Public sitting held on Tuesday 25 February 2003, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

CR 2003/11
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2003
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 25 February 2003, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Shi presiding,
in the case concerning Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2003
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 25 février 2003, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,
en l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières
(République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
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Present: President Shi
Vice-President Ranjeva
Judges Guillaume
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Judge ad hoc Rigaux
Registrar Couvreur
¾¾¾¾¾¾
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Présents : M. Shi, président
M. Ranjeva, vice-président
MM. Guillaume
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma
Tomka, juges
M. Rigaux, juge ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
¾¾¾¾¾¾
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The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is represented by:
Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal,
Deputy Director for Legal Affairs, Bureau of International Legal Services of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, The Hague,
as Agent;
Mr. D. Momtaz, Professor of International Law, Tehran University, member of the International
Law Commission, Associate, Institute of International Law,
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin, Head of Legal Affairs, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Public Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of
Frankfurt-am-Main, Head of Research Unit, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the English and Australian Bars, member of the Institute of International
Law,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Parix X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. David S. Sellers, avocat à la cour d'appel de Paris, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England
and Wales, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. M. Mashkour, Deputy Director for Legal Affairs, Bureau of International Legal Services of the
Islamic Republic of Iran,
Mr. M. A. Movahed, Senior Legal Adviser, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. R. Badri Ahari, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Tehran,
Mr. A. Beizaei, Legal Adviser, Bureau of International Legal Services of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Paris,
Ms Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. William Thomas, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. Leopold von Carlowitz, Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt,
Mr. Mathias Forteau, docteur en droit, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre
(CEDIN), University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
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Le Gouvernement de la République islamique d’Iran est représenté par :
M. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, agent de la République islamique d’Iran auprès du Tribunal des
réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran, directeur adjoint des affaires juridiques au bureau des services
juridiques internationaux de la République islamique d’Iran à La Haye,
comme agent;
M. D. Momtaz, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Téhéran, membre de la
Commission du droit international, associé à l’Institut de droit international,
M. S. M. Zeinoddin, chef du service juridique de la National Iranian Oil Company,
M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit public à l’Université Johann Wolfgang Goethe de
Francfort-sur-le-Main, directeur de la recherche à l’Institut de recherche pour la paix à
Francfort,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire
Whewell à l’Université de Cambridge, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et d’Australie,
membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
M. David S. Sellers, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, Solicitor auprès de la Cour suprême
d’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles, cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. M. Mashkour, directeur adjoint des affaires juridiques au bureau des services juridiques
internationaux de la République islamique d’Iran,
M. M. A. Movahed, conseiller juridique principal à la National Iranian Oil Company,
M. R. Badri Ahari, conseiller juridique au bureau des services juridiques internationaux de la
République islamique d’Iran, Téhéran,
M. A. Beizaei, conseiller juridique au bureau des services juridiques internationaux de la
République islamique d’Iran, Paris,
Mme Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,
Paris,
M. William Thomas, Solicitor auprès de la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles,
cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
M. Leopold von Carlowitz, chargé de recherche à l’Institut de recherche pour la paix à Francfort,
M. Mathias Forteau, docteur en droit, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre
(CEDIN) de l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre,
comme conseils;
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Mr. Robert C. Rizzutti, Vice-President, Cartographic Operations, International Mapping
Associates,
as Technical Adviser.
The Government of the United States of America is represented by:
Mr. William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Agent;
Mr. Ronald J. Bettauer, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Professor, George Washington University School of Law,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, United States
Department of State,
Mr. Michael J. Mattler, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,
Mr. Sean Murphy, Professor, George Washington University School of Law,
Mr. Ronald D. Neubauer, Associate Deputy General Counsel, United States Department of
Defence,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II, member of the Institut de droit
international, member of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Institut de France),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Paul Beaver, Defence & Maritime Affairs Consultant, Ashbourne Beaver Associates, Ltd.,
London,
Mr. John Moore, Senior Associate, C & O Resources, Washington, D.C.,
as Advocates;
Mr. Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The Hague,
Mr. David A. Kaye, Deputy Legal Counsellor, United States Embassy, The Hague,
Ms Kathleen Milton, Attorney-Adviser, United States Department of State,
as Counsel;
Ms Marianne Hata, United States Department of State,
Ms Cécile Jouglet, United States Embassy, Paris,
Ms Joanne Nelligan, United States Department of State,
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M. Robert C. Rizzutti, vice-président des opérations cartographiques, International Mapping
Associates,
comme conseiller technique.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d’Amérique est représenté par :
M. William H. Taft, IV, conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
comme agent;
M. Ronald J. Bettauer, conseiller juridique adjoint du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
comme coagent;
M. Michael J. Matheson, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université George Washington,
M. D. Stephen Mathias, directeur chargé des questions concernant les Nations Unies auprès du
conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Michael J. Mattler, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Sean Murphy, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université George Washington,
M. Ronald D. Neubauer, assistant au bureau du conseiller juridique adjoint du département de la
défense des Etats-Unis,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l’Université de Paris II, membre de l’Institut de droit
international, membre de l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Institut de France),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Paul Beaver, expert consultant en questions de défense et affaires maritimes, Ashbourne Beaver
Associates, Ltd., Londres,
M. John Moore, associé principal, C & O Resources, Washington D. C.,
comme avocats;
M. Clifton M. Johnson, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade des Etats-Unis à La Haye,
M. David A. Kaye, conseiller juridique adjoint à l’ambassade des Etats-Unis à La Haye,
Mme Kathleen Milton, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
comme conseils;
Mme Marianna Hata, département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
Mme Cécile Jouglet, ambassade des Etats-Unis à Paris,
Mme Joanne Nelligan, département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
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Ms Aileen Robinson, United States Department of State,
Ms Laura Romains, United States Embassy, The Hague,
as Administrative Staff.
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Mme Aileen Robinson, département d’Etat des Etats-Unis,
Mme Laura Romains, ambassade des Etats-Unis à La Haye,
comme personnel administratif.
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The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open, and I first call on
Mr. Bettauer.
Mr. BETTAUER:
12. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PRESENTATION
12.1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, up to this point in the
presentation of the United States you have heard about the relevant facts of the case.
12.2. Now we have arrived at the point at which we shall take up our legal analysis of both
Iran’s claim against the United States and, equally important, of the United States counter-claim
against Iran.
12.3. We shall proceed in the following order. First, Professor Prosper Weil will address the
legal context of this proceeding, taking into account the Court’s Judgment in the preliminary
objections phase of this case. He will set the stage for the discussion that will follow.
12.4. Following Professor Weil this morning, Mr. Mathias will show that Iran’s claim should
be denied by the Court as a consequence of Iran’s own conduct with respect to the subject-matter
of this case. His argument will have three main themes. First, he will demonstrate that because
Iran breached its reciprocal obligation under the 1955 Treaty with respect to United States freedom
of commerce and navigation, Iran cannot prevail on its claim with respect to United States action.
Second, he will show that Iran cannot prevail because the United States measures were a
consequence of Iran’s own unlawful conduct. Finally, he will show that any damage suffered by
Iran arises out of its own unlawful conduct more generally ¾ for example, its unlawful mining and
missile attacks.
12.5. Professor Murphy will then begin the United States discussion of Article X,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty. He will show that United States measures against the platforms did not
violate Article X, for two reasons. First, the platforms were not, in fact, engaged in activities
involving “freedom of commerce” within the meaning of the Treaty. Second, there was no
commerce “between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties” was, in fact, affected by
the United States measures.
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12.6. Following Professor Murphy, I will return to the podium and show that there was no
violation of Article X for two additional reasons. I will demonstrate that, even if there were
remote, incidental effects that might have been caused by the United States measures, any such
effects on Iranian commerce would not be a sufficient basis for a finding of breach of the Treaty. I
will then argue that Iran’s use of the platforms in support of offensive military activity precludes a
finding that United States measures against them breached the “freedom of commerce” provision in
Article X, paragraph 1.
12.7. Tomorrow morning, we shall turn to Article XX of the Treaty. Professor Weil will
present a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of Article XX.
12.8. Professor Matheson will then show that, under Article XX, the measures taken by the
United States are fully consistent with the terms of the Treaty and, accordingly, that they did not
violate the Treaty even if they might otherwise have violated Article X, which they did not.
Professor Matheson will also show that the United States measures were appropriate exercises of
the right to act in self-defence, although the Court need not reach that issue in this case.
Professor Matheson will then end the morning session.
12.9. Tomorrow afternoon, we will turn to the counter-claim. Professor Murphy will
introduce the counter-claim with a discussion of jurisdiction and admissibility issues in light of the
arguments made by Iran in its final pleading.
12.10. Following Professor Murphy, Mr. Mattler will briefly review the facts of particular
relevance to the counter-claim, including the nature of the damages suffered by United States
shipping interests as a result of Iran’s attacks on United States and other neutral shipping.
12.11. Professor Murphy will then demonstrate in some detail how Iran’s actions violated
Article X, paragraph 1.
12.12. Following that presentation by Professor Murphy, Mr. Taft will conclude the United
States first round presentation.
12.13. There is only one additional point that I wish to make before I ask you to call upon
Professor Weil. It is a general point that applies across the board to Iran’s claim. Iran, as claimant,
has the burden of establishing all the facts necessary to support its claim. As this Court said in its
Judgment in the jurisdiction and admissibility phase of the Nicaragua case, “it is the litigant
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seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of proving it” (case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101). Just four months
ago, in its Judgment in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, the Court relied on this point, citing it
favourably, and made clear that “in cases where evidence may not be forthcoming, a submission
may in the judgment be rejected as unproved” (case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment, para. 321, quoting case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101). Thus, it is for Iran ¾ and for Iran alone ¾ to prove that
the United States violated the 1955 Treaty, by undertaking measures in contravention of Article X,
paragraph 1.
12.14. Mr. President, that concludes my introduction. I ask that you call upon
Professor Weil.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bettauer. I now give the floor to Professor Weil.
M. WEIL :
13. LA COMPETENCE DE LA COUR A LA LUMIERE DE L’ARRET DE 1996 SUR L’EXCEPTION
PRELIMINAIRE : L’ARTICLE X, ALINEA 1, DU TRAITE DE 1955
13.1. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, dans son arrêt du
12 décembre 1996 sur l’exception préliminaire (C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 803), la Cour a pris
deux décisions qui définissent avec autorité de res judicata le cadre dans lequel elle se propose de
se prononcer sur la requête de l’Iran au présent stade du fond :
¾ En premier lieu, la Cour a défini l’étendue et les limites de la compétence que lui confère
l’article XXI, paragraphe 2, du traité d’amitié entre les Etats-Unis et l’Iran de 1955 pour statuer
sur «[t]out différend qui pourrait s’élever entre les Hautes Parties contractantes quant à
l’interprétation ou à l’application du présent traité». La Cour est compétente, a-t-elle décidé,
«pour connaître des demandes formulées par la République islamique d’Iran au titre du
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paragraphe 1 de l’article X dudit traité», aux termes duquel «Il y aura liberté de commerce et de
navigation entre les territoires des deux Hautes Parties contractantes.»
¾ En second lieu, la Cour a décidé que dans le cadre de sa compétence ainsi définie il lui
appartiendrait de se prononcer sur la «défense au fond» qu’elle autorise les Etats-Unis à «faire
valoir le moment venu» ¾ «défense au fond», «faire valoir le moment venu» sont les termes
employés par la Cour ¾ sur le fondement du paragraphe 1 d) de l’article XX de ce même traité
de 1955, aux termes duquel «Le présent traité ne fera pas obstacle à l’application de
mesures … nécessaires … à la protection des intérêts vitaux [des Hautes Parties contractantes]
sur le plan de la sécurité.» J’observe immédiatement que cette traduction française, utilisée par
la Cour, de la version anglaise authentique du traité de 1955 n’est pas d’une rigoureuse
exactitude. Le texte anglais qui fait foi se lit de la manière suivante : «The present Treaty shall
not preclude the application of measures … necessary to protect its [a High Contracting
Party’s] essential security interests.» Essential security interests, intérêts «essentiels», n’est de
toute évidence pas synonyme d’intérêts «vitaux» : des intérêts «vitaux» sont des intérêts qui
soulèvent un problème de vie ou de mort, de to be or not to be; des intérêts «essentiels» sont
des intérêts d’une particulière importance mais qui ne soulèvent pas nécessairement un
problème de vie ou de mort, d’être ou de ne pas être. Dans la version en langue persane,
également authentique, du traité de 1955, m’a t-on dit, le mot utilisé assasi correspond au mot
anglais essential alors que «vitaux» se serait dit hiati. Il est intéressant de noter à cet égard que
la convention d’établissement entre les Etats-Unis et la France de 1959, dont les textes anglais
et français font également foi, tout deux parlent en anglais de essential security interests, et en
français d’«intérêts essentiels en matière de sécurité». Sur la base de ce précédent et par
référence à l’article 33 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, je me permettrai,
Monsieur le président, d’utiliser dans mon intervention l’expression d’intérêts «essentiels» de
préférence à celle, manifestement moins exacte, d’intérêts «vitaux».
13.2. Monsieur le président, la mission que la Cour s’est assignée sur la base de la clause de
compétence de l’article XXI du traité de 1955 est ainsi axée autour de deux pôles : d’une part, le
paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité (que j’appellerai simplement, pour plus de commodité,
«l’article X»), qui énonce le principe de la liberté de commerce et de la liberté de navigation, et,
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d’autre part, le paragraphe 1 d) de l’article XX (que j’appellerai simplement, pour plus de
commodité, «l’article XX») qui décide que le traité ne fera pas obstacle aux mesures nécessaires à
la protection des intérêts essentiels de l’une des parties en matière de sécurité.
13.3. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis m’a fait l’honneur de me confier l’exposé des aspects
juridiques de sa position sur ces deux problèmes. Je tiens à lui exprimer ma gratitude pour la
confiance qu’il m’a témoignée et à lui dire, ainsi qu’à la Cour, que je mesure pleinement le poids
de la responsabilité qui m’est ainsi dévolue.
13.4. Comme M. Bettauer l’a indiqué tout à l’heure, mon intervention se déroulera en deux
temps.
¾ Je me propose ce matin de définir les contours de la compétence que la Cour s’est reconnue au
regard de l’article X du traité de 1955 qui pose le principe de la liberté de commerce et de
navigation entre les territoires des Etats-Unis et de l’Iran. C’est au regard de cette seule
disposition, je le rappelle, que la Cour s’est reconnue compétente dans son arrêt de 1996 pour
se prononcer sur les actes reprochés aux Etats-Unis.
¾ Il m’appartiendra demain de m’attacher à la «défense au fond», ouverte aux Etats-Unis par
l’article XX du traité, c’est-à-dire aux mesures auxquelles, selon les termes de cette disposition,
«le traité ne fera pas obstacle» (shall not preclude), c’est-à-dire aux mesures nécessaires à la
protection des intérêts essentiels de sécurité de la partie qui les a prises. A la suite de quoi,
M. Matheson montrera que les mesures reprochées aux Etats-Unis tombent sous le coup de
cette disposition, qu’en conséquence l’article X ne leur faisait pas obstacle et qu’elles étaient
donc licites.
Il sera ainsi établi tout à la fois, négativement que les actions reprochées aux Etats-Unis n’ont pas
contrevenu au principe de la liberté de commerce et de navigation posé par l’article X du traité
de 1955, et, positivement que ces actions sont légitimées par l’article XX de ce même traité.
13.5. Monsieur le président, nous nous sommes interrogés sur l’ordre dans lequel il
convenait d’aborder les deux éléments de cette problématique. Fallait-il commencer par établir que
les actions américaines n’ont pas porté atteinte à la liberté de commerce et de navigation de
l’article X et établir ensuite, dans un second temps, que même s’il en avait été autrement ces
mesures auraient été légitimées par l’article XX parce qu’elles étaient nécessaires à la protection
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des intérêts essentiels des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité ? Ou bien fallait-il commencer par
nous demander si les mesures américaines étaient nécessaires à la protection des intérêts essentiels
des Etats-Unis en matière de sécurité, auquel cas ces mesures étaient licites sans même qu’il eût été
besoin de se demander si elles avaient respecté la liberté de commerce et de navigation ?
13.6. Pour résoudre ce problème nous nous sommes tournés vers le précédent de l’affaire
Nicaragua de 1986, qui mettait en cause une disposition du traité d’amitié entre les Etats-Unis et le
Nicaragua identique à celle de notre article XX.
13.7. Dans cet arrêt la Cour a déclaré que pour conclure qu’une disposition du traité avait été
violée, il lui fallait «s’être d’abord assurée» (first satisfied) ¾ je souligne le mot d’abord (first) ¾
que le comportement incriminé n’avait pas été nécessaire à la protection des intérêts essentiels de
sécurité des Etats-Unis (C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 136, par. 272); les Etats-Unis, a précisé la Cour,
n’avaient violé le traité d’amitié avec le Nicaragua que «pour autant que [subject to the question
whether] les exceptions … concernant … les «mesures nécessaires … à la protection des intérêts
vitaux» d’une partie … ne puissent être invoquées pour justifier les actes incriminés» (op. cit.,
p. 140-141, par. 280). La Cour semblait ainsi laisser entendre que priorité devait être donnée à la
question de savoir si les mesures américaines étaient «justifiées» (justified) ¾ c’est le mot qu’elle a
employé ¾ par la nécessité de protéger les intérêts essentiels de sécurité des Etats-Unis, et que
c’est seulement dans l’hypothèse où cette question aurait appelé une réponse négative qu’elle aurait
eu à se demander si ces mesures avaient contrevenu aux autres obligations pesant sur les Etats-Unis
en vertu du traité de 1955.
13.8. Il suffit cependant d’un coup d’œil sur l’arrêt de 1986 pour constater qu’en fait la Cour
a procédé en sens inverse : elle a commencé par rechercher si les Etats-Unis avaient violé les
obligations qui leur incombaient, et elle a ajouté que c’est seulement ¾ je cite ses propres
termes ¾ «[d]ans la mesure où les actes du défendeur peuvent paraître constituer des violations des
règles de droit pertinentes [qu’elle] … devra déterminer s’il existe des circonstances qui excluraient
l’illicéité…» (C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 117-118, par. 226).
13.9. Monsieur le président, c’est pour nous conformer à la méthode ainsi suivie par la Cour
dans Nicaragua que nous commencerons par montrer que les Etats-Unis n’ont pas porté atteinte à
la liberté de commerce et de navigation édictée par l’article X; et c’est dans un second temps que
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nous établirons que les mesures reprochées aux Etats-Unis étaient «justifiées» par la disposition de
l’article XX. Si la Cour conclut que les actions américaines n’ont pas violé le principe de la liberté
de commerce et de navigation de l’article X, elle n’a plus besoin de se demander si ces actions
étaient légitimées par la protection des intérêts essentiels de sécurité de l’article XX. A l’inverse, si
la Cour conclut que les actions américaines étaient «justifiées» par la protection des intérêts
essentiels de sécurité de l’article XX, elle n’a plus besoin de se demander si ces actions
contrevenaient au principe de la liberté de commerce et de navigation de l’article X. Que ce soit
sur la première de ces bases ou sur la seconde, le résultat est le même, à savoir que les Etats-Unis
n’ont pas violé le traité de 1955 et que leur responsabilité internationale n’est pas engagée envers
l’Iran. L’ordre dans lequel la Cour décidera dans notre affaire d’aborder ces deux aspects de la
question qui lui est soumise ¾ et par conséquent la base juridique qu’elle retiendra pour rejeter,
comme nous l’espérons, la demande de l’Iran ¾ relève de son entière discrétion.
13.10. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, j’aborde donc immédiatement
la question de la licéité des actions américaines au regard du traité de 1955. Du dispositif de l’arrêt
rendu par la Cour en 1996 sur sa compétence dans notre affaire, tel qu’il est éclairé par les motifs,
il ressort que la mission de la Cour au présent stade du fond est encadrée par deux principes, l’un et
l’autre posés par l’arrêt de 1996.
13.11. Premier principe posé par l’arrêt de 1996 : La Cour n’est compétente pour examiner
la compatibilité des actions reprochées aux Etats-Unis avec le traité de 1955 qu’au regard d’une
seule disposition de ce traité : celle de l’article X relative à la liberté de commerce et de
navigation. Parmi les «trois dispositions bien déterminées» du traité à la violation desquelles l’Iran
avait, dans le dernier état de la procédure sur l’exception préliminaire, «rigoureusement» et
«exclusivement» limité sa demande ¾ ce sont les termes utilisés par l’Iran et cités par la Cour (op.
cit., p. 809, par. 13) ¾, la Cour a en effet décidé qu’une seule est de nature à fonder sa
compétence : celle de l’article X relative à la liberté de commerce et de navigation. Le dispositif de
l’arrêt de 1996 (op. cit., p. 821, par. 55) ne laisse aucun doute à ce sujet. C’est donc au regard de
cette seule disposition que la Cour est appelée au présent stade de la procédure à examiner la licéité
des actions dont l’Iran fait grief aux Etats-Unis. MM. Murphy et Bettauer montreront tout à l’heure
que les actions des Etats-Unis n’ont pas violé cette disposition.
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13.12. Deuxième principe posé par l’arrêt de 1996 : La Cour n’a pas compétence pour se
prononcer sur la compatibilité des actions reprochées aux Etats-Unis avec des règles du droit
international extérieures au traité de 1955, telles les règles du droit international général ou
coutumier relatives à l’interdiction du recours à la force sauf cas de légitime défense qui ont trouvé
expression dans la Charte des Nations Unies. Le traité de 1955 a conféré compétence à la Cour
pour veiller au respect ¾ et donc pour sanctionner la violation éventuelle ¾ «d’un droit qu’une
partie tient du traité» (ce sont les mots exacts de la Cour : C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 811, par. 21),
en l’occurrence des droits que les parties tiennent de la disposition de l’article X qui garantit la
liberté de commerce et de navigation. Les Etats-Unis ont-ils violé l’article X par quelque moyen
que ce soit, par la force ou autrement ? Voilà la question à laquelle la Cour est appelée à répondre
au présent stade du fond, comme elle l’a déclaré dans son arrêt sur l’exception préliminaire
(C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 811-812, par. 21). La Cour n’est pas appelée à se prononcer sur la
licéité des moyens employés au regard du droit international général ou de la Charte. En bref,
violation de la liberté de commerce et de navigation de l’article X ou pas violation : là est la
question. Violation par la force ou violation par quelque autre moyen, là n’est pas la question.
13.13. Il ressort d’ailleurs du paragraphe 13 de l’arrêt de 1996 sur l’exception préliminaire
qu’au cours des audiences l’Iran s’était déclaré d’accord avec cette interprétation de la clause de
compétence du traité de 1955 : «[q]uant au droit international général», observait la Cour, «il n’est
pas invoqué par l’Iran en tant que tel…» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 809, par. 13).
13.14. Il est de principe, Monsieur le président, comme la Cour l’a énoncé avec fermeté,
qu’«établir ou ne pas établir sa compétence n’est pas une question qui relève des parties; elle est du
ressort de la Cour elle-même» (Compétence en matière de pêcheries, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 450,
par. 37). Dans la présente affaire, il y a conjonction parfaite entre les vues des deux Parties, telles
qu’elles se sont dégagées au cours de la procédure sur l’exception préliminaire, et les décisions de
la Cour, telles qu’elles ressortent de l’arrêt de 1996 sur cette exception : la compétence de la Cour,
la mission de la Cour au présent stade du fond porte, et porte exclusivement, sur la licéité des
actions américaines au regard de l’article X du traité de 1955; cette compétence ne s’étend pas à
la licéité des actions américaines au regard d’autres règles du droit international, et notamment de
celles du droit international général ou de la Charte.
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Licéité des actes d’un Etat et compétence de la Cour
13.15. Monsieur le président, il me faut à ce sujet formuler immédiatement un caveat de
toute première importance. Comme la Cour l’a déclaré dans l’affaire de la Compétence en matière
de pêcheries qui opposait l’Espagne au Canada, «Il existe une distinction fondamentale entre
l’acceptation par un Etat de la juridiction de la Cour et la compatibilité de certains actes avec le
droit international.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 456, par. 55.) Il ne faut pas, a déclaré la Cour,
«confondre licéité des actes et consentement à la juridiction» (op. cit., p. 465, par. 79). Ce
principe, la Cour l’a confirmé récemment dans son arrêt relatif à l’Incident aérien du 10 août 1999
qui opposait le Pakistan à l’Inde (par. 51). L’existence d’un droit ou d’une obligation est une
chose; la compétence de la Cour pour en vérifier le respect et en assurer la sanction en est une
autre.
13.16. Cette distinction entre l’existence d’une règle juridique, d’un droit ou d’une
obligation, d’une part, et sa justiciabilité ¾ c’est-à-dire la compétence de la Cour pour en assurer le
respect et en sanctionner la violation ¾, d’autre part, a été soulignée par la Commission du droit
international dans le commentaire de son projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait
internationalement illicite. Comme la Cour le sait, la Commission a adopté ce projet en août 2001
et l’a communiqué à l’Assemblée générale (doc. A/56/10). Le professeur Crawford vient de
consacrer à ce projet, dans l’élaboration duquel il a joué un rôle décisif en sa qualité de rapporteur
spécial de la Commission, un livre sous le titre The International Law Commission’s Articles on
State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Or, comme je viens de le noter, le projet
de la Commission prend soin de distinguer entre les règles de fond gouvernant la responsabilité,
d’une part, et la compétence de la Cour, de l’autre. Les articles proposés, écrit la Commission, «ne
traitent pas des questions de compétence des cours et tribunaux» (introduction au commentaire du
chapitre V, par. 8; version française, p. 183; cf. Crawford, op. cit., p. 162). Certes, ajoute-t-elle,
«les Etats parties au Statut peuvent déclarer reconnaître comme obligatoire la juridiction de la
Cour…» (introduction au commentaire de la deuxième partie, par. 2; version française, p. 228;
cf. Crawford, op. cit., p. 191), mais ils peuvent ne pas le faire, et s’ils ne le font pas la Cour n’a pas
compétence pour connaître d’un différend à ce sujet.
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13.17. Monsieur le président, dans notre affaire les Parties ne l’ont pas fait. Elles n’ont pas
étendu la compétence de la Cour à tous les différends pouvant surgir entre elles. Elles ont, tout au
contraire, expressément limité la compétence de la Cour aux seuls différends portant sur
l’application ou l’interprétation «du présent traité». La seule et unique base de compétence de la
Cour, le seul et unique titre de juridiction de la Cour dans notre affaire, c’est le paragraphe 2 de
l’article XXI du traité du 15 août 1955, par lequel l’Iran et les Etats-Unis attribuent compétence à la
Cour pour connaître de «[t]out différend qui pourrait s’élever entre les Hautes Parties contractantes
quant à l’interprétation ou à l’application du présent traité…». «[Q]uant à l’interprétation ou à
l’application du présent traité» ¾ et non pas quant à l’interprétation ou à l’application d’un autre
traité, ou d’une règle coutumière, ou d’une règle générale de droit international, ou d’une
disposition de la Charte des Nations Unies. Cette limitation est d’autant plus frappante que,
comme la Cour elle-même en a fait l’observation, elle ne figure pas dans certains autres traités
d’amitié qui eux se réfèrent expressément à des sources autres que le traité, par exemple à la
Charte; rien de tel dans le traité irano-américain (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 813, par. 27).
La clause juridictionnelle du traité de 1955 n’équivaut pas à une clause conférant compétence
à la Cour sur tous les différends survenant entre les parties
13.18. Peut-être objectera-t-on que le traité de 1955 ne constitue pas un monde clos, fermé
sur lui-même, et qu’il faut le lire à la lumière du droit international général ou comme incorporant
certaines règles du droit international général, notamment celles qui ont trouvé expression dans la
Charte ou dans d’autres instruments telle la déclaration de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies
sur les relations amicales entre Etats. En conséquence, dira-t-on peut-être, la clause juridictionnelle
du traité de 1955 ne saurait être lue comme excluant de la compétence de la Cour les différends
relatifs à l’application des règles générales ou coutumières qui régissent le recours à la force et la
légitime défense.
13.19. Monsieur le président, admettre une telle thèse, quelque séduisante qu’elle puisse
apparaître, reviendrait à priver de toute portée le principe de la juridiction consensuelle si souvent
affirmé et réaffirmé par la Cour. En insérant dans un traité une clause prévoyant la compétence de
la Cour pour les différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’application «du présent traité», les
parties acceptent la compétence de la Cour pour les litiges qui se rapportent spécifiquement à
- 20 -
l’interprétation ou à l’application de ce traité; elles n’acceptent pas, par-là même, la compétence de
la Cour pour tous les différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’application des règles de caractère
coutumier ou relevant du droit international général sous le prétexte que ces règles seraient à
regarder comme incorporées à leur traité. En décider autrement reviendrait à dénier toute
spécificité aux clauses juridictionnelles insérées dans les dispositions finales d’innombrables traités
portant sur des aspects limités et bien définis des relations entre les parties (des traités de caractère
technique, par exemple, ou des traités de commerce, ou des traités d’investissement). Lorsqu’un
gouvernement souhaite accepter la compétence de la Cour pour tous les différends, ou pour
certaines catégories de différends, c’est à une déclaration facultative de la juridiction obligatoire de
l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour qu’il recourt. Ce n’est pas une compétence aussi
large qu’un gouvernement accepte lorsqu’il conclut un traité dont l’une des clauses prévoit que sera
soumis à la Cour tout différend portant sur l’interprétation ou l’application du présent traité.
Aucun gouvernement au monde n’accepterait plus d’inclure dans un traité une clause
juridictionnelle de ce genre s’il devait craindre que par cette porte étroite ne s’engouffre la
soumission à la Cour de tous les litiges mettant en cause la conformité de ses actes et actions avec
la totalité des règles générales et coutumières du droit international.
13.20. Une telle approche, Monsieur le président, la Cour l’a, au demeurant, d’ores et déjà
écartée dans l’affaire Nicaragua où, à propos d’une clause juridictionnelle identique à celle de
notre traité, elle a déclaré que sa compétence ne pouvait jouer que «dans la mesure où [les
demandes du Nicaragua] impliquent des violations des dispositions de ce traité»
(C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 441, par. 111; dans le même sens, p. 429, par. 83; les italiques sont de moi).
Cette thèse, la Cour l’a condamnée à nouveau dans notre affaire même puisque, dans l’arrêt
de 1996 sur l’exception préliminaire, elle a rejeté la thèse iranienne selon laquelle la disposition de
l’article premier du traité de 1955, qui dispose : «Il y aura paix stable et durable et amitié sincère
entre les Etats-Unis … et l’Iran», aurait eu pour effet d’«incorporer» dans le traité les dispositions
de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit coutumier régissant l’usage de la force ainsi que la
résolution 2625 (XXV) de l’Assemblée générale sur les relations amicales entre Etats : «L’article
premier [lit-on dans l’arrêt de 1996] ne saurait … être interprété comme incorporant dans le traité
l’ensemble des dispositions du droit international concernant … [les] relations [amicales].»
- 21 -
(C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 814, par. 28.) De même que les règles du droit international général
relatives aux relations pacifiques et amicales entre Etats n’ont pas été «incorporées» dans le traité
et n’ont donc pas pris valeur de clauses conventionnelles, de la même manière n’ont pas été
«incorporées» dans notre traité, et n’ont donc pas pris valeur de clauses conventionnelles, les règles
du droit international général régissant l’usage de la force et la légitime défense. Le
professeur Crawford l’a expressément reconnu, il y a quelques jours, la Cour a rejeté dans son arrêt
de 1996 l’argument selon lequel l’article premier du traité de 1955 aurait incorporé dans le traité la
totalité du droit international général (incorporated by reference into the Treaty the whole of
general international law) (CR 2000/5, p. 33, par. 11).
13.21. Monsieur le président, dans la procédure écrite l’Iran a reproché aux Etats-Unis de
soutenir ainsi une thèse qui leur aurait conféré un pouvoir discrétionnaire de recourir à la force
contre l’Iran ¾ embodying an unqualified, extra-legal discretion to use force on whatever
occasion ¾ et leur aurait permis d’échapper aux règles de la Charte ¾ evading the Charter
entirely (Réplique de l’Iran, p. 162-164, par. 7.71-7.74). Le professeur Crawford a repris
longuement ce thème en accusant les Etats-Unis de se prévaloir de l’article XX du traité pour
s’octroyer un broader right, un droit étendu, de recourir à la force, une autorisation de contourner
tout à la fois le traité d’amitié et la Charte, a licence to flout the Treaty of Amity and the Charter at
the same time (CR 2003/7, p. 51, par. 5), un pouvoir discrétionnaire de recourir à la force militaire
contre le territoire ou les installations de l’autre partie, a subjective discretion to use military force
against the territory of the other party (op. cit., p. 55, par. 13; cf. CR 2003/8, p. 16, par. 30).
13.22. C’est là, il importe de le souligner, un total travestissement, une complète
dénaturation, de la thèse des Etats-Unis. Que l’on nous comprenne bien. Les Etats-Unis ne
soutiennent pas que le traité de 1955 leur a donné carte blanche pour violer envers l’Iran les règles
régissant l’emploi de la force et la légitime défense, ou quelque autre règle du droit international
général ou coutumier. Les Etats-Unis ne prétendent pas que le traité de 1955 les a dispensés du
respect des règles du droit international général ou de la Charte, telles les règles qui gouvernent
l’usage de la force et la légitime défense. Ces règles du droit international général, les Etats-Unis
ne les ont pas violées. Ce que les Etats-Unis soutiennent, c’est que, même s’ils avaient violé ces
règles (ce qui n’est pas le cas, je le répète), la Cour n’aurait pas pour cette seule raison compétence
- 22 -
pour se prononcer sur la requête de l’Iran; la violation d’une règle de droit international ne confère
pas par elle-même compétence à la Cour. Cette distinction entre le fond du droit et la compétence,
je l’ai rappelé il y a un instant, a été énoncée par la Cour avec une force particulière dans l’affaire
de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries, et elle a été confirmée plus récemment dans l’affaire de
l’Incident aérien du 10 août 1999. Et ce n’est pas parce qu’une question serait importante ¾ et
celle de l’usage de la force et de la légitime défense l’est, ô combien ! ¾ que la Cour aurait de ce
seul fait compétence pour en connaître. La Cour l’a déclaré dans l’affaire du Timor oriental,
l’importance d’une question et des règles de droit international qu’elle met en jeu ne constitue pas
en soi un titre de juridiction (C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 105, par. 36). Comme un membre de la Cour
l’a observé récemment, en présence d’une clause limitative de compétence «le différend échappe à
la compétence de la Cour, quelle que soit la portée des normes qui ont été violées» (Compétence en
matière de pêcheries, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 487, par. 4, opinion individuelle du juge Koroma).
13.23. Monsieur le président, la situation est d’une grande clarté. Les parties au traité
de 1955 ont conféré compétence à la Cour pour se prononcer sur les différends portant sur
l’application et l’interprétation du traité de 1955; les parties n’ont pas consenti à ce que soit soumis
à la Cour tout différend qui pourrait surgir entre elles au sujet de l’interprétation ou de l’application
de n’importe quelle règle de droit international, coutumière ou conventionnelle, particulière ou
générale, quelle que soit son importance. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité n’équivaut pas à
une clause générale de compétence de la Cour; il n’est pas un autre article 36. La Cour a
compétence pour déterminer s’il y a eu violation d’une norme édictée par le «présent traité» ¾ en
l’occurrence s’il y a eu violation des principes de la liberté de commerce et de la liberté de
navigation posés par son article X : toutes les violations de cette obligation, quel qu’ait été le
moyen employé, a décidé la Cour ¾ décision administrative ou législative, ou recours à la
force ¾, mais seulement ces violations. Si l’une des parties a violé le «présent traité», que ce soit
par la force ou par quelque autre moyen, la Cour est là pour sanctionner cette infraction : c’est là sa
compétence, c’est là sa mission judiciaire. Mais ce que la Cour sanctionnerait alors, ce serait la
violation d’une règle du «présent traité», et non pas la violation de la règle du droit international
général qui prohibe l’usage de la force. La norme de référence, celle à laquelle les actions des
Etats-Unis doivent être confrontées dans notre affaire, ce sont les règles du «présent traité» ¾ plus
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précisément, le principe de la liberté de commerce et de navigation ¾; ce n’est pas le droit
international coutumier ou général.
13.24. Monsieur le président, tout n’est pas dans tout, et réciproquement. Ce n’est pas
contribuer aux relations pacifiques et ordonnées entre Etats que de demander à la justice
internationale de faire plus que ce qu’elle peut et doit faire ¾ et elle ne peut et ne doit faire que ce
que les Etats s’accordent à lui demander de faire. Le principe fondamental de la justice
internationale demeure, aujourd’hui comme hier, celui de la juridiction consensuelle. La Cour
n’acceptera pas que la confiance croissante que les Etats lui témoignent depuis quelques années soit
mise en péril par des demandes comme celle dont elle est saisie aujourd’hui. Si la Cour s’orientait
vers une sorte de compétence universelle, les Etats hésiteraient à lui conférer quelque compétence
que ce soit. Au lieu de plus de compétence et d’un rôle accru de la Cour, c’est à moins de
compétence que l’on aboutirait.
Les limites de la compétence de la Cour ont été finalement acceptées par l’Iran
13.25. Tout cela, Monsieur le président, la Partie iranienne a fini par l’admettre à l’extrême
fin de la procédure écrite, au terme d’innombrables hésitations et démarches en zigzag. Peut-être
n’est-il pas sans intérêt de retracer en deux mots les étapes de cette longue marche vers la
reconnaissance de ce qui n’est en définitive qu’une évidence juridique.
13.26. Dans sa requête introductive d’instance de 1992 l’Iran avait demandé à la Cour de
dire et juger que par leurs opérations contre les plates-formes pétrolières iraniennes les Etats-Unis
«ont enfreint leurs obligations envers la République islamique, notamment celles qui découlent de
l’article premier et du paragraphe 1 de l’article X du traité d’amitié, ainsi que du droit
international…» (les italiques sont de moi). Des conclusions du même ordre, mais élargies à deux
autres dispositions de ce traité, clôturaient le mémoire de l’Iran déposé en 1993.
13.27. C’est en préparant ses observations et conclusions de 1994 que l’Iran paraît avoir
compris que sa demande de voir la Cour se prononcer sur la compatibilité des actions américaines
avec le «droit international» ¾ tout le droit international ¾ se heurtait aux termes explicites de la
clause juridictionnelle du traité d’amitié et était de ce fait vouée à l’échec. Modifiant sa demande
et rectifiant le tir, l’Iran écrit alors qu’il doit être absolument clair que ses réclamations sont
- 24 -
fondées sur la violation du traité d’amitié et non pas sur la violation du droit international
coutumier (absolutely clear that its claims are for violations of the Treaty of Amity) (p. 2, par. 3-4).
Et un peu plus loin dans ce même document, l’Iran explique qu’il est «parfaitement conscient des
strictes limites que la clause compromissoire de l’article XXI 2) impose à la Cour»
(«Iran is perfectly well aware of the strict limits which are imposed upon the
Court by the Compromissory clause in Article XXI (2), given that it restricts its
jurisdiction to the settlement of only those disputes … which concern «the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty».») (Observations et conclusions
de l’Iran, p. 21, par. 2.02.)
Tout cela, Monsieur le président, ce n’est pas moi qui le dis; c’est l’Iran qui l’a écrit. C’est
seulement, a précisé l’Iran dans ce document, d’une violation de ce traité bilatéral (breaches of that
international treaty) que l’Iran demande réparation, car l’Iran sait ¾ comme il l’écrit en toutes
lettres ¾ que
«les questions relatives à des violations du droit international général et de la Charte
ne relèvent pas en tant que telles de la compétence de la Cour dans la présente affaire
où la Cour est saisie seulement en rapport avec l’interprétation et l’application du
présent traité».
(«It is true ¾ and Iran does not dispute this ¾ that questions concerning
violations of general international law and the Charter do not as such fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, where the Court may be seised only in
connection with the interpretation and application of the 1955 Treaty.») (Op. cit.,
p. 22, par. 2.06.)
Bref ¾ c’est l’Iran qui écrit cela, je le répète ¾ «l’Iran n’a pas demandé à la Cour de juger le
comportement des Etats-Unis sur la base du droit international général et de la Charte des
Nations Unies» («Iran has not asked the Court to judge U.S. conduct on the basis of general
international law and the U.N. Charter.») (Op. cit., p. 24, par. 2.11.)
13.28. Dans son arrêt de 1996 sur l’exception préliminaire la Cour a pris acte de ce que l’Iran
avait ainsi ¾ je cite les mots de la Cour ¾ «précisé et développé» son argumentation. La Cour a
noté que l’Iran fonde sa demande «rigoureusement» et «exclusivement» sur des «dispositions bien
déterminées du traité d’amitié». Quant au droit international général, précisait la Cour en toutes
lettres dans cet arrêt, «il n’est pas invoqué par l’Iran en tant que tel, mais «pour déterminer la
teneur et la portée des obligations découlant du traité»» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 809, par. 13).
13.29. Trois ans plus tard, dans sa réplique écrite de 1999, l’Iran reconnaît que, «comme la
Cour l’a décidé, les règles du droit international général ne sont pas incorporées dans le traité
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d’amitié sur renvoi de l’article premier» («as the Court has held, the rules of general international
law are not incorporated by reference into the Treaty of Amity by way of its Article 1») (p. 162,
par. 7.71); et l’Iran précise qu’il se plaint à présent seulement de ce que les Etats-Unis «ont enfreint
leurs obligations envers l’Iran qui découlent du paragraphe premier de l’article X du traité
d’amitié…»
13.30. Ainsi, Monsieur le président comme la Cour l’a précisé dans l’arrêt de 1996 sur
l’exception préliminaire, le seul et unique différend sur lequel elle est appelée à statuer
actuellement est le différend «quant à l’interprétation et à l’application de l’article X du traité»
de 1955 (C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 20, par. 53). Voilà définie avec précision par la Cour elle-même,
Monsieur le président, la question seule à laquelle, selon son propre arrêt de 1996, elle est appelée à
répondre au présent stade de la procédure : Les Etats-Unis ont-ils, par les actions qui leur sont
reprochées par l’Iran, enfreint l’obligation qui leur incombe en vertu du paragraphe 1 de
l’article X du traité de 1955 de respecter la liberté de commerce et de navigation entre les
territoires des deux parties ? La mission de la Cour au présent stade de la procédure est de se
prononcer sur la licéité des actions américaines au regard de l’article X du traité d’amitié; sa
mission n’est pas de se prononcer, sa mission telle qu’elle l’a définie elle-même n’est pas de se
prononcer sur la licéité des actions américaines au regard de quelque autre règle que ce soit.
13.31. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, comme je l’ai indiqué, le
professeur Murphy et M. Bettauer montreront à présent que les actions des Etats-Unis n’ont pas
violé le principe de la liberté de commerce énoncé à l’article X du traité de 1955. Mais auparavant
M. Mathias va établir qu’en raison de ses propres actions et de son propre comportement l’Iran est
en tout état de cause disqualifié pour alléguer une prétendue violation de cette liberté par les
Etats-Unis.
13.32. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mme et MM. de la Cour et je vous prie
Monsieur le président de vouloir bien donner la parole à M. Mathias.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Weil. I now give the floor to Mr. Mathias.
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Mr. MATHIAS:
14. IRAN’S CLAIM SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF IRAN’S VIOLATIONS OF ITS
RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES MEASURES WERE
A CONSEQUENCE OF ITS OWN UNLAWFUL ACTS, AND BECAUSE OF
IRAN’S WRONGFUL CONDUCT WITH RESPECT TO
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE DISPUTE
14.1. Thank you, Mr. President.
14.2. Mr. President and Members of the Court, my task here this morning is to demonstrate
that Iran’s fundamental breaches of the 1955 Treaty and its other illegal actions that harmed the
United States have legal consequences with respect to Iran’s ability to invoke the 1955 Treaty and
to maintain its claim against the United States in this Court.
14.3. In its Rejoinder, the United States identified three principles related to Iran’s own
conduct that should lead the Court to deny Iran’s claim: first, Iran violated obligations identical to
those that are the basis for its Application; second, the United States measures complained of, by
Iran, were a consequence of Iran’s own unlawful conduct; and third, Iran has acted improperly
with respect to the subject-matter of the dispute (Rejoinder of the United States, pp. 57-67).
Counsel for Iran attempted to dismiss these arguments together last week under the general heading
of “clean hands” (CR 2003/8, pp. 24-40). But I shall discuss each of them separately in turn.
14.4. Let’s begin with the first: Iran’s violation of the same obligations that it claims the
United States violated. Denial of Iran’s claim on this basis would constitute an application of the
fundamental and well-established international legal principle of reciprocity. In short, because of
Iran’s own violation of Article X of the 1955 Treaty, Iran cannot prevail on a claim against the
United States for an alleged violation of the reciprocal obligation.
14.5. Reciprocity is a core principle of international law. Before joining the Court earlier
this month, Judge Simma wrote concerning reciprocity that:
“It is on treaties . . . that reciprocity produces its most profound effect. From a
purely formal point of view, reciprocity governs every international agreement,
independently of its content, and consequently underlies the rules concerning the
conclusion and entry into force of treaties, and their application, termination,
amendment and modification.” (B. Simma, “Reciprocity”, Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (ed. R. Bernhardt), Vol. IV, p. 30 (2000).)
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Judge Simma wrote that “reciprocity as a principle of international law” should be applied “above
all to the maxim that a State basing a claim on a particular norm of international law must accept
the rule as binding on itself” (ibid.).
14.6. The legal consequences of breaching a reciprocal obligation are clearly established.
Lord McNair, in discussing reciprocity ¾ which he deemed “one of the most important . . .
sanctions behind international law” ¾ asserted that “[n]o State can claim from other States, as a
matter of binding obligation, conduct which it is not prepared to regard as binding upon itself”
(A. D. McNair, The Law of Treaties, p. 573, No. 2 (1961)). To a similar effect,
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who considered in depth the issue of reciprocity in his fourth report on the
law of treaties, asserted that “[t]here is a general international law rule of reciprocity entailing that
the failure of one State to perform its international obligations in a particular respect will . . . at any
rate disentitle that State from objecting to . . . corresponding non-performance” (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, A/CN.4/Ser.A/1959/Add.1, 1959, Vol. II, p. 70; emphasis in
original).
14.7. The Court applied a related proposition in the 1971 Advisory Opinion in the Namibia
case, stating in clear and unequivocal language that: “One of the fundamental principles governing
the international relationship thus established is that a party which disowns or does not fulfil its
own obligations cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the
relationship.” (I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 46, para. 91.) There, of course, the relationship was not one
of reciprocal treaty obligations. But, as we have just seen, the principle is applicable in such a
relationship as well. If a State does not act in accordance with a reciprocal treaty-based obligation,
it cannot be recognized with respect to a claim derived from alleged non-conforming conduct by
the other State.
14.8. In the treaty context, the principle is sometimes known by the Latin phrase, exceptio
inadimplenti contractus, and sometimes as the exception of non-performance. While the Court has
not applied the principle by its terms, well-known and often-quoted opinions of judges of the Court
have discussed it at length. Counsel for Iran last week discussed the Judgment of the Permanent
Court in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case (Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 70). In that case, the Netherlands sought relief for the construction of a lock by Belgium in
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circumstances in which it ¾ the Netherlands ¾ had constructed a similar lock. The Court denied
the application on the basis of its interpretation of the relevant Treaty, as counsel for Iran has
described.
14.9. Judge Anzilotti wrote in dissent, because he had a different view of the proper
interpretation of the treaty. In the course of his dissent, he had occasion to reach the alternative
Belgian submission, that “by constructing certain works contrary to the terms of the Treaty, the
Applicant has forfeited the right to invoke the Treaty against the Respondent” (ibid., p. 49).
Judge Anzilotti would have accepted Belgium’s alternative submission and dismissed the Dutch
claim on that basis. In explaining that conclusion, he first dealt with the question “whether the
legal rule on which [the submission] founds itself is applicable in relations between States” (ibid.,
p. 50). He concluded that it was, writing, “I am convinced that the principle underlying this
submission (inadimplenti non est adimplendum) is so just, so equitable, so universally recognized,
that it must be applied in international relations also. In any case, it is one of these ‘general
principles of law . . .’ which the Court applies in virtue of Article 38 of its Statute” (ibid.).
Judge Hudson, in his concurring opinion in the same case, noted that “[w]hat are widely known as
principles of equity have long been considered to constitute a part of international law, and as such
they have often been applied by international tribunals”. Judge Hudson made express reference in
this context to the exceptio non adimplenti contractus (ibid., pp. 76, 77).
14.10. The principle continues to enjoy wide recognition. The recent French Dictionary of
Public International Law states ¾ and I am translating: “The exception of non-performance is the
expression par excellence of the principle of reciprocity” (“L’exception d’inexécution constitue
l’expression par excellence du principe de réciprocité.” Dictionnaire de droit international public,
sous la direction de Jean Salmon, p. 473 (2001)). Another recent work acknowledged that the
exception “has been recognized to some extent as an operative principle in international judicial
and arbitral decisions” (James Crawford and Simon Olleson, “The Exception of Non-performance:
Links between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility”, Australian Year Book of
International Law, Vol. 21, p. 2). The Commentaries on the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on State Responsibility explain that the exception was excluded from treatment as a
circumstance precluding wrongfulness because “the exception of non-performance (exceptio
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inadimplenti contractus) is best seen as a specific feature of certain mutual or synallagmatic
obligations and not as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness” (Report of the International Law
Commission (2001), A/56/10 p. 173). The Commentaries do not question the existence or the
continued application of the exception.
14.11. There can be no question that the obligations at issue in this case are reciprocal
obligations. In the preamble to the 1955 Treaty, the parties specifically and expressly resolved to
approach the Treaty “on the basis of reciprocal equality of treatment”; indeed, the entire Treaty is
constructed around this principle. The freedoms of commerce and navigation, in particular, are
appropriate for implementation by the parties on a reciprocal basis, since they necessarily
encompass conduct relating to the territories of both parties.
14.12. Nor can there be any real question that Iran’s actions in the Gulf violated the identical
obligations, those under Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, that are the basis for its claim.
Professor Murphy will discuss in detail on Wednesday afternoon, in the context of the
United States counter-claim, how Iran’s attacks on United States and neutral shipping in the Gulf
impeded “freedom of commerce and navigation” “between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties”.
14.13. Accordingly, the Court should reject Iran’s claim. Both parties were obligated under
the 1955 Treaty to refrain from actions that obstructed freedom of commerce and navigation
between the territories of the two parties. Because Iran engaged in activities that obstructed those
freedoms, it cannot prevail on a claim premised on the alleged subsequent United States violation
of the reciprocal obligation.
14.14. I turn now to the second of the three propositions that I mentioned at the outset: that
Iran may not prevail because the United States measures it complains of were a consequence of
Iran’s own conduct, which was unlawful under the Treaty and otherwise.
14.15. The international legal basis for this proposition is also well established. The point
was stated broadly by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, again in his fourth report on treaties, who wrote that
“the first party will have no legal ground of complaint if [the] consequence [complained of] results
from his own prior non-observance of the treaty” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission,
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1959/Add.1, 1959, Vol. II, p. 66).
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14.16. The Court has dealt with the related issue, in the case concerning the
Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997). In that case, the Court, citing the
decision of the Permanent Court in the Chorzów Factory case (Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9), found that Hungary could not terminate the 1977 Treaty, notwithstanding
Czechoslovakia’s decision to proceed with Variant C (which the Court deemed an internationally
wrongful act). Why could Hungary not terminate the Treaty? Because of Hungary’s own wrongful
conduct in suspending and abandoning the works prior to Czechoslovakia’s breach. The Court said
that it could not “overlook that Czechoslovakia committed the internationally wrongful act of
putting into operation Variant C as a result of Hungary’s own prior wrongful conduct . . .”
(para. 110). As Judge Koroma put it in his separate opinion, “[I]t was th[e] original breach” by
Hungary, in suspending and abandoning the works, “which triggered the whole chain of events”
(p. 151).
14.17. The Court concluded that Hungary’s prior wrongful conduct had the legal
consequence of altering Hungary’s legally available options in reacting to Czechoslovakia’s
subsequent breach. Specifically, the Court found that “Hungary, by its own conduct, had
prejudiced its right to terminate the Treaty” (para. 110; emphasis added). Thus, Hungary could
not invoke Czechoslovakia’s breach as a ground for terminating the Treaty.
14.18. In attaching this legal consequence to Hungary’s prior breach, the Court made clear
that the application of the Factory at Chorzów case is not limited, as counsel for Iran suggested last
week (CR 2003/8, p. 36, para. 33), to a circumstance in which State A’s conduct specifically
prevents State B from fulfilling State B’s obligation. Instead, the Court found that the principle is
one of broader application where, to use Judge Koroma’s phrase, State A’s conduct “triggers” the
subsequent conduct of State B. In other words, if we were to try to paraphrase the decision of the
Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów case in the light of your subsequent decision in
Gabèíkovo, “one Party cannot avail itself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some
obligation . . . if the former Party has ‘triggered’ the breach of the obligation”.
14.19. It is clear from the record that Iran’s actions triggered the United States measures
against the platforms that are the basis for its claim. Iran’s actions, which themselves constituted
breaches of the Treaty and were otherwise unlawful, led to the United States actions that Iran
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alleges violated Article X. More precisely, had Iran not violated its own obligations, the
United States would not have taken the measures. In these circumstances, the Court should attach
legal consequences to Iran’s violation of its obligations, just as it attached legal consequences to
Hungary’s violation in the Gabèíkovo case. In the context of the present case, the appropriate legal
consequence, as in the Factory at Chorzów case, is that Iran “cannot avail itself” of the alleged
breach of Article X by the United States.
14.20. I move now to the third, and most general, of the three related propositions that I have
mentioned at the outset: that Iran may not prevail on its claim because it has acted improperly with
respect to the subject-matter of the dispute. The essence of this proposition is that Iran’s manifestly
unlawful conduct is at the very core of its claim. For this purpose, we are not concerned solely
with Iran’s breaches of its obligations under Article X of the 1955 Treaty, but also with its clear
and sustained violations of the laws of war and the use of force. Because Iran acted unlawfully in
attacking United States and other neutral shipping in the international waters of the Gulf, and
because the injury for which it seeks relief here is intrinsically related to, and indeed was the
consequence of, Iran’s own unlawful conduct, Iran should not be permitted to recover on its claim.
14.21. Recall that senior Iranian officials admitted that Iran’s attacks were inconsistent with
its international obligations. The record in this case establishes that the Deputy Foreign Minister of
Iran admitted that Iran was knowingly violating international law. He did so in a meeting with the
Ambassador of Norway, when the Ambassador protested Iranian conduct on the instructions of his
government (Exhibit 198). The record also conclusively establishes that Iran mined the
international shipping lanes of the Gulf in clear violation of its international obligations under the
law of armed conflict and elementary considerations of humanity (see, e.g., Corfu Channel, Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22. and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and again
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 112,
para. 215) and that Iran committed other unlawful uses of force and violations of the law of armed
conflict as well.
14.22. Recall also that it was not only the United States that condemned Iran’s unlawful
conduct. The Security Council of the United Nations did so. The League of Arab States did so.
Representatives of many other States did so.
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14.23. In these circumstances, it would indeed be, as Mr. Taft suggested last week, a
“perverse result” for the Court to determine that Iran may prevail on its claim against the United
States (CR 2003/9, p. 10, para. 1.3).
14.24. Professor Bin Cheng identified the principle that “an unlawful act cannot serve as the
basis of an action at law”, as a manifestation of the principle “no one can be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong” (Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals, Grotius, 1987, p. 155). These principles can be seen as aspects of the
general “clean hands” doctrine, about which counsel for Iran had much to say last week
(CR 2003/8, pp. 24-40). As he noted, the doctrine is also related to “good faith” (ibid., para. 3); in
the context of this case, Iran’s failure to act in good faith can plainly be tied to its performance of
the 1955 Treaty and is not asserted as an independent source of obligation, as counsel for Iran
implied (CR 2003/8, p. 25, para. 3).
14.25. Iran concedes that the “clean hands” doctrine has been applied in cases in which
claims of governments on behalf of their nationals have been denied because the claims arose out
of or were closely related to unlawful activities by those nationals (Reply and Defence to
Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 179). Counsel for Iran argued that the doctrine is limited to this
diplomatic protection context (CR 2003/8, pp. 26-28, paras. 6-10), but the conceptual basis for that
assertion is not clear. The related obligation to perform treaties in “good faith” is not limited to any
single area of international law.
14.26. Counsel for Iran also referenced the consideration by the International Law
Commission of whether to include a reference to the doctrine in its Articles on State Responsibility
and the Commission’s decision to exclude it from the Articles. But the Commission’s treatment of
the issue was more nuanced than a mere rejection of all aspects of the doctrine. The Commentaries
note, for example, that “[t]he principle that a State may not benefit from its own wrongful act is
capable of generating consequences in the field of State responsibility but it is rather a general
principle than a specific circumstance precluding wrongfulness” (op. cit., p. 173). That
Commission statement certainly does not exclude the possibility that in a particular case the
principle could “generate the consequence” that the State committing the wrongful act should have
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its claim denied on that basis. Instead, it suggests that the Commission was of the view that it had
not been established that the principle had that general effect.
14.27. The “clean hands” doctrine has also been addressed in the academic literature and
frequently discussed in the separate and dissenting opinions of international judges, including
Members of this Court. For example, Judge Weeramantry in the Legality of Use of Force cases
referred to this doctrine as “a principle of equity and judicial procedure, well recognized in all legal
systems, by which he who seeks the assistance of a court must come to the court with clean hands”
(Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 184, dissenting opinion
of Vice-President Weeramantry). Judge Ajibola similarly noted in the Genocide case “that [an]
applicant [to the Court] ‘must come with clean hands’” (Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 395, separate opinion
of Judge Ajibola). I note that neither of these cases involved the specialized area of diplomatic
protection, to which counsel for Iran would confine the application of the doctrine. And, of course,
in the Gabèíkovo case, the Court made specific use in its Judgment of the principle ex injuria jus
non oritur (para. 133).
14.28. With respect to our third proposition, then, the United States suggests that Iran’s
claim should be denied on the basis of accepted equitable and legal principles because it arises out
of Iran’s own admitted and manifestly unlawful conduct.
14.29. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to summarize our submissions to this point:
international law provides the basis for the Court, in the light of Iran’s own conduct, its many and
repeated violations of the Treaty at issue in this case, as well as fundamental rules of international
law and of the Charter, to dismiss Iran’s claim. In particular, Iran’s claim should be denied, first,
because Iran breached its reciprocal obligation under the 1955 Treaty, second, because the United
States actions were a consequence of Iran’s own unlawful conduct under the Treaty and other
obligations, and third, because Iran’s claim arises out of its unlawful operations. As we have seen,
there is substantial authority in international law for all three of these propositions. The
fundamental principle of reciprocity and the exception of non-performance are the basis for the first
proposition. These principles are well established in international law and are fully applicable here.
The decision of the Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów case provides a clear and precise
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basis for the second proposition. With respect to the third proposition, the United States submits
that the Court may properly apply good faith and equitable principles in light of the fact that Iran’s
claim cannot be separated from its own manifestly unlawful conduct in this case.
14.30. Before I conclude, let me make three other important points. First, the forcible United
States measures at issue in this case were taken in response to unlawful uses of force by Iran.
Accordingly, this is not a case in which the Court needs to assess the consequences of an allegedly
wrongful act involving the use of force taken in response to an unlawful act not involving the use
of force. Iran’s own conduct was a wrongful use of force and it is entirely appropriate for the Court
to attach the consequences to it that the United States has suggested and to dismiss Iran’s claim.
14.31. Second, Iran’s attempt to turn these propositions around and have the Court apply
them against the United States cannot be accepted. Iran’s wrongful conduct against the United
States pre-dated and directly resulted in the United States measures that are the basis for Iran’s
claim. Given these facts, Iran cannot argue that the alleged United States violation of Article X
somehow gave rise to its own violations. Nor can Iran prevail on a more general “clean hands”
argument, which is premised on either erroneous assertions about United States conduct, including
allegations of violations of the 1955 Treaty, or references to United States policy (CR 2003/8,
p. 38, para. 40).
14.32. Finally, for the Court to determine in this case that the consequence of Iran’s
manifestly unlawful conduct should be the dismissal of its claim would not establish a general
principle that a State must demonstrate perfection in its conduct before it can come to the Court.
Instead, it would confirm that there are cases, such as this one, in which the conduct of an applicant
is of such a seriously wrongful character, in the context of the subject-matter of the proceeding, that
it would be appropriate for the Court to dismiss the case on the basis of that conduct.
14.33. In his concurring opinion in the River Meuse case, Judge Hudson addressed this
question. He was writing in the context of the Netherlands claim against Belgium for conduct in
which the Netherlands had also engaged, but the point that he was making is equally applicable to
each of the principles that we have been discussing. Judge Hudson wrote:
“The general principle [that a party that is engaged in a continuing
non-performance of an obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a
similar non-performance by the other party] is one of which international tribunals
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should make a very sparing application. It is certainly not to be thought that a
complete fulfillment of all its obligations under a treaty must be proved as a condition
precedent to a State’s appearing before an international tribunal to seek an
interpretation of that treaty. Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the
limitations which are necessary, a tribunal bound by international law ought not to
shrink from applying a principle of such obvious fairness.” (Ibid.)
14.34. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the case before you now is Judge Hudson’s
“proper case”. Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. Mr. President, I ask that you
call upon Professor Murphy after the break.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Mathias. The hearing is now suspended for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.35 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I give the floor to Professor Murphy.
Mr. MURPHY:
15. THE UNITED STATES DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, PARAGRAPH 1
PART I
Introduction
15.1. Thank you, Mr. President. It is again a great honour to appear before this Court on
behalf of the United States.
15.2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my presentation today will focus on applying the
facts of this case to the proper interpretation of Article X, paragraph 1. As Professor Weil has
explained, Article X, paragraph 1, is the sole basis on which the Court may review the conduct of
the United States in the present proceedings. Iran alleges that such conduct violated Article X.
Iran is wrong.
15.3. Iran is wrong for four reasons, two of which I will deal with and two of which
Mr. Bettauer will deal with. The two reasons I will address are as follows.
15.4. First, Iran has not proven that the United States actions against the platforms impeded
any “freedom of commerce and navigation” as that phrase has been defined by this Court.
15.5. Second, Iran has not proven that the United States actions against the platforms
impeded commerce and navigation “between the territories” of Iran and the United States.
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A. The United States actions against the platforms did not impede any “freedom of commerce
and navigation” as that phrase is defined by this Court
15.6. Let me turn to the first reason that Iran’s allegations are without merit, which is that the
United States actions against the platforms did not impede “freedom of commerce and navigation”.
15.7. I start with the text of Article X, paragraph 1, which is on the screen and also at tab 1 in
the judges’ folders.
15.8. Obviously, the stationary platforms at issue in this case were not engaged in any form
of “navigation” and thus Iran’s claim is not and cannot be based on that portion of Article X,
paragraph 1 (see Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 817, para. 38).
15.9. Yet, in our written pleadings, the United States also has demonstrated that the actual
use to which these particular oil platforms were put does not fall within the scope of “freedom of
commerce”. Any analysis of this issue must start with the Court’s 1996 Judgment.
15.10. What did the Court decide in 1996 on this issue? While noting the placement of the
term “commerce” in Article X ¾ an article that otherwise deals with maritime commerce ¾ the
Court found that the word “commerce” was not restricted to “maritime commerce”, given other
indications in the Treaty of an intention of the parties to deal with trade and commerce more
generally (1996 Judgment, p. 817, para. 41). Further, the Court read the word “commerce” to
cover “not merely the immediate sale and purchase of goods, but also the ancillary activities
integrally related to commerce” (1996 Judgment, p. 819, para. 49). As thus defined, whenever the
freedom of “such commerce” between the territories of the parties was “impeded” ¾ the Court
used the word “impeded” ¾, the Court said that there would be a violation of Article X,
paragraph 1 (1996 Judgment, p. 819, para. 50).
15.11. Of particular importance, the Court went on to identify the types of acts that could be
capable of “impeding” the “freedom of commerce”. In paragraph 50 of its Judgment, the Court
said that the “possibility” must be entertained that the freedom of commerce “could actually be
impeded as a result of acts entailing the destruction of goods . . . to be exported, or capable of
affecting their transport and their storage with a view to export” (1996 Judgment, p. 819, para. 50;
emphasis added). We would submit that here, the Court established a test for what acts could
impede “freedom of commerce” for purposes of Article X, paragraph 1, which is captured on the
slide on the screen and also appears at tab 2 in the judges’ folders. For a violation to be found,
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either (1) the act in question must entail the destruction of goods destined to be exported; or (2) the
act in question must affect the means of transport of goods destined to be exported; or, finally
(3) the act in question must affect the storage of goods destined to be exported.
15.12. What did the Court not decide in 1996? The Court only found, on the facts alleged by
Iran, that there was a “possibility” that the freedom of commerce might be impeded
(1996 Judgment, p. 819, para. 50). It only found the United States actions “capable” of having
such an effect (1996 Judgment, p. 820, para. 51). The Court made no finding whatsoever that any
impediment actually occurred. In fact, the Court said that “[o]n the material now before the Court,
it is indeed not able to determine if and to what extent the destruction of the Iranian oil platforms
had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian oil” (1996 Judgment, p. 820, para. 51).
15.13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, nothing has changed as a result of Iran’s
subsequent submissions to this Court. None of the materials now before the Court show that
United States actions with respect to the platforms impeded the export trade in Iranian oil and, as
such, there was no violation of Article X, paragraph 1.
15.14. First, did the United States military actions entail the destruction of goods destined to
be exported? I think it is obvious that the platforms themselves were not goods destined to be
exported. Moreover, it is obvious that the United States military actions did not destroy any oil at
all. The oil itself was untouched. Yet, we would further submit that the platforms themselves did
not even produce a good destined for export (Rejoinder of the United States, paras. 3.42-3.52). Let
me explain.
15.15. As Iran acknowledges, the oil extracted by its offshore oil platforms was not in a form
capable of being exported, either when it came onto or when it left the platforms (Reply and
Defence to Counter-Claim of Iran, paras. 3.7-3.10; Exhibit 212, paras. 12-15). I direct your
attention to the slide on the screen which also appears in tab 3 of the judges’ folders. The crude oil
was first extracted from the continental shelf and, after some initial processing, was piped from the
platforms to Lavan and Sirri Islands. This is reflected in steps 1 and 2 on the slide. Only at that
point is the crude oil subjected to extensive processing sufficient to transform the crude oil into a
new and different product capable of being safely exported. Indeed, only at that point was enough
gas, hydrogen sulphide, and water extracted from the crude oil so as to make a product less
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flammable and far more stable for export. Moreover, this new product would then be blended with
other oil extracted elsewhere in Iran before being exported, and this is reflected in “step 3”. Given
such extensive transformation after leaving the platforms, and given that the United States actions
did not destroy any oil at all, Iran has not proven that damage to the platforms entailed the
destruction of a good that was itself destined for export (Rejoinder of the United States,
paras. 3.43-3.48).
15.16. Second, did the United States military actions affect the means of transporting a good
destined for export? Well, on the contrary, the means of transporting crude oil from the Gulf were
the very tankers that were subject to attack by Iran, not by the United States. It is true, as the Court
noted in 1996, that the oil pumped from the platforms was transported by subsea pipeline to land
terminals (1996 Judgment, p. 819, para. 50). However, the United States actions against the
platforms were limited to the “jackets” of the platforms ¾ that portion above the waterline ¾ and
it did not actions against the undersea pipelines (Rejoinder of the United States, para. 3.49). The
United States has introduced evidence from an engineer highly experienced in Iranian oil
extraction, Edward Price, which appears at tab 4 in the judges’ folders. If you look at that
statement at tab 4, and in particular at paragraph 16 of the statement by Mr. Price, you will see that
he unambiguously states that damage to the “jackets” of these particular platforms “would not
affect Iran’s ability to use the undersea pipeline connected to those platforms to transport” the
extracted oil (Exhibit 212, para. 16). Although Iranian counsel has insinuated that such transport
would pose difficulties, Iran has introduced absolutely no evidence to support that insinuation.
Thus, Iran has not proven that the damage to the “jackets” of the platforms affected the means of
transport of goods destined to be exported (Rejoinder of the United States, paras. 3.49-3.51).
15.17. Third and finally, did the United States military actions affect the storage of goods
destined to be exported? Well, the platforms had no storage function or facilities. Iran itself has
admitted this. Storage of oil took place on Lavan and Sirri islands (Reply and Defence to
Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 3.6, concerning Rostam; ibid., Vol. IV, Statement of Mr. Alagheband,
para. 10, concerning Sirri). Thus, Iran has not proven that damage to the platforms affected the
means for storing goods destined for export.
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15.18. If we return briefly to the slide summarizing the Court’s test for what acts might
impede “freedom of commerce”, it is clear that acts damaging the platforms are not covered under
Article X, paragraph 1. The United States military actions destroyed no oil at all. Indeed, the oil
platforms themselves did not even produce a product capable of being exported. They did not store
a product of any kind. And the platforms did not transport a product destined for export. On the
facts now before the Court it would be unwarranted to expand the concept of “freedom of
commerce” to reach the platforms. It would be like arguing that freedom of commerce covers not
only a Persian carpet woven for export, but also the pair of clippers used to shear the wool from the
Iranian sheep, even where the clippers are broken and not capable of use. It would be unreasonable
to consider such broken clippers covered by the freedom of commerce, likewise, it is unreasonable
to consider the platforms so covered.
B. The United States actions against the platforms did not impede freedom of commerce and
navigation “between the territories” of Iran and the United States
15.19. Mr. President, allow me to turn to the second part of my presentation. Article X,
paragraph 1, covers only the freedom of commerce “between the territories of the two High
Contracting Parties”. Iran must not only prove that the United States military actions impeded
Iran’s freedom of commerce generally. Iran must also prove that the United States actions impeded
freedom of commerce between the territories of Iran and the United States.
15.20. Here, too, is an issue that the Court did not decide in its 1996 Judgment. The Court
said that, at the jurisdictional stage, the Court did not have to enter into the question of whether
Article X is restricted to commerce “between” the Parties (1996 Judgment, p. 817, para. 44). The
Court merely accepted Iran’s argument that there was “to some degree” oil exports from Iran to the
United States and thus a “potential” violation of Article X, paragraph 1 (ibid., pp. 817 and 818,
paras. 38 and 44). But the Court did not make factual determinations regarding whether the United
States damage to these particular platforms in fact had any effect upon the export trade in oil to the
United States (ibid., p. 820, para. 51). That issue was left to the merits (see CR 2003/6, p. 32,
para. 65).
15.21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Court cannot read the words “between the
territories” out of Article X, paragraph 1. This Court previously has stated, in this very case, that
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when interpreting the 1955 Treaty, we must follow norms of interpretation as established in
customary international law (1996 Judgment, p. 812, para. 23). Customary international law, as
embodied in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, provides that the all the
words of a treaty provision must be given meaning, and this principle is reflected in international
jurisprudence ranging from the Cayuga Indians Claims arbitration to this Court’s decision in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case. (See British-American Claims Commission in Cayuga Indians Claims
Case, 6 RIAA 173, 184 (1926), “Nothing is better settled, as a canon of interpretation in all systems
of law, than that a clause must be so interpreted as to give it a meaning rather than so as to deprive
it of meaning”; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 105, considering whether “a
legal text should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every
word in the text” and saying that this is a principle that “should in general be applied when
interpreting the text of a treaty”.)
15.22. So what, then, does this phrase mean? The ordinary meaning of the phrase clearly
imposes a territorial restriction on the commerce covered by Article X, paragraph 1. The ordinary
meaning is that the commerce or navigation must commence in the territory of one State and then
proceed to the territory of the other State.
15.23. Reading this provision in context supports this ordinary meaning. The Court will
recall that in its 1996 Judgment, the Court made a distinction between provisions in the
1955 Treaty that contained a territorial limitation and those provisions that did not. The Court said
that the provisions of the 1955 Treaty containing a territorial limitation have a narrower scope
(1996 Judgment, p. 816, paras. 34-35). Thus, Article X, paragraph 1, is like other provisions of the
Treaty that, for instance, regulate the status of companies of one of the parties in the territory of the
other, such as may be found in Article III of the Treaty. Such provisions are directed at a territorial
limitation that the Court must take into account.
15.24. Now I note that Iran appears to concur that weight must be given to this phrase, at
least when applied to the United States counter-claim. In that context, Iran says “there can be no
doubt” that the language of Article X, paragraph 1, does “impose a territorial scope and limitation”
on its application (Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 6.47). At the same time, Iran
somewhat confusingly argues that the Court’s 1986 Judgment in the Nicaragua case did not
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concern “itself with verifying whether specific commercial activities were taking place” between
the two countries at the time of the alleged attacks and mining in that case (Reply of Iran,
para. 6.50). We submit that Iran misconstrues the Court’s Judgment by failing to take into account
the factual differences between the Nicaragua case and this case. In the Nicaragua case, the
existence of United States-Nicaraguan commerce at the time the mines were laid and at the time of
the attacks on Nicaraguan facilities was uncontested. The vessels and facilities at issue in that case
were fully functioning and there was no United States embargo on trade with Nicaragua when
those incidents occurred (see case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 76, 81, 125). As I shall soon discuss, those facts are
not present in this case.
15.25. A further important aspect of the territorial limitation in Article X, paragraph 1, is that
it is not sufficient simply to find that there was general commerce between the territories of the two
States in the relevant time period, nor even that there was general commerce in oil. Rather, the
Court must find that there was commerce in oil from these particular platforms between the
territories of the two States in the relevant time period. The need to focus on oil exports from these
particular platforms is evident in paragraph 50 of the Court’s 1996 Judgment, in which the Court
focused on whether the United States acts could potentially affect goods destined to be exported, or
specifically to be the transported or stored. It is also evident in paragraph 51 of the 1996 Judgment.
In that paragraph, the Court anticipated a decision at the merits phase on “to what extent the
destruction of the Iranian oil platforms had an effect upon the export trade in Iranian oil”
(emphasis added).
15.26. Indeed, Iran apparently agrees with this point when its argues with respect to the
counter-claim that
“it is insufficient for the United States simply to allege . . . that there was general
commerce between the Parties during the relevant time period . . . The United States
must also prove that the vessels in question were involved in commercial relations
between the territories of Iran and the United States.” (Further Response to the United
States Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 6.31; emphasis added.)
15.27. Now, applying the facts as pled by Iran in this case to the language of Article X leads
us to an unavoidable conclusion: the platforms were not engaged in commerce “between the
territories” of Iran and the United States during the time period in question. This conclusion is
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clear when one looks at both geographic ends of the alleged commerce and asks two questions:
first, was there commerce from these platforms departing Iranian territory? And second, was there
commerce from these platforms arriving in United States territory?
15.28. Taking the first question, one must immediately observe that the oil platforms do not
even lie in Iranian territory. They are outside Iran’s territorial sea, they are on Iran’s continental
shelf and within its exclusive economic zone (see, e.g., Memorial of Iran, paras. 1.13, 1.17-1.18;
Reply of Iran, para. 3.4; CR 2003/ 5, p. 18; CR 2003/6, p. 40; 1996 Judgment, p. 808, para. 12).
15.29. The Court can see this fact for itself in the map displayed on the screen
(Counter-Memorial and Counter-Claim of the United States, map 1.12) which is also at tab 6 in the
judges’ folders. If we focus on that area of the map where the three platforms lie, and then move in
even closer, we can see the platforms’ actual location. This close-up also appears at the same tab in
the judges’ folders.
15.30. The three oil platforms ¾ Rostam, Sassan and Sirri ¾ are at the lower portion of the
map. The area shaded in light blue running along Iran’s coast is the 12-nautical-mile limit of Iran’s
territorial sea.
15.31. As you can see, all three platforms are well outside Iran’s territorial sea. Based on the
evidence in the record, Rostam (which Iran refers to as Reshadat) is about 55 nautical miles from
Iranian territory. Sassan (which Iran refers to as Salman) is about 69 nautical miles from the
nearest Iranian land territory. And Sirri (which Iran refers to as Nasr) is about 17 nautical miles
from the nearest Iranian land territory.
15.32. So there is already some initial difficulty with the idea that the products from these
platforms are departing Iranian territory. But leaving that issue aside, commerce in a product
“between the territories” of the two Parties cannot occur unless there is movement of the product
from one territory to the other territory. Yet there was no movement of a product at all from two of
the platforms at issue at the time of the United States actions. Let me show the Court a slide with
the relevant dates; this also appears as tab 7 in the judges’ folders.
15.33. Iraqi aircraft attacked and completely disabled the Rostam platform in October 1986
and July 1987. As Iran itself acknowledges, at the time of the United States military action against
Rostam in October 1987, the platform was still not functioning, and had not been for more than a
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year (Reply of Iran, para. 3.13). If Rostam was not functioning, it follows that Rostam was not
engaged in commerce at all, let alone commerce “[b]etween the territories” of Iran and the United
States. And as such, there was no “freedom of commerce” that could be subject to Article X,
paragraph 1.
15.34. Iran admits that the same situation prevailed with respect to the Sassan platform (see
Reply of Iran, para. 3.14). Those dates are in the middle part of the slide. Iraq attacked and
disabled the Sassan platform in October and November of 1986, and it was still not functioning
18 months later at the time of the United States action in April 1988. Again, if Sassan was not
functioning, it follows that Sassan was not engaged in commerce at all, let alone commerce
“[b]etween the territories” of Iran and the United States. And we submit as such, there was no
“freedom of commerce” that could be violated by Article X, paragraph 1.
15.35. This, then, leads to the second question: was there commerce from the Iranian oil
platforms arriving in United States territory? The only facility ¾ the only facility ¾ that Iran
might claim was engaged in commerce of any sort whatsoever at the time of the United States
military actions was the Sirri platform. Sirri, however, was not engaged in commerce between the
territories of the two States for the simple reason that, at the time of the United States military
action, there was no longer any commerce at all in oil between Iran and the United States.
15.36. As the United States written pleadings have explained, almost six months prior to the
actions involving the Sirri and Sassan platforms, the United States banned the import of Iranian oil
and oil products. The date of the embargo, 29 October 1987, is listed on the screen. And I note
that the import ban did not cover goods that, prior to 29 October 1987, had been loaded on board
vessels and were in transit to the United States, which accounts for the very minor 1988 imports
reflected in the statistics presented to the Court by both Parties. Consequently, that ban meant that,
after October 1987, there was no relevant commerce in oil from Iranian territory to United States
territory at all (see Exhibit 225), let alone any commerce involving the one oil platform that was
extracting any crude oil at the time of the United States military actions.
15.37. Iran has conceded this point. In Iran’s words, “the sanctions adopted under Executive
Order No. 12613 on October 29, 1987, effectively put an end to any imports of Iranian crude oil
into the United States” (Reply of Iran, para. 3.22). Iran’s oil-trade expert, Mr. Peter Odell, also
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conceded this point. In his words: “The October 1987 US ban on direct Iranian oil imports
completely destroyed Iran’s trade with the United States.” (Reply of Iran, Vol. III, Odell
Statement, p. 19.) Therefore, on 18 April 1988, when it became necessary for the United States to
take action against Sirri ¾ as well as against Sassan for that matter ¾ those platforms could not
have been involved in commerce “between the territories” of the United States and Iran.
15.38. So in summary, on the facts of this case, the requirement that there be commerce
between the territories of the two countries is not met at either geographic end. There were no
products from these platforms going out of the territory of Iran. Due to Iraqi attacks, two of the
three platforms were producing no products at all, let alone products entering into commerce with
the United States. And commencing in October 1987, there were no products from any of these
platforms coming into the territory of the United States.
15.39. So, given these incontrovertible points, how does Iran respond? Iran pursues three
lines of argument, none of which sustain scrutiny.
15.40. One line of argument concerns the relevance of the United States embargo. Counsel
for Iran has asserted that the embargo cannot be used as a basis for saying that the embargo
prevented any impediment to commerce “between the territories” because, in Iran’s view, the
embargo itself was a violation of the 1955 Treaty. As Professor Crawford put it, the embargo
“cannot justify the attack” on Rostam if the embargo was “a breach of the Treaty of Amity”
(CR 2003/5, p. 38). Professor Pellet referred to the embargo as a “wrongful act,” one that cannot,
to use his words, “effacé les effects produits par la destruction des plate-formes” (CR 2003/6, p. 37,
para. 80).
15.41. The United States position, is not that there was a violation of Article X which was
then erased by the embargo. Rather, our position is that there was no violation of Article X to
begin with, in part because of the embargo.
15.42. But the more important point is that Iran at this stage cannot ask this Court to rule that
the embargo was a violation of the 1955 Treaty, such that the effects of that embargo cannot be
taken into account by the Court. No claim by Iran that the embargo was unlawful has been placed
before this Court, as Iran itself has conceded on several occasions (see, e.g., Reply of Iran,
para. 6.57; CR 2003/5, p. 40, para. 27). The matter has not been briefed to this Court, either by
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Iran or by the United States. Indeed, there is no record in this case of Iran ever having complained
to the United States regarding the embargo. If the United States had been charged with violating
international law by imposition of the embargo, the United States would have raised jurisdictional
objections and, if required, would have shown to this Court that the embargo was entirely lawful
under the 1955 Treaty for multiple reasons (see Counter-Memorial and Counter-Claim of the
United States, p. 103, note 244). Indeed, application of Article XX to an economic embargo raises
very different factual and legal issues than those presently before the Court. Iran could have
included such a claim in this case, just as Nicaragua did in the Nicaragua case, but Iran chose not
to: and Iran should not be permitted to do so now, indirectly. Moreover, the Court’s
1986 Judgment in the Nicaragua case regarding the legality of the United States embargo would in
no way be dispositive of the legality of the United States embargo against Iran since, as
Mr. Matheson will explain later in our presentation, the circumstances in the two cases are quite
different, especially as regards the application of Article XX.
15.43. In short, Professor Pellet has no licence before this Court to liken the United States to
a common thief (CR 2003/6, p. 37, para. 80). Until proven otherwise in an appropriate tribunal, the
United States embargo against Iran must be regarded as lawful. And as a lawful measure, it
precluded any commerce in oil between the territories of the two States throughout the period in
which the embargo was in place. Actions by the United States against Iran’s oil platforms could
not have impeded such commerce in that time frame because no such commerce existed.
15.44. A second line of argument that Iran pursues involves evidence of commerce in refined
oil products between customers in the United States and suppliers in Western Europe (Reply of
Iran, Vol. III, Report of Prof. Peter Odell). What is striking about this evidence, however, is that it
is actually demonstrating the absence of commerce between Iranian and United States territories in
the relevant time period. Indeed, Iran has repeatedly referred to this commerce as “indirect” in
nature (e.g., CR 2003/6, p. 36), which certainly does not fit easily with the metaphor of a “bridge”
between the two States suggested by counsel for Iran as the appropriate way to view Article X,
paragraph 1 (CR 2003/5, pp. 37-39).
15.45. Let us consider the evidence submitted by Iran. The report prepared by
Professor Odell and submitted to this Court accepts that Iranian crude oil shipped through Europe
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to the United States dropped to zero by 1988 because of the United States embargo (Reply of Iran,
Vol. III, Report of Prof. Peter Odell, table 2). But Professor Odell deploys various hypotheses and
speculations so as to claim that at least some portion of the crude oil Iran sold to purchasers in
Western Europe during the embargo was subsequently converted into refined oil products, some
portion of which third parties may have sold to customers in the United States (Reply of Iran,
Vol. III, Report of Prof. Peter Odell, p. 20).
15.46. Now, one is tempted to simply quote counsel for Iran to the effect that: “The report is
nothing more than a collection of hypotheses ¾ ‘could haves’; ‘might haves’. It is not evidence.”
(CR 2003/7, p. 27.)
15.47. But the more important point is that Professor Odell’s report amply makes clear that
the sale of crude oil from the territory of Iran to the territory of the countries of Western Europe
had no connection with the territory of the United States. Once Iranian crude oil arrived in Europe,
it was commingled with enormous amounts of crude oil from various other sources ¾ other
countries ¾ it was stored, it was redistributed, it was ultimately transformed, through refinement in
Western Europe, into an entirely new and far more valuable product, such as fuel oil.
15.48. I draw your attention to the screen and also to tab 8 in the judges’ folders for here you
will see that Iran’s expert, Professor Odell, characterizes this process as follows:
“As a result of this complexity of the European oil supply, storage, refining and
distribution system, tracing a specific barrel of crude oil exported to Europe through to
the final user of the oil products made from that barrel of crude becomes just about as
difficult as tracing a grain of wheat from a particular field of an individual farmer,
through to a specific miller and ultimately to a sack of flour!” (Reply of Iran, Vol. III,
Odell Statement, p. 7.)
15.49. Indeed, it is, so much so that we submit the Court cannot find that any Iranian product
entered into commerce in the territory of the United States from Western Europe after
October 1987.
15.50. This point is illustrated by the flow chart now on the screen, which appears at tab 9 in
the judges’ folders. I displayed the first three steps earlier. After extraction, processing, and
blending of the crude oil from the platforms in Iran, export quality crude oil was sold by Iran to
buyers in Europe ¾ that is step 4 on the chart. The crude oil underwent an even greater
transformation in Europe, first being mixed with crude oil from other sources ¾ that is step 5 ¾
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and then being refined into oil products, such as fuel oil ¾ step 6. At that point, the refined oil
products, such as fuel oil, were capable of another sale, either for consumption in Europe or for
export to other countries, including possibly the United States ¾ that is step 7.
15.51. Mr. President, Members of the Court, does this constitute commerce between the
territories of Iran and the United States? In the Court’s 1996 Judgment, the Court viewed it as
relevant, when interpreting Article X, paragraph 1, to consider the standards operating in
international trade and business law (p. 818, para. 46). Well, as a matter of international trade and
business law, it is beyond dispute that Iranian crude oil and European refined oil products are
fundamentally different goods.
15.52. Consider first international trade law. In our Rejoinder, the United States provided
documentation from the World Customs Organization, from the European Union and from the
United States itself, demonstrating that this distinction between crude oil and refined oil products is
maintained at all levels ¾ international, regional, and national ¾ for purposes of tariff
classification or rules of origin (Rejoinder of the United States, paras. 3.66-3.68, Exhibits 226, 227,
228). That documentation confirms that the commerce engaged in by United States buyers
regarding oil imports in the relevant time period concerned purchases of a European good, not an
Iranian good.
15.53. Consider second, private international law. There are no bills of lading indicating that
European oil products shipped to the United States originated in Iran. There are no letters of credit
describing such exports as originating in Iran. There are no sales contracts or insurance contracts
or, indeed, contracts of any kind whatsoever reflecting that this was Iranian oil destined for the
United States. Iranian law, Iranian courts, Iranian sellers and insurers had no interest of any kind
whatsoever in any of these European-United States transactions. No one involved in the oil
business ¾ not the buyers, not the sellers, the insurers, the bankers, the brokers, the analysts ¾ no
one would regard the shipment of Iranian crude oil to Europe for refining as a commercial
transaction between Iran and the United States, regardless of whether any resulting petroleum
products ultimately were sold to the United States (Rejoinder of the United States, para. 3.71).
15.54. We direct the Court’s attention to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (1489 UNTS 3). We direct the Court’s attention to the International
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Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of
Goods by Sea (120 UNTS 155). We direct Court’s attention to the International Chamber of
Commerce’s Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credit (1993 Revision, ICC Pub.
No. 500-842-1155-7). All of those régimes would regard Iran’s so-called commerce “between”
Iran and the United States as at least two mutually exclusive transactions: one between Iran and
Europe; the other between Europe and the United States.
15.55. Perhaps Professor Odell makes the point best in the quote we include at tab 10 in the
judges’ folders, and which is up on the screen, when he vividly characterizes the European oil
industry process as “most effectively ‘de-nationalising’ the crude oil moving into it” (Reply of Iran,
Vol. III, Odell Statement, pp. 7-8). And the Court will recall that this is from a man Iran has put
forward as “a renowned authority on the international oil economy” (CR 2003/6, p. 49).
15.56. Nor is it conceivable that Iran and the United States, when drafting the 1955 Treaty,
intended Article X, paragraph 1, to cover transactions with the territories of third countries, in this
case countries in Europe. Indeed, Iran’s argument would sweep almost all exports emanating from
the territories of either Iran or the United States within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, because
of the possibility that the exported product or some de minimis portion of it might be resold to the
other party. As a result, both States would be obliged to extend the protections of Article X,
paragraph 1, to virtually all of their trading partners to avoid, inadvertently, impeding indirect
United States-Iranian trade. Such a result was clearly not intended by the United States or by Iran,
or by any of the parties to these types of treaties. And, thus, the Court ¾ consistent with the many
international instruments touching on this question ¾ should conclude that Iranian sales to
Western Europe and European sales to the United States do not involve commerce “between the
territories” of the two Parties.
15.57. Having run into these difficulties, Iran advances a third line of argument. Iran asks
the Court to forget about actual commerce from the oil platforms to the United States and instead
focus on potential commerce. As counsel for Iran put it, Article X is not interested in “actual
commerce on a given day” but rather on “freedom of commerce on a continuing basis”
(CR 2003/5, p. 39, para. 25; see also CR 2003/6, pp. 33-34, paras. 70 and 73; “Admittedly, there
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was no guarantee that the oil concerned was in fact destined to be exported to the United States, but
that is of no relevance.”).
15.58. To sustain this argument, Iran asserts that the platforms at some earlier time had been
engaged in commerce between the two territories and therefore at some later stage would again
become engaged in such commerce (Reply of Iran, paras. 3.23, 3.29, and 6.48; Further Response
to the United States Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 6.30). This is supposedly demonstrated by a
number of contractual arrangements purportedly “concluded with American oil companies for the
export of Iranian oil to the United States both before and after the US attacks on the Iranian oil
platforms” (Reply of Iran, Vol. III, Hosseini Statement, para. 16). Since the United States actions
purportedly impeded this potential for later commerce, then according to Iran, the United States
violated Article X, paragraph 1. This argument has no merit, for several reasons.
15.59. First, this extraordinarily expansive interpretation of freedom of commerce is out of
step with the Court’s 1996 Judgment. In that Judgment, as I have discussed, the Court was
interested in evidence of actual commerce between Iran and the United States. The Court did not
interpret “freedom of commerce” as encompassing all possible, future hypothetical exports.
Indeed, if “freedom of commerce” were read so expansively, then virtually all United States actions
of any kind ¾ such as cessation of economic aid ¾ that diminishes Iran’s capacity to use its
infrastructure or to use its land would fall within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1, since the
action has the potential to preclude use of Iran’s resources for future export trade. In 1996, the
Court did not regard Article X in the manner now viewed by Iran, and the Court should not do so
today. To do so reads the phrase “between the territories” right out of Article X.
15.60. Second, Iran’s factual predicate for this argument is completely inadequate. Despite
counsel for Iran’s assertion that these platforms had historically been used for the purpose of
engaging in oil trade with the United States (CR 2003/5, para. 25), Iran has not proven that oil from
these particular platforms was exported to the United States. Certainly, prior to October 1987,
there were Iranian oil exports to the United States, but Iran has not shown that any of the oil came
from these platforms. The NIOC documents submitted by Iran regarding crude oil exports from
Lavan and Sirri Islands only list as destinations countries such as India, Japan, and Singapore ¾
not the United States (Reply of Iran, Vol. III, Hosseini Statement, paras. 10 and 11). Even more to
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the point, there is no evidence in the record to establish that these particular platforms were going
to be engaged in the export of oil to the United States at some hypothetical point in the future (see
Exhibit 225). Although Iran has taken the trouble to place in the record assorted contractual
arrangements, none of those arrangements identify these platforms as the origin of the oil.
15.61. Third, this argument is inconsistent with Iran’s own position with respect to the
counter-claim. There, Iran goes to great length to challenge whether specific vessels carrying
specific cargo “between the territories” of Iran and the United States had such cargo at the time of
their attack (Further Response to the United States Counter-Claim of Iran, paras. 6.31, 6.39-6.42,
“those vessels were not conducting trade between the territories of the two Parties”). The obvious
fact that such vessels may have carried cargo between the two countries previously, or could have
carried cargo between the two States at some future point, including oil cargo under the very
contractual arrangements cited by Iran, is viewed as completely irrelevant. If Iran believes that
specific goods must be identified as moving between the territories of the two States, then Iran’s
position on unsubstantiated and hypothetical future Iranian oil exports is all the more untenable.
15.62. Fourth, Iran’s argument is, at its heart, grounded in mere speculation, and thus cannot
serve as a basis for this Court to find a violation of Article X, paragraph 1.
15.63. For example, Iran alleges that, but for the United States attacks on the platforms, Iran
would have returned the disabled Rostam and Sassan platforms to production prior to the
imposition of the United States embargo. Yet the unavoidable fact is that for a long time the
platforms had not been repaired and were not functioning. Assertions that they might soon have
been repaired are sheer speculation.
15.64. Indeed, Iran has provided no contemporaneous records of its repair efforts or of its
allegedly imminent preparations to resume production from the platforms to support its assertion.
With respect to the Rostam platform, the best Iran can do is to have two NIOC officials baldly
assert in their statements that “based on the works schedule” it was “expected” that normal
production would resume (Reply of Iran, Vol. IV, Hassani Statement, para. 16; Sehat Statement,
para. 16). Both officials attach to their statements identical copies of the only document ¾ the
only document ¾ that Iran has submitted to support this assertion, a document entitled “Production
Commissioning of Platforms R4 & R7” (Reply of Iran, Vol. IV, Hassani Statement, Ann. D; Sehat
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Statement, Ann. C). This document appears only to be a planned schedule of improvements and
repairs. There is no indication of when this schedule for repairs was created; it could have been
created well before October 1987. There is certainly no indication that any of the repairs were
actually carried out or carried out on time. And finally, the document contains no date for the
actual resumption of oil production. If Rostam really was on the verge of being operational, surely
Iran could have produced better evidence than this.
15.65. With respect to the Sassan platform, one NIOC official again baldly asserts in his
statement that “works were about to be completed at the time of the U.S. attack”, but this time Iran
submits no supporting documentation whatsoever (Reply of Iran, Vol. IV, Emami Statement,
para. 6). Again, if Sassan really was on the verge of being operational, surely Iran could have
produced better evidence.
15.66. A further reason this Court should not enter into the world of speculation is that, on
the facts of this case, it is not at all clear where that speculation should lead. Iran’s alleged plans to
complete repairs on Rostam and Sassan assumes the absence of subsequent Iraqi attacks. Yet, as
Iran admits, Iraq was fully capable of attacking these particular platforms, had already repeatedly
attacked these platforms, and was intent upon keeping the platforms non-operational (Reply of
Iran, paras. 3.16 and 3.31-3.32; CR 2003/6, pp. 52-53). In fact, Iran’s own evidence shows that
Iraq conducted dozens of attacks upon Iranian oil facilities in the Lavan and Sirri areas up through
mid-1988 (see Reply of Iran, Vol. IV, Hassani Statement, Ann. B). There is every reason to
believe that, if the platforms had been repaired, Iraq would have attacked them again to keep them
from producing oil. So, if we are to speculate, why not speculate that Iran’s failure to make these
platforms operational was due to an Iranian concern that Iraq would then immediately attack them?
Or why not speculate that Iran’s failure to make these platforms operational was because Iran was
unable to maintain its repair schedules at all the facilities Iraq had attacked prior to the United
States actions? Or why not speculate that Iran did not need the platforms for oil exports given the
limitations on Iran from its OPEC quota, which Mr. Bettauer will discuss later?
15.67. In sum, Iran contends, without offering any serious supporting evidence, that the
Rostam and Sassan platforms might have resumed operations and that those operations might have
resulted in exports to the United States. This is an entirely speculative and undocumented
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contention, and it is characteristic of Iran’s entire claim that there was commerce between the
territories of Iran and the United States that was impeded by the attacks on the platforms.
15.68. Should the Court give credence to such speculation? Under this Court’s
jurisprudence, Iran has the burden of proving its claim. Mere speculation of this type cannot
provide the basis for a finding that a State has violated its international legal responsibilities. In the
1989 ELSI case, the United States claimed that two of its corporations were deprived of the right to
place their subsidiary through an orderly liquidation, but a Chamber of this Court found that the
treaty in that case ¾ a treaty much like the 1955 Treaty in this case ¾ was not violated because
Raytheon’s lost opportunity was “purely a matter of speculation” (Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (ELSI),
I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 62, para. 101). In light of the ELSI case, this Court should not accept Iran’s
theory that a violation of Article X may be predicated on “potential” oil commerce with the United
States.
Conclusion
15.69. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me briefly to summarize my presentation.
The United States military actions did not destroy any oil at all. Moreover, the oil platforms at
issue in this case did not produce a product capable of being exported, and did not transport or store
a product of any kind. As such, the facts pled by Iran regarding the United States actions against
the platforms have not met the Court’s 1996 test regarding the type of actions capable of impeding
the “freedom of commerce”.
15.70. Moreover, Iran has not proven that any crude oil from these platforms actually entered
into commerce “between the territories” of Iran and the United States. In fact, no crude oil did,
either because the relevant platforms were not operational or because the United States oil embargo
precluded such commerce. Any crude oil sold by Iran to Europe was commingled with crude oil
from other sources, it was refined, it was transformed into an entirely new product. Thereafter,
some of those European products may have reached the United States, but only as the result of
commercial transactions regarded under international law as solely between Europe and the United
States.
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15.71. In the end, Iran’s whole claim under Article X rests on speculation: speculation about
specific crude oil leaving these three oil platforms before and after the United States actions;
speculation about repairs to the platforms and about there being no further Iraqi attacks;
speculation that Iranian crude oil in Europe, after this extensive reprocessing would then make its
way as refined oil products to the United States.
15.72. In short, Mr. President, Iran’s claim is no more substantial than Mr. Odell’s tiny grain
of wheat. And as such, Iran’s claim clearly cannot be sustained.
15.73. Thank you, Mr. President. I now ask you to call on Mr. Bettauer to continue our
presentation.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Murphy. I now give the floor to Mr. Bettauer.
Mr. BETTAUER:
16. UNITED STATES CONDUCT DID NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, PARAGRAPH 1
PART II
Introduction
16.1. Thank you Mr. President. Professor Murphy has just explained to the Court two
important reasons why United States actions in relation to the oil platforms did not violate
Article X, paragraph 1. As Professor Murphy mentioned, there are two other important reasons for
concluding that United States actions did not violate this provision.
¾ First, even if there were any effects on Iranian oil commerce that might potentially have been
caused by the United States actions against the platforms, Iran has not shown and cannot show
that such incidental effects are a legally sufficient basis for a finding of breach.
¾ Second, it is clear that the oil platforms ¾ regardless of whether their traditional use
constitutes “commerce” ¾ were in fact being used in support of ongoing offensive military
activity directed against United States interests and the interests of other States as well. Such
non-commercial activities cannot be shielded by, and benefit from, the “freedom of commerce
and navigation” clause in Article X, paragraph 1.
I will explain these two points in my presentation today.
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United States actions had no relevant or legally cognizable effect on Iran’s international
commerce in oil
16.2. First, not only has Iran submitted no evidence that the United States military actions
impeded oil exports from these particular platforms to the United States, it has submitted no
evidence that these actions affected any Iranian oil exports. Rather, the United States has provided
documentation demonstrating that, in reality, the overall level of Iranian oil exports was not
affected in any way by the events at issue in this case.
16.3. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, Iran
agreed to restrict its production capacity by accepting certain quotas. In spite of damage to its oil
platforms resulting from United States actions, Iran continued to export oil at the approximate level
of its OPEC quota throughout the period (Exhibit 212). And in spite of Iran’s inability to use the
Rostam, Sassan, and Sirri platforms to produce oil, Iranian officials insisted that Iran continued to
have the capacity to produce more oil than it could sell. Mr. Aghazadeh, Iran’s Oil Minister, stated
at the 10 December 1987 press conference that Iran had excess oil capacity, indeed, “a substantial
potential for higher production” (Exhibit 212, Exhibit C). He reaffirmed this position nearly three
years later, noting that Iran could increase its oil production if desired by 500,000 barrels
(Exhibit 212, Exhibit D). Since Iran abided by its quota and did not increase its exports despite
asserting that it had the capacity to do so, Iran cannot claim that its exports were adversely affected
because it was denied additional excess capacity that would have lain idle.
16.4. Now, Iran responded last week that the United States argument was “very curious”
because, in its view, Iran should have the choice among local sources for its production of crude oil
and because the United States is not in a position to invoke OPEC quotas because they are
undertakings that Iran had with third parties. These arguments miss the point. We make no legal
assertion concerning Iran’s OPEC undertakings, nor do we contest that the Sirri platform became
unavailable as a source for extraction of crude oil after the United States action in April 1988.
Rather, our point is that Iran itself, in authoritative contemporaneous statements, said that it had
excess unused oil production capacity. The fact that Iran had excess capacity may be explained, in
whole or in part, by the OPEC quota. Whatever the case, Iran simply has not shown that it would
have exported any more oil than it in fact exported had the United States actions not occurred.
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There is every reason to think that it would not have exported more oil, if you read
Mr. Aghazadeh’s statements.
16.5. Since Iran cannot show an overall adverse effect on its oil trade, it attempts to show
more limited disruptions in its foreign commerce in oil. For example, Iran has stated “Iran’s oil
would often have been sold prior to its actual production under long-term contracts” (Reply of Iran,
para. 3.11). Iran went so far as to say “the oil from these oilfields was assigned to supply sales
under specific contractual arrangements to specific customers (for example, customers would buy a
specific number of tons of Salman crude, or Nasr crude)”. According to Iran, “[t]he destruction of
the platforms necessarily interrupted these contracts and thus prevented Iran from exercising its
freedom of commerce” (Memorial of Iran, para. 3.68).
16.6. Mr. President, if these assertions are true, then why has Iran not produced any
examples of contracts that it was unable to perform because of United States actions? There is no
evidence before this Court that Iran was unable to meet its contractual obligations or, in fact, not
able to sell much more oil than it actually did during the relevant period. As Professor Murphy
explained, moreover, an adverse effect on its trade with countries other than the United States
would not be enough to sustain a violation of Article X, paragraph 1.
16.7. It seems clear, therefore, that there was no adverse effect on Iranian overall oil exports
as a result of damage to the platforms ¾ let alone any adverse effect on commerce between the
territories of Iran and the United States.
16.8. Indeed, as Iran appears to recognize, any actual effects on commerce in oil between the
territories of Iran and the United States resulted from the imposition of the 1987 United States oil
embargo, not from the destruction of the platforms at issue in this case. Iran’s Reply emphasizes
the damage it suffered as a result of the embargo: “when sanctions were imposed by the
United States in October 1987, Iran found itself with a surplus crude oil production of
approximately 345,000 bpd (barrels per day), which until then had been imported to the
United States” (Reply of Iran, para. 3.24). That, however, is irrelevant to this case ¾ as
Professor Murphy noted earlier, the legality of the United States embargo is not at issue here.
16.9. The fact that Iran has not proven any effects at all of the United States actions on
United States-Iranian commerce, let alone on Iranian trade in oil in general, should put Iran’s claim
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to rest. However, even if, purely for the sake of argument, we assume that there may have been
some minimal or indirect effect of the United States actions on commerce between the territories of
the two countries, any such effect would be too remote and inconsequential to constitute a violation
of Article X, paragraph 1.
16.10. It is not enough to allege simply a linkage between United States military action
against the oil platforms and a purported adverse effect to its oil exports. Even if there is a
conceivable relationship, that is not enough. Rather, Iran must show that the relationship is direct
and consequential, and that it is not remote. Iran agrees with this principle, since Iran’s counsel
stated last Wednesday that it views the United States as responsible for all the consequences
flowing from conduct engaging State responsibility “which are not too indirect or remote”
(CR 2003/8, p. 42, para. 6).
16.11. It is well established that State responsibility will not lie for speculative, remote or
inconsequential impacts. In a different context, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the North
America Free Trade Agreement recently said:
“The possible consequences of human conduct are infinite, especially when
comprising acts of governmental agencies; but common sense does not require that
line to run unbroken towards an endless horizon. In a traditional legal context,
somewhere the line is broken; and whether as a matter of logic, social policy or other
value judgment, a limit is necessarily imposed restricting the consequences for which
that conduct is to be held accountable.” (Partial Award, 7 August 2002, Methanex
Corp. v. United States of America, para. 138, 14 World Trade and Arbitration
Materials 109 (2002), also available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
12613.pdf (tribunal chaired by Van Vecten Veeder; other members were
William Rowley and Warren Christopher).)
16.12. The International Law Commission took the same view ¾ that State responsibility is
not determined simply on the basis of “factual causality” ¾ when it adopted its Draft Articles on
State Responsibility in 2001.
16.13. In its Commentary on Draft Article 31, the Commission states that: “[C]ausality in
fact is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reparation. There is a further element,
associated with the exclusion of injury that is too ‘remote’ or ‘inconsequential’ to be the subject of
reparation.” (Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third session, United Nations
doc. A/56/10, Chap. IV (E) (2), p. 227 (2001); see also J. Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Third
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Report on State Responsibility, United Nations International Law Commission, fifty-second
session, at 15-16, para. 28, United Nations doc. A/CN.4/507 (2000).)
16.14. The same view has been explicitly acknowledged by numerous international
tribunals, including the German-United States Mixed Claims Commission, which applied the rule
in treaty interpretation (Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Germany), 7 RIAA 23, 29-30
(1923)).
16.15. While Iran has actually proved no adverse effect to freedom of commerce between the
territories of Iran and the United States, even the adverse effect it alleges without proof is clearly
too remote to sustain its claim. Upon close scrutiny, Iran’s allegations are that the United States
military actions had some minimal or indirect effect on Iranian oil exports. For the reasons I have
stated, such allegations must fail.
The use of the platforms for offensive military activities precludes recovery under Article X,
paragraph 1
16.16. Let me now turn to the second point of this presentation. Iran’s claim against the
United States under the “freedom of commerce” clause cannot be sustained because Iran’s use of
the platforms for offensive military purposes deprives Iran of the ability to sustain such a claim.
Let me explain.
16.17. Iran has repeatedly argued that Article X, paragraph 1, must protect the platforms
from damage because they were “commercial installations” (Observations and Submissions of Iran
on the United States Preliminary Objection of Iran, para. 1.28; Reply and Defence to
Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 3.1; CR 2003/8, p. 45, para. 15). Mr. President, at the time in
question, Iran was using the oil platforms for offensive military purposes against neutral shipping
interests. I demonstrated this yesterday. As such, the platforms cannot be considered solely, or in
the case of the non-functioning Rostam and Sassan platforms, even primarily, commercial
installations. Whatever their civilian or possible defence use, my point is that they were in fact put
to an offensive military use. It would be unwarranted to read Article X, paragraph 1, to provide a
guarantee that offensive military activities in which Iran engaged could be conducted without
interference. A guarantee of “freedom of commerce” between two States cannot have been
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intended to shield one of those State’s military activities against the other. That would turn
completely on its head the meaning and purpose of the provision.
16.18. Nor does the fact that Sirri was commercially operational or that other platforms were
allegedly under repair change this conclusion. Indeed, even if the Court considered that the
platforms were used for both commercial and military purposes at the time of the United States
actions, it should not read Article X, paragraph 1, so that any commercial activity or dormant
commercial purpose could shield offensive military activity. And, indeed, a shield they were, as is
evidenced by Iran’s own Naval Orders for Deployment of Observers to the Oil Platforms, which
we have submitted as Exhibit 115. As we saw yesterday, those military orders provide that the
military personnel on the platforms “will pass as NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) employees
and not use military uniforms”.
16.19. Moreover, despite its claims that these were commercial installations, as I
demonstrated yesterday, Iran itself regarded these platforms as military facilities. Iran’s own
documents submitted as evidence in this case and Iran’s own pleadings make this clear. Iran
regarded the platforms as part of its military infrastructure, with the objective of tracking the
movement of all foreign vessels in their vicinity, communicating about them with military
headquarters and other military units, and facilitating, supporting and conducting offensive military
operations. The evidence is overwhelming and there just can be no doubt about this.
16.20. In addition, Iran’s own pleadings leave no doubt that the platforms had both personnel
and equipment to operate as offensive military facilities (Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim of
Iran, Vol. IV: Statement of Mr. Hassani, para. 25, concerning all three platforms; Statement of
Mr. Sehat, paras. 20-21, concerning Rostam; Statement of Mr. Salmanian, para. 1, concerning
Rostam; Statement of Mr. Ebrahimi, paras. 5-6, concerning Sassan; and Statement of
Mr. Alagheband, paras. 12-13, concerning Sirri; CR 2003/6, p. 46, paras. 34-35).
16.21. As I have already noted, the United States submits that the “freedom of commerce”
cannot be used to shield such offensive military activities. Iran makes a similar point with respect
to pleasure craft and vessels conducting scientific investigations (Further Response to the
United States Counter-Claim of Iran, para. 6.13; Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim of Iran,
para. 6.9). Of course, such vessels can be used for commercial, pleasure, or scientific purposes, on
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the one hand, or military purposes, on the other ¾ what matters is how a vessel or facility is used,
not its normal function. Thus, if military personnel and equipment are stationed on a platform
merely to protect it, that would support the commercial purpose of the platform. But where
military personnel and equipment are deployed to conduct offensive military activities against
neutral shipping, it would be completely at odds with logic to think that their unlawful activities
can be immunized by Article X, paragraph 1.
16.22. The concept of considering the use to which a facility is put is not novel. Take, for
example, by way of analogy, the law of war. Under both conventional and customary international
law, civilian objects may not be made the object of attack. However, under customary international
law, a civilian object may be attacked if it is used to make an effective contribution to military
action (see Art. 52, para. 2, of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions). Likewise,
the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 provides that civilian objects may be targeted
when used for a military purpose (Art. 27 of the Annex, Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV); Art. 5 of the 1907 Hague
Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War). For similar reasons,
this Court should recognize that the platforms, even if it is determined that they are in part
commercial in character, lost any status they may have had under Article X, paragraph 1, when
they were used to attack United States and other neutral vessels in the Gulf.
16.23. In sum, the evidence presented precludes extending the coverage of Article X,
paragraph 1, to the oil platforms in question, since they were being used to launch and support
offensive military attacks on neutral shipping.
Conclusion
16.24. Mr. President, we are coming to the end of our presentation on Article X, paragraph 1.
I respectfully submit that the United States has demonstrated today, and in its pleadings, that the
Court should reach but one conclusion with respect to Iran’s remaining claim in this case: that
there is no basis for United States liability under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty. The
Court should conclude that the United States has not violated this provision for the reasons set out
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in our written pleadings and the reasons Professor Murphy and I have reviewed for you this
morning.
16.25. Mr. President, this concludes the United States presentation for today. I ask that you
give the floor to my colleague, Professor Weil, tomorrow morning. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bettauer. The Court now adjourns until tomorrow
morning, when it resumes at 10 o’clock.
The Court rose at 1 p.m.
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