerégispar ces dispositions. Ce principe

s'applique nécessairement àla question des droits que les Etats membres
pouvaient invoquer à l'égardd'un régimefonctionnant dans le cadre de
l'organisation comme celui qu'instaurait le système des Mandats. C'est
pourquoi, dans ce cadre et en ce qui concernait l'exécutiondes dispo-
sitions des Mandats relatives à la gestion, il ne pouvait être question
de liens juridiques entre les Mandataires et les autres Etats Membres
à titre individuel. La compétence attribuée aux Mandataires par des
décisions de l'organisation ne pouvait créer de liensjuridiques qu'entre
chacun d'eux, comme Mandataire, et l'organisation elle-même. Les Etats
Membresde l'organisation ne pouvaient avoir une part dans le processus

administratif qu'en participant aux travaux des organes par l'intermé-
diaire desquelsla SociétédesNations pouvait agir. Cette participation ne
leur donnait aucun droit d'intervention directeàl'égarddes Mandataires,
ce qui était et demeura une prérogative des organes de la Société des
Nations.
26. Il n'en résulte paspour autant que les Etats Membres assistaient
aux événements en spectateurspassifs ou impuissants, ou qu'ils n'avaient
aucun moyen d'action. Loin de là; comme membres de l'Assembléeou
du Conseil ou des deux, selon le cas, ils pouvaient soumettre à l'examen

de ces organes toutes questions intéressant les Mandats d'une manière
généraleou un Mandat en particulier et pouvaient, par leur participa-
tion, avoir une influence sur le résultat.Les procès-verbaux de 1'Assem-
bléeet des autres organes de la Société desNations montrent que les
Etats Membres onten pratique largementutilisécettefaculté. Cependant,
le fait de l'exercer,toujours par l'intermédiaire dela Sociédes Nations,
ne leur donnait aucun droit propre d'intervention directe. Il témoignait
plutôt de l'inexistence d'un tel droit.
27. C'estdans cette perspective que l'on doit envisager les dispositions
par lesquelles les pouvoirs des Mandataires ont étédéfiniset que la

Cour va maintenant examiner.

28. L'article22, paragraphe 8, du Pacte, stipule:cSile degréd'autori-
té,de contrôle ou d'administration à exercer par le Mandataire n'a pas
fait l'objet d'une convention antérieureentre les Membresde la Sociétéi,l
sera expressémentstatuésur ces points par le Conseil. ))Ce paragraphe
a été textuellementreproduit dans le quatrième considérant quele Con-
seil a lui-mêmeinsérédans le préambuledu Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest
africain, afin d'indiquer sur quellebase il adoptait sa résolution dudé-

cembre 1920 contenant les dispositions du Mandat. Ce fait même
impliquait nécessairement que les termes du Mandat n'avaient pas
((faitl'objet d'uneconventionantérieureentre les Membresde la Société ».
Toutefois, le dossier contient des indications selon lesquelles on esti-
mait à l'époqueque cles Membres de la Société ))entre lesquelsune con-
vention devait intervenir au sujet des Mandats étaient uniquement les
cinq Principales Puissances alliéeset associéesparticipant aux travaux
de rédaction, mais cela ne peut évidemment que renforcer l'opinion

24of course could only lend emphasis to the view that the members of the
League generally were not considered as having any direct concernwith
the setting up of the various mandates; and the record indicates that
they were given virtually no information on the subject until a very
late stage.
29. There is also evidence that the delays were due to difficultiesover
certain of the commercial aspects of the mandates, but that the Principal
Powers had already decided that the mandates should in any event be
issued by the Council of the League, thereby giving them a definitely
institutional basis.Preliminary and private negotiations and considera-
tion of drafts by member States, or certain of them, is a normal way
of leading up to the resolutions adopted by an international organ, and
in no way affectstheir character as eventually adopted. Accordingly the
League Council proceeded to issue the Mandate which, being in the
form of a resolution, did not admit of those processes of separate
signature and ratification generally utilized at the time in al1cases where

participation on a "party" basis was intended. Thismethod was common
to al1the mandates, except the 'A'mandate for Iraq which, significantly,
was embodied in a series of treaties between the United Kingdom, as
Mandatory, and Iraq. No other member of the League was a party
to these treaties. It was to the League Council alone that the United
Kingdom Government reported concerning the conclusion of these
treaties, and to which it gave assurances that the general pattern of their
contents would be the same as for the other mandates.
30. Nor did eventhe Principal Alliedand Associated Powers asagroup
have the last word on the drafting of the Mandate. This was the Coun-
cil's. In addition to the insertion as already mentioned, of the fourth
paragraph of the preamble, the Council made a number of alterations
in the draft before finally adopting it. One ofthese is significant in the
present context. Unlike the final version of the jurisdictional clause of
the Mandate as issued by the Council and adopted for al1the mandates,
by which the Mandatory alone undertook to submit to adjudication in
the event of a dispute with another member of the League, the original

version would have extended the competence of the Court equally to
disputesreferred toit by the Mandatory asplaintiff, as wellas to disputes
arising between other members of the League intesr e. The reason for
the change effected by the Council is directly relevant to what was
regarded as being the status of the individual members of the League
in relation to the Mandate. This reason was that, as was soon perceived,
an obligation to submit to adjudication could not be imposed upon
them without their consent. But of course, had they been regarded as
"parties" to the instrument of Mandate, as if to a treaty, they would
thereby have been held to have given consent to al1that it contained,
including the jurisdictional clause. Clearly they were not so regarded.d'après laquelleles Membres de la Sociétédes Nations en généraln'é-
taient pas tenus pour directementintéressésàl'élaborationdes Mandats;
le dossier montre d'ailleurs qu'ils n'ont vraiment reçu d'informations
en la matière qu'à un stade très tardif.

29. Il se révèleégalementqueles retards intervenus ont été causésar
des difficultésconcernant certains problèmes d'ordre commercial soule-

véspar les Mandats mais que les Principales Puissancesavaient déjàdé-
cidéque les Mandats seraient en tout cas promulgués par le Conseil,
ce qui devait leur donner sans conteste un caractère institutionnel. Il
est normal, avant qu'un organe international adopte des résolutions,
que les Etats membres ou certains d'entre eux procèdent à des négo-
ciations et examinent les projets en privé mais cela n'affecte en rien la
nature des résolutions finalement approuvées.Le Conseil a donc pro-
mulguéle Mandat sous la forme d'une résolution, excluant ainsi le pro-
cessus de signature et de ratification séparées généralement utilisé à
l'époque lorsque l'on participaitàun acte en tant que partie. La même
méthode a étésuivie pour tous les Mandats, sauf le Mandat A pour
l'Irak qui, fait significatif, a été constpar une sériede traités entre
le Royaume-Uni, Mandataire, et l'Irak. Aucun autre Membre de la So-

ciété desNations n'y a été partie.C'est au .Conseil età lui seul que le
Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a fait rapport sur la conclusion de ces
traitéset a donné l'assurance qu'ils auraient d'une manière généralele
mêmecontenu que les autres Mandats.
30. Le groupe des Principales Puissancesalliées et associées lui-même
n'a pas eu le dernier mot quant à la rédaction du Mandat. C'est le
Conseil qui est intervenu en dernier ressort. En plus de l'insertion,
déjà mentionnée,du quatrième considérant du préambule, le Conseil
a apporté au projet un certain nombre de modifications avant de l'a-
dopter. L'une de ces modifications présente de l'intérêt en l'occurrence.
D'après la dernière version de la clause juridictionnelle du Mandat,
telle qu'elle a été promulguée par le Conseil et adoptée pour tous les
Mandats, seul le Mandataire s'est engagé à se soumettre au règlement

judiciaire pour tout différendqui viendrait à s'éleverentre lui et un autre
Membre de la Société des Nations, alors que, d'après la version an-
térieure,la juridiction de la Cour se serait étendue aussi aux différends
portés devant elle par le Mandataire comme demandeur et aux diffé-
rends survenant entre les autres Membres de la Sociétédes Nations.La
raison de la modification faite par le Conseil concerne directement le
statut des Membres de la Sociétédes Nations par rapport au Mandat
tel qu'on l'envisageait. Cette raison était que, comme on s'en est rapide-
ment aperçu, on ne pouvait leur imposer sans leur consentement une
obligation de se soumettre au règlementjudiciaire. Il va sans dire que,
si l'on avait considéré queles Etats Membres étaient partiesà l'acte de
Mandat comme à un traité, ils auraient étécensésavoir par là même
donné leur consentement àtout ce que le texte contenait, y compris la

clause juridictionnelle. Manifestement, on ne les a pas considérés
comme des parties.
25 31. Another circumstance calling for notice is that, as mentioned
earlier, the Mandate contained a clause-paragraph 1 of Article 7 (and
similarlyintheother mandates)-providing that the consent of the Coun-
cil of the League was required for any modification of the terms of the
Mandate; but it was not stated that the consent of individual members of
the League was additionally required. There is no need to enquire
whether, in particular cases-for instance for the modification of any
of their "special interests" under the mandate-the consent of the
member States would have been necessary, sincewhat is now in question
is the "conduct" provisions. As to these, the specialposition given to the
Council of the League by paragraph 1 of Articl~ 7 confirms the view
that individual member States were not regarded as having a separate
legal right or interest of their own respecting the administration of the

Mandate. It is certainly inconsistent with the view that they were con-
sidered as separate parties to the instrument of mandate.

32. The real position of the individual members of the League relative
to the various instruments of mandate was a different one. They were
not parties to them; but they were, to a limited extent, and in certain
respects only, in the position of deriving rights from these instruments.
Not being parties to the instruments of mandate, they could draw
from them only such rights as these unequivocally conferred, directly
or by a clearly necessary implication. The existence of such rights could
not be presumed or merely inferred or postulated. But in Article 22
of the League Covenant, only the mandatories are mentioned in con-
nection with the carrying out of themandates in respect of theinhabitants
of the mandated territories and as regards the League organs. Except
in the procedural provisions of paragraph 8 (the "if not previously
agreed upon" clause) the only mention of the members of the League
in Article 22is in quite another context, namely at theend ofparagraph 5,

where it is provided that the mandatories shall "also secure equal
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the
League". It is the same in the instruments of mandate. Apart from the
jurisdictional clause, which will be considered later, mention of the
members of the League is made only in the "special interests" provisions
of these instruments. It is in respect of these interests alone that any
direct link is established between the mandatories and the members of
the League individually. In the case of the "conduct" provisions, mention
is made only of the mandatory and, where required, of the appropriate
organ of the League. The link in respect of these provisions is with the
League or League organs alone.

33. Accordingly, viewing the matter in the light of the relevant texts
and instruments, and having regard to the structure of the League,

26 31. Un autre faità signaler est que,comme on l'a dit plus haut, le Man-
dat contenait, ainsi que les autres Mandats, une clause subordonnant

toute modification de ses dispositions à l'autorisation du Conseil (ar-
ticle7, premier alinéa), mais qu'il n'exigeaitpas en outre l'assentiment
des Membres de la Société desNations à titre individuel. Il n'y a pas
lieu de rechercher si, dans un cas particulier, par exemple pour la mo-
dification d'une disposition du Mandat relative à l'un de leurs inté-
rêts particuliers, l'assentiment des Etats Membres aurait été nécessaire,
puisque seules sont présentement en cause les dispositions relatives à
la gestion. S'agissant de ces dernières, la situation spécialereconnue au
Conseil par le premier alinéa de l'articleconfirme que l'on ne considé-
rait pas que les Etats Membres eussent à titre individuel un droit ou
intérêt juridique propre quant à l'administration du Mandat. Cette

situation est certainement incompatible avec l'idéeque les Etats Membres
auraient été tenus pour des parties distinctes à l'acte de Mandat.

32. Le véritablestatut des Membres de la SociétédesNations par rap-
port aux actes deMandat étaitdifférent.Ils n'étaient pasparties aux Man-
dats mais, dans une mesure limitée et à certains égards seulemeiit, ils
étaientà même d'entirer des droits. N'étant pas parties aux actes deMan-
dat, ils ne pouvaient en retirer que des droits conféréssans équivoque,soit
directement, soit implicitement mais de manière claire et inéluctable.
L'existence de pareils droits ne saurait se présumerou se fondersimple-

inent sur une déduction ou un postulat. Or, àl'article 22 du Pacte, seuls
les Mandataires étaient mentionnés s'agissant de l'exécutiondes Man-
dats à l'égard des habitants des territoires sous Mandat et vis-à-vis
des organes de la Société desNations. Les Membres de la Société des
Nations, si l'on excepte les dispositions procédurales du paragraphe 8
relativesà l'absence d'une ([conventionantérieure », n'étaient mention-
nésdans cet article qu'au sujet d'une tout autre question, à la fin du
paragraphe 5 où il était stipuléque les Mandataires assureraient «éga-
lement aux autres Membres de la Société desconditions d'égalitépour
les échanges et le commerce». Dans les actes de Mandat, il en allait
de même. Endehors de la clause juridictionnelle, qui sera examinée

plus loin, ces actes ne faisaient mention des Membres de la Société des
Nations que dans leurs dispositions relatives aux intérêtsparticuliers.
C'est à propos de ces intérêtset d'eux seuls qu'un lien direct était établi
entre les Mandataires et les Membres de la Société desNations à titre
individuel. Dans les dispositions relatives à la gestion des Mandats,
il n'était question que des Mandataires et, le cas échéant, de l'organe
compétent de la Société desNations. Pour ces dispositions, le lien n'é-
tait établi qu'avec la Sociétédes Nations ou ses organes.

33. En conséquence,compte tenu des textes et instruments pertinents
et de la structure de la Sociétédes Nations, dans le cadre de laquellewithin the framework of which the mandates system functioned, the
Court considers that even in the time of the League, even as members
of the League when that organization still existed, the Applicants did
not, in their individual capacity as States, possess any separate self-
contained right which they could assert, independently of, or additionally
to, the right of the League, in the pursuit of its collective, institutional
activity, to require the due performance of the Mandate in discharge
of the "sacred trust". This right was vested exclusivelyin the League,
and was exercised through its competent organs. Each member of the
League could share in its collective, institutional exerciseby the League,

through their participation in the work of its organs, and to the extent
that these organs themselves were empowered under the mandates
system to act. By their right to activate these organs (of which they
made full use), they could procure consideration of mandates questions
as of other matters within the sphere of action of the League. But no
right was reserved to them, individuallyas States, and independently of
their participation in the institutional activities of the League, as com-
ponent parts of it, to claim in their own name,-still less as agents
authorized to represent the League,-the right to invigilate the sacred
trust,-to set themselves up as separate custodians of the various
mandates. This was the role of the League organs.

34. To put this conclusionin another way, the position was that under
the mandates system, and within the general framework of the League

system, the various mandatories were responsible for their conduct of
the mandates solely to the League-in particular to its Council-and
were not additionally and separately responsible to each and every
individual State member of the League. If the latter had been given a
legal right or interest on an individual "State" basis, this would have
meant that each member of the League, independently of the Council
or other competent League organ, could have addressed itself directly
to every mandatory, for the purpose of calling for explanations or
justifications of its administration, and generally to exact from the
mandatory the due performance of its mandate, according to the view
which that State might individually take as to what was required for
the purpose.
35. Clearly no such right existed under the mandates system as con-
templated by any of the relevant instruments. It would have involved
a position of accountability by the mandatories to each and every
member of the League separately, for otherwise there would have been
nothing additional to the normal faculty of participating in the collective

work of the League respecting mandates. The existence of such an
additional right could not however be reconciled with the way in which
the obligation of the mandatories, both under Article 22 of the League
Covenant, and (in the case of South West Africa) Article 6 of the
instrument of Mandate, was limited to reporting to the League Council, fonctionnait le système des Mandats, la Cour estime que, même à
l'époque de la Société desNations, mêmeen tant que Membres de
cette organisation quand elle existait encore, les demandeurs ne possé-
daient à titre individuel comme Etats aucun droit propre et autonome

pouvant être invoqué indépendammentou en plus du droit conféré
à la Sociétédes Nations de réclamer, dans I'accomplissement de son
activitécollective et institutionnelle, la bonne exécutiondu Mandat con-
formément à la cmission sacrée de civilisation ». Ce droit revenait
exclusivement àla Société desNations, pour êtreexercépar ses organes
compétents.Chaque Membre de la Société desNations pouvait prendre
part à l'exercice collectif et institutionnel de ce droit, en participant
aux travaux des organes de la Sociétéet dans la mesure où ceux-ci
avaient eux-mêmesle pouvoir d'agir dans le cadre du système des
Mandats. Ayant le droit de saisir lesdits organes, droit dont ils ont fait
pleinement usage, les Membres pouvaient obtenir que des questions

concernant les Mandats fussent examinéestout comme les autres ques-
tions entrant dans la sphère d'activitéde la Société desNations. Mais,
en dehors de leur participation à l'activitéinstitutionnelle de l'organi-
sation en tant que Membres de celle-ci, ils n'avaient aucun droit indi-
viduellement comme Etats à veilleà l'accomplissement de la mission
sacrée de civilisation et à s'érigerainsi en curateurs aux Mandats,
soit en leur nom propre soit, encore moins, comme agents autorisés
à représenterla Société desNations. C'étaitlà le rôle des organes de la
Société desNations.
34. La situation était autrement dit la suivante: dans le système des
Mandats et dans le cadre général dela Société desNations, les Man-

dataires ne répondaient de la gestion des Mandats que devant la So-
ciété desNations, en particulier devant le Conseil; ils n'étaientpas en
outre responsables à titre distinct envers chacun des Etats Membres.
Si un droit ou intérêt juridique avaitété conféraéux Etats à titre indi-
viduel, chaque Membre de la Société desNations aurait pu s'adresser
directement à chaque Mandataire, sans passer par le Conseil ou par un
autre organe compétent de la Société desNations, pour lui demander
des explications ou des justifications sur son administration et d'une
manière générale aurait pu exiger de chaque Mandataire la bonne exé-
cution du Mandat, selon l'opinion qu'il se serait faite lui-mêmede ce
qui étaitrequis à cet effet.

35. Il est manifeste qu'aucun droitde cegenre n'existaitdans lesystème
des Mandats tel qu'il était envisagédans les instruments pertinents.
Un tel droit aurait eu pour effet de rendre les Mandataires responsables
envers chacun des Membres de la Société desNations à titre distinct,
sans quoi il se serait confondu avec la facultéde participer normalement
à l'activité collective dela Société desNations en matière de Mandats.
Or, l'existence de ce droit supplémentaire aurait été inconciliable avec
le fait que l'obligation imposéeaux Mandataires, tant en vertu de
l'article2 du Pacte que de la disposition des actes de Mandat qui dans
le cas du Sud-Ouest africain faisait l'objet de l'articleonsistait sim-

27and to itssatisfactionalone. Sucha situation would have beenparticularly
unimaginable in relation to a systemwhich, within certain limits, allowed
the mandatories to determine for themselves by what means they would
carry out their mandates: and afortiori would this have been so in the
case of a 'C'mandate, having regard to the specialpower of administra-
tion as "an integral portion of its own territory" which, as already
noted, was conferred upon the mandatory respecting this category of
mandate.

36. The foregoing conclusions hold good whether the League is
regarded as having possessed the kind of corporate juridical personality
that the Court, in its Advisory Opinion in the case of Reparation for
InjuriesSufered in the Service of the UnitedNations (I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 174),found the United Nations to be invested with,-or whether the
League is regarded as a collectivity of States functioning on an institu-
tional basis, whose collectiverights in respect of League matters were, as

Article 2 of the Covenant implied, exercisable only through the appro-
priate League organs, and not independently of these.

37. In order to test the conclusionsthus reached, it islegitimate to have
regard to the probable consequences of the view contended for by the
Applicants,-or at any rate to the possibilities that would have been
opened up if each member of the League had individually possessed
the standing and rights now claimed. One question which arises is that
of how far the individual members of the League would have been in
a position to play the role ascribed to them. The Applicants, as part of
their argument in favour of deeming the functions previously discharged
by theCouncil ofthe Leagueto havepassed now to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, insisted on the need for "informed" dealings
with the Mandatory :only a body sufficientlyendowedwith the necessary

knowledge, experience and expertise could, it was said, adequately
discharge the supervisory role. Yet at the same time it was contended
that individual members of the League,-not directly advised by the
Permanent Mandates Commission,-not (unless members of the Coun-
cil) in touch with the mandates questions except through their partici-
pation in the work of the League Assembly,-nevertheless possessed a
right independently to confront the various mandatories over their
administration of the mandates, and a faculty to cal1upon them to alter
their policies and adjust their courses accordingly. The two contentions
are inconsistent, and the second affronts al1the probabilities.

38. No less difficultthan the position of a mandatory caught between
a number of possible different expressions of view, would have been

28 plement à envoyer au Conseil des rapports satisfaisant celui-ci et ce-
lui-ci seulement. Cette situation aurait étéparticulièfement difficiàe
imaginer, s'agissant d'un systèmequi, sous réserve de certaines limita-
tions, autorisait les Mandataires décider eux-mêmesdes moyens d'exé-

cuter leur Mandat; cela aurait été encoreplus difficile imaginer dans
le cas d'un Mandat C, eu égardau pouvoir d'administrer le pays « com-
me une partie intégrante de son territoir» qui étaitspécialementcon-
féré,comme on l'a déjànoté, à tout Mandataire chargéd'un Mandat
de cette catégorie.
36. Les conclusions qui précèdent nedépendent pasdu point de savoir
si l'on considère que la Société desNations avait une personnalité
juridique du genre de celle que la Cour a reconnueà l'organisation des
Nations Unies dans son avis consultatif sur laéparationdes dommages
subis au service des Nations Unies(C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 174), ou si
l'on estime que la Société desNations constituait une collectivité
d'Etats fonctionnant de manière institutionnelle et ne pouvant, comme
l'impliquait l'articledu Pacte, exercer leurs droits collectifs en ce qui
concernait les affaires relevant de la Socique par l'intermédiairedes

organes compétentsde celle-ci et non en dehors d'eux.

37. Pour vérifierle bien-fondé des conclusions auxquelleson est ainsi
parvenu, il est légitimede tenir compte des conséquencesque la thèse
des demandeurs aurait probablement engendrées,ou du moins de te-
nir compte de ce qui aurait pu se produire si chaque Membre de la So-
ciété desNations avait possédé à titre individuel la qualitéet les droits
aujourd'hui invoqués.La question se pose de savoir dans quelle mesure
les Membres de la Société desNations auraient pu jouer le rôle qu'on
veut leur attribuer. Dans l'argumentation qu'iis développent pour
expliquer que les anciennes fonctions du Conseil de la Société desNa-
tions sont désormaisdévolues à l'Assemblée générale de Nsations Unies,

les demandeurs soulignent la nécessitéde traiter «en connaissance
de cause » avec le Mandataire: d'après eux, seul peut s'acquitter con-
venablement de la fonction de surveillance un organe ayant les connais-
sances, l'expérience et la compétenctechnique voulues. Or, les deman-
deurs n'en soutiennent pas moins en mêmetemps que les Membres de
la Société desNations, qui ne recevaient pas directement d'avis de la
Commission permanente des Mandats et qui, sauf s'ils siégeaientau
Conseil, ne s'occupaient de questions concernant les Mandats que
dans la mesure où ils participaient aux travaux de l'Assemblée,possé-
daient à titre indépendant le droit de demander aux Mandataires des
explications sur leur administration et la faculté de les invitermo-
difier leur politique età changer en conséquenceleur ligne de con-
duite. Cesdeuxarguments sont incompatibles et leseconddéfietoute vrai-
semblance.

38. Le Conseil, dont l'autorité aurait éténécessairement sapéeet
l'action fréquemment compromises'il y avait eu quelque quarante outhat of the League Council whose authority must have been undermined,
and its action often frustrated, by the existence of some 40 or 50 in-
dependent centres of invigilatory rights.
39. Equally inconsistent would the position claimed for individual
League members have been with that of the mandatory as a member of
the Council on mandates questions. As such, the mandatory, on the basis
of the normal League voting rule, and by virtue of Article 4, paragraphs
5 and 6, and Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, possessed a vote

necessary to the taking of any forma1Council decision on a question of
substance relative to its mandate (at least in the sense that, if cast, it
must not be adversely cast); so that, in the last resort, the assent, or
non-dissent, of the mandatory had to be negotiated.

40. In the opinion of the Court, those who intended the one system
cannot simultaneously have intended the other: and if in the time of
the League,-if as members of the League,-the Applicants did not
possess the rights contended for,-evidently they do not possess them
now. There is no principle of law which, following upon the dissolution
of the League, would operate to invest the Applicants with rights they
did not have even when the League was still in being.

41. The Court will now turn to the various contentions that have
been or might be advanced in opposition to the view it takes; and
will firstdeal with a number of points which have a certain general
affinity.
42. Firstly, it may be represented that the consequences described
above as being rendered possible if individual members ofthe Leaguehad
had the rights now contended for by the Applicants, are unrea1,-because
thetrue position under the mandates systemwasthat, evenifin al1normal
circumstances the mandatories were responsible to the Council of the
League alone, nevertheless the individual members of the League pos-
sessed a right of last resort to activate the Court under the jurisdictional
clause if any mandate was being contravened. The Court will consider
the effect of the jurisdictional clause later; but quite apart from that,
the argument is misconceived. It is evident that any such right would
have availed nothing unless the members of the League had individually
possessed substantive rights regarding the carrying out of the mandates
which they could make good before the Court, if and when they did

activate it. If, however, they possessed such rights then, as already noted,
irrespective of whether they went to the Court or not, they were entitled
at al1times, outside League channels, to confront the mandatories over
the administration of their mandates, just as much as in respect of their
"special interests" under the mandate. The theory that the members of
29 cinquante centresindépendants de droit de contrôle, seserait trouvédans
une situationnon moins difficileque le Mandataire pris dans un réseau de

demandes éventuellement contradictoires.
39. De même,il y aurait eu incompatibilité entre la situation où les
divers Membres de la Sociétédes Nations se seraient ainsi trouvés et
la situation du Mandataire en tant que membre du Conseil lorsque
celui-ci traitait de questions relatives aux Mandats. Suivant la règle
de vote normalement applicable à la Société desNations et en vertu
de l'article 4, paragraphes 5 et 6, et de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, du
Pacte, le vote positif, ou tout au moins l'absence d'opposition, du
Mandataire étaitnécessairepour que le Conseil puisse prendre une dé-
cision sur une question importante concernant le Mandat; dans ces
conditions, on devait en fin de compte négocier avecle Mandataire
pour obtenir qu'il donne son assentiment ou qu'il ne fasse pas oppo-
sition.
40. De l'avisdela Cour,il estimpossible que l'on ait voulua foisl'un

et l'autre systèmeet, sà l'époque oùla Société desNations existait et
où ils en étaient Membres les demandeurs ne possédaient pas les droits
qu'ils invoquent, ils ne les possèdent évidemment pas aujourd'hui.
Il n'existe aucun principe de droit qui ait eu pour effet de conféreraux
demandeurs, à la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations, des droits
qu'ils n'avaient jamais eus alors que cette organisation existait encore.

41. La Cour examineramaintenant les arguments qui sont avancésou
pourraient l'êtreà l'encontre de l'opinion qu'elle adopte; elle réglera
d'abord quelques points qui d'une manière généralesont du même

ordre.
42. Tout d'abord, pourrait-on alléguer,les conséquencesdont il a été
indiqué plus haut qu'elles auraient pu se produire, si les Membres de
la Société desNations avaient eu à titre individuel les droits invoqués
aujourd'hui par les demandeurs, sont dépourvues de vraisemblance;
en effet, la véritablesituation dans le systèmedes Mandats était celle-
ci: si les Mandataires étaient normalement responsables devant le seul
Conseil, les Etats Membres n'en avaient pas moins à titre individuel
le droit de saisir la Cour en dernier ressort en vertu de la clause juri-
dictionnelle, au cas où il serait contrevenu à un Mandat. La Cour
examinera plus loin l'effet de la clause juridictionnelle mais l'argu-
ment est de toute façon mal fondé. Le droit de saisir la Cour n'aurait
évidemmentservi à rien si les Etats Membres n'avaient eu individuelle-
ment la possibilité de faire valoir, au cas où ils auraient saisi la Cour,

des droits de fondà l'égard del'exécutiondes Mandats. Or, s'ils'avaient
eu de pareils droits, ils auraient, comme on l'a déjà signalé, été
fondés à tout moment, qu'ils saisissent la Cour ou non, à demander
aux Mandataires des explications sur leur administration des Man-
dats sans passer par la Sociétdes Nations, tout comme ils auraient puthe League possessed such rights, but were precluded from exercising
them unless by means of recourse to adjudication, constitutes an essen-
tially improbable supposition for which the relevant texts afford no
warrant. These texts did not need to impose any such limitation, for
the simple reason that they did not create the alleged rights.

43. Again, it has been pointed outthat there is nothing unprecedented
in a situation in which the supervision of a certain matter is, on the
political plane, entrusted to a given body or organ, but where certain
individual States-not al1 of them necessarily actual parties to the in-
struments concerned-have parallel legal rights in regard to the same
matter, which they can assert in specified ways. This is true but irrele-
vant, since for the present purposes the question is not whether such
rights could be, but whether they were in fact conferred. In various
instances cited by way of example, not only was the intention to confer
the right and its special purpose quite clear,-it was also restricted to
a small group of States, members, either permanent or elected, of the
supervisory organ concerned. In such a case, the right granted was,
in effect, part of the institutional or conventional machinery of control,
and its existence could occasion no difficulty or confusion. This type
of case, which will be further discussed later, in connection with the
jurisdictional clause of the mandates, is not the same as the present one.

44.Next, it may be said that a IegaIright or interest need not necessarily
relate to anything material or "tangible", and can be infringed even
though no prejudice of a material kind has been suffered. In this con-
nection, the provisions of certain treaties and other international in-
struments of a humanitarian character, and the terms of various arbitral
and judicial decisions, are cited as indicating that, for instance, States
may be entitled to uphold somegeneral principle eventhough the particu-
lar contravention of it alleged has not affected their own material in-
terests;-that again, States may have a legal interest in vindicating a
principle of international law, even though they have, in the given
case, suffered no material prejudice, or ask only for token damages.
Without attempting to discuss how far, and in what particular circum-
stances, these things might be true, it sufficesto point outthat, in holding
that the Applicants in the present case could only have had a legal
right or interest in the "special interests" provisions of the Mandate,
the Court does not in any way do so merely because these relate to a
material or tangible object. Nor, in holding that no legal right or interest
exists for the Applicants, individually as States, in respect of the "con-

duct" provisions, does the Court do so because any such right, or in-
terest would not have a material or tangible object. The Court simply
holds that such rights or interests, in order to exist, must be clearly
vested in those who claim them, by some text or instrument, or rule
of 1aw;-and that in the present case, none were ever vestedin individual
members of the League under any of the relevant instruments, or as a
30le faire à propos des dispositions des Mandats relatives à leurs inté-

rêts particuliers. La thèse selon laquelle les Membres de la Société
des Nations auraient possédéces droits sans pouvoir toutefois les
exercer par une autre voie qu'un recours en justice constitue une sup-
position essentiellement improbable qui n'est pas justifiéepar les textes
pertinents.11était inutile que ces textes imposent une telle limitation,
pour la simple raison qu'ils ne créaientpas les droits en question.
43. On soutient encore qu'il n'est nullementsans précédentque la sur-
veillance dans un domaine donné soit confiéesur le plan politique
à un certain organe ou organisme et que, parailèlement, des Etats qui
ne sont pas tous nécessairementde véritablesparties aux instruments
en cause aient à titre individuel, dans le mêmedomaine, des droits
qu'ils peuvent faire valoir selon des modalités déterminées. Cela est
vrai mais sans pertinence, car aux fins de la présente affairela ques-
tion n'est pas de savoir si de tels droits pouvaient êtreconférésmais

s'ils l'ont effectivement été.Dans certains des exemples invoqués, non
seulement l'intention de conférer un droit et sa raison d'être étaient
très claires, mais encore ce droit était limitéun petit groupe dYEtats
qui faisaient partie de l'organe de surveillance en cause soit à titre
permanent, soit à titre électif.En pareil cas, le droit conféréétaiten fait
un élémentdu mécanismeinstitutionnel ou conventionnel de contrôle
et son existence ne pouvait entraîner de difficulté niprêterconfusion.
Ce cas, sur lequel on reviendra au sujet de la clause juridictionnelle
des Mandats, n'est pas le mêmeque le cas actuel.
44. On peut dire d'autre part qu'un droit ou intérêtjuridiquene serap-
porte pas nécessairement à un objet concret ou tangible et peut être
atteint même en l'absencede tout préjudice matériel.A cet égard, on
cite les dispositions de certains traités et autres instruments internatio-
naux de caractère humanitaire, ainsi que les termes de diverses déci-

sions arbitrales et judiciaires, pour montrer par exemple que des
Etats peuvent demander qu'un principe généralsoit observé, même si
l'infraction alléguée ce principe ne touche pas à leur intérêt concret
propre, pour montrer aussi que des Etats peuvent avoir un intérêjtu-
ridique à réclamerle respect d'un principe de droit international, même
s'ils n'ont subi dans un cas d'espèceaucun préjudice matérielou ne
demandent qu'une réparation symbolique. Sans chercher à discuter
jusqu'à quel point et dans quelles circonstances particulières cela peut
être vrai,il suffira de signaler que, si la Cour juge en l'espèceque les
demandeurs n'auraient pu avoir de droits ou intérêts juridiquesqu'à
l'égard des dispositionsdu Mandat relatives aux intérêtsparticuliers,
ce n'est nullement pour le seul motif que leur objet est concret ou tan-
gible. De même,si la Cour estime que les demandeurs n'ont pas indi-

viduellement comme Etats de droits ou intérêts juridiques à l'égard
des dispositions relativesla gestion, ce n'estpas parce que de tels droits
ou intérêts juridiques n'auraient pas d'objet concret ou tangible. La
Cour juge simplement que ces droits ou intérêtjsuridiques ne sauraient
exister que s'ils ont été clairement conférésceux qui les revendiquent
par un texte, un instrument ou une règle de droit et qu'en l'espèceon
30constituent part of the mandates system as a whole, or 'otherwise.

45. Various miscellaneous propositions are also advanced: the Man-
date is more deseming of protection than the "special interests" of any
particular State;-there would be nothing extraordinary in a State
having a legal right to vindicate a purely altruistic interest;-and so
forth. But these are not really legal propositions: they do not eliminate
the need to find the particular provisions orules of law the existence of
which they assume, but do not of themselvesdemonstrate.

46. It is also asked whether, even supposing that the Applicants only
had an interest on the political level respecting the conduct of the Man-
date, this would not have sufficedto enable them to seek a declaration
from the Court as to what the legal position was under the Mandate,
so that, for instance, they could know whether they would be on good
ground in bringing before the appropriate political organs, acts of the
mandatory thought to involve a threat to peace or good international
relations.
47. The Court is concerned in the present proceedings only with the
rights which the Applicants had as former members of the League of
Nations-for it is in that capacity alone that they are now appearing.
If the contention above described is intended to mean that because, for
example, the Applicants would, under paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the
League Covenant, have had "the friendly right ... to bring to the atten-
tion of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance ... which
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding ...
upon which peace depends", they would therefore also-and on that ac-
count-have had the right to obtain a declaration from the Court as
to what the mandatory's obligations were, and whether a violation of
these had occurred;-if this is the contention, the Court can only reply
to it in the negative. A provision such as Article 11 of the Covenant
could at most furnish a motive why the Applicants (or other members

of the League) might wish to know what the legal position was. It could
.not of itself give them any right to procure this knowledge from the
Court which they would not otherwise have had under the Mandate
itself.
48. On the other hand, an appropriate organ of the League such as the
Council could of course have sought an advisory opinion from the
Court on any such matter. It is in this connection that the chief objection
to the theory under discussion arises. Under the Court's Statute as it
is at present framed, States cannot obtain mere "opinions" from the
Court. Thisfaculty is reserved to certaininternational organs empowered
to exercise it by way of the process of requesting the Court for an ad-
visory opinion. It was open to the Council of the League to make use of
this process in case of any doubt as to the rights of the League or its
31n'en a jamais conféré auxMembres de la Société desNations à titre
individuel, que ce soit par l'un des instruments pertinents ou dans le
cadre généraldu système des Mandats ou d'une autre manière.
45. On formule aussi divers arguments consistant à dire par exemple

que le Mandat requiert une protection plus grande que les intérêts
particuliers de tel ou tel Etat, ou qu'il n'y aurait rien d'extraordinaire
à ce qu'un Etat ait le droit de défendreun intérêt purement altruiste.
Mais il ne s'agit pas là de véritablesarguments de droit: encore faut-
il rechercher les dispositions ou règlesde droit dont ces arguments pré-
sument l'existence sans la démontrer.

46. On demande en outre si, à supposer mêmeque les demandeurs
n'aient euqu'un intérêt d'ordre politiqueu regard dela gestion du Man-
dat, cela n'aurait pas suffies habiliteà solliciter de la Cour une décla-
ration sur la situation juridique existant en vertu du Mandat, afin de
savoir, par exemple, s'ils étaient fondés soumettre aux organes poli-

tiques compétentsles actes du Mandataire censésconstituer une menace
pour la paix ou pour les bonnes relations internationales.

47. La Cour n'a à connaître dans la présenteinstance que des droits
des demandeurs en leur qualitéd'anciens Membresde la Société des Na-
tions, puisque c'est ce seul titre qu'ils se présententaujourd'hui devant
la Cour. La Cour doit rejeter la thèse ci-dessus mentionnéepour au-
tant qu'elle signifie que, parce qu'ils auraient eu, par exemple, aux
termes de l'article 11, paragraphe2, du Pacte, «le droità titre amical,
d'appeler l'attention del'Assembléeou du Conseil sur toute circons-
tance ...qui menace ..de troubler la paix ou la bonne entente ...dont
la paix dépend)),les demandeurs auraient égalementeu de ce chef le
droit d'obtenir de la Cour une déclaration sur la teneur des obligations

du Mandataire et sur l'existence d'uneviolation éventuelle de ces obli-
gations. Une disposition telle que l'article 11 du Pacte pouvait tout
au plus constituer une raison pour les demandeurs ou d'autres Mem-
bres de la Société desNations de chercher à savoir quelle étaitla situa-
tion juridique. Elle ne pouvait par elle-mêmeleur donner aucun droit
de le demander à la Cour, sipar ailleurs ce droit ne leur étaitpasoctroyé
par le Mandat.

48. En revanche, il est évidentqu'un organe compétentde la Société
des Nations, comme le Conseil, aurait pu demander àla Cour un avis
consultatif sur une question de ce genre. C'est que résidela principale
objection à la thèsedont il s'agit. D'après letexte actuel du Statut de la
Cour, aucun Etat ne saurait obtenir de la Cour un simple avis. Cette
facultéest réservéeàcertainsorganesinternationaux habilités à l'exercer

par la voie de requêtespour avis consultatif soumises à la Cour.
Le Conseil pouvait recourir à cette procédure en cas de doute quant
aux droits de la Société desNations ou de ses Membres en matière
31 34 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

members relative to mandates. But in their individual capacity, States
can appear before the Court only as litigants in a dispute with another
State, even if their object in so doing js only to obtain a declaratory
judgment. The moment they so appear however, it is necessary for
them, even for that limited purpose, to establish, in relation to the de-
fendant party in the case, the existence of a legal right or interest in the
subject-matter of their claim, such as to entitle them to the declarations
or pronouncements they seek: or in other words that they are parties
to whom the defendant State is answerable under the relevant instrument

or rule of law.

49. The Court must now turn to certain questions of a wider character.
Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, that
humanitarian considerations are sufficient in themselves to generate
legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and should proceed
accordingly. The Court does not think so. It is a court of law, and can
take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given a
sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a
social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through
and within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal
service thatwould be rendered.
50. Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis
for rules of law,just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the United
Nations Charter constitute the moral and political basis for the specific

legal provisions thereafter set out. Such considerations do not, however,
in themselves amount to rules of law. Al1States are interested-have an
interest-in such matters. But the existence of an "interest" does not
of itself entai1 that this interest is specificallyjuridical in character.
51.It is inthe light of these considerations that theCourt must examine
what is perhaps the most important contention of a general character
that has been advanced in connection with this aspect of the case,
namely the contention by which it is sought to derive a legal right or
interest in the conduct of the mandate from the simple existence, or
principle, of the "sacred trust". The sacred trust, it is said, is a "sacred
trust of civilization". Hence al1 civilized nations have an interest in
seeing that it is carried out. An interest, no doubt;-but in order that
this interest may take on a specifically legal character, the sacred trust
itself must be or become something more than a moral or humanitarian
ideal. In order to generate legal rights and obligations, it must be given
juridical expression and be clothed in legal form. One such form might

be the United Nations trusteeship system,-another, as contained in
Chapter XI of the Charter concerning non-self-governing territories,
which makes express reference to "a sacred trust". In each case the legal
rights and obligations are those, and only those, provided for by the
relevant texts, whatever these may be.
52. In the present case, the principle of the sacred trust has as its sole
32de Mandats. Pour leur part, les Etats ne peuvent se présenterdevant la
Cour à titre individuel qu'en tant que partiesà un différend avec un

autre Etat, mêmes'ils ne cherchent à obtenir qu'un jugement déclara-
toire. Au moment où ils se présentent devant la Cour, ils doivent, ne
poursuivraient-ils même qu'un objectif aussi limité,établir qu'ils ont
vis-à-vis du défendeuren l'espèceun droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard
de l'objet de la demande leur permettant d'obtenir les déclarationsqu'ils
sollicitent, ou en d'autres termes qu'ils sont des parties devant les-
quelles 1'Etat défendeur est responsable en vertu de l'instrument ou de
la règle de droit pertinents.

49. La Cour abordera maintenant certaines questions plus générales.
Tout au long de la présente affaire,on a dit ou laisséentendre que des
considérations humanitaires suffisent à faire naître des droits et obliga-
tions juridiques et que la Cour peut et doit agir en conséquence.La Cour
ne le pense pas. La Cour juge le droit et ne peut tenir compte de prin-
cipes moraux que dans la mesure où on leur a donnéune forme juridique
suffisante. Le droit, dit-on, répond à une nécessité sociale,mais c'est
précisémentpour cette raison qu'il nepeut y répondreque dans le cadre
et à l'intérieur des limites de la discipline qu'il constitue. Autrement,
ce n'est pas une contribution juridique qui serait apportée.

50. Des considérations humanitaires peuvent inspirer des règles de
droit; ainsi le préambule dela Charte des Nations Unies constitue la base
morale et politique des dispositions juridiques qui sont énoncées en-
suite. De telles considérations ne sont pas cependant en elles-mêmes
des règlesde droit. Tous les Etats s'intéressentà ces questions; ils y ont
un intérêtM . ais ce n'est pas parce qu'un intérêtexiste que cet intérêt a
un caractère spécifiquementjuridique.
51. C'estcompte tenu de ces considérations quela Cour doit examiner
l'argument généralqui est peut-êtrele plus important de ceux que l'on
avance à propos de cet aspect de l'affaire: on soutient qu'un droit ou
intérêt juridiqueau regard de la gestion du Mandat découlerait de la

simple existence de la ((mission sacrée ))ou de ce principe. La mission
sacrée,dit-on, est une ((mission sacrée de civilisatio».Par suite, toutes
les nations civiliséesauraient un intérêt à son accomplissement. Un
intérêt certainement;mais, pour que cet intérêtpuisse prendre un ca-
ractère spécifiquementjuridique, il faut que la mission sacréeelle-même
soit ou devienne quelque chose de plus qu'un idéalmoral ou humani-
taire. Pour engendrer des droits et des obligations juridiques, elle doit
avoir une expression et une forme juridiques. Une de ces formes pour-
rait être le régime de tutelle des Nations Unies; une autre pourrait
êtrecelle que prévoitpour !es territoires non autonomes le chapitre XI
de la Charte, qui se réfère expressémen t une ((missionsacrée ».Dans

chaque cas, les droits et les obligations juridiques sont ceux et unique-
ment ceux que prévoient les textespertinents, quels qu'ils soient.
52. Dans la présente espèce,le principe de la mission sacréede civili-
3235 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

juridical expression the mandates system. As such, it constitutes a
moral ideal given form as a juridical régimein the shape of that system.
But it is necessary not to confuse the moral ideal with the legal rules
intended to give it effect. For the purpose of realizing the aims of the
trust in the particular form of any given mandate, its legal rights and
obligations were those, and those alone, which resulted from the rele-
vant instruments creating the system, and the mandate itself, within
the framework of the League of Nations.
53. Thus it is that paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant, in the
same breath that it postulates the principle of the sacred trust, specifies

in terms that, in order to give "effect to this principle", the tutelage of
the peoples of the mandated territories should be entrusted to certain
nations, "and that this tutelage should be exercisedby them" as manda-
tories "on behalf of the League". It was from this that flowed al1the
legal consequences already noticed.
54. To sumup,the principle ofthe sacred trust has no residualjuridical
content which could, so far as any particular mandate is concerned,
operate per se to give rise to legal rights and obligations outside the
system as a whole; and, within the system equally, such rights and obli-
gations exist only in so far as there is actual provision forthem. Once
the expression to be given to an idea has been accepted in the form of a
particular régimeor system, its legal incidents are those of the régime
or system. It is not permissible to import new ones by a process of
appeal to the originating idea-a process that would, ex hypotlzesi,
have no natural limit. Hence, although, as has constantly been reiterated,
the members of the League had an interest in seeingthat the obligations

entailed by the mandates system were respected, this was an interest
which, according to the very nature of the system itself, they could
exercise only through the appropriate League organs, and not indi-
vidually.

55. Next, it may be suggested that even if the legal position of the
Applicants and of other individual members of the League of Nations
was as the Court holds it to be, this was so only during the lifetime of
the League, and that when the latter was dissolved, the rights previously
resident in the League itself, or in its competent organs, devolved, so
to speak, upon the individual States which were members of it at the
date of its dissolution. There is, however, no principle of law which
would warrant such a conclusion. Although the Court held in the earlier

1962 phase of the present case that the members of a dissolved inter-
national organization can be deemed, though no longer members of
it, to retain rights which, as members, they individually possessed
when the organization was in being, this could not extend to ascribing
to them, upon and by reason of the dissolution, rights which, even
previously as members, they never did individually possess. Nor ofsation a pour seule expression juridique le système des Mandats. 11
représente ainsi un idéalmoral qui a donné lieu à un régimejuridique
sous la forme du systèmedes Mandats. Mais il ne faut pas confondre
l'idéalmoral et les règlesjuridiques destinéesle mettre en application.
Les droits et les obligations juridiques qui permettaient d'accomplir

la mission à l'égard d'unMandat déterminé étaient ceuxet unique-
ment ceux qui découlaient des actes pertinents créant le systèmeet le
Mandat lui-mêmedans le cadre de la Société des Nations.
53. C'est ainsique l'article2, paragraphe 2, du Pacte, en mêmetemps
qu'il posait le principe de la mission sacrée de civilisation, spécifiait
expressémentque, pour ((réaliser ...ce principe»,la tutelle des peuples
des territoires sous Mandat devait être codée à certaines nations
qui ((exerceraientcette tutelle en qualité de Mandataires et au nom
de la Société))C. 'est de cela que découlaient toutes les conséquences
juridiques déjà indiquées.
54. En résumé, le principede la mission sacréede civilisation ne con-
tient aucun élémentjuridique résiduel pouvant, dans le cas d'un Man-
dat particulier, donnerà lui seul naissanceà des droits eà des obliga-
tions juridiques en dehors du système des Mandats et, de même,il

n'existe des droits et des obligationsjuridiques l'intérieur dece systè-
me que dans la mesure où des dispositions expresses le prévoient.Une
fois admis qu'une idée s'exprimerasous la forme d'un régimeou d'un
systèmeparticulier, ses éléments juridiquessont ceux de ce régimeou
de ce système.On ne saurait en introduire de nouveaux en se référant
à l'idéede base, car on se trouverait de ce fait entraîné dans un pro-
cessus sans fin. En conséquence,bien que les Membres de la Société
des Nations aient eu, comme on l'a rappelésans cesse, un intérêt à ce
que les obligations prévues par les Mandats fussent respectées, ilsne
pouvaient, vu la nature mêmedu système,faire valoir cet intérêt que
par l'intermédiaire des organes compétents dela Sociétédes Nations
et non individuellement.

55. On pourrait soutenir ensuite que, mêmesi les :demandeurs et les
autres Membres de la Sociétédes Nationsse sont trouvésdans la situa-
tion juridique indiquée par la Cour, il en a été ainsi uniquementpen-
dant l'existencede la Sociétet que,à la dissolution de celle-ci,les droits
antérieurement conférés à l'organisation elle-mêmeou à ses organes
compétents ont été en quelque sorte dévolus à titre individuel aux
Etats qui en étaient Membres à cette date. Or, il n'existe aucun prin-
cipe de droit qui justifie pareille conclusion. La Cour a jugé en1962,
dans la phase antérieure de la présente affaire,que les anciens membres
d'une organisation internationale dissoute, tout en n'en faisant plus
partie, sont censésconserver les droits qu'ils possédaientindividuelie-
ment àtitre de membres lorsque l'organisation existait; mais on ne sau-

rait allerusqu'à leur attribuer, dèsla dissolution età raison de celle-
ci, des droits qu'ils n'avaient jamais possédésindividuellement, même 36 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

course could anything that occurred subsequent to the dissolution
of the League operate to invest its members with rights they did not,
in that capacity, previously have,-and itis the rights which they had
as members of the League that are now in question.

56. The Court can equally not read the unilateral declarations, or state-
ments of intention as they have been called, which were made by the
various mandatories on the occasion of the dissolution of the League,
expressing their willingness to continue to be guided by the mandates
in their administration of the territories concerned, as conferring on
the members of the League individually any new legal rights or interests
of a kind they did not previously possess.

57. Another argument which requires consideration is that in so far as
the Court's view leads to the conclusion that there is now no entity
entitled to claim the due performance of the Mandate, it must be un-
acceptable. Without attempting in any way to pronounce on the various
implications involved in this argument, the Court thinks the inference
sought to be drawn from it is inadmissible. If, on a correct legal reading
of a given situation, certain alleged rights are found to be non-existent,
the consequences of this must be accepted. The Court cannot properly
postulate the existence of such rights in order to avert those conse-
quences. This would be to engage in an essentially legislative task, in
the service of political ends the promotion of which, however desirable
in itself, lies outside the function of a court-of-law.

58. The Court comes now to a more specific category of contention
arising out of the existence and terms of the jurisdictional clause of the
Mandate,and of the effect ofthe Court's Judgment of 21 December 1962
in that regard. The Court's present Judgment is founded on the relevant
provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the character
of the League as an organization, and the substantive provisions of
the instrument of Mandate for South West Afrjca. The question now
to be considered is whether there is anything arising out of its previous
Judgment, or the terms of the jurisdictional clause of the Mandate,
which should lead the Court to modify the conclusions arrived at on
those foundations.
59.In the first place, it is contended that the question of the Applicants'
legal right or interest was settled by that Judgment and cannot now
be reopened. As regards the issue of preclusion, the Court finds it un-
necessasr to pronounce on various issues which have been raised in

this connection, such as whether a decision on a preliminary objection
constitutes a res judicata in the proper sense of that term,-whether
it ranks as a "decision" for the purposes of Article 59 of the Court's
34à titre de membres. D'autre part, aucun des événementsqui ont suivi
la dissolution de la Société desNations n'a évidemmentpu avoir l'ef-
fet de conférer à ses Membres des droits qu'ils n'avaient pas aupara-

vant en tant que tels; or, ce sont les droits qu'ilsient en qualitéde
Membres de la Société desNations qui sont présentement enquestion.
56. La Cour ne saurait non plusinterpréterlesdéclarationsunilatérales,
dites déclarations d'intention, par lesquelles les Mandataires ont, à
l'occasion de la dissolution de la Société desNations, annoncé qu'ils
étaient disposés à continuer à s'inspirer des Mandats aux fins de l'ad-
ministration des territoires en cause, comme conférant à titre indivi-
duel aux Membres de l'organisation des droits ou intérêts juridiques
nouveaux qu'ils ne possédaient pas antérieurement.

57. Il y a encore lieu d'examiner l'argument d'après lequell'opinion de
la Cour serait inacceptable dans la mesure où elle amèneà conclure qu'il
n'existe plus actuellement d'entité fondée à réclamer la bonne exécu-
tion du Mandat. Sans vouloir en rien se prononcer sur tout ce qu7im-
plique cet argument, la Cour estime inadmissible la déduction quel'on
cherche à en tirer. Si, après avoir interprétéd'une manière juridiquement
exacte une situation donnée, on considère que certains droits allégués
n'existent pas, on doit en accepter les conséquences.Il n'appartient pas
à la Cour de postuler l'existence de ces droits pour éviterde telles con-

séquences.Ce faisant, elle se livrerait à une tâche essentiellement 1é-
gislative, pour servir des fins politiques qu'il n'entre pas dans les fonc-
tions d'un tribunal de favoriser, si désirable celasoit-il.

58. La Cour traitera ensuited'arguments reposant plusspécialementsur
l'existence et les termes de la clause juridictionnelle du Mandat et
sur l'effeà cet égardde l'arrêt rendupar la Cour le 21 décembre1962.
Le présentarrêtde la Cour se fonde sur les dispositions pertinentes du
Pacte, sur la nature de la Sociétédes Nations en tant qu'organisation

et sur les dispositions de l'acte de Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain
qui touchent au fond. La Cour doit donc rechercher maintenant s'il
existe dans son précédentarrêtou dans les termes de la clause juridic-
tionnelle du Mandat un élémentde nature à modifier les conclusions
auxquelles elle est parvenue sur cette base.

59. On soutient en premier lieu quela question du droit ou intérêjturi-
dique des demandeurs a étérégléepar l'arrêtde 1962 et qu'ellene sau-
rait êtrerouverte. La Cour n'estime pas nécessairede se prononcer sur
les divers points qui ont étésoulevésau sujet d'une telle forclusion,
comme le point de savoir si une décisionsur une exception préliminaire

a force de chose jugée au sens propre du terme, si elle constitue une
((décision» aux fins de l'article 59 du Statut ou si elle est ((défini1)ve Statute, or as "final" within the meaning of Article 60. The essential
point is that aecision on a preliminaryobjection can never be preclusive
of a matter appertaining to the merits, whether or not it has in fact
been dealt with in connection with the preliminary objection. When
preliminary objections are entered by the defendant party in a case,
the proceedings on the merits are, by virtue of Article 62, paragraph 3,
of the Court's Rules, suspended. Thereafter, and until the proceedings
on the merits are resumed, the preliminary objections having been re-
jected, there can be no decision finally determining or pre-judging any
issue of merits. It may occur that a judgment on a preliminary objection
touches on a point of merits, but this it can do only in a provisional
way, to the extent necessary for deciding the question raised by the pre-
liminary objection. Any finding on the point of merits therefore, ranks
simply as part of the motivation of the decision on the preliminary

objection, and not as the object of that decision. It cannot rank as a
final decision on the point of merits involved.

60. Itis however contended that, even if the Judgment of 1962was,
for the above-mentioned reasons, not preclusive of the issue of the Ap-
plicants' legal right or interest, it did in essence determine that issue
because it decided that the Applicants were entitled to invoke the juris-
dictional clause of the Mandate, and that if they had a sufficientinterest
to do that, they must also have a sufficientinterest in the subject-matter
of their claiin. This view is not well-founded. The faculty of invoking
a jurisdictional clausedepends upon what tests or conditions of the right
to do so are laid down by the clause itself. To hold that the parties in
any given case belong to the category of State specifiedin the clause,-
that the dispute has the specified character,-and that the forum is the

one specified,-is not the same thing as finding the existence of a legal
right or interest relative to the merits of the claim. The jurisdictional
clause of the Mandate for South West Africa (Article 7, paragraph 2),
which appeared in al1 the mandates, reads as follows:

"The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should
anse between the Mandatory and another Member of the League
of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of

the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled
by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations."
Looking at this provision; assumingthe existenceof a dispute; assuming
that negotiations had taken place; that these had not settledthe dispute;
and that the Court was, by the operation of Article 37 of its Statute,

duly substituted for the Permanent Court as the competent forum
(al1 of which assumptions would be in accordance with the Court's
35 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (ARRÊT) 37
au sens de l'article 60. L'essentiel est qu'en aucun cas une décision
sur une exception préliminaire ne saurait empêcherl'examen d'une

question relevant du fond, que celle-ci ait étéen fait traitée ou non
propos de l'exception préliminaire. Lorsque dans une affaire le défen-
deur présente des exceptions préliminaires, la procédure sur le fond
est suspendueconformément à l'article 62, paragraphe 3, du Règlement.
Jusqu'à ce que cette procédure soit reprise, en cas de rejet des excep-
tions préliminaires,il ne peut avoir de décisionqui règledéfinitivement
ou préjugeune question de fond. Il se peut qu'un arrêtsur une excep-
tion préliminairetouche à un point de fond, mais cela n'est possible qu'à
titre provisoire et dans la mesure nécessairepour déciderla question
soulevéepar l'exception. Toute déclaration sur le point de fond consti-
tue donc simplement un motif de la décision sur l'exception et non
l'objet de celle-ci. Ce ne saurait êtreune décision définitivesur le point
de fond.

-
60. On soutient cependant que, même s'inl 'empêche paspour les mo-
tifs énoncésci-dessus l'examen de la question du droit ou intérêtju-
ridique des demandeurs, l'arrêtde 1962 a en substance tranché cette
question parce qu'il a décidé queles demandeurs étaient fondés à in-
voquer la clause juridictionnelle du Mandat et que, s'ils avaient un
intérêtsuffisant à le faire, ils avaient aussi nécessairement un intérêt
suffisant quantà l'objet de la demande. Cette opinion n'est pas fondée.
La faculté d'invoquer une clause juridictionnelle dépend des condi-
tions ou des critères auxquels cette clause subordonne le droit d'agir.
C'est une chose de dire que les partiesà une affaire donnée appartien-
nent à la catégoried'Etats mentionnés dans la clause, que le différend
a le caractère spécifiéet que le tribunal est celui qui a été indiqué;
c'est autre chose de constater l'existence d'un droit ou intérêt juridique
quant au fond de la demande. La clause juridictionnelle qui figure dans
leMandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain (article7, deuxièmealinéa)comme
dans tous les autres Mandats est ainsi conçue:

((Le hiazdataire accepte que tout différend,quel qu'il soit, qui
viendraità s'éleverentre lui et un autre Membre de la Sociétédes
Nations relatifà l'interprétation ouà l'application des dispositions
du Mandat, et qui ne soit pas susceptible d'êtreréglépar des négo-
ciations, soit soumisla Cour permanente de Justiceinternationale,
prévuepar l'article 14 du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations. ))

Si l'on considère cette clause et si l'on suppose qu'un différendexiste,
que des négociationsont eu lieu, qu'elles n'ont pas réglé le différentd
que, par le jeu de l'article7 du Statut, la Cour constitue la jurid'c-
tion compétente à la place de la Cour permanente, suppositions toutes
conformes à l'arrêt rendupar la Cour en 1962, on voit qu'il suffisait

35 38 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (JUDGMENT)

Judgment of 1962);-then al1 that the Applicants had to do in order
to bnng themselves under this clause and establish their capacity to
invoke it, was to show (a) ratione personae, that they were members
of the League, constructively if not actually, or must be deemed still
so to be for the purposes of this provision, notwithstandiiigthe dissolu-
tion of the League; and (b) ratione materiae, that the dispute did relate
to the interpretation or application of one or more provisions of the
Mandate. If the Court considered that these requirements were satisfied,
it could assume jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits without

going into the question of the Applicants' legal nght or interest relative
to the subject-matter of their claim; for the jurisdictional clause did
not, according to its terms, require them to establish the existence of
such a right or interest for the purpose of founding the competence
of the Court.
61. Hence, whatever observations the Court may have made on that
matter, it remained for theApplicants, on the merits, to establish that they
had this right or interest in the carrying out of the provisions which they
invoked, such as to entitle them to the pronouncements and declarations
they were seeking from the Court. Since decisions of an interlocutory
character cannot pre-judge questions of merits, there can be no contra-
diction between a decision allowing that the Applicants had the capacity
to invoke the jurisdictional clause-this being the only question which,
so far as this pointgoes, the Court was then called upon to decide, or
could decide,-and a decision that the Applicants have not established
the legal basis of their claim on the merits.

62. It is next contended that this particular jurisdictional clause has an
effect which is more extensive than if it is considered as a simple juris-
dictional clause: that it is a clause conferringa substantive right,-that
the substantive right it confers is precisely the right to claim from the
Mandatory the carrying out of the "conduct of the Mandate" provisions
of the instrument of mandate,-and that in consequence, evenif the right
is derivable from no other source, it is derivable from and implicit in
this clause.
63. Let it be observedfirst of al1that it would be remarkable ifthis were
the case,-that is to Sayif so important a right, having such potentially
far-reaching consequences,-intended, so the Applicants contend, to
play such an essential role in the scheme of the Mandate-of al1 the
mandates, and of the system generauy-had been created indirectly,

and in so casual and almost incidental a fashion, ,by an ordinary juris-
dictional clause, lacking as will shortly be seen in any of the special
features thatmight giveit the effectclaimed,-and which would certainly
be requisite inorder to achieve that effect. The Court considers it highly
unlikely that, given the far-reaching consequencesinvolved and, accord-
ing to the Applicants, intended, the framers of the mandates system, had
36aux demandeurs, pour pouvoir bénéficier dela clause et établir leur
aptitude àl'invoquer, de prouver a) rationepersonae, qu'ilsétaientMem-
bres de la Sociétédes Nations, sinon effectivement du moins par voie

d'interprétation, ou qu'ils devaient êtreconsidérés commel'étant en-
core aux fins de la clause malgréla dissolutionde la SociétédNations;
b) ratione materiae, que le différendétait relatàfl'interprétation ouà
l'application d'une ou plusieurs dispositions du Mandat. Si elle esti-
mait ces conditions satisfaites, la Cour pouvait, sans aborder laques-
tion du droit ou intérêt juridiquedes demandeurs quant à l'objet de
la demande, se déclarer compétente pour examiner et trancher le fond,
car, d'après ses termes, la clause juridictionnelle n'imposait pas aux
demandeurs de prouver l'existence de ce droit ou intérêt juridique en
vue d'établirla compétence de la Cour.

61. Il s'ensuit que, quelquesobservationsquela Cour ait pu faireàcet
égard, il restait aux demandeurs à établir au fond qu'ils avaient un

droit ou intérêt juridique quant à l'exécutiondes dispositions par eux
invoquées et qu'ilsétaient fondés à obtenir de la Cour les déclarations
par eux sollicitées.Les décisionsinterlocutoires ne pouvant préjuger
les questions de fond, il ne saurait y avoir d'opposition entre la dé-
cision admettant que les demandeurs avaient qualité pour invoquer la
clause juridictionnelle, seul point que la Cour était alors requise de ju-
ger ou pouvait juger, et la décisiond'aprèslaquelle les demandeursn'ont
pas établi la base juridique de leur demande au fond.

62. On soutient enfin que la clausejuridictionnelle du Mandat a une

portée plus grande que celled'une simpleclausejuridictionnelleet qu'elle
confèreun droit au fond, qui est précisément celuide réclamerdu Man-
dataire l'exécution desdispositions de l'acte de Mandat relatives à la
gestion; en conséquence,même à défautd'autre source, ce droit procé-
derait implicitement de la clause juridictionnelle.

63. Il convient tout d'abord de noter le caractère surprenant de cette
thèse, d'après laquelle un droit aussi important, pouvant avoir des con-
séquencesaussi étendues et destiné selon la thèse des demandeurs à
jouer un rôle aussi essentiel dans le cadre du Mandat, c'est-à-dire de
tous les Mandats et du systèmedes Mandats en général,aurait étéins-
titué indirectement et en somme presque incidemment par une clause

juridictionnelle de type courant totalement dépourvue, comme on le
verra plus loin, des élémentsparticuliers qui auraient pu lui conférer
l'effet prétendu et qui auraient certainement été nécessairesour le lui
conférer. La Cour considère comme tout à fait invraisemblable, étant
donné l'ampleur des conséquences éventuelles, conséquences voulues
36they had any such intention, would have chosen this particular type of
jurisdictional clause as the method of carrying it out.

64. In truth however, there is nothing about this particular jurisdic-
tional clause to differentiate it from many others, or to make it an excep-
tion to the rule that, in principle, jurisdictional clauses are adjectival not
substantivein their nature and effect. It is of course possible to introduce

into such a clause extra paragraphs or phrases specifically conveying
substantiverights or imposing substantiveobligations;but the particular
section of any clause which provides for recourse to ail indicated forum,
on the part of a specifiedcategory of litigant, in relation to a certain kind
of dispute-or those words in it which provide this-cannot simul-
taneously and per se invest the parties with the substantive rights the
existence of which is exactly what they will have to demonstrate in the
forum concerned, and which it is the whole object of the latter to de-
termine. It is a universal and necessary, but yet almost elementary
principle of procedural law that a distinction has to be made between,
on the one hand, the right to activate a court and the right of the court to
examine the merits of the claim,-and, on the other, the plaintiff party's
legal right in respect of the subject-matter of that which it claims, which
would have to be established to the satisfaction of the Court.
65. In the present case, that subject-matter includes the question
whether the Applicants possessanylegal right to require the performance
of the "conduct" provisions of the Mandate. This is something which
cannot be predetermined by the language of a cornmon-form juris-

dictional clause such as Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Mandate for
South West Africa. This provision, with slight differences of wording
and emphasis, is in the same form as that of many other jurisdictional
clauses. The Court can see nothing in it that would take the clause
outside the normal rule that, in a dispute causing the activation of a
jurisdictional clause, the substantiverights themselves which the dispute
is about, must be sought for elsewhere than in this clause, or in some
element apart from it,-and must therefore be established aliunde vel
aliter.Jurisdictional clauses do not determine whether parties have sub-
stantive rights, but only whether, if they have them, they can vindicate
them by recourse to a tribunal.
66. Such rights may be derived from participation in an international
instrument by a State which has signed and ratified, or has acceded,
or has in some other manner become a party to it; and which in con-
sequence, and subject to any exceptions expressly indicated, is entitled
to enjoy rights under al1 the provisions of the instrument concerned.
Since the Applicants cannot bring themselves under this head, they
must show that the "conduct" provisions of the mandates conferred

rights in terms on rnembers of the League as individual States, in the
same way that the "special interests" provisions did. It is however
contended that there is a third possibility, and that on the basis of the
jurisdictional clause alone, the Applicants, as members of the League,
were part of the institutional machinery of control relative to the man-
37 au dire des demandeurs, que les auteurs du système desMandats aient
choisi ce type de clause juridictionnelle pour donner effetà leur inten-
tion, à supposer qu'ils aient bien eu pareille intention.
64. En réalité, rien ne distinguela clausejuridictionnelle dont il s'agit

de nombreuses autres clauses juridictionnelles; rien n'en fait une ex-
ception à la règle d'après laquelle les clauses juridictionnelles sont en
principe, par leur nature et par leur effet, des dispositions de procédure
et non de fond. Certes, il est toujours possible d'y ajouter des alinéas
ou des membres de phrase créant expressément desdroits ou des obli-
gations quant au fond, mais la section ou les termes d'une clause qui
autorisent une catégorie donnéede parties à recourir à un tribunal dé-
terminéau sujet d'un certain type de différends nesauraient en même
temps conférerpar eux-mêmesaux parties les droits touchant au fond
dont celles-ci doivent précisémentétablirl'existence devant le tribunal
et que le tribunal a pour fonction mêmede déterminer. C'estun pin-
cipe universel, nécessaireet cependant presque élémentairedu droit de
la procédurequ'il faut distinguer entre, d'une part, le droit de saisir un
tribunal et le droit du tribunal de connaître du fond de la demande et,

d'autre part, le droit au regard de l'objet de la demande que le deman-
deur doit établirà la satisfaction du tribunal.

65. En l'espèce,l'objetdela demande estnotamment de savoir silesde-
mandeurs ont le droit de réclamer l'exécution des dispositionsdu Man-
dat relatives à la gestion. Cette question ne saurait avoir ététranchée
à l'avance par le texte d'une clausejuridictionnelle rédigésur un mode
aussi courant que le deuxième alinéade l'article 7 du Mandat pour le
Sud-Ouest africain. Cet article est conçu, à quelques nuances près
dans la rédaction et la présentation, sous la mêmeforme que nombre
d'autres clauses juridictionnelles. La Cour n'y trouve rien qui puisse
faire écarter la règle normale selon laquelle, lorsqu'un différendfait
jouer une clausejuridictionnelle, lesdroits touchant au fond sur lesquels
porte le différend doivent êtrerecherchés ailleurs que dans la clause

juridictionnelle et êtreétablis en dehors d'elle. La clause juridiction-
nelle ne détermine passi une partie a des droits de fond, mais seulement
si,à supposer qu'elleles ait, elle peut les faire valoir devant un tribunal.

66. Un Etat peut tirer de tels droits de sa participaàun instrument
international s'il l'asignéet ratifié, a adhéréou y est devenu partie
de toute autre manière et est fondéen conséquence, sauf exceptionex-
pressément formulée, à avoir des droits au regard de toutes les dispo-
sitions de cet instrument. Faute d'être dansce cas, les demandeurs doi-
vent montrer que, tout comme les dispositions relatives aux intérêts
particuliers, les dispositions des Mandats relatives à la gestion attri-
buaient expressémentdes droits aux Etats Membres de la Société des
Nations à titre individuel. On soutient cependant qu'il existeune troi-

sièmepossibilitéqui serait la suivante: sur la seule base de la clause
juridictionnelle, les demandeurs participaient, en tant que Membres
de la Sociétédes Nations, au mécanisme institutionnel de contrôle
37dates, and that in this capacity they had a right of action of the same
kind as,for instance, members of the League Councilhad under thejuris-
dictional clauses of the minorities treaties of that period, for the pro-
tection of minority rights. On this footing the essence of the contention
is that the Applicants do not need to show the existence of any substan-
tive rights outside the jurisdictional clause, and that they had-that
al1members of the League had-what was in effect a policing function
under the mandates and by virtue of thejurisdictional clause.

67. The Court has examined this contention, but does not think that
the two cases are in any way comparable. When States intend to create
a right of action of this kind they adopt a different method.Such a right

has, in special circumstances, been conferred on States belonging to
a body of compact size such as the Council of the League of Nations,
invested with special supervisory functions and even a power of inter-
vention in the matter, as provided by the jurisdictional clause of the
minorities treaties-see for instance Article 12 of the minorities treaty
with Poland, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919, which was typical.
Even so the right, as exercisable by members of the League Council,
in effectaspart ofthe Council'swork, with whichthey would ex lzypothesi
have been fully familiar, was characterized at the time by an eminent
Judge and former President of the Permanent Court as being "in every
respect very particular in character" and as going "beyond the province
of general international law". The intention to confer it must be quite
clear; and the Court holds that for the reasons which have already been
given,and for others to be considered later, there was never any intention
to confer an invigilatory function of this kind on each and everymember
of the League.
68. It has to be asked why,if anything ofthe sort wasthought necessary
in the case of the mandates, it was notdone in the same way as under the

minorities clauses (which, in general, were drafted contemporaneously
by the sameauthors)-namely by conferring a right of action on members
of the League Council as such, seeingthat it was the Council which had
the supervisory function under the mandates? This would have been
the obvious, and indeed the only workable method of procedure. Alter-
natively, it must be asked why, if it was indeed thought necessary in the
case of mandates to invest al1 the members of the League with this
function, forthe protection of the mandates, it was apparently considered
sufficient in the minorities case to bring in only the members of the
LeagueCouncil?
69. The Court finds itselfunable to reconcile the two types of case ex-
cept upon the assumption, strongly supported by every other factor in-
volved, that, as regards the mandates, the jurisdictional clause was in-
tended to servea differentpurpose, namelyto givethe individual members
of the League the means, which might not otherwise be available to
them through League channels, of protecting their "special interests"
relative to the mandated territories. In the minorities case, the right
of action of the members of the Council under the jurisdictional clause

38.sur les Mandats et avaient en cette qualitéun droit d'action semblable,
par exemple, à celui que les clauses juridictionnelles des traités de mi-
norités en vigueur à l'époquedonnaient aux membres du Conseil pour
la protection des droits des minorités. Cet argument revient essentielle-
ment àdire que les demandeurs n'ont pas à prouver l'existence de droits
au fond en dehors de la clause juridictionnelle et qu'ils avaient, comme
tous les Membres de la Société desNations, ce qui constituait en réa-
litéune fonction de police à exercer dans le cadre des Mandats et en
vertu de la clause juridictionnelle.
67. La Cour estime, aprèsavoir examinécetargument, que lesdeux cas
ne sont nullement comparables. Lorsque des Etats veulent créer un

droit d'action de ce genre, ils adoptent une méthode différente. Il est
arrivé que, dans des circonstances particulières, un tel droit ait été at-
tribué à des Etats appartenant à un organisme de dimension restreinte
comme le Conseil dela Société desNations, lequel étaitdotéde pouvoirs
de surveillance spéciauxet mêmed'un pouvoir d'intervention aux termes
de la clause juridictionnelle des traités de minorités voir par exemple
l'article 12 du traité de minorités conclu avec la Pologne et signé à
Versailles le 28 juin 1919, qui était caractéristique. Mêmedans ce cas,
un juge éminent, ancien président de la Cour permanente, a pu dire
que ce droit, qui pouvait en fait êtreexercépar les membres du Conseil
comme un élémentde l'action de celui-ci, à laquelle ils étaient par

définition pleinement associés, avait «à tous égards un caractère très
particulier et exorbitant du droit internationagénéral ».L'intention de
le conférer doit être parfaitement claire et la Cour estime que, pour
les motifs déjà donnés et pour d'autres motifs qu'elle examinera plus
loin, on n'a jamais eu l'intention de conférer une fonction de contrôle
de ce genre à chaque Membre de la Sociétédes Nations.
68. Siquelque chose decet ordre a étéconsidérécommn eécessairedans
le cas des Mandats, pourquoi n'a-t-on pas alors procédé commepour
les clauses relatives aux minorités, qui ont étéen général rédigéee sn
mêmetemps et par les mêmesauteurs?Autrement dit, pourquoi n'a-t-on

pas conféréde droit d'action aux membres du Conseil en tant que tels,
puisque c'est le Conseil qui exerçait la fonction de surveillance dans le
cadre des Mandats? Cette méthode aurait dû s'imposer et en vérité
c'étaitla seule qui pût fonctionner. Inversement, si, pour la protection
des Mandats, on a effectivementjugé nécessaired'attribuer cettefonction
à tous les Membres de la Société desNations, pourquoi a-t-on paru
considérer, dans le cas des minorités, qu'il suffisait de faire uniquement
intervenir les membres du Conseil?
69. La Cour ne parvientà concilier lesdeux cas qu'en partant del'hypo-
thèse, nettement confirmée par tous les autres facteurs en jeu, qu'en
ce qui concerne les Mandats la clause juridictionnelle avait un autre

but, qui était de donner aux Membres de la Société desNations le
moyen, qu'autrement les rouages de l'organisation ne leur auraient
peut-être pas fourni, de protéger leurs intérêts particuliers relatifs aux
territoires sous Mandat. Dans le cas des minorités, le droit d'action
des membres du Conseil en vertu de la clause juridictionnelle ne visait
38 was only intended for the protection of minority populations. No other
purpose in conferring a right of action on members of the League
Council would have been possible in that case. This was not so in regard
to the mandates, the provisions of which afforded another and perfectly
natural explanation of the jurisdictional~clause and of its purpose;
whereas, if a policing function had been intended, it is obviously to the
members of the Council that it would have been given, and in the same
sort of terms as in the minorities case.
70. In this last connection it is of capital importance that the right as

conferredin the minorities case wassubjected to certain characterizations
which were wholly absent in the case of the jurisdictional clause of the
mandates. Any "difference of opinion" was characterized in advance
as being justiciable, because it was to be "held to be a dispute of an
international character" withinthemeaning ofArticle 14of the Covenant
(this was the well-known "deeming" clause), so that no question of any
lack of legal right or interest could arise. The decisions of the Court
were moreover, to be final and, by means of a reference to Article 13
of the Covenant, were given an effect erga omnes as a general judicial
settlement binding on al1 concerned. The jurisdictional clause of the
mandates on the other hand, was essentially an ordinary jurisdictional
clause, having none of the special characteristics or effects of those of
the minorities treaties.

71. That the League Councilhad functionsin respect of mandates,just
as it did in respect of minorities,can only serve to underline the fact
that in the former case no right of recourse to the Court was conferred

on the members of the Council in their capacity as such, although the
mandates were drafted in full knowledge of what the minorities treaties
contained. The true significance of the minorities case is that it shows
that those who framed the mandates were perfectly capable of doing
what the Applicants claim was done, when they intended to. The
conclusionmust be that in the case ofthe mandates they did not intend to.

72. Sincethe course adopted in the minorities case does not constitute
any parallel to that of the mandates, the Applicants' contention is seen
to depend in the last analysis almost entirely on what has been called
the broad and unambiguouslanguage of the jurisdictional clause-or in
other words its literalmeaning taken in isolation and without reference to
any otherconsideration.Thecombination ofcertainphrases in this clause,
namely the reference to "any dispute whatever", coupled with the further

words "between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of
Nations" and thephrase "relating ..to theprovisions of the Mandate", is
said to permit of a referenceto the Court ofa dispute about any provision
ofthe Mandate, and thus to imply,reflector bear witness to the existence
of a legal right or interest for every member of the League in the due
execution of every such provision. The Court does not however consider
39 que la protection des populations minoritaires. L'attribution d'un droit
d'action aux membres du Conseil n'aurait pu avoir aucun autre but en
l'occurrence. Il n'en allait pas de mêmepour les Mandats dont les dis-

positioris justifiaient autrement et d'une manière parfaitement naturelle
l'existence et l'objet de la clause juridictionnelle; si l'on avait songé
une fonction de police, c'est évidemment aux membres du Conseil
qu'on l'aurait confiéeet selon le même genrede formule que lorsqu'il
s'était agi desminorités.
70. Sur ce dernier point, il est essentiel de noter que le droit octroyé
dans le cas des minorités était assortide certaines limitations qui étaient
totalement absentes des clauses juridictionnelles des Mandats. On
admettait d'avance que toute ((divergence d'opinion)) pouvait faire
l'objet d'un recours en justice puisqu'on devait l'assimiler à un «dif-
férendayant un caractère international » au sens de l'article 14 du Pacte

- la clause bien connue de l'assimilation - de sorte que la question
de l'existence d'un droit ou intérêt juridique ile pouvait pas se poser.
Au surplus, les décisionsde la Cour devaient êtredéfinitiveset, par le
jeu d'un renvoi à l'article 13du Pacte, elles produisaient effet erga omnes
et constituaient ainsi un règlement judiciaire général s'imposant à
tous les intéressés. En revanche,la clause juridictionnelle des Mandats
était essentiellement une clause juridictionnelle de type courant, sans
aucun des caractères ou des effets particuliers de la clause qui figurait
dans les traités de minorités.
71. Le faitque le Conseil exerçait des fonctions taàtl'égard desMan-
dats qu'à l'égard desminoritésne peut que souligner que, dans lepremier

cas, le droit de saisir la Cour n'a pas étéattribuéaux membres du Conseil
en tant que tels, bien que les Mandats aient étérédigés à un moment
où l'on connaissait très bien le contenu des traités de minorités. Le cas
des minorités prouve véritablement que les auteurs des Mandats sa-
vaient parfaitement comment faire, quand ils le voulaient, ce que les
demandeurs prétendent avoir étéfait. On doit conclure que, s'agissant
des Mandats, ils n'ont pas eu pareille intention.

72. Les méthodes suivies dans le cas des minorités et dans celui des

Mandats n'étant donc pas comparables, on voit que la thèse des deman-
deurs repose entièrementen dernière analysesurle libellédela clausejuri-
dictionnelle, que l'on a qualifiéde large et sans équivoque, autrement
dit sur son sens littéral envisagé isolément et endehors de toute autre
considération. On dit que la juxtaposition de certains membres de
phrase: ((tout différend, quel qu'il soit)), ((entre lui [le Mandataire]
et un autre Membre de la Société desNations » et ((relatif [... aux ...]
dispositions du Mandat,)), permet de soumettre à la Cour un différend
concernant n'importe laquelle des dispositions du Mandat et qu'elle
implique, traduit ou atteste l'existence d'un droit ou intérêt juridique
de chaque Membre de la Société desNations au regard de la bonne

exécution de toute disposition du Mandat. La Cour ne considère pas
39 that the word "whatever" in Article 7, paragraph 2, does anything more
than lend emphasis to a phrase that would have meant exactly the same
without it; or that the phrase "any dispute" (whatever) means anything
intrinsically different from "a dispute"; or that the reference to the
"provisions" of the Mandate, in the plural, has any different effect
from what would have resulted from saying "a provision". Thus reduced
to its basic meaning, it can be seen that the clause is not capable of

carrying the load the Applicants seek to put upon it, and which would
result in giving such clauses an effect that States accepting the Court's
jurisdiction by reason of them, could never supposethem to have.

73. In this connection theCourt thinks it desirable to draw attention to
the fact that a considerable proportion of the acceptances of its com-
pulsoryjurisdiction whichhave been given under paragraph 2 of Article
36 of the Statute of the Court, are couched in language similarly broad
and unambiguous and even wider, covering al1 disputes between the
accepting State and any other State (and thus "any dispute whateverM)-
subject only to the one condition of reciprocity or, in some cases, to
certain additional conditions such as that the dispute must have arisen
after a specified date. It could never be supposed however that on the
basis of this wide language the accepting State, by invoking this clause,
was absolved from establishing a legal right or interest in the subject-
matter of its claim. Otherwise, the conclusion would have to be that
by accepting the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court in the widest terms
possible, States could additionally create a legal right or interest for

themselves in the subject-matter of any claim they chose to bring, and
a corresponding answerability on the part of the other accepting State
concerned. The underlying proposition that by conferring competence
on the Court, a jurisdictional clause can thereby and of itself confer a
substantive right, is one which the Court must decline to entertain.

74. TheCourt must now, though only as a digression, glanceat another
aspect of the matter. The present Judgment is based on the viewthat the
question of what rights, as separate members of the League, the Appli-
cants had in relation to the performance of the Mandate, is a question
appertaining to the merits of their claim. It has however been suggested
that the question is really one of the admissibility of the claim, and
that as such it was disposed of by the Court's 1962Judgment.

75. In the "dispositif" of the 1962Judgment, however, the Court, after
considering the four preliminary objections advanced-which were
objections to the competence of the Court-simply found that it had
"jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits". It thus appears that the
Court in 1962 did not think that any question of the admissibility of
40 cependant que les mots ((quelqu'il soit ))aient d'autre effet au deuxième
alinéade l'article 7 que de souligner une expression qui sans eux aurait
exactement le mêmesens, que les termes «tout différend ))(quel qu'il
soit) aient intrinsèquement une autre signification que un dzjiérend,
ni que la mention des ((dispositions ))du Mandat au pluriel introduise
une autre idéeque si l'on avait dit une disposition. Si on la réduitainsi
à sa signification essentielle, on voit que la clause ne saurait avoir la
portée que les demandeurs prétendent lui attribuer et qui aurait pour
résultat de faire produire aux dispositions du même genreun effet que

les Etats acceptant la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour à raison de ces
dispositions ne songeraient jamais à leur imputer.
73. Acetégard,la Cour estimeopportuc designalerque denombreuses
déclarations d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire faites en vertu
de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut sont rédigées entermes aussi
larges et aussi peu équivoques, voireplus généraux,et s'appliquent à
tous les différendsentre 1'Etat auteur de la déclaration et tout autre
Etat et ainsià (ctout différend, quel qu'il soi»,sous la seule condition
de la réciprocité ou,dans quelques cas, sous certaines conditions sup-

plémentaires, l'une d'ellesétant par exemple que le différendsoit né
après unedate spécifiéeO . n ne saurait cependant supposer que, en raison
de la vaste portéedes termes utilisés,1'Etatauteur de la déclaration soit
dispensé,quand il invoque cette clause, d'établir l'existenced'un droit
ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de l'objet de sa demande. S'il en allait
autrement, il faudrait en conclure que, en acceptant lajuridiction obliga-
toire de la Cour dans les termes les plus larges, les Etats pourraient
créer à leur profit un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de l'objet de
toutedemandequ'ils décideraientdeporter devantlaCour, avecl'obligation
réciproque que cela comporterait de la part des autres Etats intéressés

ayant fait une déclaration. La Cour ne saurait admettre la proposition
que ce raisonnement sous-entend et d'après laquelleune clause juri-
dictionnelle attributive de compétence pourrait conférer enelle-même
un droit quant au fond.

74. La Cour doit maintenant envisager, mais de manière purement
incidente, un autre aspect du problème. Le présentarrêtse fonde sur

la conception selon laquelle la question des droits que les demandeurs
avaient individuellement en tant que Membres de la Société des Nations
au regard de l'exécutiondu Mandat est une question de fond. On dit
néanmoins que cette question concerne à proprement parler la receva-
bilitéde la demande et que, à ce titre, elle a étérégldans l'arrêtrendu
par la Cour en 1962.
75. Or, dans le dispositif de son arrêt de1962,la Cour a simplement
dit, après avoir examinéles quatre exceptions préliminairesqui avaient
étésoulevéeset qui concernaient sa juridiction, qu'elle était «compé-
tente pour statuer sur le fond ». La Cour n'a donc pas considéréen

1962 qu'elle avait à trancher une question concernant la recevabilité the claim, as distinct from that of its own jurisdiction arose, or that
the Respondent had put forward any plea of inadmissibility as such:
nor had it,-for in arguing that the dispute was not of the kind contem-
plated by the jurisdictional clause of the Mandate, the purpose of the
Respondent was to show that the case was not covered by that clause,
andthat it did not in consequencefa11within the scope of the competence
conferred on the Court by that provision.
76. If therefore any question of admissibility were involved, it would
fa11to be decided now, as occurred in the merits phase of the Nottebohm
case (I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4); and al1that the Court need Sayis that

if this were so, it would determine the question in exactly theame way,
and for the same reasons, as in the present Judgment. In other words,
looking at the matter from the point of view of the capacity of the
Applicants to advance their present claim, the Court would hold that
they had not got such capacity, and hence that the claim iwas inad-
missible.

77. Resuming the main thread of its reasoning, the Court will now
refer to a supplementary element that furnishes indications in opposition
to the interpretation of the jurisdictional clause advanced by theAppli-
cants. This contra-indication is afforded by the genesis of the juris-
dictional clause appearing in al1 the instruments of mandate. The
original drafts contained no jurisdictional clause. Such a clause was
first introduced in connection with the'B'mandates by one ofthe States
participating in the drafting, and concurrently with proposals made by
that same State for a number of detailed provisions about commercial
and other "special interests" rights (including missionary rights) for

member States of the League. It was little discussed but, so far as it is
possible to judge from what is only a sumrnary record, what discussion
there was centred mainly onthe commercial aspects of the mandates and
the possibility of disputes arising in that regard over the interests of
nationals of members of the League. This appears very clearly from the
statements summarized on pages 348, 349 and 350 of Part VI A of the
Recueil des Actes of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1920,if these
statements are read as a whole. No corresponding clear connection
emerges between the clause and possible disputes between mandatories
and individual members of the League over the conduct of the mandates
as mandates. That such disputes could arise does not seem to have been
envisaged. In the same way, the original drafts of the 'C' mandates
which, in a different form, contained broadly al1 that now appears in
the first four articles of the Mandate for South West Africa, had no
jurisdictional clauseand no "missionary clause" either. The one appeared
when the other did.

78. The inference to be drawn from this drafting history is confirmed
by the very fact thatthe question of aight of recourse to the Court arose de la demande, distincte de la question de sa propre compétence, ou
que le défendeur avait formulé une exception d'irrecevabilité en tant

que telle; le défendeurne l'a d'ailleurs pas fait, car, en soutenant que
le différendn'était pasde ceux que prévoyait la clause juridictionnelle
du Mandat, il avait pour but de montrer que l'affaire ne relevait pas de
la clause et n'entrait donc pas dans le domaine de compétence que la
clause a attribué à la Cour.
76. Sipar conséquentune question de recevabilitéseposait, c'estmain-
tenant qu'il faudrait la trancher, comme cela s'est produit dans l'affaire
Nottebohm à la phase du fond (C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 4); la Cour se
bornera à dire qu'en pareil cas elle trancherait la question exactement
de la mêmemanière et pour les mêmesmotifs que dans le présentarrêt.
En d'autres termes, si elle envisageait le problème du point de vue
de l'aptitude des demandeurs à présenter la demande, la Cour dirait
qu'ils n'ont pas cette aptitude et que la demande est par conséquent
irrecevable.

77. Pour reprendre la ligne principale de son raisonnement, la Cour
examinera maintenant une autre objection qui peut être opposée à
l'interprétation de la clause juridictionnelle donnée par les demandeurs.
Cette objection a trait à la genèse de la clause juridictionnelle qui se
retrouve dans tous les actes de Mandat. Les premiers projets ne con-
tenaient pas de clause juridictionnelle. Cette clause a étéintroduite au
sujet des Mandats B par I'un des Etats participant aux travaux de
rédaction, lequel a proposé en mêmetemps un certain nombre de dis-
positions détailléesreconnaissant aux Etats Membres de la Société
des Nations des droits relatifs à des intérêts commerciaux etautres
intérêts particuliers et concernant notamment les missionnaires. La

discussion a étébrève mais, pour autant qu'on puisse en juger d'après
des comptes rendus sommaires, elle a essentiellement porté sur les
problèmes d'ordre commercial soulevéspar les Mandats et sur l'éven-
tualité de différendsrelatifs aux intérêtsdes ressortissants des Etats
Membres en la matière. Cela ressort très clairement, si on les lit dans
leur ensemble, des déclarations résuméesaux pages 348, 349 et 350 de
la partie VI A du Recueildes actes de la conférencede la paix de Paris
de 1919-1920.En revanche, on ne voit nettement apparaître aucun lien
de corrélation entre la clause et les différendsopposant éventuellement
les Mandataires aux Membres de la Société desNations au sujet de la
gestion des Mandats en tant que tels. Que pareils différends puissent
survenir, cela ne semble pas avoir étéenvisagé.De même,les premiers
projets de Mandat C, qui, sous une forme différente,contenaient en
général toutesles dispositions constituant actuellement les quatre pre-

miers articles du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, ne comportaient
ni clause juridictionnelle ni disposition relative aux missionnaires.
L'une est apparue en mêmetemps que l'autre.
78. La déduction àtirer des travaux de rédaction est confirméepar le
fait que la question du droit de saisir la Cour ne s'est posée qu'austade only at the stage of the drafting of the instruments of mandate, and that
as already mentioned, no such right figured among the "securities"
for theperformance of the sacred trust embodied in the LeagueCovenant.
79. After going through various stages,the jurisdictional clause finally
appeared in the same form in all the mandates, except that in the case
of the Mandate for Tanganyika (as it then was) a drafting caprice
caused the retention of an additional paragraph which did not appear,
or had been dropped in al1the other cases. Once the principle of a juris-
dictional clause had been accepted, the clause was then introduced as

a matter of course into all the mandates. This furnishes the answer
to the contention that, in the case of theC'mandates, it must have been
intended to relate to something more than the single "missionary clause"
(Article5 in the Mandate for South West Africa). Also, it must not
be forgotten that it was simultaneously with the missionary clause
that the jurisdictional clause was introduced; and that at the timemuch
importance was attached to missionary rights. In any event, whatever
the purpose of the jurisdictional clause, it was the same for all the
mandates, and for the three categories of mandate. It is in the light
of the mandates system generally that this purpose must be assessed,
-and, so considered, the purpose is clear.

80. The Court willnow consider a final contention which has been ad-
vanced in support of the Applicants' claim of right, namely the so-called
"necessity" argument.
81. In order todo this, and at the risk of someunavoidablerepetition, it

isnecessaryto reviewa little more closelythe functioning of the mandates
system. This system, within the larger setting of the League, was an
entirely logical one. Thevarious mandatories did not deal with the indi-
vidual members of the League over the "conduct" provisions of their
mandates, but with the appropriate League organs. If any difficulty
should arise over the interpretation of any mandate, or the character
of the mandatory's obligations, which could not be cleared up by dis-
cussion or reference to an ad lzoc committee of jurists-a frequent
practice in the League-the Council could in the last resort request the
Permanent Court for an advisory opinion. Such an opinion would not
of course be binding on the mandatory-it was not intended that it
should be-but it would assistthe work of the Council.
82. In the Council, which the mandatory was entitled to attend as a
member for the purposes of any mandate entrusted to it, if not otherwise
a member-(Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant), the vote of the
mandatory, if present at the meeting, was necessary for any actual
"decision" of the Council, since unanimity of those attending was the

basic voting rule on matters of substance in the main League organs-
(Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant). Thus there could never be
any formal clash between the mandatory and the Council as such.
In practice, the unanimity rule was frequently not insisted upon, or itsde la rédaction des actes de Mandat et que, comme on l'a déjà signalé,
ce droit ne figurait pas parmi les (garanties »incorporées dans le Pacte
pour l'accomplissement de la mission sacrée de civilisation.
79. Après diverses modifications, la clause juridictionnelle a fini par
prendre la mêmeforme dans tous les Mandats, sauf le Mandat sur le
Tanganyika - tel était alors le nom de ce pays - où, par suite d'une
anomalie, on a maintenu un alinéa supplémentairequi ne figurait pas
dans les autres Mandats ou en avait été rayéU . ne fois admis son prin-
cipe, la clause juridictionnelle a ététout naturellement inséréedans
chacun des Mandats. Cela réfute la thèse d'après laquelle on a voulu

donner à la clause juridictionnelle des Mandats C un champ d'applica-
tion plus vaste que la seule disposition relative aux missionnaires (Man-
dat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, article 5). Il convient aussi de ne pas
perdre de vue que la clause juridictionnelle et la disposition relative
aux missionnaires ont étéintroduitesen même temps et quel'on attachait
à l'époque une grande importance aux droits des missionnaires. En
tout cas, quel qu'il fût, le but de la clausejuridictionnelle était lemême
pour tous les Mandats et pour les trois catégories de Mandat. C'est
en fonction du système des Mandats en général qu'ilfaut apprécier
ce but; dans cette perspective, il est clair.

80. La Cour traitera enfin d'un dernier argument avancé à l'appui du
droit que revendiquent les demandeurs, l'argument dit de la nécessité.

81. A cette fin,il convient, au risque d'inévitablesrépétitions,d'exami-
ner d'un peu plus près le fonctionnement du système des Mandats. Ce
systèmeétait, dans le cadre plus large dela SociétédesNations, parfaite-
ment cohérent. En ce qui concernait les dispositions relativesàla gestion
de leurs Mandats, les Mandataires n'avaient pas affaire aux Membres
de la Société desNations à titre individuel mais aux organes compétents
de la Société.Si des difficultés survenaient au sujet de l'interprétation

d'un Mandat ou de la nature des obligations d'un Mandataire et que
ces difficultés ne puissent êtrerégléespar des discussions ou par un
renvoi à un comité ad hoc de juristes, procédure courante à la Société
desNations, le Conseil pouvait en dernier ressort demander à la Cour un
avis consultatif. L'avis ne lierait évidemment pas le Mandataire - tel
n'étaitpas le but recherché-mais assisterait le Conseil dans sestravaux.
82. Au sein du Conseil, où, s'il n'enétait pasdéjà membre,un Manda-
taire avait le droitde siégerpour toutes les affaires concernant un Mandat
dont il était chargé(Pacte, article4, paragraphe 5), sa voix étaitnéces-
saire, lorsqu'il était présent, pour que le Conseil puisse prendre une
véritable décisio puisque la règle de vote essentielle des organes prin-

cipaux de la Société desNations s'agissant de questions importantes
étaitla règle de l'unanimité des présents (Pacte,article5, paragraphe 1).
Il ne pouvait donc y avoir d'opposition formelle entre le Mandataire
et le Conseil en tant que tel. En pratique, il était fréquent que l'on
42impact was mitigated by a process of give-and-take, and by various
procedural devices to which both the Council and the mandatories lent
themselves. So far as the Court's information goes, there never occurred
any case in which a mandatory "vetoed" what would otherwise have
been a Council decision. Equally, however, much trouble was taken
to avoid situations in which the mandatory would have been forced
to acquiesce in the views of the rest of the Council short of casting an

adverse vote. The occasional deliberate absence of the mandatory
from a meeting, enabled decisions to be taken that the mandatory might
have felt obliged to vote against if it had been present. This was part
of the above-mentioned process for arriving at generally acceptable
conclusions.
83. Such were the methods,broadly speaking, adopted in the relations
between the various mandatories and the League over the conduct of the
mandates, and it can be seen how out of place in the context would
have been the existence of substantive rights for individual members
of the League in the conduct of the mandates (particularly if backed up
by a right of recourse to the Court) exercisable independently of the
Council at the will of the member State. On the other hand-and here
again the concept was entirely logical-by the combined effect of the
"special interests" provisions and the jurisdictional clause-(the latter
alone could not have sufficed)-a right of recourse was given to the
individual League members in respect of such interests, since the League
Council could not be expected to act in defence of a purely national,
not "League", interest.

84. Under this system,viewedas a whole, the pcssibility of any serious
complication was remote; nor did any arise. That possibility would have
been introduced only if the individual members of the League had
been held to have the rights the Applicants now contend for. In actual
fact, in the 27 years of the League, all questions were, by one means or
another, resolved in the Council; no request was made to the Court for
an advisory opinion; so far as is known, no member of the League
attempted to settle direct with the mandatory any question that did not
affect its own interests as a State orhose of its nationals, and no cases
were referred to the Permanent Court under the adjudication clause
except the various phases of one single case (that of the kfavrommatis
Concessions)coming under the head of "special interests". These facts
may not be conclusive in themselves; but they have a significance which
the Court cannot overlook, as suggesting that any divergences of view
concerning the conduct of a mandate were regarded as being matters
that had their place in the political field, the settlement of which lay

between the mandatory and the competent organs of the League,-not
between the mandatory and individual members of the Laague.n'insiste pas sur la règlede l'unanimitéou que l'on en atténueles effets
au moyen de compromis et d'artifices de procédureauxquels le Conseil

et le Mandataire se prêtaient. A la connaissance de la Cour, aucun
Mandataire n'a jamais opposé son veto à une décision éventuelledu
Conseil. On a par ailleurs pris grand soin d'éviterde mettre les Manda-
taires dans l'obligation d'avoirà choisir entre l'adoption du point de
vue des autres membres du Conseil etun votecontraire. En s'abstenant
volontairement de siéger à telle ou telle séance,le Mandataire permet-
tait au Conseil de prendre des décisionscontre lesquelles il aurait cru
devoir voter s'il avait étéprésent. Cela faisait partie des moyens
d'aboutir àdes conclusions généralement acceptablesq , ui viennent d'être
mentionnés.
83. Telles étaient d'unemanière générale lem s éthodes adoptéesen ce
qui concernait les relations entre les Mandataires et la Sociétédes
Nations s'agissant de la gestion des Mandats; on voit combien étran-
gère au contexte aurait été l'existencede droits de fond touchant à la

gestion des Mandats, que les Membres de la Société desNations au-
raient pu exercer à leur gréet à titre individuel, indépendamment du
Conseil, surtout si ces droits avaient été assortisdu droit de saisir la
Cour. En revanche - et cela aussi étaittoutà fait logiqu- par l'effet
combiné des dispositions relativesaux intérêts particulierset de la clause
juridictionnelle, qui n'aurait pas suffi elle seule, les Membres de la
Société desNations avaient un droit propre de saisir la Cour d'affaires
visant lesdits intérêtsc,ar on ne pouvait attendre du Conseil qu'il prenne
la défense d'intérêts puremen ntationaux ne concernant pas la Société
des Nations.
84. Envisagédans son ensemble, ce systèmetendait à écartertoute pos-
sibilitéde complications sérieuseset il ne s'en est d'ailleurs pas produit.

11aurait pu y en avoir uniquement si 1'011avait considéréque les Mem-
bres de la Société desNations possédaient à titre individuel les droits
auxquels prétendent aujourd'hui les demandeurs. En fait, durant les
vingt-sept années d'existencede la Sociétédes Nations, le Conseil a
résolu d'unemanière ou d'une autre toutes les questions qui se sont
posées; la Cour n'a reçu aucune demande d'avis consultatif; autant
qu'on le sache, aucun Membre de la Société desNations n'a essayé
de régler directement avecun Mandataire une question n'affectant ni
ses propres intérêtsen tant quYEtatni ceux de ses ressortissants; et la
Cour permanente ne s'est vu soumettre en vertu de la clause juridic-
tionnelle qu'une seule affaire relativedes intérêtsparticuliersà savoir
l'affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en ses diverses phases. Sans
doute ces faits ne sont-ils pas déterminants par eux-mêmes,mais la
Cour ne peut manquer d'y voir l'indication que l'on considérait les

différends relatifs la gestion d'un Mandat comme relevant de l'ordre
politique et comme devant êtreréglés entre le Mandataire et les organes
compétents de la Société desNations et non entre le Mandataire et
les Etats Membres à titre individuel. 85. Such then is the background against which the "necessity" argu-
ment has to be viewed. The gist of the argument is that since the Council
had no means of imposing its views on the mandatory, and since no
advisory opinion it might obtain from the Court would be binding on
the latter, themandate could have been flouted at will. Hence, so the
contention goes, it was essential, as an ultimate safeguard or security
for the performance of the sacred trust, that each member of the League
should be deemed to have a legal right or interest in that matter and, in
the last resort, be able to take direct action relative to it.
86. It is evident on the face of it how misconceived such an argument
must be in the context of a system which was expressly designed to
include al1those elements which, according to the "necessity" argument,

it was essential to guard or provide securities against. The Court will
leave on one side the obvious improbability that had the framers of the
mandates system really intended that it should be possible in the last
resort to impose a given course or policy on a mandatory, in the perfor-
mance of the sacred trust, they would have left this to the haphazard
and uncertain action of the individual members of the League, when
other much more immediate and effective methods were to hand-
for instance, by providing that mandatories should not be members
of the Council for mandates purposes, though entitled to attend, or
should not be entitled to exercise a vote on mandates questions; or
again by investing members of the Council itself with a right of action
before the Court, as in the minorities case. The plain fact is that, in
relation to the "conduct" provisions of the mandates, it was never the
intention that the Council should be able to impose its views on the
various mandatories-the system adopted was one which deliberately
rendered this impossible. It was never intended that the views of the

Court should be ascertained in a manner binding on mandatories, or
that mandatories should be answerable to individual League members
as such in respect of the "conduct" provisions of the mandates. It is
scarcely likely that a system which, of set purpose, created a position
such that, if a mandatory made use of its veto, it would thereby block
what would othenvise be a decision of the Council, should simultaneously
invest individual members of the League with, in effect, a legal right of
complaint if this veto, to which the mandatory was entitled, was made
use of. In this situation there was nothing at al1unusual. In the inter-
national field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last resort
be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception,-and this was even more the case in 1920 than today.

87. As regards the possibility that a mandatory might be acting con-
trary not only to the views of the rest of the Council but to the mandate
itself, the risk of this was evidentlyen with open eyes; andthat the risk

was remote, the event proved. Acceptance of the Applicants' contention
on the other hand, would involve acceptance of the proposition that
even if the Council of the League should be perfectly satisfied with the
way in which a mandatory was carrying out its mandate, any individual 85. C'est dans cette perspective qu'il faut considérer l'argument de la

nécessité,argument qui consiste essentiellement en ceci: puisque le
Conseil n'avait aucun moyen d'imposer sonpoint de vue au Mandataire
et qu'un avis consultatif de la Cour n'aurait pu être obligatoirepour
ce dernier, le Mandat aurait pu êtretournéà volonté; il.était par suite
essentiel, titre d'ultime sauvegarde ou garantie pour l'accomplissement
de la mission sacrée de civilisation,que chaque Membre de la Société
des Nations se voie reconnaître un droit ou intérêt juridiqueen la ma-
tière et puisse en dernier ressort agir directementcet égard.
86. On voit d'emblée combienl'argument de la nécessitest mal fondé,
dans le contexte d'un systèmevisant expressément à englober tous les
élémentscontre lesquels, dans la logique mêmede l'argument, il était
essentiel de se prémunir ou de se garantir. La Cour ne tiendra pas
compte du fait évidentque, au cas où les auteurs du systèmedes Man-

dats auraient réellementvoulu que l'on puisse en dernier ressort im-
poser à un Mandataire, dans l'accomplissement de la mission sacrée
de civilisation, une ligne de conduite ou une politique déterminée,
ils ne s'en seraient pas remisl'action aléatoireet incertaine des Mem-
bres de la Société desNations à titre individuel, alors que s'offraient
des méthodes beaucoup plus immédiateset efficaces: on aurait pu pré-
voir par exemple que les Mandataires ne seraient pas membres du
Conseil aux fins des affaires de Mandats, même s'ilsétaient autorisés
à assister aux séances,ou qu'ils ne seraient pas admisà voter sur les
questions touchant aux Mandats ou encore que les membres du Conseil
auraient le droit de saisir la Cour, comme dans le cas des minorités.
En fait, l'intention n'a jamais été que leConseil puisse imposer son
point de vue aux Mandataires au sujet des dispositions des Mandats

relativesà la gestion; cela, le système adopté l'empêchaità dessein.
L'intention n'a jamais étéd'obtenir de la Cour des prononcés liant les
Mandataires ni de rendre les Mandataires responsables devant les
Membres de la Sociétédes Nations à titre individuel au regard des
dispositions relatives la gestion des Mandats. Il est peu vraisemblable,
alors qu'on a donné de propos délibéré aux Mandataires le pouvoir
d'empêcherpar leur veto le Conseil de prendre une décision, qu'on
ait en mêmetemps attribué aux Membres de la Société desNations
à titre individuel le droit d'agir enjustice au cas où le Mandataire ferait
usage du droit de veto dont il pouvait se prévaloir. La situation en-
visagée n'avait riend'anormal. Dans le domaine international, l'exis-
tence d'obligations dont l'exécution nepeut faire en dernier ressort
l'objet d'une procédure juridique a toujours constitué la règle plutôt

que l'exception; cela était encore plus vrai en 1920 qu'aujourd'hui.
87. Lerisque que lesMandataires agissent d'unemanièrecontrairenon
seulement à l'opinion des autres membres du Conseil mais encore
aux dispositions mêmes desMandats a de toute évidence été con-
sciemment accepté; les faits ont d'ailleurs prouvé que ce risque était
négligeable.En revanche, accepter la thèse des demandeurs serait ad-
mettre que, mêmesi le Conseil était parfaitement satisfait de la manière
dont un Mandataire exécutait son Mandat, chaque Membre de lamember of the League could independently invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court in order to have the same conduct declared illegal, although,
as mentioned earlier, no provision for recourse to the Court was included

amongst the "securities" provided for by the Covenant itself. Here
again the difference isevident betweenthis case and that of the minorities,
where it was the members of the Council itself who 'had that right.
The potential existence of such a situation as would have arisen from
investing al1 the members of the League with the right in question is
not reconcilable with the processes described above for the supervision
of the mandates. According to the methods and procedures of the League
as applied to the operation of the mandates system, it was by argument,
discussion, negotiation and CO-operativeeffort that matters were to be,
and were, carried fonvard.

88. For these reasons the Court, bearing in mind that the rights of the
Applicants must be determined by reference to the character of the
system said to giverise to them, considers that the "necessity" argument
fallsto the ground for lack ofverisimilitudein the context ofthe economy

and philosophy of that system. Looked at in another way moreover,
the argument amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the equiva-
lent of an "actio popularis", or right resident in any member of a com-
munity to take legal action in vindication of a public interest. But
although a right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems
of law, it is not known to international law as it stands at present:
nor is the Court able to regard it as imported by the "general principles
of law" referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), of its Statute.

89. The Court feels obliged in conclusion to point out that the whole
"necessity" argument appears, in the final analysis, to be based on
considerations of an extra-legal character, the product of a process of
after-knowledge. Such a theory was never officially advanced during
the period of the League, and probably never would have been but for
then con-
the dissolution of that organization and the fact that it was
sidered preferable to rely on the anticipation that mandated territories
would be brought within the United Nations trusteeship system. It is
these subsequent events alone, not anything inherent in the mandates
system as it was originally conceived, and is correctly to be interpreted,
that give rise to the alleged "necessity". But that necessity, if it exists,
lies in the political field. Ites not constitute necessity in the eyes of
the law. If the Court, inorder to parry the consequences of these events,
were now to read into the mandates system, by way of, so to speak,
remedial action, an element wholly foreign to its real character and
structure as originally contemplated when the system was instituted, it Société desNations pouvait invoquer indépendamment la juridiction
de la Cour en vue de faire déclarerla gestion du Mandat illicite, bien
que, comme on l'a noté plus haut, aucune disposition permettant de
saisir la Cour ne fût comprise parmi les ((garantie» prévues par le
Pacte. Il y a là encore une différence évidenteentre le présent cas et
celui des minorités, où ce droit était prévuau bénéficedes membres
du Conseil. La situation qui aurait pu se créer siles Membres de la
Sociétédes Nations avaient tous eu ce mêmedroit aurait été incon-
ciliable avec les méthodes de surveillance des Mandats rappeléesplus
haut. Etant donné les méthodes et les procédures de la Société des

Nations, c'est par la voie de la persuasion, de la discussion, de la négo-
ciation et de la coopération que son action en matière de Mandats
devait êtremenéeet l'a été.

88. Pour ces motifs, la Cour, tenant compte de ce que les droits des
demandeurs doivent être établisen fonction de la nature du système
qui est censéleur avoir donné naissance, considère l'argument de la
nécessitécomme sans fondement, du fait de son invraisemblance au
regard de l'économie générale ed te l'esprit du système. Au surplus,
si on l'envisage sous un autre angle, cet argument revient à dire que
la Cour devrait admettre une sorte d'actio popularis, ou un droit pour

chaque membre d'une collectivité d'intenterune action pour la défense
d'un intérêptublic. Or, s'ilse peut que certains systèmesde droit interne
connaissent cette notion, le droit international tel qu'il existe actuelle-
ment ne la reconnaît pas et la Cour ne saurait y voir l'un desincipes
générauxde droit » mentionnés à l'article 38, paragraphe 1 c), de son
Statut.

89. La Cour croit devoir relever pour conclure qu'en dernière analyse
l'argument dela nécessitésemble entièrementfondésur desconsidérations
extra-juridiques découvertesà posteriori. On n'a jamais invoquéofficiel-
lement aucune théoriede ce genre à l'époquede la Société desNations;
on ne l'aurait sans doüte mêmejamais fait si l'organisation n'avait été

dissoute et s'il n'avait alors été jugé préférable d'escomptq eue les
territoires sous Mandat seraient placés sous le régime de tutelle des
Nations Unies. La prétenduenécessitéesn téeuniquement des événements
ultérieurs,et non d'élémentsinhérentsau système desMandats tel qu'il
a été conçu à l'origine et tel qu'il doit êtrecorrectement interprété.
Or cette nécessité,i elle existe, relèvedu domaine politique. Ce n'est pas
une nécessitéau regard du droit. Si la Cour devait maintenant, pour
pallier les conséquences des événementsi,ntroduire dans le système des
Mandats à titre de remèdeun élémententièrement étranger à sa nature
et à sa structure véritables telles qu'ellesont été conçuesau moment
de son institution, elle s'engagerait dans un processus rétrospectif

45would be engaging in an ex post facto process, exceeding its functions
as a court of law. As is implied by the opening phrase of Article 38,

paragraph 1, of its Statute, the Court is not a legislative body. Its duty
is to apply the law as it finds it, not to make it.
90. It is always open to parties to a dispute, if they wish the Court to
givea decision on a basis of ex aequo et bono, and are so agreed, to invoke
the power which, in those circumstances, paragraph 2 of this same
Article 38 confers on the Court to give a decision on that basis, not-
withstanding the provisions of paragraph 1. Failing that, the duty of the
Court is plain.
91. It may be urged that the Court is entitled to engage in a process
of "filling in thegaps", in the application of a teleologicalprinciple of
interpretation, according to which instruments must be given their
maximum effect in order to ensure the achievement of their underlying
purposes. The Court need not here enquire into the scope of a principle
the exact bearing of which is highly controversial, for it is clear that it
can have no application in circumstances in which the Court would
have to go beyond what can reasonably be regarded as being a process
of interpretation, and would have to engage in a process of rectification

or revision. Rights cannot be presumed to exist merely because it might
seem desirable that they should. On a previous occasion, which had
certain affinities with the present one, the Court declined to find that
an intended three-member commission could properly be constituted
with two members only, despite the (as the Court had held) illegal refusa1
of one of the parties to the jurisdictional clause to appoint its arbitrator
-and although the whole purpose of the jurisdictional clause was
thereby frustrated. In so doing, the Court (I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 229)
said that it was its duty "to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them".
It continued :

"The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res
magis valeat quampereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness,
cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the
settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as
stated above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit."

In other words, the Court cannot remedy a deficiency if, in order to do
so, it has to exceed the bounds of normal judicial action.

92. It may also be urged that the Court would be entitled to makegood
an omission resulting from the failure of those concerned to foresee
what might happen, and to have regard to what it may be presumed
the framers of the Mandate would have wished, or would even have
made express provision for, had they had advance knowledge of what
was to occur. The Court cannot however presume what the wishes and
intentions of those concerned would have been in anticipation of events

46outrepassant ses fonctions de tribunal. Or, ainsi qu'il ressort du début

de l'article 38, paragraphe 1, du Statut, la Cour n'est pas un organe
législatif.Sa mission est d'appliquer le droit tel qu'elle le constate et
non de le créer.
90. Silesparties àun différenddésirentque la Cour statue ex aequoet
bono et sont d'accord pour qu'elle le fasse, il leur est toujours loisible
d'invoquer la facultéqu'en de telles circonstances le paragraphe 2 du
mêmearticle 38confère àla Cour de prononcer sa décisionsur cette base,
nonobstant les dispositions du paragraphe 1. En dehors de ce cas, le
devoir de la Cour est clair.
91. On peut faire valoir quelaour serait fondée àcombler des lacunes
en application d'un principe téléologiqued'interprétation aux termes

duquel il faudrait donner aux instruments leur effet maximum en vue
d'assurer l'accomplissement de leurs objectifs fondamentaux. Il n'y a
pas lieu de discuter dans le présentarrêtd'un principe dont la portée
exacte est fortement sujette à controverse, car ce principe ne saurait
évidemment s'appliquer en des circonstancesoù la Cour devrait sortir
du domaine que l'on peut normalement considérer comme celui de
l'interprétation pour entrerdans celui dela rectification ou de la revision.
On ne saurait présumer qu'un droit existe simplement parce que son
existence peut paraître souhaitable. Dans une affaire précédentequi
n'est pas sans rapport avec l'affaire actuelle, la Cour s'est refusée à
dire qu'une commission devant comporter trois membres pourrait être
valablement constituée de deux membres seulement, bien qu'elle ait

jugé illicitele refus de l'une des partiesà la clause juridictionnelle de
désigner unarbitreet que ce refus allâtàl'encontre du but mêmede cette
clause. Ce faisant, la Cour a dit qu'elle étaitappelée«à interpréter les
traités, nonà les reviser»(C.I.J.Recueil 1950, p. 229). Elle a poursuivi
encestermes :

«Le principe d'interprétationexprimépar la maxime ut res magis
valeat quampereat, principe souvent désigné sous le nom de principe
de l'effetutile, ne saurait autoriser la Cour entendre la clause de
règlement des différends insérée dans les traités de paix dans un
sens qui, comme il vient d'être exposé c,ontredirait sa lettre et son
esprit.)

Autrement dit, la Cour ne saurait remédier à une lacune si cela' doit
l'amener à déborderle cadre normal d'une action judiciaire.

92. Onpourrait égalementallégueq ruelaCour estfondée àréparer une
omission due à l'imprévoyance desauteurs du Mandat et à prendre en
considération ce qu'on peut imaginer qu'ils auraient souhaitéou même
auraient expressément prévus'ils avaient su d'avance ce que réservait
l'avenir. Mais la Cour ne saurait présumer les vŒuxet les intentions des

intéressésà l'égard d'événemenf tuturs qu'ils n'ont pas prévuset qui
étaientimprévisibles;le pourrait-elle, il n'en serait pas moins impossible that were neither foreseen nor foreseeable; and even if it could, it would
certainly not be possible to make the assumptions in effect contended
for by the Applicants as to what those intentions were.

93. In this last connection, it so happens that there is in fact one test
that can be applied, namely by enquiring what the States who were
members of the League when the mandates system was instituted did
when, as Members of the United Nations, they joined in setting up
the trusteeship system that was to replace the mandates system. In
effect, as regards structure, they did exactly theame as had been done
before, with only one though significant difference. There were of
course marked divergences,as regards for instance composition, powers,
and voting rules, between the organs of the United Nations and those of
the League. Subject to that however, the Trusteeship Council was to
play the same sort of role as the Permanent Mandates Commission had
done, and the General Assembly (or Security Council in the case of
strategic trusteeships) was to play the role of the League Council; and
it was to these bodies that the various administering authorities became
answerable. No right of supervision or of calling the administering

authority to account was given to individual Members of the United
Nations, whose sphere of action, as in the case of the League members,
is to be found in their participation in the work of the competent organs.

94. The significant differencereferred to lies in the distribution of the
jurisdictional clause amongst the various trusteeship agreements. The
clause itself is almost identical in its terms with that which figured in
the mandates, and was clearly taken straight from these ("any dispute
whatever", "between the Administering Authority and another Member
of the United Nations", "relating to ... the provisions of this Agree-
ment"). But whereas the jurisdictional clause appeared in al1the man-
dates, each of which contained "special interests" provisions, it figures

only in those trusteeship agreements which contain provisions of this
type, and not in agreements whose provisions are confined entirely to
the performance of the trust in accordance with the basic objectives of
the system as set out in Article76 of the Charter.

95. If therefore, the contention put forward by the Applicants in the
present case were correct in principle (and this contention is in a major
degree founded on the existenceand wording of the jurisdictional clause,
and also involves the erroneous assumption that it can per se confer
substantive rights), it would follow that, in the case of some of the
trusteeships, individual members of the United Nations would be held
to have a legal right or interest in the conduct and administration of

the trust, but in relation to others they would not, although these were
no less trusteeships,-no less an expression of the "sacred trust of
civilization". The implications beconle even more striking when it is
realized that the trusteeships to which no jurisdictional clause attaches
are three previous Pacific 'C' mandates-that is to Say the class of
47d'accepter les hypothèses avancées ensubstance par les demandeurs
quant àcesintentions.

93. Il estun critère applicabàcetégard,celuiqui consiste à rechercher
ceque les Etats quiétaientMembres dela Sociétédes Nations au moment
de l'institution du système desMandats ont fait, lorsque, devenus Mem-
bres de l'Organisation desNations Unies, ils ont participé ài'établisse-
ment du régimede tutelle destiné à remplacer le système des Mandats.

Or, s'agissant de la structure du régime, ilsont fait exactement la même
chose qu'auparavant à une seule exception près, significativeil est vrai.
Il existe évidemmentde nettes différencesentre les organes de la Société
desNationset ceuxdes Nations Unies notamment quantàlacomposition,
à la compétenceet aux règlesde vote, mais, sous cette réserve,le Conseil
de tutelle joue un rôle semblable à celui de la Commission permanente
des Mandats et l'Assemblée généralo eu, pour les accords de tutelle
concernant des zones stratégiques,le Conseil de sécuritéjouent le même
rôle que le Conseil de la SociétédeNations; c'estdevant ces organes que
les autorités administrantes sont devenues responsables. Les Membres
des Nations Unies ne se sont vu attribuer aucun droitpropre de surveiller
l'autorité administrante ou de lui demander des comptes; comme pour
les Membres de la Sociétédes Nations, leur action consiste à participer

aux travaux des organes compétents.
94. La différence significativedont on vient de faire étata traità la
présenceou à l'absence de la clause juridictionnelle dans les accords de
tutelle. La clauseelle-mêmeest conçue presquedans lesmêmes termes que
celle des Mandats et il est clair qu'elle en procède directement: ((Tout
différend,quel qu'il soi...entre l'Autorité chargéede l'administration et
tout autre Membre des Nations Unies, relativement [... aux ...] disposi-
tions du présent Accord.» Cependant, tandis que la clausejuridictionnelle
figurait danstous les Mandats, qui tous contenaient une disposition rela-

tiveauxintérêtp sarticuliers, on nela trouve quedans lesaccords detutelle
comportant des dispositions de cette sorte, et non dans ceux dont les dis-
positions se limitentà l'accomplissement de la mission conformément
aux fins essentielles du régime detutelle énoncées à l'article 76 de la
Charte.
95. En conséquence,si l'on tenait pour exacte dans son principe la
thèseque lesdemandeurs soutiennent enl'espèce, thèsefondéeessentielle-
ment sur l'existence et les termes de la clause juridictionnelle et aussi

l'hypothèseerronéed'après laquellecette clause pourrait en soi conférer
des droits au fond, on serait amené àconclure que les Membres des Na-
tions Unies ont individuellement un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard
de la gestion et de l'administration durust pour certainestutelles et non
pour les autres, alors que celles-ci sont des tutelles exactement au même
titre et ne correspondent pas moinsàune (mission sacréede civilisatio».
Cette conclusion frappe encoredavantage sil'on songeque les accords de
tutelle ne comportant pas de clause juridictionnelle concernent trois
anciens Mandats C pour la régiondu Pacifique,c'est-à-dire desterritoires territory inhabited by precisely the most undeveloped categories of
peoples, the least "able to stand by themselves".

96. It has been sought to explainthis apparent anomaly by referenceto
the strong negotiating position in which the various mandatories found
themselves, inasmuch as they were not legally obliged to place their
mandated territories under trusteeship at all, and could therefore,
within limits, make their own terms. But this would in no way explain
why they seem to have been willing to accept a jurisdictional clause in
the case of trusteeships that contained "special interests" provisions,
including one Pacific 'C' mandate of this kind, but were not willing
to do so in the case of trusteeships whose terms provided only for the
performance of the trust in accordance with the basic objectives of the
systeni.
97. No doubt, as has been pointed out, even where no jurisdictional
clause figures in a trusteeship agreement, it would be possible, inthose
cases where the administering authority had made an appropriately
worded declaration in acceptance of the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction
under the optional clause provision of Article 36 of the Court's Statute,
for another member of the United Nations having made a similar and

interlocking declaration, to seise the Court of a dispute regarding
the performance of the trust. The number of cases in which this could
occur has, however, always beenvery limited, and the process is rendered
precarious and uncertain, not only by the conditions contained in, and
the nature of the disputes covered by certain of these declarations,
but also by their liability to amendment, withdrawal, or non-renewal.
The optional clause system could therefore in no way have afforded a
substitute for a general obligation to adjudicate, if such an obligation
had really been regarded as essential;-moreover, even in those cases
where an optional clause declaration could be invoked, it would still be
necessary for the invoking State-as here-to establish the existence of a
legal right or interest in the subject-matter of its claim.
98. It has also been sought to explain why certain trusteeship agree-
ments do not contain the jurisdictional clause by a further appeal to the
"necessity" argument. This clause was no longer necessary, so it was
contended, because the United Nations voting rule was different. In the
League Council, decisions could not be arrived at without the concur-

rence of the mandatory, whereas in the United Nations the majority
voting rule ensured that a resolution could not be blocked by any single
vote. This contention would not in any event explain why the clause
was accepted for some trusteeships and not for others. But the whole
argument is misconceived. If decisions of the League Council could not
be arrived at without the concurrence, express or tacit, of the mandatory,
they were, when arrived at, binding: and if resolutions of the United
Nations GeneraI Assembly (which on this hypothesis would be the
relevant organ) can be arrived at without the concurrence of the ad-
ministering authority, yet when so arrived at-and subject to certain
exceptions not here material-they are not binding, but only recom-
mendatory in character. The persuasive force of Assembly resolutionshabités précisémentpar les peuples les moins développés etles moins
« capables de se diriger eux-mêmes ».
96. On tente d'expliquer cetteanomalie apparente en arguant dela po-
sition solide dont bénéficiaient lesMandataires dans les négociations,
du fait qu'ils n'étaientpas juridiquement tenus de placer sous le régime
de tutelle leurs territoires sous Mandat et pouvaient par conséquent,
dans certaines limites, imposer leurs conditions. Or, cela n'explique en

rien pourquoi ils ont paru disposés à accepter la clause juridictionnelle
dans le cas des accords de tutelle c~nt-nant des dispositions relatives
aux intérêtsparticuliers, notamment un ancien Mandat C pour la région
du Pacifique, mais non dans le cas des accords de tutelle dont les dispo-
sitions ne visaient que l'accomplissement de la mission conformément
aux fins essentielles du régime.
97. Même s'agissant desaccords de tutelle sans clausejuridictionnelle,
il n'est pas douteux que, comme on le signale, si l'autorité administrante
a fait, en termes appropriés, une déclaration d'acceptation de la juri-

diction obligatoire de la Cour en vertu de la disposition facultative de
l'article36 du Statut, un autre Membre des Nations Unies ayant fait
une déclaration correspondante peut saisir la Cour d'un différend relatif
à l'accomplissement de la mission. Toutefois, le nombre de cas où cela
pourrait jouer a toujours ététrès limitéet le procédé estrendu précaire
et incertain non seulement par les conditions énoncéesdans les déclara-
tions etpar la nature des différendsviséspar certaines de ces déclarations,
mais aussi par la possibilité d'amender, de retirer ou de ne pas renouveler
les déclarations. Le systèmede la disposition facultative ne peut donc en
aucune manière remplacer une obligation généralede se soumettre au

règlementjudiciaire lorsque pareille obligation est réellement considérée
comme essentielle; au surplus, mêmedans les cas où un Etat peut in-
voquer une déclaration faite en vertu de la disposition facultative, il doit
encore établir, comme en l'espèce, l'existence d'un droit ou intérêt
juridique au regard de l'objet de la demande.
98. On chercheaussi à expliquer pourquoi certainsaccords detutelle ne
contiennent pas de clause juridictionnelle en recourant de nouveau à
l'argument de la nécessitéL. a clausejuridictionnelle n'est plus nécessaire,
dit-on, parce que les Nations Unies appliquent une règle de vote diffé-

rente. Le Conseil de la Société desNations ne pouvait prendre de
décision sans l'adhésion du Mandataire, tandis qu'aux Nations Unies,
en vertu de la règledu vote àla majorité, un Etat Membre ne saurait à
lui seul empêcherl'adoption d'une résolution. Cela n'expliquerait pas
en tout cas pourquoi on a acceptéla clausejuridictionnelle dans certains
accords de tutelle et non dans d'autres. Mais tout l'argument est mal
fondé. Si le Conseil de la Société desNations ne pouvait prendre de
décisions sans l'adhésion expresse ou tacite du Mandataire, ces
décisions,une fois prises, étaient obligatoires; en revanche, si l'Assem-
blée générale deN s ations Unies, qui serait dans cette hypothèse l'organe

compétent, peut prendre des résolutions sans l'adhésion de l'autorité
administrante, cesrésolutions,une fois prises, ne sont que des recomman-
dations dépourvues de caractère obligatoire, sauf dans certains cas sanscan indeed be very considerable,-but this is a differentthing. It operates
on the political not the legal level: it does not make these resolutions
binding in law. If the "necessity" argument were valid therefore, it
would be applicable as much to trusteeships as it is said to be to man-
dates, because in neither case could the administering authority be
coerced by means of the ordinary procedures of the organization.
Theconclusion to be drawn is obvious.

99. In the light of these various considerations,the Court findsthat the
Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right or
interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims,
and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them.

100. For these reasons,

by the President's casting vote-the votes being equally divided,

decidesto reject the claims of the Empire of Ethiopia and the Republic
of Liberia.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague,this eighteenthday of July, one thousand
nine hundred and sixty-six,in four copies, one of which will be placed
in the archivesofthe Court and the otherstransmitted to the Government
of the Empire of Ethiopia, the Government of the Republic of Liberia
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, respectively.

(Signed) Percy C. SPENDER,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

President Sir Percy SPENDEm Rakes the following declaration:

1. The judgment of the Court, which consists of its decision and the
reasons upon which it is based (Article 56 (1) ofthe Statute), is that the
Applicants cannot be considered to have established that they have
any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of the present claims,
and that accordinglytheir claims are rejected.pertinence en l'espèce. Certes, les résolutionsde l'Assembléegénérale
peuvent avoir une grande influencemais c'est là une autre question. Cela
joue sur le plan de la politique et non du droit; cela ne rend pas ces
résolutions juridiquement obligatoires. Par conséquent, si l'argument

de la nécessitéétaitvalable, il s'appliquerait aussi bien aux accords de
tutelle qu'aux Mandats, en raison de l'impossibilitédans l'un et l'autre
cas de contraindre le Mandataire ou l'autorité administrante par les
procéduresordinaires de l'organisation. La conclusion s'impose.

99. Se fondant sur les considérations qui précèdent,la Cour constate
que les demandeurs ne sauraient êtreconsidéréscomme ayant établi
l'existenceàleur profit d'un droit ou intérêtjuridiqueau regard de l'objet
des présentesdemandes; en conséquencela Cour doit refuser d'y donner
suite.

100. Par ces motifs,

par la voix prépondérantedu Président, les voix étant également
partagées,

décidede rejeter les demandes de l'Empire d7Ethiopieet de la Répu-
blique du Libéria.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le dix-huit juillet mil neuf cent soixante-six, en
quatre exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux archives de la Cour
et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de
l'Empire d'Ethiopie, au Gouvernement de la République du Libéria
et au Gouvernement de la Républiquesud-africaine.

Le Président,
(Signé) Percy C. SPENDER.
Le Greffier,

(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

Sir Percy SPENDERP ,résident, fait la déclaration suivante:
1. Dans son arrêt, quicomprend la décisionproprement dite et les
motifs sur lesquels celle-ci se fonde (article6, paragraphe 1, du Sta-
tut), la Cour dit que les demandeurs ne sauraient êtreconsidéréscomme
ayant établil'existence à leur profit d'un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau
regard de l'objet desdemandes présentéespar eux et qu'en conséquence

ces demandes sont rejetées.
49 2. Having so decided, the Court's task was completed. It was not
necessary for it to determine whether the Applicants' claims should or
could be rejected on any other grounds. Specifically it was not called
upon to consider or pronounce upon the complex of issues and questions
involved in Article 2 of the mandate instrument ("The Mandatory
shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of the inhabitants of the territorysubject to the present
Mandate"); or Article 6 thereof ("Thr Mandatory shall make to the
Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction
of the Council, containing full information with regard to the territory,

and indicating the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed
under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5"); or to enter into a legal enquiry as to
what it would or might have decided in respect to these and related
matters had it not reached the decision it did. To have done so would,
in my view, have been an excess of the judicial function.

3. The Judgment of the Court does not represent the unanimous
opinion of the judges and, in consequence, Article 57 of the Statute of
the Court, which provides that in that case "any judge shall be entitled
to deliver aseparate opinion", comes into operation.
4. It follows that any judge, whether he concurs in or dissents from
the Court's judgment, is entitled, if he wishes, to deliver a separate
opinion.

5. Since in my view there are grounds other than as stated in the
Judgment upon which the Applicants' claims or certain of them could
have been rejected, and since 1 agree with the Court's Judgment, there
arises for me the question whether, and if so to what extent, it is per-
missible or appropriate to express by way of separate opinion my
views on these additional grounds for rejecting the Applicants' claims
or certain ofthem.
6. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider not
merely the text of Article 57 but the general purpose it was intended
to serve, and its intended application.

7. 1 would not wish to Say anything which would unreasonably
restrict the right accorded to a judge by Article 57. It is an important
right which must be safeguarded. Can it be, however, that there are
no limits to the scope and extent of the exercise of this right by any
individual judge? 1 cannot think so. There must, it seems to me, be
some limits, to proceed beyond which could not be claimed to be a
proper exercise of the right the Statute confers.
8. The right of a judge to express a dissenting opinion in whole or in
part was not easily won.

9. In the Hague Convention of 1899 a right of dissent from arbitral
decisions was recognized; it was adopted without discussion. At the
Hague Conference of 1907 the question of dissent or no dissent was
discussed at considerable length. In the result the right of dissent was
suppressed.
50 2. Ayant ainsi statué, la Cour s'est acquittée de sa tâche. Il ne lui
incombait pas de déterminer si les demandes devaient ou pouvaient
êtrerejetées pour d'autres raisons. Plus particulièrement, elle n'était

pas appelée àexaminer ou à trancher l'ensemble des problèmes et ques-
tions soulevés par l'article 2 de l'acte de Mandat («Le Mandataire
accroîtra, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le bien-être matérielet
moral ainsi que le progrès social des habitants du territoire soumis au
présentmandat ») ou par l'article 6 («Le Mandataire devra envoyer au
Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations un rapport annuel satisfaisant le Con-
seil et contenant toute information intéressant le territoire et indiquant
les mesures prises pour assurer les engagements pris suivant les articles
2, 3, 4, »);elle n'étaitpas appeléenon plus à procédera une rezerche
juridique sur ce qu'aurait étéou aurait pu êtresa décisioneu égard à
ces questions et aux questions connexes, si elle n'avait pas adopté
la décisionqui est la sienne. L'aurait-elle fait qu'elle auràimon avis,
outrepassé sa fonction judiciaire.

3. L'arrêtde la Cour n'exprimant pas l'opinion unanime des juges,
l'article 57du Statut de la Cour qui dispose qu'en pareil cas ((toutjuge
aura le droit d'y joindre l'exposéde son opinion individuelle» entre
en jeu.
4. Il en résulte que tout juge, qu'il souscrive ou nonà l'arrêt dela
Cour, est en droit d'exprimer s'il le désireune opinion séparée.

5. Comme, à mon sens, les demandes ou certaines d'entre elles au-
raient pu êtrerejetéespour d'autres motifs encore que ceux qui sont

invoqués dans l'arrêt et commeje souscris à la décisionde la Cour,
la question se pose pour moi de savoir si et dans quelle mesure il est
admissible ou opportun que j'exprime, dans une opinion individuelle,
mon avis sur les motifs additionnels que la Cour aurait pu faire valoir
pour rejeter les demandes ou certaines d'entre elles.
6. Pour répondre à cette question, il est indispensable d'étudier non
seulement le texte de l'article 57, mais aussi l'objet généralauquel il
répond et les conditions dans lesquelles on a voulu qu'il s'applique.

7. Il n'est pas dans mes intentions de dire quoi que ce soit qui puisse
indûment restreindre le droit reconnu à tout juge par l'article 57. II
s'agit d'un droit important qui doit êtresauvegardé. Se pourrait-il
toutefois que rien neviennelimiter dans sa portée et son étenduel'exer-
cice de ce droit par un juge? Je ne puis le croire. Il doit selon moi y
avoir certaines limites au-delà desquelles un juge ne saurait plus pré-
tendre exercer légitimementle droit que lui confère le Statut.
8. Le droit pour un juge d'exprimer une opinion dissidente sur tout
ou partie de l'arrêt a étédifficilà conquérir.

9. La convention de La Haye de 1899a reconnu aux arbitres le droit
de constater leur dissentiment à l'égard des sentencesrendues par le
tribunal; ce droit a étéadopté sans discussion. A la conférencede La
Haye de 1907 la question du droit d'exprimer une opinion dissidente
a étélonguement débattue. Finalement, ce droit a étésupprimé. 10. The Committee of Jurists, in drafting the Statute of th- Permanent
Court in 1920, after discussion, reached the conclusion that a judge
should be allowed to publish his dissent, but not his reasons. This
however failed to receive the approval of the Council of the League
at its tenth meeting in Brussels in October of that year. There was
then introduced into the text the right of a judge who did not concur
in al1or part of the judgment to deliver a separate opinion.

11. The record reveals clearly that this recognition of the right of
ajudge not only to publish his dissent but, as well, to express the reasons

for thesame, was the result of compromise (Leagueof Nations Documents
on Article 14 of the Covenant,pp. 138et seq.). It was stated by Sir Cecil
Hurst, who was at Brussels, and who defended,before the Sub-Committee
of the Assembly, the view arrived at at the Brussels meeting of the
Council, that the reason for disagreeing witl-ithe Committee of Jurists
was because it was feared in England that the decisions of the Court
might establish rules of law which would be incompatible with the
Anglo-saxon legal system. The agreement reached in the Council of
the League in Brussels,it seemsclear, aimed at avoiding this apprehended
danger by the publication of dissenting opinions.

12. This would strongly sugg,:st that the contemplated purpose of
the publication of the dissent, certainly its mainpurpose, was to enable
the view of the dissenting judge or judges on particular questions of
law dealt with in the Court's judgment to be seen side by side with
the views of the Court on these questions.
13. In the result there was, without dissent, written into the Statute

of the Permanent Court Article 57 thereof, which read:
"If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the
unanimous opinion of the judgs, dissenting judges are entitled
to deliver aseparate opinion."

14. There is the considerable authority of President of the Permanent
Court Max Huber for the view that the contemplated purpose of the
right to publish reasons for a dissent was as stated in paragraph 12
above. In the course of a long discussion in that Court in July of 1926
on the general principle of dissenting opinions (Series D, Addendum

No. 2, p. 215) he is recorded as having observed (my italics):

"Personally the President had always construed the right con-
ferred on judges by Article 57 as a right to state their reasons and
not simply to express their dissent, the object being to enable judges
to explain their understanding of international law in order to
false impression that a particular judgment
prevent the creation of a
or opinionexpressed the unanimous opinion of the Court, in regard
to the interpretation of internationallaw on aparticularpoint." 10. Le comité dejuristes qui a rédigéen 1920le Statut de la Cour per-

manente est parvenu, après discussion, à la cmclusi on qu'un juge de-
vrait être autoriséà faire connaître pub1iquem:nt son dissentiment mais
non pas les motifs de celui-ci. Toutefois le Conseil de la Société desNa-
tions,à sa dixième session tenue à Bruxelles en octobre de la même
année,n'a pas approuvé cette conclusion. On a alors introduit dans le
texte le droit, pour un juge qui n'accepterait pas tout ou partie de l'ar-
rêt, dejoindre à la décision l'exposéde son opinion individuelle.
11. I! ressort nettement des procès-verbaux que cette recannaissance
du droit, pour un juge, non seulement de publier son o~icion dissiden-
te mais aussi d'exprimer les motifs qui l'inspirent a étéle fruit d'un com-
promis (Documents au sujet de mesures prises par le Conseil de la So-

ciétédes Nations aux termes de l'article 14 du Pacte, p. 138 et suiv.).
Sir Cecil Hurst, qui avait étéà Bruxelles et qui a défendu à la sous-com-
mission de l'Assembléeles vues adoptées par le Conseil à sa session
de Bruxelles, a préciséque, si les conc!usions du comité de juristes n'a-
vaient pas été approuvées,c'est parce que l'on craignait en Angleterre
de voir les décisions de la Cour créerdes règles de droit inccmpatib!es
avec le système juridique anglo-saxon. L'accord auquel le Conseil
était parvenu à Bruxelles visait, de toute évidence, à écarter ce danger
au moyen de !a publication des opinions dissidentes.
12. Ces indications tendent nettement à prouver que la publication
des opinions dissidentes avait pour objet, et certainement pour objet

essentiel, de permettre une comparaison entre les vues du ou des juges
dissidents et celles de la Cour elle-mêmesur certains des points de droit
traités dans l'arrêt dela Cour.
13. En conséquence, ila étédécidé,sans opposition, de stipuler à
l'article 57 du Statut de la Cour permanente:

((Sil'arrêtn'exprime pas en tout ou en partie l'opinion unanime
des juges, les dissidents ont le droit d'y joindre l'exposé de leur
opinion individuelle.))

14. La très grande autorité de M. Max Huber, Président de la Cour
permanente, est là pour coi~firmer que le droit de publier les motifs
d'une opinion dissidente avait bien l'objet qu'énonce le paragraphe 12
ci-dessus. En juillet 1926, au cours d'un long débat consacré par la
Cour permanente au principe généraldes opinions dissidentes, il a fait
observer (C.P.J.I. sérieD, addendunzau no2, p. 215 - les italiques sont
de nous):

((Personnellement, le Président avait toujours interprété la fa-
culté accordée aux juges par l'article 57 comme étant la faculté
d'exposer leurs motifs,et non pas d'exprimer simplement leur dis-
sentiment; le but était en effet de permettre aux juges d'exposer
leur manière de comprendre le droit international, afin d'em-

pêcherque se créel'opinion fausse que tel arrêt,ou avis est l'expres-
sion de l'opinion unanime de la Cour, quant à l'interprétation du
droit international surun point dr'terminé .)
5 1 15. Further support for Max Huber's view is, 1 think, to be found
in a resolution of the Permanent Court of 17 February 1928which, in
part, read as follows (my italics): "Dissenting opinions are designed
solelyto setforth thereasonsfor whichjudges donotfeel ableto accept the
opinionof the Court. .."
16. It would amear evident from the record that it would have
been quite forei& to the understanding of those who drafted the
provision according the right of a judge to publish the reasons for his
dissent, that this right could be one which permitted a judge to express
his opinion at large, on matters not directly connected with the nature
and subject-matter of the Court's decision.
17. This then was the origin of Article 57 of this Court's Statute,
which was evidently based by its framers not only on the text of the
corresponding article in the Statute of the Permanent Court, but, as
well, upon the commonly understood purpose a dissenting opinion was
designed to serve.
18. Article 57 of this Court's Statute extends the ri~ht-to deliver
a separate opinion to any judge, where the judgment does not represent
in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges.
19. If a dissenting judge is free to state his opinion on matters which
are not directly connected with the Court's judgment, so it would
appear is a concurring judge who, for any reason which recommends
itself to him, desires to deliver a separate opinion.

20. In other words, if any judge is entitled to give a separate opinion
quite outside the range of the Court's decision and on issues upon
which the Court has made no findings of any kind, every other judge
is so entitled. The inevitable confusion which this could lead to cannot,
in my view, be supported by any rational interpretation and application
of Article 57.It would, or could, inpractice be destructive of theauthority
of the Court.

21. President Basdevant, a former distinguished President of this
Court, in his Dictionary of the Terminologyof InternationalLaw (p. 428)
defines an individual concurring opinion as not a mere statement of
disagreement as to the reasons given for a decision, the dispositif of
which the judge accepts, but the forma1 explanation he gives of the
grounds on which he personally does so; whilst a dissenting opinion
denotes not a mere statement of dissent relative to a decision but the
forma1 explanation given of the grounds on which the judge bases his
dissent.
22. In the light of al1these considerations the following conclusions
appear justified:

(a) individual opinions, whether dissenting or merely separate, were,
when the Court's Statute was drafted, regarded as such as were
directly connected with and dependent upon the judgment of the 15. Les vues de M. Max Huber sont encore confirmées, semble-t-il,
par une résolution de la Cour permanente en date du 17 février 1928,
qui contient le passage suivant (les italiques sont de nous): ((Les avis
dissidents sont destinésuniquement à exprimer les motijs pour lesquels
lesjuges estiment ne pouvoir se rallierà l'opinion de la Cour...))
16. Il semble évident, d'aprèsles procès-verbaux, que la disposition
reconnaissant à tout juge le droit de publier les motifs de son désac-
cord ne devait pas, dans l'esprit de ses auteurs, donner aux juges le
droit d'exprimer une opinion sur l'ensemble des questions qui n'étaient
pas directement liées à la nature et à l'objet de la décision dela Cour.

17. Telle est donc l'origine de l'article 57 du Statut de la Cour, pour
le libelléduquel les auteurs se sont inspirésnon seulement du texte de
l'article correspondant du Statut de la Cour permanente, mais encore
de l'objet communément reconnu et assignéaux opinions dissidentes.

18. L'article 57 du Statut de la Cour accorde à tout juge le droit de
formuler une opinion individuelle, lorsque l'arrêt n'exprime pas en
tout ou partie l'opinion unanime des juges.
19. Si un juge dissident avait toute latitude pour exposer son avis
sur des points non directement liés à l'arrêtde la Cour, il semble qu'il
devrait en aller de mêmepour un juge souscrivant à la décisionde la

Cour mais désirant, pour une raison particulière, exprimer une opinion
individuelle.
20. En d'autres termes, si un juge étaiten droit d'exprimer une opi-
nion séparée n'entrant nullement dans le cadre de la décisionde la Cour
et sur des points au sujet desquels la Cour n'aurait formuléaucune con-
clusion quelle qu'elle soit, il conviendrait de reconnaître un droit iden-
tique à tout autre juge. Aucune interprétation et aucune application
rationnelle de l'article 57 ne saurait,à mon avis, justifier l'inévitable
confusion à laquelle on risquerait ainsi d'aboutir. Dans la pratique,
une telle confusion serait ou pourrait être fatale à l'autorité de la
Cour.

21. D'après le Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international
(p. 428) de M. Basdevant, qui fut un éminent Président de la Cour,
l'expression opinion individuelledésignenon le simple énoncédu désac-
cord d'un juge sur les motifs d'une décisiondont il accepte le dispositif,
mais l'exposé officiellementprésentépar lui des motifs sur lesquels il
entend fonder ladite décision; quant à l'expression opinion dissidente,
elle désignenon le simple énoncédu dissentiment d'un juge par rapport
à une décision, mais l'exposé officiellementprésentépar lui des motifs
sur lesquels il fonde ce dissentiment.
22. Toutes ces considérations permettent, semble-t-il, d'aboutir aux
conclusions suivantes:

a) on a estimé,lors de l'élaboration du Statut de la Cour, que les opi-
nions dissidentes ou simplement individuelles devaient êtredirec-
tement liéeset subordonnées àl'arrêtde la Cour - ou dans le cas 55 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DECLS . PENDER)
Court itself (or in the case of advisory opinions (Statute, Article 68,
Rules, Article 84 (2)), its opinion), in the sense of either agreeing
or disagreeing with it, or its motivation, or as to the sufficiencyof

the latter;
(b) the judgment (or opinion) of theCourt must bethefocalpoint of the
differentjudicial viewsexpressed on any occasion, sinceit is the exis-
tence and nature of the judgrnent (or opinion) and their relation-
ship to it that gives individual opinions their judicial character;
(c) in principle such opinions should not purport to deal with matters
that fa11entirely outside the range of the Court's decision, or of
the decision'smotivation;
(d) there must exist a close direct link between individual opinions
and the judgment of the Court.

23. If these conclusions are, as 1 think them to be, sound, there
still remain wide limits within which an individual judge may quite
properly go into questions that the Court has not dealt with, provided
he keeps within the ambit of the order of question decided by the Court,

and in particular observes the distinction between questions of a pre-
liminary or antecedent character and questions not having that character.
1 cannot however agree that a separate or dissenting opinion may
properly include al1 that a judge thinks the judgment of the Court
should have included.
24. The mere fact that a judgment (or opinion) of the Court has been
given does not afford justification for an expression of views at large
on matters which entirely exceed the limits and intended scope of the
judgment (or opinion). Without the judgment (or opinion) there would,
of course, be no relationship and nothing of a judicial character that
could be said by any judge. There is equally no relationship imparting
judicial character to utterances about questions which the Court has not
treated of at all.
25. Suppose that the Court, on a request to give an advisory opinion,

refuses to do so, as for example it did in the case of Eastern Carelia,
1923, Series B, No. 5, on a specific ground stated; could a judge of the
Court, by way of a separate individual or dissenting opinion, proceed
to give his views as to what the opinion of the Court should have been
if it had decided to express it?1 should have thought not.

26. 1s there in principle any real distinction between this supposed
case and the present cases? 1 think not. The Court has decided, on
what is a preliminary question of the merits, that the Applicants' claims
must be rejected: thus further examination of the merits becomes
supererogatory. 1s any judge in a separate opinion, in disregard of the
particular issue or question decided by the Court and the reasoning
in support of the decision, entitled to go beyond giving his reasons for
disagreeing with that decision, and passing entirely outside it to express

his views on what the Court should have decided in relation to other
matters of the merits, on which no decision has been arrived at and no d'un avis consultatif (article 68 du Statut et article 84, para-
graphe 2, du Règlement) à l'avis de la Cour - en ce sens qu'elles
devaient approuver ou désapprouver la décision, sesmotifs ou le
caractère suffisant de ces derniers:
b) l'arrêtou l'avis de la Cour doit êtreau centre même des vuesexpri-

méespar les juges car le caractère judiciaire des opinions séparées
qu'ils émettent dépend de l'existence et de la nature de l'arrêtou
de l'avis et des rapports qu'elles ont avec cet arrêtou cet avis;
c) en principe on ne devrait pas chercher dans de telles opinions à
traiter de questions totalement étrangères à la décision de la Cour
ou aux motifs donnés par elle;
d) il doit y avoir un rapport direct et étroit entre les opinions séparées
et l'arrêt dela Cour.

23. Si, comme je le pense, ces conclusions sont justifiées, leslimites
dans lesquelles un juge peut légitimement examiner des questions que
la Cour n'a pas traitées n'en demeurent pas moins vastes, mais il doit
s'en tenir des questions du mêmeordre que celles que la Cour a tran-
chéeset respecter en particulier la distinction entre les points de carac-

tère préliminaireou prioritaire et les autres. Mais je ne saurais admettre
qu'il soit légitimepour un juge de traiter, dans une opinion individuelle
ou dissidente, de tout ce dont il estime que la Cour aurait dû parler
dans son arrêt.
24. Le simpiz fait que la Cour ait rendu un arrêtou un avis ne sau-
rait justifier que soient exprimées des vues d'ordre généralsur des
problèmes n'entrant pas du tout dans le cadre de l'arrêt oude l'avis et
excédantla portéequ'on a voulu lui assigner. A défaut d'arrêtou d'avis,
ces vues ne se rattacheraient évidemment à rien et un juge ne pourrait
rien dire qui présente un caractère judiciaire. De même,des énoncés
relatifs des points que la Cour n'a pas abordés ne sauraient se rattacher
à rien qui puisse leur conférer un caractère judiciaire.
25. Supposons que la Cour, saisie d'une requêtepour avis consul-

tatif, refuse d'y donner suite, comme elle l'a fait, par exemple, dans
l'affaire duStatut de la Carélie orientale,1923, C.P.J.I. sérieB no5,
en indiquant un motif précis.Un membre de la Cour pourrait-il alors,
dans une opinion individuelle ou dissidente, exposer ses vues quant à
l'avis que la Cour aurait dû donner, si elle avait décidéde le faire? Je
pense que non.
26. Existe-t-il en principe une distinction réelleentre ce cas hypothé-
tique et les présentes affaires? Je ne le pense pas. La Cour a décidé,
sur une question préliminaire touchant au fond, qu'il fallait rejeter les
demandes: tout autre examen du fond devient ainsi superflu. Un juge
peut-il, ne tenant pas compte de la question ou du problème que la Cour
a tranchéset des motifs qu'elle a invoqués àl'appui de sa décision,faire
davantage dans une opinion séparée qu'indiquerles raisons pour les-

quelles il désapprouve cette décision et peut-il s'en écarter totalement
pour exprimer ses vues quant à la manière dont la Cour aurait dû
trancher d'autres points de fond, sur lesquels la Cour ne s'est paspro-expression of opinion has been given by the Court? To do so, in my
view, would be to go outside the proper limits of an individual or
separate opinion.
27. It cannot be that the mere dispositifitself can enlarge the proper
scope of a separate opinion. The dispositif cannot be disembowelled

from the Court's opinion as expressed in its motivations. It surely
cannot be that just because the dispositifrejects the claims, it is permis-
sible for a dissenting judge to give his reasons why the claims should
be upheld in whole or part. The content of the judgment must be ob-
tained from reading together the decision and the reasons upon which
it is based. The claims are dismissed for particular assigned reasons
and on a specificground. It is to these reasons and this ground, it seems
to me, that in principle al1separate opinions must be directed, not to
wholly unconnected issues or matters.

28. It would seem inconceivable that a judge who concurs in the
dispositifshould in aseparate opinionbe freeto go beyond considerations
germane to the actual decision made by the Court and its motivations.
In the present cases he would, of course, be free to advance another
ground of the same order as that on which the Court's decision rests

which would separately justify it, or other related reasons which might
go to support it. But it would hardly be justifiable for such a judge to
proceed further into the merits, expressing his views on how he thinks
the Court should or would have pronounced upon the whole complex
of questions centering around different provisions of the Mandate, for
example Articles 2 and 6 thereof, had the Court not reached the decision
it actually did.
29. There is however no warrant to be found in Article 57 of the
Court's Statute which would leave it free for a dissenting judge to do
this but not a concurring judge. They both stand upon an equal footing.
The dispositif and a judge's vote thereon, for or against, could not,
in itself, affect the proper limits within which any separate opinion
under Article 57may be delivered.

30. In the present cases the questions of merits that arise can them.

selves be divided into two categories, namely questions of what mighi
be called the ultimate merits and certain other questions which, thougk
appertaining to the merits, have an antecedent or more fundamenta:
character, in the sense that if decided in a certain way they render a
decision on the ultimate merits unnecessary and indeed unwarranted.
As the Judgment States,there are two questions having that character-
that of the Applicailts' legal right and interest (which is the basis of
the Court's decision) and that of the continued subsistence of the
Mandate for South West Africa.

31. It would be entirely proper for a judge who votes in favour of
the dispositif to base a separate opinion wholly or in part upon the
second of those two questions. He would not be going outside thenoncée et n'a pas donné son sentiment. Procéder ainsi reviendrait, à
mon avis, à dépasser les limites légitimesde l'opinion séparéeque peut
formuler un juge.
27. Il n'est pas possible que le dispositif autorisà lui seul un élar-
gissement de la portée des opinions séparées. Le dispositif ne saurait

être détaché de l'opinion de la Cour telle qu'elle ressort des motifs. Ce
n'est certes pas simplement parce que le dispositif rejette les demandes
qu'un juge dissident peut indiquer les raisons pour lesquelles, selon lui,
il conviendrait de faire droità tout ou partie des demandes. La teneur
de l'arrêtdoit se dégagerde la décisionproprement dite et des motifs
sur lesquels elle se fonde. Les demandes sont rejetées pour des rai-
sons particulières, qui sont indiquées,et pour un motif précis.C'est sur
ces raisons et ce motif, et non pas sur des problèmes ou des questions
sans rapport aucun avec l'arrêt,quetoutes les opinions séparées doivent
en principe porter.
28. Il semblerait inconcevable qu'un juge qui souscrit au dispositif

ait, dans une opinion individuelle, la faculté d'aller au-delà de consi-
dérations se rattachant à la décision de la Cour proprement dite et à
ses motifs. Dans les présentes affaires, il lui serait évidemment loisible
d'invoquer un autre motif du mêmeordre que celui sur lequel la Cour
fonde sa décision et qui justifierait celle-ci d'une autre manière et il
lui serait loisible aussi d'invoquer d'autres raisons connexes à l'appui
de cette décision. Mais un juge ne serait guèrejustifié à traiter davan-
tage du fond et à exprimer ses vues sur la manière dont, selon lui, la
Cour aurait dû ou aurait pu statuer sur l'ensemble des questions que
posent diverses dispositions du Mandat, comme les articles 2 et 6, si
elle n'avait pas abouti à la décision qui est la sienne.
29. L'article 57 du Statut de la Cour ne contient aucune disposition

qui interdiraità un juge de la majorité d'agir de la sorte mais y autori-
serait un juge dissident. Tous les deux sont placéssur un pied d'égalité.
Ni le dis~ositif. ni le vote favorable ou défavorable sur ce dis~ositif
ne sauraient en eux-mêmesavoir une incidence sur les limites dans le
cadre desquelles un opinion individuelle peut être expriméeaux termes
de l'article57.
30. Dans les présentes affaires, les questions de fond qui se posent
peuvent êtredivisées en deux catégories, à savoir les questions tou-
chant à ce que l'on pourrait appeler le fond irréductible et certaines au-
tres questions qui, quoique relevant du fond, ont un caractère priori-

taire ou plus fondamental, en ce sens que, si elles sont tranchées d'une
certaine manière, cela rend inutile, voire injustifiée,toute décision sur
ce qui constitue irréductiblement le fond. Comme le dit l'arrêt,deux
questions revêtent ce caractère, celle du droit ou intérêtjuridique
des demandeurs - c'est là le fondement de la décision de la Cour
- et celle du maintien en vigueur du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest
africain.
31. Un juge votant en faveur du dispositif serait parfaitement en droit
de fonder une opinion individuelle, en tout ou en partie, sur la seconde
de ces deux questions. Il s'en tiendrait ainsà une question du mêmeorder of question considered by the Court, namely that of antecedent
issues on merits operating as a bar to al1 the Applicants' claims, he
would not have attempted to pronounce on the question of ultimatc
merits, necessarily excluded and rendered irrelevant by the Court':
Judgment.
32. To the extent that any separate opinion, whether concurring or
dissenting, goes outside the order of the question considered by the
Court, it is my view that the opinion ceases to have any relationsl-ii~:
with the judgment of the Court, whatever the means may be by which

such a relationship or link is sought to be estab!ished-it ceasestherefore
to be an expression properly in the nature of a judicial expression of
opinion, for, as has been already indicated, it is only through their
relationship to the judgment that a judicial character is imparted to
individual opinions.
33. In my view, such an opinion, to the extent it exceeds these limits,
ceases to be a separate opinion as contemplated by the Court's Statute
and Rules since it expresses viewsabout matters for which the judgment
of the Court does not provide the basis necessary for the process of
agreement or disagreement which is the sole legitimate raison d'être
of a separate opinion.
34. 1 am not persuaded that the views 1 have expressed are in any
sense invalidated if it be that on one or two occasions this or that judge
has, in some manner, not acted in conformity therewith. Action which

is impermissible does not become permissible because it may have been
overlooked at the time or no objection taken. The correct path to follow
remains the correct path even though there may have been occasional
straying from it.
35. These views must dictate my own action. However 1 might agree
or disagree with the views expressed by any individual judge in a
separate opinion in relation to the complex of questions both of law
and fact centering around Articles 2 and 6 of the Mandate and certain
other articles thereof, 1would not, in my considered view, be entitled to
express any opinion thereon. Were 1 to do so 1 would be expressing
purely personal and extra-judicial views contrary to what I think is the
object and purpose of Article 57of the Statute, and contrary, in my view,
to the best interests of the Court.
36. And what it is not permissible or proper to do in a separate
opinion, it is certain would be impermissible and improper to do in a

declaration.
37. 1 associate myself unreservedly with the Court's Judgment, and,
having regard to the viewsherein expressed,have nothing to add thereto.

Judge MORELLaInd Judge ad hoc VAN WYKappend Separate Opinions
to the Judgment of the Court.

55ordre que celle que la Cour a examinée, à savoir une question de fond

ayant un caractère prioritaire et faisant obstacle toutes les demandes;
il ne tenterait pas, de la sorte, de se prononcer sur la question touchant
irréductiblement au fond, nécessairement exclueet rendue sans perti-
nence par l'arrêtde la Cour.
32. Dans la mesure où une opinion individuelle ou dissidente porte
sur des questions d'un autre ordre que celles dont la Cour a traité,
cette opinion n'a plus,àmon avis, aucun rapport avec l'arrêtde la Cour,
quels que soient les moyens par lesquels on s'efforce d'établir un tel
rapport ouun tel lien; ce n'est donc plus véritablementl'expression d'une
opinion judiciaire, car, comme je l'ai déjàsignalé, lesopinions séparées
n'ont un caractère judiciaire que pour autant qu'elles se rattachent à

l'arrêt.

33. A mon avis, dans la mesure où de telles opinions dépassent ces
limites, elles cessent d'être desopinions individuelles aux termes du
Statut et du Règlement de la Cour, car elles expriment des vues sur des
questions à l'égarddesq~elles l'arrêtde la Cour ne fournit pas le fon-
dement nécessaire au processus d'approbation ou de désapprobation
qui est la seule raison d'êtrelégitimed'une opinion individuelle.
34. Je ne crois pas que les vues quej'ai expriméessoient en quoi que
ce soit infirméespar le fait que, en une ou deux circonstances, tel ou
tel juge ne s'y serait pas conforméen tous points. Un acte inadmissible
ne devient pas admissible parce qu'à l'époqueil a pu échapper à l'atten-

tion ou parce qu'aucune objection n'a étéélevée.Le droit chemin de-
meure le droit chemin, quand mêmeon s'en serait parfois écarté.

35. Je me dois de régler là-dessusmon attitude. Que j'approuve ou
désapprouveles vues expriméespar des juges dans des opinions séparées
relativement à l'ensemble des questions de droit et de fait que posent
les articles et 6 du Mandat ainsi que certains autres articles du Mandat,
je ne m'estimerais pas en droit, tout bien considéré,d'exprimer une
opinion quelconque à cet égard.Le ferais-je que j'exprimerais des vues
purement personnelles et extrajudiciaires, contrairement à ce que je
crois êtrel'objet et le but de l'article57 du Statut et contrairement,

selon moi, aux intérêts dela Cour.
36. Or, ce qui ne serait ni admissible ni opportun dans une opinion
séparée, nele serait certainement pas davantage dans une déclaration.

37. Je souscris sans réserve à l'arrêtde la Cour et, compte tenu de
ce qui vient d'êtredit, n'ai rien à y ajouter.

M. MORELLeIt M. van WYK,juge ad ]?oc,joignent à I'arrêt lesexpo-
sés de leur opinion individuelle.

55 Vice-President WELLINGNOO,Judges KORETSKTA, NAKAJ,ESSUP,
PADILLANERVOF,ORSTERand Judgead hoc Sir Louis MBANppend
Dissenting Opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) P. C. S.
(Initialled) S. A. M. WELLINGTON KOO, Vice-Président, MM. KORETSKYT ,ANAKA,
JESSUPP, ADILLANERVO,FORSTER j, ges, et sir Louis MBANEFj,ge
ad hoc, joignentà l'arrêtles exposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé)P. C. S.

(Paraphé)S. A.

ICJ document subtitle

Second Phase

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 18 July 1966

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