Public sitting held on Tuesday 1 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

Document Number
087-19940301-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
1994/2
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

International Court Cour internationale

of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

Public si tting

held on Tuesday 1 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Bedjaoui presiding

in the case concerning Maritime Delimi tation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar and Bahrain

(Qatar v. Bahrain)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNEE 1994

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 1.' mars 1994, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président

en l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales

entre le Qatar et Bahreïn

(Qatar c. Bahrein)

COMPTE RENDU President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda

Ag0
Sir Robert Jennings
Judges Tarassov
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley

Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Jiuyong
Fleischhauer

Koroma

Judges ad hoc Valticos
Ruda

Registrar Valencia-Ospinats ; M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-Président

MM. Oda
Ag0
sir Robert Jennings
MM. Tarassov
Gui11aume

Shahabuddeen
Aguilar Mawdsley
Weeramantry
Ranjeva

Herczegh
Jiuyong
Fleischhauer
Koroma, juges

MM. Val ticos,
Ruda, juges ad hoc

M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier -4-

The Government of Qatar is be represented by:

H.E. Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, Minister Legal Adviser,

as Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Adel Sherbini, Legal Expert,

as Legal Adviser;

Mr. Sami Abushaikha, Legal Expert,

as Legal Adviser;

Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of InternationalLaw at the

University of Paris 1,

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles,

Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India,
Former President of the International BarAssociation,

Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Barrister at Law, Member of the

Institute of International Law,

Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., Professor emeritus of

International Law at the University of London,

as Counsel and Advocates ;

Mr. Richard Meese, Advocate, partner in FrereCholmeley, Paris,

Miss Nanette E. Pilkington, Advocate, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,

Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, Frere Cholmeley, Paris.

The Government of Bahrain is represented by:

H.E. Dr. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, Minister of State for Legai
Affairs, Barrister at Law, Member of the International Law

Commission of the United Nations,

as Agent and Counsel ;

Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor emeritus a
in the University of Cambridge,

Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and *

New York, -5-

Le Gouvernement du Qatar est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, ministre conseiller juridique,

comme agent et conseil;

M. Adel Sherbini, expert juridique,

comme conseil 1er juridique;

M. Sami Abushaikha, expert juridique,

comme conseiller juridique;

M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à
l'université de Paris 1,

M. Jean Salmon, professeur à l'Université libre de Bruxelles,

M. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate à la Cour suprême
de l'Inde, ancien président de l'International Bar Association,

Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister at Law, membre de
1 'Institut de droit international,

Sir Francis Vallat, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., Q.C., professeur émérite de

droit international à l'université de Londres,

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Richard Meese, avocat, associé du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris,

Mlle Nanette E. Pilkington, avocat, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à
Paris,

M. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, du cabinet Frere Cholmeley à Paris

Le Gouvernement de Bahreïn est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Husain Mohammed Al Baharna, ministre dtEtat chargé des
affaires juridiques, Barrister at Law, membre de la Commission du
droit international de l'Organisation des Nations Unies,

comme agent et conseil;

M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien

titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'université de Cambridge,

M. Keith Highet, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia et de
New York,Mr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professorof InternationalLaw at

the Law School, Catholic University, Montevideo, Uruguay,

Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professorof
InternationalLaw and Director of the Research Centre for

InternationalLaw, University of Cambridge; Member of the Institut
de droit international,

Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor emeritus atthe Université de droit,

d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,

as Counsel and Advoca tes ;

Mr. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,

Mr. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, Trowers & Hamlins, London,

Mr. ~avid Biggerstaff, Solicitor,Trowers & Hamlins, London,

as Counsel .M. Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga, professeur de droitinternational à
la faculté de droit de l'universitécatholique de Montevideo,

Uruguay,

M. Elihu Lauterpacht,C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honoraire dedroit

internationalet directeur du Research Centre for International Law
de l'universitéde Cambridge; membre del'Institut de droit
international.

M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'universitéde droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales deParis,

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Donald W. Jones, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,

M. John H. A. McHugo, Solicitor, du cabinet Trowers et Hamlins à

Londres,

M. David Biggerstaff, Solicitor, ducabinet Trowers et Hamlins à
Londres,

comme consei1 S. -8-

Mr. PRESIDENT: Please beseated. The Sitting is open. 1 give the

floor to Mr. Shankardass. Please continue.

Mr. SHANKARDASS: Thank you. Mr. President, Membersof the Court,

before the Court rose for the day yesterday 1 was dealing with the

proceedings of the Tripartite Cornmitteeformed under the third paragraph

of the 1987 Agreement setup to work out the procedure for implementing

the Partiest cornmitment to bring their disputesto this Court.

The Court will recollect 1 had shown that the First Meeting was .

addressed on the two different methodsof approaching the Court. Because

of Bahrain's insistence that a special agreementwould be a more

appropriate way to approachthe Court, the Second, Third and Fourth

meetings considereddrafts of possible special agreements but no

agreement could be reached on a list of disputes that could be included

into such a single document. A kind of dead-lock situation had been

reached so that no meetings of the Committee were held for several

months. One question raised at these meetings whichhad remained

unanswered was whether therewas a way in which each party could place

its own separate claims before the Court.

Mr. President, I will now continuemy submission from the period a

few months after the Fourth Meeting.

(vii) The Bahraini formula

Eventually, as a result of a Saudi Arabian initiative (yetagain),

and after discussions during an exchange of visits of the Heirs Apparent

of Bahrain and Qatar to each other's country, the Heir Apparent ofBahrain transmitted tothe Heir Apparent of Qatar a general formulafor

reference of the disputesto the Courtwhich, the Court will have seen,

was in the following terms:

IlTheParties request theCourt to decide any matter of

territorial rightor other title or interest which may be a
matter of difference between them; andto draw a single
maritime boundarybetween their respective maritime areas of
seabed, subsoil and superjacentwaters." (See,MQ,
AIUI.11.29.)

(viii)The Fifth TripartiteConmittee Meeting

Mr. President, this proposed general formula was discussed at the

Fifth Meeting of the Tripartite Committee on 5 November 1988. Qatar

welcomed the proposed formulaas a good step forward, but its initial

reaction was that its scope was too wide. Qatar continuedto hold the

view that the subjects of the dispute had already beendefined in the

course of the Saudi Arabian Mediation.

Nevertheless,Qatar decided to seek certain clarificationsin regard

to the newly proposed general formulainow called the Bahraini formula).

It was also felt by the Meeting that it would be desirable to have the

Parties' legal advisers consider various questions relatingto the

formula beforethe next meeting of the Tripartite Committee

The Fifth Meetlng therefore endedon a somewhat optimistic note.

However, as the Court willhave seen from the pleadings and documents on

record, Prince Saud stated to the Meeting that he had been directed to

submit a report on the progress madeby the Committee and that King Fahd

considered the Cornmittee's mission wouldterminate by the date ofthe

forthcomingGCC Summit Meeting in December 1988 and he said "whetheror - 10 -

not it succeeded to achieve what was required from it" (see, CMB,

para. 3.50 and Minutes of the Fifth Tripartite Committee Meeting,Qatar's

T.C.M. Documents, p. 208).

(ix) The Sixth Tripartite Codttee Meeting

1 now turn to the closing stagesof the work of the Tripartite

Committee in December 1988. The Sixth and final meeting of this

Committee on 6 December 1988 was preceded by a meeting of thelegal

experts of both sides who discussed the scope of the Bahraini formula

Professor Jean Salmon will address the Court in more detail on the

implicationsof this discussion in his later presentation. Forthe

purpose of my submission it is only necessary forme to point out that

Dr. Al-Baharna informed the meeting that the Bahraini formula was meant

to be a "compromiseformula" to enable each Party to submit whatever

claims it wished concerningthe disputed mattersto the Court. The

Chairman of the meeting, SheikhAbdul Rahman Mansuri of Saudi Arabia,

expressed his understandingof Bahrain's proposal, i.e., its formula, in

the following words:

"Bahrainproceeds £rom the view that there is no agreement
to define particular pointsfor presentation to the Court. It,

therefore, proposes that a particular formulasatisfying both
Parties be reached, which will give the Court the jurisdiction
to consider any claims by them whether they relateto
sovereignty, rights or interests. Thus, the Parties go to the

Court not with defineddisagreementsbut by giving the Court
jurisdictionand power, and the disagreementswill be defined
there. " (Ibid., p. 238.)

Dr. Al-Bahrana himself offered a most significantclarification when

he observed:

"We are faced witha delicate problem which hinderedthe

two Parties from reachingan accepted formulafor the Special
Agreement for a whole year. That is Qatar's objection to the reference to Zubara, and the attitude of Bahrain regarding
Hawar. It is the sensitivityof this matter which has,

undoubtedly,made us propose this general formula." (Ibid.,
p. 242.)

1 would submit, Mr. President, that when Dr. Al-Baharna has himself

explained that the Bahraini formula was specifically devisedto enable

Bahrain to raise the subject of Zubarah in any way that it wished, it is

impossible to understandhow Bahrain can now cornplainit is unable to do

so merely because the formula is not incorporatedin a special agreement

and because Qatar has approached the Courtwith its own Application under

Article 38 of the Rules of Court. Bahrain itself admits in its

Counter-Memorialthat it is possible even fora special agreement to

provide that one party could commence proceedings before theCourt and

the other would respond (see,CMB, para. 5.22)

It is particularly interesting,Mr. President, to note that in fact

in justifying the general formulaDr. Al-Baharna spoke of Article 40 of

the Statute and the requirernents of Article 38 of the Rules of Court

ii.e.,for an application)rather than Article 39 which, the Court is

aware, concerns notificationof a special agreement.

Dr. Al-Baharna explained:

"1 would liketo make clear that inconsulting theStatute
and Rules of the 1I.C.J.(Article 40, Article 38) 1 did not find

any provision requirlng the two parties to a dispute to submit
it to the Court according to thegeneral traditional rule
referred toby the Qatari note. Moreover, the Statute gives
the two parties the full rightand freedom in selecting the

formula theyconsent to. Al1 that is required is that the
formula should contain two basic foundations: the subjectof,
and parties to thedispute." (See,Minutes of the Legal
Experts Meetings, Sixth Tripartite CommitteeMeeting, Qatar's

T.C.M. Documents, p. 234.)

Dr. Hassan Karnelfor Qatar read out and also dealt with the requirements

of Article 38 of the Rules of Court, in particular theneed "to specify - 12 -

the precise natureof the clairn" in an application,as provided by

&ticle 38, paragraph 2 (ibid.,p. 239). It is of interest to note that

in this discussion that took place at a Legal Experts Meeting, Article 39

dealing with a special agreement was not referred to. What the parties

were now talking about was not a joint subrnission but simply giving the

Court jurisdictionand thereafter enabling each party to specifythe

precise nature of its claims and present them to the Court in accordance

with the requirernent of its Rules.

It was in this context thatQatar at that stage expressed some

doubts as to whether the Bahraini general formula was specific enough. I

For this reason, Qatar proposed an arnendedversion of the general formula

and also suggested that the formula could have two annexes attachedto

it; each State could define in its annex the subjects of dispute it

wanted to refer to the Court. Dr. Al-Baharna described this asa very

uconstructiveproposal" (ibid., p. 242) but stated he was not authorized

to accept it.

When this proposa1 was placed beforethe meeting of the Tripartite

Committee later on in the day, both Bahrain and Qatar declared that

neither would sign the other's annex. This demonstratesthat the Parties

simply could not reach an agreement on the specific subjects of dispute w

that the other would wish to refer to the Court. However, at the end of

the Meeting, Bahrain sought further timeto consider Qatar's amendrnents.

Bahrain contends in its pleadings (see,CMB, para. 6.29) that the

signed Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Tripartite Cornmitteerecorded

the Parties' "agreement"on the subjects of dispute to be referred to the

Court. Mr. President, a mere reading of theMinutes shows this clairnto

be wholly unfounded. These Minutes record theterms of the Bahraini - 13 -

formula, the amended version suggestedby Qatar, Qatar's proposa1 of

attaching twoAnnexes, and the Bahraini request for time to consider the

Qatari amendments. If there was any agreementat all, it was to the

effect that even under the Bahraini Formula (either with or without the

Qatari amendments), the subjects to be raised before the Court would be

"confined"to the list mentioned in the Minutes. Furthermore, while

"Zubarah"is included in this listat item (l), which Bahrain claimsis

an agreed list, item (3) records Qatar's disagreement that:

"if the content of the dispute regardingZubarah related to
sovereignty over the area, then it would not agree to its
inclusion in the subjects to be referred"

and Bahrain's position that it would make "the most unrestrictedmaximum

possible claimsn (see,Signed Minutes of the Sixth Tripartite Committee

Meeting, Qatar's T.C.M. Documents, pp. 282-283).

In any event, Bahrain's contention is not consistent withthe

statement in its Counter-Memorial (see,CMB, para. 7.7) that "as late as

the Sixth Tripartite meeting on 6 December 1988 the Parties had reached

no agreement". As 1 have just explained, the signed Minutes of

7 December 1988 and the fact that the Tripartite Committeeceased to

function from that date 1s further evidenceof the failure of the Parties

to reach any agreementeven at the Sixth Meeting of the Committee.

As 1 have said, Bahrain soughttlme to consider Qatar's amendments

to the Bahraini formula and its proposals of two annexes. However,

without any explanation orexcuse, Bahrain failedto react or respondto

these proposals either up to the time of the GCC Summit two weekslater,

when the Tripartite Committeeceased to function, or indeed at any time

thereafter. Thus, the exercise, initiated at Bahrain's proposa1 in

January 1988, to implement the 1987 Agreement by way of a Special - 14 -

Agreement, ended in failure; and in view of King Fahd's direction

terminating its deliberations, the Tripartite Committee ceased to

function - facts which Bahrain simplyfails to address. 1 would

emphasize, however, that in spite of these developments, thereis no

evidence that it was ever in the contemplationof the Parties thatthe

1987 Agreement to refer the dispute to the Court.wouldbe abandoned or

rendered invalid merely because no special agreementwas signed.

The proceedings of the Tripartite Cornmitteedid however have one

positive feature.

This was that bothQatar and Bahrain had accepted the factthat

whatever method was eventuallychosen for "communicatingwith" the Court

would, instead of a joint submission,have to enable each of the Parties

to put forward its own claims to the Court which (in the words of Dr. Al-

Baharna) "would be left to the Courtto decide upon" (ibid.,pp. 235-6).

In view of Dr. Al-Baharna's explanationsof the scope of the Bahraini

formula that 1 have just referred to, 1 respectfullysubmit,

Mr. President and Members of the Court, it had become immaterialwhether

the reference to the Court was by notificationof a special agreement or

by application. The Parties weresimply not going to be able to agree on

a list of specific subjects of dispute to be incorporated ina single

document making a joint submission. It was this situation that the Doha

Agreement eventually dealt with.

(XI 1988-1990: Purther Saudi efforts to eettle the dispute

After the conclusion of the Sixth Tripartite CommitteeMeeting and

the GCC Sumrnit,it will be seen from the pleadings of the Parties that

the matter was discussed again at the GCC SurnmitMeeting in Bahrain in

December 1988, which followed that meeting. A meeting which was not only - 15 -

final but a most undecisivemeeting. At this GCC Meeting, it was agreed

that Saudi Arabia be givena further periodof six months to see if it

could secure an agreement on the substanceof the disputes through its

rnediation. No agreement was achievedduring the whole of 1989 and the

unresolved situation was discussed again at the GCC Sumrnitin Muscat in

December 1989. Once again, it was agreed to try to achieve a resolution

on the substanceof the disputes through the Saudi mediation. These

efforts continueduntil the next Summit Meetingin Doha in December 1990.

There were, of course, during these two years, no meetings of the

Tripartite Committeeas it had ceased to function at the GCC Summit in

December 1988.

4. THE DOHA AGREEMENT

(il The 1990 Summit Meeting

Mr. President and Members of the Court, by the time of the next GCC

Summit Meeting in Doha in December 1990, Qatar had been seeking

resolutionof its disputes with Bahraln for over 40 years. This issue

had been raised at every GCC Surnrnit since 1987, but without any effective

resolution. The Tripartite Cornritteeconstitutedunder the third

paragraph of the 1987 Agreement nad ceased to function two years earlier.

The Doha Summit was held in the rnidstof the crisis following upon the

invasion and occupaticn of Kuwalt by Iraq - a situation which led

everyone presentto be conscious of the urgent need topeacefully resolve

al1 boundary disputes betweenthe member States.

Qatar had been deeply disappointedthat its disputes with Bahrain

had not been resolvedduring the preceding two yearsof Saudi mediation

and articulatedits frustrationat the opening sessionof the Summit - 16 -

Meeting in strong terms. In the course of the discussionsthat followed,

Bahrain soughta further extensionof Saudi mediation withouta

time-limit, to which Qatar was strongly opposed. During the discussions

several suggestionswere made and, eventually, an understanding emerged

that the decision to refer the disputes to the Court shouldnow be

implemented. To facilitate such submission, Qatarannounced it would

accept the Bahraini fonnula as a definition of the subject and scope of

the disputes to be adjudicatedby the Court. Qatar thus decided it would

deal with any claims Bahrainmight make under the Bahraini formula.

Bahrain wrongly statesin its Counter-Mernorial (see, CMB, para. 1.9) that

Qatar began by insisting that the Saudi efforts to achievea solution

should terminate in May 1991 after which the Parties shouldbe free to

take the matter to the Court. In fact, Bahrain's Foreign Minister

confirms in his Staternentfiled with the Counter-Memorial,that it was

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos of Oman who made this suggestion, i.e., that

before the submission was made to the Court, a further period up to the

end of Shawwal imid-May 1991) should be granted to Saudi Arabia to see if

a solution on the merits could be achieved; if no such solution was

reached during this period, the distinguished Foreign Minister states

"the matter might proceed to the I.C.J." (see,CMB, Vol. II, p. 160).

This suggestionwas accepted by the Parties and it was also agreed that

the Saudi mediationwould continue even after the submission to the Court

and that the case be withdrawn from the Court if a mutually-agreed

solution was achieved. It was this understandingwhich emergedat the

Summit meeting thatled to theagreement between Qatarand Bahrain which

was recorded in the Doha Agreement of 25 December 1990. The accuracy of - 17 -

Qatar's report of the observations ofKing Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the

Sultan of Oman to this effect, contained inQatar's Memorial, has not

been challengedby Bahrain.

As also explained in Qatar's Memorial, it was Oman which took on the

main work of helping to implement theunderstanding reachedat the

GCC SurnmitMeeting. It was Oman which producedthe draft of the

Doha Agreement. It was Oman which undertookthe negotiations with Qatar

and Bahrain which resulted inthe final text of the Doha Agreement that

was also signed by Saudi Arabia in the contextof its role under the

Framework and as a guarantor of the 1987 Agreement, under paragraph 4 of

that Agreement.

Mr. President, the Doha Agreement wasseen as a final resolutionof

the problem in the way of implementing the 1987 Agreement andof

resolving al1 the disputes between the partiesin terms of the Framework

"comprehensivelytogether". There was no question of any further

negotiations to reacha Special Agreement.

Dr. Al-Baharna,who had so strenuously advocatedthe proposa1 to

approach the Courtby a Special Agreement atthe first meetingof the

Tripartite Committeein January 1988 and had said "what is required is a

special agreement specifying the disputed points", had since lucidly

explained theadequacy of the Bahraini general formula interms of

Article 38 of the Rules of Court by showing thatit would enable each

party to raise its own separate claims before the Court. In

December 1990 he no longer foundit necessary to suggest thatthe

Doha Agreement, which evidencedthe acceptance by both Parties of the

Bahraini Formula, should specifythe need fora Special Agreementor for

the incorporationof the Bahraini Formula in such an agreement. The - 18 -

Bahraini Formula by its very terms was capableof standing on its own and

was understood andaccepted as such.

Both Qatar and Bahraindeclare in their pleadings that each was most

anxious to ensure inclusion of the reference to the Bahraini formula and

its acceptance by Qatar in the Doha Agreement. (see, CMB, para. 6.71 and

RQ, para. 3.62). 1 respectfully submit, Mr. President and Members of the

Court, that this was obviously to ensure that each could raise its own

claims before the Court. Each Party was seeking to secure and secured

the other's consent to the Bahraini formula, which, in turn, 1 submit

sustains the Court's jurisdictionto deal with Qatar's application.

(ii) Evente following the 1990 GCC Sudt Meeting

Let me now turn, Sir, briefly, to the events thatfollowed the

Doha Agreement. In accordancewith the provisions of the Doha Agreement,

Saudi Arabia duly enteredupon further effortsto bring about a

settlement of the matters in dispute betweenQatar and Bahrain. However,

because these efforts were unsuccessful,the Amir of Qatar wrote to

King Fahd on 6 May 1991 informing him that as the agreed period was

approaching its end, Qatar intendedto go to the Court after its expiry

(see,MQ, Ann. 11.34). The Foreign Ministerof Bahrain confirmsin his

Statement amexed to Bahrain's Counter-Memorial isee, CMB, Vol. II,

Ann. 1.25, p. 165) that King Fahd told the Amir of Bahrain at a meeting

on 3 June 1991 "that he had been approachedseveral times by the Amir of

Qatar regardingthe matter ..." but that he hadasked him "not to be in

such a rushv - a comment whichobviously related-tothe reference to this

Court and not to a settlement by Mediation which was to continue in any

event even after the reference to the Court. - 19 -

After a meeting with King Fahd on 5 June 1991, the Amir of Qatar

agreed in a letter to the King of 18 June to give Bahrain threemore

weeks to respondto Qatar's most recent proposals to settlethe dispute

after which Qatarsaid it would go to the Court (see,MQ, Ann. 11.35).

Having received no response, Qatar filedits Application on 8 July 1991.

Thus, Mr. President, King Fahd was informedseveral times (and twice

in writing) of Qatar's intention to go to the Court. At no time did the

King suggest thatQatar was not entitledto go to the Court or should not

do so.

Let me turn to another event that Bahrain refers to (see, CMB,

paras. 7.22 and 7.33 and RejB, para. 1.14) which it regards as

significant,and that is that in September 1991, i.e., after Qatar had

filed its Application in the Court, Saudi Arabia submitted to both

parties a suggested "compromise"Special Agreement. Bahrain claims that

Saudi Arabia therefore perceived therh ead been no agreement betweenthe

parties at Doha to abandon the search for a Special Agreement; and

furthermorethat Saudi Arabia's action is incompatible withQatar's

assertion that the work of the Tripartite Committeehad terminated in

failure in December 1988 (see,RejB, para. 4.24). 1 would respectfully

draw the Court's attention to the following aspects in consideringthe

validity of Bahrain's argument:

(a) Saudi Arabia did not attempt to convene a meeting of the Tripartite

Committee after December 1988 or even after September 1991 to

consider any further draftsof a possible Special Agreement. In

fact it was at the instance of King Fahd that the workof the

Committee was terminated in December 1988. Furthermore, neither

Qatar nor Bahrain made any attempt to summon a meeting of the - 20 -

Cornmitteeafter that date, nor after the Doha Agreement, either to

consider the September 1991 Draft or any other procedural stepsfor

referring the caseto the Court.

(b) The circumstancesin which the so-called September draft was sent

also bear mention. By letter of 23 August 1991 to the Registrar of

this Court, Bahrain announced its refusa1 to attend a meeting of the

Parties' Agents (calledunder Article 31 of the Rules of Court) with

the Presidenton 26 August 1991 claiming "it would be inappropriate

for it to participate in a meeting whichproceeds on the assumption

that Qatar has filed a valid Applicationw. After the Registrarof

the Court explained the legal position in his letter of

26 August 1991, Bahrain agreed to attend the proposed meeting with

the President which was eventually held on 2 October 1991. It was

just before this meeting that the so-called "September 1991 draft"

of a Special Agreement madeits appearanceand reached Qatar in a

very strange manner. by facsimile,and without the covering

Memorandum that Bahrain claims was sent to both Parties. Even the

copy of the Memorandum now filed by Bahrain is undated. Until now,

Qatar has not received the so-called Memorandum

(cl The recent attemptby Bahrain initiatedat the begiming of this year

and shortly before the openrng of these oral hearings, to secure the

leave of the Court under Article 56 of the Rules of Court forthe

production of further correspondence betweenthe mir of Bahrain and

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is a further sign of Bahrain's efforts to

involve Saudi Arabia inthe present proceedings before the Court.

This attempt is certainly not consistent with what Prince Saud of

Saudi Arabia declaredas early as at the Second Meeting of the - 21 -

Tripartite Comrnittee, which was that Saudi Arabia's role "was

limited to proposing certainideas with the expresspurpose of

avoiding any exploitationof Saudi mediation to strengtheneither

partyls position at the expense of the other party" (see,RejB,

p. 129).

In al1 these circumstances,Mr. President,Qatar cannot but raise a

number of questions with respect tothe so-called "September 1991 draft"

of a Special Agreement. 1s it conceivable that Saudi Arabia would have

itself entered upon an exercise to draft a Special Agreement (something

it had never attempted during the life of the defunct Tripartite

Committee)? 1s it possible that Saudi Arabia would take this initiative

after King Fahdhad been informed "severaltimes" by the Amir of Qatar of

Qatar's intention to take the disputes to this Court after the expiry of

the deadline - with no objection £rom King Fahd? Or that it would

transmit it to the Parties in such a casual manner? Was the whole thing

a ploy enqineered by Bahrain to distract the Courtby raising the "Aeyean

Sea case" type of argument? Frankly, Mr. President, Qatar is simply

mystified and left only with these questions.

Qatar suggeststhat this draftis not only strictly speaking

irrelevant to the issues before the Court but also that in the

circumstancesit is impossible to infer anything either aboutits

provenance or its alleqed significance.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 submit with great respect

that the circumstancesthat 1 have outlined clearlyestablish that there

was never any question onceBahrain and Qatar had been helped by the

Mediator to conclude the 1987 Agreement that theirdisputes would not be - 22 -

submitted to this Court for adjudication if they could not conclude a

Special Agreement. 1 believe, Sir, 1 have shown that both Parties

understood the 1987 Agreement as recording their commitmentto refer

their disputes to the Court and the work of theTripartite Committee to

be directed only to "conLider the procedures" by which their commitment

to make the reference couldbe implemented (see,RB, Ann. 1.1, p. 83).

The formation of the Tripartite Committee forthis purpose could in no

sense be regarded as transformingthat commitment to makethe reference

or turning it into a conditional one.

In conclusion,Mr. President, and Members of the Court, 1 believe

that the events describedby me show the following:

(il By accepting the Saudi Framework in 1983 with the amended.Fifth

Principle, Bahrain and Qatar agreed to have their long-standing

disputes decided accordingto internationallaw.

(ii) Under the 1987 Agreement the Parties made a firm and

acknowledged commitmentto refer the disputes to this Court.

iiii) In an effort to agree on the procedure for the reference to the

Court the Parties made an attempt to finalize a Special

Agreement throughthe Tripartite Committee;but the attempt

failed. This situation was finally resolved by the Doha

Agreement, whereby each Party consentedto the other moving the

Court in terms of the Bahraini formula aftera further short

period of SaudiMediation up to May 1991.

Mr. President andMernbersof the Court, it only remains forme to

say again what a very great honourand a privilege and a pleasure it has

been for me to address the Court as counsel for The State of Qatar, and - 23 -

to express my very deep gratitude for the attention and the patient

hearing you have given me.

May 1 suggest, Mr. President, that it would now be appropriate to

cal1 upon Sir Ian Sinclair to address the Court on the next part of the

submissions for the State of Qatar. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Shankardass. 1 give the floor to

Sir Ian Sinclair.

Sir Ian SINCLAIR:

THE STATUS OF THE DOHA MINUTES OF DECENBER 1990

Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is my task this morning to

address the Court on the status of the Doha Minutes of 25 December 1990,

and related issues. In referring to this written instrument as "the Doha

Minutes", 1 am not to be taken as detracting in any way £rom Qatar's

basic contention that these Minutes constitute a binding international

agreement. I will, of course, enlaroe on this point in a minute. Having

regard to the written pleadings of the Parties, it would seem that the

following are the more important questions that require analysis in

relation to the status and iegal effect of the Doha Minutes:

(1) First, whether the Doha Minutes constitute an international

agreement binding on Bahrain and Qatar.

(2) Secondly, whether, if so, they constitute a "treaty" or "convention"

within the meanlng of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

(3) Thirdly, whether the Foreign Mlnisters of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi

Arabia had capacity to enter into an international agreement of the - 24 -

kind constituted by the Doha Minutes without the need to produce

full powers.

(4) Fourthly, whether the agreement constituted by the Doha Minutes

entered into forceon signature.

(5) Fifthly, assuming that the Doha Minutes do constitute a binding

international agreement in force between Bahrain andQatar, whether,

in the circumstances, Bahrain is entitled to invoke the fact that

its consent to be bound by that agreement has been expressedin

violation of Bahrain8s constitutional requirements, thereby

invalidatingthat consent.

1 will deal with the first four questions; and ProfessorSalmon, who

will follow me, will address the fifth question.

1. Do the Doha Minutes constitute an international agreement
binding on Bahrain and Qatar?

The Court will needno reminding that there existsno generally

accepted definition in customary internationallaw of what is an

internationalagreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

incorporatesa definition of the term "treaty"as follows:

"an internationalagreement concluded betweenStates in written
form and governed by internationallaw, whether embodied ina
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and

whatever itsparticular designationu.

But this definition, as the Court will beaware, is expressly stated

to be "for the purposes of the present Conventionu,so it does not

purport to be all-embracing. For example, it deliberatelyomits

internationalagreements concluded between Statesand international

organizationsor internationalagreements concludedbetween two or more

internationalorganizations. Other definitionsof the term I'treaty" have been suggestedby

distinguished writers. Thus, Lord McNair used the term "treaty" to

denote :

"a written agreement by which twoor more States or

internationalorganisationscreate or intend to create a
relation between themselves operatingwithin the sphere of
international law" (McNair,Law of Treaties, 1961, p. 2).

Paul Reuter utilized a broader definition in his magisterial work on

the law of treaties:

"A treaty is an expression of concurring wills attributable
to two or more subjects of international law and intended to
have legal effects under the rules of internationallaw."
(Reuter,Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 1989, (English
translation of a revised version ofthe 2nd. ed. published in

French in 1985), p. 23.)

Finally, Mme Suzanne Bastid finds three elements which serveto

distinguisha "treaty" from other internationalinstruments. According

to Mme Bastid, a treaty is an agreement betweenStates, it is designed to

have legaleffects and it is governed by internationallaw (Bastid, Les

traités dansla vie internationale, 1985, pp. 19-22) .

The commentariesto the final set of draft articleson the law of

treaties prepared by the InternationalLaw Commission shed some light on

the definition of the term "treaty" for the purposes of the Vienna

Convention. For example, it 1s stated ln the commentary to the

definition of "treaty"which was incorporated withoutchange in the final

text of the Vienna Convention:

"The term 'treaty'is used throughout the draft articlesas
a generlc term coverlng al1 forms of internationalagreement in

writing concluded betweenStates. Although the term 'treaty1
in one sense connotes onlythe single forma1 instrument, there
also exist internationalagreements, such as exchanges of
notes, which are not a single forma1 instrument,and yet are

certainly agreementsto which the law of treaties applies.
Similarly, very many single instrumentsin daily use, such as
an 'agreed minute' or a 'memorandumof understanding',could not appropriately be calledformal instruments, but they are
undoubtedly international agreements subject to the law of
treaties" . (Reports of the InternationalLaw Commission, 1966,
p. 21.)

The Commission goes on in its comrnentary to explain why it preferred to

use the term "treaty" rather than "internationalagreement":

"First, the treaty in simplified form, far from
being at al1 exceptional, is very common, and its use
is steadily increasing. Secondly, the juridical
differences, in so far as they really exist at all,
between formal treaties and treaties in simplified

form lie almost exclusively in the method of
conclusion and entry into force." (Ibid.)

Thus, there can be little argument with the proposition that the

term "treatyU is normally used in a generic sense as encompassing al1

types of internationalagreement, whatever be the designation of the

particular instrument or instruments. In the recently published

ninth edition of Oppenheim, the learned editorsdraw attention to a

number of features in the Vienna Convention definition. 1 need not

reproduce them all, but the following perhapsmerit attention:

"(1) 'Treaty'is given a generic meaning, rather than a meaning
limited to one particular form of internationalagreement.

(2) Whether or not an instrumentconstitutesa treaty does not

depend on its designation ...

[Iomit (311

(4) The agreementmust be governed by internationallaw. So

agreements subject to some national system of law will not
constitute treaties, even though the parties are states, or
perhaps more usually in these circumstances, government
departments of different states ...

(5) In addition to the traditional formof treaties - i.e.,
treaties negotiatedand signed expressly on behalf of the
Head of State by virtue of full powers received from him -
treaties may be concluded betweengovernments or
departments of governments ..." (Oppenheim'sInternational

Law, Ninth Ed. (Jenningsand watts), Vol. 1, Parts 2-4
(1992),pp. 1199-1200.) - 27 -

The editors of the ninth editionof Oppenheim go on to point out

that the ViennaConvention definitionof the term "treatyvdoes not

assist very much with the answer to the question whethera particular

instrument is "an internationalagreement ... governed by international

lawu. They continue:

"It is suggested that the decisive factoris still whether
the instrument is intendedto create internationallegal rights
and obligations betweenparties - an element which the
international Law Commission regardea ds embraced within the
phrase 'governedby internationallawl. The existence of such
an intention will need to be determined in the lightof al1 the

circumstancesof each case. The registrationof an instrument
with the United Nations may imply that it was intended and
understood to be a treaty." (Op. cit., p. 1202.)

Now, these being the broadly acceptedcriteria which serve to

distinguish treaties (in the generic sense) £rom other international

instruments ortransactions,how should onecharacterisethe Doha Minutes

We know that Bahraindenies that theDoha Minutes constitute an

internationalagreement. The Bahraini contention is rather that they

were no more than a diplomatic documentand "non-bindingin character"

(CMB,para. 6.80). Now, let us look at this contention rather more

closely, in the llght of existing doctrineand practice. The fact that

the Doha Minutes are designated as "minutes"is, of course, far from

being evidencethat they do not constitute an internationalagreement.

Even Bahrain does not seek to deny that an international agreementcan

take the formof agreed minutesof meetings (MCB,para. 6.3). Qatar

equally does not dispute that agreed minutescan be so formulated asto

evidence the intention of the States concernednot to regard those agreed

minutes as constitutinga binding internationalagreement. Now, the

Court will be aware that, in the 1970s, the Institute of InternationalLaw took up a topic entitled (a rather lengthytitle) "International

Texts of Legal Import in the Mutual Relations ofTheir Authors and Texts

Devoid of Such Importu. 1 apologize for the title, it is not my

responsibility. The late and highly respectedMichel Virally acted as

Rapporteur on the topic, which led to the adoption of a resolution of the

Institute at its Cambridge sessionin 1983. The resolution was

essentially of a procedural nature, and in particular the Instituteas a

collective body took no position on the conclusions presentedby the

Rapporteur. But some of the conclusions suggested by MichelVirally are

of interest in the context of the present case and deserve to be

recalled. Thus, he proposes, as paragraph 1 of his conclusions,a

definition of internationaltexts of legal import in the following terms:

"International textsof legal importin the relations

between their authors include, irrespectiveof their form:

fa) texts by which their authors agree to define, to amend or
to revoke legal commitments;

(b) texts by which their authors agree to produce other legal
effects, whatever theirnature, such as the establishment
of a legal frameworkfor future action of the parties, the
creation of an organ or institutional mechanismlikely to

act at the legal level, the recognitionof a specific legal
situation or claim, and the recognitionof the legal
authority of principles or rules of internationallaw."

By way of contrast, the Rapporteur seeks to define international

texts devoid of legal import in paragraph 4 of his conclusions in the

following terms:

"Subject to what is stated in paragraphs 5 and 6, texts
containing commitments which States that accepted them intended
to be binding solely at the political level andwhich have al1

their effects at that level do not constitute textsof legal
import in the mutual relations between theirauthors. However,
a specific text, whatever its name, may contain at the same
time provisions of a legal character within the meaning of
paragraph 1 and purely political commitments withinthe meaning

of the preceding sub-paragraph." - 29 -

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Rapporteur's conclusionsare not

immediatelyrelevant in the contextof the present proceedings. But

paragraphs 7 and 8 are perhaps relevant.

Paragraph 7 provides that commitments set forth in the text of an

international treatywithin the meaning of the Vienna Convention are

legal comrnitments unless it follows unquestionably£rom that text that

the intention was to the contrary.

And paragraph 8 provides more significantly:

"The legal or purely political character of a commitment

set forth in an internationaltext of uncertain character
depends upon the intention of the parties as may be established
by the usual rules of interpretation,including an examination
of the terms used to express such intention, the circumstances
in which the text was adopted and the subsequentbehaviour of

the parties."

How do the Doha Minutes fit into these prescriptions? TheVirally

conclusions donot of course amount to a treaty text, and it would be a

rnistaketo interpret themas if they were. But, even with this

qualification,Qatar is firmly of the view that the Doha Minutes

constitute an international text of legal import within the intended

scope of paragraph 1 of the Virally conclusions. Their effect is to

confirm and supplement the legal commitmentsalready entered intoby

Qatar and Bahrain by virtue of the 1987 Agreement, and indeed toproduce

other legal effects such as the fixing of a time-limit after which the

dispute betweenthe Parties couldbe referred to the Court; and this

quite irrespectiveof whether the reference to the Court shouldbe by the

Parties jointly or by each of the Parties individually. Bahrainwould

appear to be contending that the Doha Minutes embody "purely political

cornrnitrnent s" that expressionis described inparagraph 4 of the

Virally conclusions. But this can hardly be reconciled with the fact - 30 -

that the Doha Minutes confirmand indeed build upon the legal commitments

already embodiedin the 1987 Agreement; and the Court will, of course,

recall that Bahrain does not, in relation to the 1987 Agreement, dispute

"the existence of an agreement in the terms of the Saudi Arabian

proposalstt (CMB, para. 5.9). An alternative argumentmight be

constructed to the effect that the Doha Minutes constitutewhat Virally

would refer to as an "internationaltext of uncertain character"as

described in paragraph 8 of his conclusions. Qatar would strongly

dispute this, but, even applying this test, would submit that the legal

character of the comrnitments entered into by Qatar and Bahrainby virtue

of the Doha Minutes is wholly confirmed by:

(a) an examination of the terms used to express the intention of the

parties;

(b) the background against whichthe text was negotiated;

(cl the circumstancesin which the text wasadopted; and

(dl the subsequent behaviour of the parties.

As regards the examination of the terms used to express the

intention of the parties, the reaffirmationof what had been agreed

previously between the parties certainly covered the legal comrnitment of

both Qatar and Bahrain, expressed in paragraph 1 of the 1987 Agreement,

that al1 the disputed matters shouldbe referred to the present Court for

a final ruling; the agreement that "the parties" would be at liberty to

submit the natter to the Court after 15 May 1991 is self-evidently a

cornmitment of a legal character, and this is irrespectiveof the dispute

between Qatar and Bahrain as to whether the phrase "the parties" is to be

interpretedconjunctivelyor disjunctively; and the recording of the - 31 -

acceptance by Qatar of the Bahraini formula is self-evidentlythe written

expression of a legal commitmentundertaken by Qatar.

As regards the background againstwhich the text was negotiated, it

is self-evidentthat the would-be interpreterof a treaty must bear in

mind that backgroundin seeking to determine the meaning of the terms

used in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the

treaty. The background willbe of particular significance in

ascertaining the object and purpose of the treaty. In stressingthe

importanceof the historical backgroundto the treaty, one noted

authority has commented:

"11 s'agit du cadre historiqueque forme l'ensemble des

événements qui ont porté les parties à conclure le traité pour
maintenir ou confirmer le statu quo ou apporter un changement
qu'une nouvelle conjoncture nécessite." (Yasseen,
"L'interprétationdes traitésd'après la Convention de Vienne

sur le droit des Traités", 151 Recueil des Cours (1976-1111,
p. 90.)

Now, any objective observer called uponto consider the historical

background to the signature of the Doha Minutes in 1990 will inevitably

focus on certain key events. These events include:

(1) the unfortunate failure of Saudi Arabia to secure a substantive

solution to the disputes between Bahrain andQatar, notwithstanding

repeated attempts made over 11 years of the mediation effort between

1976 and 1987;

(2) the initiative taken by Saudi Arabia in 1987 leading to the

conclusion of the 1987 Agreement;

(3) the setback to the process of referring the disputed matters to the

Court occasionedby the terminationof the work of the Tripartite

Comrnittee at the end of 1988 without havingdischarged the mandate

entrusted to it by virtue of paragraph 3 of the 1987 Agreement; and - 32 -

(4) the subsequent lack of any progress by Saudi Arabia in 1989 and 1990

to achieve, through its mediationefforts, any agreement on the

substance of the disputes between Qatarand Bahrain.

Our notional objective observerwould no doubt have anticipated in these

circumstancesthat a major effort wouldbe made at the GCC summit meeting

in Doha in December 1990, to breathe new life into the agreed proposa1

that the matters in dispute between Bahrain and Qatarshould be referred

to this Court; and our notional objective observer would not have been

mistaken.

This brings me to a considerationof the circumstancesin which the

text of the Doha Minutes was adopted. Here, 1 would like to begin by

drawing attentionto what Mr. SherlockHolmes might have referredto as

"the strange episodeof the appearance of Dr. Al-Baharna at Doha". In so

characterizingthis episode, 1 intend no disrespect to the distinguished

Agent for Bahrain. The point 1 wish to makeis, however, of some

significance. The Court will be aware that Bahrain has sought to develop

the argument that the Doha Minutes are not a binding agreement, are

indeed no more than a diplornatic document and were not regarded by the

parties as constituting an international agreement (CMB, paras. 6.75 to

6.89). The plausibility of these arguments is severely impaired when one

takes into account the following facts whichare not essentially, as far

as Qatar understandsit, in dispute. The final text of the Doha Minutes

derives from a text originally put to both parties on the evening of

24 December 1990, by the Foreign Minister of Oman, acting as

intermediary. It would appear that the text was put first to the Qatari

delegation, since there is clear evidence that the phrase "in accordance

with the Bahraini formula, which has been acceptedby QatarM was inserted - 33 -

into the original Omani drafton the initiative of Mr. Sherbini, Legal

Adviser to the Qatari delegation. The Omani draft, with this addition,

was then put to the Bahraini delegation,again on the evening of

24 December. The ForeignMinister of Oman reported to the Qatari

delegation later in the same evening thatBahrain would like to study the

draft, and that it had been sent by fax to Dr. Al-Baharna who would be

arriving in Doha early the followingmorning with his comments (RQ,

para. 3.65)

Now, the fact thatDr. Al-Baharna was suddenly summoned toDoha on

the night of 24/25 December 1990, to participate in the further

negotiation of the Omani text, is hardly consistent with the subsequent

Bahraini attempt to downplay the legal significanceof the Doha Minutes.

One does not suddenly summonone's most senior law officer to participate

in the drafting of a mere diplomatie document not intended to have any

legal effects. No doubt it was because the Bahraini delegation was well

aware that theproposed agreed mlnuces recording the outcomeof the

discussion at the GCC Summit on 23 December 1990 were intendedto

incorporate bindinglegal undertakings that it urgently summoned

Dr. Al-Baharna to Doha.

My second point under this head can be put more briefly. Bahrain

places great stress on the two modifications whichit succeeded in having

made to the original Omanidraft of the Doha Minutes, namely the

substitutionof the phrase "the parties" (al-tarafan)for "either of the

two parties" and the insertion intothe text of the phrase "and the

proceedings arising therefrom" (see CMB, para. 6.53 and RejB, paras. 5.20

to 5.22 and 5.31 to 5.36). Other of my colleagues,notably

Professor Quéneudec and the Qatari Agent, Dr. Najeeb Al-Nauimi, will be - 34 -

addressing the significance of these changes and the interpretationto be

given to these phrases within the contextof the Doha Agreement as

signed. The point 1 wish to make is that, throughout the proceedingsof

the Tripartite Committeein 1988, Bahrain had been insistent on the need

for a special agreementas an essential preliminary to reference of these

disputes to the Court. 1s it not therefore astonishing that Bahrain made

no attempt to secure the inclusion in the Doha Minutes of a reference to

the continued need fora special agreement, given that,on Bahrain's own

argument, as developed in the written pleadings, the Bahraini formula was

only capable of acceptance as part of a special agreement betweenthe

parties? Or is it rather thatBahrain was well aware that the other

participants in the GCC Summit favoured immediate reference of the

disputes between Qatarand Bahrain to the Court, and would not have taken

kindly to a further attempt by Bahrain to veto such a reference by

striving yet again to insist on the conclusion of a special agreement

between Bahrainand Qatar?

Now, Mr. President, my third point is closely related to my second

point. If, as Bahrain contends, the understandingbetween the parties at

Doha was that negotiations for the conclusion of a special agreement

between Bahrain and Qatar would have to be resumed after the expiry of

the extended five-monthperiod of Saudi mediation, why was this not

reflected in the Doha Minutes? The answer, Qatar would submit, must be

that it was in nobody's contemplationat the time - not even Bahrainus -

that the wearisome task of formulatinga special agreementwould have to

be resumed after May 1991, particularly inthe light of Qatar's

unqualified acceptance of the Bahraini formula in theDoha Agreement.

Bahrain might well have subsequentlyregretted havinggiven its basic - 35 -

consent to the jurisdictionof the Court in the 1987 Agreement.

Certainly, Bahraini conduct after 1987 must give rise to the suspicion

that Bahrain was anxious to wriggle out of its commitment to seek

judicial settlement of its disputes with Qatar.

My fourth point is more general. The Court will be aware that, in

the jurisdictionalphase of the Fisheries Jurisdiction case betweenthe

United Kingdom and Iceland, it emphasized repeatedly the significanceof

the history of the negotiations in interpretingthe compromissoryclause

in the UK/Icelandic Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961. Thus, the Court

states in its Judgment on jurisdictionof 2 February 1973:

"The history of the negotiationsnot only shows the
intentions of the parties but also explains the significanceof
the six monthst notice requiredto be given by the Government
of Iceland to the United Kingdom Government."
(I.C.JReports 1973, p. 13, para. 21.)

1 cite this brief passages from the Court's judgment in the

jurisdictional phasecf the Fisheries Jurisdictioncase simply in order

to stress the importance of the history of the negotiation of a

compromissory clausein the context of a challenge by a State to the

jurisdictionof the Court based on that compromissoryclause. Qatar, for

its part, entertalns r-Odoubt that the history of the negotiations at

Doha leading up to the adopt-on of the Doha Agreement in the form of

Agreed Minutes, particularly when read in the light of the events from

1987 onwards, can lead only to the conclusion thatthe Court has

jurisdictionto rule on the matters submittedto it in the Qatari

Application.

Finally, 1 turn to the subsequent behaviour of the Parties. This

confirms the Qatari analysisof the significanceof the Doha Minutes. - 36 -

The Court will recall that, subsequent to the conclusion of the ~oha

Agreement but before the expiry, on 15 May 1991, of the extended

time-limit for Saudi Mediation,the Amir of Qatar wrote two letters to

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The substanceof these letters is reproduced

in the Qatari Memorial (para. 3.62). The second of these two letters,

dated 6 May 1991, urged King Fahd to renew his good offices as soon as

possible in view of the imminent expiryof the extended time-limit agreed

at Doha, and informed him that Qatar intendedto subrnitthe dispute with

Bahrain to the Court thereafter. In a further letter to King Fahd of

18 June 1991, the Amir of Qatar agreed to a further extensionof three

weeks from 5 June 1991, of the extended time-limit for Saudi Mediation.

The Amir repeatedhis warning that thereafter Qatar would takethe

necessary measures to submit its disputewith Bahrain to the Court in

accordance with the Doha Agreement of 25 December 1990. Thus, Qatar had

certainly made clear to Saudi Arabia, in the early months of 1991 and

well before the Qatari Application to the Court was filed on 8 July 1991,

its intention to refer its dispute with Bahrain to the Court on the

expiry of the fixed five-monthperiod for mediation for whichprovision

had been made in the Doha Agreement; and indeedQatar had given a

further demonstrationof its extraordinarypatience by agreeing to an

additional three-week period £rom 5 June 1991, for the Saudi Mediation

effort. we know from parayraph 15 of the affidavit of the Bahraini

Foreign Minister dated 21 May 1992 (CMB, Vol. II, Ann. 1.25) that, at

least on 3 June 1991, the Amir of Bahrain had been informedby King Fahd

that he had been approachedby the Amir of Qatar several times about the

matter since the Doha summit; in the circumstances,Qatar, while in no

way impugning inany sense the veracity of the affidavit, finds it - 37 -

difficult to believe that Saudi Arabia did not even give a hint to

Bahraini officials that they must expect Qatar to make a unilateral

application to the Court on the expiry of the extended time-limit if no

substantive solution had been found. Indeed, this would have been a

powerful weapon in the hands of the mediator to urge a degree of

moderation on Bahrain. What can be stated with absolute certainty,

however, is that Saudi Arabia did not seek to dissuade Qatar £rom giving

effect to its stated intention after 26 June 1991.

To sum up, there ean be little doubt in these circumstances that the

Doha Minutes incorporated legal commitments confirming and supplementing

the agreement of both parties to refer their disputes to the Court. By

December 1990, when the GCC summit met in Doha, two years had elapsed

since the work of the Tripartite Cornmitteehad been brought to an end and

three years had elapsed since the conclusion of the 1987 Agreement.

Having regard to the history of the previous negotiations in 1988 within

the framework of the Tripartite Comr,ittee,Qatar could not reasonably

have been expected, after it had demonstrated its good faith by its

unquallfied acceptance of the Bahraini formula, to contemplate a

resurnptionof negotiatlons with Bahrain for the purpose of concluding a

special agreement; and Bahrain could not reasonably have assumed that

Qatar would be prepared to contemplate such a resumption of negotiations.

For Bahrain to affect surprise at the Application filed by Qatar on

8 July 1991, is no doubt good theatre, but lacks any sense of conviction.

In surn,and for the totality of the reasons given, Qatar submits

that the Doha Mlnutes constitute an international agreement binding on

both Qatar and Bahraln. 2. Can the Doha Minutes be said to constitute a mtreatym or mconventionm
within the meaning of Article 36(1) of the Statute?

Bahrain has of course contended that neitherparty saw the 1987

Agreement as a treaty or convention for the purpose of Article 36,

paragraph 1, of the Statute - in Bahraints words - "but rather as a

cornmitmentto negotiate in good faith a special agreement"; and that

"[the] acceptance of the jurisdictionof the Court wouldarise in due

course from such Special Agreementtt (CMB, p. 99). Bahrain is, of course,

perfectly entitled to set out its own position, but is not entitled to

distort Qatarts position. Qatar submits tothe contrary that, by virtue

of the 1987 Agreement, both Stateshad consented to submit their disputes lllr

to the Court for decision, although they had not explicitly agreed upon

the way in which the Court was to be approached.

Bahrain equally denies that the Doha Minutes constitute a binding

internationalagreement. 1 have already dealt with this contention.

But, assuming that the Court accepts the Qatari contention that the Doha

Minutes do constitute a binding internationalagreement, can they be

regarded, when read with the 1987 Agreement, as constitutinga "treaty'

or "convention"within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the

Statute? Qatar submits that theanswer is certainly "Yesw. 1 have
I

already demonstratedthat the term"treaty" is normally used in a generic

sense. It is clearly so used in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The referenceto "treatiesand conventions in force" in that provision is

not confined to internationalagreements designated as lttreatiesu or

"conventions"; it certainly comprehendsany international agreement

between States which is governed by internationallaw, whatever be the

designation of that agreement. A "treatynor "convention"within themeaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute in fact covers a wider

category of treaty instrumentsthan 1 have just described. The

jurisprudence of the Court reveals,for example, that a mandate

instrument (that is to Say, an agreement between theLeague of Nations

and a Mandatory Power) isregarded as a "treatyuor "conventionNwithin

the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Thus, in the

South West Africa case (jurisdictional phase) the Courtunhesitatingly

held that: "TheMandate, in fact and in law, is an international

agreement having thecharacter of a treaty or convention." (1.C.J

Reports 1962, p. 330.) This expressionof view was advancedprecisely in

the contextof an argument that the Mandatefor South West Africa was not

a treaty or conventionwithin the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute.

It was a view reaffirmedby the Court in its advisory opinionon the

Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa

in Namibia (1.C.J Reports 1971, p. 46)

The Court will also recall that, in the jurisdictional phaseof the

Aeyean Sea ContinentalShelf case, it observed:

"that it knows of no rule of internationallaw which might
preclude a jolnc cornrnunlquférom constitutingan international

agreement to submit a dispute to arbitrationor judicial
settlernent ... Accordlngly,whether theBrussels Communiqué of
31 May 1975 does or does not constitutesuch an agreement
essentially depends on the nature of the actor transaction to

which the Communiqué gives expressiona ;nd it does not settle
the question simply torefer to the form - a communiqué - in
which that act ortransactionis embodied."
(1.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 39, para. 96) .

Professor Quéneudecwlll deal more fully with the significance,in the

context of the present case, of the Court's Judgment in the

jurisdictional phase of the Aegean Sea case. 3.Did the Foreign Ministers of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have
capacity to enter into an international agreementof the kind conetituted
by the Doha Minutee without the need to produce full powere?

1 need hardly remindthe Court of the tenns of Article 7,

(a) of the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties which
paragraph 2

provides that:

"In virtue of their functionsand without havingto produce
full powers, the following are considered as representingtheir
State;

(al Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, forthe purpose of performing al1 acts
relating to the conclusion of a treaty."

Bahrain does not appear to contest that, by virtue of the rule which1 -

have just cited, the Bahraini Foreign Ministerwas ipso jure competent to

express the consent ofBahrain to be bound by theDoha Agreement,

assuming thatthe Doha Minutes constitute,as Qatar submits, a binding

internationalagreement. Yet Bahrain advances an argument whichseeks to

deprive this impliedadmission of al1 substance. Bahrain arguesthat

there is nothing in Article 7, paragraph 2 (al, that accords to a Foreign

Minister full powers to give immediate effectto his signature to a

treaty if he does not intend to do so or is prohibited by his

constitution from doing so. With al1 respect, Mr. President, this is

pure casuistry. What Article 7, paragraph 2 (a),does is precisely to

entitle the named categoriesof perçons to represent theirState for the

purpose of performing al1 acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.

This would includethe act of affixing his signature to an international

agreement either expressly or impliedly designet do enter into force on

signature. Bahrainhas completely misunderstoodthe object and purpose

of Article 7, paragraph 2 (a), of the Vienna Convention if it believes

that the capacity of a Foreign Minister to bind theState which herepresents to a treaty which by its terms or by necessary implication

enters into forceon signature should have been speltout in that

particular provision. Whether the internationalagreement constitutedby

the Doha Minutes did enter into forceby virtue of signatureis a quite

different issue which1 hope to address in a few moments. 1 would simply

add that the InternationalLaw Commission specifically disavowed the

argument impliedlyput forwardby Bahrain that a Foreign Minister is not

entitled to give immediate effectto his signature of a treaty if he is

prohibited by his constitutionfrom doing so. In its commentaryto what

is now Article 46 of the Vienna Convention, the Commission rejectedthe

view that interna1 laws limiting the power ofState organs to enter into

treaties may render voidable any consent given on the international plane

in violation ofa constitutional limitation. In doing so, the Commission

commented:

"If this view were to be accepted, it would follow

that other States would not be entitled to rely onthe
authority to commit the State ostensiblypossessed bya
Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, etc.
under Article [ï]; they would haveto satisfy themselves

in each case that the provisions ofthe State
constitutionare not infringedor take the riskof
subsequentlyfinding the treaty void." (ILCReports
(1966),pp. 69-70, para. 2.)

Qatar does not believe it necessary at this stage toanalyse in

the abstract whether there exists a category of international

agreements "in simplified form". Certainly, the fact that the

expression "treaty in simplified form" does not appear in the Vienna

Convention isnot determinative,just as the absence of any reference

in the Vienna Convention tothe conceptof a "restrictedmultilateral

treaty" does not mean that no such concept exists. What Qatar would

wish to emphasizeis t,hatState practice over thelast 50 years or so - 42 -

undoubtedly confirms the growing trend towardsthe elimination of

formalities in the conclusion of treaties.

In the early years of the twentieth century, it came gradually

to be accepted that, as a general rule, ratification was necessaryto

render a treaty binding. The Court will be aware of the view

expressed by the PermanentCourt in the Territorial Jurisdiction of

the InternationalCommission of the River Oder case.

But this traditionalview is now out-moded. A detailed study of

state practice by Blix in the early 1950s led him to the conclusion

that :

"whenever States intend to bring treaties into force by
some procedure other than signature, that intention is
evidenced by express provisionsor by cogent implication"

and that :

"in the present practiceof States the treaties in which
there is no clear evidence, express or implied, of the
parties' intentions asto the modeof entry into force

almost withoutexception enter into force bysignature"
(Blix, "The requirementof ratification",30 BYBIL
(19531,p. 380).

Blix had studied 1,760 treaties published inthe League of Nations

Treaty Series between 1932and 1940 and 1,300 treaties published in

the U.N. Treaty Series between 1946 and 1951 and had pointed out that

53% of the treaties publishedby the League had been ratified,

whereas inonly 23% of the treaties publishedby the United Nations

had the same procedure been followed (loc. cit., pp. 359-60). Even

more startling figures havebeen provided more recently by

Maria Frankowska who points outthat only nine of the 1,579 treaties

published in the U.N. Treaty Series between 1963 and 1965 requiredratification (Frankowska,"De la prétendueprésomption en faveur de

la ratification", 73 RGDIP (19691, p. 78). These figures strikingly

confirm the following view expressed by theInternationalLaw

Commission in 1966:

"Meanwhile,however, the expansion of intercourse
between States, especially in economic and technical
fields, led to an ever-increasing useof less forma1
types of internationalagreements,amongst which were

exchanges of notes, and these agreements are usually
intended by the parties to become binding bysignature
alone. On the other hand, an exchange of notes or other
informa1 agreement, though employedfor its ease and

convenience,has sometimes expressly been made subject to
ratification because of constitutionalrequirements in
one or other of the contractingStates." (ILCReports
(1966),p. 30, para. 3.)

The PRESIDENT: This will, 1 understand,be a convenient moment

for the customary coffeebreak; the Court will adjourn for fifteen

minutes

The Court adjourned from 11.20 a.m. to 11.40 a-m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Sir Ian Sinclair

Sir Ian SINCLAIR: Mr. President,Members of the Court, my

fourth headlng is:

4. Did the Agreement constituted by the Doha Minutes
enter into Force on Signature?

1 have alreadybegun to trespass into this area by having cited,

just before the coffee break, the authority of Blix and indeed of the

International Law Commission in their commentary on the final set of

draft articles on the law of treaties. But still something more - 44 -

needs to be said. Let us look initially at the arguments on this

point developed by Bahrain in its written pleadings.

There is, first of all, Bahrain's denial "that the 1990 in ut es,

even if amounting to an agreement, constitutedan agreement that did

not require ratificationn (CMB, p. 93). In a rather condescending

manner, Bahrain then proceeds to assert that "it is not necessary for

this purpose to pursue the question of whether or not the agreement

was in a simplified formu. The constraintsof time have persuaded

Qatar not to take issue specificallywith this assertion, while

reminding the Court that oneof the generally recognized features of

a treaty in simplified form is that it enters into forceon

signature, unless the parties specificallyprovide for ratification

or some other form of subsequent confirmationor approval. Thus, one

comrnentator maintains that "the only juridicalcriterion for

distinguishing between 'treaties'and 'agreementsin simplified form'

is the existence or absence of the requirementof ratification"

(Bolinteanu,"Expressionof consent to be bound by a treaty in the

light of the 1969 Vienna Convention", 68 AJIL, 1974, p. 677).

Now, we know that the rule expressed in Article 24 of the Viema

Convention is that a treaty enters into force in such manner and upon

such date as it may provide or as the negotiating States may agree;

and that, failing any such provisions or agreement, a treaty enters

into force assoon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been

established for al1 the negotiating States. As both the 1987

Agreement and the Doha Minutes are silent as regards entry into

force, we are driven back to Articles 12 and 14 of the Vienna

Convention which set out thecircumstancesin which the consent ofa - 45 -

State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by signature or by

ratification respectively. Article 12, paragraph 1, lists three

cases in which the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be

expressed by the signature of its representative and Article 14,

paragraph 1, lists four cases in which the consentof a State to be

bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification.

then analyse the question of the entry into force of
Now let us

the 1987 Agreement and of theDoha Minutes in the light of the rules

expressed in Articles 12, paragraph 1 and 14, paragraph 1, of the

Vienna Convention. It is convenient to take the 1987 Agreement

first. That Agreement containedno provision with regard to entry

into force or consent to be bound; nor did the Amirs of Bahrain or

Qatar sign their lettersof acceptance of King Fahd's proposais

subject to ratification. Can it be said that, in the case of the

1987 Agreement, it has been, in terms of oneof the three cases

listed in Article 12, paragraph 1, otherwise establishedthat the

negotiating States were agreed thatsignature should havethe effect

of expressing consentto be bound, so that the 1987 Agreement entered

into forceby virtue of signature and without the requirementof

ratification.Qatar confidently submitsthat it has been so

established. Let us look closely at the terms of the 1987 Agreement

and at the action taken in implementationof that Agreement.

Paragraph 2 of the 1987 Agreement contains three undertakings by the

parties to respect the status quo. The first two of these

undertakings are expressed to be operative "frornto-date". This is

consistent only witha common understandingthat the proposals are to

be operative immediately,that is to Say, from 26 December 1987 - the - 46 -

date of signature of the last of the letters of acceptance from the

Amirs of Bahrain and Qatar. This is confirmed by the action taken in

implementationof the 1987 Agreement. A preliminary meeting was

already held in late December 1987, at Riyadh on the margins of the

GCC Sumrnitmeeting (MQ,p. 45, para. 3.34). The first formal meeting

of the Tripartite Committeetook place inRiyadh on 17 January 1988

bd. These undisputed facts demonstratebeyond a shadow of doubt

that both Bahrain and Qatar were agreed that the 1987 Agreement

should enter into force by virtue of signature, and should not be

subject to ratification.

Against thisbackground, one can begin to assess whetherthe

Doha Minutes of 1990 are to be regarded as an agreement entering into

force on signature or as an agreement entering into force on the

exchange of instrumentsof ratification. The text of the Doha

Minutes makesno provision for ratification;nor was the idea of

ratification ever raised in Doha by the Bahraini Foreign Minister,

who signed the Doha Minutes along withhis counterparts fromQatar

and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most significantlyof all, the Doha

Minutes were aimed at implementinga previous agreement, the 1987

Agreement, which itself had entered into forceby virtue of

signature. The notion that the Doha Minutes may have been signed

subject to ratification is not only totally incomprehensible in the

light of its relationship to the 1987 Agreement; it is also

contradictedby the internal evidenceof the time-limit of May 1991,

after which the parties would be free to submit their disputes to the

Court. It is the relationship betweenthe Doha Minutes and the

1987 Agreement, combined with the internal evidence of the time-limit - 47 -

of May 1991, which entitles Qatar confidentlyto submit that, in

terms of the rule expressed in Article 12, paragraph 1 (b), of the

Vienna Convention, it has been otherwiseestablished thatboth Qatar

and Bahrain were agreed that signatureof the Doha Minutes by their

respective ForeignMinisters expressed theconsent of the two States

to be bound by the agreement constitutedby those Minutes.

One final point, Mr President. Qatar hasto anticipate a

possible Bahraini argument that bilateralagreements to submit a

dispute to arbitrationor to judicial settlementare, by their very

nature, agreementswhich are subject to ratification. Qatar has

carried out alimited study of recent agreements of thistype; and

the only conclusionwhich can be reached is that practice is variable

and does not support any such rule. Qatar has identified four

agreements of this typeconcluded in recent years which were made

subject to ratification, but it has equally identified seven

arbitrational similar agreements concluded since 1975 which were

expressed tocorneinto force onsignature, including the Accord-Cadre

of 31 August 1989 between Chad and Libya, which provided thebasis

for the exercise of jurisdictionby the Court in the recent

Libya/Chad Territorial D~spute case (Art. 8).

Qatar does not claim that lt has carried out an exhaustive

survey of al1 recent agreementsof this type; but the resultsof the

study which it has undertaken onlygo to confirm thatState practice

in this matter is variable and that, in particular, it does not

support any claim thatbllateral agreements providing for reference

of disputes to arbitrationor judlcial settlement or other form of - 48 -

third-partydetermination are always concluded subject to

ratification.

Before 1 conclude, Mr. President, 1 should perhaps make

reference to a new argument advancedby Bahrain in paragraph 5.25 of

its Rejoinder. This argument is derived from the recent Judgmentof

the Chamber of the Court in the El Salvador/Hondurasdispute, where

the Chamber determined that it had no jurisdiction to delimit the

waters of the Gulf of Fonseca. Bahrain suggests that this conclusion

was based upon direct evidencein the form of a statement by the

Foreign Minister of El Salvador that he never had the intention of

conferring upon the Chamber a power to carry out a delimitation in

the area in controversy. Qatar does not read the Judgment of the

Chamber in this sense. What the Chamber was saying was that Honduras

had not established that the Special Agreement shouldbe so

interpreted as to require that the phrase "determinethe legal

situation of the maritime spaces" must encompass delimitation. In

the words of the Chamber's Judgment:

"In essence, [Honduras]is arguing thata special
meaning - one comprising the concept of delimitation - was
lntended by the Parties to attach to the phrase 'determine
the legal situation of the ... maritime spaces'. The onus
is therefore on Hondurasto establish that such was the

case." (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 585, para. 377.)

The Chamber found that Honduras had not discharged thatburden.

This is perfectly understandable in the contextof the El

~alvador/Honduras case. The Chamber did not in fact, in denying its

jurisdictionon this aspect of the case, seek to rely on an ex post

facto statement by the Foreign Ministerof El Salvador that he never - 49 -

had the intentionof conferringa power of delimitationof the Gulf

of Fonseca upon the Chamber.

5. Conclusione

Mr. President,Members of the Court, this analysisof the status

and legal effect of the Doha Minutes has inevitablybeen somewhat

arid and, it might seem, theoretical. Nonetheless, Qatarwould urge

the Court to look at the totalityof Bahraini and Qatari conduct in

relation to the 1987Agreement and throughoutthe three-yearperiod

immediately preceding signature of the Doha Minutes in order to

assess what was the implied intent of the parties in signing theDoha

Minutes. Qatar is confident that the Court will draw the following

conclusions:

(1) that the Doha Minutes were intended to constitute, and did

constitute,an international agreement binding upon botB hahrain

and Qatar;

(2) that the 1987 Agreement, as conf~rmedand supplementedby the

Doha Minutes, conçtitutesa "treaty"or "convention"within the

meaning of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute so as to

afford the necessary basis for the exercise of jurisdictionby

the Court rn relation to the matters identified inthe

Application filed by Qatar with the Court on 8 July 1991;

(3) that the ForeignMinisters of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia

had capaclty to enter intoan international agreement ofthe .

kind constituted. by the Doha Minutes without theneed to produce

full powers; and - 50 -

(4) that the agreement between Bahrainand Qatar, constitutedby the

Doha Minutes of 25 December 1990, entered into forceby virtue

of signature.

Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 thank you for your patience

and courtesy. 1 suggest that it would now be appropriate forProfessor

Salmon to be invited to address the Court on the issue of the alleged

violation of Bahrain's constitutional requirementsas invalidating

Bahrain's consent to be bound by theDoha Agreement.

Mr. PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Sir Ian. J'appelle à la barre le

professeur Jean Salmon.

M. SALMON : Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour,

c'est toujours avecémotion et humilité qu'un professeur de droit

international se présente à cette barre. J'en mesure le privilège.

C'est aujourd'hui à la confiance de 1'Etat du Qatar que je dois cet

honneur et je lui en suis profondément reconnaissant.

Sir Ian Sinclair vient d'exposer à la Cour que le textede l'accord

de Doha est un accord international,entré en vigueur à la signature, qui

crée donc desobligations juridiques pour lesParties. Pressentantle

caractère inéluctablede ces conclusions, Bahreinprésente une

argumentationsubsidiaire. 11 n'y aurait pas eu de consentement

valablement donnépar le ministre des affaires étrangères deBahrein, car

le consentement aurait été donné, aurait été expriméen violation des

prescriptions constitutio~elles de cet Etat.

Avant d'examiner la validité de l'argument,encore faut-il en saisir

la portée. Bahrein a été fluctuantsur la nature de l'exceptionet les

conséquences juridiques qu'il attache à la prétendue violation. - 51 -

A l'origine, dans sa notedu 18 août 1991, il a soutenu que le fait

que ce consentementaurait été donné enviolation de la constitutionde

Bahrein faisait tomber la situation sous le coup de l'article 46 de la

conventionde Vienne sur le droit des traités. La Cour se souviendra que

cette disposition se trouve dans le chapitrerelatif aux nullités.

Bahrein invoquaitdonc un motif de nullité.

Dans le contre-mémoire du 11 juin 1992, Bahreïn avance qu'il

soutient simplement qu'il n'y aurait pas de traité valide car il y aurait

défaut de consentement (contre-mémoirede Bahrein, par. 6.97) et

subsidiairement seulement que s'il y avait un traité il pourrait invoquer

l'article 46 de la conventionde Vienne (id., par. 6.98). Si l'on

interprète convenablementla pensée des auteurs de ce texte, il ne

s'agiraitplus à proprement parler d'unenullité mais bien d'une

inexistence,pour défaut de consentemenr.

Sans vouloir entrer dansla controversethéorique, il y a sans

doute, à première vue,quelque logique à soutenir qu'il n'y a pas d'acte

luridique à défaut de consentement. Il n'y a en effet pas d'acte à

annuler là où il n'y a pas d'acte du tout. Pourtant,la théorie de

l'inexistencetrouve difficilemen:son chemin en droitinternational. La

doctrine sur cepornt est d'une insigne pauvretéet c'est tout dire.

Le régime des nullités en droit international étant déjà par

lui-même assez fruste, la théorie de l'inexistence,fortement critiquée

en droit interne, n'a pas eu de succès en droit international faute d'une

structurationsuffisante de l'ordre internationalet à vrai dire d'une

utilité concrète quelconque. Le regretté PaulReuter, dans son cours à

l'Académiede 1961, se bornait à consacrer à cette notion une note en bas - 52 -

de page la qualifiant de"si controverséeet polymorphe" (RCADI, t. 103,

Paul Guggenheim, un professeur sérieux qui consacra quelques pages à

la question tant dans son cours de 1949 à l'Académie de droit

internationalque dans les deux éditions successivesde son magistral

traité, définissait l'acte "inexistantnde la manière suivante:

"Il y a acte inexistant lorsque des individus ou des
entités juridiques élèvent laprétention d'avoir créé un acte

juridique, bien que les élémentsd'un tel acte fassent à tel
point défaut que, de toute évidence, il ne saurait en être
question. Un examen sommaire suffit pourdénier validité à
l'acte. " (2e édition, t. 1, 1967.)

Les exemples domés ensuite par PaulGuggenheim sont dès lors des

évidences : actes auxquels procèdent des individus au nom d'une entité

n'ayant pas la qualité de sujet de droit internationalou bien actes

auxquels procèdent des individusqui n'ont aucune qualitépour

représenter un sujet de droit international.

Pour que l'inexistences'impose donc et que le problème de

l'annulabilitésoit écarté, il faut que l'absenced'acte soit l'évidence

pour tous. Dès qu'il y a contestation sur l'existence,dès qu'il y a

apparence d'un acte, c'est le problème de sa validité qui se pose. C'est

bien le cas ici où l'accord de Doha répond à la définition du traité

donnée par l'article 2, paragraphe 1 a), de la convention de 1969 ainsi

que vient de vous le démontrer sir Ian Sinclair.

Il est très symptomatiqueque pendant les longs travaux de la

Commission du droit international,puis de la conférence de Vienne sur le

droit des traités, et d'aucuns ici se souviendrontde tout cela, il ne

fut jamais question d'inexistencemais simplement de nullités. Le fait

que le consentement de llEtat à être lié par un traité a été exprimé en - 53 -

violation d'une disposition constitutionnelle est envisagé par la

conventionde 1969 dans le cadre du régime des nullités.

Nous examinerons doncsi l'article 46 de cette conventionpeut

trouver à s'appliquer en l'espèce.La Cour me pardonnera de citer un

texte qui lui est certes familier:

"Disposition du droi t interne concernant la compétencepour
conclure les traités"

"1. Le fait que le consentementd'un Etat à être lié par un
traité a été expriméen violation d'unedisposition de son

droit interne concernant la compétencepour conclure des
traités ne peut être invoquépar cet Etat comme viciantson
consentement, à moins que la violation n'ait été manifeste et
ne concerne une règle de son droit interne d'importance
fondamentale.

2. Une violation est manifeste si elle est objectivement
évidente pour tout Etat se comportanten la matière
conformément à la pratique habituelleet de bonne foi."

Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, l'histoirede ce texte

vous est bien connue. Deux courants s'opposaienten doctrine: les

constitutionnalistes,donnant le primat au respect des textes

constitutionnelset les internationalistes estimant que la validité d'un

traité concluselon les formes reconnues du droit internationalpar des

représentantsautorisés ne pouvait être remiseen cause. Les deux

premiers rapporteurs dela Commission du droit international(le

ProfesseurBrierly et Sir Hersch Lauterpacht) penchaient pourla première

thèse (la thèse constitutionnaliste). Sir GeraldFitzmaurice,dans son

troisième rapport (1958) prit au contraire fermement parti pour la

seconde thèse (la thèse internationaliste).Sir Humphrey Waldock, fut,pour sa part, à l'origine d'un compromis à dominante internationaliste.

Il fut suivi par la Commissionet enfin par les gouvernements dans leurs

observations.L'équilibrene fut plus rompu à la conférencede Vienne.

Désormais, lléconomie de l'article 46 est la suivante.

En principe, la violationdes règles constitutio~elles relatives au

pouvoir de conclure les traités ne peut être invoquée comme viciant le

consentementd'un Etat à être lié, à moins que - la formule négative a

été adoptée à dessein pour souligner le caractère exceptionnel de

l'hypothèseenvisagée - il s'agisse d'une violation manifesteconcernant

une règle interne d'importance fondamentale concernant la compétenc dee

conclure un traité.

C'est à cette aune qu'il nous faut maintenantmesurer le texte de

l'article 37 de la Constitution de Bahreinqui a été publiée dans le

Journal officiel de Bahrein du 26 mai 1973. La traduction française que

j'utilise et que je vais lire est tirée du Corpus constitutionnel,

supplément no 1, édité par Brill à Leiden en 1976, page 94:

"L'Emir conclura les traités par décret et les transmettra

immédiatement à l'Assembléenationale avec lerapport
approprié. Le traité n'aura force de loi qu'après avoir été
signé, ratifié et publié au Journalofficiel.

Cependant, les traités de paix et d'alliance, les traités

concernant le territoire de llEtat, ses ressources naturelles,
ses droits souverains, ou les droits publics ou priv6s des
citoyens, les traités de commerce, de navigation et de
résidence, et les traités qui entraînent des dépenses

supplémentairesqui ne sont pas prévues dans le budget de
l'Etat, ou qui impliquent une modification des lois de Bahrein,
n'entreront en vigueur que lorsqu'ilsauront fait l'objet d'une
loi.

L'argument de Bahrein peut se résumer de la manière suivante.Le

traité n'a été approuvé ni par décret ni par une loi. Il y a donc

violation de la constitutionde Bahrein, que le Qatar connaît fort bien - 55 -

puisqu'il y a échange entre les deux pays des journaux officiels. Le

ministre des affaires étrangères de Bahrein, qui connaît ses limites

constitutionnelles,n'aurait pas souscritun accord avec le Qatar sans

assurer le respect de sa constitution. La violation de la Constitutionde

Bahrein est donc manifeste.

Le Qatar a, de ce texte constitutionnel, une lecturetout à fait

différente de celle expriméedans les écritures de Bahrein. Le Qatar

soutient que Bahreïn fait une confusion entre la procédure relative à la

conclusion des traités,qui est régiepar le droit internationalpublic

et à laquelle le texte de l'article 37 ne fait aucune allusion, et la

procédure relative à 1 'introductiond'un traité en droit interne à

laquelle cetarticle est exclusivementconsacré.

L'article 37 ne traite, en effet, que des procédures d'introduction

du traité dans l'ordre juridique interne. Cette incorporationpeut

s'effectuersoit par décret de l'Emir, soit par une loi. Cette seconde

forme est réservée au: traités qui touchent les matières relevant de la

compétence de l'Assembléenationale.

Le contrôle parlementaire et démocratique établi par cet article n'a

cependant jamaisété ]usqutà subordonner le pouvoir de conclure de 1'Emir

à l'accord de cette Assemblée. On ne se trouve pas ici dans un cas - que

l'on trouve dans certaines constitutions - où le pouvoir de l'exécutif

serait partagé avec le législatif et où l'exécutifdevrait êtreautorisé

par une loid'habilitationpour pouvoir conclure internationalemenl te

traité. L'Assembléenationale n'a aucun rôle dans l'exercice du pouvoir

de conclure les traités, ni au stade de la négociation,ni au stade du

consentement à être lié. Les traités lui sontsimplement communiqués. - 56 -

Le vocabulaire de l'article 37 est lumineux. Il y est question pour

llEmir de conclure les traités"par décret", que le traité acquiert

"force de loiw après signature, ratificationet publication au Journal

officiel, de traités qui "n'entreronten vigueur que lorsqu'ils auront

fait l'objet d'une loi1'.Il est notoire, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs

de la Cour, que l'on ne conclut pas un traité internationalement par

décret publié au Journal officielou par une loi. Cette terminologieest

révélatrice qu'il s'agit d'actes de l'ordre juridique interne à des fins

propres à cet ordre. A supposer donc qu'il y ait eu, en l'espèce,

violation du texte del'article 37 de la Constitution, cette violationne

porterait pas sur le pouvoir de faire des traités mais sur leur

incorporationdans l'ordre interne.

La ratio legis de ce type de disposition,que l'on rencontre dans

bon nombre de constitutions,est d'assurer un contrôle par une assemblée

parlementaire,sans affecter la compétence externe de l'exécutif en

matière de conclusion des traités.

C'est donc un partage, mais cette fois-ci sous forme de contrôle

démocratique.

Mais ici, entre de discrètes parenthèses, Bahreïn signaleque

l'Assembléenationale a été dlssoute par un décret de 1'Emir de 1975,

no 14, et qu'une ordonnance no 4 de 1975 a transféré lespouvoirs de

l'Assembléenationale au Conseil desministres.

Dans le cas de Bahrein, ce contrôle législatifa été supprimé en

même temps quel'Assembléenationale.

Une telle dissolution de l'Assembléenationale, opéréeau demeurant

en contravention,semble-t-il,de la Constitution de Bahrein dans

plusieurs de ces articles, fut certes patente, mais elle n'affecte que le - 57 -

contrôle interne, sans toucher au pouvoir de faire les traités.Si l'on

devait considérer que ce contrôle était une condition de la conclusion

internationale des traités, Bahreinse serait trouvé depuis 1975 dans

l'impossibilité de conclure aucun traité requérant l'approbation

législative, ce que Bahreins'est bien gardé de soutenir.

Il en résulte toutefois qu'au moment des faits qui nous occupent la

séparation des pouvoirs proclamée à l'article 32 a) de la Constitution

n'existe plus. Le pouvoir législatifappartient à l'exécutif seul. La

différence entre décret et loi est doncdevenue purement formelle

puisqulellene recouvre plus aucun contrepoidsréel entre lespouvoirs.

A supposer donc que l'on considère l'accord de Doha comme un 'traité

concernant le territoire de llEtat, ses ressources naturellesou ses

droits souverainsv,le contrôle législatif estdésormais sans objet faute

d'organe pour l'exercer.

On soulignera en passant qu'il est d'ailleurs discutable que

l'accord de Doha tombe dans cette catégorie car si l'accord a pour objet

de faire trancherpar la Cour un différend entre lesdeux Etats sur des

questions de cette nature, il n'a aucun caractère constitutif. Selon la

doctrine dominante, un arrêt de la Cour en matière territoriale a un

caractère déclaratif des drolts des parties.

Selon l'article 32 b) de la Constitutionde~Bahrein "Le pouvoir

exécutif appartient à l'Emir, au Conseil des ministreset aux ministres".

Ceci est importanten l'espèce car, lors de la réunion du Conseil de la

coopération dans le Golfe a Doha, les personnes représentant Bahreïnet

ayant avalisé l'accord signé après trois joursde discussions difficiles

étaient le premier ministre représentant le chef de llEtat, le ministre

des affaires étrangeres et le ministre desaffaires juridiques,Dr. AlBaharna. On voit donc mal quel contrôlele pouvoir exécutifpourrait

avoir sur une telle délégation.A supposer qu'il y en ait un, encore une

fois, il serait, au demeurant, d'effet purement interne, leconsentement

de 1'Etat à l'accord ayant été valablement donnépar un organe engageant

1'Etat conformémentau droit international,c'est-à-dire à l'article 7 de

la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités.

Répondant à Qatar qui demandait où se situait la violation

manifeste, Bahreinse borne à répondre:

"la règle était d'importance fondamentale puisqu'elle était
incorporée dans la Constitutionde Bahreinn (contre-mémoirede
Bahrein, par. 6.98).

Cette réponseest assez inattendue. Toutd'abord parce qu'elle

confond "règle" et "violationde celle-ciu.Je ne peux pas résisterau

plaisir de citer ce que déclara à bon escient M. Jiménez de Aréchaga à la

Commission du droit international

"la condition poséepar l'article n'est pas que la disposition

de la constitutionnationale qui a été violée doit avoirété
'notoire' , mais que la violationparticulière d'une disposition
constitutio~elle doit avoir étémanifeste.Autrement dit,
c'est la violation concrèted'une dispositionconstitutionnelle

qui doit 6tre manifeste; ce n'est pas la disposition
constitutionnelleelle-même qui doit être notoire." (888e
séance, 12 juillet 1966,Annuaire, 1966, vol. 1, 2e partie,
p. 332-33, par. 84.)

Par ailleurs, si le slmple fait qu'une disposition soit incluse dans

la constitutionsuffisait à en faire une règled'importance fondamentale,

on voit mal ce qui resteraitdes limites que les rédacteursde la

conventionde Vienne sur le droit des traités ont entendu poseren

spécifiant qu'il devait s'agir des violations lesplus manifestes des

règles de son droit interned'importancefondamentale.

En prévoyant cetteexigence, les rédacteursde la conventionde

Vienne ont eu en vue la difficulté fréquentepour un Etat d'apprécier - 59 -

l'impact exact des prescriptionset des modifications constitutionnelles

d'un cocontractant. Toutd'abord, des textes, bien qu'utilisantdes

formules identiquesou similaires,peuvent avoir un sens différent d'un

pays à l'autre. D'autre part, la coutume constitutionnelle, sousla

pression des exigences des relations internationales, joue parfois un

rôle d'assouplissement considérable, notamment dans le domaine des

accords en forme simplifiée.

L'affaire soumise aujourd'hui à la Cour est une preuve de la sagesse

des rédacteurs de la convention de Vienne de 1969. A supposer en effet

qu'il y ait eu, en lloccurrence,une division du pouvoir de conclureles

traités entrel'exécutif et le législatif,ce qui, en l'espèce, on l'a

vu, n'est pas le cas, que peut faire 1'Etat cocontractantd'un Etat qui

supprime le contrepoids législatifen violation apparentede sa

constitution? Monsieurle Président,Messieurs de la Cour, on l'a dit et

répété les Etats sont des monstres froids. Ils traitent avec ceux qui

sont au pouvoir à peine de ne pouvoir conclure avecpersonne. Toute

remarque sur les modifications constitutionnelle du cocontractant,comme

l'a relevé la Commission du droit international (Annuaire, 1966, II,

p. 263, par. 8) et quci qx'en prétende Bahreïn (par. 5.61 de sa

duplique), risquerait d'ailleursd'être considérée comme une immixtion

inadmissible dansles affaires intérieuresde 1'Etat qui a pris ces

initiativeset ne faciliteraitpas les rapports conventionnels.Le seul

risque d'une telle attitude est que la violation de la constitutionsoit

invoquée par un pouvoir autrement composé du point de vue politique, mais

certainementpas par le gouvernementqui a lui-même violé sa propre

constitution. Mais, encore une fois, on n'est pas ici dans cette hypothèse.Si un

décret ou une loi, ou leur publication au Journal officielde Bahrein,

sont requis par le droit interne de Bahrein à des fins de cet ordre

juridique, ces exigences sont entre les mains de l'exécutif qui a

souscrit le traité. La difficulté de droit interne soulevéepar Bahrein

est donc le résultatde sa propre inaction.Comme le relevait à bon

escient la Commission du droit international:

"chaque fois qu'il y a inobservation de prescriptions

constitutionnelles lors dela conclusion d'un traité, la
responsabilitéen incombe de toute évidenceau gouvernement de
1'Etat intéresséu (Annuaire, 1966, vol. II, p. 263, par. 8).

Il en résulte Monsieur lePrésident,Messieurs de la Cour, qu'aux

yeux du Qatar Bahreinn'a pas apporté la moindre preuve qu'il y aurait

eu, en l'occurrence,violation manifeste d'une disposition d'importance

fondamentalede son droit interne concernant la compétencepour conclure

les traités et que par conséquent, le consentementdonné par le ministre

des affaires étrangères de Bahreïn est parfaitement valableet la

validité de l'accord de Doha n'est en rien entamée.

Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, le conseil du

Gouvernement du Qatar vous exprime sa reconnaissance pour la

bienveillante attentionque vous avez bien voulu lui prêter. Il vous

serait reconnaissant,Monsieur le Président,de bien vouloir accorder

maintenant la parole à M. le Professeur Jean-Pierre~uéneudec qui doit

poursuivre les arguments du Qatar.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup ProfesseurSalmon. Je donne la parole

au professeur Jean-Pierre ~uéneudec. - 61 -

M. QUENEUDEC : Monsieur le Président, Messieursles Juges,

L~i~t~~ét~ti~~ de 1l~~~~~d de Dob

C'est un honneur que d'apparaîtreune nouvelle fois devant la Cour

et de vous présenter les argumentsqui, selon 1'Etat du Qatar, militent

en faveur de votre compétence pourconnaître des différends qui

l'opposent à 1'Etat de Bahrein.

Mon intervention sera consacrée à l'interprétationdu texte signé à

Doha par les deux Etats le 25 décembre 1990, lequel constitue, commel'a

montré sir Ian Sinclair,un véritable accord international comportand tes

engagements juridiquesde la part des signataireset doit être regardé

comme un traité en vigueur, au sens de l'article 36 du Statut.

Avant d'aborder le problème de l'interprétation proprementdite, il

paraît toutefois nécessaire d'attirer l'attentionde la Cour sur la

confusion entre les problèmes de compétence et de saisine que Bahreïna

introduite dansle débat. Une miseau point préalable s'impose à ce

sujet.

1. Compétence et saisine de la Cour

Le Gouvernement de Bahreïn conteste la compétence de votre haute

juridictionpour connaître du différend porté devant vous pal re Qatar,

en prétendant essentiellement qu'il n'a jamais consenti à ce que la Cour

puisse être saisiede cette affaire par voie de requête unilatérale

Le coeur de la thèse de Bahreïn surce point tient tout entier dans

la phrase suivante de sa dernière pièceécrite:

"In the absence of clear evidence of agreement orconsent
by Bahrain that the Courtshould possessjurisdictionon the
basis of a unilateral application,the Court has no
jurisdictionon that basis." (Duplique,par. 5.24, p. 36.) - 62 -

Cette phrase est soulignéedans le texte de la duplique de Bahrein,

afin d'en montrer toute l'importance.

Elle est importanteen effet. Elle démontreon ne peut plus

clairement que la Partie adversemaintient constamment une confusion

entre les problèmes de compétence et de saisine de la Cour.

Plus précisément, Bahreintend à faire comme si la compétencede la

Cour dépendait du mode de saisine, alors que l'on s'accorde généralement

pour recomaître que la saisine n'est possible que s'il existe

préalablement une base de compétence - exception faitede la situationde

forum prorogatum où la compétencesuit la saisine.

Dans ces conditions,on ne saurait parler, commele fait Bahrein, de

la compétence de la Cour sur la base d'une requête unilatérale -

"jurisdictionon the basis of a unilateralapplicationu - et dire que la

Cour n'a pas compétencesur cette base; car la base de compétencede la

Cour ne réside pas ici dans la requête unilatérale déposéepar le Qatar.

La compétence de la Cour en l'espèce repose sur l'accord des deux Etats,

qui ont accepté l'obligationde soumettre leur différend à la Cour.

Sans doute existe-t-ilun lien assez étroit entre les problèmes de

compétence et de salsine, lorsqu'uneexception préliminaire

d'incompétence vient ouvrir une procédure incidente,ou bien - comme

c'est le cas dans la présente affaire - lorsqu'ila été décidé que la

première phase del'affaireporterait sur la compétence de la Cour et la

recevabilitéde la requête.

Il n'en demeure pas moins cependant qu'il s'agit de deux problèmes

de nature différente.La question de la compétenceest régie uniquement

par le chapitre II du Statut de la Cour (art. 34 à 38). Au contraire, la

question de la saisine, en tant que question de procédure, relève à la - 63 -

fois du chapitre III du Statut (plus précisémentde l'article 40) et du

titre III, section C, sous-section 1, du Règlement de la Cour, où les

articles 38 à 43 sont consacrés à l'introductionde l'instance.

S'il en est ainsi, c'est parce que la compétencede la Cour dépend

de la volonté desparties - hormis, bien sûr, les cas particuliers des

recours en interprétationou en revision d'un arrêt ou des demandes

d'intervention.Et l'on doit rappeler à ce sujet que, selon le Statut,

l'expressionde cette volonté des parties n'est nullement assujettie à

une quelconque conditionde forme, comme l'avait souligné la Cour

permanente en 1928 dans l'affaire des Droits de minorités en Haute-

Silésie (écolesminoritaires) ,arrêt no 12, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A no 15,

p. 23.

Quant au mode de saisine - notificationd'un compromis ou requête -

il n'a pas nécessairementla même base volontariste.Le mode de saisine

peut certes être convenu entre les parties;mais, en l'absence d'accord

entre elles sur ce point, comme c'est le cas dans la présente affaire, il

appartient à la Cour d'apprécier la régularitéde la saisine, parce que

le mode de soumissiond'une affaire à la Cour est réglé par les textes

régissant son fonctionnement.

L'appréciationde la régularitéde l'acte introductif d'instance

consiste alors à vérifier, comme cela avait été fait dans l'affaire du

Détroit de Corfou, C.I.J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 28, que tel mode de

saisine n'est pas exclu par'un texte obligatoire pourles parties en

cause.

A la lumière de cette observation préliminaire,il est possible de

dire que le Qatar a pu valablement porterla présente affairedevant la

Cour par une requête introductived'instance,parce que la saisine - 64 -

unilatérale apparaît commele corollaire inéluctablede la compétence

obligatoire. Pour qu'une telle saisine soitpossible, il faut que les

intéressés aient accepté la juridiction de la Cour mais il
deux Etats

suffit que cette possibiliténe soit pas expressémentou implicitement

exclue par les textes luiconférant compétence obligatoire.

Dès lors, si le Qatar a pu valablement saisir la Cour par voie de

requête unilatérale, c'est parce que la compétence de la Courétait

définitivement acceptée par les deuxEtats en cause et parce que ce mode

de saisine n'était pas exclu par les textes pertinentsen l'espèce, même

si ces textes ne l'avaientpas expressément prévu.

C'est ce que je voudrais maintenant m'attacher à démontrer à travers

l'examen de la question relative à l'interprétationde l'accord de Doha

de 1990.

A cette fin, il n'est peut-être pas inutilede commencerpar

rappeler la manière dont nous concevons l'application enl'espèce de la

règle générale qui prévaut en matière d'interprétation,dans la mesure où

Bahrein n'a pas hésité, dans ses pièces écrites, à prendre quelques

libertés avec les normes les mieux établiesen matière d'interprétation.

Puis il conviendra d'examiner la significationqui s'attache aux termes

employés dans l'accord de Doha, et dont nous verrons qu'elle conduit à la

conclusion selon laquellela Cour est compétentepour connaître de la

requête du Qatar. 11 ne restera plusqu'à vérifier si cetteconclusion

est confirmée lorsque l'on prend en considérationles circonstances de

l'élaborationde cet accord. - 65 -

2. L'application de la règle généraledlinterprétation

Afin d'interpréterl'accord de 1990, il est à la fois nhcessaire et

suffisant, ici aussi, de s'en tenir à la règle générale d'interprétation

énoncée à l'article 31 de la conventionde Vienne sur le droit des

traités.

Une telle démarcheest ici d'autantplus indispensableque chacun

sait, depuis l'arrêt de la Cour permanente dans l'affairedes Zones

franches de la Haute-Savoieet du Pays de Gex, que ctoute clause

prévoyant la juridictionde la Cour doit êtreinterprétéestrictement,

(C.P.J.I. série A/B no 46, p. 138-139).

Toutefois, chacun sait aussi que l'interprétationstricte d'une

clause de juridiction nepeut pas conduire à une interprétation

restrictivequi aboutirait à ce que l'interprèteresterait en deçà de ce

qui est prévu ou autorisé par les termes employés dans le texte prévoyant

la soumissiondu différend à la Cour

En effet, selon la belle formule de CharlesDe Visscher :

«Le juge international respecte une volonté qus ie
restreint; il est sans complaisance pour une souverainetq éui
se dérobe. » (Problèmesd'interprétationjudiciaire en droit

internationalpublic, 1963, p. 201. )

Or, il semble que Bahrein tente aujourd'huide çe dérober à un

engagement préalablementsouscrit. Cette tentative de se soustraire à la

juridiction dela Cour est menée en se fondant sur les intentions qui

auraient été celles des représentants deBahreïn lors de la réunion de

Doha en décembre 1990. Ceux-ci n'auraientpas eu, nous dit-on,

l'intentionde conclureun accord juridiquementobligatoire,et encore

moins celle de permettrela saisine de la Cour sur la base du texte

adopté à cette occasion - 66 -

Mais c'est oublier qu'un accord entre Etatsne se fait pas

nécessairement sur les intentionsde telle ou telle partie, mais

uniquement sur une formulationécrite de ce qui apparaît comme

l'expressionde la commune intention des auteurs du texte. C'est

pourquoi l'interprétationd'un accord doit avant tout s'attacher à la

manifestation de la volonté concordantedes Parties telle qu'elle est

exprimée dans le texte del'accord. Cette volonté commune ou concordante

n'est pas nécessairement le refletmécanique de deux intentions

rigoureusementidentiques,mais elle peut apparaître comme le produit OU

la résultante d'intentionsplus ou moins divergentes à l'origine. Aussi

ne peut-on se fier à l'intentionprimitive des Parties, ou a fortiori de

l'une des Parties, car cela reviendrait à supposer ou à présumer que-

cette intention était unique; ce qui, on en conviendra,n'est pas

toujours le cas le plus fréquent. On ne saurait doncs'attacher aux

arrière-penséesdes négociateurset leur donner la préférence sur ce que

ces mêmes négociateurs ont décidé d'exprimer dans le texte qu'ils ont

signé, c'est-à-diresur une volonté qu'ils ont extériorisée.

Dans ces conditions, le point de départ de toute opération

d'interprétationest le texte lui-même, tel qu'il a été rédigé. La Cour

l'a encore rappelétout récemment dansl'affaire du Différend

territorial : *L'interprétationdoit être fondée avant toutsur le texte

du traité lui-même.> (Arrêtdu 3 février 1994, par. 41.) La soumission

au texte n'est en effet pas autre chose quela soumission à l'expression

la plus directe de la volonté des parties.

Cette prlmauté du texte, dans laquellePaul Reuter voyait *la règle

cardinale de toute interprétations (Introduction au droit des traités,

2e éd., Paris, 1985, p. 851, revêt une importanced'autant plus grande - 67 -

que le texte à interpréter fondeici la compétence de la Cour, dont ala

juridictionn'existe que dans les termes où elle a été acceptée,, selon

la formule utilisée parla Cour permanentedans l'affaire des Phosphates

du Maroc, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 74, p. 23-24.

Partir du texte, ce n'est cependant pas, comme le faitBahrein,

isoler une ou deux expressions dansun texte rédigé en langue arabe pour

tenter d'identifier la ou les formules qui reflètentle mieux en anglais

ou en français le véritable sens des termes arabes utilisés

(contre-mémoirede Bahreïn, par. 6.8, p. 54). Partir du texte, ce n'est

pas davantagevouloir déterminerson effet en considérant uniquement

l'interprétationde quelques mots qui y ont été introduits à l'initiative

de Bahreïn notamment.

La jurisprudence internationale, et celle de la Cour en particulier,

a eu l'occasion à maintes reprisesde soulignerque, dans tout processus

d'interprétation,le sens d'un mot ou d'une expression ne saurait être

déterminé isolément,car un mot «tire son sens du contexte danslequel il

est employé* (Compositiondu Comité de la sécurité maritime de

llOrganisationintergouvernementale consultative de la navigation

maritime, C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 158), et lorsque la convention de

Vienne sur le drolt des traités pose la règle qu'il convient de suivre le

sens ordinaire destermes, elle précise en même temps que ce sens est à

attribuer aux termes pris dansleur contexte.

11 paraît ici nécessaire de souligner que lecontexte strictosensu,

tel qu'il est défini dans l'article 31, paragraphe 2, de la convention de

Vierne, n'est toutefo~spas ce que Bahreïn appelle, dans ses écritures

(contre-mémoirede Bahrein, par. 6.68-6.74, p. 82-84; duplique de

Bahrein, par. 5.42-5.48, p. 45-49), "le contexte général du procès-verbal - 68 -

de 1990"; car les éléments qui sont invoqués à ce titre par Bahrein

concernent en réalité les circonstances dela conclusion de l'accord de

Doha. Il s'agit là, non du contexte auquel la convention de Vienne

assigne un rôle spécifique dans le processusd'interprétation,mais d'un

moyen complémentaire, extérieurau texte, et permettant de vérifieret de

confirmer, le cas échéant, l'interprétationselon le sens ordinaire,

comme nous le verrons ultérieurement

De plus, contrairement à la prétention de Bahrein, (contre-mémoire

de Bahrein, par. 6.29, p. 63-64; duplique de Bahrein, par. 5.18,

p. 32-33), faire référenceau contexte, ce n'est pas replacer le texte

signé à Doha dans le cadre de prétendus aaccordss qui seraient intervenus

préalablement entre les Parties quant à la conclusion d'un compromis et

quant à la soumission conjointede leur différend à la Cour.

L'article 31, paragraphe 2, de la convention de Vienne n'envisage, comme

faisant partiedu contexte ou lui étant rattachés, que les instruments

établis à l'occasion de la conclusion de l'accord à interpréter. Ce qui

n'est évidemment pas le cas des sol-disant accords préalablesinvoqués

par Bahrein. Nous aurons égalementl'occasionde revenir sur ce point

Faire appel aucontexte, c'est envisager lesdiverses dispositions

de l'accord en les considérant dans leurs rapportsentre elles. Ce que le

Tribunal arbitralchargé de 1 'interprétation de 1'accord aérien du

27 mars 1946 entre les Etats-Unis et la France explicitaitdans sa

sentence du 22 décembre 1963 :

"L'interprétation,en tant qu'opérationlogique visant à
établir avec le maximum de certitude l'intentioncommune des

Parties, ne saurait parvenir à fixer le sens à attribuer à un
terme figurant dans une clause du traité que dans lecadre et
en fonction de la clause tout entière. A son tour, une clause doit être interprétée par référence au contenu du traité pris
dans sa totalité ..." (RSA, vol. XVI, p. 11-71; RGDIP, 1965,

p. 189-260, à la page 230).

Le contexte interdit doncd'examiner isolément une disposition, en

la séparant de l'ensemble dont elle fait partie.

Il s'agit en quelque sorte de ce que le regretté Mustafa Kamil

Yasseen appelait "la règle de l'examen global" ("L'interprétationdes

traités d'après la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités", RCADI,

vol. 151, p. 36). Et, dans le cours qu'il avait donné à l'Académiede

droit internationalde La Haye sur 11interpr6tationdes traités,

l'éminent juriste arabe insistaitsur le fait que le sens ordinaired'un

terme employédans un traité ne peut pas être conçu dans l'abstrait;car,

disait-il, il s'agit "d'un sens ordinaire concret qui ne peut être

discerné que parl'examen du terme en question dans le contextede ce

terme et à la lumière de l'objet et du but du traité" (ibid., p. 26).

Cet examen global du texte, en effet, ne peut lui-même se faire

qu'en ne perdant jamaisde vue l'objet et le but de l'accord, c1est-à-

dire en prenant en considérationl'éclairageprojeté par les finalités

d'un texte sur l'interprétationde celui-ci.

Dans l'affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries, la Cour

avait ainsi accordéune place nonnégligeable à l'examen de l'objet et du

but d'un échange de notes entre le Royaume-Uniet l'Islande, en vue de

déterminer s'il existait une volonté communedes parties de reconnaître

la compétence de la Cour (Compétence en matière de pêcheries, C.I.J.

Recueil 1973, p. 17, par. 32).

Si l'on cherche à déterminer l'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha,

la question essentielle est celle de savoir ce que les parties ont voulu

atteindre dans les limites des dispositionsqu'elles ont formulées. - 70 -

Selon Bahrein, le texte adopté à Doha n'aurait eu d'autre but que de

mettre un terme à une initiativeintempestiveet malencontreuse prisepar

le Qatar à l'ouverturede la réunion du Conseil de coopérationdu Golfe,

sans pour autant faire perdre laface à l'auteur de cette initiative.

Quant à son objet, le texte en cause se serait borné,aux dires de

Bahrein, à enregistrer l'acceptationpar le Qatar de la "Bahraini

formulaw;et les deux parties seraient simplement convenues de prendre

les mesures en découlant pour pouvoir ensuite soumettre leur litige à la

Cour par voie de compromis.

Mais si l'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha se résumaient à cela,

le texte aurait fort bien pu avoir un libellé extrêmement simple.11

aurait alors suffi, par exemple, d'avoir un paragraphe ainsi rédigé:

"Le Qatar a accepté la formule bahreïniteet les deux
Parties poursuivront leursefforts pour conclure un compromis
en vue de saisir la Cour internationalede Justice."

Il ne s'agit pas là d'une caricature; car telle est bien, au fond,

la position que soutient Bahreïn

Or, cela revient à considérer que certaines dispositions de l'accord

de Doha devraient être tenuespour des dispositions inexistantes ou non

avenues qui n'auraientpas été réellement voulues par les auteurs du

texte. En particulier, que devient la référence,qui est faite dans le

texte, au mois de mai 1991 ? Le membre de phrase "A l'expirationde ce

délai" n'aurait plus aucune signification.Il en serait de même de la

clause prévoyant la poursuite desbons offices de l'Arabie saoudite

pendant la soumission de l'affaire à la Cour, ainsi que de la disposition

faisant obligation aux Partiesde retirer l'affairedu règlement

juridictionnelen cas de solutionamiable. - 71 -

L'objet et le but de l'accord de Doha, tels qu'ils se dégagent du

texte même de l'accord,ne peuvent doncpas se limiter à ce que Bahrein

prétend qu'ils sont, sinon on aboutit à une interprétationdu texte qui

ne permet pas-de donner à toutes ses dispositions,sans exception, la

portée et l'effet qui sont normalementles leurs.

L'accord de Doha vise, en réalité, à permettre la mise en oeuvre de

l'obligation que les deuxEtats avaient antérieurement contractée dans le

cadre de la médiation de l'Arabie saoudite.Le préambule de l'accord

situe d'ailleurscelui-ci "dans le cadre des bons offices du roi Fahd Ben

Abdul Aziz, Gardien des deux saintes Mosquées"

Il convient de rappeler à ce sujet que l'un des principes approuvés

dans le cadre de la médiation en 1983 avait prévu qu'en cas d'échec des

négociationspour régler le différend,

"les gouvernements des deux payss'attacheront,en consultation

avec le Gouvernementde l'Arabie saoudite, à déterminer les
meilleurs moyensde régler laditeou lesdites questions, sur la
base des dispositi~nsdu droit international. La décisionque
prendra l'instance cholsie d'un commun accord à cette fin sera

définitive et obligatoire."

Devant l'impossibilitéde parvenlr à une solution négociéeentre les

deux parties, le médiateur entrepriten 1987 de mettre enoeuvre le

principe en question. 11 formula dlverses propositions concernant la

procédure à suivre, et ces propositions, acceptéespar les deux Etats,

ont constitué l'accord de 1987, qui comporte notammentl'engagement

suivant :

"Toutes les questions en litige seront soumises à la Cour
internationale deJustice, à La Haye, pour qu'elle rende une

décision définitive et obligatoirepour les deux Parties, qui
devront en exécuter lesdispositions." - 72 -

Dès ce moment-là, les deux Etats avaient ainsi consenti à soumettre

leurs différendsau jugement de la Cour, sans toutefoisse mettre

explicitementd'accord sur la manière d'approcher la Cour.

Eu égard à son contenu, l'accord de Doha a eu manifestementpour

objet et pour but, d'une part, d'englober dans une référence générale à

la "formule bahreiniteu les questionsen litige qui pouvaient être

déférées à la Cour et, d'autre part, de préciser la date à partir de

laquelle la Cour pouvaitêtre saisie.

L'accord de Doha se présente donc comme un instrumentpermettant, à

partir de la date qu'il fixe, c'est-à-dire à partir du mois demai 1991,

la réalisation complète de l'engagement souscrit par les deux Etats en

1987.

L'engagement contenu dans l'accord de 1987 constitue, à n'en pas

douter, une règle particulièrementpertinente aux fins de

l'interprétationde l'accord de Doha. Il y a là une "règle pertinente de

droit internationalapplicable dans les relations entre les parties", au

sens de l'article 31, paragraphe 3, alinéa c), de la convention de Vienne

sur le droit des traités, dont il doit être tenu compte en même temps que

du contexte.

C'est pourquoi, lorsque le Qatar affirme quel'accord de Doha

rendait possible la saisine de la Cour conformément à l'article 40 du

Statut, on est fondé à considérer quel'interprétationainsi retenue est

celle qui répond le mieux à l'objet et au but de cet accord et celle qui

est en même temps la plus propre à réaliser cetobjectif.

De surcroît, une telle interprétationest celle qui tient le plus

compte de l'unité fondamentalede tout processus interprétatif.Celui-ci, - 73 -

en effet, constitue un véritable creuset où viennent se fondre les

différents éléments mentionnés à l'article 31 de la conventionde Vienne.

C'est en faisant applicationde cette démarche qu'ilest possible de

déterminer le sens véritable et la portée exactedu texte de l'accord du

25 décembre 1990.

Monsieur le Président,j'en viens donc à présent à l'examen de la

signification des termes de l'accord de Doha.

3. La signification des termes de l'accord de Doha

Dans la réplique qu'il avait présentée à la Cour, le Qatar avait

pris soin d'analyser,paragraphe par paragraphe, l'ensembledu texte

signé à Doha. La dupliqueprésentée par Bahrein a été beaucoupplus

sélective sur ce point et s'est bornée - pour l'essentiel - à reprendre

le schéma et le contenu de soncontre-mémoire.

Aussi, sans nécessairement revenirsur tout ce qui se trouve à ce

sujet dans nos piècesécrites, convient-ilnéanmoins de rappeler les

termes qui composentchacun des deux premiers paragraphes de l'accord de

Doha. Le troisième paragraphepeut être laissé de côté, dans la mesure où

il n'y a pas vraiment de divergence entre lesParties quant à son

interprétation.Mals il est évident que l'interprétationdes deux

premiers paragraphescioittenir compte de l'existencede ce troisième

paragraphe en tant qu'élément du texte dans son ensemble.

A. Le premier paragraphe de l'accord tend à "réaffirmerce dont

les deux partiessont convenues précédemment".

A en croire Bahreïn, par cette disposition,les deux Etats auraient

purement et simplement réaffirmé en 1990 'a course of conductu visant à

l'élaborationd'un compromis et à une saisine de la Cour par voie de - 74 -

notification conjointede ce compromis (contre-mémoire de Bahrein, p. 62,

par. 6.27). Selon la Partie adverse, le texte adopté à Doha se situerait

donc dans la suite logiquede la Commission tripartitequi avait été

constituée en 1987 et dont il viserait en quelque sorte à poursuivre les

travaux .

Une telle attitude passecomplètement soussilence le fait que cette

commission avait échoué danssa tâche et que, conformément à l'annonce

faite par le prince Saud le 5 novembre 1988, elle était arrivée au terme

de son mandat à la fin de l'année 1988. Elle aurait certespu être

reconstituée, avec sansdoute un mandat différent etplus spécifique,en

vertu d'un accord exprèsde toutes les parties intéressées. Mais aucun

accord de ce type n'a été consignédans le texte adopté à Doha, qui ne

fait d'ailleurs aucunemention de la Commission tripartite.

En raison de la généralité de la formulationdu premier paragraphe

de l'accord, on ne peut certainement pas interpréter celui-ci comme le

fait Bahreïn et prétendre que cette disposition fait renvoi à un

engagement qu'auraientcontracté les deux Etats de conclure un compromis.

Sans doute, la voie de l'élaborationd'un compromis a-t-elle été explorée

dans le cadre de la Commission tripartite; mais, outre lefait que cette

tentative n'a pas pu aboutir, il convient de souligner que l'accord de

1987 ne fixait pas la manière dont les parties devraient approcher la

Cour et n'édictait aucune obligation de conclure un compromis. Il se

bornait à prévoir la création d'une commission composéede représentants

des deux Etats en litigeet de l'Arabie saoudite, en vue dl

"entrer en rapport avec la Cour internationale deJustice et
d'accomplir les formalitésrequises pour que le différend soit
soumis à la Cour conformément à son Règlement ..." - 75 -

Il est évident quele premier paragraphede l'accord de 1990 ne peut

pas être regardécomme réaffirmantla dispositionde l'accord de 1987,

relative à la Commission tripartite, puisquecelle-ci avait cessé de

fonctionner. On doit donc considérer quela disposition de l'accord de

1987 concernant cettecommission est, de ce fait, devenue obsolète.

A fortiori en est-,ilde même de ce qui avait été convenu dansle

déroulementdes travaux de cette commission,contrairement à ce que

Bahrein prétend danssa duplique (par. 5.18, p. 32-33).

En particulier, le fait que les deux Etats étaient convenus, à un

moment donné, de tenter d'élaborerun compromis ne saurait être regardé

comme un engagement définitifde leur part d'envisager exclusivement une

soumission conjointedu différend à la Cour au moyen d'un compromis; car

ce n'était qu'une des voies possibles. On peut, de surcroît, noter que,

même si un compromisavait été conclu, cela n'aurait pas nécessairement

conduit à une notification conjointedudit compromis.

En outre, après l'échec de la tentative d'élaborationd'un compromis

et à la suite de l'expirationdu mandat de la Commission tripartite,il

est tout de même diffkile de concevoir que les accords partiels

intervenus entreles participants à cette commissionont été en quelque

sorte réactivésou réaffirmés par le texte de l'accord de Doha. Une telle

position ignorerait lefait que ces "accords partiels"étaient intervenus

dans le cadre et à propos des travaux dela commission tripartite et

qu'ils ont donc perdu tout intérêtet toute pertinence dès lors quecette

commissionavait cessé de fonctionneret d'exister.

Qui plus est, cela revientou reviendrait à réduire le texte de

l'accord de Doha à son premier paragraphe, c'est-à-dire à détacher

totalement ce paragraphe de son contexte. - 76 -

Or, nous l'avons vu, aux fins de l'interprétationde la disposition

contenue dans le premier paragraphe,celui-ci doit être replacédans le

contexte de l'ensembledes dispositionsde l'accord. Il apparaît alors

que la position adoptéepar Bahrein sur ce point est difficilement

compatible avec les autres dispositions contenuesdans l'accord de Doha,

en particulier avec la fixationd'une date limite à partir de laquelle

l'affaire pouvait être déférée à la Cour.

Le sens naturel et ordinaire des termes employésdans ce premier

paragraphe, replacés dans leur contexteet entendus à la lumière de

l'objet et du but de l'accord, conduit à dire que la réaffirmationde ce

qui avait été préalablement convenu entre les deux Etatsn'est rien

d'autre qu'une référence aux principes sur lesquels les parties s'étaient

mises d'accord antérieurementquant au mode de règlementde leurs

différends; ce que confirment d'ailleurs les termes du préambule de

l'accord situant celui-ci "dans le cadre des bons officesdu roi Fahd".

L'interprétationcorrecte de cette disposition conduit à y voir en

réalité une double référence. Il s'agit, pour partie,d'un renvoi au

principe adopté en 1983 dans le cadre de la médiation, qui prévoyait le

règlement du litige par une instance choisie d'un commun accord et

statuant sur la base du droit international. Mais il s'agit aussi plus

particulièrementd'une référence à l'accord intervenu en 1987 qui

prévoyait ensuite que "toutes les questions en litige serontsoumises à

la Cour internationalede Justice".

Comme le Qatar a déjà eu l'occasionde le rappeler dans ses

écritures, cette interprétationse trouve confirmée par les circonstances

dans lesquelles a été conclu l'accord de 1990. Dans la dernière partie du

présent exposé, nous reviendronssur ce caractèreconfirmatif de l'examen - 77 -

des circonstancesentourant l'accordde Doha. Il suffit pour l'instantde

noter que si la disposition du premier paragraphe de l'accordde Doha se

présente comme un rappel de la teneur des engagements pris par lesdeux

parties quant- à la soumission du litige à la Cour, c'est essentiellement

parce qu'un tel rappel est apparu à l'époque d'autantplus nécessaire

qu'à l'ouverturede la réunion du Conseil de coopérationdu Golfe à Doha

en décembre 1990, le premier ministre de Bahrein, qui représentait1'Emir

de Bahrein à cette réunion, avait semblé vouloir remettreen cause

l'engagementqu'avait souscritson Etat d'aller devant la Cour (réplique,

par. 3.58, p. 35-36).

Ces différentes raisons mènent à la conclusion que le premier

paragraphe de l'accord de Doha doit être interprété commeréaffirmant.ou

confirmant,purement et simplement, l'acceptation dela juridiction de la

Cour par les deux Etats.

Monsieur le Président, si la Cour en est d'accord, je pourrais

arrêter ici mon exposé et poursuivre à l'audience de demain matin la

présentationde l'interprétationdu deuxième paragraphe de l'accord de

Doha.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Professeur Quéneudec. La Cour

ajourne ses travaux et les reprendra demain matin à 10 heures.

L'audience est levée à 13 h 01.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Tuesday 1 March 1994, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

Links