Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2009/6
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Monday 9 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 9 mars 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire du Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes
(Costa Rica c. Nicaragua)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Judge ad hoc Guillaume
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
TCinçade
Yusuf
Greugesood,
Gjil.eume, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Republic of Costa Rica is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Edgar Ugalde-Alvarez, Ambassador, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
as Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Emeritus Professor of Interna tional Law, Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, Geneva, member of th e International Law Commission, member of
the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, associate member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Sergio Ugalde, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Arnoldo Brenes, Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Ms Kate Parlett, Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, Solicitor
(Australia), PhD candidate, University of Cambridge (Jesus College),
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvillie rs Urbina, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Ricardo Otarola, Chief of Staff to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica,
Mr. Sergio Vinocour, Minister and Consul General of Costa Rica to the French Republic,
Mr. Norman Lizano, Consul General of Costa Rica to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Carlos Garbanzo, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations
Office at Geneva,
Mr. Fouad Zarbiev, PhD candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva,
Mr. Leonardo Salazar, National Geographic Institute of Costa Rica,
as Advisers;
Mr. Allan Solis, Third Secretary at the Embassy of Costa Rica in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Assistant Adviser. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Costa Rica est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Edgar Ugalde-Alvarez, ambassadeur, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du
Costa Rica,
comme agent ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.LuciusCaflisch, professeur émérite de dro it international de l’Institut de hautes études
internationales et du développement de Ge nève, membre de la Commission du droit
international, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut de hautes études internationales
et du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M.SergioUgalde, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Arnoldo Brenes, conseiller principal auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du Costa Rica,
MmeKateParlett, conseiller spécial auprès du ministère des affaires étrangères du CostaRica,
Solicitor (Australie), doctorante à l’Université de Cambridge (Jesus College),
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Aguilar-de Beauvilliers Urbina, ambassadeur du CostaRica auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.RicardoOtarola, chef d’état-major auprès du vice-ministre des affaires étrangères du
Costa Rica,
M. Sergio Vinocour, ministre et consul général du Costa Rica en République française,
M. Norman Lizano, consul général du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M.CarlosGarbanzo, conseiller à la mission pe rmanente du Costa Rica auprès de l’Office des
Nations Unies à Genève,
M.FouadZarbiev, doctorant à l’Institut de haut es études internationales et du développement de
Genève,
M. Leonardo Salazar, Institut géographique national du Costa Rica,
comme conseillers ;
M. Allan Solis, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Costa Rica au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseiller adjoint. - 6 -
The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, former Chairman of the
International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de Droit International; Distinguished Fellow, All
Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of Internati onal Law at the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, United States of America, former member of the
International Law Commission,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member and
former Chairman of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Paul Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the
United States Supreme Court, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Irene Blázquez Navarro, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
Ms Clara E. Brillenbourg, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
New York,
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar
of the United States Supreme Court, member of the Massachusetts Bar, member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit International de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs of Nicaragua,
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua,
as Assistant Counsel. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur du Nicaragua auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, ancien président de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) de l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la McGeorge School of Law de
l’Université du Pacifique à Sacramento (Etats-Unis d’Amérique), ancien membre de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari s Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit international,
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Fole y Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de dro it international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Irene Blázquez Navarro, docteur en droit international public, Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid,
Mme Clara E. Brillenbourg, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux des districts de
Columbia et de New York,
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des
barreaux de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du Massachusetts et du district de
Columbia,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
M. César Vega Masís, directeur, direction des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire,
ministère des affaires étrangères du Nicaragua,
comme conseils adjoints. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. I note initially that Judge Shi, for
reasons made known to me, is unable to take his seat on the Bench today.
The Court meets today to hear the second round of oral argument of the Republic of
Costa Rica. I now give the floor to Professor Crawford.
CMRr. WFORD:
I.G ENERAL ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION
Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in th is opening, I will deal with three issues of a
general character, under each of which I will subs ume arguments made by different counsel for
Nicaragua last week.
A. Sovereignty and the perpetual right of free navigation
2. The first issue is the relationship betw een sovereignty and a perpetual right of free
1
navigation. ProfessorBrownlie dealt with this at length ⎯ without, however, always avoiding
caricaturing our actual position. For example, he attributed to us the view “that the right of
2
navigation referred to in the 1858Treaty is in some sense absolute or peremptory” . In fact the
word “peremptory” appears nowhere in our pleadin gs. The word “absolute” appears four times.
Three times it is used to quote the Central Am erican Court of Justice judgment which says that
Nicaragua’s ownership of the river is “neither absolute nor unlimited” 3. It is used once to say that
4
Nicaragua’s sovereignty is not absolute but is subject to limitations established by treaty . The
paragraphs of the Reply actually cited by Prof essorBrownlie state that Nicaragua cannot limit
Costa Rica’s right of navigation, but they do not suggest that Costa Rica’s treaty right is superior to
Nicaragua’s sovereignty. The two coexist, as they coexist in Article VI of the Treaty.
3. But I would note now that Professor Brownlie has suggested it that the word “peremptory”
could be justified ⎯ not peremptory in the sense of Article53 of the Vienna Convention, but
CR 2009/4, pp. 19-20, paras. 4-9 and pp. 29-35, paras. 46-67.
2
CR 2009/4, p. 30, para. 53, citing RCR, paras. 3.13.-3.25.
3
MCR, para. 2.46; RCR, para. 2.10; RCR, para. 3.33.
RCR, para. 3.09. - 9 -
peremptory in the sense of something required or demanded as of right; something not to be
interfered with. The Permanent Court in the S.S. “Wimbledon” case used the phrase “general and
peremptory” of Article380 of theTreaty of Vers ailles, which required the Kiel Canal to be
“maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and war of all nations at peace with
Germany” (Judgments, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No.1 , p.21): evidently in Article380 vessels of
commerce included passenger ships. ArticleVI of theTreaty of Limits is bilateral rather than
general, but it is equally peremptory in the sense used by the Permanent Court.
4. (Tab52) In 1858 CostaRica expressly r ecognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the
waters of the San Juan. But this sovereignty is conditioned by the rights of free navigation granted
to Costa Rica. Nicaragua made the point itself in its Counter-Memorial:
“The right of free navigation appears as a qualification of the sovereignty of
Nicaragua and is introduced by the term ‘pero’ (but). Thus a particular right of
Costa Rica is presented as a qualification of the general grant of rights (in the form of
title (dominio) and sovereignty (‘sumo imperio’) to Nicaragua.” 5
As you will see from the projection (tab 52 in your folders), the emphasis “qualification” was
Nicaragua’s itself. Its “dominio y sumo imperio” is qualified in the very same sentence by the
rights of free navigation of Costa Rica.
5. CostaRica agrees with the analysis in these passages of the Counter-Memorial, but it
seems that Nicaragua does not. Now it is sovere ignty which overrides rights; the general trumps
the particular. Thus according to Professor Brownlie:
“whatever the precise nature and extent of CostaRica’s rights... Nicaragua must
have the exclusive competence to exercise the following regulatory powers:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(e) the maintenance of the treaty provisions prescribing the conditions of navigation in
accordance with theTreaty; that is to say, the maintenance of the discipline of
6
the Treaty as such, together with the terms of the Cleveland Award” .
6. This is, with all respect, an extraordinary statement. Nicaragua is apparently to have
“exclusive competence” with regard to “the maintenance of the discipline of the Treaty as such”.
That sounds to me like auto-interpretation ⎯ a recipe for indiscipline, not discipline; and certainly
not respect for international law.
5
CMN, para. 2.1.48.
6CR 2009/4, pp. 35-36, para. 67. - 10 -
7. That is not how the Permanent Court, your predecessor, saw the relationship between
sovereignty and obligation in the context of transit rights. In the S.S. “Wimbledon” case, Germany
argued that the terms of a treaty should be restrictively interpreted because it impinged on
Germany’s sovereignty. The Court ⎯ in one of its most famous passages ⎯
“decline[d] to see in the conclusion of anyTreaty by which a State undertakes to
perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty.
No doubt any convention creating an obligati on of this kind places a restriction upon
the exercise of the sovereign rights of the St ate... But the right of entering into
international engagements is an a ttribute of State sovereignty.” ( Judgments, 1923,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 21.)
8. ProfessorBrownlie cited another famous passage, this time of this Court in the Temple
case, on the finality of boundary settlements (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 34) 7. He added:
“In the present case, the analogy with the Temple of Preah Vihear case arises
not from the line of the boundary as such but from the danger of permitting a régime
of navigation which would introduce an elem en8 of legal porosity and instability into
the otherwise lucid attribution of territory.”
9. But it is the 1858Treaty itself which explicitly permits a perpetual right of free
navigation, navigation which is itself a “con tinuously available process”, or should be.
Professor Brownlie invites you to give effect to the boundary defined in the first part of Article VI
but to restrictively interpret, if not eviscerate, the régime of free navigation introduced with the
word “pero” and set out in the second part of Ar ticleVI and elsewhere in theTreaty. It is
Nicaragua that thereby seeks to revise, as distinct from interpreting, the settlement of 1858.
B. The Character of the Treaty of Limits
10. This brings me to my second general point ⎯ the character of the Treaty of Limits. As
to this, Nicaragua made three main arguments.
(a) Nicaragua’s “cloud of duress”
11. The first point was made by Nicaragua’s distinguished and experienced Agent, who said:
“During the next 30 years after the signing of theTreaty of Limits, it caused great resentment in
7
CR 2009/4, p. 20, para. 7.
8CR 2009/4, p. 20, para. 8. - 11 -
9
Nicaragua that thisTreaty had been signed under a cloud of duress.” It is true that the
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of theTr eaty of Limits demonstrate the existence of a
serious conflict over canalization issues, but they do not come close to establishing duress, or even
a cloud of duress ⎯ I am not sure what I would prefer, duress or a cloud. Three quick facts refute
this claim . . .
12. First, the negotiations were mediated and count ersigned by a representative of a neutral
State, Salvador. I invite the Court to read th e Additional Act accompanying the Treaty of Limits,
in which the negotiators expressed their “feelings of gratitude” for the “estimable” and “impartial”
assistance provided by the mediator 10. There is no trace of duress.
13. Secondly, the decree of the President of Nicaragua, approving and ratifying the Treaty of
Limits specifically confirmed that it had been concluded by GeneralJerez firmly “in accordance
with the bases which, for that purpo se, were transmitted to him by way of instructions”, a finding
11
which the Nicaraguan Congress later endorsed .
14. Thirdly, not even Nicaragua pleaded duress before President Cleveland. Instead it relied
on constitutional arguments which George Rives rejected as “untenable” 12.
15. Incidentally, it was implied last week th at Rives shared the assessment of theTreaty as
unfair and unequal so far as Nicaragua is concerned 13. He certainly did not. In the one passage of
his report which might be taken as a comment on the Treaty, he noted:
“that Costa Rica had for nearly the same period of twenty years [viz., 1838-1858] laid
claim to more territory than she obtained under theTreaty of Limits, fully appears
from her decree of ‘Basis and Guarantees’ of the 8th March, 1841 ⎯ which asserts as
the boundaries of CostaRica the line of the River La Flor, the shore of Lake
14
Nicaragua and the River San Juan.”
9
CR 2009/4, p. 11, para. 13 (Argüello).
10
MCR, Ann. 7, pp. 52-53.
11
MCR, Complete Annexes, Ann. 207, p. 53.
12First Report of George L. Rives, 2 March 1888, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 70, pp. 13, 15, 17.
13CR 2009/5, p. 34, para. 21 (McCaffrey).
14
First Report of George L. Rives, 2 March 1888, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 70, p. 7. - 12 -
(b)The “Nicoya theory” is wrong ⎯ but anyway it is irrelevant to the interpretation of the Treaty
16. The second point made under this head by Nicaragua is what I call the “Nicoya theory”.
It was put forward principally by ProfessoB r rownlie, but with loyal support from
Ambassador Argüello and Professor McCaffrey.
17. Nicaragua presented a map attributed to Fermin Ferrer presenting an inflated extension
of the CostaRican province of Guana caste, mistakenly equated to Nicoya 15. What Nicaragua
failed to mention was that Mr. Ferrer was an associate of William Walker, the notorious Filibuster.
Ferrer acted successively as Walker’s Provisional President and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Considering Walker’s well-known intentions of taking over not merely Nicaragua but the canal
route and eventually the rest of Central Ameri ca, it is no surprise his map portrays Guanacaste as
16
reaching east to the Caribbean and south to the Colorado River .
18. (Tab 53) You can see on the screen Professor Brownlie’s own graphic, based on Ferrer’s
map. The area shown in green was labelled by him “Department of Nicoya prior to Treaty”. There
is almost nothing about this map which is accurate. Nicaragua’s case is that this vast area was
“usurped” 17 from it in 1824 in violation of the uti possidetis principle, and that its cession or
relinquishment by Nicaragua was the key feature in the unequal bargain of the Treaty of Limits 18.
19. The first point to note is that there was no breach of uti possidetis. This was not the first
time in Latin American practice that an administra tive unit was detached from one territory to be
integrated into another or to be treated as separ ate. Other examples include Chiapas. On the
19
principle of uti possidetis I refer the Court to our pleadings .
20. The incorporation of Nicoya in Costa Rica was by free decision of its people, it was not a
usurpation. It was ratified by the people of Nicoya no less than seven times 20. It was confirmed by
21 22
the Central American Congress in 1825 . Professor Brownlie made much of the expression “For
15CR 2009/4, p. 24, paras. 22-23, (Brownlie).
16
On Ferrer see http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferm%C3%ADn_Ferrer.
17
CR 2009/4, p. 10, para. 8, (Argüello).
18
CR 2009/4, p. 28, paras. 40-41, (Brownlie).
19RCR, para. 1.23, and App. 1, paras. A15-A28.
20RCR, para. A.17.
21CMN, Ann. 55; RCR Ann. 5; RCR, para. A.17.
22
CR 2009/4, p. 25, paras. 25-26. - 13 -
the time being” in Article 1 of the Congress’s Decree. In fact the same article explains the reason:
“For the time being, and until the demarcation of the territory of each State provided by Article VII
of the Constitution is made . . .” Article VII provi ded for the demarcation of the interior States to
be carried out by special law once the data were available 23. That demarcation was never carried
out, but the process envisaged by ArticleVII was one of demarcation, not the retransfer of an
unwilling people to an unruly province. As Rives said in his report: “in 1858 Costa Rica had been
continuously in possession of the District of Nicoya, under a claim of title, for more than thirty-two
24
years” .
21. The Nicoya question became a question for President Cleveland in the following way. If
Nicoya was part of Nicaragua before 1858 , its cession without the approval of successive
Congresses was unconstitutional and on that basis the Treaty of Limits would have been invalid.
Rives’s First Report thus examined the question in detail.
22. According to Rives:
“The District of Nicoya lies on the Pacific side of the Continent and — roughly
speaking — is triangular in shape, its apex lying towards the South. It is bounded on
the Westwards by the Pacific Ocean and on th e Eastwards by the Gulf of Nicoya and
the Rio del Salto . . . a small stream enteri ng into the head of the Gulf and having its
25
sources not far from the Southerly shore of Lake Nicaragua.”
The northern boundary of the district was the lake and (according to Costa Rica) the La Flor River,
though Rives did not need to decide that. Nor did he need to decide what line joined the source of
the Rio del Salto with “the mouth of the San Juan River at the port of San Juan del Norte”, but he
26
did say that he had “no reason for thinking that it should have been a straight line” , let alone a
straight line shown by Professor Brownlie.
23. (Tab54) What is clear is that Nicoya could not have extended to the mouth of the
Colorado River as Nicaragua portrays it. “The District of Nicoya lies on the Pacific side of the
Continent”, as Rives said; and even when Nicoya was part of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala,
maps showed its boundary extending north from the Rio del Salto to the lake. An example is in
23
www.asamblea.gob.ni/opciones/constituciones/1824-11-22.doc; First Rives Report, CMN,
Complete Annexes, Ann. 70, p. 4.
24
First Rives Report, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 70, p. 5.
25Ibid., p. 3.
26Ibid., p. 6. - 14 -
27
tab 54 in your folders . Quite independently of Nicoya, the northern boundary of Costa Rica ran
along the Desaguadero, as stated in the 1573 Royal Charter 28.
24. Professor Brownlie asserted once more that “the San Juan de Nicaragua River belonged
29
exclusively to the Province of Nicaragua from 1573” . That is not the case. Formally Nicaragua
did not gain a territorial claim on the Caribbean coast until 1745 and even then it was occupied by
the Moskito Indians under a British protectorate that did not end until 1860. In 1858 Nicaragua did
not have possession of the port of San Juan del Norte. This is mentioned in Article 5 of the Treaty
of Limits.
25. In the event, Rives concluded that the 1838 Constitution of Nicaragua “did not definitely
fix the boundaries of the State” 30, and that the 1858Treaty was “a mere treaty of limits, settling
disputed boundaries, and not one involving a cession of territory and an amendment to the
Constitution” 31. It followed that the Treaty of Limits was valid ⎯ a conclusion upheld by
President Cleveland and part of the res judicata in this case.
26. Thus in 1858 Nicaragua abandoned its claim to Nicoya, but it got the area south of the
La Flor River, a strip along the southern shore of the lake, giving it complete control of the lake for
the first time, as well as the whole course of the SanJuan River. This was not an unequal
settlement.
(c) The true object and purpose of the Treaty of Limits
27. That brings me to the third point ⎯ the object and purpose of theTreaty of Limits.
ProfessorBrownlie, consistently with the Nicoya thesis, treated it as entirely about territorial
sovereignty.
28. But that is to ignore the elephant in the room. The elephant in the room ⎯ the obvious
purpose of theTreaty ⎯ was the interoceanic canal. This was why the common defence of the
common bays at each end of the proposed ro ute of the canal was necessary, and the
27
See
http://books.google.nl/books?id=iACOaiasV1oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=rio…
28
Royal Charter to Diego de Artieda, CMN, Ann. 86.
29
CR 2009/5, p. 25, para. 29.
30First Rives Report, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 70, p. 12, para. 29.
31Ibid., p. 11. - 15 -
demilitarization along that route effected by Ar ticleIX. This was why the completely new
boundary south of the lake was so important. This is why the boundary of the two States lay along
the left bank of the SanJuan. And this is why the quid pro quo of freedom of navigation on the
common course of the river was given: it was the only highway in the region ⎯ it still is ⎯ and if
sovereignty over the highway belonged to one Stat e, a broad right of use was in the very same
article in the “pero” clause conceded to the other.
29. (Tab 55) George Rives understood the situ ation perfectly well when, in response to the
tenth question of doubtful interpretation, he defined the “natural rights” of Costa Rica referred to in
Article VIII. Article VIII defined Costa Rica’s droit de regard in relation to a future canal: if
CostaRica’s “natural rights” were not affected by the canalization project, its vote was only
advisory. You will see on your screen, and in your fo lders, how Rives defined those natural rights.
And the crucial phrase is at the end. The natural rights of Costa Rica are those rights which inter
alia she owns: “in that part of the delta of the Ri ver San Juan which she owns or of the portion of
the River itself in which she has perpetual right s of free navigation and other riparian rights” 32.
This is how Rives expressed the subject-matter of the Treaty of Limits from a Costa Rican point of
view. Cleveland’s Award was to the same effect, though he added the words “and perhaps other
33
rights not here particularly specified” , an indication of the extensive approach to the
interpretation of the Treaty of Limits which Cleveland took.
30. I stress: CostaRica’s natural rights accordi ng to Rives extended to “the portion of the
River itself in which she has perpetual rights of free navigation and other riparian rights”. It was
not that theTreaty of Limits was not a territorial settlement ⎯ the view foisted on us by
ProfessorBrownlie. It was a territorial settlement, but it entailed the river, and it did so on a
perpetual basis. If ever there was a treaty establis hing “obligations and rights... relating to the
regime of a boundary” within the meaning of Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention 34, this was
it.
32
Second Rives Report, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 71, p. 15.
33
Cleveland Award, point 10: MCR Ann. 16, p. 99.
34Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 23 May 1978, 1946 UNTS 3, Art. 11 (b). - 16 -
C. The perpetual right of free navigation
31. I turn to what Rives was happy to call ⎯ tout court ⎯ Costa Rica’s “perpetual rights of
free navigation”. Here I need to make three short points.
(a)The right is permanent in character
32. In another of its exercises in revisionism, Nicaragua suggests “that Costa Rica’s rights of
navigation would [not] necessarily be ‘perpetual ’”. Professor McCaffrey stated these rights would
35
effectively cease with the conversion of the river into a canal” . Now this is a further
hypothetical, like the large-scale dredging, and the Court does not need to pronounce on this issue
any more than on dredging. But you will understand that the issue, having been raised by
Nicaragua, requires a response. In fact theTreaty of Limits expressly provides for consultation
with Costa Rica in respect of all future canalization schemes: it was Nicaragua’s failure to comply
with this obligation which led to the case before the Central American Court. I have referred
already to ArticleVIII which provides that “if th e [canal] transaction does not injure the natural
rights of CostaRica, the vote asked for shall be only advisory”. I have already quoted Rives’s
conclusion on what these natural rights are, incl uding the “perpetual rights of free navigation and
other riparian rights”. Rives added that where these natural rights were engaged “Costa Rica would
have a right of veto, and, her assent being essential to the validity of the agreement, she would in
effect become a party to any complete grant for inter-oceanic transit”, though without being
36
entitled to share in “the profits reserved for Nicaragua” . PresidentCleveland answered the
eleventh question accordingly 37. So the Treaty of Limits provided for the eventuality of
canalization, in a form which would preserve the reality of CostaRica’s “perpetual rights of free
navigation and other riparian rights”.
(b)Even if Article VI referred to “articles of trade”, these would be words of extension
33. My second point concerns the dreaded “articles of trade” to which our colleagues say our
freedom is limited. ProfessorKohen will deal w ith the interpretation of the phrase “objetos de
comercio”. In what I say I am going to assume, quod non, that Nicaragua is right in interpreting
3CR 2009/5, p. 29, para. 6 (McCaffrey).
36
Rives Second Report, CMN, Complete Annexes, Ann. 71, p. 15 (response to point 11).
3Cleveland Award, point 11: MCR, Ann. 16, pp. 99-100. - 17 -
this phrase as “articles of commerce”. My point is that even if it means “articles of commerce” or
“articles of trade” these are words of extension, not limitation.
34. Mr.President, Members of the Court, if I gave you a right to transit my river ⎯ a
perpetual right of free navigation ⎯ and I later add the phrase “with articles of trade” I am not
qualifying, limiting or reducing my grant ⎯ I am clarifying and extending it. We are talking about
free navigation ⎯ amongst other things, free of taxes, imposts and charges including customs
duties. I might grant a right of navigation to you but exclude the goods you are carrying. A very
important aspect of the word “free” is the exempti on from customs duties. Article VI extends that
freedom even to goods landed on the opposite side of the river, and ArticleV gave Nicaraguan
goods customs exemption at Punta de Castilla for as long as the then independent port of San Juan
del Norte was not recovered and remained a “ free port”. The additional phrase “with articles of
trade” is not there as a limitation of the right of free navigation; it makes it clear that the freedom
extends to trade goods you may be carrying with yo u. The words are, quite simply, not words of
limitation at all.
35. What would a right of free navigation with articles of trade look like ⎯ how would it
work ⎯ if the phrase “articles of trade” involved a limitation or a restriction, as Nicaragua now
contends? I would start off in the morning with my eggs for market, eggs produced by my riparian
hens: obvious articles of trade. I would be free on the river ⎯ no visas, no taxes, no charges. I
arrive with my eggs, intact I hope, at the busy local market of Sarapiquí and in a trice all my eggs
are sold. But now I have no more eggs, no more articles of trade: how do I get back to my hens ?
In selling my articles of trade I have sold my freedom on the river for the day. I am stuck; I have
to go to San José to get a visa, in the course of doing which I spend all the profits I have made from
selling my eggs! This one-way freedom is no freedom at all ⎯ the freedom to leave the river with
no right of return. And it is no answer for Mr .Reichler to say that riparians are exempt from
visas38: that is a mere concession. ArticleVI makes no distinction between riparians and
non-riparians.
38
CR 2009/4, p. 24, para. 43 (Reichler). - 18 -
36. (Tab56) Let me issue a formal challenge to colleagues opposite. Find me a treaty
providing for freedom of navigation for persons if, and only if, they are carrying trade goods. This
is what such a provision should look like: “but the Republic of Costa Rica shall have the perpetual
right of free navigation on the said waters, if and only if [si y sólo si] such navigation is with
39
articles of trade . . .” That is not what ArticleVI says. The Nicaraguan argument based on
“articles of trade” is, with great respect, obvious nonsense.
(c) Nicaragua’s argument based on “articles of trade” is inconsequential
37. But there is a further problem with Nicar agua’s distinction between voyagers with and
without trade goods ⎯ blankets and beads. It is entirely inconsequential in terms of the régime
applied in practice. I confess, Am bassadorArgüello, that I have been to the river: I went there
without any articles of trade. But it made no difference whether I had articles of trade or not. No
one asked if I was carrying articles of trade; no one ch ecked the boat for safety, or for articles; we
stopped, I paid, the boatman paid ⎯ though he was local ⎯, we stopped repeatedly at army posts;
no services were performed, no checks were carried out; we stopped, we paid, we stopped some
more, eventually we left. We were wiser for the experience, no doubt ⎯ but poorer and
completely unserviced by Nicaragua.
38. Again the point is a short one. The lawy er’s argument based on “objetos de comercio”
bears no relation to the actual régime of reporting, certification, payment, imposts, applied on the
river. It is entirely inconsequential. Trade goods have nothing to do with it.
Outline of Costa Rica’s reply
39. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this concludes my initial general remarks. With
your permission, Mr.President, ProfessorKohe n will now deal in more detail with the
interpretation of ArticleVI; ProfessorCaflisch will deal with the right of regulation and the
individual Nicaraguan measures; I will return to discuss public navigation, related rights and
remedies, and Ambassador Ugalde will conclude.
Mr. President, I would ask you now to call on Professor Kohen.
3Spanish version: “pero la República de CostaRica tendr á el derecho perpetuo de libre navegación en dichas
aguas, entre la desembocadura de río indicada y el punto, a tres millas inglesas de distancia de Castillo Viejo, si y sólo si,
esta navegación es con artículos de comercio . . .” - 19 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford, for your presentation. I now give the
floor to Professor Marcelo Kohen.
M. KOHEN :
II. LARTICLE VI DU TRAITÉ DE LIMITES SE RÉFÈRE «AUX FINS DU COMMERCE »
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, lors du premier tour de plaidoiries, la Partie
adverse a maintenu son interprétation de l’expression «con objetos de comercio» comme signifiant
uniquement «marchandises». Il est vrai que ses conseils ont suivi des pratiques différentes.
Antonio Remiro, et par la suite Alain Pellet, ont préféré la formule «avec des objets de commerce».
D’ailleurs, le premier a aussi employé «av ec des choses faisant l’objet de commerce».
Antonio Remiro a employé «avec des choses faisant l’objet d’activités commerciales» 40. Certes, il
41
a aussitôt affirmé que cela voulait dire, en bon français, «avec des marchandises» . Paul Reichler
et StevenMcCaffrey ont, quant à eu x, choisi de ne pas s’aventure r dans des traductions et ont
employé directement l’espagnol tout au long de le urs exposés, et ceci alors même que Cleveland a
42
utilisé l’expression «purposes of commerce» . IanBrownlie, pour sa part, après avoir cité
correctement l’articleVI dutraité Cañas-Jerez a ajouté: «the words «for the purposes of
43
commerce» are not accepted by Nicaragua as an accurate translation into English» . M. Brownlie
n’a pas pour autant indiqué depuis quand le Nicaragua refuse cette traduction et comment cet Etat
l’a fait savoir.
2. Il doit être troublant pour une partie qui se présente devant votre Cour et qui conteste
l’interprétation et la traduction d’un traité, de ne pas être capable de produire une version du traité
allant dans son sens. D’autant plus que la Cour dispose de la seule version que la Partie a produite
et qui exprime exactement le contraire de ce qu’elle prétend devant votre prétoire.
3. L’objet de mon exposé sera de réfuter les arguments avancés par le Nicaragua la semaine
dernière relativement à l’expression controversée. Conformément à vos instructions, je ne
40CR 2009/4, p. 36-37, par. 2, 5 et 6.
41
CR 2009/4, p. 46, par. 42 (Brotóns).
42CR 2009/5, p. 9-12, par. 6, 9, 11, 13, 14 (Reichler) , CR 2009/5, p.28-31, par. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 (McCaffrey).
43CR 2009/4, par. 19 (Brownlie). - 20 -
reviendrai pas sur les questions que nous avons soulevées lors du premier tour et au sujet
desquelles nos contradicteurs ont gardé un silence éloquent.
4. Le plan de mon exposé est le suivant: premièrement, j’aborderai les arguments de la
Partie adverse sur le sens des termes «con objetos de comercio» en général. Deuxièmement, la
pertinence pour cette affaire de la traduction identique faite par les parties à l’occasion de
l’arbitrage du président des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. Troisièmement, la conception très étroite que
le Nicaragua adopte relativement à la notion de «c omercio», démontrant que cette notion inclut le
transport de passagers en général et de touristes en particulier. Quatrièmement, je me référerai à la
pratique subséquente, qui confirme l’interprétation que nous avons faite de l’articleVI du traité
Cañas-Jerez. Cinquièmement, je viendrai sur les digressions temporelles d’Alain Pellet relatives à
l’interprétation évolutive des traités.
A. L’interprétation du membre de phrase «con objetos de comercio»
5. Antonio Remiro nous a accusé d’avoir transformé ⎯ je cite ⎯ «l’acception courante et
naturelle de l’expression objetos de comercio , à laquelle l’articleVI du traité lie le droit de libre
navigation, en un concept «finaliste», selon lequel objets de commerce ne représenterait pas des
choses, des marchandises, mais des fins, des objectifs commerciaux» 44.
6. Primo, mon ami et contradicteur suppose bien rapidement et, ceci sans preuves à l’appui,
qu’il n’existe qu’une seule acception courante et naturelle de l’expression «objetos de comercio» et
que celle-ci est «marchandises». Secundo, nous n’avons pas transformé quoi que ce soit. Si
quelqu’un a modifié ce qui a été l’interpréta tion communément acceptée, il s’agit bien du
Nicaragua! Monsieur le président, l’interpréta tion «finaliste», comme l’appelle AntonioRemiro,
le Nicaragua l’a adoptée devant Cleveland en tr aduisant «for the purposes of commerce» et l’a
même explicitée dans ses publications officiell es de 1954 et 1974 en parlant de la navigation
costa-ricienne «con fines de comercio y fiscales» 45. Franchement, Monsieur le président, je ne
comprends pas ce procès que nous fait la Partie adverse, alors qu’elle-même a indiqué dans son
44CR 2009/4, p. 36, par. 3.
45Nicaragua, ministère des affaires étrangères, Situación juridica del Rio San Juan , Managua 1954, mémoire du
Costa Rica (MCR), vol. 6, annexe 219 ; Nicaragua, ministère des affaires étrangères, Situación juridica del Rio San Juan,
Managua, 1974, MCR, vol. 6, annexe 222. Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 18. - 21 -
contre-mémoire que, je cite, «the right of free navigation is articulated in the form of a careful
46
statement of purposes» .
7. M. Argüello n’a pas apprécié que je soutienne qu’il a traduit à l’espagnol l’expression
française «sous le rapport du commerce» de la manière suivante : «con fines comerciales» 47. Il ne
m’a pas contredit jeudi dernier, bien au contrair e. Le distingué agent du Nicaragua vous a aussi
donné sa traduction anglaise de «con fines comercia les», traduction qu’il a utilisée pour expliquer
ce que «sous le rapport du commerce» veut dire en espagnol. Sans surprise, cela donne «for
commercial purposes» 48. Le tour est fait: voilà qu’il arri ve à une variante équivalente de la
traduction de «con objetos de comercio» en angl ais à laquelle tout le monde adhérait avant la
naissance de ce différend, y compris le Nicaragua!
a) Le débat linguistique confirme l’interprétation costaricienne
8. Antonio Remiro a prétendu que le rapport Mo reno de Alba n’a pas apporté des preuves
documentaires à l’appui de ses conclusions 49 . Mais chacun des commentaires de l’académicien
hispano-américain est étayé par des références conc rètes aux utilisations des termes examinés. De
plus, un appendice est joint au rapport. C’est un rapport complet, concret, fouillé et pertinent.
9. Comme M.Seco, Antonio Remiro Brotóns a écarté d’un revers de la main tous les
o 50
exemples du tableau n 1 de la réplique du Costa Rica dans lesquels le singulier «objeto» signifie
51
«fin» . Ce sont soixante-deuxexemples, un nombr e assez impressionnant en effet, face à une
thèse qui affirme que le terme «objetos» au pluriel ne peut jamais signifier «fins» 52! Et ces
exemples ne sont pas tirés de la littérature ou de journaux n’ayant aucun lien avec la situation : il
46
Contre-mémoire du Nicaragua (CMN), par. 2.1.51.
47
Carlos J. Argüello Gomez, Algunos aspectos jurídicos sobre el Tratado Jerez-Cañas y el Laudo Cleveland ,
ministère des affaires étrangères, Ma nagua, 26 août 1998. Disponible :sur er
http://www.joseacontreras.net/dirinter/america/Nicaragua_Rio_San_Juan.p… (visité le 1 mars 2009). Jusqu’au
27 février 2009 aussi in : http://www.euram.com.ni/pverdes/articulos/aspectos_juridicos_rio_san_ju…. Dossier de
plaidoiries, onglet n 27.
48CR 2009/4, p. 12, par. 16 (Argüello).
49
CR 2009/4, p. 39, par. 14 (Brotóns).
50 th
Réplique du Costa Rica (RCR), tableau 1, «Use of the term «objetos» as meaning «purposes» in 19 Century
documents», p. 99-126.
51
RCR, tableau 1, documents, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29,
30, 31.
52
CMN, par. 4.1.27; DN, par. 3.12. - 22 -
s’agit uniquement de l’emploi du terme «objeto» comme «fin», au singulier ou au pluriel, dans des
traités et des contrats publics conclus au cours du XIX esiècle par l’un ou l’autre des pays. Le
rapport MorenodeAlba a expliqué pourquoi la pr étention selon laquelle «objetos» au pluriel ne
53
peut signifier «fins» n’est pas correcte. Je vous y renvoie .
10. Il restait tout de même dix-huitautres exemples d’utilisation du terme «objetos» (au
pluriel) dans le sens de «fins». Le conseil nicaraguayen en a compté seize, mais le fait est que dans
un seul et même texte le terme apparaît deux fois dans le sens de «fins». Peu importe. Le
professeurRemiro essaye d’écarter une dizaine de cas sous prétexte que le terme «objetos» (au
pluriel) apparaît seul 54. Est-ce là une bonne raison ? Le Ni caragua ne nous avaient-il pas dit que
«objetos» au pluriel ne voulait jamais dire «fins» ? 55
11. Le conseil nicaraguayen pense que, au vu des cas mentionnés dans le «Corpus
diachronique de l’espagnol» dans lesquels l’e xpression «objetos de comercio» est employée
comme ⎯je le cite ⎯ «choses faisant l’objet d’activités commerciales», la seule signification
possible de l’expression «con objetos de comercio» à l’articleVI est «marchandises» 56. Je
remarque que dans aucun de ces cas l’expression est précédée de la préposition «con», tel qu’elle
figure à l’article VI. Le conseil de la Partie a dverse oublie trop vite l’importance du contexte afin
de déterminer le sens des termes qui comportent plusieurs significations. Son expert l’a affirmé et
57
le professeur Remiro l’a lui-même cité . C’est vrai que M. Seco ne dit pas ce qu’il fait, mais cela
est une tout autre question.
12. Pour trouver une analyse sémantique et ⎯syntactique, il faut se référer au rapport de
M. Moreno de Alba. Il procède à l’exercice suivant. Allégé de tous les éléments non nécessaires à
l’analyse en question, la phrase se résume à ce qui suit : «La République du Costa Rica aura … un
droit…de libre navigation…aux fins du comme rce…avec le Nicaragua…» Il montre que le
seul sens que le syntagme «con objetos de comerci o» peut revêtir est «aux fins du commerce». En
effet, si on lit «con objetos de comercio» comme signifiant «marchandises», le résultat auquel on
53Documents annexés à la lettre de l’agent du Costa Rica du 27 novembre 2008, annexe I, III.
54
CR 2009/4, p. 40, par. 18 (Brotóns).
55
CMN, par. 4.1.27, duplique du Nicaragua (DN), par. 3.12.
56CR 2009/4, p. 39-40, par. 15.
57CR 2009/4, p. 37-38, par. 8. - 23 -
parvient est un non-sens, aussi bien par rapport au terme «navigation» que par rapport au syntagme
«avec le Nicaragua». Relativement au premier de ces termes, cela fonctionnerait comme un
complément, qui signifierait «navigation acco mpagnée de marchandises» ou «navigation en
cohabitation avec de marchandises» ou «navigation au moyen de marchandises». En ce qui
concerne le second groupe de mots, cela donnerait la phrase su ivante: «La République du
Costa Rica aura … un droit … de libre navigation … avec des marchandises … avec le
Nicaragua». Et M.Moreno de Alba de conc lure: «Navigation avec le Nicaragua? Des
marchandises avec le Nicaragua? Impossible. Il s’agit là encore d’une ineptie car, dans la
reformulation, le nom commerce perd son sens déverbal (issu d’un verbe) et donc, laisse le
58
syntagme avec le Nicaragua sans aucun lien sémantique ni syntactique .
b) Les traités d’amitié, de commerc e et de navigation conclus par les parties à la même époque
que le traité Cañas-Jerez
13. L’analyse linguistique se voit d’ailleurs confirmée par la pratique précédente ou
contemporaine à la conclusion dutraité Cañas- Jerez. Je voudrais me servir d’exemples non
seulement intéressants du point de vue linguistique, mais aussi et surtout juridique. Car ce sont
des traités conclus par les deux Parties. Et pas n’importe quels traités, puisqu’il s’agit de traités qui
concernent deux termes qui sont essentiels à l’interp rétation de l’articleVI dutraité de 1858:
«navigation» et «commerce».
14. Mon ami Antonio Remiro s’est référé aux traités de commerce et de navigation qui,
depuis le traité Jay utilisent l’expression «para los obj etos de su comercio» en espagnol et «for the
purposes of their commerce» en anglais. Au sujet des Parties à cette affaire, il a cité letraité
d’amitié, de commerce et de navigation CostaRi ca/Etats-Unis (Molina-Webster) de 1851, et les
troistraités d’amitié, de commerce et de navi gation Etats-Unis/Nicaragua de 1857 (Cass-Irrisari),
de 1859 (Lamar-Zeledón) et de 1867 (Ayon-Dickinson) 59.
15. Voici à l’écran un exemple de la formule type employée dans tous ces traités, l’article II
dutraité Cass-Irrisari de 1857, dans ses versions espagnole et anglaise, également authentiques 60.
58Documents annexés à la lettre de l’agent du Costa Rica du 27 novembre 2008, annexe I, VIII.2.
59
CR 2009/4, p. 41, par. 21 (Brotóns).
60Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n° 58. - 24 -
Le conseil du Nicaragua ne s’est pas donné la peine d’appliquer sa théorie linguistique à
l’expression «para los objetos de su comercio». Ma nifestement, traduire «para los objetos de su
comercio» en français en disant «pour les objets de son commerce» et prétendre ensuite que cela
signifie «pour les marchandises» aurait dépassé les limites de la témérité. Il a pourtant conclu avec
61
beaucoup de courage que ces traités ne prouvent pas que le terme «objetos» signifie «fins» .
16. Le conseil nicaraguayen, contrairement à ses habitudes, du moins dans cette affaire, se
livre à un exercice qu’il aurait pu appeler «finaliste», pour justifier son interprétation selon laquelle,
«para los objetos de su comercio» veut dire d es marchandises et uniquement des marchandises. Il
nous dit : «Leur commerce porte évidemment sur les marchandises qu’ils achètent et qu’ils vendent
62
et logiquement qu’ils entreposent et emmag asinent dans des bâtiments et des entrepôts» . Je me
pose les questions suivantes : comment viennent-ils, les citoyens qui, selon les termes de ces traités,
ont le droit d’arriver sur le territoire de l’autre pa rtie? Ont-ils le droit de venir, au regard de
l’interprétation nicaraguayenne, «sans articles de commerce» ? Je peux croire que la fonction d’un
entrepôt est en effet d’emmagasiner des marchandises, mais ce n’est pas celle d’une maison. Le
professeur Remiro pourra-t-il m’expliquer quel type de marchandise l’ Accessory Transit Company
de Cornelius Vanderbilt achetait et vendait lorsqu ’ à l’époque elle commerçait sur le fleuve
63
San Juan, transportant environs 68 000 passagers entre 1848 et 1869 ?
17. Par ailleurs, la thèse du professeur Remiro doit faire face à un problème insurmontable.
Le texte authentique anglais de ces traités utilise la formule «for the purposes of their commerce».
Comme il est établi au paragraphe3 de l’article 33 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit
destraités, «[l]es termes d’untraité sont présu més avoir le même sens da ns les divers textes
64
authentiques» . Aucun doute n’est donc possible: « objetos» et « purposes» ont le même sens.
«Objetos de comercio» et «objetos de su co mercio» ont été traduits à la même époque par
«purposes of commerce» et «purposes of their commerce». Je pense qu’il ne vaut plus la peine de
61
CR 2009/4, p. 42, par. 26 (Brotóns).
62CR 2009/4, p. 42, par. 25 (Brotóns).
63http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessory_Transit_Company ;
http://www.bruceruiz.net/PanamaHistory/argonauts.htm (visités le 8 mars 2009)
64«The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text» Cf., Ile de
Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1062, par. 25. - 25 -
s’appesantir sur le point de savoir si « objetos» au pluriel peut indiquer ou non «fins» lorsque ce
terme est associé à celui de «comercio». A ce stade, la réponse va de soi.
c) Les traités de l’époque utilisaient d’autres expressions pour se référer aux marchandises
18. Je passe maintenant à la pratique de l’époque pour désigner des marchandises.
M.Remiro s’est seulement conten té de voir dans le tableaun o2 de la réplique du CostaRica la
65
preuve de la richesse de notre langue commune . Dommage qu’il ne s’y soit pas arrêté un peu
plus en détails. Parce qu’il n’existe pas un seul texte qui emploie l’expression objetos de comercio
pour définir des marchandises.
19. En effet que découvrons-nous? Que sur 218cas cités, 43emploient «artículos», suivis
ou non d’une qualification, 32«mercancías», 19«m ercaderías», 26«efectos», 28«productos»,
16«manufacturas», 13«géneros/jéneros» et 13 «objetos», dans un contexte sans équivoque
66
possible. Il y a encore d’autres expressions employées .
20. Le conseil du Nicaragua aurait pu a pprécier que lorsqu’on voulait évoquer des
marchandises, on utilisait des expressions dépourvues d’ambiguïté. Il aurait aussi pu constater
⎯puisqu’il a été longuement question du transport du café dans les plaidoiries de la Partie
nicaraguayenne ⎯, que quand on voulait se ré férer concrètement à d es articles d’importation ou
d’exportation, on le faisait explicitement 67, de même que lorsqu’on voulait parler des articles
68
naturels ou de production nationale . L’article VI du traité Cañas-Jerez se trouve loin, très loin, de
l’une et de l’autre de ces hypothèses.
d) L’approche du Costa Rica devant Cleveland mène à une interprétation de l’article VI qui va
bien au-delà du transport de marchandises
21. Alain Pellet et Steven McCaffrey ont cru trouver un argument en faveur de
69
l’interprétation nicaraguayenne dans un passage de la plaidoirie du Costa Rica devant Cleveland ,
en lui faisant dire ce qu’il ne dit pas et en oubliant en passant de mentionner la réponse du
65
CR 2009/4, p. 43, par. 27 (Brotóns).
66 RCR, p. 127-151.
67 RCR, tableau n 2, documents n 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26.
68 RCR, tableau n 2, documents n 5, 9, 10, 15, 22.
69
CR 2009/4, p. 58-59, par. 20-21 (Pellet) ; CR 2009/5, p. 31-32, par. 13 (McCaffrey). - 26 -
CostaRica. Il s’agit d’un passag e qui pose une question rhétorique d’ordre général traitant de
l’étendue du droit de libre navi gation découlant de l’article VI 70. Vous voyez à l’écran la réponse
o
complète, que vous avez aussi dans vos dossiers à l’onglet n 59. Je cite quelques extraits
importants relativement à notre question :
«La réponse semble être très simple… Il semble être indiscutable que le
Costa Rica peut naviguer sur le San Juan av ec des bateaux publics qui ne sont pas des
vrais navires de guerre… Le sens de l’ expression «navigation commerciale» inclut
nécessairement la police douanière, l’achemin ement du courrier ainsi que tout autre
service public de même nature» . 71
22. La réponse du CostaRica à sa propre ques tion rhétorique est donc dépourvue de toute
ambiguïté. Elle est bien évidemment négative. Il est simplement impossible de déduire de ce texte
que pour le Costa Rica «objetos de comercio» voula it dire «marchandises» ou que la seule «fin du
commerce» équivalait au transport de marcha ndises. Bien au contraire. «Navigation
commerciale» et non pas «navigation avec des marchandises», voilà comment le CostaRica
interprétait l’expression «navegación con objetos de comercio» à cette époque.
e) Si le Nicaragua avait des doutes au sujet de la traduction présentée à Cleveland, il aurait mis
les mots équivalents espagnols entre parenthèses
23. Voyons maintenant ce qu’il en a été du cô té du Nicaragua. Dans la traduction du traité
de 1858 produite par cet Etat et présentée au prési dent Cleveland, les mots originaux en espagnol
apparaissent entre parenthèses lorsque le Nicaragua a considéré que la traduction exigeait une
clarification. Vous voyez à l’écran l’articleVI tel que présenté par le Nicaragua à l’arbitre.
Comme vous pouvez l’observer à l’onglet n o60 de vos dossiers, la Partie adverse a recouru à cette
clarification à quatre reprises, pour les mots ou expressions «atracar», «canalización», «este voto
será consultivo» et «crédito activo» respectivement aux articles VI, VII, VIII et XI. Sans surprise,
le Nicaragua n’a pas trouvé nécessaire d’insérer entre parenthèses «con objetos de comercio» au
regard de sa traduction «for the purposes of commerce».
70MCR, vol. 6, annexe 207, p. 831 [p. 155].
71
[Traduction du Greffe.] Texte anglais original: «The answer seems to be very simple … It seems to be beyond
discussion that Costa Rica can navigate in the San Juan rive r with public vessels, which are not properly men-of-war.
Within the meaning of the words, commercial navigation, both the revenue police, the carrying of the mails, and all other
public services of the same kind are necessarily included». Ibid., p. 831-832 [p. 155-156]. Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet
n 59. - 27 -
f) La sentence Cleveland devient illisible si l’on suit l’interprétation nicaraguayenne
24. Dans sa plaidoirie du 5 mars, Alain Pelle t a semblé semer la confusion en lisant la
sentence Cleveland et ⎯ en passant ⎯ a fait preuve d’une d’imagination débordante en
m’attribuant des propos que je n’ai pas tenus relativement à la sentence 72. Mon contradicteur et
cher ami affirme de manière des plus légères : «Comme l’a relevé le professeur Kohen, cette phrase
ne fait pas grand sens en français, que l’on traduise «con objetos de comercio» par «avec des
73
marchandises» ou «à des fins commerciales»» . La réalité est que, après avoir lu la sentence dans
la partie qui utilise l’expression «purposes of commerce», j’avais affirmé que «[l]a lecture
nicaraguayenne aboutirait au résultat absurde de l’exercice d’un droit d’usage du fleuve aux
74
«articles de commerce»» . Donc, seule une lecture conforme à l’approche du Nicaragua serait
absurde. De plus, Monsieur le président, dans la sentence Cleveland, rien n’est à traduire de
l’espagnol parce que l’arbitre rend sa sentence en anglais et utilise «purposes of commerce» dans le
passage en question. Ceci fait beaucoup de sens, aussi bien en anglais que dans la traduction en
français du Greffe par ailleurs.
25. Les choses ne se sont pas arrêtées là. Il s’agissait sans doute d’un moment de fébrilité.
Alain Pellet a ensuite décidé de se plonger dans d es eaux troubles et très agitées, bien plus agitées
que celles du SanJuan. Il a lancé une attaque c ontre la sentence Cleveland, affirmant que la
référence faite à la jouissance des «fins du commerce» n’était peut-être qu’«une simple
inadvertance de l’arbitre», ou que ce dernier, et je cite mon ami,
«a préféré ne pas se lancer dans une in terprétation de l’expression «con objetos de
comercio» (traduite par «for purposes of commerce» par les Parties) et a délibérément
choisi de recourir aux guillemets, afin de signifier qu’il utilisait cette expression sans
se prononcer sur un problème d’interprétation que l75 Parties ne lui avaient pas soumis
et sur lequel elles ne s’étaient pas exprimées» .
26. Alain Pellet nous démontre ici toute l’étendue de son imagination. Bien sûr, je
comprends que l’article2 de la sentence Clevela nd mette le Nicaragua dans une situation très
embarrassante. Les guillemets s’expliquent tout si mplement par le fait que Cleveland était en train
72CR 2009/4, p. 59, par. 21 (Pellet).
73
CR 2009/4, p. 59, par. 21 (Pellet) ; note de bas de page omise.
74CR 2009/2, p. 64, par. 58 (Kohen).
75CR 2009/4, p. 59, par. 21 (Pellet). - 28 -
76
de citer les termes de l’articleVI tels que traduits par les deux Parties . Alain Pellet crée par
ailleurs «un problème d’interprétation» qu’il sait inexistant, puisqu’il avait affirmé auparavant qu’il
n’y avait pas de désaccord entre les Parties sur le sens et la portée de l’article VI 77.
27. Le texte de l’article2 de la sentence est clair et dépourvu d’ambiguïté: «l’exercice du
droit d’usage de ce fleuve «aux fins du commerc e» que lui reconnaît led it article», ceci fait
pleinement sens; «l’exercice du droit d’usage de ce fleuve «avec des marchandises» que lui
reconnaît ledit article ne fait pas sens du tout.
g) La première sentence Alexander : une approche large du commerce
28. Alain Pellet a également cru pouvoir trouver dans la première sentence arbitrale, rendue
par l’ingénieur Alexander, un appui à la thèse nicaraguayenne. Dans cette sentence, l’arbitre
78
indique que, «throughout the treaty, the river is treated and regarded as an outlet of commerce» .
Aux yeux de mon éminent contradicteur, cette expression «vise clairement le commerce «avec des
marchandises»» 79. A mon avis, cette affirmation rejoint plutôt l’interprétation costa-ricienne.
Alexander utilise «commerce» et non «trade» et, co mme le Nicaragua l’a affirmé devant la Cour,
en anglais «commerce» est un concept plus large que «trade», et va au-delà de l’achat et la vente de
marchandises 80. Cela inclut donc les diverses acceptions, y compris le transport des personnes.
B. La traduction identique des parties devant Cleveland entraîne des conséquences juridiques
29. Je passe maintenant aux conséquences juridi ques de la traduction identique des parties
devant Cleveland. A en croire Antonio Remiro, «le Costa Rica prétend remplacer l’interprétation
du seul texte authentique rédigé en espagnol par l’interprétation d’une tr aduction anglaise faite à
81
l’occasion de l’arbitrage Cleveland qu’il considère mieux adaptée à ses prétentions» . Pas du tout,
Monsieur le président. Nous ne prétendons pas remplacer quoi que ce soit.
76RCR, par. 3.66-3.68.
77CR 2009/4, p. 57, par. 19 (Pellet).
78Sentence arbitrale no1, 30 septembre 1897, Pasicrisie Internationale 1794-1900 (Berne : Stampfli,1902,
réimpr. par P.-M. Eisemmann, La Haye : M. Nijhoff, La Haye, 1997), p. 531, MCR, vol . 2, annexe 18. MCR, par. 4.24.
Traduction : «partout dans le traité, le fleuve est considéré comme un débouché pour le commerce».
79CR 2009/4, p. 60, par. 22 (Pellet).
80 Memorial of Nicaragua (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility) , I.C.J. Pleadings, Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, vol. I, p. 403-404.
81
CR 2009/4, p. 40, par. 16 (Brotóns). - 29 -
30. Il va de soi que le texte du traité est en espagnol. Nous soutenons simplement que les
deux Parties ont traduit l’article VI de la même manière : «for the purposes of commerce».
31. Le professeur Pellet me concède qu’il n’ex istait pas de désaccord entre les Parties au
sujet de l’interprétation des termes «con objetos de comercio» devant Cleveland. Mais il ajoute
qu’«il n’y a eu aucun accord pour l’exce llente raison qu’il n’y avait aucun désaccord» 82.
Franchement, j’ai un peu de mal à suivre le raisonnement de mon collè gue. Apparemment, pour
Alain Pellet, pour que deux Etats se mettent d’ accord sur quelque chose, il faut nécessairement
qu’ils aient été auparavant en désaccord. C’est une étrange manière de concevoir les relations
internationales. Non, Monsieur le président . Les Etats se mettent heureusement d’accord sur
beaucoup de questions dans le but de poursuivre des fins commune s, sans qu’il soit obligatoire
qu’il y ait préalablement des différends ou des divergences relativement aux objets de ces accords.
32. Allons un peu plus loin sur la question concrète qui nous occupe : l’attitude des parties
devant Cleveland. Il n’y avait pas de désacco rd sur la portée de l’expression «con objetos de
comercio». Personne n’a soulevé de point d’interprétation douteuse, C’est tout ? Non, ce n’est pas
tout. Sur quoi portait l’accord devant Cleveland? Sur la façon de traduire cette expression en
anglais.
33. J’avais constaté lundi dernier que les deux parties ont traduit la phrase présentement
controversée exactement de la même manière, pas un iota de différence 83. Alain Pellet l’a
84
reconnu . Pour moi, cela démontre non seulement qu’il n’y avait pas de désaccord, mais aussi que
les parties étaient d’accord sur la façon de traduire «con objetos de comercio» en anglais.
34. Monsieur le président, toute traduction a une signification. Il s’agit de la manière
d’exprimer une idée dans une autre langue. Alain Pellet ne veut tirer aucune conclusion de cette
remarquable coïncidence intervenue deva nt l’arbitre appelé à trancher toute question
d’interprétation douteuse du traité. Pour notre part, nous tirons celle qui s’impose.
82CR 2009/4, p. 57, par. 19 (Pellet).
83
CR 2009/2, p. 50, par. 9 (Kohen).
84CR 2009/4, p. 57, par. 19 (Pellet). - 30 -
35. Et à ce stade avancé de la procédure je me permets le commentaire suivant : j’ai attendu
en vain que la Partie adverse nous explique po urquoi le Nicaragua a traduit «con objetos de
comercio» en 1887 de la manière qu’il rejette avec véhémence aujourd’hui.
C. Le terme «comercio» ne se limite pas à l’achat et à la vente de marchandises
36. Le Nicaragua a déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour constater une évidence : à savoir que le
85
transport de marchandises tombe sous le coup de la navigation aux fins du commerce .
Contrairement à ce que nos adversaires et amis affirment 86, le CostaRica n’a aucune difficulté à
accepter la première acception du terme «commerce». Nous sommes même prêts à reconnaître que
l’achat et la vente de marchandises constitue l’activité commerciale la plus emblématique. Mais ce
n’est pas la seule ! Ni au XIX esiècle, ni aujourd’hui.
37. Par contre, mes collègues Remiro et Mc Caffrey ont beaucoup de difficultés avec la
87
seconde acception du terme commerce, celle signifiant communication . Nous avons cité cette
acception dès notre mémoire 88 et le Nicaragua ne s’y est jamais référé durant la phase écrite !
38. Aux annexes 59 et 60 de la duplique, le Nicaragua a présenté l’entrée «comercio»
contenue dans deux dictionnaires bilingues anglais-es pagnol, l’un datant de 18 09, l’autre de 1858.
Vous les voyez à l’écran. Il est question non seulement de «commerce» and «trade», mais aussi de
«communication», et ceci au regard des deux dictionnaires.
39. Au fond, Messieurs les juges, votre C our a déjà examiné en détail la portée du mot
«commerce» dans l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières 89. Je n’oserais pas abuser de votre
patience en vous rappelant cette analyse exhaustive qui s’avère pertinente pour les besoins de cette
affaire et dont vous trouverez un extrait à l’onglet n o 61 de vos dossiers.
85
Ibid., p. 43- 46, par. 28-42 (Brotóns).
86 Ibid., p. 44, par. 34 (Brotóns).
87 Ibid., p. 44-45, par. 33-35 (Brotóns) ; CR 2009/5, p. 29-30, par. 7 (McCaffrey).
88 MCR, par. 4.52-4.72.
89
Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c.Etats-Unis d’Amériquo), exception préliminaire,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 818-819, par. 45-46, 48-49. Dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n - 31 -
a) La navigation commerciale inclut le transport des passagers
40. Le conseil du Nicaragua a affirmé en ne s’appuyant sur aucune référence concrète que
«[t]ous les documents diplomatiques et lestrai tés avortés antérieurs autraité Jerez-Cañas
rapportent la navigation sur le fleuve San Juan au transport de fruit s, de produits, de marchandises,
90
notamment de café» . Ceci est faux et je vous renvoie à nos plaidoiries qui traitent de ces
questions 91.
41. Nous avons fourni la preuve démontrant que le transport de passagers est compris dans
le droit costa-ricien de libre navigation découlant de l’articleVI dutraité Cañas-Jerez et je n’y
reviendrai pas 92.
42. Le silence du Nicaragua, en particulier par rapport auxtraités qu’il a conclus en1857
avec les Etats-Unis, en 1859 avec la France et en 1860 avec la Grande-Bretagne, est assourdissant.
Toustrois se réfèrent explicitement au SanJuan , au CostaRica et à la navigation avec des
93
personnes et des marchandises, aussi bien du gouvernement que des citoyens . Même en adoptant
la lecture la plus favorable au Nicaragua, ces troistraités sonnent le glas de l’interprétation
nicaraguayenne de l’article VI qui limite ce dernier exclusivement au transport de marchandises et
aux navires privés.
43. J’ajouterai que l’interprétation nicara guayenne excluant les passagers aboutit à un
e
résultat absurde et déraisonnable. Imagi nons un producteur du café costa-ricien du XIX siècle.
S’il voulait aller en Europe pour promouvoir et vendre son café, il devrait partir par le Pacifique et
faire le tour du cap Horn. Une fois revenu au CostaRica avec son carnet de commandes par la
même route, il pourrait toutefois envoyer son café par le San Juan. Et s’il partait avec sa cargaison
de café en Europe par le San Juan, il devrait rentre r en faisant le tour du cap Horn car il rentrerait
«sans articles de commerce»! Peut-on sérieus ement imaginer un instant que telle était la
perception des négociateurs du traité Cañas-Jerez ?
90 CR 2009/4, p. 47, par. 48 (Brotóns).
91 RCR, par. 2.53-2.54 ; CR 2009/2, p. 66-67, par. 64-68 (Kohen).
92
MCR, par. 4.58-4.72 ; RCR, par. 3.76-3.78.
93
United States-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Co mmerce and Navigation, 16 novembre 1857, RCR, vol.2,
annexe 10 (article XX, dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n° 30);traité d’amié, de commerce et de navigation conclu le
11avril1859 entre la France et le Nica ragua, RCR, vol.2, annexe 14 (article XXXIII, dossier de plaidoiries, onglet
n 28); Treaty of Friendship, Comme rce and Navigation between Great Brita in and Nicaragua, 11février1860, RCR,
vol. 2, annexe 15 (article XXVI, dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n - 32 -
b) Le transport de touristes tombe sous le coup de l’article VI du traité de 1858
44. Alain Pellet est allé jusqu’à invoquer que le droit de libre navigation ne pourrait inclure
le transport de touristes pour la simple raison que le tourisme n’avait pas l’importance économique
qu’il a aujourd’hui et qu’il aurait été, à l’en croire, sans rapport aucun avec le commerce à l’époque
de la conclusion du traité 94.
45. Il ne fait aucun doute que le tourisme existait à l’époque de la conclusion dutraité
Cañas-Jerez, certes pas avec la dimension qu’il a au jourd’hui. Alain Pellet a soigneusement évité
d’affirmer le contraire 95.
46. En effet, de nombreux éléments témoigne nt de l’existence de cette activité. Il est
intéressant de relever que le premier emploi que l’on trouve du mot «turista» en espagnol fait
référence à un adjectif qua lifiant une activité précise ⎯ l’excursion ⎯, et qui, de plus, date de la
96
décennie précédant letraité Cañas-Jerez . MarkTwain a sans doute été le voyageur le plus
97
célèbre qui a navigué sur les eaux du San Juan peu après la conclusion du traité, en 1863 .
47. «Le tourisme ⎯ c’est-à-dire le voyage d’agrément ⎯ est apparu à la fin du XVII e siècle
en Angleterre», nous dit un auteur qui explique que cette activité est passée d’un luxe de riches à
un loisir de masse 98. Même à l’époque où il était exclusivement réservé aux riches, le tourisme
exigeait une organisation : en effet, il fallait se dépl acer, naviguer, acheter de la nourriture et autres
«marchandises» ⎯ l’obsession de nos contradicteurs ⎯ et se loger ailleurs : tous ces agissements,
Monsieur le président, n’englobent-ils pas des activ ités commerciales ? En fait, je m’étonne de la
position élitiste prise par Alain Pellet. Apparemment , si c’était l’Œuvre d’une poignée de riches, il
serait prêt à l’admettre pour le San Juan, mais non lorsqu’il s’agit d’une activité ouverte à une large
partie de la population.
94CR 2009/4, p. 53, par. 9 (Pellet).
95Ibid., p. 53-54, par. 9-10 (Pellet).
96
Juan Valera, Correspondencia 1847-1857. Disponible dans : http://corpus.rae.es/cordenet.htm (visité le
8 mars 2009).
97
http://www.maritimeheritage.org/vips/marktwain.html (visité le 8 mars 2009).
98
StéphaneoLecler, «Une histoire du tourisme. D’un luxe de rich es à un loisir de masse» dans Alternatives
Economiques ⎯ n 271 ⎯ juillet 2008 ( http://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/une-histoire-du-tourisme-d_un-lu…-
riches-a-un-loisir-de-masse_fr_art_735_38022.html) (visité le 8 mars 2009). - 33 -
48. Je ferai un bref commentaire sur l’interprétation de l’affaire Kasikili/Sedudu faite par
99
mon contradicteur. Dans le communiqué de Kasane du 24mai1992, qu’il a cité , les présidents
des deux pays ont noté que «la navigation devait rester sans entrave et, entre autres, les touristes
devaient pouvoir se déplacer librement» ( Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p.1107, par.102; les italiques sont de nous). «Rester»: c’est là la
manifestation du maintien de quelque chose qui ex iste déjà, et non celle d’un accord constitutif.
Or, aucun texte conventionnel n’attribuait un dro it spécifique lié à la navigation touristique.
J’insiste: l’intérêt essentiel de l’arrêt Kasikili/Sedudu est celui de l’interprétation de la liberté de
navigation comme incluant la navigation touristique.
49. Au fond, Monsieur le président, la question fondamentale n’est pas celle de savoir si le
tourisme existait ou non à l’époque de la conclusion du traité Cañas-Jerez, mais si des gens qui se
dirigent d’un point à un autre du territoire costa-ricien devraient être exclus du bénéfice de la
notion de libre navigation à des fins du commerce, pour la seule raison qu’ils sont des touristes.
50. Ces touristes vont d’un point du territoire costa-ricien à un autre: de Sarapiquí à
Tortuguero notamment. Les touristes sont aussi des passagers. Et ils sont en transit. Va-t-on
demander à chaque passager se trouvant sur des bateaux costa-riciens s’il ou elle voyage par loisir
ou pour d’autres raisons, en vue de savoir s’il peut ou non bénéficier du dr oit de libre navigation
aux fins du commerce ?
D. La pratique subséquente existe et confirme l’interprétation costa-ricienne
51. Alain Pellet s’est employé à minimiser la por tée de la pratique suivie par les parties dans
100
l’application dutraité, allant même jusqu’à en nier purement et simplement l’existence . Je lui
répondrai qu’il existe un faisceau très large d’élémen ts de la pratique, qui inclut non seulement les
bateaux, les marchandises, les bateliers, les passager s et les agents publics, mais aussi les traités et
les prises de position des parties. Ces vrai que c’est plus facile de nier l’existence de la pratique
101
que de répondre aux exemples concrets de cette pratique que nous avons donnés . Cela ne
facilite pas pour autant la situation procédurale du Nicaragua.
99CR 2009/4, p. 5, par. 12 (Pellet).
100
Ibid., p. 55-62, par. 13-26 (Pellet).
101CR 2009/2, p. 61-63, par. 49-55 (Kohen) ; CR 2009/3, p. 36, par. 9 (Kohen). - 34 -
52. Je vais ajouter d’autres références relatives aux deux décennies qui ont précédé la
naissance du différend. Le CostaRica a présenté la preuve que son droit a davantage été exercé
pour le transport de personnes (privées ou fonctionnaires publics) que pour celui des marchandises,
sans que le Nicaragua n’ait manifesté la moindre opposition, sauf à partir de la naissance de ce
102
différend . Il s’agit, pour reprendre les termes du pr ofesseur Pellet, de «la pratique ouverte et
constante de l’une des parties» qui «ne se heurte pas à une objection de la part de l’autre» 103.
53. Des déclarations sous serment de certains professionnels du transport et autres individus
104
démontrent que le transport des touris tes était pratiqué depuis les années 1970 . Une déclaration
sous serment d’un fonctionnaire militaire nicaraguayen confirme qu’il en était ainsi 105.
E. Les contradictions nicaraguayennes sur l’interprétation évolutive
54. Alain Pellet nous a invités à discuter de l’interprétation évolutive des traités 106. La Partie
défenderesse est consciente de la faiblesse de son interprétation relative à l’article VI et cherche à
minimiser la portée de l’étendue des fins de commerce auxquelles l’article se réfère.
55. Le raisonnement adopté par le conseil nicaraguayen comporte plusieurs lacunes. S’il
rappelle que le critère ultime pour trancher le problème de l’interprétation évolutive est l’intention
107
des parties , il ne développe pas la question de savoir en quoi consistait cette intention sur le point
précis qui nous intéresse.
56. Son argumentation est pour le moins curieuse. Il accepte que les «articles de commerce»
108
et les moyens de navigation constituen t des notions par définition évolutives . Donc, tout ce qui
102Voir, entre autres : déclaration sous serment de Carlos Lao Jarquin, 27 janvier 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 84 ;
déclaration sous serment de Geovany Navarro Garro, 27 janvier 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 85 ; déclaration sous serment
de Pablo Gerardo Hernández Varela, 27 janvier 2006, MCR, vol.4, annexe 86 ; déclaration sous serment de Santos
Martin Arrieta Flores, 27janvier2006, M CR, vol.4, annexe 87 ; déclaration sous serment de Carlos Luis Alvarado
Sánchez, 27janvier2006, MCR, vol.4, annexe 88 ; déclaratio n sous serment de Daniel So to Montero, 27janvier2006,
MCR, vol.4, annexe89 ; dé claration sous serment de Luis Ángel Jiron Angulo, 28 janvier 2006, MCR, vol.4,
annexe 90 ; déclaration sous serment de Marvin Hay Gonzalez, 28 janvier 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 91 ; Armando Perla
Pérez, 28 janvier 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 92.
103CR 2009/4, p. 55-56, par. 14 (Pellet).
104Voir, entre autres: déclaration sous serment de Santos Martin Arrieta Flores, 27 janvier 2006, MCR, vol.4,
annexe 87; déclaration sous serment de Marvin Hay Gonzalez, 28 janvier 2006, MCR, vol.4, annexe 91; déclaration
sous serment de Ruben Lao Hernández, 17 février 2006, MCR, vol. 4, annexe 103.
105Déclaration sous serment du brigadier général Denis Membreño Rivas, 10 mars 2008, DN, vol. II, annexe 73.
106CR 2009/4, p. 49-55, par. 3-12 (Pellet).
107Ibid., p. 50, par. 3 (Pellet).
108
Ibid., p. 51-52, par. 6 (Pellet). - 35 -
est marchandise ou navire aujourd’hui tombe sous le coup de l’article VI. Par contre, selon lui, le
terme «commerce» devrait garder la signification qu’il avait en 1858 109. Si l’on suit le
professeurPellet, son coéquipier Antonio Remiro aurait tort, puisque d’après ce dernier, la
deuxième acception du terme «comercio», celle de «communication», ne devrait pas être prise en
110
considération aujourd’hui, car elle serait tombée en désuétude . Je crois, Monsieur le président,
que la Partie adverse devrait d’urgence accorder ses violons…
57. La référence qu’Alain Pellet a faite à la sentence arbitrale rendue dans l’affaire du Sheikh
d’Abu Dhabi est loin d’appuyer la thèse du Nicaragua. Il est dit dans cet extrait, qu’il convient de
«présumer qu’une personne qui cède des droits de propriété de grande valeur n’entend disposer que
des droits qu’elle possède au moment de la cession» . D’après le professeur Pellet, tel serait le cas
du Nicaragua dont «on ne peut présumer qu’il ait cédé au CostaRica des droits dont personne
111
n’envisageait l’existence en 1858» . Primo, il est inutile de chercher da ns letraité de limites la
cession ou l’octroi par le Nicaragua de droits au Costa Rica. La reconnaissance de la souveraineté
nicaraguayenne et le droit de navigation co sta-ricien vont de pair à l’articleVI. Secundo, le
transport des passagers sur le fleuve San Juan existait déjà à l’époque de la conclusion du traité et
c’est le Nicaragua qui l’a qualifié d’activité lucrative 112. Le parallèle établi avec l’affaire du Sheikh
d’Abu Dhabi est donc tout simplement fallacieux.
58. La réponse juridique correcte à la questi on est simple. Pour paraphraser les formules
employées par votre Cour dans l’affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egée, le «commerce» est
un terme générique englobant toutes pratiques«d e nature à être légitim ement considérées comme
se rapportant» (Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978,
p. 31, par. 74) à cette activité et comme «revêt([an t) à tout moment la signification que pourraient
lui donner» ( ibid., p.32, par.77) les circonstances qui prév alent au moment de l’interprétation.
Sinon, va-t-on prétendre que pour chaque traité de commerce et de navigation, il faudra figer leur
portée à l’égard des activités commerciales uniquement au moment de leur conclusion ?
109Ibid., p. 52, par. 7 (Pellet).
110
Ibid., p. 44, par. 35 (Brotóns).
111Ibid., p. 54, par. 10 (Pellet)
112CMN, par. 4.1.37 ; DN, par. 3.91. - 36 -
59. Que telle ait été l’intention des parties est de surcroît confirmé par la qualification de
«perpétuel» du droit de navigation reconnu au Co sta Rica. Pour reprendre à nouveau ce que votre
Cour a dit sur un point tout à fait comparable où il était question d’un instrument sans limite de
durée, «il ne semble guère concevable que dans un instrument semblable on ait voulu donner à [ce
113
terme] … un contenu invariable quelle que soit l’évolution ultérieure» (ibid., p. 32, par. 77) .
60. Cette réponse s’impose avec d’autant plus de force que la pratique ultérieure suivie par
114
les parties dans l’application dutraité a enreg istré cette compréhension du terme «commerce» .
C’est le ministre du tourisme du Nicaragua lui-mê me qui a reconnu que le droit costa-ricien de
libre navigation incluait la navigation touristique car le tourisme ⎯selon lui, est une forme
115
moderne de commerce .
Conclusion
61. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jug es, l’interprétation que le CostaRica donne de
l’articleVI est appuyée par les règles d’interprétati on que votre Cour a toujours suivies. Elle est
confortée par tous les éléments pertinents. Ces éléments ne laissent aucun doute quant au sens
qu’il convient de donner à l’expressi on «con objetos de comercio». Il s’agit d’un droit de libre
navigation qui englobe tant le transport de passagers que celui de marchandises, exercé tant par des
navires publics que privés.
62. Monsieur le président, je vous remercie de votre attenti on et vous prie, sans doute après
la pause, de donner la parole à mon collègue et ami le professeur Lucius Caflisch.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Kohen, for your presentation. As you suggest, the
Court can have a short coffee break for about 10 minutes and we will resume the session.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professor Caflisch.
113
Affaire concernant le Filetage à l’intérieur du golfe du Saint-Laurent entre le Canada et la France, sentence
du 17 juillet 1986, RSA, vol. XIX, p. 247, par. 37.
114Ibid., sentence du 17 juillet 1986, RSA, vol. XIX, p. 247, par. 37.
115MCR, par. 4.69 et vol. 5, annexes 138 et 139 (dossier de plaidoiries, onglet n 24). - 37 -
Mr. CAFLISCH: Thank you, Mr. President.
III. NICARAGUA ’S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SAN J UAN R IVER AND C OSTA RICA ’S
PERPETUAL RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION
1. Introduction
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my observations today will bear on two matters:
first, the relation between Nicara gua’s sovereignty over the waters and bed of the SanJuan River
and Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free navigation; and second, the reasonableness and lawfulness
of Nicaragua’s regulations and measures relating to the portion of the river where navigation is
common.
2. Before broaching these issues, I should like to respond briefly to four points made by
116
Ambassador Argüello Gómez in his introductory presentation .
3. First, Mr. Argüello Gómez stated that, in making her claims, Costa Rica pretended in fact
to be the river’s co-sovereign. Quoting the great Latin American jurist Andres Bello on the content
of sumo imperio, he asked what would remain of that imperio if CostaRica’s claims were found
acceptable. That question could, with at least e qual justification, be turned around: what would
remain of CostaRica’s “right” of navigation if its exercise were entirely subordinated to
Nicaragua’s summum imperium?
4. Second, the distinguished Agent of Nicaragua contended that CostaRica aspires to an
unlimited right of navigation: as CostaRica’s written pleadings and oral arguments show, this is
not the case: CostaRica objects to crippling, disproportionate, ineffective and discriminatory
regulations and measures. As pointed out durin g the first round of oral argument, CostaRica
would not object, for instance, to frequent and atten tive patrolling, for instance to curb drug traffic
and smuggling 11. What she does object to are measur es substantially narrowing her right of
navigation, for instance by insisting on Nicaraguan Departure Clearance Certificates and by
controlling every Costa Rican boat, on every journey and return journey, at every Nicaraguan army
post, and by levying fees and taxes.
116
CR 2009/4, pp. 12-14.
11CR 2009/3, p. 28. - 38 -
5. Ambassador Argüello Gómez concluded that Nicaragua holds all police powers, and
Costa Rica none. One wonders how this is supposed to tally with what President Cleveland had to
say when, in paragraph 2 of his award in 1888, he ruled that:
“Costa Rica may navigate said river with such vessels of the revenue services as may
be related to and connected with her [Cos taRica’s] enjoyment of the ‘purposes of
commerce’ accorded to her in said Article[ArticleVI of course] or as may be
118
necessary to the protection of said enjoyment” .
6. A last observation to be made here relates to the assertion that, at the meeting point of the
San Juan and the Colorado, 90 per cent of the waters go into the Colorado. What does this have to
do with the present case? One could assert, with equal justification, that CostaRica contributes
about 70percent of its waters to the SanJuan, while the contribution of Nicaragua amounts to
30 per cent.
2. Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the San Juan River and Costa Rica’s
perpetual right of free navigation
7. Allow me now, Mr.President, Members of the Court, to deal with the relationship
between sovereignty and the perpetual right of fr ee navigation. Mr.Brownlie has rightly pointed
out that stability is the main objective of boundary treaties. I would go so far as to say that the
instrument in point, the 1858 Cañas-Jerez Treaty, al so had the object of achieving stability, which
does not mean, however, that it is an ordinary treaty establishing a boundary. As Nicaragua has
remained remarkably discreet on the issue, I should like to recall that the Treaty of 1858 establishes
a comprehensive legal régime for the area of the San Juan River: establishment of the international
boundary on the Costa Rican bank on the lower San Juan (Art. II); right of both riparian States to
sail ships on the part of the river open to common navigation, and right of the ships of both States
to accost on the banks of the other State (Art. VI); establishment of the waters at each end of the
boundary (the waters of the Salinas Bay and SanJuan del Norte) as condominia (Art. IV);
common defence of the river in the event of exte rnal aggression (Art.IV); prohibition of acts of
war on the river, on Lake Nicaragua or in the port of SanJuan del Norte (Art.IX) and duty for
Nicaragua to consult Costa Rica if it plans to canalise the river area are in the offing (Art. VIII).
118
MCR, Vol. 2, p. 18. - 39 -
8. I find it difficult indeed to accept that we are in the presence of a simple boundary treaty.
It is, rather, a combination of different pieces which are constitutive of a boundary and a régime.
To borrow from the language used by my friend an d colleague Ian Brownlie, the amalgamation of
these elements produces a sort of legal “porosity” ⎯ a porosity incidentally to be found in other,
similar treaty instruments.
9. The characterization of the 1858Treaty as a boundary treaty, and little else, has led
Nicaragua to claim that that Treaty’s main elemen t is her sovereignty over the waters and the bed
of the river, whereas in CostaRica’s view, as perceived by Nicaragua, her navigation rights
predominate. It is this point which forms the main bone of contention between the Parties.
10. According to Nicaragua, her own soverei gnty must be paramount, and exceptions to it
must, pursuant to this Court’s case law, be construe d restrictively. I have already attempted to
show that that case law becomes relevant only if there is a doubt over the meaning to be attributed
119
to the provision under consideration . In the absence of such doubt, the interpretation must
follow the canons of treaty interpretation set by the 1969Vienna Convention, including the
principle ut magis valeat quam pereat: the concept of free navigation cannot be rendered nugatory
by subordinating it to the will of the territorial sovereign. It cannot be left to unilateral
determination by that State.
11. CostaRica’s view of the matter is quite different. As is true for most concepts of
international law, sovereignty is not absolute; it is affected by the relevant State’s specific rights
and duties. In other words, as was pointed out in the first round of oral argument, there is no
hierarchy sovereignty/right of navigation but sovereignty tempered by international obligations
120
inherent in the Treaty régime . There is nothing extraordinary to this.
12. This reasoning seems to be confirmed by the defendant Party itself. Indeed, in her
121
Rejoinder , Nicaragua takes care to demonstrate that the regulations issued and measures taken
by her are “reasonable”. According to CostaRica, they are not; but the very fact that Nicaragua
tries to justify them as such amounts to an admission that Nicaragua’s sovereignty is indeed limited
119
CR 2009/2, pp. 43-44.
120
CR 2009/3, pp. 32-33, 36 and 45.
12RN, Vol. II, 4.34 – 4.98. - 40 -
by the obligations imposed through the Cañas- Jerez Treaty, in particular those resulting from
Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free navigation.
13. In the conclusion to this first part of my intervention, I will stress the following points:
(i) The instrument of 1858 is a treaty establishing a boundary and a multifaceted international
régime governing a waterway.
(ii) This being the case, sovereignty and the right of navigation are pieces of one and the same
picture. They are on a par in the sense that it cannot be said, simplistically, that the one
dominates the other. And
(iii)For the present case, this means that Nicaragua cannot exercise her sovereignty via
measures and regulations that are unlawful, discriminatory or unreasonable in the sense
that Costa Rica’s navigational interests are disp roportionately affected. These regulations
and measures must also be effective ones, th at is, be capable of preventing and curbing
undesirable activities such as smuggling and drug traffic.
14. These conclusions bring me to the second theme I propose to deal with, namely, the
lawfulness and reasonableness of Nicaragua’s re gulations and measures curtailing CostaRica’s
perpetual right of free navigation.
3. Lawfulness and reasonableness of Nicaragua’s regulations and measures
(a) General issues
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I therefore now come to the question of the right to
regulate the uses of international watercourses su ch as the SanJuan. The defendant State has
invoked a series of authorities and precedents to buttress that right. Mr.Brownlie has cited a
number of authorities to establish that there is no general right or freedom of river navigation in
Latin American practice 122; we did not say that there was. Nor did we express the “extravagant”
123
opinion that that right of navigation, stipulated and not merely “referred to” by the 1858 Treaty,
was, and I cite Mr. Brownlie, “in some sense absolute and peremptory”. What we did say and what
we maintain is that a treaty right to free navi gation cannot be regulated out of existence by
122
CR 2009/4, p. 30.
12Ibid. - 41 -
invoking Nicaragua’s sovereignty. This observation is also valid for the passages quoted from
Wheaton and O’Connell.
16. There remains the case of MacMahan (USA) v. United Mexican States , quoted
124
extensively by Mr. Brownlie . The case related to the Rio Grande forming the boundary between
Mexico and the United States, on which freedom of navigation prevailed, and to American citizens
navigating on it. The majority of the US/Mexic o General Claims Commission found that Mexico
was “entitled to exercise police powers, some police powers at least, over the course of the
RioGrande”, without, however, defining them. In that same decision, one finds the following
caveat:
“It is reasonable to think that the right of local jurisdiction shall not be exercised
in such a manner as to render nugatory the inn125nt passage through the waters of the
river, particularly if established by treaty.” (Emphasis added.)
This observation is very pertinent for the presen t case. Another observation which needs to be
made is that, unlike the present situation, the Rí o Grande is a river whose waters are divided
between the two riparians, probably in the middle of the thalweg, and where, consequently, the
navigators could always try to pass on the side of their national State. CostaRicans do not have
such an opportunity.
17. In his intervention of 6 March 2009, Mr. Re ichler referred to three further texts dealing
with the regulatory power of States 126. Article6 of the Barcelona Statute on the Regime of
international waterways of 1921 enables riparians to enact laws and regulations on public health,
control of diseases, movement of persons, and customs,
“it being understood that such stipulations must be reasonable, must be applied on a
footing of absolute equality between the nationals, property and flags of any one of the
Contracting States, including the State which is their author, and must not without . .
reason impede the freedom of navigation” (emphasis added).
18. The “Projet de règlement international de navigation fluviale” adopted in 1887 by the
Institute of International Law is essentially a set of general international regulations, not containing
anything specific on national regulations. All it says in its Article 28 is that each riparian preserves
12Ibid., p. 32.
125
United Nations, Reports on International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. IV, p. 490.
12CR 2009/4, pp. 13-14. - 42 -
its sovereign rights over its portion of the rivers, but “dans les limites établies par les stipulations
de ce règlement et les traités ou conventions” (emphasis added).
19. Another text cited by Mr.Reichler are the Berlin Rules on Water Resources adopted
in2004 by the International Law Association, not without some dissent, however. Article 45 of
those Rules allows a riparian State to
“regulate, limit or suspend navigation as appropriate for the purpose of public safety,
health, or the environment, over that portion of the watercourse within its jurisdiction,
provided the State does not discriminate agains t the shipping of another riparian State
and does not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of the rights of
navigation . . .”127(emphasis added).
20. Finally, one really fails to see what the 1936 MontreuxConvention on the Turkish
128
Straits has to do with this case. The Straits Convention pertains to the law of the sea, not to
watercourses. One is under the impression that Nicar agua amalgamates the law of sea with that of
international watercourses whenever convenient. Moreover, the Article cited states that there is
freedom of transit and of passage in the Straits and that that freedom is regulated ⎯ that means
governed ⎯ by the provisions of the Convention. I fa il to see what this could prove in the context
of the present case.
21. The Court will note that none of these texts relate to boundary treaties conferring a right
of navigation. None of them take into account the special situation where the boundary follows the
bank of the river. One can nonetheless deduce from them that, when mentioning regulations, they
specify that they must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory. This has been, and also is,
the position of CostaRica: riparian States ma y regulate if they respect these conditions.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the time has now come to turn to Nicaragua’s regulations and
measures.
(b)Regulations applied and measures taken by Nicaragua
(iGenerao lbservation
22. Before examining these regulations and measures one by one, I shall make two
preliminary observations ⎯ one of a specific and one of a general character. First, it has to be
127
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 72.
12League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 173, p. 215. - 43 -
noted that Nicaragua’s environmental engagement has certainly acquired momentum as a result of
the present case, although some caveat may have to be entered on account of the failings referred to
earlier in the present oral argument 129. In the general area of environmental protection, on the basis
130
of the Molina affidavit , Nicaragua has, among other things, tried to make a point on logging.
There is no evidence, however, that the wood men tioned in that affidavit was indeed cut in
Nicaragua by Costa Ricans. This could just as well have been done on the Costa Rican side. How,
by whom, when and where the picture repr inted in Nicaragua’s Rejoinder was taken 131, no one
knows.
23. The second observation, the condition of reasonableness for regulations and measures
includes the need for them to be effective, so as to achieve the purpose for which they are adopted.
If they are not effective, they are of no use and, therefore, unreasonable. The condition of
non-discrimination is, in my view at least, disregarded, if fees collected are not the same for
everyone or if they change all the time. Finally, the prohibition of arbitrariness serves to prevent,
inter alia , that regulations are adopted, and measur es taken, without a proper legal basis and
without being communicated to those to which they are intended to apply, Costa Rica in the event.
Legal certainty and transparency are the surest means to avoid arbitrariness.
(ii) Obligation to stop and register
24. Let me now turn to the first specific measure, which is the obligation to stop and register.
The duty of stopping and registering allegedly serves a multitude of purposes which have been
reviewed in great detail. Its preventive virtues have been praised. One of CostaRica’s main
objections is that for each and every journey a fee of US$5 plus a handling fee of US$2 for entering
the country and another handling fee of US$2 for leav ing it have to be paid. While this sum may
seem trifling to lawyers litigating before this Court, it is a lot for the inhabitants of a poor area of
CostaRica whose daily lives depend on the river. One also wonders what the services rendered
really are, since their contribution to crime and accident prevention appears to be slim. Finally, one
may well ask whether these incessant controls ⎯ twice a day, for every journey, at every border
12CR 2009/3 , pp. 25-26.
130
RN, Vol. II, Ann. 72.
13RN, Vol. I, p. 93. - 44 -
post ⎯ remain within the purview of what is reasonabl e? Do they not, rather, amount to a form of
harassment?
(iii) Departure clearance certificates (DCC)
25. I come next to the departure clearance certificates. We were told, at the end of last week,
that the issue of such certificates by Nicaragua is primarily aimed at making sure that vessels are
132
safe and seaworthy, and also at verifying who and what is on board . The fees charged, which
are meant to pay for services rendered, have varied , as is shown in an annex to the CostaRican
133
Memorial , between US$5 and 25 ⎯ you will find a US$25 receipt in your folders at tab62
(projection) ⎯ and they are levied for every journey. For the boatmen in the area, US$25 is a
considerable sum if measured against local salaries and profits. Having myself travelled in the
area, as all of Costa Rica’s counsel have, et ergo in Arcadia, I have witnessed both the handling of
the stopping and registering requirements and the inspection of the boats to check their
seaworthiness and the identity of the cargo and p assengers. I was unlucky; though a fee was paid,
I saw no inspection of the boat. There was no service rendered for which a fee could be collected.
26. Here again, Mr. President, one wonders about where the legal basis for this requirement
lies, as no supporting legislation has been supplied, except for visas and tourist cards. The claimed
preventive value of the measure is minimal as it is not applied methodically. The varying fees
suggest arbitrariness.
27. It is alleged, however, by the other side, that local Costa Rican residents are “regularly”
issued departure clearance certificates free of ch arge, “strictly as a courtesy” as was said by
Mr. Reichler 134. Just how “regular” that practice was is shown by the evidence presented by
CostaRica in her Memorial and in her Reply: out of six local residents, four testified that they
were charged 135.
28. Mr.Reichler justifies the imposition of a fee for the departure clearance certificates on
the ground that it is not an “impost”, which w ould breach Article VI, but “a fee for service, a
13CR 2009/5, p. 20.
133
MCR, Vol. 6, Ann. 241.
13CR 2009/5, p. 21.
13MCR, Vol. IV, Anns. 92, 96, 103 and 108; RCR, Vol. II, Anns. 50 and 51. - 45 -
‘redevance’, not a tax” 136. He insisted on this point, suggesting that my characterization of the fee
137
as a tax was “contradicted by all the evidence”. Mr. Reichler cites no evidence in support of his
assertion that 138services are provided: and that assertion is contradicted by evidence in the record,
namely, evidence from Costa Rican boatmen that no inspection, no service has ever been provided
139
in exchange for a departure clearance certificate . This evidence is not acknowledged in
Nicaragua’s Rejoinder, which merely asserts, without reference, that an inspection is performed.
Nor is it acknowledged by Mr. Reichler, who did the same.
29. Whatever Nicaragua may call the charge fo r the departure clearance certificates, in the
absence of the provision of a service, and no matter how small the charge, it is properly
characterized as a tax 140. Furthermore, if a service is provided, the charge must not exceed the
141
actual cost of the inspection : it cannot be varied at will by the Nicaraguan army officer on duty.
142
The distinction between a tax and a fee for services rendered is well known in international law
and practice, and there is no reason to suggest that it is not applicable in the present case. The
references in support of this proposition are set out in the footnotes to my intervention.
30. There is, finally, the alleged recognition by CostaRica of the departure clearance
certificate procedure practised by Nicaragua. The meeting of the Binational Commission, in 1997,
dealt with drug traffic and was intended to draw th e attention of the Nicaraguan authorities to that
issue. The measure discussed at the meeting was that each State should see to it that vessels
“navigate only if duly registered by the posts th at issue corresponding navigation certificates; in
136CR 2009/5, pp. 21-22.
137CR 2009/5, p. 22.
138
CR 2009/3, p. 29.
139
RCR, Ann. 51, pp. 281-282; Ann. 52, p. 283.
140See for example case 24/68 Commission v. Italy [1969] ECR 193; case 18/71 Eunomia v. Italy [1971]
ECR811; case 39/73 REWE-Zentralfinanz v. Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer Westfalen-Lippe [1983] ECR 1039;
case 314/82 Commission v. Belgium [1984] ECR 1543.
141
See for example case 18/87 Commission v. Germany [1988] ECR 5427; case 132/82 Commission v. Belgium
[1983] ECR 1649; case 24/68 Commission v. Italy [1969] ECR 192; Commission v. Belgium [1984] ECR 1543;
case 46/76 Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5. See also Art. II.2 (c) GATT 1994; Art. VIII.1(a) GATT 1994; WTO Panel Report,
India ⎯ Additional and Extra Additional Duties on Imports from the United States, 9June2008, paras.7.301-7.394;
WTO Panel Report, United States ⎯ Import Measures on Certain Products fro m the European Communities, 17 July
2000, para. 6.70; GATT Panel Report, United States ⎯ Customs User Fee, 2 February 1988, paras.68-117; GATT
Panel Report, European Community ⎯ Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain
Processed Fruits and Vegetable, 4 October 1978, para. 4.6.
142
Art. II.2 (c), GATT, 1994. - 46 -
143
this case, the posts at SanJuan de l Norte, San Carlos and Sarapiquí” . What this means is a
registration requirement with a ⎯ CostaRican or Nicaraguan ⎯ border post entitled to deliver
such certificates. It is nowhere said that v essels have to obtain, from Nicaragua, departure
clearance certificates which have to be issued for every journey, nor, a fortiori, that Costa Rica had
condoned such a practice. This is a far cry from finding, as Mr.Reichler did, that “CostaRica
herself agreed that there was good reason for both the registration and departure clearance
requirements imposed by Nicaragua and that she approved of them on that basis” 14. The
developments in the CostaRican Memorial show that the requirement of departure clearance
certificates has been objected to continuously from 1980 to this day 14.
(iv) The prohibition of travel at night
31. I now come to the prohibition to travel at night. As pointed out, earlier 146, navigation in
the upper part of the San Juan may be dangerous; it is much less so in the portion of the river open
to common navigation: here the river is wide a nd, apart from fallen branches and some banks, as
they are found in most other navigable waterways, there are few major obstacles. In the past, no
prohibition of travelling by night existed; but perhaps our friends from the Nicaraguan side will
147
tell us that the SanJuan has become dangerous as a result of the army’s “Action Plan” . That
Plan is the sole basis of the measure, so fa r as we are aware, and it was not communicated by
Nicaragua to the CostaRican Government. This is certainly a most extraordinary way of
conducting neighbourly relations, due perhaps to an over-optimistic view of what “sovereignty”
means in the context of the 1858 Treaty.
32. In my previous intervention on this point, I ventured to suggest that, maybe, a better and
less intrusive way to reduce or obviate the hazards of night travel would be to co-operate and to
install some lights on the river’s banks and, also, to oblige embarkations sailing at night to carry
lights. This is a standard requirement for nocturn al travel both on international rivers and in the
14RN, Vol. II, Ann. 4.
144
CR 2009/5, p. 21.
145
MCR, Vol. I, 5.11-5.26.
14CR 2009/3, p. 31.
14RN, Ann. 48. - 47 -
coastal waters of all States, rich or poor. Mr .Argüello Gómez has credited me with being well
intentioned but unfamiliar with the river and unaware of the extreme poverty characterizing most of
148
the local population . I let him be the judge of my unaware ness but one thing is certain: the use
of lights, especially on the basis of a common agreement, would serve the safety of navigation at
least as well, and probably better, than the highly intrusive measure taken by Nicaragua to prohibit
navigation for 12 out of 24 hours every day.
33. Relating to the nocturnal activities by Nicar aguan vessels, Mr.Reichler states that my
149
“geography is a bit off” . That may be so. It is a fact, however, that nocturnal movements by
Nicaraguan ships do take place in the upper parts of the San Juan River. This fact is attested to by
150
two illustrations, which are being projected right now . These illustrations, indicating the places
and times of departure and arrival, can be seen on the screen, as I said, and also under tab63 of
your folders. This is unquestionably a matter of domestic concern. But it does show that what may
be considered dangerous for some ⎯ and the upper reaches of the river are dangerous ⎯ is not
judged dangerous for others.
34. In short, the prohibition complained of is unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and lacks any
legal basis other than the army’s “Action Plan”.
(v) The duty to fly the Nicaraguan flag
35. I now come to the duty to fly the Nicaraguan flag. I shall be very brief on this. Despite
my peregrinations on the San Juan, I am not certain whether the hoisting of the Nicaraguan flag is
required of every CostaRican vessel or only of those equipped with masts and turrets as asserted
by Mr. Reichler 151; the small boat in which I travelled carried a flag on one of its sides, as it had
neither mast nor turret, perhaps this was a gesture of courtesy by the owner; perhaps, as is more
likely, this was done for fear of sanctions. This leads me to Mr.Reichler’s further assertion that
there has not been a single incident of a Costa Rican boat being prevented from navigating without
148
CR 2009/5, p. 23.
149
CR 2009/5, p. 24.
15See http://www.nicatour.net/en/nicaragua/orario_lanchas_rio_san_juan.asp andhttp://www.visitariosanjuan.
com/elcastillo/elcastillo-comollegar-es.html
15CR 2009/5, p. 26. - 48 -
152
displaying the Nicaraguan flag ⎯ of course not, as the boatmen did not wish to provoke such
incidents.
36. In my earlier intervention on this point I did mention the possibility of there being a
practice, inspired by international courtesy, to show the territorial State’s flag in addition to that of
153
the flag State . This statement led Mr.Reichler to conclude that “Nicaragua, as the sovereign
over these waters . . . has the right to insist on this courtesy” 154. I very much doubt this conclusion;
how can one try to turn international courtesy into binding internal regulations relating to the
exercise of a conventionally guaranteed right of navigation? These regulations are, incidentally,
another fruit of the Nicaraguan army’s “Action Plan” and, to my mind, serve very little purpose.
(vi) Immigration and visa requirements
37. I now come to the last series of me asures, immigration and visa requirements.
Mr. Reichler argues that in practice the visa requirement affects but few of the persons cruising on
the river in tourist boats, as most of them need no visa. Moreover, “as a courtesy”, local
155
CostaRican residents and boatmen are permitte d to operate without visas or tourist cards and,
hence, have no financial burden to bear.
38. CostaRica has shown, however, that boatmen were in fact required to secure visas to
156
carry on their activities : and some tourists were unable to complete their tour because their
boatmen had no visa 157. One boatman was detained by the Nicaraguan army for not carrying his
passport and subsequently had to travel to San José twice and to purchase two visas 158. This shows
that sometimes exemptions are granted, sometimes not. Moreover, when Nicaragua argues that, as
a matter of courtesy, local residents and boatmen are exempted from visa or tourist card
requirements, this means, of course, that the exemption can be withdrawn whenever Nicaragua opts
to do so.
152Ibid.
153
CR 2009/3, p. 33.
154
CR 2009/5, p. 26.
155
Ibid., p. 25.
156MCR, Anns. 85, 87, 91, 92, 93, 95 and 189; RCR, Anns. 51 and 52.
157MCR, Ann. 86.
158
MCR, Anns. 84, 238 and 244. - 49 -
39. Inasmuch as these requirements are effectivel y applied, and are allowed to remain, they
will have a considerable financial impact on boatmen: US$25 per visa, travel expenses to and from
San José, US$5 per tourist, plus US$4 for immigr ation charges, also per tourist, and US$5 to
US$25 for the Departure Clearance Certificate. Thus, if a boatman were to transport tourists on the
SanJuan River once a week throughout the year, he would have to spend over 100days at the
Embassy of Nicaragua in San José for the purpose of processing visas. This would amount to a
total approximate sum of US$2,800. So much for Mr.Reichler’s “non-burdensome immigration
159
regulations” .
40. In legal terms, the measures in question ar e highly objectionable. As I have explained
earlier, in most cases, boatmen and their passengers transit on the river without entering Nicaragua
160
for any length of time . This means that there should be no visa and tourist card requirements at
all. I have also tried to explain why the need for Nicaraguans to obtain a visa when entering
Costa Rican territory is irrelevant in this connection. Th e distinguishing factor is that Costa Rica
has conventionally protected rights of transit passage on the river, whereas Nicaraguans entering
CostaRica are protected by no such right. As a result, the meas ures in question are unlawful in
addition to being unreasonable.
4. C ONCLUSIONS
41. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I have now come to the end of my intervention:
my general conclusions hold in three points:
(i) CostaRica maintains that Nicaragua’s sove reignty over the SanJuan must be seen as a
part — an important part — of the fluvial régime established in 1858.
(ii) The regulations enacted by Nicaragua must not infringe CostaRica’s perpetual right of
free navigation. In particular, they must be lawful, public, non-arbitrary and
non-discriminatory. Furthermore, they must be adapted to fulfil a legitimate public
purpose.
159
CR 2009/5, p. 25.
16CR 2009/3, p. 28. - 50 -
(iii) None of the measures applied by Nicaragua meet these conditions; they are in breach of
the 1858Treaty, the Cleveland Award and the 1916decision of the Central American
Court of Justice.
Thank you, Mr.President, Members of the Court, for your kind attention and forbearance.
May I suggest that you now invite Professor Crawford to the floor.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorCaflisch, for your presentation. Now, I give the
floor to Professor Crawford.
CMRA. WFORD:
IV. P UBLIC VESSELS ,RELATED RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this presentation I will deal first with the issue of
public vessels, secondly with related rights, especially subsistence fishing, and third with remedies.
Given the positions taken by Nicaragua on the latitude points I can be happily brief.
Costa Rica’s rights of navigation with public vessels
2. As to rights of navigation with public vessels, Professor Kohen has already demonstrated
that CostaRican State vessels enjoy the same rights of navigation for purposes of commerce as
Costa Rican privately owned vessels. I will not come back on this, except to make one important
point. This is that an official ⎯ a health worker, for example ⎯ can be transported on the river by
way of commercial navigation. The CostaRican health service does not possess its own boats.
When they need to take medicines or provide ot her forms of health care to riparian communities,
they do what any private person does who has to travel on the river and does not have a boat: they
take one of the local boats at Sarapiquí or another riverine port which is for daily hire and travel in
that. But these CostaRican vessels are exercising the right of free navigation for commercial
purposes. The fact that some of the passengers may be going to deliver medicines or treat a
screwworm epidemic is irrelevant. The navigati on is still commercial on any meaning of the term
“commercial”. London taxi cabs may not ply for hire without a licence. They ply for hire ⎯ they
engage in commercial activity ⎯ even if they are carrying late Cabinet Ministers to meetings at - 51 -
10Downing Street. The same would be true of ri ver taxis. The exercise by CostaRican private
boats of the perpetual right of free navigation is not dependent on the motivations of the
passengers. Otherwise we will have a distasteful form of selection on the river bank: the public
health personnel who are going to give drugs to local communities will be excluded (unless they
have gone to San José, on each and every o ccasion, to apply for Nicaraguan Government
permission for their mission and to get a visa); by contrast, the representative of foreign drug
companies who propose to sell the same drugs as artic les of trade are free to travel. The selection
is to be carried out by junior military personne l on the Nicaraguan side. That is the Nicaraguan
version of a perpetual right of free navigation.
3. But in what follows I am dealing with public vessels not exercising Article VI rights in the
way that I have just described.
(a) The Cleveland Award did not determine CostaRi ca’s rights to navigate with any and all
public vessels
4. Professor McCaffrey claimed that President Cleveland “ruled on the question whether
CostaRica has a right to navigate on the San Juan with its warships or other public vessels ” 161.
According to him, the Cleveland Award prohibite d navigation by all public vessels other than
vessels of the revenue service 162.
5. This is not what the Cleveland Award say s. The issue before Cleveland was carefully
circumscribed: “whether Costa Rica has the right to navigate the River San Juan with ships of war
or revenue boats” 163 . The fourth point of doubtful interpretation put by Nicaragua was similarly
164
limited . Nicaragua leaves out these words of limita tion. The issues raised were in fact
formulated to reflect the actual dispute between th e Parties at the time. This can be confirmed by
reference to the correspondence prior to the referral to arbitration: which refers only to navigation
165
on the San Juan by the revenue guard .
161
CR 2009/5, p. 31, para. 11 (McCaffrey); emphasis added.
162
CR 2009/5, p. 31, para. 11; p. 33 para. 18 (McCaffrey)
163Art.VI, Esquivel-Roman Convention, MCR, Ann.16; see also Cleveland Award, MCR, Ann.26, p.457
(p. 98).
164MCR, Ann. 207, p. 10.
165CMN, Anns. 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. - 52 -
6. Nicaragua argues, on the basis of one hypothetical question posed by CostaRica which
takes up four lines out of a pleading of 181 pages, that “Costa Rica placed the issue of broad rights
166
of navigation by public vessels before the arbitrator” . That is not true. Costa Rica was making
an incidental point in the course of argument, not reformulating the question asked. For its part in
argument, Nicaragua made no reference to any vessels other than vessels of war, and vessels in the
revenue service before President Cleveland. Neither the Parties nor the arbitrator debated the issue
167
of navigation by pub lic vessels in general . Correspondingly, the terms of the award addressed
the limited question of CostaRica’s right of navigation with vessels of war and vessels of the
revenue service. Cleveland did not “[reject] the idea” of broad rights of navigation by public
vessels 168, either expressly or by implication. What did he decide?
(b) The Cleveland Award recognized a specific treaty right of navigation for revenue vessels
7. Professor McCaffrey argued that Cleveland was determined to cause “the least possible
impairment to Nicaragua’s soverei gnty”, and that this can be seen “from his sharp curtailment of
the navigational rights proposed by Rives for CostaRica” 169. ProfessorMcCaffrey went to great
pains to show the Court that Cleveland modified Rives’s draft “in his own hand” and “substituted
170
his own, much more restrictive ruling” . In fact the drafts show exactly the opposite: Cleveland
substituted for Rives’s proposal of a mere “priv ilege”, a specific treaty right of navigation for
vessels of the revenue service.
8. (Tab 64) In its original version, Rives’s draft proposed that Costa Rica’s privileges would
be the same as any other nation in time of peace. He referred to “general usage... [which]
171
constitute[s] an imperfect right entitling such vessels to claim hospitality” . Rives’s proposal
was simply that Costa Rica’s vessels of war and of the revenue service should receive the treatment
extended to those of any other nation. He derived from general international law, not from the
Treaty, a practice of granting privileges ⎯ privileges ⎯ to foreign ships in territorial waters. For
16CR 2009/5, p. 36, para. 26 (McCaffrey).
167
See MCR, Ann. 208, pp. 48-49.
168
CR 2009/5, p. 36, para. 26 (McCaffrey).
16CR 2009/5, p. 34, para. 21 (McCaffrey).
17CR 2009/5, p. 33, para. 21 (McCaffrey).
17CMN, original documents deposited within the Registry, Part II, Ann. 71, p. 217; emphasis added. - 53 -
Rives, CostaRica had no treaty right of navigation for vessels of its revenue service, only an
imperfect right or privilege derived from general international practice. Costa Rica’s treaty rights
of navigation were, according to Rives, limited to rights of commercial navigation, and were not in
any respect rights of public navigation. On this basis, Rives suggested the following text in
response to the second question:
“The Republic of CostaRica has the same privileges of navigating the River
San Juan with vessels of war or of the revenue service as civilized nations usually
accord in their territorial waters to the pub lic vessels of friendly powers in time of
172
peace; but no other or greater privileges.”
9. Cleveland disagreed, considering that Cost aRica had more than simply a “privilege”
enjoyed contingently by any other State. Cost aRican revenue vessels were entitled to a specific
and perpetual treaty right of navigation. That is to say, Cleveland, like it or not, found a treaty right
of navigation for the public vessels he was asked about ⎯ revenue vessels. His decision stated:
“The Republic of Costa Rica under said treaty and the stipulations contained in
the sixth article thereof, has not the right of navigation of the river San Juan with
vessels of war; but [he would have said “pero”] she may navigate said river with such
vessels of the Revenue Service as may be related to and connected with her enjoyment
of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in said article, or as may be necessary
to the protection of said enjoyment.” 173
10. Cleveland authoritatively decided that Cost a Rican revenue vessels held a treaty right to
navigate “as may be related to and connected with her enjoyment of the purposes of commerce”, or
as may be necessary to protect the enjoyment of that right. Both ProfessorMcCaffrey and
Mr. Reichler quoted Cleveland as saying “related to and connected with navigation ‘con objetos de
174
comercio’” . But Rives, though he understood Spanish, wrote in English, and he wrote
“purposes of commerce” ⎯ because that was what both Parties had written, and because it
reflected their understanding of CostaRica’s rights. Cleveland decided that CostaRican revenue
vessels had a right to navigate for purposes of commerce and a right to navigate to protect
Costa Rican navigation for purposes of commerce. This was the main point ⎯ of all the points that
172
CMN, Vol. II, Ann. 72; emphasis added.
17MCR, Anns., Vol. 2, Ann. 16; emphasis added; see also CMN,, Vol. II, Ann. 72.
17CR 2009/5, p. 31, para. 9 (McCaffrey); p. 42, para. 2 (Reich ler); see also p. 32, para. 17 (McCaffrey); p. 35,
para.24 (McCaffrey); p.45, para.9 (Reichler); p.46, para10 (Reichler); p.51, para. 20 (Reichler); p.54, para.25
(Reichler); p. 56, para. 29 (Reichler). - 54 -
were canvassed in the arbitration ⎯ this was the main point on which he disagreed with Rives ⎯
and it reflected a broader, not a narrower, view of Costa Rica’s treaty rights.
11. In particular, whereas Rives had taken the position that CostaRica must exercise its
duties of protecting commerce entirely from its ow n bank of the river— the guards must run up
and down amongst the trees, looking for things to protect apparently— Cleveland’s formulation,
already quoted, entailed a broader view. In the same context, ProfessorMcCaffrey asserted that
175
“Article IV says nothing about having to do this by boat” : that is slightly strange. In practice,
then and now, the only way to protect comme rce on the river was by boat. I take it
ProfessorMcCaffrey is not suggesting that Costa Rica protects commerce on the river and in the
common bays by, let us say, synchronized swimming!
12. Costa Rica explained in its written pleadings that the functions performed by the revenue
guard at the time of the Cleveland Award are now performed by the National Coastguard Service,
the Fiscal Control Police, the Border Police and the Rural and Civic Guards 176. Nicaragua has
produced no evidence and made no statement to th e contrary. Mr. President, Members of the
Court, I reiterate, this is res judicata. ProfessorPellet may be apprehensive at the sight of a
revenue vessel, but he strikes me as a man of more than ordinary courage. But that is what
President Cleveland decided.
(c) Both Parties agree that Cleveland affirmed rights of navigation for armed public vessels
13. (Tab 65) In the first round I gave an ove rview of the practice of Costa Rican navigation
on the San Juan with armed vessels. I did so becau se Nicaragua had refused to admit that revenue
vessels were armed vessels, and that Cleveland had confirmed the existence of Costa Rican treaty
rights of navigation with armed public vessels. For example, in its Counter-Memorial Nicaragua
stated: “no armed navigation by Costa Rican vessels is permitted by the Treaty, as interpreted by
177
the Award, without the prior authorization of Nicaragua” . Nicaragua maintained this position in
178
its Rejoinder , defending the 2005 Presidential Decree which stated: “The Government of
17Ibid.
176
CR 2009/3, p. 15, para. 28 (Crawford); MCR, App. B.
17CMN,, para. 3.1.56 (d); see also ibid., para. 3.1.9.
17See, for example, RN, para. 5.33. - 55 -
Nicaragua will not allow Armed Navigation of Foreign Forces in Nicaraguan Territorial
179
Waters.” Now this has always been a difficult point, given that Nicaragua argued before
Cleveland that revenue vessels “are armed vessel s, capable of enforcing their demands by
180 181
force” , and given that the Rives Report reflected that fact . But it seems that the tale of the
182
Chandler and its fulsome reward for the President finally did the trick ! Costa Rica has a treaty
right of navigation for its armed revenue service vessels, affirmed by the Cleveland Award and
183
Nicaragua has now admitted it .
14. Now once that point is established, the i ssue of practice becomes an entirely subordinate
one. The state of the dossier as to whether Cost aRica exercised its treaty right to navigate with
revenue service vessels is irrelevant. I might add that the written records on both sides of the
question are limited, and on Nicaragua’s side, positiv ely exiguous. But my point is that, once a
right arises under a valid and subsisting treaty, inte rpreted by a competent arbitrator with the force
of res judicata, the right survives independently of its exercise.
15. While I am, so to speak, on the Chandler, I should note that ProfessorPellet has given
the Court a further insight into the kind of vessel Cleveland was envisaging. As he pointed out, and
it is true, the Chandler was formerly commissioned in the navy and it engaged in active service
during the American Civil War 184. ProfessorPellet— looking over his shoulder— expressed a
concern that Costa Rica immediately commission v essels of the same size and the same attributes
185
as the Chandler or the Forward, and send them onto the San Juan . This was not my purpose in
using the example of the Chandler, and Costa Rica has better things to do with its limited budget
than commission new revenue cutters on this scale. I simply use it to demonstrate two things.
First, that President Cleveland was perfectly aware— and if he had not already been aware the
parties had told him— that revenue vessels were armed. Secondly, that it would be utterly
179RCR, Ann. 69; RN, paras. 5.30-5.32.
180
MCR, Ann. 208, p. 49.
181
CMN, Ann. 70, p. 4.
182
CR 2009/3, pp. 13-14, para. 23 (Crawford).
183See, for example, CR 2009/5, pp. 34-35, paras. 23-24 (McCaffrey); ibid., p. 60, para. 10 (Pellet).
184http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Jasmine_1866.pdf cited in CR 2009/5, p. 60, para. 10 (Pellet).
185
CR 2009/5, p. 60, paras. 10-11 (Pellet). - 56 -
paradoxical if Cleveland had perm itted armed revenue service vessels to navigate on the San Juan
without infringing his prohibition of vessels of war, while at the same time prohibiting navigation
by these humble CostaRican public vessels, whic h perform the same tasks, including necessary
tasks of resupply of border posts guarding the river from the Costa Rican side.
16. As I have said, in light of Nicaragua ’s admission that Cleveland expressly permitted
navigation by armed revenue vessels on the San Ju an, the consistency of Costa Rica’s subsequent
practice of armed navigation assumes less significance. Nevertheless, Mr.Reichler said
“CostaRica has failed to present... any official documentation, or for that matter, any other
evidence, establishing... CostaRica’s actual exer cise” of its right of navigation with revenue
vessels 186. This is not true. On Tuesday I directed you to the documentary evidence 187 which
suggests that the revenue guard was engaged in the activities it was directed to perform under the
188
Decree of 1886 . The very fact that Nicaragua pressed the point before Cleveland suggests that
those vessels were actually navigating ⎯ otherwise the point would have been moot.
17. (Tab66) Mr.Reichler’s claim that ther e is no evidence of CostaRica’s exercise of the
right in more recent times can be disproved by refe rence to only one exampl e. The Report of the
Revenue Guard at the Mouth of the San Carlos River, dated 26 July 1968, states that the Guard
received a complaint regarding the noxious plant Ipecac — I gather the Ipecac comes from the root
of the plant— at a place called Infiernito (considering that it had a noxious plant there, perhaps
aptly named Infiernito), a community on the San Juan River, and that they “went to said place” and
189
made an inventory of the Ipecac they found there . As you can see on the screen, from Boca San
Carlos to Infiernito the distance along the San Ju an is about 26km, a journey which would take
rather less than an hour by boat. Now Nicaragua notes that the Report does not say explicitly “we
travelled on the San Juan River”, and asserts th at Infiernito is accessible by land from Boca San
Carlos 190. It does not reference or produce any map to support that claim; the only map it
186
CR 2009/5, p. 44, para. 6 (Reichler).
187
MCR, Anns. 211, 212, 213, 215, 215 and 216; RCR, Anns. 31 to 38.
18MCR, Ann. 206, Art. 5th.
18RCR, Ann. 33, p. 245.
19RN, para. 5.72. - 57 -
191
produced was the Ecomapas map , which we have dealt with, which does not mark Infiernito or
show any relevant road. In fact there is no di rect road between Boca San Carlos and Infiernito,
there are some circuitous unpaved tracks accessi ble during the dry season. But the incident
occurred in July, in the middle of the wet season. This is only one example; I have referred the
192
Court to further documentary evidence . The practice is corroborated by Nicaragua’s own
affidavit evidence, which confirms that Costa Rican civil guard boats navigated on the river during
193
the 1960s and the 1970s .
(d)The Cuadro-Lizano Joint Communiqué establishes the status quo ante practice of
notification, not authorization
18. (Tab67) I turn to Professor McCaffrey’ s characterization of the Cuadro-Lizano Joint
Communiqué which, he said, “shows that Costa Rica recognizes that she requires the permission of
194
Nicaragua to navigate on the river with public , armed vessels to resupply her border posts” .
Professor McCaffrey did not cite the text of the Communiqué, and that is understandable since
nowhere in the text do the words “permission” or “authorization” appear. The operative paragraph
is on the screen and in tab 67 in your folders. I will not read the whole of it, I simply highlight the
key words:
“Third: Both Ministers manifest thei r willingness to resolve this regrettable
inconveniences that occurred over the past fe w days and, for this purpose, they are
establishing the following orders for their respective subordinates:
1. The crew of the vessels of the Public Fo rce of CostaRica that carry out relief of
police and the supply of the border posts located on the right bank of the San Juan
River will navigate [will navigate] along the aforementioned river after having
given the required notice [aviso] carrying only their normal arms, and the
Nicaraguan authorities may accompany the CostaRican vessels making this
journey along the San Juan River in their own separate means of transportation.
Should the Nicaraguan vessel not accompany the CostaRican vessels, the latter
may carry out their rounds in keeping with the corresponding border post reports
as indicated in this agreement.
2. The CostaRican authorities must report [reportarse] to the Nicaraguan posts
throughout their journey along the San Juan River.” (Emphasis added.)
19Ibid., p. 280.
192
See for example CRM, Anns. 88, 90, 94 and 103.
193
RN, Ann. 65, p. 404, para. 6 (Espinoza).
19CR 2009/5, pp. 38-39, para. 36 (McCaffrey). - 58 -
A very carefully drafted balance.
19. Nicaragua claims that the Communiqué requires CostaRica to “obtain Nicaragua’s
195
permission in every case” and that requests for authorization were made prior to each voyage .
Well, you can read it for yourself. It only requires notice; it allows Nicaraguan authorities
navigating in their own vessels to accompany the Costa Rican vessel on the San Juan, but it is clear
that Costa Rican vessels are not prevented from navigating if the Nicaraguan authorities choose not
to accompany them; the CostaRican vessels must report to any Nicaraguan post but there is no
indication that they can be turned back if they comply with the terms of the Communiqué. This
system reflected the status quo ante, which was one of notification and reporting, not authorization.
This balanced practice has now been outlawed by Nicaragua.
(e) Nicaragua’s claim that the status quo ante for police navigation was a system of Nicaraguan
authorization
20. Mr.Reichler devoted much energy on Friday to his argument that CostaRica had
provided no evidence that it re-supplied its border po sts on the San Juan. But even he was forced
to concede that “Costa Rican police traversed the San Juan to bring personnel or supplies to border
posts or to engage in law enforcement activities” between 1994 and 1998, this in light of a detailed
police report in Annex227 of the Memorial 196 . In respect of this evidence, he reverts to
Nicaragua’s familiar and unsupported claim that the navigation must have been with express
197
Nicaraguan permission, even though the document does not say this .
21. (Tab68) You will recall that in its Rejoinder, Nicaragua claimed that CostaRica had
sent its vessels onto the San Juan to detain Nicar aguans, relying on a segment of this same
report 198. But as Mr.SergioUgalde pointed out, th e detention occurred at Boca Tapada, some
199
25 km inland in Costa Rica’s own territory . Nicaragua has not reverted to that claim. But now
Mr. Reichler argues that “Costa Rica began to send her armed police vessels onto the San Juan . . .
for the purpose of intercepting Ni caraguans thought to be illegally bound for CostaRica”. He
19CR 2009/5, p. 39, para. 36.
196
CR 2009/5, p. 47, para. 12; see MCR, Ann. 227.
197
CR 2009/5, p. 47, para. 12.
19RN para. 5.88.
19CR 2009/2, p. 27, para. 12 (Ugalde). - 59 -
referred to the same page of the same report and claimed that CostaRica’s own documentary
evidence showed that Costa Rican police vessels “transported detained Nicaraguans at gunpoint on
200
the San Juan River in June of 1998” . The relevant entry is on the screen and is in tab 68 of your
folder. I won’t read it again, I will simply summarize what it says.
22. First, the Nicaraguans were detained on a farm ⎯ not a fish farm ⎯, a farm of
Gerardo Miranda-Alvarez not on the river. It is not true that the detention occurred on the San Juan
River. Further, it appears they were not transporte d on the river at all. The report refers to them
being picked up by “vehicle No.711”. The report consistently uses the term “vessel” to refer to
boats, and “vehicle” to refer to motor vehicles. There is no reference to the San Juan in this extract,
and no reference to anyone being transported by any means at “at gunpoint”.
23. Mr.Reichler criticizes the affidavit of Mr .Navarro for failing to refer to the July2000
aide-memoire annexed to the Rejoinder 201. It will not have escaped the Court, but we have had to
spend quite a lot of these oral arguments responding to evidence in the Rejoinder, which could, and
should have been produced in the Counter-Memorial. And this is a further example. For his part
the Nicaraguan Agent criticized the Court for allowing any further Costa Rican evidence after the
202
repleaded Rejoinder . By contrast Mr.Reichler ⎯ good trial lawyer that he is ⎯ wanted so
more and more evidence 203! The Court’s response to our limited filing shows that we got the
balance right.
24. Turning to the substance, I have alread y stated that there is no evidence that this
aide-memoire of July2000 was ever seen or approved by anyone from the CostaRican side.
Nicaragua did not produce any handwritten minutes of the meeting, any tape recording, which
would have permitted ve rification of their authenticity and of any signatures, if indeed they were
signed. Moreover, Mr. Reichler too hastily dismisses the Navarro affidavit: Mr. Navarro expressly
states that after Nicaragua’s prohibition of poli ce navigation “in meetings with the Nicaraguan
Army personnel, in which he personally participated” ⎯ we know from the record that the
20CR 2009/5, p. 52, para. 22 (Reichler).
201
RN, Ann. 68.
202
CR 2009/4, p. 17, para. 38 (Argüello).
20CR 2009/5, pp. 47-48, para. 14. - 60 -
July2000 meeting was one of these ⎯ “it was never stated or anticipated that there existed an
obligation or practice of requesting permission from the Nicaraguan authorities for the navigation
of CostaRican police on the San Juan River” 204. The statement is clear and it refutes
205
Colonel Molina’s Minutes ⎯ or rather GeneralCarrión’s “authentication” of ColonelMolina’s
Minutes.
25. Mr.Navarro’s affidavit, supported by documentary evidence 206, puts into question the
five Nicaraguan army affidavits filed late with Nicaragua’s Rejoinder, which constitute the only
evidence of the alleged “practice” of requesting prior authorization. In these circumstances,
Nicaragua’s claim that there was consistent prac tice on the San Juan of public vessels requesting
authorization should be rejected.
(f) Nicaragua has breached CostaRica’s rights of navigation with public vessels to deliver
health, social and other essential services to the riparians of the Costa Rican bank
26. My final point on this topic relates to the right of navigation to deliver essential health,
social and other services to riparian communities on the CostaRican bank. Mr.Reichler asserted
that there was no such right of navigation 207; but he said “Nicaragua does not... prohibit
CostaRica from navigating on the river for purpos es of delivering medical, educational or other
social services to CostaRican citizens on the right bank of the river” all it requires is for vessels
and officials to “register” and to “co mply with applicable visa requirements” 208. He dismissed the
evidence of breaches as “bureaucratic inefficiencies” ⎯ apparently a new circumstance precluding
wrongfulness ⎯ resulting in delays in the issuing of “some visas”, in “isolated cases” 209.
27. In fact however Nicaragua has prohibited Costa Rica from navigating on the river for the
purposes of delivering health, social, educational and security services to riparians. Costa Rica has
produced evidence of this prohibition 210. For example, Mrs.LauraNavarro, who works for a
204CR Ann. IV to letter dated 27 November 2008, para. 5.
205
CR 2009/5, p 49, para. 17 (Reichler).
206
CR Ann. V to letter dated 27 November 2008.
207CR 2009/5, p. 55, para. 26 (Reichler).
208CR 2009/5, p. 54, para. 25 (Reichler).
209CR 2009/5, p. 55, para. 28 (Reichler).
210
See, for example, MCR, Anns.150, 52, 53, 166, 167, 168, 236, 237, 239, 98, 99, 100, 101; RCR, Anns.45,
47, 55, 57, 56, 49. - 61 -
social welfare agency in CostaRica, states that Nicaragua imposed “a prohibition... upon
211
Costa Rican public workers . . . navigating the San Juan River” . Similarly Mr. Marvin Chaves,
another social welfare worker, says that Nicar aguan authorities “requir[ed] that CostaRican
officials request permission” to visit Costa Rican communities 212. The uncontroverted evidence of
Dr.Ching is that the Nicaraguan Ambassador told her personally that she had to request
213
“authorization to navigate on the San Juan River” . Her evidence was filed in July 2008. In the
circumstances it is, with respect, disingenuous to suggest that Nicaragua “does not... prohibit
Costa Ricans from navigating on the river for the purposes of delivering medical . . . services”, and
214
that it only requires registration . A demand for authorization entails a right to prohibit. The
prohibition is quite separate from the issue of visas, which Professor Caflisch has dealt with.
28. Nicaragua’s prohibition of this form of public navigation has had a detrimental effect on
the provision of essential services. This is clear from CostaRica’s evidence, which states that
“Primary Care activities” were suspended in communities close to the San Juan “due to the
increasing restrictions on free navigation on the river” 215. CostaRican health workers attest that
the services were suspended “due to the problem s being encountered regarding navigation” and
216
“with the purpose of protecting the physical integrity of the health workers...” . They also
attest to the effect on the local population: v accinations cannot be provided to children, adults
cannot receive basic health services 217 , healthcare provided to persons in the region has in general
218
been negatively affected .
29. This evidence cannot be dismissed as “bur eaucratic inefficiencies which have resulted in
delays in the issuance of some visas” 219 . What was provided to Dr. Ching was not a visa. It was
211RCR, Ann. 57, p. 297.
212
RCR, Ann. 56, p. 295 (emphasis added).
213
RCR, Ann. 55, p. 292.
214
CR 2009/5, p. 54, para. 25 (Reichler).
215MCR, Ann. 239, p. 1047. See also CRM, Anns. 236, 237, 98, 99, 100.
216MCR, Ann. 99, p. 527. See also CRM, Anns. 98 and 100.
217MCR, Ann. 100, pp. 531-532.
218
MCR, Ann. 99, p. 527. See also RCR, Ann. 55, p. 292; Ann. 59, p. 304.
219
CR 2009/5, p. 55, para. 28 (Reichler). - 62 -
an “authorization . . . to navigate on the San Juan River” 220. She was not applying for a visa, nor
even for visas for the employees who were going to carry out the journey; she was compelled by
221
the Nicaraguan Ambassador to apply for “authorization” for the programme itself . Mr. Reichler
alleges that since May2007, Nicaragua has “expe ditiously grant[ed] visas so that CostaRican
officials could deliver governmental services” 222. Well first, this confuses the requirement of visas
with the requirement of authorization for the programme. In Costa Rica’s Reply, it was noted that
223
in some cases Nicaragua had provided authorization within a reasonable time , but it was also
noted that other requests had been ignored 224 and the practical effect of this was a prohibition on
navigation by these government officials.
Fishing
30. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I turn ⎯ something I am not used to doing ⎯ to
subsistence fishing, but after the raising of he ns, I suppose fishing comes next. ProfessorKohen
225
has explained why the claim to subsistence fishing is admissible , and Mr.Reichler, while
preserving Nicaragua’s position on admissibility, did not respond to his arguments at all 226. As to
the substance of the claim, Mr. Reichler said that Nicaragua had not prohibited subsistence fishing
on the river and that Nicaragua “has absolutely no intention of preventing CostaRican residents
from engaging in subsistence fishing activities” 227–– has absolutely no intention of preventing
CostaRican residents from engaging in subsistence fishing activities. He stressed, however, that
228
commercial including sport fishing is not permitted . So there are three points. As to the first ⎯
the facts ⎯ we produced affidavit evidence that fishing by riparians has been prohibited and that
220
CMN, Ann. 53, p. 193.
221
CMN, Ann. 51, p. 189.
222CR 2009/5, p. 55, para. 28 (Reichler).
223RCR, paras. 4.36-4.37.
224CRR, Anns. 49 and 56; CRR, paras. 4.34-4.36.
225CR 2009/3, pp. 55-57, paras. 13-22 (Kohen).
226
CR 2009/5, p. 27, para. 48 (Reichler).
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid. - 63 -
229
boats and tackle have been confiscated . As to the second, if you decide there is an admissible
dispute, we ask the Court, in its dispositif, respectfully, to record and give effect to Nicaragua’s
stated position that subsistence fishing by ripa rians, whether from the CostaRican bank or from
boats on the river, will not be impeded. As to the third point, Costa Rica has never claimed ⎯ and
does not claim ⎯ a right to commercial fishing or sport fishing on the river and we have no
objection that this be made clear in the judgment.
Remedies
31. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I d ealt with remedies in my abbreviated speech in
the first round 230. ProfessorPellet in his unabbreviated speech on Friday did not say much that
requires a response. We agree on the need for the Court by way of a clear declaratory judgment to
spell out the respective rights and obligations of th e Parties in so far as they are in dispute before
the Court 231. Where we do not agree is that Nicaragua apparently persists in seeking a declaration
232
on hypothetical matters not presently in dispute ⎯ such as dredging . Nicaragua’s right to
dredge is as set out in the Cleveland Award in response to the sixth poi
nt of doubtful
233
interpretation . Whether any particular dredging prog ramme meets Cleveland’s conditions will
depend on its scope, scale and modalities. Presently there is no proposal for dredging and the
matter is entirely hypothetical. This is not, you will be relieved to know, an advisory opinion.
234
32. Turning to what ProfessorPellet persists in calling injunctions , obviously the Court
does not issue injunctions in the domestic law sense; it issues orders, often very clear and specific,
which are binding on the States parties to the case. I would simply and respectfully request the
Court not to allow any room for backsliding in the terms of the provisions of the dispositif. On the
subjects in dispute the Parties need to know exactly where they stand, so there can be no excuse for
non-performance, no new circumstance precluding wrongfulness, so they can ⎯ more happily than
229
On Nicaragua’s established fishing prohibition, see the following affidavits: MCR, Anns. 106, 107,
108, 109; RCR, Ann. 54, and the Press notes at RCR, Ann. 59. On the confiscation of fishing gear, boats and
fish see MCR, Anns. 105, 106, 107, 109; RCR, Anns. 54 and 59.
230
CR 2009/3, pp. 63-70, paras. 1-28 (Crawford).
231
CR 2009/5, p. 57, para. 3 (Pellet).
232CR 2009/5, p. 59, para. 6 (Pellet).
233MCR, Ann. 16, p. 99, numbered para. 6.
234CR 2009/5, p. 61, para. 15 (Pellet). - 64 -
in recent decades ⎯ co-exist on the river which marks fo r a substantial distance their common
border.
33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there being nothing I can usefully add on damages,
it remains to thank you for your courteous attention during this case, and to ask you, Mr. President,
to call on Costa Rica’s Agent to present our final remarks and submissions.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford, for your presentation. I
now give the
floor to the Agent of Costa Rica, Ambassador Edgar Ugalde to present his closing remarks.
UMGr. LDE-ALVAREZ:
V. C LOSING REMARKS
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, Costa Rica has come to the end of its
oral pleadings. It is my task to draw our final conclusions for the Court as well as to state
CostaRica’s submissions. However, before I turn to these final points, I will refer briefly to
various misstatements made by Nicaragua in its oral pleadings.
2. (Tab69 of the judges’ folder) First, let me say again that CostaRica does not possess
235
military forces. The chart presented by Nicaragua last Thursday , apparently showing
236
Costa Rican “military” expenditure, is referenced from a website which bases the information on
the CIA’s World Factbook 237. It should be noted that Nicaragua omitted expenditure on its police
forces and only included expenditure on its military forces. Costa Rica rejects the assertion that the
amounts depicted correspond to CostaRican “military expenses”. As a matter of fact, the CIA
238
source cited from the website clearly indicates that Costa Rica does not possess military forces .
239
IfNicaragua’s total police and military expenditure was cons idered, as should have been the
case, then in absolute terms Nicaragua’s expenditure on security is nearly $100million!, about a
fifth more than CostaRica’s, despite large di screpancies between the GDP of both countries.
235
CR 2009/4, p. 12, para 18 (Argüello).
236
See http://www.militarybudget.info/WorldwideSpending.html.
23See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
23See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cs.html.
23See
http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/clas/pdba/Security/citizensecurity/nica… - 65 -
Furthermore, as you can see in the graphic projected, the chart there shows that Nicaragua’s
240 241
expenditure, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP , is much higher than Costa Rica’s
(tab 70 of the judges’ folder).
3. In addition, the recent Human Development Report 242 prepared by the United Nations
Development Programme states that Costa Rica has zero, I repeat, zero military expenditure for the
period between 1990 and 2005.
4. Secondly, the reference made by Nica ragua to its 1986 Application to the Court 243 cannot
and should not have any weight in the present pr oceedings. As Nicaragua has pointed out, that
case was discontinued by it in 1987, before Cost aRica had any opportunity to respond to
Nicaragua’s Memorial, let alone appear before this Court 244. In any case, Costa Rica emphatically
rejects all allegations that may have been made by Nicaragua there.
5. Nicaragua seems satisfied to use the Court’s valuable time to fashion new fields of
conflict, because that is precisely what it does by stating that CostaRica has not reacted to other
problems, such as environmental issues as a result of mining operations or the settlement of
245
maritime boundaries . It must be said that these issues fall entirely outside the dispute before the
Court in the present case. In this context, however, Costa Rica expects to soon receive the relevant
246
documents pertaining to Nicaragua’s planne d hydroelectric dam on the SanJuan River , with
indications of its possible environmental impact on the river and both riparian States. Costa Rica is
also hopeful that Nicaragua will finally decide on the date when the mariti me delimitation talks,
which were unilaterally suspended by it in 2005, could be resumed.
240
See tab 69 of the judges’ folder. Information derived from
http://www.militarybudget.info/WorldwideSpendin`g.html; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html; and http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/clas/pdba/Security/citizensecurity/nica…
gobernacion2008.pdf .
24See tab 70 of the judges’ folder. Information derived from
http://www.militarybudget.info/WorldwideSpendin`g.html; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html; and http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/clas/pdba/Security/citizensecurity/nica…
gobernacion2008.pdf .
24See http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf.
24CR 2009/4, p. 15, para. 29 (Argüello).
24CR 2009/2*, p. 12, para. 1 (Ugalde-Alvarez).
245
CR 2009/4, pp. 16-17, paras. 32-34 (Argüello).
246
See http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/imprimir/41417; http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/secciones/
nota/43824-NN/nicaragua-y-brasil-firman-acuerdo-sobre-plan-hidroelectrico/. - 66 -
6. Nicaragua insists on censuring CostaRica for enforcing its immigration laws in
CostaRica’s own territory. As has been show n to the Court, Nicaragua has misrepresented
evidence related to this issue 247. However, I would like to respond to Nicaragua’s allegation that in
1998 CostaRica’s Government engaged in a new policy in response to what was perceived as
increased Nicaraguan illegal immigration to Costa Rica 248. It has been shown that these allegations
249
are not true . As a matter of fact, it was that Administration that enacted in 1998 the largest
250
immigration amnesty in CostR aican history , which effectively allowed some
150,000 Nicaraguans to legalize their situation in Costa Rica.
7. Finally, Nicaragua’s Agent found it appropr iate to announce before the Court that, for the
first time in over 150years, it is disputing issues regarding the situation of the common Bays of
SanJuan and Salinas 251. Is Nicaragua disposed to challenge , once again, the final and perpetual
character of the 1858 Treaty of Limits, along with the res judicata character of the 1888 Cleveland
Award?
8. CostaRica has come to the International Court of Justice, as I said, as a last resort to
definitively settle the way in which it can effec tively enjoy its rights of free navigation on the
San Juan River 252. The river has an exceptional régime which is reflected in the number of
instruments and decisions that relate to it, in particular the 1858Treaty of Limits, the 1888
Cleveland Award, the 1916 judgment of the Central American Court of Justice and the
1956 Agreement. We trust that the Court will view this régime in its entirety and will find it, along
with the evidence submitted, to fully support Costa Rica’s submissions.
9. Therefore, we trust that the Court will find that Costa Rica indeed possesses the rights of
navigation for purposes of commerce that the instru ments have granted it. The clarity of your
decision is of great importance, so that CostaRi ca and Nicaragua will be able to recognize that
children may navigate freely to school, that mother s and their children can have effective access to
24CR 2009/2, p. 27, para. 12 (Ugalde). See also CR 2009/6, pp. 50-64 (Crawford).
248
CR 2009/5, p. 51, para. 21 (Reichler).
249
CR 2009/2*, pp. 25-27, paras. 7-13 (Ugalde).
25See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,NATLEGBOD,,CRI,3ae6b560c,0.htm
25CR 2009/4, p. 17, para. 35 (Argüello).
25CR 2009/2*, p. 14, para. 9 (Ugalde-Alvarez). - 67 -
health and social services, that tourists may be transported without being searched and subjected to
ad hoc measures, and that police protection can be brought to communities. It is equally important
for the State of Costa Rica to fully exercise its rights and obligations, including the protection and
guarding of the San Juan River and the Bay of Sa n Juan del Norte, which is commonly owned by
both countries, as well as that of Salinas. It is our hope that these rights, shall they be found to
belong to CostaRica, be enjoyed in such a ma nner that they are effective and meaningful, free
from constant and aggravating interference. Th e people of CostaRica wish nothing more than
peaceful and friendly relations with their neighbours, but they also desire that the rule of
international law be upheld and fully respected.
Submissions
10. Mr.President, pursuant to Article60 of the Rules of Court, I shall now read the final
submissions of the Republic of Costa Rica.
Having regard to the written and oral pleadings and to the evidence submitted by the Parties,
may it please the Court to adjudge and declare that the Republic of Nicaragua has:
(a) the obligation to allow all CostaRican vessels and their passengers to navigate freely on the
SanJuan for purposes of commerce, including communication and the transportation of
passengers and tourism;
(b) the obligation not to impose any charges or fees on Costa Rican vessels and their passengers for
navigating on the river;
(c) the obligation not to require persons exercising the right of free navigation on the river to carry
passports or obtain Nicaraguan visas;
(d) the obligation not to require Costa Rican vessels and their passengers to stop at any Nicaraguan
post along the river;
(e) the obligation not to impose other impediments on the exercise of the right of free navigation,
including timetables for navigation and conditions relating to flags;
(f) the obligation to allow Cost aRican vessels and their passengers while engaged in such
navigation to land on any part of the bank where navigation is common without paying any
charges, unless expressly agreed by both Governments; - 68 -
(g) the obligation to allow Costa Rican official vessels the right to navigate the San Juan, including
for the purposes of resupply and exchange of personnel of the border posts along the right bank
of the river with their official equipment, including service arms and ammunition, and for the
purposes of protection as established in the releva nt instruments, and in particular the Second
Article of the Cleveland Award;
(h) the obligation to facilitate and expedite traffic on the San Juan, within the terms of the Treaty of
15April1858 and its interpretation by the Cleveland Award of 1888, in accordance with
Article 1 of the bilateral Agreement of 9 January 1956;
(i) the obligation to permit riparians of the Costa Rican bank to fish in the river for subsistence
purposes.
11. Further, the Court is requested to adj udge and declare that by reason of the above
violations, Nicaragua is obliged:
(a) immediately to cease all the breaches of obligations which have a continuing character;
(b)to make reparation to CostaRica for all injuries caused to CostaRica by the breaches of
Nicaragua’s obligations referred to above, in the form of the restoration of the situation prior to
the Nicaraguan breaches and compensation in an am ount to be determined in a separate phase
of these proceedings; and
(c) to give appropriate assurances and guarantees th at it shall not repeat its unlawful conduct, in
such form as the Court may order.
12. The Court is requested to reject Nicaragua’s request for a declaration.
13. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, the Government and the people of
the Republic of CostaRica express their gratit ude to the Court for the opportunity given to
CostaRica to be heard. May I also offer our than ks to the Court’s Registry and to the team of
interpreters and translators for their excellent work. Costa Rica reaffirms its full confidence in the
Court and expresses its acceptance of the judgment to be found. This judgm ent should serve to
allow both countries to build a fraternal and peaceful future. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ambassador Edgar Ugalde. The Court takes note
of the final submissions which you have now read on behalf of the Republic of CostaRica. The - 69 -
Republic of Nicaragua will present its second round of oral argument on Thursday 12 March from
10 a.m. to 1 p.m. This sitting is now adjourned until Thursday.
The Court rose at 1 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 9 March 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)