Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
By a letter dated 7 August 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Registry Decision 1998/297 of 5 August 1998, by which the Economic and Social Council requested the Court for an advisory opinion on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, and on the legal obligations of Malaysia in that case. The Special Rapporteur, Mr. Cumaraswamy, was facing several lawsuits filed in Malaysian courts by plaintiffs who asserted that he had used defamatory language in an interview published in a specialist journal and who were seeking damages for a total amount of US$112 million. However, according to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Cumaraswamy had been speaking in his official capacity as Special Rapporteur and was thus immune from legal process by virtue of the above-mentioned Convention.
Written statements having been filed by the Secretary-General and by various States, public sittings were held on 7, 8 and 10 December 1998, during which the Court heard oral statements by the representative of the United Nations and three States, including Malaysia. In its Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, having concluded that it had jurisdiction to render such an opinion, the Court noted that a Special Rapporteur entrusted with a mission for the United Nations must be regarded as an expert on mission within the meaning of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. It observed that Malaysia had acknowledged that Mr. Cumaraswamy was an expert on mission and that such experts enjoyed the privileges and immunities provided for under the Convention in their relations with States parties, including those of which they were nationals. The Court then considered whether the immunity applied to Mr. Cumaraswamy in the specific circumstances of the case. It emphasized that it was the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, who had the primary responsibility and authority to assess whether its agents had acted within the scope of their functions and, where he so concluded, to protect those agents by asserting their immunity. The Court observed that, in the case concerned, the Secretary-General had been reinforced in his view that Mr. Cumaraswamy had spoken in his official capacity by the fact that the contentious Article several times explicitly referred to his capacity as Special Rapporteur, and that in 1997 the Commission on Human Rights had extended his mandate, thereby acknowledging that he had not acted outside his functions by giving the interview. Considering the legal obligations of Malaysia, the Court indicated that, when national courts are seised of a case in which the immunity of a United Nations agent is in issue, they must immediately be notified of any finding by the Secretary-General concerning that immunity and that they must give it the greatest weight. Questions of immunity are preliminary issues which must be expeditiously decided by national courts in limine litis. As the conduct of an organ of a State, including its courts, must be regarded as an act of that State, the Court concluded that the Government of Malaysia had not acted in accordance with its obligations under international law in the case concerned.
This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.