Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2009/25
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LHAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada, presiding,
on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)
_____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
er
tenue le mardi 1 décembre 2009, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
des institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du Kosovo
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presidekta
Shi Judges
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Trindade Cançado
Yusuf
Greenwood
Couvgisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
M. Tomka v,ice-président
Shi MM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Grejugesood,
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The authors of the unilateral declaration of independence are represented by:
H.E. Mr. Skender Hyseni,
as Head of Delegation;
SirMichael Wood, KCMG, member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
ProfessoreanD. urphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law,
George Washington University,
Mr.Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Nexhmi Rexhepi,
Ms Vjosa Osmani,
Mr. Qerim Qerimi,
Ms Albana Beqiri,
Mr. Qudsi Rasheed, member of the English Bar,
as Advisers.
For the complete list of delegations of all participants, please refer to CR 2009/24. - 5 -
Les auteurs de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance sont représentés par :
S. Exc. M. Skender Hyseni,
comme chef de délégation ;
SirMichael Wood, KCMG, membre du barreau d’ Angleterre et membre de la Commission
du droit international,
Professeur Sean D. Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire
de la chaire de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
M.Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
S. Exc. M. Nexhmi Rexhepi,
Mme Vjosa Osmani,
M. Qerim Qerimi,
Mme Albana Beqiri,
M. Qudsi Rasheed, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseillers.
Pour consulter la liste complète de toutes les délégations, prière de se reporter au CR 2009/24. - 6 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitti ng is open. The Court meets this afternoon to
hear the authors of the Unilateral Declaration of I ndependence. Thus I shall now give the floor to
His Excellency Mr. Skender Hyseni.
Mr. HYSENI:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you today. I should
say at the outset how grateful we are to the Court for the invitation to participate both at the written
stage and at this hearing. These proceedings are of great importance for the people of the Republic
of Kosovo, who are following them with keen attention.
A. Kosovo today
2. The question before the Court concerns a pa rticular Declaration of Independence that was
issued on a particular day in February2008. But allow me first to say a few words about the
position of Kosovo today, so as to provide important context to these proceedings.
3. Just a few months after issuance of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of
the Republic of Kosovo came into force in June 2008. This Constitution is consistent with the
Settlement developed in 2007 by the Secr etary-General’s Speci al Representative,
PresidentAhtisaari, for Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo’s Constitution is a modern constitution,
which does reflect the highest international standard s of human and minority rights. It protects the
rights of all citizens of Kosovo and gives special rights to the various communities that live in
Kosovo. The people of Kosovo are very proud of this foundational document.
4. The institutions of the Republic, comp rising all three branches of government, are
well-established. As provided in the Constitution, an Assembly exists for debating and enacting
legislation and has to date passed around 120 laws. Further, a wide range of ministries implement
Kosovo’s laws on matters such as foreign affairs, trade, commerce, environmental protection,
labour relations, agriculture and othe r important matters. An extensive array of civil and criminal
courts operate in Kosovo at both the trial and appellate levels to enforce these laws, and the
Constitutional Court began functioning earlier this year. - 7 -
5. These laws cover crucial areas for eseen in the Ahtisaari Settlement, such as
decentralization of local government, protection of minority rights, and pr otection of cultural and
religious heritage. Both the new Constitution and the adoption and enforcement of these laws have
created the basic prerequisites to implement the Ahtisaari Settlement in its entirety.
6. Despite the contrary assertions of Serbia , and indeed despite Serbian pressure, Kosovo
Serbs are increasingly taking part in institution building in Kosovo. Reconciliation among all of
our communities has been a standing priority of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo. A
Community Consultative Council has been establis hed within the Office of the President of
Kosovo, and the Prime Minister has established a Special Office for outreach to the minority ethnic
communities.
7. The Constitution of the Republic of Kos ovo and a number of laws govern the conduct of
elections in Kosovo. The Law on General Electi ons, as well as that on Municipal Elections, was
passed in June2008. The Kosovo Central Electi on Commission was thus fully charged with the
organization and conduct of the 15 November 2009 el ections for the assemblies and the mayors of
36municipalities across Kosovo. I am pleased to a nnounce to the Court that the participation of
non-majority communities in the November elections was sizeable. Out of 74entities certified to
contest these elections, 40 represent various minority communities. Twenty-two were Kosovo Serb
political entities. The participation of the Serb community members in these elections was
satisfactory in spite of the calls from Belgrade for a boycott. In a resolution adopted last Thursday,
on 26November, the European Parliament welc omed “the unprecedented good participation of
Kosovo Serbs” and it regarded “[t]his as an en couraging indication that the Kosovo Serb
community is willing to take up its responsibilities in the Kosovo institutions”. There is a new
momentum in building up a multiethnic Kosovo.
8. Observer missions to the 15November electi ons in their eventual statements described
those elections as free, fair and democratic. The European Parliament Ad Hoc Delegation
welcomed in its statement the “ongoing decentr alization process and peaceful election day in
Kosovo”. The European Union presidency statem ent “welcomed the orderly conduct of municipal
elections”, as well as a broad participation of di fferent ethnic groups. The orderly conduct of the
November elections was also welcomed in i ndividual statements by many Governments and - 8 -
observer missions from Europe and elsewhere. Very positive reactions on elections came from
NATO Secretary-General, European Union Speci al Representative in Kosovo, Ambassadors from
various States accredited to Pristina, and various national and international NGOs. And the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General “considered the trend towards more active participation by
the Kosovo Serb community as an encouraging step towards longer term reconciliation and
integration with the local community”.
9. The international community has played a vital role in securing peace and security, and in
bringing hope to the people of Kosovo. The UnitedNations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
provided important support for the people of Kosovo, in preparing our institutions so that they
would be ready for independence. Following i ndependence, EULEX is now providing assistance
in the Rule of Law sector. The people of Kosovo are grateful for all the contributions made, and
being made, towards our development.
10. As for our relations with other Stat es, 63nations around the world have recognized
Kosovo as a sovereign and independent State. The vast majority of States in Europe have
recognized Kosovo, including all of our immediate neighbours, except Serbia. Other States have
taken steps that indicate clear acceptance of Kosovo’s sovereignty. A total of 109 States supported
Kosovo’s membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
11. Kosovo has entered into diplomatic re lations with many States. We now have
21 diplomatic missions and nine c onsular posts across the world. We have entered into a number
of bilateral treaties, including with Albania, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Turkey and
the United States of America. On 17 October this year, we concluded a border agreement with the
Republic of Macedonia, as foreseen in the Ahtisaar i Settlement. We have recently concluded our
first treaty succession agreement, with Belgium. Senior officials of Kosovo continue to have
numerous bilateral and internati onal meetings with their opposite numbers from other States, with
both inward and outward visits.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we are at peace today but, as you know, there was
a time when the situation in Kosovo was different . This is well documented, including in the
Yugoslav Tribunal’s Milutinović judgment of February this year. We cannot and should not forget - 9 -
the crimes against humanity and other horrors that we re inflicted upon the people of Kosovo; such
things must never happen again.
13. Yet, Mr. President, we in Kosovo are fi rmly committed and determined to look towards
the future. There is now, finally, peace and s ecurity in Kosovo, and in the region; we are
determined to preserve that peace. There are now constitutional protections of human rights in
Kosovo, and in the region; we are determined to preserve those protections. Now it is more certain
than ever before that the common future for both Kosovo and Serbia lies in eventual membership
for both States in the European Union, as contemplated in the European Commission’s latest report
in October. Indeed, the future for all seven States of the w estern Balkans lies in European
integration.
14. We also look forward to the day when we will be able to take our place as a Member of
the United Nations. The commitments expressed in our Declaration of Independence and in our
Constitution demonstrate our willingness to assume the responsibility of such membership. Indeed,
the Government has adopted a draft law to enable Kosovo to implement Security Council
sanctions, which the Assembly is expected to adopt shortly.
B. The impossibility and futility of further status negotiations
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, with all that has happened, it is inconceivable that
we could accede to Serbia’s call to turn the clock back ⎯ to pursue further negotiations on whether
Serbia will or will not accept Kosovo as an independe nt State. That would be highly disruptive,
and could even spark new conflict in the region. Kosovo’s independence is irreversible and that
will remain the case, not only for the sake of Kosovo, but also for the sake of sustainable regional
peace and security, to which Kosovo’s independence has so greatly contributed.
16. As the Court will recall, by 2005 th ere was widespread agreement within the
international community that the status quo in Ko sovo was unsustainable. Consequently, intensive
negotiations took place throughout 2006 and 2007 on Kosovo’s final status, including on issues
such as decentralization, protection of cultural a nd religious heritage, and minority rights. The
United Nations Special Envoy, MarttiAhtisaari, now a Nobel Peace Prize winner, prepared a
detailed Settlement, including a package of me asures to protect Kosovo’s minorities and a - 10 -
recommendation of independence for Kosovo. In doing so, PresidentAhtisaari recognized that
there was no way that Kosovo and Serbia could remain together in the same State after the horrific
events of the 1990s. The Settlement was endorsed by the European Union and NATO. It was fully
supported by the United Nations Secretary-General. It enjoyed widespread international support.
But it was rejected by Serbia.
17. After a period of discussions in the Secu rity Council and the despatch of a Security
Council mission to the region, the Contact Group, consisting of France, Germany, Italy, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, proposed that a “troika” of officials
from the European Union, the Russi an Federation, and the United States make one last effort to
find common ground between Pristina and Belgrade . German Ambassador WolfgangIschinger
stated at the outset of this effort that no stone should be left unturned in an effort to reach a
mutually acceptable solution.
18. Kosovo did engage in the troika-led ta lks, actively and in very good faith. Yet a
mutually acceptable outcome was still not possi ble, first and foremost because of Serbia’s
intransigence in seeing Kosovo as simply a piece of territory that Serbia must possess, with no
regard whatsoever to the hopes, aspirations, and fears of the people living on the land.
19. With no stone having been left unturned, the people of Kosovo had to move forward.
Lack of clarity about status was holding back our economy, discouraging international investment
and preventing us from accessing international financ ial institution lending. Lack of clarity about
status was preventing the people of Kosovo from taking full ownership over their own democratic
institutions. In short, lack of clarity was denying the people of Kosovo, and indeed the entire
region, of a clear roadmap for the future. We we re exhausted after two decades of isolation, war
and political uncertainty.
20. Lacking any agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, independence was the solution
endorsed by Special EnvoyAhtisaari. Independe nce was the solution en dorsed by the United
Nations Secretary-General. Independence was the solution advocated by many members of the
international community, including States within Eu rope and the Balkans, for they understood that
to prolong Kosovo’s uncertain st atus would have been greatly d estabilizing, threatening the peace
in Kosovo, and in the region, that the internationa l community had striven so hard to achieve. So - 11 -
independence was the course that was ultimately pursued by the people of Kosovo through their
democratically-elected representatives on 17 February 2008.
21. Those who today call for renewed negotiations either are unaware of the situation and the
great efforts made to achieve consensus or, worse, actively seek to create disorder in the region.
Those who have recognized Kosovo in the region, in particular all of Kosovo’s immediate
neighbours except Serbia, have continually emphasized this point.
C. The Declaration of Independence
22. Mr. President, I now address more specifica lly the Declaration of Independence that was
issued by the representatives of the people of Kosovo on 17 February 2008.
23. The Declaration is reproduced at Annex 1 to our first Written Contribution. After several
preambular provisions, there are 12operative pa ragraphs. Paragraph1 states: “We, the
democratically-elected leaders of our people, he reby declare Kosovo to be an independent and
sovereign state.”
24. As expressed in our Declaration, as well as in our Constitution, Kosovo is committed to
international law, including binding resolutions of the Security Council. That commitment has
never wavered. Each time I have been to the S ecurity Council this year, I have reiterated this
commitment.
25. Another important aspect of the Declaration of Independence was the commitment, in
paragraph2, to the principles of democracy, secu larism, multi-ethnicity, and non-discrimination.
The fundamentals of human rights are essential to Kosovo. In paragraph 3, we accepted fully all of
the obligations for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Settlement, including the protection and
promotion of the rights of all communities in Kosovo.
26. The final aspect of the Declaration of Indepe ndence that I wish to highlight is that it was
issued in the name of the people of Kosovo, by their democratically-elected representatives
meeting in an extraordinary session, as a constituen t body in Pristina, as a number of States have
3
rightly stressed in their written statements . Issuance of the Declaration was not an act of the
Kosovo, Further Written Contribution, para . 1.23. See, e.g., Austria, para. 8; Germany, pp. 6-7; Luxembourg,
para. 13; Switzerland, para. 79; United Kingdom, para. 1.12; United States of America, pp. 32-33. - 12 -
“Provisional Institutions of Self-Government” (PISG), or of the Assembly of Kosovo acting as one
of the PISG. As I have explained to the Security Council in June this year:
“the independence of the Republic of Kosovo was declared by elected representatives
of the people of Kosovo, including by all . . . repr4sentatives of non-Albanian
communities except the members of the Serb community” .
27. The Declaration of Independence was the ma nifestation and realization of the will of the
people of Kosovo. The will of the people of Ko sovo to determine freely their political status goes
back many years. This was cl ear to all participants in the 1999 RambouilletConference. It was
recognized through the “will of the people” clau se in the Rambouillet Interim Agreement as the
key element in resolving Kosovo’s final status. It was clear immediately after the 1999 conflict,
when resolution 1244 expressly referred to the Ramb ouillet Accords. It was clear throughout the
period of UNMIK administration, and it was full y discussed and considered throughout the final
status negotiations.
D. Kosovo’s future relations with Serbia and the region
28. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the past and suffering that the people of Kosovo have
been through, we still wish for good neighbourly relations with Serbia. We would welcome talks
with Serbia on practical issues of mutual concern. Indeed this was what was foreseen in the
Ahtisaari Settlement, which we wholeheartedly accepted in our Declaration of Independence. Such
talks would be normal between neighbouring sovereign and independent States.
29. But any such talks must be held on an equal basis, between two sovereign States. We
could not enter into negotiations that would bri ng into question our status as a sovereign and
independent State. There can be no going back . Any attempt to do so would be severely
destabilizing and dangerous to peace and security in the region.
30. Regional stability and co-operation with all our neighbours remains one of Kosovo’s key
priorities. We hope that, in due course, the Republic of Serbia will join in the efforts of the other
countries in the western Balkans to establish an environment of co-operation and understanding
throughout the region.
Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record, Sixty-Fourth Year, 6144th Meeting, 17 June 2009, S/PV.6144,
p. 23. - 13 -
E. Presentation of legal argument
31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we c ontinue to rely on what is said in our Written
Contribution of April of this year and in our Fu rther Written Contribution of July. A considerable
number of United Nations Members have submitte d written statements and comments, or will
address the Court during this hearing, in supp ort of the position that the Declaration of
Independence did not contravene a ny applicable rule of international law. We appreciate their
support.
32. Mr. President, our counsel will take you th rough the main elements of our case, leading
to our request to the Court, if it deems it approp riate to answer the quest ion, to find that the
Declaration of Independence of 17February 2008 did not contravene any applicable rule of
international law.
33. Mr. President, I would now most kindly urge you to invite Sir Michael Wood to continue
the presentation of Kosovo’s case. I thank you very much for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Mr.Skender Hyseni, and now call upon
Sir Michael Wood.
Sir Michael WOOD:
II.SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
OF THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you in these
proceedings.
2. I propose, first, to give a brief overview of our legal case. Then, I will take you through
some of the main events between 1998 and2007, that form the essential background to the
issuance of the Declaration of Independen ce. My colleagues MrD . anil üller and
Professor Sean Murphy will then deal in more detail with the legal issues.
A. Summary of legal argument
3. Our legal arguments may be summarized in five propositions. - 14 -
4. First, the Court will need to consider the propriety of answering the question put by the
General Assembly. We note that a number of States have raised serious questions in this regard . 5
5. Second, as many States have made clear in their written pleadings, the General
Assembly’s question to the Court is narrow and precise 6. The question relates solely to the
Declaration of Independence that was issued on 17 February2008. It does not concern questions
of statehood, it does not concern questions of recognition or membership in international
organizations. On that, at least, there seems to be a measure of agreement today. We shall not, for
this reason, react to what Professors Shaw and Kohen said this morning about Kosovo’s statehood
today. We have set out our position on this in ou r written pleadings, in particular in Chapter 2 of
our Further Written Contribution. There is no doubt that Kosovo is today a sovereign and
independent State. The description we heard this morning of the current position of the
international actors in Kosovo has no basis in reality, as we have explained carefully in our Further
Written Contribution.
6. Third, the third proposition is that general international law does not contain rules by
which the legality of a declaration of independe nce, like that of 17February2008, may be
assessed. In particular, the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity could not have operated
to prohibit the issuance of the Declaration.
7. Fourth, nothing in Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999 precluded the issuance of the
Declaration of Independence in 2008.
Ou8r. fifth point is that some States, in their written pleadings, have focused on the principle
of self-determination. We refer to it only as a subs idiary or alternative point. We do not consider
that the Court need reach the issue. But, if it does, we are clear that in February 2008 the people of
Kosovo were entitled to exercise the right of self- determination, and they did so by choosing
5
See the Written Statements of the Czech Republic, pp.3- 5; France, pp.15-33, paras.1.1-1.42; Albania,
pp. 30-37, paras. 54-70; the United States of America, pp. 41-45; and Ireland, pp. 2-4, paras. 8-12, as well as the Written
Comments of France, pp.1-10, paras.4- 23); Albania, pp.24-26, paras.39-43; and the United States of America,
pp. 10-12.
6
See the Written Statements of the Czech Republic, p. 6; Fran ce, p. 36, para. 2.3; Austria, p. 3, para. 2; Egypt,
pp.3-4, para.7; Germany, pp.5-6; Poland, p.4, para. 2.1; Luxembourg, pp.5-6, paras.9-12; the United Kingdom,
p.25, para.1.16; the United States of America, pp.45-46; Se rbia, pp.26-27, paras.19-23; Sp ain, p.7, para.6(iii);
Estonia, p.2; Japan, pp.1 and 2; and of Denmark, p. 2. See also the Written Comments of Norway, p.3, para.7;
Serbia, p.28, para.45; Germany, p.3; the Netherlands, p.2, para.2.1; the United Kingdom, p.5, para.9; and of the
United States of America, p. 10. - 15 -
independence. We share the views of the many States, such as Albania and Switzerland, which
have reached this conclusion . 7
B. Principal events
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the main events leading to the issuance
of the Declaration of Independence, that was done in the name of the people of Kosovo, now nearly
two years ago, on 17February2008. I do so b ecause it is important to understand the context in
which that Declaration came about.
T1h0e. Milutinović judgment of a trial chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal, given on
26February2009, contains an authoritative and t horough account of many of the factual issues
8
relevant to the present proceedings . The Yugoslav Tribunal covered in depth such issues as the
dual nature of Kosovo within the Socialist Federa l Republic of Yugoslavia, the SFRY, and Serbia,
prior to 1989 9; it covers the events of1989, when Ko sovo’s status as a fe deral unit was illegally
10
removed by the Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia’s President, SlobodanMiloševi ć ; and it covers
in detail the events preceding the atrocities of 1998-1999 11; and those atrocities themselves . 12
T1h1e. Milutinović judgment constitutes, to use the words of this Court in its2007
Judgment in the Bosnia v. Serbia Genocide case, “evidence obtained by examination of persons
directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and
experienced in assessing large amounts of factual info rmation, some of it of a technical nature”
(Application of the Convention on the Preven tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p.131,
7See the Written Statements of Switzerland, pp.15-26, paras.57-96; Albania, pp.40-44, paras.75-85;
Germany, pp.32-37; Finland, pp.3-5, paras.7-12; Po land, pp.24-29, paras.6.1-6.16; Estonia, pp.4-12; the
Netherlands, pp.3-7, paras.3.1-3.11; Sl ovenia, p.2; Latvia, p.1, point1; Ireland, pp.8-12, paras.27-34; and
Denmark, pp.12-13. See also the Written Comments of Albani a, pp.31-36, paras.55-65; and of Switzerland, pp.2-3,
paras. 6-9.
8Prosecutor v. MilanMilutinovi ć, NikolaŠainovi ć, DragoljubOjdani ć, NebojšaPavkovi ć, VladimirLazarevi ć,
Sreten Lukić (IT-05-87-T), Judgement,F26b.9 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug). See citations in Written Contribution, paras. 3.20, 3.27, 3.33, 3.49, 3.51,
3.52.
9
Written Contribution, para.3.20.
10Ibid., para. 3.27.
11Ibid., para. 3.33.
12Ibid., paras. 3.49 and 3.51. - 16 -
para. 213; Armed Activities on the Territory of the C ongo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment , I.C.J. Reports 2005 , p.35, para.61). In that Judgment ⎯ the Genocide
Judgment ⎯ this Court, after carefully examining the procedures of the Yugoslav Tribunal,
concluded “that it should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant findings of fact made by
the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have been upset on appeal” (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 , p.134, para. 223).
According to the Court’s Judgment, even Serbia “b ased itself on the jurisprudence of the Tribunal”
(ibid., p. 131, para. 215) at both the trial and appella te levels. Of course, as Members of the Court
will know, the Milutinović judgment is under appeal, and that appeal may include the evaluation
made by the Trial Chamber of some of the facts, the evaluation that it made, but we nevertheless
submit that the Court can attach weight to the Tribunal’s finding of fact relevant to the present
proceedings.
1. Events prior to 1998
12. Mr. President, turning to facts, I want first to recall briefly three important matters from
the past, which still resonate today. I do so becau se Serbia’s view of history, as expressed in its
written pleadings, is distorted and lacks credence. The humanitarian catastrophe of 1998-1999, and
the adoption of resolution 1244, did not come out of the blue.
T1he. first point is this. In the period 1912 to 1918, Kosovo, which for centuries had been
part of the Ottoman Empire, was forcibly o ccupied by the Kingdom of Serbia, and then
incorporated into the new southern Slav State. It was immediately subjected to large-scale
colonization. This was followed by a period of persecution — including what would now be called
“ethnic cleansing”— lasting well into the 1920s 1. There was a further period of brutal
suppression in the 1950s and 1960s, within the Fe deral People’s Republic of Yugoslavia,
orchestrated by its Minister of the Interior, Aleksandar Ranković 14.
13
Written Contribution, paras. 3.03-3.07; Further Written Contribution, paras. 3.08-3.11.
14Ibid., para. 3.13. - 17 -
T1he. second point is this: Kosovo has long had a status distinct from Serbia. Since 1946
it was a federal unit forming a direct part of the Yugoslav Federation, like Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia. Serb ia’s depiction of the constitutional position of
Kosovo as wholly controlled by Serbia is simp ly wrong. Following the Second World War, and
especially under the 1974Constitution of the Social ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),
Kosovo enjoyed the status of a federal unit within the federal Yugoslavia, a status that under the
1974Constitution was, in substance, the same as that of the six republics: it operated, and
represented itself, directly at the federal level 15. Thus, Kosovo had a dual nature, as a unit of a
federal State, like the six republics, and as an autonomous province within Serbia. Under the
federal Constitution, it enjoyed specific constituti onal protections vis-à-vis Serbia, protections
which simply could not survive the dissolution of the federal Yugoslavi a. Kosovo had never
accepted to be simply an autonomous part of a sove reign State of Serbia. Members of the Court,
this is all very well described in the Milutinović judgment of the Yugoslav Tribunal 1. It is also, for
17
example, well set out by Slovenia in its Written Comments .
15. Contrary to what ProfessorKohen annou nced this morning, Kosovo’s autonomy was
forcibly removed by the Miloševi ć régime in 1989 by intimidation, and in contravention of the
18
SFRY, Serbian and Kosovo Constitutions . This is also well descri bed in the Yugoslav Tribunal
in Milutinović 19, and by Slovenia in its Written Comments . Slovenia, for example, describes what
actually happened in the SFRY constitutional c ourt decision, as do we in our Further Written
Contribution. As Slovenia concludes,
“[t]he analysis of the legal history and other events shows that the Constitutional
amendments of 1989 and the laws adopted on these bases regarding the action against
1Written Contribution, paras. 3.15-3.22; Further Written Contribution, paras. 3.17-3.3.28.
1Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević,
Sreten Luki ć (IT-05-87-T), Judgement, 2e0.09 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug), para. 213, cited in Written Contribution, para. 3.20.
1Slovenia, Written Comments, paras. 9-110.
1Written Contribution, paras. 3.23-3.28; Further Written Contribution, paras. 3.29-3.33.
19
Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević,
Sreten Luki ć (IT-05-87-T), Judgement, 2e0.09 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug), paras. 217-221, cited in Written Contribution, para. 3.27.
2Slovenia, Written Comments, paras. 25-34. - 18 -
the autonomy of Kosovo were a violation of the 1974 SFRY Constitution and of the
rule of law principle” .21
T1he. third point dating from before 1999 that I want to recall briefly— and this is still
vivid in the minds of many people living in Koso vo today — is the large-scale discrimination and
22
the human rights violations of the late 1980s that lasted throughout the 1990s . This tragic period
for the people of Kosovo has also been well documented in the Milutinović judgment 23, as well as
in numerous General Assembly a nd Security Council resolutions 24and other United Nations
25
documents referred to in our Written Contribution .
2. The humanitarian catastrophe of 1998-1999
17. Mr.President, I now come to the humanitarian catastrophe of 1998 and 1999. As
Members of the Court will recall, at this time a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo unfolded on an
unimaginable scale. The inability of the new cons titutional structure in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (the FRY) to protect the human rights of the people of Kosovo had become clear in the
1990s. This culminated in crimes against human ity, ethnic cleansing, and other war crimes which
led to massive refugee flows and an IDP crisis: approximately 90 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian
population were driven from their homes, fleei ng, many to the hills, many to neighbouring
countries. The Yugoslav Tribunal in Milutinović found that the attacks on the Kosovo Albanians
were the result of a deliberate policy of the aut horities of the FRY and Serbia, one that vastly
26
exceeded any possible misconduct by Kosovo Albanians . Contrary to Serbia’s claims, there can
be no comparison whatsoever between the massive, officially inspired human rights violations
committed by the Yugoslav and Serbian authoriti es and the acts committed by some Kosovo
21
Slovenia, Written Comments, para. 111.
22
Written Contribution, paras. 3.29-37; Further Written Contribution, paras. 3.34-3.50.
2Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević,
Sreten Luki ć (IT-05-87-T), Judgement, Fe60.09 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug), paras. 223-229, cited in Written Contribution, para. 3.33.
24
General Assembly resolutions 48/153, 20Dec.1993; 49/204, 23Dec.1994; 50/190, 22Dec.1995; 51/111,
12 Dec. 1996; 52/139, 12 Dec. 1997; 53/164, 9 Dec. 1998; and 54/183, 17 Dec. 1999. In 1992, the situation of human
rights in Kosovo was dealt with in the Assembly’s resolutio n 47/147 on the “Situation of human rights in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia” (18 Dec. 1992, para. 14).
25
Paras. 3.34-3.37.
26
Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević,
Sreten Luki ć (IT-05-87-T), Judgement, Fe60.09 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug), passim, for example paras.1156, 1178, cited in Written Contribution,
paras. 3.49-3.51. - 19 -
Albanians in the late 1990s. Nor can the actions of the FRY and Serbia be described as
counter-insurgency actions. They amounted, rath er, to a general attack on the Kosovo Albanian
population.
18. The crisis of 1998-1999 is described in numerous United Nations documents referred to
in our first Written Contribution: documents from the General Assembly, from the Security
Council, from the Secretary-General, from the Commission on Human Rights and its Special
Rapporteur, from the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, and others 27. In May 1999
the Security Council expressed its “grave concer n at the humanitarian crisis in and around
Kosovo” 28. This Court itself had occasion, in June 1999, to refer to “the human tragedy, the loss of
life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo” 29. The General Assembly, in December 1999,
30
condemned “the grave violations of human rights in Kosovo that affected ethnic Albanians” .
19. Mr. President, none of us who watched the images on television, day after day, will ever
forget the columns of terrorized families carrying all their belongings, the very young, the very old,
the trains packed with terrified evacuees, th e crowded camps in neighbouring Macedonia and
Albania, overflowing with people who feared that they would never see their homes again. How
much more vivid must it still be, in the minds of those men, women and children, who lived
through these horrors at first hand! They are re luctant to speak, but— if you press— virtually
every Kosovar has a nightmare story to tell of tho se days, those weeks, those months. The pain is
still there, it does not go away so fast, if at all. It is no wonder that the people of Kosovo cannot
contemplate a future within Serbia.
27Written Statement, paras. 3.47-3.60.
28Security Council resolution 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999.
29Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures , Order of 2June1999 ,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 131, para. 16; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada), Provisional Measures, Order of
2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.265, para.15; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France), Provisional
Measures, Order of 2June1999 , I.C.J. Reports 1999, pp.369-370, para.15; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Germany), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999 , I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 428, para. 15; Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. Italy), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 488, para. 15; Legality of Use
of Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 549, para. 16;
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Portugal), Provisional Measures, Order of 2June1999 , I.C.J. Reports 1999,
p. 663, para. 15; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional Measures , Order of 2June1999 ,
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.768, para.15; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures,
Order of 2June1999 , I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.833, para.15; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 922, para. 15.
30General Assembly resolution 54/183 of 17 December 1999. - 20 -
20. Mr.President, the crisis in Kosovo had worsened so dramatically by 1998, that
diplomatic efforts intensified in the course of th at year. They included action by the Security
Council, which adopted a series of resolutions 3, largely ignored by Miloševi ć, and action by the
Contact Group of six States. Again, these diplomatic efforts are well described in the Milutinović
judgment 32.
21. The negotiating process led by Ambassador ChristopherHill between mid-1998 and
early 1999 made some tentative steps forward. Professor Murphy will describe this in some detail,
because it is important to a proper understanding of resolution1244. He will also cover the
Rambouillet Conference, which ended with th e Kosovo Albanians accepting an agreement
proposed by the negotiators. That agreement was re jected by Serbia. Ultimately, as the Court is
well aware, a number of States then acted to prev ent further, large-scale, catastrophic human rights
abuses in Kosovo.
3. Resolution 1244 and UNMIK (1999-2004)
22. I now turn to the period between June 1999, when Security Council resolution 1244 was
adopted, and 2005, when final status talks were in itiated. As I have said, Professor Murphy will
deal in more detail with 1244 and the Hill and Ram bouillet talks that preceded it. At this stage I
want to stress just one thing. In considering a ll these efforts to bring about an enduring peace, it is
essential to recall the clear distinction, understood by all those involved, between on the one hand,
the establishment of conditions for a peaceful and st able situation on an interim basis and, on the
other hand, the subsequent determination of the final status for Kosovo. Resolution1244 dealt
primarily with the interim period. It hardly touched on final status. It would not have been
conducive to a return to peace and stability in Kosovo to have sought to resolve, back in June 1999,
the final status question. Indeed, it was to be six years before it was felt that the time had come to
commence talks on that issue.
31Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 Mar. 1998, and 1199 (1998) of 27 Sept. 1998.
32Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević,
Sreten Luki ć (IT-05-87-T), Judgement, e0. 09 (available on the ICTY website:
http://www.icty.org/case/milutinovic/4#tjug), Vol. 1, paras. 312-412. - 21 -
23. In the months immediately following June 1999, efforts focused on the return to Kosovo
and to their homes of the one and a half million refugees and displaced persons, and the rebuilding
of their lives. Next came the establishment of the provisional institutions of self-government. It
was only at a much later stage, beginning in 2004, that attention turned to the political process for
Kosovo’s final status. As at Rambouillet, all options were open ⎯ though resolution1244 had
acknowledged that the will of the Kosovo people was a fundamental premise of the political
process that the United Nations would facilitate.
4. Final status talks (2005-2007)
24. So I come to the extensive efforts that were made to resolve Kosovo’s final status. The
Secretary-General, with the support of the Security Council, led that process. Final status talks
were launched in 2005, by which time, as all agreed , the interim status was no longer sustainable.
Comprehensive negotiations then took place that explored all possible aspects of an agreed
solution. After two years of efforts, by the end of 2007 at the latest, all involved, including the
Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, President Ahtisaari (all, that is, except Serbia) came to
see Kosovo’s independence as the only viable option. To prolong final status talks would have
been seriously destabilizing for Kosovo and the W estern Balkans more widely. Only in this
context, did the democratically-elected re presentatives of the people of Kosovo declare
independence.
25. A catalyst for the timing of the final status negotiations was a sudden upsurge of violence
in Kosovo in March2004. We reject the descrip tion of these events given this morning by the
representatives of Serbia. We described what actually happened in our Further Written
Contribution at paragraphs 364-366. There you will see the reality. For example, of the 19 persons
who died, 11 were Kosovo Albanians. Neverthe less, these events of March 2004 came as a shock
to the international community; they came as a shock to the Kosovo authorities and to the people
of Kosovo. But given the unfounded allegations by Serbia, I want to make clear that the Kosovo
authorities immediately condemned the violence and th ey have done all in their power to bring the
perpetrators to justice. - 22 -
26. Following the events of March 2004, th e Secretary-General requested Ambassador Eide
to conduct a general review of the Kosovo opera tion. His initial report of August 2004 suggested
33
that “[r]aising the future status question soon seems ⎯ on balance ⎯ to be the better option” . In
Ambassador Eide’s second report, transmitted to the Security Council in October 2005, he said that
“an overall assessment leads to the conclusion th at the time has come to commence [the final
34
status] process” . As he put it, “Kosovo will either move forward or slide backwards ⎯ having
moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again be allowed to take hold there” 3.
27. In a Presidential statement of 24Octobe r2005, the Security Council agreed with this
assessment, welcomed the Secretary-General’s read iness to appoint a Special Envoy to lead the
process, and reaffirmed “its commitment to the objective of a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo,
36
which must reinforce regional stability” .
28. In November2005, President Ahtisaari was appointed by the Secretary-General as his
Special Envoy to lead the final status process. I shall not rise to the disgraceful assertions of bias
that were heard this morning against the most distinguished Nobel prize-winner and public servant.
The Secretary-General’s letter of appointment, which is Document No. 198 in the Dossier provided
to the Court by the United Nations Secretariat, stated that the Special Envoy would “lead the
political process to determine the future status of Kosovo in the context of resolution 1244 (1999)
37
and the relevant Presidential Statements of the . . . Council” . The Terms of Reference that were
annexed to the Secretary-General’s letter can al so be found at Document No.198. They
emphasized that the Special Envoy “will lead this process on behalf of the Secretary-General”.
They further stated “[t]he pace and duration [and duration] of the future status process will be
determined by the Special Envoy on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking
into account the cooperation of the parties and th e situation on the ground”. The Special Envoy
33
Report on the situation in Kosovo, S/2004/932, 30 Nov. 2004, Enclosure, Dossier No. 71.
34
“A comprehensive review of the situation in Kos ovo”, S/2005/635, 7Oct.2005, Ann., para.62, Dossier
No. 193.
35
Ibid., para. 63.
36Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2005/51, 24 Oct. 2005, Dossier No. 195.
37Letter from Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, 14 Nov. 2005, Dossier No. 198. - 23 -
was to have “maximum leeway in order to undert ake his task” and was “expected to revert to the
Secretary-General at all stages of the process”.
29. Thus Mr. President, Members of the Cour t, President Ahtisaari was acting directly for
the Secretary-General, and had very broad discre tion as to the modalities and duration of the final
status process. There is no indication in the le tter of appointment, or in the Terms of Reference
annexed to that letter, that the settlement of the final status for Kosovo could only occur if it had
the consent of Serbia, or if there were a further decision of the Security Council. That omission
seems to have been deliberate.
30. President Ahtisaari conducted fifteen rounds of negotiations in the course of 2006.
Belgrade’s position throughout was that independence was unacceptable. Belgrade even made the
38
wholly untenable claim that international la w precluded a settlement involving independence .
Kosovo’s position was also clear. Pristina insi sted that the settlement should result in the
independence of Kosovo. But within the framewo rk of independence, there could be far-reaching
protections for minority communities (including within the system of governance of Kosovo),
protections for religious and historic monuments, and of course protections for human rights.
31. Notwithstanding a high-level meeting on 24 July 2006, positions remained far apart. The
ensuing Contact Group statement stressed that “Belgrade needs to demonstrate much greater
flexibility in the talks than it has done so far”, and the Contact Group reiterated that
“once negotiations are underway, they cannot be allowed to be blocked. The process
must be brought to a close, not least to minimise the destabilising political and
economic effects of continuing uncertainty over Kosovo’s future status” 39.
32. In their later statement of 20 September 2006, Contact Group Ministers said:
“Striving for a negotiated settlement s hould not obscure the fact that neither
party can unilaterally block the status pro cess from advancing. Ministers encouraged
38
See Serbia’s opening “platform”, 5 Jan. 2006 (cited in M. Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for
Independence (2009), p.200): a line repeated in the Assembly of Serb ia’s resolution of 14Feb.2007 (Assembly
Resolution following UnitedNations Special Envoy Martti Ah tisaari’s “Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo status
settlement” and continuation of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Priorities/KIM/resolution_kim_e.html).
39High-level meeting on the future status of Kosovo, Contact Group Statement, Vienna, 24 July 2006, (available
at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Statement_of_the_Contact_Group_after_first…
meeting_held_in_Vienna.pdf ). - 24 -
the Special Envoy to prepare a comprehensiv e proposal for a status settlement and on
this basis to engage the parties in moving the negotiating process forward.” 40
33. Then, on 30September2006, while the final status talks were ongoing, Serbia took a
dramatic step that signalled a complete unwillingness to engage in meaningful negotiations. On
that day, Serbia adopted a new Constitution. The new Constitution was narrowly approved a
month later by a referendum in which Kosovo Alba nians were ineligible to participate. The
referendum campaign “emphasised that defending Ko sovo was the main point of the constitution”,
as did Party leaders when urging the Assembly to adopt the Constitution . 41
34. The preamble to the new Constitution of Se rbia, which remains in force to this day,
focuses almost exclusively on Kosovo. It consis ts of just two paragraphs, the second of which
reads:
“Considering [ . . .] that the province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part
of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the
sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and
Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the
state inter42ts of Serbia in Kosovo and Met ohija in all internal and foreign political
relations” .
35. There are many provisions in this Cons titution of 2006 that make the same point. For
example, the Presidential oath commences with the words: “I do solemnly swear that I will devote
all my efforts to preserve the sovereignty and inte grity of the territory of Serbia, including Kosovo
and Metohija as its constituent part” . 43
36. So, Mr.President, in the middle of the final status negotiations, the adoption of this
Constitution signalled a complete entrenchment of Serbia’s position regarding the status of
Kosovo. It also revealed Serbia’s true view as to what “autonomy” would mean for the people of
Kosovo. The Constitution provides that “The s ubstantial autonomy of... the Autonomous
Province of Kosovo and Metohija shall be regulated by the special law which shall be adopted in
44
accordance with the proceedings envisaged for amending the Constitution” . After reviewing this
40
Contact Group Ministerial Statement, New York, 2S0p.06, para.(available on
http://www.unosek.org/docref/2006-09-20_-_CG _Ministerial_Statement_New _York.pdf).
41
International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No.44, 8Nov.2006, Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy
Going Backwards, p.4.
42
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 2006, preamble.
43Ibid., Art. 114.
44Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 182, para. 2. - 25 -
language, the Venice Commission of the Council of Eu rope concluded that “the Constitution itself
does not at all guarantee substantial autonomy to Kosovo, for it entirely depends on the willingness
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serb ia whether self-government will be realised or
45
not” . In other words, under the 2006 Constitution, the Assembly of Serbia, could characterize
Kosovo’s so-called “autonomy” to mean whatever it wanted the concept to mean. Like Humpty
Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass, when they use a word it mean s just what they choose it to
mean ⎯ neither more nor less 46.
37. The adoption of this new Constitution, a ddressing Kosovo in such stark terms, not only
demonstrates Serbia’s entrenched negotiating po sition, and not only Serb ia’s precarious idea of
“substantial autonomy”, but also Serbia’s utter disregard for the will of the people of Kosovo. It is
yet another example of Serbia treating Kosovo as a mere piece of land. For this Constitution was
drafted without any involvement of the institutions or people of Kosovo. The International Crisis
Group concluded that “[t]he main purpose of th e new constitution was to demonstrate Serbian
hostility to and create further legal barriers against, Kosovo independence” 47.
38. Mr. President, Special Envoy Ahtisaari pr esented his draft comprehensive Settlement to
Belgrade and Pristina on 2February2007. On that day, the Contact Group issued a statement
encouraging both Parties “to engage fully and cons tructively with the Special Envoy in this phase
48
of the process” .
39. Further negotiations took place, in th e course of which Kosovo essentially accepted the
Settlement, while Serbia, in a move reminiscent of its actions at Rambouillet eight years before,
presented a whole new version of the documen t, among other things referring to Kosovo
throughout as “the Autonomous Province of Kos ovo and Metohija”, which was to be governed in
45
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No.405/2006 on the
Constitution of Serbia , 19 Mar. 2007, para. 8 (available at the Ve nice Commission’s website
<http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)004-e.pdf>). Art.182, para.2, of the Constitution provides:
“The substantial autonomy of ... the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija shall be regulated by the special
law which shall be adopted in accordance with the proceedings envisaged for amending the Constitution.”
46Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, Chap. VI.
47International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No.44, 8Nov.2006, Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy
Going Backwards, p. 1.
48
Joint Contact Group Statement, 2 Feb. 2007 (available on http://www.unosek.org/docref/Joint Contact Group
Statement 2nd february 2007.doc). - 26 -
accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and within its sovereignty 49 ⎯ and
hence in a manner that would leave Kosovo exposed to future changes in Serbian national law
adopted against its wishes.
40. The Secretary-General presented Preside nt Ahtisaari’s Report on Kosovo’s Future
Status, together with his proposed Settlement, to the Security Council on 26March2007 50. The
Special Envoy’s recommendation was that: “Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised
51
by the international community.”
41. In his report, President Ahtisaari said, “[i]t is my firm view that the negotiations’
potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount
52
of additional talks, whatever th e format, will overcome this impasse” . Indeed, he put it rather
bluntly, “Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy w ithin Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing
short of independence” 53. He was also of the view that
“Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot c ontinue. ... Pretending otherwise
and denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo ’s status risks challenging not only its
own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.” 54
55
42. Ahtisaari explained that reintegrati on into Serbia was not a viable option , and that
56
continued international administration was not sustainable . He concluded that independence with
international supervision was the only viable option 57. President Ahtisaari’s recommendation was
58
endorsed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations .
43. In his covering letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General said:
“Having taken into account the developments in the process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status, I full y support both the recommendation made by
49
M. Weller, Contested Sovereignty: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, 2009, pp. 210-211.
5S/2007/168 and Add.1 [Dossier Nos.203 and 204]. Addendum 2 consists of a note about the availability of
certain maps.
5Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-Gene ral on Kosovo’s future status, S/2007/168, 26Mar.2007,
heading [Dossier No. 203].
5Ibid., para. 3.
5Ibid., para. 2.
5Ibid., para. 4.
5Ibid., paras. 6-7.
56
Ibid., paras. 8-9.
57
Ibid., paras. 10-14.
58
See para. 43 above. - 27 -
my Special Envoy in his report on Kosovo’s future status [that is independence] and
the Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.”
44. In its pleadings before this Court, and in many public statements about these Court
proceedings, Serbia argues that, if Kosovo’s Declaration of Indepe ndence is not found to
contravene international law, ther e will be worldwide repercussions. This is simply not the case.
As Ahtisaari himself underlined:
“Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a
precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopti ng resolution1244
(1999), the Security Council responded to Milosevi ć’s actions in Kosovo by denying
Serbia a role in its governance, placi ng Kosovo under temporary United Nations
administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s
future. The combination of these f actors makes Kosovo’s circumstances
extraordinary.” 59
45. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the next stage was that, at Russia’s suggestion, a
Security Council mission went to the region in April 2007 . Like Ahtisaari, the mission concluded
61
that the positions of the sides remained far apart .
46. A final effort to reach a settlement accep table to both States was undertaken by the
Troika, consisting of very senior representatives of the European Union, the Russian Federation,
62
and the United States of America . In August2007, the Secretary-General welcomed this
initiative, restating his belief that the status quo was unsustainable and requesting a report by
63
December 2007 .
47. Between August and December 2007, over a four-month period, the Troika undertook an
intense schedule of meetings with the parties, w ho were represented at the highest level. They
were fully supported by Contact Group Ministers, who repeated that “striving for a negotiated
settlement should not obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally block the status process
64
from advancing” . The Troika could not achieve a settle ment acceptable to both sides. They
59
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-Gene ral on Kosovo’s future status, S/2007/168, 26Mar.2007,
para. 15 [Dossier No. 203].
60
For the composition and terms of reference of the mi ssion, see letter dated 19 April 2007 from the President of
the Security Council to the Secretary-General, S/2007/220, Ann., Dossier No. 206.
61Report of the Security Council mission on the Kos ovo issue, S/2007/256, 4May 2007, para.59, Dossier
No. 207.
62M. Weller, Contested Sovereignty: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (2009), Chap. 13.
63Available on http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2692.
64Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers, 27Se pt. 2007, S/2007/723, 10 Dec. 2007, Ann. III, Dossier
No. 209. - 28 -
reached the same conclusion as Ahtisaari and the S ecurity Council mission to the region. In their
report, presented to the Council in December, the Troika concluded that “the parties were unable to
reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on
the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo.” 65
48. Thus, Mr.President, Members of the Cour t, by December2007, there was widespread
acceptance, including by the United Nations Secret ary-General and his Special Envoy, that all
efforts to achieve a settlement accep table to both sides had been exhausted. At the same time, it
was not possible to secure a decision of the Security Council on the way forward. It was,
nevertheless, clear that independence, as recomme nded by the Special Envoy and endorsed by the
Secretary-General, was the only outcome acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of
Kosovo. It was clear that to prolong the process would not bring results; rather, it would serve to
destabilize Kosovo and the entire western Balkans.
49. Kosovo was fully prepared to entrench protections for all of the people of Kosovo,
especially the Serb community, within the contex t of independence, consistent with the Ahtisaari
Settlement, and in close co-ordination with the inte rested members of the international community.
This occurred through the Declaration of Inde pendence of 17February2008 and the Constitution
of the Republic of Kosovo, which entered into force on 15 June 2008.
C. Conclusions from the final status negotiations
50. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in concluding let me set out five central
propositions that emerge from these efforts to secure a negotiated final status.
51. First, there was agreement among all major participants that the status quo in Kosovo
was unsustainable 66.
67
52. Second, there could be no return to the pre-March 1999 situation in Kosovo .
65
Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo, S/2007/723, 10 Dec. 2007,
para. 2, Dossier No. 209.
66
See, among many such statements, th e second Eide Report (“A comprehens ive review of the situation in
Kosovo”, S/2005/635, 7 Oct. 2005, Ann., pa ra.63, Dossier No. 193); the Report of the Security Council Mission (“the
current status quo was not sustainabl e”, S/2007/256, 4 May 2007, para. 59,Dossier No. 207); the Contact Group
Ministers on 27 Sep. 2007, who “endorsed fully the United Nations Secretary-General’s assessment that the status quo is
not sustainable” (Statement on Kosovo by the Cont act Group Ministers, New York, 27Sep.2007, S/2007/723,
10 Dec. 2007, Ann. III, Dossier No. 209). Ahtisaari said in his report, “Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue”
(Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, S/2007/168, 26Mar.2007, Ann.,
para. 4, Dossier No. 203). - 29 -
53. Third, once the final status process had started, it could not be blocked and would have to
be brought to a conclusion . In other words, the process could not continue indefinitely and might
lead to a settlement without the consent of one of the parties.
54. Fourth, the Security Council and the Secretary-General entrusted PresidentAhtisaari
with responsibility for the negotiations, including expressly, in his terms of reference, for
determining their duration. He ultimately concluded that negotiations had been exhausted.
A5n5d. fifth, under resolution1244, the final status process was to take into account the
Rambouillet Accords, which meant that any settle ment had to be acceptable to the people of
Kosovo 69. Further, any settlement had to ensure im plementation of standards with regard to
Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character, and promote the future stability of the region 70.
56. Mr.President, it is clear from these propositions that in no sense did Kosovo’s
Declaration of Independence occur as an unexpected or radical event, let alone one that violated
international law. Rather, the issuance of the Declaration came as a natural consequence of the
political process initiated by the Security Council in 2005, that had run its course by the end of
2007.
57. Mr.President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. I thank you for
your attention, and I request that you now call on Mr. Daniel Müller.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Michael Wood. I now call upon Mr. Daniel Müller.
Mr. MÜLLER: Thank you, Mr. President.
67
Contact Group Statement, London, 3J1an2.006 (available on < http://www.unosek.org/docref/
fevrier/statement by the contact group on the future of Kosovo - Eng.pdf>).
68“A comprehensive review of the situation in Kos ovo”, S/2005/635, 7Oct.2005, Ann., para.70, Dossier
No.193; Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a se ttlement of the status of Kosovo, S/2005/709, 10Nov.2005,
Ann., Doss1io.; Contact Group Statemen t, Vienna,Jul06 (available on
<http://www.unosek.org/docref/Statement_of_the_Contact_Group_after_first_
Pristina-Belgrade_High-level_meeting_held_in_Vienna.pdf>); Statement on Kosovo by the Contact Group Ministers,
New York, 27 Sep. 2007, S/2007/723, 10 Dec. 2007, Ann. III, Dossier No. 209.
69Or, as it was put at Rambouillet, in Security Counc il resolution1244(1999), and in the preamble to the
Constitutional Framework of 2001, the final settlement would ha ve to be on the basis of/take full account of “the will of
the people”.
70Statement on Kosovo by the Contact Group Ministers, New York, 27Sep.2007, S/2007/723, 10 Dec. 2007,
Ann. III, Dossier No. 209. - 30 -
III. LA DEMANDE D ’AVIS CONSULTATIF ,LA DÉCLARATION D ’INDÉPENDANCE
ET SA CONFORMITÉ AVEC LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL GÉNÉRAL
Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un honneur et un privilège de me présenter
devant vous cet après-midi pour exposer nos observations concernant la demande d’avis consultatif
dont vous êtes saisis.
1. Par cette demande matérialisée dans sa résolution 63/3 du 8 octobre 2008, l’Assemblée
générale a posé à la Cour la question suivante :
«La déclaration unilatérale d’indépe ndance des institutions provisoires
71
d’administration autonome du Kosovo est-elle conforme au droit international ?»
2. Notre réponse à la question, sir Michael l’a déjà annoncé, est fort simple : aucune règle du
droit international général n’interdit la déclaration d’indépendance du 17 février 2008 proclamée au
nom du peuple du Kosovo par leurs représentants démocratiquement élus. Elle est donc «conforme
au droit international». Il me revient de vous présenter les arguments juridiques qui nous ont
amenés à cette conclusion partagée par la plupa rt des Etats ayant participé à la procédure
écrite (III). Le professeur Murphy expliquera tout à l’heure pourquoi la résolution 1244 (1999) du
Conseil de sécurité 72n’interdit pas non plus la déclaration d’indépendance.
3. Mais permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de commencer ma présentation avec quelques
considérations concernant la dema nde d’avis consultatif et le sens qu’il convient de donner à la
question posée par l’Assemblée générale(I), avan t de dire quelques mots sur la déclaration
d’indépendance des représentants du peuple kosovar en date du 17février2008(II). C’est cette
déclaration qui est, ou devrait être, au centre de la demande d’avis en dépit de la formulation, que
l’on peut trouver maladroite, de la question a doptée par l’Assemblée générale sur proposition de la
seule Serbie. Je vais revenir sur ce point qui semble encore diviser les Etats ayant participé à la
procédure écrite dans un instant.
I. La demande d’avis consultatif et la question de l’Assemblée générale
4. La demande d’avis de l’Assemblée générale, adoptée par 77 voix contre 6 avec
74 abstentions 73, et la question qu’elle contient sont loin de faire le consensus entre les 192Etats
71
A/RES/63/3, 8 octobre 2008 [dossier, pièce n° 7].
72
S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 juin 1999 [dossier, pièce n° 34].
73A/63/PV.22, 8 octobre 2008, p. 11 [dossier, pièce n° 6]. - 31 -
74
Membres des Nations Unies . Dans leurs exposés et observations écrits, plusieurs Etats ont fait
part de leur doutes et objections quant à l’opportunité judiciaire d’y répondre.
5. Eu égard à «l’obligation [de la Cour] de s’assurer, chaque fois qu’elle est saisie d’une
demande d’avis, de l’opportunité d’exercer sa fonction judiciaire, sur la base du critère des «raisons
décisives»» ( Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien
occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil2004 , p.157, par.45), vous devriez, selon la position de
75
plusieurs Etats Membres que nous avons déjà rappelée dans notre contribution écrite
additionnelle 76, refuser de répondre à la demande d’ avis consultatif. Car une réponse
⎯ indépendamment de son contenu ⎯ ne constituerait pas «une participation de la Cour à l’action
de l’Organisation». Pour l’Etat ayant parrainé la résolution 63/3, la Serbie, il s’agit de l’exercice de
son droit de «poser à la Cour une ques tion simple, élémentaire sur un problème qu’ il considère
comme étant d’une importance vitale» 77 Et encore ce matin, M. Dušan [Bataković] a souligné qu’il
s’agit d’une question vitale pour son pays, la Serbie. Tout compte fait, la Cour a été priée d’agir
comme un conseil juridique pour les Etats Membres de l’Organisation. Mais ce n’est aucunement
votre fonction, Messieurs de la Cour : «L’avis est donné par la Cour non aux Etats, mais à l’organe
habilité pour le lui demander» ( Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la
Hongrie et la Roumanie, première phase, avis consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil1950 , p. 71 ; Sahara
occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil1975 , p. 24, par. 31 ; Applicabilité de la section22 de
l’articleVI de la convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 188, par. 31 ; Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le
territoire palestinien occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J.Recueil2004 , p.158, par.47). Jamais il n’a
été question de donner à l’Assemblée générale un avis autorisé du point de vue juridique sur la
conformité de la déclaration d’indépendance. La Cour et la procédure consultative mise à la
disposition des organes de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ne doivent pas être instrumentalisées
74
A/63/PV.22, 8 octobre 2008, p. 12 (sir John Sawers). Voir aussi exposé écrit du Royaume-Uni, p. 21, par. 1.7
ou exposé écrit des Maldives, p. 2.
75
Voir notamment les exposés écrits de la République tchèque (p. 3-5), de la France (p. 15-33, par. 1.1-1.42), de
l’Albanie (p.30-37, par.54-70), des Etat s-Unis d’Amérique (p.41-45) et de l’Ir lande (p.2-4, par.8-12), ainsi que les
observations écrites présentées par la France (p.1-10, p4-23), par l’Albanie (p.24 à 26, par.39 à 43) et par les
Etats-Unis d’Amériques (p. 10-12).
76
Contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 5-8, par. 1.12-1.17
77A/63/PV.22, 8 octobre 2008, p. 2 ; les italiques sont de nous [dossier, pièce n° 6]. - 32 -
ainsi par un Etat pour chercher un «conseil d’ordre juridique» ou pour faire résoudre ses problèmes
par votre haute juridiction.
6. Au cas où vous jugeriez néanmoins appr oprié, Messieurs de la Cour, d’accueillir la
demande d’avis, la Cour doit s’en tenir à la form ulation de la question soumise, sans qu’elle puisse
en élargir les termes. En vertu de sa jurisprude nce, «lorsqu’elle rend s on avis, la Cour est en
principe liée par le libellé des ques tions formulées dans la requête» ( Demande de réformation du
jugement n° 158 du Tribunal adm inistratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1973,
p. 184, par. 41 ; Demande de réformation du jugement n° 273 du Tribunal administratif des
Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 349, par. 47).
78
7. Nous avons expliqué dans nos écritures que la question posée par la Serbie à travers
l’Assemblée générale contient plusieurs éléments biaisés et orientés: la déclaration y est décrite
comme étant «unilatérale», ses auteurs ont été identifiés d’une façon erronée et la question semble
présupposer que le droit international connaît effe ctivement des règles régi ssant des déclarations
d’indépendance. Mais indépendamme nt de ces éléments, la question est précise et restreinte et la
plupart des Etats l’a reconnu dans leurs exposés et observations écrits 79. Selon la Serbie
80
elle-même, la question «ne prête nullement à controverse» et il n’est pas nécessaire «de l[a]
modifier ou d’y ajouter des éléments» 81. M Djerić a réitéré cette position ce matin. Vous êtes
donc appelés à répondre à la seule et unique question, très précise et restreinte, de la conformité de
la déclaration d’indépendance du 17février2008 avec le droit international. Autrement dit, pour
paraphraser les termes de l’avis consultatif sur la Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes
82
nucléaires , la Cour doit déterminer les principes et règles existants et, s’il y en a ⎯ quod non ⎯
78
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, p.126-128, par.7.04-7. 10, contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p.9,
par. 1.21.
79
Voir les exposés écrits de la République tchèque (p.6), de la France (p.36, par. 2.3), de l’Autriche (p.3,
par. 2), de l’Egypte (p. 3 et 4, par. 7), de l’Allemagne (p. 5 et 6), de la Pologne (p. 4, par. 2.1), du Luxembourg (p. 5 et 6,
par.9 à 12), du Royaume-Uni (p.25, par.1.16), des Etats-Un is d’Amérique (p.45 et 46), de la Serbie (p.26 et 27,
par. 19-23), de l’Espagne (p. 7, par. 6 iii)), de l’Estonie (p.2), du Japon (p.1-2) et du Danemark (p.2), ainsi que les
observations écrites de la Norvège (p.3, pa r.7), de la Serbie (p.28, par.45), de l’Allemagne (p.3), des Pays-Bas (p.2,
par. 2.1), du Royaume-Uni (p. 5, par. 9) et des Etats-Unis d’Amérique (p. 10).
80 A/63/PV.22, 8 octobre 2008, p. 2 [dossier, pièce n 6].
81 A/63/PV.22, 8 octobre 2008, p. 2 [dossier, pièce n 6].
82
Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 234, par. 13. - 33 -
les appliquer à la déclaration d’indépendance du 17 février 2008 afin d’apporter à la question posée
une réponse fondée en droit.
8. La question ne porte sur rien d’autre et il n’y a aucune façon, ni aucune nécessité, de lui
83
accorder un sens plus «complet» . Elle ne porte pas sur le pr oblème, différent, de la qualité
étatique de la République du Kosovo aujourd’hui, et nous n’allons pas revenir sur les arguments
dépourvus de tout fondement présentés ce matin. La question ne porte pas non plus sur la légalité
ou l’opportunité de ses soixante-trois reconnai ssances, ou encore des traités conclus par la
République du Kosovo 84, y compris ceux concernant sa pa rticipation à des organisations
85
internationales ou la démarcation de ses frontières . Contrairement à certaines demandes d’avis
consultatif dont la Cour a été saisie dans le passé 86, l’Assemblée a évité de vous demander de vous
prononcer sur les conséquences de la conformi té ou la non-conformité de la déclaration
d’indépendance du Kosovo avec le droit internationa l. Elle vous a seulement demandé si cette
déclaration était interdite par le droit internati onal lorsqu’elle a été adoptée il y a presque deux ans
maintenant. Permettez-moi de faire remarquer pa r ailleurs que, eu égard à son objet, la question
87
semble utiliser la mauvaise forme temporelle .
9. Contrairement à la position présentée à plusie urs reprises par les conseils de la Serbie ce
matin, une éventuelle réponse à la question posée ne concerne pas d’autres cas dans lesquels des
mouvements séparatistes ont tenté ou tentent de réali ser la scission de certaines parties du territoire
d’un Etat préexistant par la force 88. La demande de l’Assemblée générale, rédigée exclusivement
par la Serbie, ne concerne à l’évidence que la déclaration d’indépendance du 17février2008 au
83 Voir l’allégation de la Serbie, observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 28, par. 45.
84
Voir la liste des accords internationaux conclus par la République du Kosovo sur le site de la Gazette officielle
de la République du Kosovo (http://www.ks-gov.net/GazetaZyrtare/MN.aspx).
85
Accord entre la République du Kosovo et la République de Macédoine relatif à la démarcation physique de la
frontière d’Etat, 16 et 17octobre2009, publié sur le site inrnet de la Gazette officielle de la République du Kosovo
(http://www.ks-gov.net/gazetazyrtare/Documents/anglisht-222.pdf).
86
Voir notamment Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en
Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution276(1970) du Conseil de sécurité , avis consultatif ,
C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p.16, Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé , avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p.136. Cf. égalementDifférend relatif à l’ immunité de juridiction d’un rapporteur
spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme , avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 62 et Interprétation de l’accord
du 25 mars 1951 entre l’OMS et l’Egypte, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 73.
87 Exposé écrit de l’Allemagne, p. 8.
88 Observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 12, par. 4. - 34 -
moment et dans les circonstances qui lui sont propres et qui ne correspondent aucunement à la
sombre image que la Serbie veut lui donner.
10. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, si vous considér ez approprié de donner
suite à la demande d’avis, vous de vriez répondre à cette seule question, très précise : la déclaration
d’indépendance du mois de février 2008 était-elle en violation avec les règles applicables du droit
international? Notre réponse est aussi précise que c oncise: ni le droit international général ni la
résolution 1244 du Conseil de sécurité, sur laquelle mon collègue le professeur Murphy va revenir
tout à l’heure, ne contiennent de règles qui s’op posent à la déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo.
Et ceci m’amène à dire quelques mots sur cette déclaration d’indépendance du 17 février 2008.
II. La déclaration d’indépendance du 17 février 2008
11. Pour commencer, Monsieur le président, la issez-moi vous dire une fois pour toute qu’il
n’y a pas de «déclaration unilatérale d’indépenda nce des institutions provisoires d’administration
autonome du Kosovo». La formulation de la questi on par la Serbie est, à cet égard, erronée.
Conformément à l’article1.5 du cadre constitutionnel pour un gouvernement autonome
89
provisoire , les institutions provisoires d’administra tion autonome étaien t l’Assemblée, le
Président du Kosovo, le gouvernement, les tribunaux, ainsi que «[l]es autres institutions et organes
précisés dans le cadre constitutionnel» tel que le médiateur, le ministère public et la chambre
spéciale de la Cour suprême pour toutes les questi ons relatives au cadre constitutionnel. Un regard
rapide sur cette liste ne laisse aucun doute: ces institutions n’ont jamais été les auteurs d’une
déclaration commune et encore moins d’une déclaration d’indépendance.
12. La seule déclaration d’indépendance du 17février2008 est celle qui a été lue en
albanais, qui a fait l’objet d’un vote et qui, par la suite, a été signée par les représentants du peuple
du Kosovo 90. Nous avons déposé auprès du Greffe une reproduction grandeur nature de cette
91
déclaration et avons produit une photocopie de l’original dans notre contribution écrite
accompagnée des traductions anglaise et française. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de
89 o
Règlement n 2001/9 relatif à un cadre oonstitutionnel pour un gouvernement autonome provisoire au Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 mai 2001 [dossier, pièce n 156].
90Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 2, p. 11-14 (p. 235-238).
91Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1 (p. 207 et 209). - 35 -
remarquer que les traductions anglaise et française reproduites dans le dossier soumis au nom du
Secrétaire général 92 ne correspondent pas à l’original albanais de la déclaration telle qu’elle a été
proclamée.
13. Certes, à plusieurs points de vue, la ré union des représentants du peuple lors de laquelle
la déclaration a été votée et signée a pu être confondue avec l’Assemblée du Kosovo. Pourtant, elle
ne constitue pas un acte de cette Assemblée au mê me titre que les lois adoptées par elle dans le
cadre de sa fonction d’institution provisoire d’admi nistration autonome. Il n’est également pas
correct d’affirmer que M.Sejdiu, le président du Kosovo, et M.Thaçi, le premier ministre, ont
endossé la déclaration par leur signature dans le ur qualité d’institutions provisoires ou de membre
d’une institution provisoire. Les circonstances pa rticulières de la session extraordinaire de
93
l’Assemblée, présentées en détail dans notre contribution écrite , montrent qu’il s’agissait d’un
acte particulier adopté au nom du peuple kosovar, par ses représentants démocratiquement élus
réunis en constituante à Pristina.
e
M14. Djerić a voulu vous faire croire que tous les éléments de preuve confirment que
l’Assemblée en tant qu’institution provisoire était l’ auteur de la déclaration d’indépendance. Mais
il a oublié un élément tout à fait crucial. Messieurs de la Cour, il suffit en effet de regarder le texte
de la déclaration qui a été lue publiquement ce jour-l à. Son auteur n’est pas l’Assemblée et elle ne
prétend pas l’être. C’est notamment à cet égard que les traductions dans le dossier soumis au nom
du Secrétaire général sont inexactes. La d éclaration ne commence nullement avec les mots
«L’Assemblée du Kosovo…Approuve», mais, d’une f açon on ne peut plus cl aire, par les termes
suivants: «Nous, les représentants de notre peuple, démocratiquement élus, déclarons…» 94. Ce
membre de phrase suffit à réfuter la position présentée par la Serbie, ainsi que celles de l’Argentine
et de Chypre qui continuent d’insister, sans jamais se référer au texte justement, que la déclaration
est un acte de l’Assemblée du Kosovo. Aucun de ces Etats n’explique cependant pour quelle
raison l’ensemble de la déclaration est ré digée à la première personne du pluriel ⎯ «nous
92 o
Dossier, pièce n 192.
93
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, p. 109-113, par. 6.03-6.12.
94Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 1 de la déclaration d’indépendance. - 36 -
déclarons» , «nous acceptons» 96, «nous adopterons» 9, «nous saluons» 98, «nous invitons et
99 100 101 102
accueillons» , «nous sommes convaincus» , «nous exprimons» et «nous affirmons» ⎯ et
non pas à la troisième personne du singulier, comme ce devrait être le cas si l’Assemblée avait été
l’auteur de la déclaration.
Ils n’expliquent pas pourquoi la déclaration a été rédigée à la main sur du papyrus et pourquoi elle
a été signée par tous les élus du peuple du Kosovo et non pas par le seul président de l’Assemblée.
Et ils n’expliquent pas non plus pourquoi la d éclaration n’a pas été publiée en tant qu’acte des
institutions provisoires dans la gazette officie lle de ces institutions, comme c’est le cas pour
l’ensemble des actes adoptés par l’As semblée agissant en cette qualité . Le texte de la déclaration
l’explique: il ne s’agit pas d’ un acte de l’Assemblée du Kosovo en tant qu’institution provisoire,
mais d’une déclaration faite par les représenta nts du peuple, démocratiquement élus, comme
103
plusieurs Etats l’ont par ailleurs souligné dans leurs exposés et observations écrits .
15. Par leur déclaration, les élus affirmen t la volonté du peuple et proclament que «le
Kosovo est un Etat indépendant et souverain» 10. Le préambule situe cette initiative dans le
contexte historique particulier du Kosovo dont sir Michael vous a déjà présenté les grandes lignes.
16. Mais la déclaration du 17février2008 co ntenait bien plus que la proclamation de
l’indépendance. Comme S.Exc.M.Hyseni l’a déjà dit au début de notre présentation, les
représentants du peuple ont pris, en effet, des engagements fermes quant à quelques principes de
base concernant l’organisation politique du futur Etat ⎯une «république démocratique, laïque et
multiethnique guidée par les principes de non-discrim ination et de la protection égale devant la
95
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 1 et 2 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
96
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 3 et 8 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
97
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 4 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
98Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 5 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
99Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 5 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
100Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 6 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
101
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 7 et 11 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
102
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, annexes, annexe 1, par. 12 de la déclaration d’indépendance.
103
Voir exposé écrit de l’Allemagne, p.6; exposé écr it du Luxembourg, p.6, par.13; exposé écrit du
Royaume-Uni, p.23, par.1.12; exposé écrit de l’Estonie, p.3 et 4; exposé écrit de la Finlande, p.5 et 6, par.13-15;
observations écrites de l’Allemagne, p. 7 ; observations écrites de la Suisse, p. 2, par. 3.
104
Ibid., par. 1. - 37 -
loi» 105conformément aux obligations découlant du plan Ahtisaari 106. Ils ont également pris
107
l’engagement d’une «appartenance responsable à la communauté internationale» , avec toutes les
conséquences qui en découlent. Ainsi, les représentants du peuple n’ont pas seulement réaffirmé la
validité de la résolution1244 (1999), ils ont égal ement invité les présences internationales à
108
continuer de jouer leur rôle dans le futur . De surcroît, ils ont souscrit publiquement et de
manière irrévocable aux obligations international es clés découlant de la Charte des NationsUnies
et de l’acte final de Helsinki, aux obligations concernant le bon voisinage entre Etats, le respect des
frontières et la coopération avec le Tribunal pé nal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. Ils ont également
réaffirmé leur attachement à la paix et à la stab ilité de la région et aux bonnes relations avec leurs
voisins, notamment la République de Serbie 109. Et les représentants de continuer : «Dans tous ces
domaines, nous agirons en accord avec les principes du droit international et avec les résolutions du
110
Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, y compris la résolution1244 (1999).»
L’Etat nouvellement créé a immédiatement endo ssé les engagements et assurances assumées dans
la déclaration comme étant ses obligations intern ationales lorsque le président et le premier
ministre écrivirent aux Etats étrangers afin de demander leur reconnaissance. L’exposé écrit de la
Norvège montre que cette démarche a bien été comprise ainsi 111.
17. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les j uges, on voit mal comment une telle déclaration
par laquelle les représentants démocratiquement élus d’un peuple s’engagent au respect scrupuleux
des règles élémentaires du droit international peut ne pas être conforme à ces règles.
Mais, Monsieur le président, avant d’aborder ce troisième point de ma plaidoirie, puis-je
suggérer que ceci constitue un bon moment pour la pause café habituelle ?
105
Ibid., par. 2.
106
Ibid., par. 3.
107
Ibid., par. 8.
108Ibid., par. 5.
109Ibid., par. 7-11.
110Ibid., par. 12.
111
Exposé écrit de la Norvège, p. 7, par. 22, p. 10, par. 32-34. - 38 -
The PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Müller. I believe that this is a good point of breaking up your
presentation. We shall have a short recess of 15 minutes and we shall come back to you. Thank
you.
The Court adjourned from 4.25 to 4.40 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Now I invite Mr. Müller to continue his presentation.
M. MÜLLER : Thank you.
III. La conformité de la déclaration d’indépendance
avec le droit international général
18. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, pourquoi donc la déclaration
d’indépendance du 17février2008 es t-elle conforme au droit international ou, à vrai dire,
n’était-elle pas en violation de ses règles ? Parce que le droit international ne contient aucune règle
régissant les déclarations d’indépendance, ni négativement ⎯ en les interdisant ⎯ ni positivement
⎯ en les encourageant (A). Notamment le principe de l’intégrité territoriale, sur laquelle ceux qui
soutiennent la position de la Serbie se sont basés pour essayer de démontrer la non-conformité de la
déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo avec le droit in ternational, ne l’interdit aucunement(B).
Constater l’absence de toute règle interdisant la déclaration d’indépendance suffit par ailleurs à
112
répondre à la question posée par la Serbie à travers l’Assemblée générale . Il n’est pas nécessaire,
contrairement aux arguments de l’Etat ay ant parrainé la demande d’avis consultatif 113, de
démontrer que les représentants du peuple kosov ar avaient le droit, reconnu par le droit
international, d’adopter et de proclamer une décl aration d’indépendance. Le droit international
n’en connaît guère, parce qu’il n’encourage pas la sécession, sans pour autant l’interdire.
Toutefois, si, pour répondre à la question, nous de vrions démontrer le droit des Kosovars de se
constituer en Etat indépendant ⎯ ce qui, à notre avis, n’est pas le cas ⎯, nous considérons que le
principe de l’autodétermination des peuples le fonde juridiquement (C).
112
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, p.137-139, par.8.03-806. Voir aussi exposé écrit de l’Albanie, p.27,
par. 45 ; exposé écrit de l’Autriche, p. 14, par.22; exposé écrit de l’Allemagn e, p.8 et exposé écrit du Royaume-Uni,
p. 24, par. 1.14.
113Observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 92, par. 205. - 39 -
A. Le droit international ne règle pas les déclarations d’indépendance
19. Mais, pour revenir à mon premier argument, M onsieur le président, le droit international
ne règle pas les déclarations d’indépendance 114. Il ne s’agit que d’un élément factuel dans le
115
processus qui aboutit, ou n’aboutit p as, à l’établissement d’un Etat en tant que «fait primaire» .
Bien qu’il n’en déplaise au professeur Kohen, le dro it international ne crée pas l’Etat, son sujet par
excellence, mais constate son existence 116, en prend acte et en tire toutes les conséquences. A ce
titre, le droit international ne peut que constater l’existence de la Républi que du Kosovo en tant
qu’Etat souverain et indépendant disposant d’ un territoire, d’une population et d’un pouvoir
politique qui y exerce un contrôle efficace. Mais, Messieurs de la Cour, ce n’est pas la question qui
vous a été posée. La Cour n’est pas appelée à se prononcer sur la qualité étatique de la République
117
du Kosovo . Bien que la déclaration d’indépendance ait sans aucun doute visé ce résultat, ce
118
n’est pas elle qui l’a réalisé au regard du droit international . Il est donc erroné de soutenir
qu’elle produirait un effet au rega rd du droit international et sera it, par conséquent, sujette à ce
droit en raison du fait que les représentants du pe uple kosovar ont exprimé leur volonté de créer un
Etat souverain.
20. Au même titre que le droit international gé néral ne régit pas la création ou la disparition
de l’Etat, il n’est aucunement concerné par l’e xpression de la volonté de créer un Etat dans une
déclaration d’indépendance formulée par des représentant s du peuple. Il ne la qualifie ni de licite,
ni d’illicite et reste indifférent au sort que lui réserve le droit interne de l’Etat directement
114Contribution écrite du Kosovo, p.140-157, par.8. 07-8.37 et contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo,
p. 59, par. 4.03. Voir aussi exposé écrit de la République tchèque, p. 7 ; exposé écr it de la France, p. 35-39, par. 2.2-2.9 ;
exposé écrit de l’Autriche, p. 14 et 15, par. 24 ; exposé écrit de l’Allemagne, p. 27-29 ; exposé écrit du Luxembourg, p. 7,
par.16-17; exposé écrit des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, p. 50- 51; exposé écrit de l’Estonie, p.4; exposé écrit de la
Finlande, p.4-5, par.7 et 10; exposé écrit du Japon, p. 2; observations écrites de l’A llemagne, p. 6 et 7 ou encore
observations écrites du Royaume-Uni, p. 16, par. 33.
115
G.Abi-Saab, «Cours général du droit international public», RCADI, vol.207, 1987-VI, p.68-69 et
«Conclusion», in M. G. Kohen (dir. publ.), Secession: International Law Perspectives , Cambridge University Press,
2006, p.470, P.Daillier, M.Forteau et A.Pellet, Droit international public (Ngyuen Quoc Dinh) , 8 éd., LGDJ, Paris,
2009, p. 574, no339.
116Commission d’arbitrage de la conférence pour la paix en Yougoslavie, avis n 1, 29 novembre 1991, RGDIP,
t.XCVI, 1992, p.264 [dossier, pièce n o233]. Voir aussi avis n o 8, 4 juillet 1992, RGDIP, t.XCVII, 1993, p.588-589
o
[dossier, pièce n 235].
117Voir par. 8 ci-dessus.
118T.Christakis, «The State as a «primary fact»: Some thoughts on the principle of effectiveness», in
M. G. Kohen (dir. publ.), Secession: International Law Perspectives , Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.145. Voir
aussi exposé écrit de l’Autriche, p. 15, par. 25 ; exposé écrit du Japon, p. 2 et 3 ou observations écrites du Royaume-Uni,
p. 18, par. 36. - 40 -
119
concerné . Une déclaration d’indépendance peut bien aller, et va dans la plupart des cas, à
l’encontre des dispositions du droit interne. Ce la n’implique cependant aucunement qu’une telle
120
déclaration est conforme ou contraire au droit international .
21. Contrairement aux allégations erronées et basées dans la plupart des cas sur une lecture
tendancieuse des résolutions de l’Assemblée générale ou du Conse il de sécurité, la pratique
étatique confirme l’indifférence du droit internati onal à la question de la validité d’une déclaration
d’indépendance 121. Nul besoin cependant, Monsieur le président, de remonter loin dans le passé :
les bouleversements intervenus en Europe dans les années1990 suffisent amplement à démontrer
que le droit international ne qualif ie ni de valide ni d’invalide des déclarations d’indépendance en
tant que telle. Nous avons don né dans notre contribution écrite, l’exemple de la déclaration
d’indépendance de la Slovaquie proclamée par le conseil national slova que le 17 juillet 1992,
quelques mois avant la dissolution de la Tch écoslovaquie. Aucun Etat n’a considéré cette
déclaration d’indépendance comme non valide par rapport, ou non conforme, au droit
international 12.
22. Plus particulièrement, Messieurs de la Cour, plusieurs des anciennes républiques
yougoslaves ont proclamé leur indépendance avan t même que la RSFY ait cessé d’exister: la
Slovénie et la Croatie, après avoir interrogé leurs peuples, ont fait des déclarations en ce sens
le25juin1991; la population de la Macédoine a exprimé sa volonté d’indépendance dans un
référendum du mois de septembre1991; et le pa rlement de la Bosnie-H erzégovine a adopté une
résolution de souveraineté le 14 octobre de cette mê me année. Malgré la position ferme de la part
des autorités de Belgrade qui considéraient que ces déclarations et sécessions étaient contraires aux
règles constitutionnelles et mettaient en péril l’inté grité territoriale et les frontières de la RSFY 12,
les Etats européens ont engagé un processus po litique visant la reconnaissance de ces nouveaux
119
Contre : observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 91, par. 201.
120Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 51, par. 73 ou
Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise , fond, arrêt, 1925, C.P.J.I. série A n°7 , p.19. Voir aussi
l’article3 des articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour it internationalement illicite, NationsUnies, Aesemblée
générale, résolution A/RES/56/83, 12 décembre 2001, annexe et son commentaire dans Ann. CDI, 2001, vol. II, 2partie,
p. 37-39. Cf. exposé écrit du Royaume-Uni, p. 58-59, par. 5.2-5.7 ; exposé écrit des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, p. 51.
121
Observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 92 et 93, par. 206.
122Contribution écrite du Kosovo, p. 144, par. 8.15.
123Ibid., p. 150, par. 8.27 et p. 151, par. 8.29. - 41 -
Etats. Personne n’a suggéré que les déclarations d’ indépendance violaient le droit international. Il
est par ailleurs remarquable que, dans le cadre de la conférence pour la paix en Yougoslavie, la
commission d’arbitrage composée d’éminents jurist es de plusieurs Etats s’est prononcée, en droit,
sur les demandes des nouveaux Etat s à être reconnus. Et pourtant, dans aucun de ses avis
concernant ces demandes, la co mmission ne soulève ou n’examin e la question d’une prétendue
conformité ou non-conformité des déclarati ons d’indépendance avec le droit international 124.
Certes, en ce qui concerne la Bosnie-Herzégovi ne, la commission a émis des doutes quant à la
125
réalité de la volonté de la population de se constituer en Etat souverain ; mais elle n’a ni
condamné la déclaration déjà faite ni empêch é la tenue d’un référendum afin de dissiper ces
126
doutes . En 1996, la Cour de céans, après avoir ét abli que la République de Bosnie-Herzégovine
était devenue un Etat Membre des NationsUnies, a dit: «Peu importent alors les circonstances
dans lesquelles elle a accédé à l’indépendance» (Application de la convention pour la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 611, par. 19).
23. Plusieurs Etats ont cependant prétendu lo rs de la phase écrite que les déclarations
d’indépendance sont en tant que telles effectivement soumises au respect du droit international
parce que, dans certaines situations comme une tenta tive de création d’un Etat par l’emploi ou la
menace de la force d’un Etat tiers ou l’instau ration d’un régime fondé sur l’apartheid ou la
discrimination raciale, ces déclarations ne sont pas reconnues par la communauté internationale,
voire sont invalidées par le Conseil de sécurité . La déclaration d’indépendance dont vous êtes
127
saisis ne rentre à l’évidence dans aucun de ces cas de figure . Mais il ne résulte aucunement des
exemples donnés dans les exposés et observations écr its que de telles déclarations d’indépendance
proclamées en recourant à la force armée, par exemple, soient intrinsèquement non valides; leur
condamnation par le Conseil de sécurité et la comm unauté internationale résulte plutôt du principe
selon lequel il ne faut pas reconnaître une situati on créée par une violation grave d’une obligation
124 os
Commission d’arbitrage de la conférence pour la paix en Yougoslavie, avis n4, 5, 6 et 7, 11janvier1991,
RGDIP, tome XCVII, 1993, p. 564 à 583.
125
Commission d’arbitrage de la conférence pour la paix en Yougoslavie, avis n°4, 11janvier1991, RGDIP,
tome XCVII, 1993, p. 567, par. 4.
126Ibid.
127Cf. observations écrites de l’Albanie, p. 29, par. 51. - 42 -
découlant d’une norme impérative du droit intern ational général ou prêter aide ou assistance au
maintien d’une telle situation 12.
24. La création de l’Etat est toujours un simp le fait au regard du droit international, même
aujourd’hui, et le «demi-siècle d’évolution du droit international» 129auquel la Serbie veut faire
croire n’y a rien changé. La pratique étati que concernant les déclarations d’indépendance
proclamées au début des années 1990 par les anci ennes républiques de l’ex-Yougoslavie confirme
nettement la proposition que le droi t international n’interdit pas de telles déclarations. Celle du
17février2008 constitue la dernière des déclara tions d’indépendance des unités fédérées de la
RSFY et s’intègre dans le processus de la dissolu tion de l’ancienne Yougoslavie. Les événements
extraordinaires commençant en 1988/1989 ont poussé les républiques à déclarer leur indépendance,
tout comme ces événements, aggravés par la cat astrophe humanitaire de1998/1999 et ses suites,
ont finalement confirmé au peuple kosovar qu’il n’ y avait pas d’autre possibilité que de choisir la
même voie. La conformité de ces déclarations avec le droit international n’a jamais été remise en
question. Certes, le droit international a joué un rôle lors de l’identification des nouveaux Etats à
travers les critères factuels bien connus. Mais le droit s’est borné à constater l’existence de ces
nouveaux Etats ⎯ ni plus, ni moins.
B. La règle de l’intégrité territoriale n’interdit pas la déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo
25. Il n’y a donc rien dans l’ordonnanceme nt juridique international qui interdit la
déclaration d’indépendance du 17 février2008. En particulier le principe qui garantit la
souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale des Etat s ne s’oppose aucunement à l’adoption de la
130
déclaration d’indépendance par l es représentants du peuple kosovar . Bien qu’il soit
incontestable que l’établissement de la République du Kosovo en tant qu’Etat souverain remet en
cause l’emprise territoriale de la Serbie, la déclaration d’indépendance ne constitue pas une
violation de la règle de l’intégrité territoriale te lle qu’elle est aujourd’hui consacrée par le droit
international.
128
Art.41, par.2, des articles sur la responsabilitl’Etat pour fait internationale ment illicite, NationsUnies,
Aesemblée générale, résolution A/RES/56/83, 12 décembre 2001, annexe et son commentaire ( Ann. CDI, 2001, vol.II,
2 partie, p. 122-124). Voir également contribution écrite du Kosovo, p. 145 et 146, par. 8.18.
129
Observations écrites de la Serbie, p. 95.
130Contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 60-75, par. 4.05-4.30. - 43 -
26. Il ressort clairement de la formulation de l’ article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte, ainsi que
de tous les autres instruments juridiques qui consacrent le principe de l’intégrité territoriale, que
«[l]es Membres de l’Organisation [c’est-à-dire les Etats ] s’abstiennent, dans leurs
relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l’emploi de la force … contre
l’intégrité territoriale ou l’indépendance politique de tout Etat» 131.
132
Cette disposition qui reflète la règle coutumière impose donc aux seuls Etats de respecter
l’intégrité territoriale d’autres Etats. Elle ne pe ut être appliquée à des situations se produisant à
l’intérieur d’un même territoire et ne peut s’appliquer à des décl arations d’indépendance qui, par
133
principe, sont formulées par des entités non étatiques .
27. Le même raisonnement s’impose quant au principe connexe de la stabilité des frontières :
134
il ne s’applique, comme nous l’avons démontré dans notre contribution écrite additionnelle ,
qu’aux modifications coercitives des frontières d’un Etat par un autre Etat et ne peut pas être
invoqué par un Etat contre sa propre population.
28. Dans ce domaine, Monsieur le président, il apparaît que le droit des gens porte bien mal
son nom ⎯ si on ignore l’origine latine du terme ⎯ et ne s’impose qu’aux Etats. Il ne protège ici
l’entité souveraine que contre ses pairs, l’Etat contre l’Etat.
29. Les résolutions de l’Assemblée générale qui, selon les dires de la Serbie (réitérées par le
professeur Shaw ce matin) et quelques autres Etats, élargissent le champ d’application du principe
de l’intégrité territoriale et interdiraient par là mê me des déclarations d’indépendance, ne font rien
de tel. Ni la résolution 1514 (XV) de l’Assemblée générale, ni la déclaration relative aux principes
du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les Etats conformément
à la Charte des NationsUnies de1970 135, ni non plus la résolution1244 du Conseil de sécurité,
dont le professeur Murphy parlera dans un instant, et aucun autre des textes invoqués par la
Serbie 136ne s’éloigne du champ d’application restreint de l’article2, paragraphe4, de la Charte.
131Les italiques sont de nous.
132Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et cont re celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) ,
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 99-101, par. 188-190.
133Voir contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p.61- 63, par.4.06-4.09; observa tions écrites de l’Albanie,
p.29, par.49-51; observations écrites de la Suisse, p. 2, par.3; observations écrit es du Royaume-Uni, p.19-22,
par. 39-45.
134Contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 65 et 66, par. 4.12.
135Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, résolution 2625 (XXV), 24 octobre 1970, annexe.
136
Contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 63-65, par. 4.10-4.11. - 44 -
Qui plus est, elles le confirment à l’instar de la clause de sauvegarde cont enue dans l’article46,
paragraphe1, de la déclaration des Nations Un ies sur les droits des peuples autochtones que le
professeur Shaw a mentionnée, en passant, sans en dire le texte. Elle prévoit :
«Aucune disposition de la présente déclar ation ne peut être interprétée comme
impliquant pour un Etat, un peuple, un groupement ou un individu un droit
quelconque de se livrer à une activité ou d’accomplir un acte contraire à la Charte des
Nations Unies, ni considérée comme autorisant ou encourageant aucun acte ayant
pour effet de détruire ou d’amoindrir, to talement ou partiellement, l’intégrité
137
territoriale ou l’unité politique d’un Etat souverain et indépendant.»
Cette disposition ne reconnaît simplement pas de droit à l’indépendance aux entités non étatiques,
pas plus qu’elle ne les autorise ou encourage à décl arer leur indépendance. Mais, contrairement à
la lecture biaisée à laquelle s’est livrée la Serb ie, elle n’impose aucunement un devoir aux entités
138
non étatiques de s’abstenir à de tels actes. Elle ne les interdit point .
30. L’article46, paragraphe1, de cette déclar ation, ainsi que maintes autres résolutions de
139
l’Assemblée générale , apportent donc la confirmation que le droit international ne favorise pas la
sécession, mais ne l’interdit pas non plus. Le droit international prend seulement acte d’une
sécession réussie. Dans ce cas, «[l]e droit s’incline devant le fait étatique» 14. Au même titre que
141
la sécession, une déclaration d’indépe ndance constitue un «legally neutral act» en droit
international pour emprunter les mots du professeur Cr awford. En tant qu’élément factuel dans la
création d’un nouvel Etat, elle n’est ni encouragée ni interdite en vertu du principe de l’intégrité
territoriale de l’Etat prédécesseur. Elle n’est tout simplement pas concernée par le droit
international.
31. Monsieur le président, Messieurs le s juges, il n’y a donc aucune règle du droit
international général qui régit, et encore moin s qui interdit, la déclaration d’indépendance du
Kosovo. C’est une réponse tout à fait satisfaisante à la question contenue dans la résolution 63/3 de
137
Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, résolution A/RES/61/295, 13 septembre 2007, annexe ; les italiques sont
de nous. Voir également contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 65, par. 4.11.
138Voir aussi observations écrites de l’Albanie, p. 33, par. 58.
139Contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo, p. 63-65, par. 4.10- 4.11.
140A.Pellet, «Le droit international à l’aube du XXI esiècle (La société internationale contemporaine ⎯
Permanences et tendances nouvelles)», Cours euro-méditerranéens Bancaja de droit international , vol.I, 1997, p.59.
Voir aussi exposé écrit de la Finlande, p. 4, par. 6, exposé écrit du Japon, p. 3.
141J. R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2 éd., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 390. - 45 -
l’Assemblée générale. Mais pour dissiper tout doute quant à notre position vis-à-vis du principe de
l’autodétermination et du droit à l’indépendance, permettez-moi d’en dire quelques mots.
C.Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, le peuple kosovar était autorisé par le droit
international de se constituer en Etat
32. Monsieur le président, ma première remarque concer nant la question d’un droit à
l’indépendance demeure toujours la même: il n’ est pas nécessaire que vous décidiez de cette
question. Elle n’est pas incluse dans celle de l’ Assemblée générale. Il ne vous a pas été demandé
si la déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo est autori sée par le droit international, mais si elle y
142
était conforme . J’y ai déjà apporté notre réponse et il n’y a rien à y ajouter, je crois.
33. Mais, et ceci est ma deuxième remarque , il ne s’agit aucunement d’une dérobade
contrairement aux allégations que vous avez dû entendre ce matin . Nous pensons que le peuple du
Kosovo avait le droit de disposer de lui-mê me et a pu l’exercer, en2008, en choisissant
143
l’indépendance dans les circonsta nces particulières de l’espèce . Car deux conditions sont
remplies :
⎯ D’abord, la population du Ko sovo constitue un peuple, un grou pe susceptible d’être titulaire
d’un droit à l’autodéterm ination (interne d’abor d, externe si cela devient nécessaire). Le
préambule du cadre constitutionnel pour un gouvern ement autonome provisoire promulgué en
2001 par le représentant spécial du Secrétaire général utilise à plusieurs reprises la qualification
de «peuple» du Kosovo et l’article 1.1 précise sans ambiguïté : «Le Kosovo est une entité sous
administration internationale provisoire qui, ains i que son peuple, présente des caractéristiques
144
historiques, juridiques, culturelles et linguistiques uniques.» On a également dit que,
lorsqu’elle octroie à la population du Kosovo un statut d’autonomie substantielle, la
142
Contribution écrite du Kosovo, p. 157-158, par. 8.38-8.41, contribution écrite additionnelle du Kosovo,
p. 75-76, par. 4.31, p. 86, par. 4.53. Voir aussi exposé écrit de l’Allemagne, p. 8, observations écrites du Royaume-Uni,
p. 5-6, par. 10.
143
Contribution écrite additi onnelle du Kosovo, p.76-86, par.4.32-4.52.Voir aussi les exposés écrits de la
Suisse, p. 15-26, par. 57-96, de l’Albanie, p. 40-44, par. 75-85, de l’Allemagne, p. 32-37, de la Finlande, p. 3-5, par. 7-12,
de la Pologne, p. 24-29, par. 6.1-6.16, de l’ Estonie, p. 4-12, des Pays-Bas, p. 3-7, par. 3.1-3.11, de la Slovénie, p. 2, de la
Lettonie, p. 1, point 1, de l’Irlande, p. 8-12, par. 27-34 et du Danemark, p. 12-13 et les observations écrites de l’Albanie,
p. 31-36, par. 55-65 et de la Suisse, p. 2-3, par. 6-9.
144Règlement n 2001/9 relatif à un cadre constitutionnel pour un gouvernement autonome provisoire au Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 mai 2001 [dossier, pièces n o156]. - 46 -
résolution1244 (1999) admet non seulement l’ex istence d’un groupe distinct, mais lui
reconnaît un véritable droit d’autodétermination sans oser le terme 14.
⎯ En second lieu, les atrocités commises à l’en contre de la popul ation du Kosovo dont
sirMichael vous a parlé tout à l’heure, ains i que l’attitude dont la Serbie a fait preuve
depuis1999 jusqu’à aujourd’hui vis-à-vis de la population qui habite le territoire du Kosovo
n’ont laissé au peuple aucun autre choix que de se déclarer indépendant. Dans ce cas, le droit
international, le droit des gens, doit reconnaître un droit à la sécession, non pas pour punir
146
l’Etat responsable, mais pour sauver les êtres humains qui souffrent de son fait .
34. Ces considérations clôturent ma présentation. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président et
Messieurs les juges, pour la bienveillante atte ntion que vous m’avez accordée. Je vous prie,
Monsieur le président, de donner maintenant la parole à mon collègue, le professeur Sean Murphy.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Müller, for your presentation. I now call upon
Mr. Murphy to take the floor.
Mr. MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. President.
IV. T HE D ECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE DID
NOT CONTRAVENE RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)
1. It is a great honour and pleasure to appear once again before this Court.
2. Mr. Müller has just addressed why the Decl aration of Independence by Kosovo cannot be
regarded as a violation of general international law. I will now explain why the Declaration did not
contravene United Nations Security Council reso lution1244. My presentation will address five
key points.
3. First, resolution 1244 (1999) contained no prohibition, express or implied, on a declaration
of independence, nor any requirement of Serbia’s consent to such a declaration.
145
Dans ce sens, voir C.Tomuschat, «Secession and self-détermination»,dans M. G. Kohen (dir. publ.),
Secession: International Law Perspectives , Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 34 et P.Weckel, «Plaidoyer pour le
processus d’indépendance du Kosovo : réponse à Olivier Corten», RGDIP, vol. 113, 2009, n 2, p. 264.
146
Voir C.Tomuschat, «Secessi on and self-détermination», dans M. G. Kohen (dir. publ.), Seceesion:
International Law Perspectives , Cambridge University Press2006, p. 41, M. N. Shaw, International Law , 6 éd.,
Cambridge University Pr ess, 2008, p.523 et A.Pellet, «Le droit international à l’aube du XXIcle (La société
internationale contemporaine — Pe rmanences et tendances nouvelles)», Cours euro-méditerranéens Bancaja de droit
international, vol. I, 1997, p. 58. - 47 -
4. Second, the lack of any requirement of Serbian consent is confirmed by resolution 1244’s
assertion that the final status process must take into account the March 1999 Rambouillet Accords.
Those Accords contained no requirement of Serbian consent to the determination of Kosovo’s final
status, and instead anchored the final status determination upon “the will of the people” of Kosovo.
5. Third, as anticipated in resolution1244 , the international civilian presence in Kosovo
facilitated the final status process which commenced in 2005 and ended in 2007. A decision by the
people of Kosovo to pursue independence did not cont ravene or inhibit “facilitation” of this final
status process; rather, the decision was fully consistent with the process.
6. Fourth, United Nations officials authori zed to set aside inconsistent measures by
authorities in Kosovo did not set aside the Declar ation of Independence. This reaction strongly
supports the proposition that the issuance of the Declaration did not violate resolution 1244.
7. And fifth, for various reasons, the Declar ation of Independence cannot be regarded as a
violation of international law either as an ultra vires act of the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government (PISG) or as a contravention of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional
Self-Government, promulgated by the Secretary- General’s Special Representative in Kosovo
(SRSG) in 2001.
A. Resolution 1244 (1999) contained no prohibition, express or implied, on a declaration
of independence, nor any requirement of Serbian consent to such a declaration
8. Turning to my first point: Serbia has repeatedly asserted that resolution1244 prohibited
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Yet Serb ia is unable to point to any such language in
resolution 1244.
9. There is no reference of any kind in th e resolution to a declaration or statement by
Kosovo’s leaders, let alone a reference that prohib its such a declaration. The lack of any such
provision may be contrasted with a different S ecurity Council resolution relied upon by Serbia
itself this morning, and that is Security Council resolution 787, which was adopted in 1992 147. In
paragraph 3 of that resolution, as counsel for Serbia noted, the Security Council turned its attention
to the possibility of a declaration of indepe ndence by the leaders of Republika Srpska in
147
Security Council resolution 787 (1992), 16 Nov. 1992, para. 3. - 48 -
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Worried that such a decl aration might be issued, the Security Council
expressly affirmed in resolution 787 that it would not accept “any entities unilaterally declared”.
10. Yet, in resolution1244, no such language appears, even though it was well known in
1999 that the people of Kosovo desired to establish an independent State. The lack of any such
language we submit makes clear that resolution1244 did not preclude the possible issuance of a
declaration of independence by the representatives of the people of Kosovo.
11. Resolution787 also helps demonstrate two further points. First, even in a resolution
where the Security Council expressly addressed a po ssible declaration of independence, it did not
forbid the issuance of the declaration itself, in the sense of asserting that the declaration in question
would violate an obligation imposed by the Council. Rather, the Council simply stated that it
would not accept any such declaration, such as when c onsidering the admission of an entity to
membership in the United Nations. This approach is consistent with the observation in our written
pleadings that generally the Security Council does not seek to regulate entities other than States 14.
12. Second, although the Council in resoluti on787 opposed RepublikaSrpska’s declaration
under those particular circumstances, the Council nowhere indicated that it regarded all such
declarations as violating general international law. This approach is consistent with our contention
that, as a general matter, international law does not seek to regulate the issuance of declarations of
independence 149.
13. Not only does resolution 1244 lack any reference to a declaration of independence, it also
lacks any provision calling for a final status settlement in which Kosovo remains a part of either the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or Serbia. In this regard, resolution 1244 may be contrasted
with resolution1251(1999), which was adopted in the same month of 1999. In resolution1251,
the Council considered the situation of northern Cyprus and stated, in paragraph 11, that
“a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and
international personality and a single citizensh ip, with its independence and territorial
integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described
in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation,
148
KFWC (Further Written Contribution), paras. 5.67-5.74.
14KWC (Written Contribution), paras. 8.08-8.37. - 49 -
and that such a settlement must exclude uni on in whole or in part with any other
country or any form of partition or secession” 150.
14. Yet, in resolution1244, adopted in the very same month, no statements of any kind are
present indicating that a political settlement for Kosovo must be based on Serbia or the FRY with a
“single sovereignty and international personality”, or that the political settlement must “exclude
secession”. The language is simply not there.
15. Consider two further Council resolutions from 1999 relating to the situation unfolding in
Georgia. In resolution1225 of January1999 and resolution1255 of July1999 ⎯ thus, these are
resolutions that pre-date and immediately post-date resolution 1244 ⎯ the Council expressly called
151
for a “settlement on the political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia” . In other words,
the Council expressly stated that the settlement should be one that involved Abkazia remaining
within the sovereign State of Georgia.
16. Again, in resolution 1244, no such language appears. So, at the end of the day, it is no
surprise that Mr.HansCorell, who was the Legal Counsel to the United Nations when
resolution 1244 was adopted, has opined, in his pr ivate capacity, that resolution 1244 per se “does
not guarantee that Serbia would have maintained Kosovo within its border”, and then it goes on
“that the resolution does not foresee that Kosovo should remain within the borders of Serbia” 15.
17. The lack of any prohibition in resolution 1244 regarding a declaration of independence,
or any demand that Kosovo stay within Serbia, is readily confirmed by the fact that all the key
leading participants have viewed resolution124 4 as establishing a “status-neutral” framework.
Now counsel for Serbia this morning spoke of a “status-neutral” approach by the United Nations
today, but the point is that everyone views reso lution1244 itself as a “status-neutral” framework.
The Secretary-General repeatedly refers to resolution1244 as “status-neutral” 153, as does the
154 155
SRSG . Members of the Security Council refer to the resolution in this way . Even Serbia has
150Security Council resolution 1251 (1999), 29 June 1999, para. 11.
151
Security Council resolution1225 (1999), 28 Jan. 1999, para.3; Security Council resolution1255(1999),
30 July 1999, para. 5; emphasis added.
152
Remarks of Hans Corell, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 2008, p. 134.
153E.g., S/2009/300, para. 6.
154E.g., S/PV.6144, p. 4.
155E.g., S/PV.6144, p. 10, Vietnam; ibid., p. 15, China; ibid., p. 19, Uganda; S/PV.6202, p. 20, China. - 50 -
confirmed to the Security Council itself that resolution 1244 is “status-neutral” 156. It is difficult to
see how resolution1244 can, on the one hand, be “status-neutral” and, on the other hand, have
forbidden a particular final status in the form of Kosovo’s independence.
18. Confronted with this difficulty, Serbia at times refrains from arguing that resolution 1244
directly prohibited the Declaration of Indepe ndence, and instead argues that resolution1244
prohibits such a declaration in the absence of Serb ia’s consent. On this reading, it is not the
Declaration per se that violated resolution1244, but instead the issuance of such a declaration in
the absence of Belgrade’s consent.
19. This reading of resolution1244 is equally problematic, for the language of
resolution 1244 nowhere calls for approval by Serbia of Kosovo’s final status. If the Council had
intended to decide that such consent must exis t prior to the resolution of Kosovo’s status, it
certainly could have said so, but it did not. C ouncil resolutions pre-dating resolution1244 had
gone so far as to call for negotiati ons between Belgrade and Pristina 15. In resolution1244,
however, even that language has been dropped.
20. So what did the Council say in resolution 1244 about Kosovo’s final status?
21. The Court will note that most of the resolution was not directed at the issue of Kosovo’s
final status. It was directed at the role of the international community during an interim period. In
paragraph 1 of resolution 1244, the Council states that a political solution to the 1999 Kosovo crisis
will be based on the general principles expressed in Annexes 1 and 2 to the resolution, which were
the principles on which NATO’s military campaign were brought to a close, such as the withdrawal
of all Serbian military and police forces from Kos ovo. Paragraphs2 through4 of the resolution
then indicate the various steps fo r the withdrawal of those forces, while paragraphs5 through11
elaborate on the deployment of the internationa l military and civilian presences to Kosovo.
Virtually all of these provisions are addressing the interim period.
22. Now, in its written and oral pleadings, Serbia relies upon the preambular reference in
resolution 1244, which reaffirms the commitment of Member States to the “territorial integrity” of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Now, this provision is not addressing a commitment of the
156
E.g., S/PV.6202, p. 7, statement of Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremić.
15KFWC, para. 5.32. - 51 -
Security Council, let alone an obligation or pr ohibition imposed by the Council. Further, this
preambular provision only refers to “territorial integrity” “as set out in Annex 2”, and in Annex2
the issue of “territorial integrity” relates solely to “the interim political framework”, meaning the
political framework existing prior to final status.
23. Counsel for Serbia laments that the S ecurity Council could not possibly have been
reaffirming a commitment of Member States that would last only during the interim period. But
the language says what it says. And it differs fro m formulations in prior resolutions. This
preambular provision also refers to “territorial integrity” as set out in the Helsinki Final Act. But as
we explained, at page 147 of our Written Contribution, the principles expressed within the Helsinki
Final Act recognize a variety of competing con cepts, ones that seek to protect territory from
external uses of force but that also seek to promote human rights and the rule of law. As such it is
not possible to ascribe to the Helsinki Final Act a single fixed notion disfavouring the legality of
declarations of independence.
24. Rather than look at the preamble to de termine the Council’s positi on on Kosovo’s final
status, it is necessary to look at the operative part of the resolution, and specifically to
paragraph11, which sets forth the responsibilities of the international civilian presence. Again,
most of paragraph11 is addressing the inte rim period. However, subparagraphs 11 (e) and 11 (f)
state that the international civilian presence’s responsibilities include two things:
“(e)Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status,
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.”
25. Those are the provisions in resolution1244 that speak to Kosovo’s final status and the
Declaration of Independence did not violate th em. When the time came, the UnitedNations did
facilitate the final status talks that were la unched in 2005 and conclude d in 2007, without any
interference by Kosovo authorities, let alone inte rference in the form of a declaration that was
issued in the following year. Nor did the Declaration impede the overseeing of the transfer of
authority to institutions established under a final status settlement.
26. Again, to the extent that it addresses th ese provisions in resolution1244, Serbia simply
tries to read into subparagraphs 11 (e) and (f) a requirement of Serbian consent to the Declaration - 52 -
of Independence. Serbia tries to insist that the words “political process” in subparagraph 11 (e) or
the words “political settlement” in subparagraph 11 (f) must mean “Serbian consent to Kosovo’s
final status”. Obviously the language of paragraph 11 does not say that. Rather, what it does say in
subparagraph 11 (e) is that the future status must take into account “the Rambouillet accords”.
Now, the background and language of those Ac cords make abundantly clear that Serbia’s
interpretation of paragraph 11 as re quiring Serbian consent to final status is completely wrong.
And to confirm this requires some attention to what happened both before and during the
Rambouillet Conference, which takes me to my second point.
B. By contemplating a political process for Kosovo’s final status that takes into account
“the Rambouillet accords”, the Council accepted that the final status
determination would not require Serbian consent
27. In 1998, the Contact Group tasked Amba ssadorChristopher Hill with achieving an
agreement that would stabilize the unfolding Koso vo crisis. The four drafts of the agreement
considered during this “Hill Process” pre-dated the Rambouillet Accords and resolution1244, but
they were important in setting the stage for both th ese instruments. Analysis of the texts confirms
that the idea of a Belgrade-Pristina mutual agreem ent on final status was rejected and ultimately
replaced instead with the idea of a final status settlement based on various factors, the first of which
is the “will of the people” of Kosovo 158.
28. Turning first to the Hill Process, all four drafts of the proposed Hill agreement reflect
that it was not thought possible to resolve Kosovo’s final status at the outset. Instead, the central
focus of the negotiations had to be on establishi ng an interim stage, one designed to create the
immediate conditions for the return to a peaceful and normal life for the inhabitants of Kosovo.
29. A short provision found at the end of each of the Hill drafts very briefly addressed the
process for Kosovo’s final status. This provision avoided prejudging what the final status would be
and, in its fourth and final version, avoided giving Serbia any veto over resolution of that status.
30. In the first Hill proposal of 1 October 1998, the relevant clause stated:
“In three years, the sides will undertak e a comprehensive assessment of the
Agreement, with the aim of improving its implementation and considering proposals
158
KFWC, paras. 5.05-5.18. - 53 -
by either si159for additional steps, which will require mutual agreement for
adoption.”
Hence, the first Hill proposal included an express requirement that the final status determination
would require “mutual agreement” between Belgrade and Pristin a. The second Hill proposal,
1 November 1998, repeated this final provision 160. The third Hill proposal, 2 December 1998, also
161
repeated this provision, but replaced the word “sides” with “Parties” .
31. Yet because this language of “mutual ag reement” would have gi ven Serbia a veto over
future developments, it was not accep table to the Kosovo delegation. Consequently, in the fourth
and final Hill proposal of 27 January 1999, this provision was altered and placed in brackets, so as
to read as follows:
“In three years, there shall be a comp rehensive assessment of this Agreement
under international auspices with the ai m of improving its implementation and
determining whether to implement proposals by either side for additional steps, by a
procedure to be determined taking into a ccount the Parties’ roles in and compliance
162
with this Agreement.”
32. In other words, the last version of the Hill proposals, in that last version, the reference to
“mutual agreement” by the “sides” or the “Partie s” is completely dropped. Instead, the proposed
provision adopted an approach to Kosovo’s final status that would involve a “comprehensive
assessment” under “international auspices” of a “procedure” that would “take into account” the two
sides’ roles in compliance with the agreement. No aspect of this (or any other) provision precluded
the possibility of the people of Kosovo declaring independence or required Serbian consent prior to
determination of Kosovo’s final status.
33. The final Hill proposal was produced afte r the Yugoslav offensive of December1998,
and after the massacre of some 45Kosovo Albanians in the village of Reçak/Ra čak on
15 January 1999. Two days after it was issued, the Contact Group called upon the parties to meet
at Rambouillet for further negotiations. Thus, comi ng only days after the end of the Hill Process,
159
KFWC, para. 5.07; emphasis added.
16KFWC, para.5.07 (“In three years, the sides will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement,
with the aim of improving the implementation and considering proposals by either side for additional steps, which will
require mutual agreement for adoption.”).
16KFWC, para.5.07 (“In three years, the Parties will und ertake a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement,
with the aim of improving its implementation and considerinproposals by either side for additional steps, which will
require mutual agreement for adoption.”).
16KFWC, para. 5.08; emphasis added. - 54 -
and including Ambassador Hill himself as one of the negotiators, the Rambouillet negotiations built
upon the Hill Process.
34. Like the Hill proposals, the Rambouillet In terim Agreement envisaged an interim period
of substantial Kosovo autonomy followed by a fina l settlement. Indeed, the formal title of the
accord is “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo”.
35. Moreover, like the final Hill proposal, the Rambouillet Interim Agreement abandoned the
idea of Kosovo’s final status being determined by “mutual agreement” between Belgrade and
Pristina. The first draft of the Rambouillet Inte rim Agreement, dated 6 Fe bruary 1999, drew upon
that relevant clause in the final part of the last Hill proposal, stating:
“In three years, there shall be a co mprehensive assessment of the Agreement
under international auspices with the ai m of improving its implementation and
163
determining whether to implement proposals by either side for additional steps.”
36. During the course of the Rambouillet nego tiations, however, it became apparent that
some greater content had to be given to the m eans by which Kosovo’s final status would be
determined. In doing so, the negotiators did not return to that original language of “mutual
agreement” in the first three Hill proposals, but instead emphasized the need to base the final status
upon “the will of the people” of Kosovo, in conjunction with certain other factors.
37. Specifically, Chapter8, ArticleI, paragr aph3, of the final version of the Rambouillet
Interim Agreement stated:
“Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international
meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for
Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each
Party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final
Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this 164
Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.”
38. So, Mr. President, Members of the Court, looking at the progression of text from the first
Hill proposal of October1998 to the final vers ion of the Rambouillet Interim Agreement of
March1999, it is quite apparent that the idea of a Belgrade-Pristina mutual agreement on final
status had been dropped, and replaced with the id ea of a final status settlement based on various
factors, the first of which is the “will of the people” of Kosovo.
163
KFWC, para. 5.12.
16Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 23 Feb. 1999, Chap. 8, Art. I (3), reproduced in
S/1999/648, Dossier No. 30. - 55 -
39. Kosovo signed the Rambouillet Interim Agre ement. Serbia did not. Instead, Serbia
sought a wholesale revision of the Rambouillet Accords which, among other things, would have
replaced that final status provision referring to “t he will of the people” with a different provision
that would have required Serbia’s consent to a final status settlement. Specifically, the Serbian
authorities proposed to change the final clause so as to read:
“After three years, the signatories shall comprehensively review this Agreement
with a view to improving its implementati on and shall consider the proposals of any
signatory for additional measures, whose adoption shall require the consent of all
165
signatories.”
The negotiators at Rambouillet rejected Serbia’s pr oposed revision. This failed effort by Serbia
confirms that the Rambouillet Interim Agreement, in its final form, contemplated a final status
process in which “the will of the people” was assign ed a pivotal role, and in which there was no
requirement of Serbian consent.
40. Mr.President, in its pleadings to this Cour t, including this morning, Serbia asserts that
the Rambouillet Interim Agreement accepted that Kosovo would remain a part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia unless Serbia consented. Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the
Rambouillet meeting, the Government in Belgrade had a very, very different view, stating to the
Security Council that the “solution” proposed at Rambouillet constituted an “ultimatum” in which
166
Belgrade was being asked to voluntarily give up Kosovo . Further, in explaining its rejection of
the Rambouillet Accords, Belgrade asserted to the Council that it “cannot agree to the secession of
167
Kosovo and Metohija, either immediately or after the interim period of three years” . Such
assertions were exaggerated, in that the Rambou illet Interim Agreement did not expressly provide
that Kosovo would become an independent State after three years. Yet, by Belgrade’s own
contemporaneous admission in 1999, the Rambouille t Interim Agreement cannot be interpreted as
requiring Serbian consent to independence and Serbia itself did not see it that way.
41. Rather, the provision in the Rambouillet Acco rds calling for a final status to be resolved
after three years based on “the will of the people” was well understood at that time, even by Serbia,
165
KFWC, para.5.13: FRY Revised Draft Agreement, 15Mar. 1999, Chap.8, Art.I(4), reprinted in Weller,
pp. 489-490; emphasis added.
166
S/PV.3989, p. 11.
16S/PV.3988, p. 14. - 56 -
as including the possibility— indeed, perhaps the likelihood— of Kosovo’s emergence as an
independent State after the interim period. And as such, resolution1244’s authorization for the
international civilian presence to facilitate a fi nal status process “taking into account the
Rambouillet accords” cannot be viewed as requiring a process in which Belgrade’s consent was
necessary to a final status settlement. That simply is not what the Rambouillet Accords
contemplated.
C. The political process that ultimately unfolded, including the issuance of the Declaration of
Independence, was fully consistent with requirements of resolution 1244
42. Mr.President, allow me to turn to my th ird point, which is that the political process on
Kosovo’s final status that ultimately unfolded, including the issuance of the Declaration of
Independence in February 2008, was fully consistent with the requirements of resolution 1244.
43. Sir Michael Wood has already described the final status negotiations, as do our written
pleadings 168, and I will not repeat the details of that process, but I do wish to highlight certain
elements that establish consistency with the re quirements of resolution1244, specifically the
requirement that the international civilian presen ce facilitate a “political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords”.
44. First, the Security Council itself determined in 2005 to launch the final status
negotiations. After Ambassador Kai Eide, in Octo ber2005, found that the interim situation in
Kosovo was no longer sustainable, the Security Co uncil agreed with that assessment. Moreover,
the Council expressly stated that it supported “the Secretary-General’s intention to start a political
process to determine Kosovo’s Future Status, as fo reseen in Security Council resolution 1244”. It
further welcomed “the Secretary-General’s readiness to appoint a Special Envoy to lead the Future
169
Status process” . Hence, there is no question that, in 2005, the Security Council commenced the
final status process envisaged by paragraph 11 of resolution 1244.
45. Second, there is also no question as to who was to lead this fina l status process. As
SirMichael noted, the Secretary-General proposed the appointment of former Finnish President
168
KWC, Chaps. V and IX.
16Dossier No. 195. - 57 -
170
MarttiAhtisaari as his Special Envoy for supervising the process , a proposal welcomed by the
President of the Security Council 17. As I am sure that this Court is aware, this was not a casual
selection. President Ahtisaari was already, at that time, a highly rega rded and experienced
diplomat, one who was well respected for his fairness and effectiveness, and who had a proven
track record for resolving difficult conflicts.
46. In addition to welcoming the appointment of PresidentAhtisaari, the Security Council
provided to the Secretary-General for his “refer ence” certain “guiding principles” for the final
status talks that had been developed by the C ontact Group, including the Russian Federation.
Those principles called for the “launch” of a “pro cess to determine the future status of Kosovo in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1244” a nd made clear that this was a process that the
Special Envoy would “lead”.
47. Third, the Security Council fully understood that this process, once begun, must be taken
to a conclusion; it could not c ontinue indefinitely, based on the in transigence of one party or the
other. In those same “guiding principles”, it wa s stated that “[o]nce the process has started, it
172
cannot be blocked and must be brought to a conclusion” . Thus, the Security Council fully
understood in 2005, even in the face of strongly held and quite possibly irreconcilable positions
between Belgrade and Pristina, that the Council was commencing a political process that could not
be blocked and would have to reach a conclusion at the end of the process.
48. Fourth, contrary to the suggestion made this morning by counsel for Serbia, there was no
doubt as to who was to decide whether the process had run its course. The terms of reference
provided by the Secretary-General to President Ahtisaari made clear that while he must engage in
consultations with all the relevant actors, it wa s he— and he alone— who would determine the
“duration” of the process 17.
17Dossier No. 196.
171
Dossier No. 197.
17Ibid., Ann.
17Dossier No. 198. - 58 -
49. Nowhere in the Secretary-General’s recommendation and appointment in 2005 of the
Special Envoy, or in these terms of reference of th e Special Envoy, was it stated that the process
would only end when there was consent by Serbia or a Belgrade-Pristina agreement.
50. Fifth, the Special Envoy clearly fulfilled the mandate given to him by the Security
Council. After receiving his instructions, President Ahtisaari set to work immediately and, over the
course of 15months, conducted extensive negotiati ons with all the relevant parties, including
authorities in Belgrade and Pristina. Most of these meetings took place in Vienna, and while
Kosovo and Serbia were certainly central to them , the meetings also involved a wide array of
experts from the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, international financial
institutions, and others.
51. As Minister Hyseni noted earlier this afte rnoon, no stone was left unturned. But on the
issue of autonomy versus independence, the two sides’ positions remained thoroughly entrenched
and diametrically opposed. The Government in Be lgrade insisted that Kosovo remain a part of
Serbia, while Kosovo authorities, reflecting the long-standing desire of the people of Kosovo,
insisted upon independence.
52. After fully exploring all these avenues, PresidentAhtisaari determined in 2007 that
nothing more could be accomplished through negotiations. He said the potential for “any mutually
agreeable outcome was “exhausted”. No “additiona l talks, whatever the format,” could overcome
174
the “impasse” ; and this conclusion by PresidentAhtisaari about the futility of further
negotiations is certainly consistent with th is Court’s own recognition, such as in the South West
Africa cases, that there comes a time in ne gotiations when “a deadlock” is reached ⎯ when “both
sides remain adamant” in their positions ⎯ in which case, the Court said “there is no reason to
think that the dispute can be settled by further negotiations between the Parties” (South West Africa
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) , Preliminary Objections , Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 346; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
174
Dossier No. 203. - 59 -
175
Series A, No.2 , p.13 (the same)) . PresidentAhtisaari not only concluded that such a deadlock
had been reached, he also concluded that “the only viable option” for Kosovo was independence 176.
53. Thus, in accordance with his terms of refe rence, which stated that the duration of the
status process would be determined by him, Pres ident Ahtisaari concluded that the time for ending
the process had come, and that the only viable political settlement, as envisaged in resolution 1244,
paragraph 11, was independence for Kosovo.
54. To that end, PresidentAhtisaari advanced his “Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo
Status Settlement” and recommended independe nce, a proposal and recommendation fully
supported by the Secretary-General 17. Extensive efforts thereafter to secure Serbian co-operation
failed. And it is only then, with a “real risk of progress beginning to unravel and of instability in
Kosovo and the region” 178, that Kosovo’s democratically elected representatives declared
independence. When one steps back and looks at the totality of this process, it simply cannot be
said that the Declaration was a sudden, surprising, unilateral act, nor one that violated paragraph 11
of resolution 1244.
55. When adopting resolution 1244, the Security Council authorized the international civilian
presence, in paragraph11, to facilitate a politi cal process designed to determine Kosovo’s final
status. That process moved forward and it resulted in conclusions by the Secretary-General and by
his Special Envoy that the status quo was unsusta inable, and that further negotiations would serve
no purpose, and that independence was the only viable option. Under such circumstances, it simply
cannot be said that the Declaration of Independen ce of February 2008 contravened paragraph 11 of
resolution1244. Rather, the Declaration was an obvious and necessary next step for achieving a
final settlement of Kosovo’s status, one that flow ed directly from the conclusions by the very
authorities charged by the Security Council with leading the final status process.
175
See also Oppenheim’s International Law (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds.), Vol. 1, 1182-1183 (9th ed.
1992) (States “are under no legal obligation to reach an areement; nor does any obligation to negotiate necessarily
involve an obligation to pursue lengthy negotiations if the circumstances show that such negotiations would be
superfluous.”).
176
Dossier No. 203.
177Dossier No. 204.
178Dossier No. 82. - 60 -
D. United Nations bodies charged with overseeing implementation of resolution 1244 and
setting aside inconsistent measures in Kosovo did not set aside the Declaration
56. Mr.President, allow me to turn to my fourth point, which concerns the reaction of
relevant United Nations officials and bodies to the issuance of the Declaration of Independence.
57. As the Court is aware, efforts to secu re Security Council endorsement of certain
institutional steps envisaged in the Ahtisaari Settlement were unsuccessful. While such
endorsement was politically desirable, and would have allowed for the termination of UNMIK’s
mandate, such endorsement was not required prior to the issuance of a declaration of independence.
Indeed, contrary to the assertion made this morn ing by counsel for Serbia, the draft resolution
circulated within the Security Council in July 2007, even if it had been adopted, would not have
addressed or authorized the issuance of a declaration of independence.
58. For present purposes, the important fact is that after issuance of the Declaration of
Independence, neither the Security Council, nor the SRSG, chose to proclaim the Declaration null
and void, or to set it aside, though they were empowered to do so. Resolution 1244 specifically
charged the international civilian presence in Kosovo with “overseeing the development of
179
provisional democratic self-gove rning institutions in Kosovo” and, further, the provisional
Constitutional Framework adopted by the SRSG stat ed that he would take “appropriate measures
whenever [PISG] actions are inconsistent with resolution1244 (1999) or this Constitutional
Framework” 180. Counsel for Serbia this morning confirmed that the SRSG was essential the
supreme legislative and executive authority within Kosovo.
59. In fact, prior to the completion ⎯ prior to the completion of the final status process ⎯
the SRSG had ⎯ on several occasions ⎯ taken steps to prevent or set aside actions or declarations
by the interim Kosovo authorities that constituted a move toward independence 18. Yet the SRSG
did not take any such action with respect to the February 2008 Declaration of Independence, which
came after the end of the final status process. By not doing so, we submit, the “supreme
17Resolution 1244, para. 11 (c).
180
Constitutional Framework, Chap. 12, Dossier No. 156.
18KWC, paras. 9.24-26. - 61 -
administrative authority” 182in Kosovo acted in a manner that does not fit Serbia’s claim that the
Declaration violated resolution 1244.
60. There can be no doubt that the SRSG and other United Nations officials considered
whether they should take such action. After issuance of the Declaration, Serbia formally demanded
that the Secretary-General take steps to have the Declaration set aside, by instructing the SRSG to
183
that effect . The Secretary-General did not do so. Nor did the Security Council, either by
resolution or through a statement of its President.
61. Our submission, Mr.President, is that the fact that neither the SRSG, nor the
Secretary-General acted to set aside the Decl aration strongly supports the proposition that the
issuance of the Declaration in February 2008 did not violate resolution 1244.
E. The Declaration of Independence was neither an ultra vires act of the PISG
or a contravention of UNMIK’s constitutional framework
62. I now turn to my fifth and final point . With no support in the language or in the
negotiating history of resolution1244, or in the subsequent practice under that resolution, for the
proposition that the resolution prohibited a declara tion of independence in February 2008, Serbia
resorts to the argument that the Declaration was unlawful in a different way. Specifically, Serbia
attempts to argue that the Declaration was an ultra vires act of the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government, the PISG, or a contraven tion of the SRSG’s provisional Constitutional
Framework for governance within Kosovo. Serbia’s anxious attempt to find some kind of violation
of some instrument is perhaps understandable as a litigation tactic, but it is wholly unpersuasive as
184
a matter of law, for several reasons .
63. First, as discussed by Mr.Müller, the D eclaration of Independence was not adopted by
the PISG. Rather, this particular action was of a very special and extraordinary nature, one taken
by the democratically-elected re presentatives of the people of Kos ovo. That act simply cannot be
judged as the act of a body established under th e Constitutional Framewor k and charged with
18Serbia Written Statement, paras. 895-96.
183
KWC, para. 9.27.
18KFWC, paras. 5.61-5.66. - 62 -
day-to-day administrative responsibilities, governing responsibilities, in Kosovo during the interim
period.
64. Second, even if this action of the represen tatives of Kosovo were to be regarded as an
action of the PISG, the legality of that action ca nnot be judged against standards set forth for the
governance during the interim period. Since the final status process had concluded, issuance of the
Declaration in February 2008 was not an act of an interim institution transgressing its limited
authority; rather, it was the act of a constituent body declaring, in the name of the people, its
readiness to exercise governing authority on a perm anent basis, as contemplated by the political
process that unfolded in resolution 1244.
65. Third, whether or not the PISG issued th e Declaration, it fell to the Secretary-General’s
Special Representative, the SRSG, to dete rmine whether the Declaration was an ultra vires act or
whether it violated the Constitutional Framework that he had promulgated, if that was truly the
case. Yet, as I previously noted, the SRSG took no such action.
66. Now, in this regard, an important point of United Nations institutional law arises. In this
case, the Security Council delegated authority to the Secretary-General and to his Special
Representative in charge of civilian administra tion within Kosovo. In doing so, the Council
provided those officials with authority to develop whatever regulations were deemed necessary to
implement the Council’s resolution in theatre. If there is a question about whether there was a
transgression in theatre of the rules adopted by the SRSG to regulate local matters, considerable
weight should be accorded to that representative to determine whether a transgression has occurred
185
and, if so, to correct it . In this instance, the SRSG’s decision not to declare null, or void, or to set
aside the Declaration as an ultra vires act, or as a violation of his Constitutional Framework, was
an authoritative, or at least highly persuasive , interpretation of what UNMIK’s regulations
required.
67. Fourth, even if one hypothesizes that the Declaration constituted an ultra vires act of the
PISG, or that it violated the SRSG’s Constitutional Framework, Serbia errs in regarding any such
action as a violation of international law as referred to in the question put to this Court by the
185
Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 8, p. 37. - 63 -
General Assembly. Such action would only have been a violation of the domestic law applicable in
Kosovo, for the Constitutional Framework w as an UNMIK regulation and, like all UNMIK
regulations, was part of the local law established fo r the interim administration of Kosovo. In this
respect, the Declaration of Independence would have been ultra vires only in the same way that
most declarations of independence are — as a cont ravention of the constitutional or other domestic
law of the State concerned.
68. Finally, given the several assertions this mo rning that the Declaration brought to an end
the régime under resolution1244, I note that the i ssuance of the Declaration did not terminate or
seek to terminate the role of UNMIK under resolu tion 1244. Resolution 1244 contemplated a role
for UNMIK in both the interim and post-interim periods, which UNMIK continues to fulfil. Serbia
itself accepts that the Declaration did not set aside the mandate of UNMIK and that UNMIK
continued to perform certain functions after the adoption of the Declaration 18. Kosovo accepts that
it is for the Security Council to terminate the international civilian presence in Kosovo and that
resolution 1244 remains the United Nations basis for UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo.
F. Conclusion
69. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as Sir Michael indicated , Kosovo’s basic position
consists of the following five propositions.
70. First, the Court will need to consider the propriety of answering the question put by the
General Assembly. A number of States have raised serious questions in this regard.
71. Second, if it is to be answered, the General As sembly’s question to this Court is narrow
and precise, relating solely to the Declaration of Independence that was issued in February 2008. It
does not concern questions of statehood, recognition, or membership in international organizations.
72. Third, general international law contains no rul es by which the legality of a declaration
of independence may be assessed.
73. Fourth, as I have discussed, resolution1244 of 1999 did not preclude the issuance in
2008 of the Declaration of Independence.
186
Serbia Written Statement, paras. 827 and 834. - 64 -
74. Fifth, while some States have focused on the principle of self-determination, we have
referred to it only as a subsidiary point, since we do not think the Court need reach the issue. But if
it does, it is our submission that the people of Kosovo clearly were entitled to exercise the right of
self-determination, and did so by choosing independence.
75. Mr.President, Members of the Court, for the reasons set forth in our written pleadings,
and at the present hearing, we respectfully request that the Court ⎯ if it deems it appropriate to
respond to the request for an advisory opinion contained in General Assembly resolution 63/3 ⎯ to
find that the Declaration of Independence of 17Fe bruary2008 did not contravene any applicable
rule of international law.
76. This concludes our oral contribution. On behalf of all those who have spoken this
afternoon, I have the honour to thank the Court for its very kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, ProfessorMurphy. This concludes the oral
contribution of the authors of the unilateral decl aration of independence, and brings to a close
today’s hearings. The Court will meet again tomo rrow, at 10a.m., when it will hear Albania,
Germany, Saudi Arabia and Argentina. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 6 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada, presiding, on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)